

THE
HISTORY
OF THE
WORLD,
IN FIVE BOOKS.

By Sir WALTER RALEGH, Kt.

The ELEVENTH EDITION, *printed from a Copy revis'd by HIMSELF.*

To which is PREFIX'D,

The LIFE of the AUTHOR,

NEWLY COMPIL'D,

From Materials more ample and authentick than have yet been publish'd;

By Mr. OLDYS.

Also his TRIAL, with some Additions:

TOGETHER WITH

A new and more copious INDEX to the whole WORK.

VOLUME II.

L O N D O N :

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and J. and R. TONSON.

M DCC XXXVI.



THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD:

INTREATING of the
*Times from the Destruction of JERUSALEM to
the Time of PHILIP of MACEDON.*

The THIRD BOOK.

C H A P. I.

*Of the Time passing between the Destruction of Jerusalem, and
the Fall of the Assyrian Empire.*

S E C T. I.

Of the connection of sacred and prophane history.



THE course of time; which in prophane histories might rather be discerned thro' the greatest part of his way, hitherto passed in some outworn foot-steps, than in any beaten path, having once in Greece by the Olympiads, and in the eastern countries by the account from Nabonassar, left surer marks, and more applicable to actions concurrent, than were the war of Troy, or any other token of former date; begins at length in the ruin of Jerusalem to discover the connection of antiquity fore-spent, with the story of succeeding ages. Manifest it is, that the original and progress of things could ill be sought in those that were ignorant of the first creation: as likewise that the affairs of kingdoms

and empire afterwards grown up are not to be found among those, that have now no state nor policy remaining of their own. Having therefore pursued the story of the world unto that age, from whence the memory of succeeding accidents is with little interruption of fabulous discourse derived unto us, I hold it now convenient briefly to shew, by what means and circumstances the history of the Hebrews, which of all other is the most ancient, may be conjoined with the following times, wherein that image of sundry metals, discovered by God unto Nebuchadnezzar, did reign over the earth, when Israel was either none, or an unregarded nation.

Herein I do not hold it needful, to insist upon those authorities, which give, as it were by hearsay, a certain year of some old Assyrian king unto some

some action or event, whereof the time is found expressed in scripture: for together with the end of *Ninus's* line in *Sardanapalus*, if not before, all such computations were blotted out; the succession of *Belochus* and his issue that occupied the kingdom afterwards, depending upon the uncertain relations of such, as were neither constant in assigning the years of his beginning, nor of credit enough for others to rely upon. Let it therefore suffice, that the consent and harmony, which some have found in the years of those overworn monarchs, doth preserve their names, which otherwise might have been forgotten. Now concerning the later kings of that nation, howsoever it be true that we find the names of all or most of them in scriptures, which are recorded by prophane historians, yet hereby could we only learn in what age each of them lived, but not in what year his reign began or ended, were it not that the reign of *Nebuchadnezzar* is more precisely applied to the times of *Jehoiakim* and *Zedekiah*. Hence have we the first light whereby to discover the means of connecting the sacred and prophane histories. For under *Nebuchadnezzar* was the beginning of the captivity of *Juda*, which ended when 70 years were expired; and these 70 years took end at the first of *Cyrus*, whose time being well known, affords us means of looking back into the ages past, and forwards into the race of men succeeding. The first year of *Cyrus's* reign in *Persia*, by general consent, is joined with the first year of the 55th *Olympiad*, where, that he reigned 23 years before his monarchy, and 7 years afterwards, it is apparent, and almost out of controversy. Giving therefore 408 years unto the distance between the fall of *Troy*, and the instauration of the *Olympiads* by *Iphitus*; we may easily arrive unto those antiquities of *Greece*, which were not merely fabulous. As for princes ruling the whilst in sundry parts of the world, *St. Augustine* and others may be trusted in setting down their times, which they had by tradition from authors of well-approv'd faith and industry.

From *Cyrus* forwards, how the times are reckoned unto *Alexander*, and from him to the battel of *Actium*, it were (peradventure) in this place impertinent to set down. But seeing that the beginning and end of the *Babylonian* captivity are marks whereby we are chiefly directed, in passing from the first unto the latest years of the world, thro' any story, with least interruption, it is very expedient that we take some pains to inform our selves truly of the 70 years, during which it continued, even from *Nebuchadnezzar* unto *Cyrus*.

SECT. II.

A brief rehearsal of two opinions, touching the beginning of the captivity: with an answer to the cavils of Porphyry, inveighing against St. Matthew, and Daniel, upon whom the later of these opinions is founded.

MANY commentators, and other historians and chronologers find, that the captivity then began when *Jechonias* was carried prisoner into *Babylon*, 11 years before the final destruction of *Jerusalem* under *Zedekias*. This they prove out of divers places in *Ezekiel*, especially out of the 14th chapter, where he makes a plain distinction between the beginning of the captivity, and utter destruction of *Jerusalem* by *Nabuzaradan*, in these words: *In the five and twentieth year of our being in captivity in the beginning of the year, in the tenth*

day of the month, in the fourteenth year after that the city was smitten. In which words he beginneth the captivity in plain terms, 11 years before the city was destroy'd. *Beroaldus* is of opinion that it began in the first of *Nabuchodonosor*, and the 4th of *Joakim*, which he endeavours to prove out of the 2d of *Chronicles*, but more especially out of *St. Matthew* and *Daniel*, whose words afford matter of long disputation, but serve not to make good so much as *Beroaldus* would enforce. That place of *St. Matthew*, and the whole book of *Daniel*, have ministred occasion of scoffing and railing at the Christian religion to that wretched man *Porphyry*, who, not understanding how the sons of king *Josias* were called by divers names, as *Epiphanius* hath shew'd at large, thought that the apostle had spoken he knew not what in reckoning the sons, or, according to some translations, the sons and nephews of that good king, begotten about the time of the captivity. Upon *Daniel* also the same *Porphyry* doth spend the 12th of his malicious books written against the Christians, affirming that these prophecies and visions remembred by *Daniel*, were written long after his death, and at, or near the time of *Antiochus Epiphanes*. This fond supposition of his, *Eusebius*, *Apollonius*, and others, have sufficiently answer'd. For the 70 interpreters, who converted the *Old Testament* about 100 years before *Epiphanius*, did also turn this book of *Daniel* out of *Hebrew* into *Greek*, as a part of scripture received. And were there no other argument to confound *Porphyry*, than that of *Alexander Macedon*, it were sufficient, who lived divers years before *Antiochus Epiphanes*. For *Jaddus* the high priest shew'd that great conqueror, when he came towards *Jerusalem* to have destroy'd it, this book of *Daniel*, wherein he beheld his own glory foretold, as the same was plainly expounded unto him; which not only stay'd his hand from the harm of that city and people, but his assurance and resolution was so confirm'd and strengthened thereby, as despising all future peril and resistance, he conquered *Darius*, and the eastern empire in a shorter time than *Nabuchodonosor* had done one city, to wit, *Tire* in *Phenicia*.

It is true indeed, that the *Jews* themselves give less authority to *Daniel*, than to *Moses*, and the prophets, accounting his book among those which they call *Cetaphim*, or *Hagiographa*, or holy writings, which they say *Esdras* and the seniors of the synagogue compiled after their return from *Babylon*. But first, that the book of *Daniel* (I mean so much as is found in the *Hebrew*) is canonical: Secondly, that it was written by *Daniel* himself, and not by *Esdras* and the seniors; we may assure ourselves by testimony of councils, and fathers. For in the council of *Laodicea* held about the year of our Lord 368, after the death of *Jovinian* the emperor, and after the *Nicene* council 43 years, this book of *Daniel* was received, verified and confirmed among the other canonical scriptures, as in the epitome of the same council it may be seen, and so doth *Meliton* the most ancient bishop of *Sardis* number it, witness *Eusebius* in his ecclesiastical history, the 4th book, and 25th chapter, so doth the same author in the catalogue of canonical books upon *Origen*, so doth *Hilarius* in his preface upon the *Psalms*, and *Epiphanius* in his book of *Weights and Measures*, &c. To these I may add *St. Jerome*, *Gregory Nazianzene*, and others. For the *Hagiographie* books, or holy writings, the *Jews* and *Rabbins* reckon to be these, *Daniel*, *Psalms*,

^a Ezek. 1. 2. & 3. 11, 15.

^b 1 Mac. 11.

^c Jos. Ant. 11

Proverbs, Job, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Ezra, Nehemiah, and the Chronicles. And that it was *Daniel*, and not *Esdra*, that wrote this book, God's commandment unto him by his angel, to seal up the same to the time appointed, is an unanswerable testimony. Yea, that which exceedeth all strength of other proof, our Saviour Christ who citeth no apocryphal scripture, in *Matth. xxiv. 15.* and *Mark xiii. 14.* alledgeth *Daniel* the prophet, to wit, the last verse of his 19th chapter. Further, in *John v.* Christ distributeth the risen from the dead, as in *Daniel xii. 2.* St. *Paul* describeth *Antichrist* out of *Daniel*, and the *Revelation* is wholly an interpretation of *Daniel's* visions.

SECT. III.

That the 70 years of captivity are to be numbred from the destruction of Jerusalem; not from the migration of Jeconia.

HAVING thus far digressed, in maintaining that authority, which must often be cited in the present argument, it is now convenient, that we return unto the differences of opinion, concerning the beginning of these 70 years. Neither will I stand to trouble my self and others with laying open the grounds or weakness of that which *Eusebius* and some few nameless authors, have sometimes held in this point, which is lately revived by *Beroaldus*; but will forthwith enter into consideration of that opinion, which many both ancient and late writers have so earnestly maintained, that it wants not much of being common.

Four kings of *Juda* were carried away captives to *Babylon*: first *Manasses*; then *Jehoiakim*, and with him among others, *Daniel* the prophet: thirdly *Jeconias*, and with him *Ezekiel*: lastly, *Zedekias*, at which time the city and temple were destroy'd. To the first of these captivities the beginning of the 70 years is referr'd by none that I have read; to the second by few and with weak proof; to the third by very many and with much confidence. For besides those places of *Ezekiel* already cited, there is a strong argument gather'd out of *Jeremy xxix. 10.* which may seem to make the matter plain; for the prophet in comforting the people that were carried away with *Jeconias*, used these words: *Thus saith the Lord: after 70 years be accomplished at Babel, I will visit you, and perform my good promise towards you, and cause you to return to this place.*

But it stands indeed with little reason that we should seek the interpretation of a prophecy out of circumstances, when the prophecy is such as doth sufficiently expound it self. *Jeremiah* had already in the 4th year of *Jehoiakim*, denounced the judgment of God against the land, for the sins and impenitency of that obstinate people, in these words: *Behold, I will send and take to me all the families of the north, saith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babel, my servant, and will bring them against this land, and against the inhabitants thereof, and against all those nations round about, and I will destroy them, and make them an astonishment, and an hissing, and a continual desolation. Moreover, I will take from them the voice of mirth, and the voice of gladness, the voice of the bridegroom, and the voice of the bride, the noise of the mill-stones, and the light of the candle, and this whole land shall be desolate, and an astonishment, and these nations shall serve the king of Babel 70 years. And when 70*

years are expired, I will visit the king of Babel. Here we see prescribed unto the captivity the term of 70 years, which were to commence, neither when the prophecy was uttered; nor when *Jehoiakim*, who then reign'd, was taken by *Nebuchadnezzar*; nor yet in the time of *Jeconia*; but with the utter desolation of the city, whereof *Jeremiah* did again give notice to those that were already in *Babylon*, at such time as he sent them the comfort of deliverance before rehearsed. And so did the people understand this prophecy, in those times when they saw it accomplished, beginning the 70 years at the time of the desolation, as manifestly appears in the end of the history of *Juda*, where it is said thus: *They burnt the house of God, and brake down the wall of Jerusalem, and burnt all the palaces thereof with fire, and all the precious vessels thereof, to destroy all: and they that were left by the sword, carried he away to Babel, and they were servants to him and to his sons, until the kingdom of the Persians had rule, to fulfil the word of the Lord by the mouth of Jeremiah, until the land had her fill of her sabbaths: for all the days that she lay desolate, she kept sabbath, to fulfil 70 years. But in the first year of Cyrus king of Persia (when the word of the Lord, spoken by the mouth of Jeremiah, was finished) the Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus. We seldom find one piece of scripture so precisely and plainly expounded by another, as in this prophecy, to have afterwards been the subject of altercation. For one can hardly devise, how either the desolation could have been express'd more sensibly than it was by the prophet, or the event of the prophecy have been more exactly set down, than it was in the place now last of all cited. If it be requisite that we bring more proof in so evident a case, the 9th chapter of *Daniel* yields testimony sufficient, unto this exposition of *Jeremiah's* prophecy, that *Jerusalem* was to lie waste 70 years. For in the first year *Darius the Mede*, which was the last of the 70, *Daniel* obtained of God the deliverance that had been promised by prayer, which he made upon consideration of the time that was expired: as he telleth us in these words: *In the first year of his reign, I Daniel understood by books the number of the years, whereof the Lord hath spoken unto Jeremiah the prophet, that he would accomplish 70 years in the desolation of Jerusalem.* So that howsoever the time of *Daniel's* own captivity be reckon'd from the taking of *Jehoiakim*, and that the people carried away with *Jeconia*, did account, as well they might, the years of their own captivity; yet with the general desolation of the country, wherein were few or none of the *Israelites* left remaining to inhabit, began in the 19th year of *Nabuchodonosor* the great captivity, which by God's appointment continued unto the end of 70 years. This I will not further seek to prove, by the authority of *Josephus* and others affirming the same; soasmuch as that which already hath been produced, is enough to satisfy any man that hath not fully determined to hold the contrary.*

SECT. IV.

Sundry opinions of the kings which reigned in Babylon during the 70 years.

WHAT kings reign'd in *Babylon*, during these 70 years of the captivity, and how long each of them did wear the diadem, it is a matter of no great importance to know, for as much

* Jer. 29. 16, 17, 18. b 2 Chron. 36. 19, &c. c Dan. 9. 2.

as neither their acts were notable in the age wherein they lived, nor the length of their reigns any way helpful to the concordance of times, foregoing or succeeding. The conquests recounted by ^a *Xenophon* of *Syria*, *Arabia* (or rather some part of it) *Hyrcania*, *Bactria*, and perhaps of some other countries, may seem fruits of the victories obtain'd by *Nebuchadnezzar* the great (or by some of his ancestors) in the former part of his life, before he betook himself to ease, and to the sumptuous building of his great *Babel*, for the house of his kingdom, and for the honour of his majesty, where it may seem that he and his heirs kept a great state, and did very little. The idle behaviour of the *Assyrian* soldiers, in such skirmishes as afterwards they had with the *Medes*, doth argue no less. For whereas under *Nebuchadnezzar*, they were so stout and industrious, that (to omit other proofs) they attempted, and finish'd, that hardy piece of work, of winning the strong city of *Tyre*, by joining it unto the continent, filling up the deep and broad channel of the sea, dividing it from the main with a mole, or peer of earth, and other matter, the reparation whereof, when the sea had washed it away, was the very greatest of *Alexander's* works; in the times following, they became timorous, that they durst not approach nearer to the enemy than their bows would carry, but were ready to turn their backs as soon as any, tho' inferiour in numbers, adventuring within the distance offered to charge them.

Now as their actions, from the end of ^b *Nebuchadnezzar's* wars, till the ruin of their empire, were not worthy to be recorded; so was the distinction of their times, and reign of their several kings, unworthy of the great labour that hath in vain been taken in that business. For when it is granted, that the captivity of *Juda*, ending with that empire, lasted 70 years, we may as reasonably forbear to search into the particular continuance of two or three slothful kings, as we are contented to be ignorant of the ages of the patriarchs, and their children, living in the *Egyptian* servitude; resting satisfy'd in both with the general assured sum.

Yet for as much as many have travelled in this business, upon desire (as I take it) to approve the beginning and end of the 70 years, not only by the reigns of other princes, ruling elsewhere, but by the times of the *Assyrians* themselves: I will not refuse to take a little pains in collecting their opinions, and shewing what I think may best be held for likely, if the certain truth cannot be found.

The opinions are many, and greatly repugnant, both in recounting the kings themselves, and in setting down the years of their several reigns. The first (as I take it) the surest, is theirs, who meerly follow the authority of the scriptures, without borrowing any help from others. These name only three kings, *Nebuchadnezzar*, *Evilmerodach*, and *Balthasar*. Neither have they only the silence of *Daniel*, who names none other, to be their warrant, but the prophecy of *Jeremiah* precisely, and in a manner purposely teaching the very same. For God, by the mouth of that prophet, shewing that he being absolute lord of all would dispose of all, according to his own will, and making it known that he had put some countries here named, into the hands of the king of *Babel*, saith thus: *And all nations shall serve him, and his son, and his sons son, until the very time of his land come also; then many nations and great kings shall serve themselves of him.* These words expressing the continuance of

the *Chaldean* empire, and number of the kings, will hardly be qualify'd with any distinction. But indeed I find no other necessity of qualification to be used herein than such as may grow out of mens desire to reconcile the scriptures unto prophane authors. And this desire were not unjust, if the consent of all histories were on the one side, and the letter of the holy text were single on the other side.

But contrariwise, the authors which are cited in this case, are so repugnant one to the other, and the proofs of their different reports are so slender and insufficient, that the succession of these princes, had it not been thus delivered in scriptures, but only set down by some author of equal credit with the rest, might very well have found and deserved as good belief, as any of those things which they have delivered in this point. For some there are, who following ^c *Josephus*, derive that empire, as by descent from father to son, thro' five generations; beginning with *Nabuchodonosor* the great, and giving to him 43 years, to *Evilmerodach* 18, to *Niglifar* the son of *Evilmerodach* 40, to *Labosardach* the son of *Niglifar* 9 months, and lastly to *Balthasar* (whom *Josephus* intimates to be of the race of *Nabuchodonosor*, without naming his father) 17 years. And this opinion (save that he forbears to reckon the years, and plainly calls *Balthasar* the son of *Labosardach*) *St. Jerome* doth follow, alledging *Berosus*, and *Josephus* as a sectator of *Berosus*, for his authors; tho' *Berosus*, as he is cited by ^e *Josephus*, reports the matter far otherwise. For he tells us that *Evilmerodach* the son of *Nabuchodonosor* did reign but two years, being for his wickedness and lust, slain by his sister's husband *Niziglissoroor*, who occupied the kingdom after him four years, and left it to his own son *Labosardach*, who being an ill-conditioned boy, was at the end of 9 months slain by such as were about him, and the kingdom given to one *Nabonidus*, who held it by the election of the conspirators, and left it unto *Cyrus* after 17 years. This relation ill agrees with that of *Josephus*, and both of them as bad with the scriptures, in number either of years, or of generations; yet the particularities which they handle, have procured unto them some authority, so that the names which they have inserted, are taken as it were upon trust. There is a third opinion, which makes the three last kings brethren, and sons of *Evilmerodach*; and this may well enough agree with the scripture: tho' I had rather believe ^f *Xenophon*, who saith that the last king of *Babylon* was immediate successor to his father. But whereas the author of the scholastical history, who is founder of this opinion, placeth between him that took *Jerusalem*, and *Evilmerodach*, another *Nabuchodonosor*: plain enough it is that he hath, out of any history sacred or prophane, as little warrant to guide him, as we have reason to follow him. *Eusebius*, *Sulpitius Severus*, and *Theodoret*, upon better ground, have supposed, that *Evilmerodach* and *Balthasar* were brethren and sons of the great *Nabuchodonosor*. This is built on the 5th chapter of *Daniel*, wherein *Balthasar* (for of *Evilmerodach* there is none that ever doubted) is often called *Nabuchodonosor's* son. And so common grew this explication, that *St. Jerome* called it the vulgar opinion. But the place of *Jeremiah* before cited, proves that *Balthasar* was not the son indeed, but the grand-child of that great conqueror, tho' by the phrase very common in scriptures, and familiar in those eastern languages, he was called the son.

^a *Xenoph.* *Cyropæd.* l. 1. ^b *Xenoph.* *Cyropæd.* l. 1. & l. 3. *Apjiom.* l. 1.

^f *Xenoph.* *Cyropæd.* l. 4.

^c *Jer.* 27. 7.

Jos. Ant. l. 10. c. 12.

^e *Jos. contr.*

Annius's Metasthenes hits very rightly the 70 years of captivity, giving to *Nabuchodonosor* 45 years, to *Evilmerodach* 30 years, and to the 3 sons of *Evilmerodach*, nephews of *Nabuchodonosor*, 14 years; that is, to *Reg-Affer* the eldest son 3 years, to *Lab-Affer Datch* the 2d son 6 years, and to *Balthasar* the 3d son 5.

To this account agreeing with the scriptures, both in the whole sum of years, and in the number of generations, I have sometime subscribed, as not daring to reject an appearance of truth, upon no greater reason than because the author was of *Annius's* edition. Yet could I not satisfy my self herein; both for that none of the ancient, and few such of the modern writers as deserve to be regarded, have consented with this *Metasthenes*; and for that making *Balthasar* to succeed unto his brother in the kingdom, and not unto his father, he is wholly against *Xenophon*, whose history of the elder *Cyrus* in his *Assyrian* war I cannot slightly value in many respects, and especially because it is very agreeable to the scriptures, in the taking of *Babylon*, while the king was at his drunken feast.

Seeking therefore diligently into all circumstances that might give any light in this obscurity, I found manifest proof, that the time allotted unto ^a *Balthasar*, by *Annius's Metasthenes*, was far short of the truth, which is enough to render all suspected that he hath said in distributing what part of the 70 years he pleased among the rest. For in the 3d year of *Balthasar*, *Daniel* saw a vision, after which he was sick certain days, but when he rose up, he did the king's business: from which business, that he did afterwards withdraw himself, and lived retired, so long that he was forgotten in the court, it appears plainly, both by the many words which the old queen used to set out his sufficiency, and by the king's asking of him, when he came into his presence, whether he were ^b *Daniel*. Now to think that a man of such account and place as ^c *Daniel* had held, could in two years have been worn out of remembrance, were in my judgment a very strange conceit, which rather than I would entertain, I can well be contented to think the whole story (thus related) a part of *Annius's* impostures.

Out of these reports of *Josephus*, *Berosus*, and others, many new opinions are framed, by conjectures of late writers. For the endurance of the captivity being 70 years, and these years extending unto the first of *Cyrus*, in which course of time *Nebuchadnezzar*, his son and grand-child, must have reigned; it hath seemed needful to supply the years of these three descents, by inserting some whose reigns might fill up the whole continuance of the captivity, with which the time allotted by *Berosus* and others, to *Evilmerodach* and *Balthasar*, joined unto the years following the 19th of *Nebuchadnezzar* (wherein *Jerusalem* was laid desolate) are nothing even.

Therefore *Mercator*, and others following him, fashion the years of *Evilmerodach* in this sort. They say, that the 18 years given to him by *Josephus* in the 10th of his antiquities, should be read and numbred 28 years, and the 2 years, that *Berosus* hath allowed to *Evilmerodach* should be written 23: in the first number the figure of [1] is mistaken for the figure of [2] and in the latter there should have been added the figure of [3] to that of [2:] this granted [to wit] that *Evilmerodach* reigned 28 years, whereof 5 together with his father, and 23 after his death, and the same number

of 23 added to the 25 which *Nabuchodonosor* lived after the destruction of *Jerusalem*, make 49, then 4 years of *Niglifar* according to *Berosus*, 9 months of *Labassardach* his son, and 17 years of *Lakonidus* or *Balthasar*, make up the number of 70 years to the first of *Cyrus*. But whether by error in figures or in words, the numbers be utterly mistaken, in all copies extant; upon how weak a foundation do they build; who having nothing to help them, save only the bare names of two unknown kings, found in authors manifestly corrupted, and such as if they had been entirely extant, were not worthy to have that place of *Jeremiah* called into dispute, in regard of their authority?

SECT. V.

A more particular examination of one opinion touching the number, persons, and reigns of the Babylonian kings.

OTHER suppositions, little different in substance from this of *Mercator*, I purposely forbear to rehearse, as falling under the same answer. That of *Joseph Scaliger* I may not forget, as deserving to be consider'd apart from the rest. He gives to *Nebuchadnezzar* 44 years, to *Evilmerodach* 2; to *Balthasar* 5, and to *Nabonidus* 17. So that from the 19th of *Nebuchadnezzar*, in which *Jerusalem* was destroy'd, unto the time of *Cyrus*, he accounteth only 59 years; beginning as (many do) the captivity 11 years sooner, from the transportation of *Jechonia*. But hereof enough hath been said already. That which we are now to consider, is his distribution of the time running between the 19th of *Nebuchadnezzar*, and the fall of the *Chaldean* empire: wherein if he have erred, then is all further inquisition frivolous.

Concerning the length of *Nebuchadnezzar's* reign, I shall hereafter upon better occasion deliver my opinion. The time which he gives to *Evilmerodach* is very short, and more precisely agreeing with *Berosus* than with the scriptures. For we find in *Jeremiah*, that this *Evilmerodach* in the first of his reign, shewing all favour to *Jechonia*, did among other things take order for him at his table; and that he did continually eat bread before him all the days of his life. His portion was a continual portion given him of the king of ^d *Babel*, every day a certain, all the days of his life until he died. The very sound of these words (which is more to be esteemed, than the authority of *Berosus*, were he perfectly extant) imports a far longer time than two years, wherein *Jechonia*, under this gentle prince, enjoy'd the comfort sent by God, whose commandment he had obey'd in yielding himself to *Nebuchadnezzar*. Indeed how long *Jechonia* did live it cannot be proved; but plain it is hereby that all his remaining days he eat bread before this king. Now that he lived not so short a while after this as two years, it is more than likely, for he was but 55 years old when he was set at liberty, having been 37 years in the prison, whereinto he was cast at the age of 18 years; after which time it seems plain that he begat *Salathiel*, as well by the age of *Zorobabel*, who is said to have been but a young man, and one of *Darius's* pages threescore years after this, as by other circumstances of his imprisonment it self.

Of *Balthasar*, to whom *Scaliger* gives the next five years, naming him also *Labassardach*, I should wonder why he calls him *Nebuchadnezzar's* daugh-

^a Dan. 8. 4. & 27.^b Dan. 5. 11, 12, 13. Dan. 2. 49.^d Jer. 52. 33, 34.

ter's son, were it not that herein I find him very careful to help out *Berosus*, by shifting in his *Nigilissor*, as husband to *Nebuchadnezzar's* daughter, and protector of his son four of these years; by which means there remains about one year to *Balthasar* alone, agreeing nearly with the nine months assigned by *Berosus* to the son of *Niglisar*. But *Jeremij* hath told us that it was to *Nebuchadnezzar*, and to his son, and to his son's son (not to his daughter's son) that the empire was promis'd: which difficulty, if *Scaliger* could not help it, was well done of him, to pass it over with silence.

Nabonidus the last of these, whom others (desirous to reconcile *Berosus* to the scriptures) have judged to be all one with *Balthasar*, is by *Scaliger* thought to be *Darius* of the *Medes*. But herein *Scaliger* is no firm *Berosian*: for *Berosus* makes him of the same stock or race, a *Babylonian*. I speak not this to disgrace the travel of that most learned man (for it highly commends his diligence and judgment, that he was not so wedded to any author, as affected with the love of truth) but to shew that he himself having in some points disliked those writers, whom in general he approveth, might with greater reason have wholly reformed them by the scriptures, wherein can be no error. Two things there are which chiefly did breed to confirm this opinion in *Scaliger*, that he whom *Berosus* calls *Nabonidus*, was the same whom *Daniel* had called *Darius* of the *Medes*: First, the phrase scripture, which signifies unto us, that *Darius* took the kingdom, not saying that he won it by force of arms. Secondly, a fragment of *Megasthenes* found in *Eusebius*, wherein this *Nabonidus* is called the *Median*. Touching the word of the original, or of the Greek translation, which expressing no force of arms doth only signify, that *Darius* took or received the kingdom; I see no reason why we should thereupon infer, that the next king enter'd by election; seeing *Daniel* relateth not the means and circumstances of *Balthasar's* death, but only the swift accomplishment of his own prophecy. Neither could it indeed have properly been said (if *Daniel* had car'd to use the most expressive terms) that *Darius* of the *Medes* breaking into the city, did win the kingdom; seeing this was performed by *Cyrus* in the absence of *Darius*, though by his forces, and to his use. Now concerning the fragment of *Megasthenes*, true it is, that in *Eusebius's* works printed at *Basil*, in the year 1599, I find only thus much of *Megasthenes*, cited out of *Alpheus*; that *Nabuchodonosor*, was more valiant than *Hercules*; that he subdued all *Libya*, and the rest of *Asia* as far as to the *Armenians*; and that, as the *Chaldeans* report, being return'd into this kingdom, and wrapt with a divine fury, he cry'd with a loud voice, O *Babylonians*, I foretell ye of a great calamity that shall come upon you, which neither *Bel*, nor any of the Gods shall avert: There will come a *Persian*, half an *Ass*, that shall bring slavery upon ye: and that this and the like when he had spoken, he vanish'd. Of all this I believe little or nothing, saving that *Nabuchodonosor* knew before-hand, that this empire should be translated, as *Daniel* had foretold, from the golden-head, to the silver breast. But that he won all *Africa* or *Libya*, I hold it neither true nor probable.

If *Scaliger's* copy of *Eusebius* were the more perfect, out of which *Megasthenes* tells us that *Nabuchodonosor* won both *Africa* and *Spain*, I believe the fragment so much the less; and am as little moved with the authority of it, where it calls a

Median the pride and confidence of the *Assyrians*, as where it tells of *Nebuchadnezzar's* own vanishing away. Indeed that same title of half an *Ass*, by which he calleth *Cyrus*, makes me to suspect the fable as cunningly forged out of *Apollo's* oracle, wherein he termeth him a *mule*, because his parentage was more noble on the mother's side, than on the father's; as *mules* are begotten by *asses* upon *mares*. And thus much in answer of the two principal foundations whereon this opinion is built. As for the concinnity and coherence which it hath within it self, I easily allow it. But this proves nothing, for meer fictions have not wanted these commendations: neither can any man believe that one so judicious, industriously and deeply learned as *Joseph Scaliger*, would over-shoot himself in setting down repugnancies.

It now remaineth to examine the agreement of this with the scriptures, from which there is no appeal. And herein it seems that *Scaliger*, well knowing his own sufficiency, hath been little careful to satisfy men that would frame arguments against him. For if the prophecy of *Daniel* were true, that the kingdom of *Balthasar* was divided, and given to the *Medes* and *Persians*, either we must think that *Darius* of the *Medes* was not *Nabonidus*, or else we must bethink our selves what *Persian* it might be that shared the kingdom with him. For it is not more certain, that *Balthasar* lost his life and kingdom, than that his kingdom was divided and given to the *Medes* and *Persians*. Neither did the *Medes* and *Persians* fall out and fight for it, as by supposing *Nabonidus* to have been *Darius*, they should be thought to have done; but these two nations did compound the body of that empire, and were accounted as lords over all the subject provinces, insomuch that the Greek historians did commonly call those wars which *Darius*, and after him *Xerxes*, made upon *Greece*, the wars of the *Medes*. Yea, to clear this point, even *Daniel* himself resembles that king, with whom *Alexander* fought, unto a ram with two horns, calling him the king of the *Medes* and *Persians*. Wherefore the whole nation of *Chronologers* were not to have been condemned by *Joseph Scaliger*, for maintaining upon such good grounds, that *Darius* of the *Medes* was partner with *Cyrus* in his victories, and not a *Chaldean* king by him subdued. Neither was *Josephus* to be the less regarded for affirming that *Balthasar* was destroyed by *Darius* of the *Medes*, and his nephew *Cyrus*, though herein he varied from *Berosus*, and others, whose authority elsewhere he gladly citeth. For *Josephus* had no reason to believe any man's faith or knowledge of those times, half so well as *Daniel's*, whom I believe that he understood as far as was needful in this case. Lawful it was for him to alledge all authors that had any mention, though imperfect, of the same things that were contain'd in the writings of the *Jews*, to whose histories thereby he procured reputation in the *Roman* world, where they were strangers, and might seem fabulous. Even so do *Eusebius*, and other Christian writers, willingly embrace the testimonies of heathen books making for the truth in some particulars; yet will they not therefore be tried in general by the self-same *Rabnick* philosophers, but leave them where they are against the truth; as *Josephus* in this case hath left *Berosus*. And thus much I thought it meet to say of *Scaliger's* opinion in this point; holding nevertheless in due regard his learning and judgment, which if in some things it had not failed, the miracle had been very great.

SECT. VI.

What may be held as probable of the persons and times of Nabuchodonosor's successors.

IT now remains that I freely acknowledge mine own weakness, who cannot find how the 70 years of captivity are to be divided among them which reigned in *Babylon*, tho' I find that the distribution made of them, in such wise as already is rehearsed, be ill agreeable to the holy scriptures. Wherefore I may truly say with *Pererius*, that we ought liberally to pardon those whose feet have failed them in the slippery ways of chronology, wherein both learning and diligence are subject to take a fall at one time or other, by ignorance, forgetfulness, or heedless reckoning. Yet will I adventure to deliver my opinion, wherein the judgment of *Lyra* and others (holding those only to have reign'd over *Chaldeans*, whose names are found in the scriptures) appears more conformable to reason and account of time, than any of the other sentences or conjectures before rehearsed. Not that I will take upon me to defend *Lyra's* conjectures, when he supposeth by *Niglifar* and *Labofardach* to be meant the same persons which are called in scripture *Evilmerodach* and *Balthasar* (for this can by no good colour be maintained) but only to shew that the kings by him cited, are likely to have occupied the whole time of 70 years. First therefore, let us consider the reign of *Nebuchadnezzar*, in whose 18th year *Jerusalem* was taken and sack'd, but in his 19th laid utterly desolate.

Most writers have given to him 43 years of reign, following therein *Berosus*. There are who have added one year more; and some have made it up 45. To dispute about the certainty were needless: for in shewing by what length of time the scriptures measure him, we shall shew the certain truth.

Manifest it is, that the 19th year of *Nebuchadnezzar*, is joined with the 11th of *Zedekia*; as also that his 8th year, was the first year of *Jechonia's* captivity; the reign of *Zedekia* occupied all the mean space, being of 11 years. This is generally agreed upon, so that it needs no further proofs: As for the beginning of his successor *Evilmerodach*, it was in the 37th year of *Jechonia's* captivity; so that *Nebuchadnezzar* after his 8th year (which was the first of *Jechonia's* bondage) reigned 35 whole years, and peradventure a good part of the 36th, forasmuch as *Jechonia* was enlarged with so great favour, not until the end of the year. Subtracting therefore out of these 44, which *Nebuchadnezzar's* reign did well near occupy, those 18 years of his which passed away before the captivity of *Juda*, and ruin of the city, we have remaining 26 years of the 70, that were almost wholly spent, when his son began to reign.

It is now to be considered how the remainder of the 70 years were divided between the kings ruling in *Babylon* until the first of *Cyrus*. A question more difficult (as I said before) than greatly needful: the whole sum being certain, and the distinction of times affording no benefit in knowledge of their actions, who were slothful princes. Neither can any man the more justly suspect the beginning or end of the whole 70 years, for that the distribution of some part of them is only conjectural; seeing that none who gives any other terms to their beginning or end, hath refused to follow both un-

likely and desperate conjectures in dividing them! I will therefore be bold to do as others have done; knowing well before-hand, that whosoever shall discover my error, must do me the pleasure (which I could rather wish in a case more material) of making me to understand the truth.

Of the 44 years remaining in account at *Nebuchadnezzar's* death, we are to take away the last, which was the first of *Darius the Mede*, and then having authority good enough to warrant us from blame of presumption, in giving us 17 years to *Balthasar*, we find left in our hands to bestow upon *Evilmerodach* 26 years. Of the year belonging to *Darius the Mede*, I have already spoken what I thought sufficient, in delivering my opinion of the beginning and continuance of this captivity. That *Balthasar* did reign 17 years, we have the authority of *Josephus*, before cited in express words; we have also the general consent of all, or the most late writers, interpreting *Berosus's Nabonidus*, who reigned so long; and *Balthasar* to have been one. But nothing moved me so much to believe this tradition, as first those evident places in *Daniel*, shewing that in the 3d year of *Balthasar*, he followed the king's business, and yet was forgotten ere the end of his reign (a proof sufficient of no few years passing under this man, especially seeing it is no where found that *Daniel's* employments took end either that year or the next.) Secondly, the consideration of *Cyrus's* wars against the *Assyrians*, which beginning with the death of this man's father, and being always prosperous, could hardly have occupied any longer time, tho' we make large allowance to his deeds in the lower *Asia*, which fell out in the mid way: I have already shewed, that there appears in the scriptures likelihood enough to make it credible that the reign of *Evilmerodach* was not short; and that men of great judgment have found it most probable that he was a king 23 years. More, I think, they would have allowed him, had not the desire of satisfying *Berosus* caused them to rest content with this. And surely it were greatly to be wished, that books of such antiquity, as those of *Berosus*, were extant without corruption; a great light (no doubt) they would yield in many dark passages of antiquity. I will yet confess, that were his works never so excellent, and in all things else unquestionably true, I would not therefore condescend unto him in some one point, wherein the scriptures were his open enemy. How much less ought I to obey a broken fragment of his, containing only 7 or 8 lines, and part even of the title corrupted, as they believe that follow him in the rest? The scriptures have told us, that God gave the empire to *Nebuchadnezzar*, to his son, and to his sons son: how long each of them held it, we find not express'd; yet would we gladly know it of *Berosus*, or of any other that would teach us; provided always, that helping us in a particularity, he destroy not thereby the general truth. More words are needless. It is enough to say with others, that *Berosus*, or *Josephus* who cited him, hath been wronged by the carelessness of scribes; and that it was as easy for those scribes to err in writing 2 for 26, as for 23, or perhaps more easy. For the omission of the 2d figure, was as likely the one way as the other; and the character 5 signifying 6, hath a nearer resemblance of 6 than stands for 2, than hath 7 which is used for 3. So that the numeral notes 65 expressing 26, were not safe enough from being mistaken in the true copy, and might be al-

^a 2 Kings 25, 8. Jer. 51, 12. 2 Kings 24, 12. ^b 2 Kings 25, 27. Jer. 52, 31. ^c Dan. 9, 1, 27. & 11, 11, 12, 13. Jer. 27, 7.

tered, as ill written, if some crooked hand, or other mischance not unusual, had omitted the first stroke of the former letter, or added a dash to the latter, which might cause them to seem not two different figures, but the one a correction of the other, which how it could be supposed in *gy* standing for 23, I do not well perceive. As for the arithmetical figures now in use, they were long after the time of *Josephus* brought in by the *Arabians*, and therefore do not appertain to this business; unless we should guess that his works were corrupted in that unlearned age, which following the *Saracen* conquest, was little occupied in the studies of humanity, but in a sort wholly given over to the doctrine of *Aristotle*. If this will serve to make *Berosus* our friend, so let it be; if not, I will not purchase the favour of his authority, by forsaking *Jeremiah* and *Daniel*; when they seem to be his opposites.

SECT. VII.

Of the victories which Nabuchodonosor obtained between the destruction of Jerusalem and conquest of Egypt.

WITH what actions this time of 70 years was entertained by the *Babylonian* kings, few have written, or little is remaining in record. Which may peradventure have been some cause that the time it self was, and is yet fought to be abridged, as not having left sufficient matter to witness the length of it. But by such an argument we might as well deny to many people even their being. For every nation (I know not whom I should except) between the beginning and last end of it, hath in some slothful age rather dream'd away the time, than spent it. It is therefore no marvel, if the posterity of *Nabuchodonosor*, finding all things ready to their hand, which their hearts could have desired, betook themselves to their ease and pleasures, thinking perhaps, like the prodigal sons of greedy fathers, their own wisdom greater, which knew how to enjoy, than that of their ancestors, which wearied away their days in the restless travel of purchasing. Tho' indeed the reign of *Nabuchodonosor* was so divided, that his youthful and stronger years having been exercised in victorious arms, no small part of his life was remaining to be spent in establishing what was gotten, and gathering the fruit of his worthy labours past. The 19th year of his reign it was, when destroying utterly the great and mighty city of *Jerusalem*, he enrich'd himself with abundance of spoil, and terrified all that would offer to resist him, by that fearful example. From that time forward, until his 23d year, he labour'd in the conquest of those adjoining regions, which God had exposed unto his sword, and commanded to wear his yoke; namely the *Edomites*, *Moabites*, *Ammonites*, *Tyrans*, *Sidonians*, and *Egyptians*, tho' some of these were already become his followers, and served under him, when *Jerusalem* was beaten down and burnt. But the *Tyrans*, whose city was founded on an island, safe enough from any danger of a land army, and whose fleet was so strong that they needed not to fear any enemy at sea, were neither daunted with the fall of their neighbour cities, nor with the obstinate resolution of this mighty prince, employing all his power to their subversion.

That the city of *Tyre* was rather well pleased than any way discouraged with the fall of *Jerusalem* (which had held the same course that *Tyrus* did,

and endured all that might be in the same quarrel against the common enemy) it appears by the words which *Ezekiel* condemneth as the common voice of *Tyrus*; "Aha, the gate of the people is broken, it is turned unto me; for seeing she is desolate, I shall be replenished. Yet at length, even in the 19th year of *Nabuchodonosor*, that great work of his, whereof we have already spoken, began to appear above the waters, and threaten them with inevitable mischief.

But those prophecies of *Jeremiah* and of *Isaiab*, which appoint unto this desolation of *Tyre* the same term of 70 years, that was prescribed unto the reign of the *Chaldeans*, do plainly shew, that she followed *Jerusalem*, the same 19th year of *Nabuchodonosor*, in the same, or a very like fortune. The particulars, which doubtless were memorable in the issue of so great and laborious a siege, are in a manner utterly lost. Thus much we find, that the citizens perceiving the town unable to hold out, embarked themselves, and fled into the isle of *Cyprus*. Nevertheless it seems that this evasion served only the principal men, who escaping with their goods, abandon'd the poorer sort unto the enemies fury. For not only such people of *Tyre* as dwelt on the continent (who were called her daughters in the field) were put to the sword; but the like execution was done in the streets, into which with excessive labour the *Affyrian* made way for his horses and chariots. Thus *Nabuchodonosor* caused his army to serve a great service against *Tyrus*, wherein every head was made bald, and every shoulder was made bare, yet had he no wages, nor his army; but was fain to rest contented with the honour of having destroyed that city, which in all mens judgments had been held invincible.

The destruction of these two great and powerful cities, having made the name of the *Chaldeans* dreadful in the ears of all the nations thereabout, *Nabuchodonosor* used the advantage of that reputation which he had obtain'd by victories already gotten, to the getting of more, and more profitable, with less pain. The kingdom of *Egypt* was the mark at which he aimed; a country so abounding in all riches and pleasures, that it might well have tempted any prince, finding himself strong enough, to seek occasion of quarrel against it; and so far an enemy to the crown of *Babylon*, that had it been poorer, yet either it must have been subdu'd, or the conquest of *Syria* could ill have been established. Nevertheless it was needful that before he entred into this business, the countries adjacent should be reduc'd into such terms, that either they should wholly stand at his devotion, or at least be unable to work him any displeasure. And herein the decree of God concurr'd, as in all prosperous enterprises, with reason of state. For the people of *Moab*, *Ammon*, *Edom*, *Damascus*, *Kedar*, *Hazor*, and other adjoining regions, whom God for their sins had condemn'd to fall under the *Babylonian* swords, were such, as regarding only their own gain, had some of them, like ravens, follow'd the *Chaldean* army, to feed upon the carcases that fell by the cruelty thereof; others taking advantage of their neighbours miseries, occupied the countries which were by his victories belonging to *Nabuchodonosor*; all of them thinking, that when the *Affyrian* had satisfy'd his fury, he should be fain to forsake those desolate parts, and leave the possession to those that could lay hand upon it. Particularly the *Edomites* and *Philistines* had shewed much malice to the *Jerus* when their city was taken. What good service they

^a Ezek. 26. 2. ^b Jer. 25. 11a. 23. 15. ^c Ezek. 29. 18. ^d Ezek. 25. 12, 15

had done to the *Chaldeans*, I find not; if they did any, it is likely to have been with reference to their own purposes, wherein they were disappointed. The *Ammonites* were not contented to rejoice at the fall of *Jerusalem*, but presently they entred upon the country of *Gad*, and took possession, as if not the *Affrians*, but they had subdu'd *Israel*. Neither can I perceive what other ground that practice had of *Baalis* king of the *Ammonites*, when he sent *Ismael*, a prince of the blood of *Juda*, to murder *Gedalia*, whom the king of *Babel* had left governour over those that remain'd in *Israel*, and to carry captive into the *Ammonites* country the people that abode in *Mispah*, than a desire of embroiling *Nabuchodonosor* with so many labours at once, as should make him retire into his own country, and abandon those wasted lands to himself and others, for whom they lay conveniently. Such or the like policy the *Moabites* did exercise; whose pride and wrath were made frustrate by God, and their dissimulation condemn'd, as not doing right.

All these nations had the art of ravening, which is familiar to such as live or border upon desarts; and now the time afforded them occasion to shew the uttermost cunning of their thievish wits. But *Nebuchadnezzar* did cut asunder all their devices by sharp and sudden war, overwhelming them with unexpected ruin, as it were in one night; according to the prophecies of *Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, and *Ezekiel*, who fore-told with little difference of words, the greatness and swiftness of the misery that should come upon them. With which of them he first began, I find not; it seems that *Moab* was the last which felt his hand: for so do many good authors interpret the prophecy of *Isaiah*, threatening *Moab* with destruction after 3 years, as having reference to the third year following the ruin of *Jerusalem*; the next year after it being spent in the *Egyptian* expedition. This is manifest, that all the principal towns in these regions were burnt, and the people slain, or made slaves, few excepted, who being preserv'd by flight, had not the courage to return to their habitations over-hastily, much less to attempt any thing against *Nabuchodonosor*, but liv'd as miserable out-laws, or at least oppressed wretches, until the end of the 70 years, which God had prescrib'd unto the desolation of their countries, as well as of the land of *Juda*.

SECT. VIII.

That Egypt was conquer'd, and the king therein reigning slain by Nabuchodonosor, contrary to the opinion of most authors: who following Herodotus and Diodorus, relate it otherwise.

WHEN by a long course of victory *Nabuchodonosor* had brought into subjection all the nations of *Syria*, and the bordering *Arabians*, in such wise that no enemy to himself, nor friend of the *Egyptians*, was left at his back, that might give impediment unto his proceeding, or take advantage of any misfortune; then did he forthwith take in hand the conquest of *Egypt* himself, upon which those other nations had formerly been depending. Of this expedition, and the victorious issue thereof, the three great prophets *Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, and *Ezekiel*, have written so plainly, that I hold it altogether needless to look after more authority, or to cite for proof half of that which may be alledg'd out of these. Nevertheless we find many and good

authors, who, following *Herodotus* and *Diodorus Siculus*, are well contented to strain these prophecies with unreasonable diligence unto such a sense, as gives to *Nabuchodonosor* little more than the honour of having done some spoil in *Egypt*, omitting the conquest of that land by the *Babylonian*, and referring the death of *Apries* or *Hophra* to a chance long after following, which had no coherence with these times or affairs. So preposterous is the delight which many men take in the means and second helps conducing to their purpose, that oftentimes they prefer the commentator before the author; and to uphold a sentence giving testimony to one clause, do carelessly overthrow the history it self, which thereby they fought to have maintain'd. The reports of *Herodotus* and *Diodorus*, concerning the kings of *Egypt*, which reign'd about these times, are already rehearsed in the former book: but that which they have spoken of *Apries*, was purposely reserv'd unto this place. *Herodotus* affirms, that he was a very fortunate king, but wherein he telleth not (unless we should understand that he was victorious in the war which he is said to have made upon *Tyrus* and *Sidon*) that he reign'd 25 years, and was finally taken and put to death by his own subjects; who did set up *Amasis* as king, which prevail'd against him. The rebellion of the *Egyptians* he imputeth to a great loss which they receiv'd in an expedition against the *Cyrenians*, by whom almost their whole army was destroy'd. This calamity the people of *Egypt* thought to be well pleasing to their king, who had sent them on this dangerous expedition, with a purpose to have them consum'd, that so he might with greater security reign over such as stay'd at home. So they who escap'd, and the friends of such as were slain, rebell'd against *Apries*, who sent *Amasis* to appease the tumult; but *Amasis* became captain of the rebels, and was by them chosen king. Finally, the whole land consented unto this new election; where-by *Apries* was driven to trust unto his foreign mercenaries, the *Ionians* and *Carians*, of whom he kept in readiness 30000 good soldiers that fought valiantly for him, but were at length vanquish'd by the great numbers of the *Egyptian* forces, amounting unto 250000, which were all by birth and education men of war. *Apries* himself being taken prisoner, was gently intreated by *Amasis* for a while, until the *Egyptians* exclaiming upon him as an extream enemy to the land, got him deliver'd into their hands, and strangled him, yet they gave him honourable burial. Such is the report of *Herodotus*, with whom *Diodorus Siculus* nearly agrees, telling us that *Apries* did vanquish the *Cyprians* and *Phenicians* in battel at sea, took by force and demolish'd *Sidon*, won the other towns of *Phenicia*, and the isle of *Cyprus*, and finally perished, as is before rehearsed, when he had reign'd 22 years. This authority were enough (yet not more than enough) to inform us of *Apries*'s history, if greater authority did not contradict it. But the destruction of *Egypt* by the *Babylonian*, foretold by the prophets, which hath no coherence with these relations, hath greater force to compel our belief, than hath the traditions of *Egyptian* priests (which the *Greek* historians followed) and greater probabilities to persuade those that look only into human reasons. For *Isaiah* prophesy'd long before of the shameful captivity of the *Egyptians*, whom the king of *Assur* should carry away naked, young and old, in such wise that the *Jews*, who fled unto them for deliverance from the *Affrian*, should be

^a Ezek. 25. 3. Jer 49. 1. ^b Jer. 40. 14. & 41. 2, 10. Jer. 28. 27, &c. ^c Isa. 16. 14. ^d Herod. l. 2. & l. 4.
^e Diod. Sic. l. 1. c. 2. ^f Isa. 20. 4, 5, 6.

ashamed of their own vain confidence in men so unable to defend themselves.

But *Ezekiel* and *Jeremiah*, as their prophecies were nearer to the time of execution, so they handled this argument more precisely. For *Ezekiel* telleth plainly, that *Egypt* should be given to *Nebuchadnezzar*, as wages for the service which he had done at *Tyre*: also he recounteth particularly all the chief cities in *Egypt*, saying, that these by name should be destroy'd and go into captivity; yea, that ^a *Pharaoh* and all his army should be slain by the sword. Wherefore it must needs be a violent exposition of these prophecies, which by applying the issue of such threatnings to an insurrection and rebellion, concludes all, without any other alteration in *Egypt*, than change of the king's person, wherein *Amasis* did succeed unto *Apries*, by force indeed, but by the uniform consent of all the people. Certainly, if that notable place of *Jeremiah*, wherein he foretelleth how the ^b *Jews* in *Egypt* should see *Pharaoh Hophra* delivered into the hands of his enemies, as *Zedekia* had been, were to be referred unto the time of that rebellion whereof *Herodotus* hath spoken, as the general opinion hath over-ruled it, then was it vainly done of the same prophet (which God forbid that any Christian should think, seeing he did it by the appointment of God himself) to hide in the clay of a brick-kiln, those very stones, upon which the throne of *Nabuchodonosor* should be set, and his pavilion spread. Yea, then was that prophecy no other than false, which express'd the end of *Pharaoh* thus: ^c *Behold, I will visit the common people of No, and Pharaoh and Egypt, with their gods and their kings, even Pharaoh, and all that trust in him: and I will deliver them into the hands of those that seek their lives, and into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar king of Babel, and into the hands of his servants.* The clearness of this prophecy being such as could not but refute that interpretation of many other places, which referred all to the rebellion of *Amasis*, it caused me to wonder what those commentators would say to it, who are elsewhere so diligent in fitting all to the *Greek* historians. Wherefore looking upon *Junius*, who had in another place taken the enemies of *Pharaoh Hophra* to be *Amasis*, and his followers, I found him here acknowledging that the *Egyptian* priests had notably deluded ^d *Herodotus* with lies, coin'd upon a vain-glorious purpose of hiding their own disgrace and bondage. And surely it may well be thought, that the history of *Nebuchadnezzar* was better known to the *Jews* whom it concern'd, than to the *Greeks* that scarcely at any time heard of his name. Therefore I see no cause why we should not rather believe *Josephus*, reporting that *Nabuchodonosor* in the 23d year of his reign, and the 5th year of the destruction of *Jerusalem*, did conquer *Egypt*, kill the king thereof, and appoint another in his stead, than *Herodotus* or *Diodore*; who being meer strangers to this business, had no greater reason to labour in searching out the truth, but might rest contented with any thing that the priests would tell them. Now, if setting aside all advantage of authority, we should only consider the relations of ^e *Josephus*, and of the *Greek* historians, as either of them might be verified of it self by apparent circumstances, without reflecting upon the *Hebrew* prophets or *Egyptian* priests; methinks the death of *Apries* can no way be approved, as having been wrought by consent of the people, but affords great matter of suspicion; yea, tho' no man had oppo-

fed the reports of *Herodotus* and *Diodore*. For the great love and honour which the *Egyptians* did bear unto their kings, is notorious by the uniform testimony of all others that have handled the matters of that country, as well as by the report of *Diodore* himself. How then can we think it probable, that *Apries* having won great victories, did for one only loss fall into the hatred of all his people, or which may serve to persuade us, that a king of *Egypt* would seek, or so demean himself, that he might be thought to seek the destruction of his natural subjects? As for that army of 30000 soldiers *Carians* and *Ionians*, which the king of *Egypt*, whom *Amasis* took prisoner, is said to have kept for his defence: doth it not argue that he was a foreigner, and one that armed himself against the *Egyptian*, wishing them few and weak; rather than any of the *Pharaohs*, who accounted the force of the country, as assuredly their own, as the strength of their own bodies? It were more tedious than any way needful, to use all arguments that might be alledged in this case. The very death of this supposed *Apries*, which the clamours of the people obtained of *Amasis*, who sought to have kept him alive, doth intimate that he was some foreign governour, not a natural prince; otherwise the people would have desired to save his life, and *Amasis* to take it quickly from him. I will not labour any further to disprove that opinion, whereunto I should not have yielded, tho' it stood upon great appearance of truth, considering that the voice of truth it self cries out against it; but leave the circumstances proving the conquest of *Egypt* by *Nabuchodonosor* to be observ'd, where due occasion in course of the story following shall present them.

SECT. IX.

How Egypt was subdued and held by Nebuchadnezzar.

IT is a great loss, that the general history of the world hath suffer'd, by the spoil and waste which time hath made of those monuments, that should have preserved the memory of such famous actions as were accomplished by this mighty prince *Nabuchodonosor*; wherein, whether his virtue or fortune were greater, it is now uncertain. That his victories following the conquest of *Syria*, and the neighbour provinces, were such as did more enlarge his dominion, than all the former wars had done, it may easily be gathered out of *Ezekiel*: who reckons up in his 30th chapter (besides the whole country of *Egypt*) *Phut* and *Lud*, with other nations that may seem to have reach'd out into *Mauritania*, as people subdu'd by this great *Babylonian*. The circumstances of these wars are in a manner utterly lost; but that the victory was easy and swift, any man shall find, who will take the pains to confer the places, wherein the three great prophets touch this argument. Thus much I think worthy of more particular observation; that *Pharaoh*, who (as is already noted in the former book) thought himself most safe in *Egypt* by the well defended situation of his country, did very unwisely in suffering his enemies to sweep the way clean unto his own doors, by consuming all his friends and adherents in *Syria*. For as the labour of this business did more harden than weary the *Chaldean* army, so the confidence and vain security of the *Egyptians*, relying upon the difficult passages which the

^a Ezek. 29. 20. ^b Jer. 30. ^c Ezek. 32. 31. ^d Jer. 44. 30. ^e Jer. 46. 25. 26. ^f Jun. in Jer. 44. 30.

^g Joseph. de Antiq. Jud. l. 10. c. 11.

enemy was to make through the *Arabian* deserts, and the much advantage which the great river of *Nilus* would afford unto themselves, did little avail them in provision for the war, and much astonish them (as may justly be thought) in the time of execution: it being usually seen, that the hearts of men fail, when those helps fail, in which they had reposed more confidence than in their own virtue. Hitherto the kingdom of *Egypt* had flourished under the rule of the *Pharaohs*, about a thousand and five hundred and fourscore years; but from this time forward it remained forty years without a king, under the subjection of the *Babylonians*; and then at length it began to recover by little and little the former greatness, yet so, that it was never dreadful unto others, God having said of that people, ^a *I will diminish them that they shall no more rule the nations.* For whereas it hath been said of *Pharaoh*: ^b *I am the son of the wise, I am the son of the ancient kings*; and whereas he had vaunted, ^c *The river is mine, and I have made it*; the princes of *Egypt* now became fools, the river failed them, the king himself was taken and slain, and that ancient lineage quite extinguished. This came to pass in the first year after the destruction of *Jerusalem*, and the 23d of *Nebuchadnezzar*, at which time (saith *Josephus*) *He slew the king then reigning, placed another in his room, and carried captives thence to Babylon, the Jews whom he found in that country.* Now concerning the time which *Josephus* gives unto this business, and the business it self, I have already shewn that it is warranted by all the prophecies which insinuate the same. As likewise the last destruction of *Jerusalem*, and carrying away those unto *Babel*, who inhabited the miserable ruin of that great city; which was in the same ^e *three and twentieth of Nebuchadnezzar*, is not improbably thought by good authors to have been at the return from this *Egyptian* expedition. But whereas *Josephus* tells us that there was another king put in the room of *Apries* by *Nebuchadnezzar*, we must understand, that he was only a viceroy, and not (as some have mistaken it) think that this was *Amasis*. For to place the beginning of *Amasis's* reign in the 23d of *Nebuchadnezzar*, were as well repugnant unto the prophecies before alledged, as to all chronology and history. Some there are, which to help this inconvenience imagine that there were two successively bearing the name of *Amasis*; others that there were two *Apries*, the one slain by *Nebuchadnezzar*, the other by *Amasis*: a question of small importance, because the difference is only about a name, it being once granted that the person mention'd in scriptures, was deprived of life and kingdom by the *Affrians*. Yet for any thing that I can perceive, that *Apries*, of whom the *Greek* historians wrote, could not be the deputy of *Nebuchadnezzar*, seeing that he was the grandchild of *Pharaoh Neco*, and made war (as they report) upon the *Phenitians*, who were, before the *Egyptians*, become subject unto the crown of *Babylon*. I might add perhaps, that he whom *Nebuchadnezzar* left as governour of *Egypt*, was more likely to have had some *Chaldean* or *Affrian* than *Egyptian* name; unless we should think that he had been a traitor to his natural prince, and so rewarded by the conqueror with lieutenantship the country: about which it were but frivolous to dispute. Thus much in brief we ought to believe, that *Nabuchodonosor* made an absolute conquest of *Egypt*; that he was not so foolish as to give it away, any man may guess; that he appointed one to rule the country, it is consequent unto the former, and

hath authority of *Josephus*; that this governour (or some successor of his) was afterwards taken and slain by *Amasis*, I see probability enough to persuade my self; and yet can well be content, that others use their liberty, and believe what they list. As for the army which the *Egyptian* king *Apries* is supposed to have kept of *Ionians* and *Carians*; I hold them to be none other than the garrisons of mercenary soldiers which were left by the *Affrian* for the guard of his viceroy, and custody of the new subdued province: as likewise the company returning from *Cyrene* and *Barce*, who together with the friends of such as were slain in that expedition, remembered before out of the *Greek* historians, deposed and slew *Apries*, I take them to have been the *Egyptian* fugitives which then recovered their own country. Sure it is that this prophecy of *Ezekiel* was verified, ^d *At the end of forty years will I gather the Egyptians from the people where they were scattered, and I will bring again the captivity of Egypt, and will cause them to return into the land of Pathros into the land of their habitation, and they shall be there a small kingdom.* If the *Egyptian* priests alluded hereunto in the tale which they made of *Amasis's* obtaining the kingdom, then are they to be help'd with this or the like interpretation; if they devised matter that had no shadow of truth, only to keep the *Greeks* from knowledge of their country's disgrace; then are they little to be regarded, since we know the truth with them.

S E C T. X.

Of the sundry accounts drawn from sundry acts of Nebuchadnezzar, and of the destruction of Nineveh by him; the time of which action is uncertain.

THESE victories brought the greatness of the *Affrian* empire to the full, and from them was reckoned the time of *Nebuchadnezzar's* reign in sundry places of scripture. To speak any more of the questions arising about the supputation of *Nebuchadnezzar's* times, might seem to be the overhandling of one argument: yet thus much I will note; that whereas ^e *Daniel* was carried captive in the 3d year of *Jehoiakim's* reign (which ran along with some part of *Nebuchadnezzar's* first year) and was kept in diet 3 years more, before he was brought into the king's presence; it could not be the 2d of *Nebuchadnezzar's* kingdom, wherein he interpreted the forgotten dream of the great image, foreshewing the success of monarchies, but the 2d of his empire. The same or the like may be said of divers places which refer sundry matters unto their set years; as that of *Ezekiel* before cited, where he foretells that *Egypt* should be given in reward for the service done before *Tyrus*, dating his prophecy in the 27th year; and that of *Daniel*, placing the erection of the golden image in the 18th year: for these years held no dependance upon either the beginning of *Nebuchadnezzar's* kingdom, or of his empire, nor yet upon any of the captivities, but had reference to some memorable actions omitted in scripture, and therefore not easy to be found, nor worth the labour of uncertain search.

Of any war made by *Nebuchadnezzar* after such time as he returned from the conquest of *Egypt*, I do not read: excepting that against *Nineveh*, the destruction whereof was fore-told by the prophet *Nabum*. *Nineveh* had long before been taken by *Merodach* (as in due place hath been shewed) and together with the rest of *Affria* made

^a Ezek. 29. 13. 14. 15. ^b Isa. 19. 11. ^c Ezek. 29. 9. 13. 14. ^d Dan. 1. 2.

^e Jer. 52. 5.

^f Ezek. 3. 2.

^g Jos. Ant. Jud. l. 10. c. 11.

^h Jer. 52. 5.

ⁱ Ezek. 3. 2.

subject to *Babylon*. Yet was it left under a peculiar king; who rebelling against the *Chaldean*, as *Jehoiakim* and *Zedekias*, tributary kings of *Juda*, had done, tasted likewise of the same fortune. That the destruction of *Nineveh* followed the conquest of *Egypt*, it appeareth by the comparison which ^a*Nabum* the prophet made between this city that was to fall, and the city of *No* in *Egypt* that was fallen already. But how long after this came to pass, it is (methinks) impossible to find out. For whereas it is found in an *Hebrew* chronology, that it was in the first of *Nebuchadnezzar*'s reign; the place of *Nabum* last cited is enough to disprove it. Whereas it is referred by some unto the first of his monarchy, which began at the end of the *Egyptian* wars; the whole prophecy of *Nabum*, which went between the one and the other, argueth strongly, that there was a longer space of time intercurrent. So that to enquire into the very year of this destruction, or other circumstances of the war, whether managed by *Nabuchodonosor* in person, or by his lieutenants, were somewhat like unto the vain curiosity of *Tiberius Cesar*, enquiring who was the mother of *Hecuba*; or to the like idle pains which he should take, who would seek to learn what woman that *Huzzab* queen of *Nineveh* was, whose woful captivity the same prophet *Nabum* likewise did foretell.

SECT. XI.

Of the latter time of Nebuchadnezzar; his buildings, madness, and death.

OF the time which this great monarch spent in quiet, I think there are no monuments extant; save those which we find among the prophecies of *Daniel*. Among these we may reckon his great works at *Babylon*, wherewith he pleased himself so well, that he broke out into these glorious words: ^b*Is not this great Babel that I have built for the house of the kingdom, by the might of my power, and for the honour of my majesty?* Surely if those things be true that are by *Josephus* rehearsed of him out of *Berosus* and *Megasthenes*, he might well delight himself with the contemplation of such goodly and magnificent buildings. For it is said, that he fortified *Babylon* with a triple wall; that besides other stately works, he raised those huge arches wherewith were borne up the high orchards, hanging as it were in the air, and equalling the tops of mountains, which most sumptuous frame, that outlasted all the remainder of the *Assyrian*, and all the *Persian* empire, is said to have been reared, and finished in 15 days.

But of all this, and other his magnificence, we find little else recorded, than that (which indeed is most profitable for us to consider) his over-valuing of his own greatness abased him unto a condition, inferior to the poorest of men. And not undeservedly fell these judgments of God upon him. For whereas God had honoured him, not only with many victories, and much happiness in his own life, but with a discovery of things to come after him, yea, and had approved the certainty of his dream, by the miraculous reducing of it into his memory, and interpretation thereof by *Daniel* the prophet: he nevertheless became so forgetful of God, whose wonderful power he had seen and acknowledged, that he caused a golden image to be set up and worshipped: ordaining a cruel death as reward unto them that should dare to disobey his kingly will and pleasure, which was utterly repug-

nant to the law of him that is *the King of kings*. Hereof *St. Jerome* hath well noted; *Velox oblivio veritatis, ut qui dudum servum Dei quasi Deum adoraverat, nunc statum sibi fieri jubeat, ut ipse quasi Deus in statua adoraretur*: A hasty forgetfulness of the truth, that he who so lately had worshipped (*Daniel*) the servant of God, as if he had been God himself, should now command a statua to be erected unto himself, wherein himself might be worshipped as God. From this impiety it pleased God to reclaim him, by the strange and wonderful delivery of those blessed saints out of the fiery furnace; who being thrown into it bound, for refusing to commit idolatry, were assisted by an angel; preserved from all harm of the fire; loosened from their bands; and finally called out with gracious words, and restored to their former honour, by the king: who, amazed at the miracle, made a decree tending to the honour of God, which by erection of his image he had violated. Yet this devotion of *Nebuchadnezzar* was not so rooted in him, that it could bring forth fruit answerable to his hasty zeal. Therefore was he forewarned by God in a dream of the terrible judgment hanging over his head, which *Daniel* expounding, advised him to *break off his sin by righteousness, and his iniquity by mercy towards the poor, that there might be an healing of his error*. Hereby it seems injustice and cruelty were the faults, for which he was threatened, but this threatening sufficed not unto his reformation. For that so great a monarch should be driven from among men (according to the tenor of the dream and interpretation) yea compelled to dwell with the beasts of the field, and made to eat grass as the oxen, was a thing so incredible in man's judgment, that easily it might be thought an idle dream, and much more easily be forgotten at the year's end. One whole year's leisure to repent was given to this haughty prince: which respite of the execution may seem to have bred in him a forgetfulness of God's sentence. For at the end of 12 months; walking in the royal palace of *Babel*, he was so overjoy'd and transported with a vain contemplation of his own seeming happiness, that without all fear of God's heavy judgment pronounced against him, he uttered those lofty words before rehearsed, in vaunting of the majestic works which he had reared, as well be-seeming his majestic person. But his high speeches were not fully ended, when a voice from heaven, telling him that his kingdom was departed from him, rehearsed over unto him the sentence again, which was fulfilled upon him the very same hour.

That *Solomon* and many other princes and great ones, have taken delight in their own buildings, it cannot any way be doubted; yet I do not remember that ever I have read of any, that were punished for rejoicing in works of this kind (tho' it is hard in joy, or any passion of the mind, to keep a just measure) excepting only this *Nebuchadnezzar*.

The like may be said of *David*: for other (and some very godly) kings have mulctured all their forces to the very last man; but few or none have been known to have been punished as *David* was. Surely I not only hold it lawful to rejoice in those good things, wherewith God hath blessed us; but a note of much unthankfulness to entertain them with a sullen and unfeeling disposition. Yet as all human afflictions, wherein due reference to God is wanting, are no better than obscure clouds, hindring the influence of that blessed light, which

^a *Nabum* 1. 9

^b *Dan* 4. 30

clarifies the soul of man; and predisposeth it unto the brightness of eternal felicity; so that insolent joy, which man in the pride of his vain imagination conceiveth of his own wrath, doth above all other passions blast our minds, as it were with lightning, and make us to reflect our thoughts upon our seeming inherent greatness, forgetting the whilst him, to whom we are indebted for our very being. Wherefore these *mala mentis gaudia*; the evil joys of the mind, were not unaptly, by the prince of *Latin* poets, bestowed in the entrance of *hell*, and placed further inward than sorrows, cares, and fears; not far from the iron cabbins of the *furies*. And certainly it is no unlikely token of vengeance near at hand, when these unreasonable flushes of proud and vain joy, do rage in a mind, that should have been humbled with a just repentance and acknowledgment of ill deserving.

This was verified upon *Nebuchadnezzar*, whose punishment was singular and unexampled. For he ran among beasts in the fields and woods, where for seven years he lived, not only as a savage man, but as a savage beast, for a beast he thought himself *secundum suam imaginationem*, as ^a *Thomas* noteth, and therefore fed himself in the same manner, and with the same food that beasts do; not that he was changed in figure external according to ^b *Mediana*, in so much as he appeared a beast to other men's eyes, as *St. Jerome* in the life of *Hilarius* (how true God knows) speaks of a woman that appeared to all other men's sight a cow, but to *Hilarius* only a woman; neither was he changed as *Iphigenia* the daughter of *Agamemnon* was said to be, into a hind, nor made a monster as ^c *Dorotheus* and *Epiphanius* dreamed: but according to *St. Jerome's* exposition of these words. *At the same time was my understanding restored unto me, &c. Quando dicit (saith St. Jerome) sensum sibi redditum, ostendit non formam se amisisse sed mentem*; when he saith that his sense was restored unto him, he sheweth that he had not lost his human shape, but his understanding. Seven years expired, it pleased God to restore *Nebuchadnezzar*, both to his understanding, and to his estate, for which he acknowledged and praised God all the rest of his life, ^d confessing his power and everlasting being; that he was the Lord of heaven and earth, and wrought without resistance what he pleased in both; that his works were all truth, and his ways righteous. Which gave argument to many of the fathers, and others, not to doubt of his salvation; namely *St. Augustine*, *Theodoret*, *Lyra*, *Carthusianus*, and others. And for that place of *Isay* the fourteenth, out of which his perdition may be gathered, the aforementioned authors apply the same to *Balthasar*, because *Isay* both in the thirteenth and fourteenth chapter speaketh of the king, and the destruction of *Babylon* jointly.

S E C T. XII.

OF EVILMERODACH.

HAVING already spoken what I could of the succession and years of *Nebuchadnezzar's* posterity; the most that may be said of him, is said of *Evilmerodach*, which I will not here again rehearse.

He lost some part of that which his father had gotten; and left his kingdom burning in a war that consumed it to ashes. He lost *Egypt* by rebellion of the people, in the nineteenth year of his reign, which was forty years after his father had conquered it. But this agrees neither with the

account of *Herodotus*, who allows to *Amasis* four and forty years of reign; nor with that of *Diodorus*, who gives him five and fifty, saying that he died in the third year of the threescore and third *Olympiad*, when *Cambyfes* did conquer *Egypt*. There were indeed but seven and thirty years, which passed between the second year of the four and fiftieth *Olympiad* (which was the nineteenth of *Evilmerodach*, and the first of *Amasis*) and the fifth of *Cambyfes's* reign wherein he won *Egypt*; of which seven and thirty years it is credibly held that *Psammetichus*, the son of *Amasis*, reigned three: so that *Amasis* could be no longer king than four and thirty years. But seeing that these two *Greek* historians have been abused by *Egyptian* priests, in the substance of that which was spoken of *Amasis*, it is no marvel though they were also deceived in the length of his reign. This is the plain answer to this objection. For to say either that the numbers were miswritten, and four and forty set down instead of four and thirty, or that *Amasis* did temporise a while with the *Affyrians*, and not bear himself as absolute king of *Egypt*, until the nineteenth of *Evilmerodach* (at which time, and not before, it hath been proved out of *Ezekiel*, that *Egypt* became again a kingdom) I hold it a superfluous excuse.

Whether these *Egyptian* troubles did animate the king of the *Medes* to deal with *Evilmerodach*, as with a prince greater in fame, and reputation, gotten by the decayed valour of his people, than in present forces; or rather (as I think) some foil received by the *Affyrian* invading *Media*, emboldened the *Egyptians* to rebel against him: I will neither undertake, nor seek to define. ^e *Xenophon* tells, that the first service of young *Cyrus* in war was under *Astyages* king of the *Medes*, his grandfather, in a prosperous fight against the *Affyrian* prince, who did set upon him; at which time *Cyrus* was fifteen or sixteen years old. If therefore *Cyrus* lived threescore and three years (as he is said to have died well stricken in years) which is held to be the ordinary term of no short life, then was this encounter in the third year of *Evilmerodach's* reign. Yet by the same reckoning it should follow, that the war began more early between these nations, for as much as the manner of their fight in former times, with other circumstances insinuating as much, are found in the same place of ^f *Xenophon*. And it may well be, that the death or destruction of *Nabuchodonosor* gave courage unto those that had felt him a troublesome neighbour, to stand upon prouder terms with the *Affyrians*, than in his flourishing estate they durst have used. Howsoever the quarrel began, we find that it ended not before the last ruin of the *Affyrian* monarchy. For the *Babylonian*, being too proud to digest the losses which he received by the *Medes* and their allies the *Persians*, drew unto his party the *Lydians*, and all the people of the lesser *Asia*, with gifts and strong persuasions, hoping so to overwhelm his enemies with a strong invasion, whom in vain he had sought to weary out with a lingering war.

This happen'd after the death of *Astyages*, who left the world in the nineteenth year of *Evilmerodach*, at which time *Amasis* took possession of *Egypt*. So that the *Affyrian* having his hands already full of business, which more earnestly did affect him, seems thereby to have given the better means unto the *Egyptians*, of new erecting their kingdom, which by long distance of place did sundry times find occasion to rebel in after-ages, and set up a king within it self, against the far more mighty *Persian*.

^a L. 2. de Reg. pri. ^b Med. l. 2. de rella in Deum fide, cap. 7. ^c Dor. in Synesii Ep. in vit. Den. ^d Dan. 4. 32. 33. ^e Xenoph. Cyroped. l. 1. ^f Xenoph. Cyroped. l. 8.

The issue of these great preparations made by *Evilmerodach* against the *Medes*, was such as opened the way unto the fulfilling of those prophecies, which were many years before uttered against *Babel*, by *Esay* and *Jeremy*.

For the *Affyrians*, and their confederates, who, trusting in their numbers, thought to have buried the *Medes* and *Persians*, under their thick showers of arrows and darts, were encountered with an army of stout and well-trained men, weightily armed for close fight, by whom they were beaten in open battle, wherein *Evilmerodach* was slain. So that great frame of empire which *Nabuchodonosor* had raised and upheld, being shaken and grievously crack'd under his unfortunate son, was left to be sustained by his unworthy nephew: a man more likely to have overthrown it, when it was greatest and strongest, than to repair it, when it was in way of failing.

SECT. XIII.

A private conjecture of the author; serving to make good those things, which are cited out of Berofus, concerning the successors of Evilmerodach, without wrong to the truth, the quality, and death of Balthasar.

THOUGH I have already (as it seems to me) sufficiently proved that *Balthasar* was the son and immediate successor to *Evilmerodach*, yet considering earnestly the conjectures of those writers, which following *Berofus*, insert *Niglifar* or *Niriglissaroor*, and his son *Labassardach* between them: as also that which I find in *Herodotus* of *Nitocris* a famous queen of *Babylon*, who greatly adorned and fortified that city; I have thought it not superfluous here in this place to shew, by what means it was possible that some error might have crept into the history of those times, and thereby have brought us to a needless trouble of searching out the truth, as it were by candle-light, in the uncertain fragments of lost authors, which we might have found by day-light, had we adher'd only to the scriptures. First therefore I observe, that the time which *Berofus* divides betwixt *Evilmerodach*, and the two next kings, agrees with the years in which *Nebuchadnezzar* lived wild among brute beasts in the open field. Secondly, that the suddenness of this accident, which came in one hour, could not but work much perturbation in that state, wherein doubtless the honour of so noble a prince was highly regarded, his calamity pity'd, and his restitution hop'd; the prediction of *Daniel* finding reputation in that clause which promised his recovery, as being verified in that which had been more incredible. Now if we do in common reason judge, what course was like to be taken by the great ones of the kingdom, for settling the government, whilst the king was thus distracted, we shall find it most likely, that his son and heir did occupy the royal throne, with condition to restore it unto his father, when God should enable him to possess it. In this his rule *Evilmerodach* being to supply the utter want of understanding in his father, as *protectors* do the unripe-ness of it in young, but reasonable kings, might easily either commit the intolencies, or fall into the troubles, incident to such an office. That he had in him very small ability of government, it appears by his ill maintaining the empire, when he held it in his own right. That his sister *Nitocris* (if *Nitocris* were his sister) was a woman of an high spirit, it appears by that which *Herodotus* reports of her, say-

ing that she was more cunning than *Semiramis*, as appear'd in her magnificent and useful works about the river of *Euphrates*, and her fortification of *Babylon* against the *Medes*, who had gotten many towns from the *Affyrians*, and amongst them *Nineveh*. Wherefore it were not unreasonable to think, that such a woman, seeing how the empire went to decay through her brother's misgovernment, used practices to get the rule into her own hands, and afterwards, as a mother, to leave it unto her ungracious son. Other time than this, wherein *Nitocris* could have reigned, we do not find; but we find in *Berofus* (as *Josephus* hath cited him) that *Niglifar*, who got the kingdom from *Evilmerodach*, was his sister's husband; which argues this to have been the same woman. As for *Labassardach* the son of *Niglifar*, if at the end of nine months reign he were for his lewd conditions slain by the nobility, as the same *Berofus* reporteth, it seems that God prepared here by the way for *Nebuchadnezzar*'s restitution (whose term of punishment was then expired) by raising such troubles as should make him the more desired, both of the princes and the people. I will not here use many words to confute that which *Berofus* hath further set down of *Evilmerodach*, telling us that he was slain by his sister's husband: for the plain words of scripture naming the year wherein he gave liberty to *Jechonia*, do plainly testify that he out-lived the three or four and fortieth year of his father's reign, which was the last of his life.

This may suffice to shew, that they who are said to have succeeded *Evilmerodach* in the kingdom, might indeed have so done, though not when he held it in his own right. Of *Balthasar*, who was his son and heir, we find, that he had such conditions, as God permitted to be in a king for the ruin of the people. He was from his young years of a mischievous nature; having in his father's time slain a noble young man that should have married his sister, only for spight and envy to see him kill two wild beasts in hunting, at which himself having thrown his javelin had missed them. Another great lord he had gilded, because a gentlewoman commending his beauty, said it were a happy woman that should be his wife. Such barbarous villanies caused many which had loved his father (as a good and gracious, though unfortunate prince) to revolt from him unto the enemy as soon as he was king. Neither do I find that he perform'd any thing worthy of record, but as a coward and a fool he lost all; sitting still, and not once daring to give battle to them that daily took somewhat from him; yet carelessly feasting when danger had hemm'd him in on every side, and when death arrested him by the hands of those whom he had wronged in his father's life. So the end of him was base and miserable; for he died as a fool taken in unexcusable security, yet had not that happiness (such as it is) of a death free from apprehension of fear, but was terrified with a dreadful vision, which had shewed his ruin not many hours before, even whilst he was drinking in that wine, which the swords of his insulting enemies drew out of him, together with his latest blood. It is therefore in this place enough to say of him, That after a dishonourable reign of seventeen years, he perished like a beast, and was slain as he deserved. The rest that concerneth him in question of his time, hath been spoken heretofore; in matter of his affairs, shall be handled among the of *Cyrus*, to whose story that of *Balthasar* is but an appendix.

Of the original and first greatness of the Persians.

iii

in the eyes of God, than the subversion of any state or monarchy, how powerful soever.

And it may well be thought, that the soldiers employed in that service did rather ascribe the glory to him that was the best man of war, than to the *Median*, who was greatest in riches and power. All which also falling upon *Cyrus* by succession, and continuing in his posterity, did much augment the fame of his virtue, which among prophane historians over-grew altogether the honour due to *Cyaxares*, both because he was old, and did nothing in person; as also because he soon after quitted the world, and left *Cyrus*, who was possess'd of whatsoever belonged to *Darius*, before the fame of any such king or conqueror was carried far off.

And for the *Greek* historians, they took all things from the relation of the *Persians*, who gave to *Cyrus* all the praise of a most excellent prince, making none his equal. Only *Daniel* in the first, fifth, and sixth chapters of his prophecies, makes it plain that himself not only lived a great officer under king *Darius*, but that he continued in that estate to the first of *Cyrus*, which, being the year of *Daniel's* death, could not have been distinguished from the reign of *Darius*, if they had begun together and reigned jointly; neither can it be imagined that *Darius* held the kingdom by *Cyrus's* permission, considering that *Cyrus* began after him.

SECT. III.

Xenophon's relation of the war which the Medes and Persians made with joint forces upon the Assyrians and others.

THESE testimonies of the scriptures, which need no other confirmation, are yet made more open to our understanding, by that which *Xenophon* hath written of these wars: the cause whereof, according to his report, was this.

When the *Assyrian* had enlarged his empire with victories, and was become lord of all *Syria*, and many other countries, he began to hope that if the *Medes* could be brought under his subjection, there should not then be left any nation adjoining able to make head against him. For the king of the *Medes* was able to bring into the field three-score thousand foot, and above ten thousand horse, to which the forces of *Persia* being joined made an exceeding strong army.

The *Assyrian* considering the strength of such a neighbour, invited *Cresus* king of *Lydia*, a prince very mighty both in men and treasure, and with him other lords of *Asia* the less to his assistance, alledging that those eastern nations were very powerful, and so firmly conjoin'd by league and many alliances, that it would not be easy, no not possible, for any one nation to resist them. With these incitements, and strengthened with great presents, he drew to himself so many adherents as he compounded an army of two hundred thousand foot, and three-score thousand horse; of which, ten thousand horse, and forty thousand foot were led by *Cresus*, who had great cause of enmity with the *Medes*, in regard of the war made by them against his father *Alyattes*; but this great army was by *Cyaxares* king of the *Medes*, and by *Cyrus* general of the *Persian* forces, utterly broken; upon which defeat, the *Assyrian* king being also slain, so many of the *Assyrians* revolted as *Babylon* it self could not longer be assured without the succours of mercenaries, waged with great sums of money out of *Asia* the less, *Egypt*, and elsewhere. Which new-gathered forces were also scattered by *Cyrus*, who following his advantage, possess'd himself of a great part of the lesser *Asia*, at

which time it was, as I take it, that *Cresus* himself was also made prisoner.

The attempt of *Babylon* following soon after, the army lying before it being paid by *Darius*, whom *Xenophon* calleth *Cyaxares*, and led by *Cyrus's* sister's son, prevailed against *Balthasar*, as in due time shall be set down.

Those *Persians* which followed *Cyrus*, and by him levied, are number'd thirty thousand Foot-men, of which a thousand were armed gentlemen, the rest of the common sort were archers, or such as used the dart and the sling. So far *Xenophon*. Of whom in this argument, as it is true, that he described in *Cyrus* the pattern of a most heroical prince, with much poetical addition: so it cannot be denied, but that the bulk and gross of his narration was founded upon mere historical truth.

Neither can it indeed be affirmed of any the like writer, that in every speech and circumstance he hath precisely tied himself to the phrase of the speaker, or nature of the occasion, but borrowed in each out of his own invention, appropriating the same to the times and persons of whom he treated. Putting therefore apart the moral and political discourse, and examining but the history of things done, it will easily appear that *Xenophon* hath handled his undertaken subject in such sort, that by beautifying the face thereof, he hath not in any sort corrupted the body.

SECT. IV.

The estate of the Medes and Persians in times foregoing this great war.

FOR it is commonly agreed upon, that *Aschemenes* the son of *Perfes* being governour of *Persia*, did associate himself with *Arbaces*, who commanded in *Media* in that rebellion against *Sardanapalus*, and that each of them after the victory obtained, held for himself the dominion of those countries which he had formerly ruled for the *Assyrians*; as also that they conveyed over the same honour and power to their posterity; which in *Media* was not absolutely regal, but with some restraint limited, until such time as *Deioces* took upon him the full authority and majesty of a kingdom. From the death of *Sardanapalus* to the reign of *Deioces*, are usually accounted about an hundred and forty years, in the last sixty whereof there reigned in *Assyria* mighty princes, namely *Salmanassar* and his successors, whose great achievements in *Syria* and elsewhere witness, that the *Medes* and *Persians* found it not for their advantage to undertake any offensive war against those victorious kings, it being also probable that the league continued as yet between these the successors of *Belochus*, and *Arbaces*, who had formerly shared the empire.

Now from the beginning of *Deioces* to the first of *Astyages*, there pass'd above ninety years, in which if *Herodotus* have written truly, that *Phraortes* conquered *Persia*, and how he and other the kings of *Media* by many victories greatly enlarged their dominions, and commanded many parts of *Asia*, it had been but an unadvised enterprise of the *Assyrians* and *Babylonians*, to have wasted themselves against the *Syrians* and *Egyptians*, leaving so able and victorious a nation on their backs. But that the *Medes* had done nothing upon the south parts of *Persia*, and that the *Persians* themselves were not masters of *Susiana* in *Nabuchodonosor's* time, it is manifest in *Daniel*, who was then governour for the *Babylonians* in *Susa* or *Susan*, the chief city thereof. It is true indeed, that the *Medians*, either under *Cyaxares* or *Astyages*, or both, had quarrel with *Alyattes*

Cyaxartes the father of *Cresus*, which after some six years dispute was compounded.

How the affairs of *Persia* stood in so many ages, I do not find any memory. It seemeth that the roughness of the mountainous country which they then possess'd, with the confederacy which they continued with the *Medes*, gave them more security than fame: For if their kings, being the posterity of *Achemenes*, had done any memorable acts, the greatness which they afterward obtained would not have suffer'd any forgetfulness thereof. But as we find all *Xenophon's* reports, both of these wars and the state of those countries to be very consonant and agreeable to the relation of many other good authors, so it appears, that the race of *Achemenes* held the principality of *Persia* from father to son for many descents. And therefore we may better give credit to *Xenophon*, who affirmeth, that *Cambyfes* the father of *Cyrus* was king of *Persia*: than to those that make him a mean man, and say, that *Astyages* gave him his daughter *Mandane* in marriage, to the end that her son (whose nativity he feared) might be disabled from any great undertaking by his father's ignobility.

For what cause of grief could it be to *Astyages*, that the son of his daughter should become lord of the best part of *Asia*? No; it was more likely, that upon such a prophecy his love to his grandchild should have encreased, and his care been the greater to have married her to some prince of strength and eminent virtue.

Yea, the same *Herodotus*, who is the first author, and, as I think, the deviser of the mischief intended against *Cyrus* by his grand-father, doth confess, That the line of the *Achemenide* was so renowned, that the great king *Xerxes* in the height of his prosperity did thence derive himself, and vaunt of it: which he would never have done, had they been ignoble, or had they been the vassals of any other king or monarch.

For in this sort *Xerxes*, in the seventh of *Herodotus*, deriveth himself.

Achemenes
Cambyfes
Cyrus
Teispens
Ariaramnes
Arfames
Hystaspes
Darius
Xerxes.

Of the *Achemenide* there were two races: of the first was *Cyrus* the great, whose issue-male failed in

his two sons, *Cambyfes* and *Smerdis*. This royal family is thus set down by the learned *Reineccius*.

Achemenes the son of *Perfes*, first king of *Persia*.

Darius.

Cyrus, the first of that name, had *Cambyfes* and *Atossa*, who, married to *Pharnaces*, king of *Cappadocia*, had *Artystona* and other daughters.

Cambyfes had

Cyrus the great; *Cyrus* had

Cambyfes, who succeeded him, and *Smerdis* slain by his brother *Cambyfes*.

Of the second were those seven great princes of *Persia*, who having overthrown the usurped royalty of the *Magi*, chose from among themselves *Darius* the son of *Hystaspes* king.

This kingdom of *Persia* was first known by the name of *Elam*, so called after *Elam* the son of *Sem*, and the people therein inhabiting *Elamitæ*; by *Elianus*, *Elymæ*; by *Josephus*, *Elymi*.

Suidas derives this nation sometimes from *Assur*, sometimes from *Magog*, of whom they were called *Magusæi*; which *Magusæi*, according to ^a *Eusebius*, are not to be taken for the nation in general, but for those who were afterward called the *Magi*, or wise men. So do the *Greeks*, among many other their sayings of them, affirm, that the *Persians* were anciently written *Artæi*, and that they called themselves *Cephenes*. But that they were ^b *Elamitæ*, *Moses*, and the prophets, *Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, *Ezekiel*, *Daniel*, and *Esdra*s, in many places confirm: which also *St. Jerome* upon *Jeremiah* the 25th, upon *Daniel* the 8th, and in his *Hebrew* questions approveth, saying, *Elam a quo Elamitæ principes Persidis*; *Elam*, of whom were the *Elamites* princes of *Persia*.

And that city which the author of the 2d book of the *Maccabees* calleth *Persepolis*, is by the author of the ^d 1st called *Elimais*, but is now called *Siras*, being the same, which *Antiochus*, for the great riches thereof, twice attempted in vain, and to his great dishonour. And yet this city, now called *Siras*, was not the old *Persepolis*; for *Alexander*, at the request of *Thais* the harlot, burnt it.

The first king of *Persia* to us known, if we follow the current of authors interpreting the 14th chapter of *Genesis*, was *Chedorlaomer*, who lived with *Amraphel* or *Ninias*, and joined with him in the war against those *Arabians*, who was afterwards extinguished by the forces of *Abraham*.

^a Euseb. 1. 6. c. 8. de Præp. Evang. ^b Gen. 10. II. 11. 21, 22. Jer. 25, & 29. Ezek. 32. Dan. 8. Efd. 4
^c 2 Mac. 9. ^d 1 Mac. 6.

C H A P. III.

Of C Y R U S.

S E C T. I.

Of Cyrus's name and first actions.

AS touching the name of *Cyrus*, ^a*Strabo* saith, that the same was taken from a river which watereth *Persia*; this great prince having *Agradatus* for his proper name. But the great *Cyrus* was not the first of that name. *Herodotus* otherwise; and that *Cyrus* signifieth a father in the *Persian* tongue, and therefore so intitled by the people.

It is true, that for his justice and other excellent virtues he was indeed called a father; but that the name of *Cyrus* had any such signification, I think it be mistaken.

^b*Plutarch* hath a third opinion, affirming, that *Cyrus* is as much as to say the sun, in the same language. Howsoever it be, yet the prophet *Isaiah*, almost 200 years before *Cyrus* was born, gives him that name, *Thus saith the Lord unto Cyrus*, &c.

Before the conquest of *Babylon*, the victories which *Cyrus* obtained were many and great: among which, the conquest of *Lydia*, and other provinces thereto subject, together with the taking of *Cresus* himself, are not recounted by *Eusebius*, *Orosius*, and others, but placed among his later achievements, whose opinion for this difference of time is founded upon two reasons; namely, that of the *Median* there is no mention in that last war against *Cresus*: and that the obtaining of *Sardis* is referr'd to the 58th *Olympiad*, and the glorious victory which *Cyrus* had over *Babylon*, to the 55th *Olympiad*.

The former of which might have been used (and was by the *Greeks*) to exclude the *Medes* from the honour of having won *Babylon* it self, which in due place I have answered. The later seems to have reference to the second war which *Cyrus* made upon *Lydia*, when it rebelled; at which time he so established his former conquest, as after that time these nations never offered to revolt. Wherefore I like better in this particular to believe with *Herodotus*, whom the most of chronologers follow, and find the enterprize of *Sardis* to precede that of *Babylon*.

S E C T. II.

Of *Cresus* the king of *Lydia*, who made war upon *Cyrus*.

IHave in the last book spoken somewhat of *Cresus*, of his race and predecessors, as also of those kings which governed *Lydia* in more ancient times: of which the first (to prophane authors known) was *Lydus*, the son of *Atys*: which family extinguished, the kingdom was by an oracle conferred upon *Argon*, descended from *Hercules*, whereof there were 22 generations, *Candaules* being the last, who, by shewing his fair wife naked to *Gyges* his favorite, was by the same *Gyges* (thereto urged upon peril of his own life by the queen) the next day slain. Which done, *Gyges* enjoy'd both the queen and kingdom of *Lydia*, and left the same to *Atys* his son, who was father to *Sadyattes*, the father of *Halyattes* (who thrust the *Cimmerians* out of *Asia*) and *Halyattes* begat *Cresus*: which five kings, of a third race, enjoy'd that kingdom 170 years. *Halyattes* the father of *Cresus* was an undertaking

prince, and after he had continued a war against *Cyaxares* the *Median*, a prince very powerful, and maintained it 6 years, a peace was concluded upon equal conditions between them.

Astyages, the son of *Cyaxares*, and grand-father to *Cyrus*, thought himself greatly honoured by obtaining *Aryenes*, *Cresus*'s sister, whom he married.

But *Cresus* so far enlarged his dominions after his father's death, as he was nothing inferior in territory to any king or monarch of that age: of which, about that time, there were four in effect of equal strength; to wit, the *Median*, the *Babylonian*, the *Egyptian*, and the *Lydian*: only *Nabuchodonosor*, after he had joined *Phenicia*, *Palestina*, and *Egypt* to his empire, had thenceforward no competitor during his own life.

But *Cresus*, notwithstanding the men and treasure spent in the quarrel of the *Babylonians*, yet mastered *Æolis*, *Doris*, and *Ionia*, provinces possess'd by the *Greeks* in *Asia* the less, adjoining to *Lydia*; gave law to the *Phrygians*, *Bithynians*, *Carians*, *Myrians*, *Paphlagonians*, and other nations. And that he also enforced the *Ephesians* to acknowledge him, notwithstanding they compassed their city with *Diana's* girdle, ^c*Herodotus* witnesseth. Moreover, ^e*Athenæus* out of *Berosus* (which also *Strabo* confirmeth) makes report of a signal victory which *Cresus* obtain'd against the *Saceans*, a nation of the *Scythians*, in memory whereof the *Babylonian's* allies did yearly celebrate a feast, which they called *Sacea*: all which he perform'd in 14 years.

And being now confident in the continuance of his good fortune, and envious of *Cyrus's* fame, doubting also, that his prosperous undertakings might in the end grow perilous to himself, he consulted with the oracle of *Apollo*, whom he presented with marvellous rich gifts, what success he might hope for against *Cyrus*, if he undertook him: from whom he received this riddle, *Cresus passing over the river Halys, shall dissolve a great dominion*. For the devil, being doubtful of the success, paid him with merchandise of both sides like, and might be inverted either way to the ruin of *Persia*, or of his own *Lydia*.

S E C T. III.

Cresus's expedition against Cyrus.

Hereupon *Cresus* being resolved to stop the course of *Cyrus's* fortunes, if he could, despised all the arguments used by *Sandanes* to the contrary, who desired him to forethink, that he urged a nation inhabiting a barren and mountainous region, a people not covered with the soft silk of worms, but with the hard skins of beasts; not fed with such meat as they fancied, but content with what they found; drinkers of water, not of wine: and in a word, a nation warlike, enduring, valiant and prosperous; over whom if he became victorious, he could thereby enrich himself in nothing but fame, in which he already excelled: and if by them beaten, and subjected, so great would his loss appear of all things which the world hath in account, as the same could neither hastily be told, nor readily conceived.

^a Strab. l. 15^b Plut. in vit. Arta.^c Herod. l. 1. p. 3, 4, 5.^d Herod. l. 1^e Athen. l. 14. c. 17

Notwithstanding this solid counsel, *Cresus* having prepared a powerful army, he led the same towards *Media*, but in his passage he was arrested at *Pterium*, a city of great strength in *Cappadocia*; which while he fought by all means to surprize or to force, *Cyrus* came on, and found the *Lydians* encamped before it. That each was inferior to other in strength or opinion, I do not find: for out of doubt, *Cresus* as he excell'd any prince of that age in riches and ability; so was he not under any in territory and fame that then lived.

But as *Cratippus* of *Mitylene* answer'd *Pompey* when he complain'd against the Gods, because they favour'd a disturber and usurper of the commonwealth against him who fought for the *Roman* liberty, That kingdoms and commonwealths had their encrease and period from divine Ordinance: so at this time was the winter of *Cresus's* prosperity at hand, the leaves of his flourishing fortune ready to fall, and that of *Cyrus* but in the flower and first spring. The God of all power, and not *Admetis Herdman*, *Apollo*, had given date to the one, and a beginning of glory to the other.

When these two armies were in view of each other, after the entertainment of divers skirmishes, the *Persians* and *Lydians* began to join in gross troops: supplies from both kings thrust on upon the falling off and advancement of either nation: and as the *Persians* had somewhat the better of the day, so when the dark veil of night had hidden each army from the other's view, *Cresus* doubting what success the rising sun would bring with it, quitted the field to *Cyrus*, and with all speed possible retir'd, and taking the next way into *Lydia*, recover'd *Sardis* his first city and regal seat, without any pursuit made by *Cyrus* to retard him. Where being arrived, and nothing suspecting *Cyrus's* approach, or any other war for that winter, he dismissed the soldiers, and sent the troops of his sundry nations to their own provinces, appointing them to reassemble at the end of five months, acquainting his commanders with his intents for the renewing of the war at the time appointed.

S E C T. IV.

The conquest of Lydia by Cyrus.

CYRUS in the following morning finding the *Lydians* departed, put his army in order to pursue them, yet not so hastily, and at their heels, as to be discovered. But having good intelligence of *Cresus's* proceeding, he so measured his marches, as he presented not himself before *Sardis*, till such time as *Cresus* had disposed his army to their wintering garrisons: when being altogether unlook'd for, and unlearned, he surrounded *Sardis* with his army: wherein *Cresus* having no other companies than his citizens and ordinary guards, after fourteen days siege the same was enter'd by assault, and all executed that resisted. *Cresus* having now neither arms to fight, nor wings to fly, *Sardis* being on all parts strongly encompassed, thrust himself into the heap and miserable multitude of his vassals, and had undergone the common fortune of common persons vanquished, had not a son of his, who had been dumb all his life (^bby extremity of passion and fear enabled) cried out to the soldiers to spare *Cresus*. Who thereupon being taken and imprisoned, despoiled of all things but the expectation of death, he was forthwith tied in fetters, and set on the top of a great and high heap of wood, to be consumed to ashes thereon. To which when the fire

was set and kindled, remembering the discourse which he had had with the *Athenian* law-giver, he thrice cried out on his name, *Solon, Solon, Solon*: and being demanded what he meant by that invocation, he first used silence; but urg'd again, he told them, That he had now found it true which *Solon* had long since told him, That many men in the race and courses of their lives might well be accounted fortunate, but no man could discern himself for happy indeed, till his end.

Of which answer *Cyrus* being speedily inform'd, remembering the changes of fortune and his own mortality, he commanded his ministers of justice to withdraw the fire with all diligence to save *Cresus*, and to conduct him to his presence: which done, *Cyrus* demanded of him who it was that had persuaded him? or what self-reason had conducted him to invade his territory, and to make him of a friend an enemy? To whom he thus answer'd, it was thy prosperous and my unprosperous destiny (the *Grecian* God flattering therewithal my ambition) that were the inventors and conductors of *Cresus's* war against *Cyrus*.

Cyrus being pierc'd with *Cresus's* answer, and bewailing his estate, though victorious over it, did not only spare his life, but entertained him ever after as a king and his companion, shewing therein a true effect of mercy indeed. *Quæ non causam, sed fortunam spectat.*

And herein is the real difference discerned between that behaviour which we call *Beneficium latronis*, & *gratiam principis*: A thief sometimes sparing the life of him which is in his power, but unjustly: A king that giveth breath, and a continuance of being, to him that was the cause and author of his own evil.

The report made by *Xenophon* is, That *Cyrus* did friendly entertain *Cresus* at the first sight, not mentioning that which *Herodotus* delivers, and is here already set down, that he should have been burnt alive. It may well be, that *Xenophon* portraying (in *Cyrus*) an heroical prince, thought an intent so cruel fitter to be forgotten than rehearsed, as too much misbecoming a generous nature. And it is very likely, that nearness of alliance might withhold *Cyrus* (had he been otherwise vicious) from so cruel a purpose against his grand-mother's brother. Howsoever it was, the moral part of the story hath given much credit and reputation to the report of *Herodotus* (as to many the like it often doth) and made it pass for current, though the trust reposed in *Cresus* afterwards may seem to argue, that *Cyrus* did not use him inhumanely at the first.

For as *Herodotus* himself telleth us, when *Cyrus* pass'd with his army over *Araxes* into *Scythia*, he left *Cresus* to accompany and advise his son *Cambyses*, governour of the empire in his absence, with whom he lived all the time of *Cyrus*, and did afterwards follow *Cambyses* into *Egypt*, where he hardly escaped his tyrannous hand. What his end was I do not find.

But in this time the races of three of the greatest kings in that part of the world took end; to wit, of the *Babylonians*, *Medians*, and *Lydians*; in *Balthasar*, *Cyaxares*, and *Cresus*.

S E C T. V.

How Cyrus won Babylon.

AFTER this *Lydian* war ensued the great conquest of *Babylon*, which gave unto *Cyrus* an

^a In communi calamitate suam quisque habet fortunam, Curt.

^b Homo qui in homine calamitose misericors est meminit sui, Call.

^c Memoriam metus perimit: timor vocis est incitamentum, &c.

empire so large and mighty, that he was justly reputed the greatest monarch then living upon earth. How long time the preparations for this great action took up, it is uncertain; only it seems, that ten whole years did pass between his taking those two cities of *Sardis* and *Babylon*, which nevertheless I do not think to have been wholly occupied in provision for the *Affyrian* war, but rather to have been spent in settling the estate which he had already purchased. And hereunto perhaps may be referred that which *Ctesias* hath in his fragments, of a war made by *Cyrus* upon the *Scythians*, though related as foregoing the victory obtain'd against *Cresus*. He telleth us, that *Cyrus* invaded *Scythia*, and being victorious over that nation, took *Amorges* their king prisoner: but being in a second battle overthrown by the wife of *Amorges*, *Sparetha*, and therein taken, the one king was deliver'd for the other.

Likewise it may be thought that no small part of those troubles which arose in the lower *Asia*, grew soon after the departure of the victorious army, before the conquest was fully established.

For after *Cyrus* was returned out of *Asia* the less, many nations, conquered formerly by *Cresus*, and now by *Cyrus*, revolted from him; against whom he employed *Paëtiæ*, and then *Harpagus*, who first reduced the *Phocians* under their former obedience, and then the rest of the *Greeks* inhabiting *Asia* the less, as the *Ionians*, *Carians*, *Eolians*, and *Lycians*, who resolutely (according to the strength they had) defended themselves. But in the attempt upon *Babylon* it self, it is not to be doubted, that *Cyrus* employed all his forces, having taken order beforehand, that nothing should be able to divert him, or to raise that siege, and make frustrate the work upon which he did set all his rest. And great reason there was, that he should bend all his care and strength unto the taking of that city, which beside the fame and reputation that it held, as being head of an empire thereon depending, was so strongly fenced with a treble wall of great height, and surrounded with waters unfordable, so plentifully victualled for many years, that the inhabitants were not only free from all doubt and fear of their estate, but despised and derided all purposes and power of their besiegers.

The only hope of the *Medes* and *Persians*, who despaired of carrying by assault a city so well fortified and man'd, was, in cutting off all supplies of victuals and other necessities: whereof though the town was said to be stored sufficiently for more than twenty years, yet might it well be deemed, that in such a world of people as dwelt within those gates, one great want or other would soon appear, and vanquish the resolution of that unwarlike multitude. In expecting the success of this course, the besiegers were likely to endure much travail, and all in vain, if they did not keep strict watch and strong guards upon all quarters.

This was hard to do, in regard of the vast circuit of those walls which they were to gird in, with numbers neither great enough, nor of men sufficiently assured unto their commander: The consideration whereof ministered unto the *Babylonians* matter of good pastime, when they saw the *Lydians*, *Phrygians*, *Cappadocians*, and others, quartered about their town to keep them in, who having been their ancient friends and allies, were more likely to join with them, if occasion were offered, than to use much diligence on the behalf of *Cyrus*; who had, as it were yesterday, laid upon their necks the galling yoke of servitude. Whilst the besieged were

pleasing themselves in this deceitful and vain gladness, which is the ordinary fore-runner of sudden calamity, *Cyrus*, whom the ordinance of God made strong and constant, and inventive, devised, by so many channels and trenches as were sufficient and capable of *Euphrates*, to draw the same from the walls of *Babylon*, thereby to make his approach the more facile and assured: which when by the labour of many hands he had perform'd, he stayed the time of his advantage for the execution: for he had left certain banks or heads uncut, between the main river which surrounded the city, and his own trenches.

Now *Balthasar*, finding neither any want or weakness within, nor any possibility of approach for his enemies without, prepared an exceeding sumptuous feast, publick plays, and other pastimes; and thereto invited a thousand of his princes or nobility, besides his wives, curtizans, and others of that trade. This he did either to let the besiegers know, that his provisions were either sufficient, not only for all needful uses, but even for jollity and excess; or because he hoped that his enemies, under the burthen of many distresses, were well near broken; or in honour of *Bel* his most revered idol; or that it was his birth or coronation-day; or for many or all these respects. And he was not contented with such magnificence as no prince else could equal, but (using *Daniel's* words) *he lifted himself up against the Lord of heaven*: for he and his princes, wives and concubines, made carousing cups of the vessels of God, in contempt of whom he praised his own puppets, made of silver and gold, of brass, iron, wood and stone; *Quanta fuit stultitia in vasibus aureis bibentes, ligneos & lapideos deos laudare!* How great a foolishness was it (saith *St. Jerome*) drinking in golden cups, to praise Gods of wood and stone! Whilst *Balthasar* was in this sort triumphing, and his brains well filled with vapours, he beheld a hand, which by divine power wrote on the wall opposite unto him, certain words which he understood not: wherewith so great a fear and amazement seized him, as *the joints of his loins were loosed, and his knees smote one against the other*. Which passion, when he had in some part recovered, he cryed out for his *Chaldeans*, astrologians, and soothsayers, promising them great rewards, and the third place of honour in the kingdom to him that could read and expound the writing: but it exceeded their art. In this disturbance and astonishment, the queen hearing what had past, and of the king's amazement, after reverence done, used this speech: *There is a man in thy kingdom, in whom is the spirit of the holy Gods, and in the days of thy father, light and understanding, and wisdom, like the wisdom of the Gods was found in him, whom the king Nabuchodonosor, thy father, the king (I say) thy father made chief of the incanters, astrologians, Chaldeans, and soothsayers, because a more excellent spirit, and knowledge, and understanding, &c. were found in him, even in Daniel, &c. Now let Daniel be called, and he will declare the interpretation.*

This queen, *Josephus* takes for the grandmother; *Origen* and *Theodoret*, for the mother of *Balthasar*; either of which may be true; for it appeareth that she was not any of the king's wives, because absent from the feast; and being past the age of dancing, and banqueting, she came in upon the bruit of the miracle, and to comfort the king in his distraction. And whereas *Daniel* was forgotten and neglected by others both of younger years and times, this old queen remembered well what he had done in the days of *Nabuchodonosor*, grandfather to this

^a Xenoph. Cyropæd. l. 7.

^b Dan. 5. 6.

^c Orig. & Theod. in Dan. Joseph. Ant. 10.

Balthasar, and kept in mind both his religion and divine gifts.

When *Daniel* was brought to the king's presence, who acknowledg'd those excellent graces wherewith God had enriched him, he pray'd him, together with promises of reward and honour, to read and interpret those words miraculously written; to whom *Daniel* made answer in a far different style from that he used towards his grandfather: for, the evil which he foretold *Nabuchodonosor*, he wished that the same might befall his enemies; but to this king (whose neglect of God, and vice, he hated) he answered in these words, *Keep thy rewards to thy self, and give thy gifts to another; yet will I read the writing unto the king, and shew him the interpretation.* Which before he had performed, he gave him first the cause of God's just judgment against him, and the reason of this terrible sentence, whereof the king and all his wise men were utterly ignorant. Which being written at large in *Daniel* v. 18, 19, 20. hath this effect, that forgetting God's goodness to his father, whom all nations fear'd and obey'd, and that for his pride and neglect of those benefits, as he deprived him of his estate and understanding, so upon the acknowledgment of God's infinite power he restored him to both. This king, notwithstanding, lifted himself up against the same God; and presuming both to abuse those vessels dedicated to holy uses, and neglecting the Lord of all power, praised and worshipped the dead idols of gold, silver, brass, iron, stone and wood: and therefore those words, from the oracle of a true God delivered (to wit) *Mene Tekel, Upharsin*, gave the king knowledge, that God had numbred the time of his kingdom, and finished it; that he was weighed in the ballance of God's justice, and found too light; and that his empire was divided, and given to the *Medes* and *Persians*.

The very evening or night of this day, wherein *Balthasar* feasted and perished, *Cyrus*, either by his spies, according to *Xenophon*; or inspired by God himself, whose ensign he followed in this war, found the time and opportunity to invite him: and therefore while the king's head, and the heads of his nobility were no less filled with the vapours of wine, than their hearts with the fear of God's judgment, he caused all the banks and heads of his trenches to be opened and cut down with that diligence, as by them he drew the great river of *Euphrates* dry for the present, by whose channel running, his army made their entrance, finding none to disturb them. All the town lay buried (as the poet saith) in sleep and wine: such as came in the *Persians* way were put to the sword, unless they saved themselves by flight, as some did, who ran away crying, and filling the streets with an uncertain tumult.

Such *Assyrian* lords as had revolted from *Balthasar*, and betaken themselves to the party of *Cyrus*, did now conduct a selected company to the king's palace; which having easily forced, they rushed into the chamber where the king with his princes were banqueting, slew both him and them without any mercy, who struggled in vain to keep those lives which God had newly threatened to take away. And now was the prophecy of *Jeremiah* xxvii. fulfilled, and that of *Isaiab* xlvii. 200 years before this subversion; who in his 47th chapter, and elsewhere, writeth this destruction so feelingly and lively, as if he had been present both at the terrible slaughter there committed, and had seen the great and unfeared change and calamity of this great empire;

yea, and had also heard the sorrows and bewailings of every surviving soul therunto subject. His prophecy of this place he beginneth in these words; *Come down, and sit in the dust, O virgin daughter of Babel: sit on the ground, there is no throne, &c.* And again, *Sit still, and get thee into darkness, O daughter of the Chaldeans; for thou shalt no more be called the lady of kingdoms.* For, tho' it cannot be doubted, that God used *Nabuchodonosor*, and the *Chaldeans*, to punish the idolatry of the *Judeans*; yet ^a *Isaiab* teacheth us in this place, that he did not yet forget, that the execution of his judgments was mix'd with a rigorous extremity. For (saith *Isaiab*) in the person of God, *I was wroth with my people, I have polluted mine inheritance, and given them into thine hand: thou didst shew them no mercy, but thou didst lay thy very heavy yoke upon the ancient. I will rise up against them, saith the Lord of hosts, and will cut off from Babel the name, and the remnant, and the son, and the nephew.* And in the 13th, *Every one that is found, shall be stricken thorough: whosoever joineth himself, shall fall by the sword, their children also shall be broken in pieces before their eyes, their houses spoiled, and their wives ravished.* So as there is no historian who was either present at this victory of *Cyrus*, or that received the report from others truly as it was, that could better leave the same to posterity after it happen'd, than *Isaiab* had done in many places of his prophecies, which were written 200 years before any thing attempted.

The greatness and magnificence of *Babylon*, were it not by divers grave authors set down, might seem altogether fabulous: for, besides the reports of *St. Jerome*, *Solinus*, and *Orosius*, *Aristotle* in the 3d of his *Politicks*, the 2d chapter, received the report for true, that one part of the city knew not that the rest was taken three days after. Which is not impossible, if the testimony of ^b *Diodorus Siculus* may be taken; who finds the compass thereof at 360 stadia or furlongs, which makes forty-five miles: the walls whereof had so great a breadth, that six chariots might pass in front thereon. And of height, according to *Ctesias* and *Clitarchus*, three hundred threescore and five foot, garnished with an hundred and fifty towers. *Strabo*, in the beginning of his 16th book of geography, gives it a greater circuit, adding twenty-five furlongs more to the former compass, reckoning the same at three hundred fourscore and five furlongs, which make forty-eight miles and one furlong, but finds the wall far under that which *Diodore* reports: and so doth *Curtius* measure their thickness but at thirty-two foot, and their height at an hundred cubits, which is also very much; every cubit containing a foot and a half of the large measure, tho' to the whole circuit of the city he gives the same with *Siculus*, and eight furlongs more. ^c *Herodotus* finds a greater content than *Strabo* doth, namely, four hundred and fourscore furlongs circle; the thickness of the wall he measures at fifty cubits, and the height at two hundred of the same regal cubit. For entrance, it had an hundred gates of brass, with posts and hooks to hang them on of the same metal: and therefore did the prophet ^d *Isaiab* rightly intitle *Babylon*, *The princess and glory of kingdoms.*

But when *Cyrus* had won her, he stripp'd her out of her princely robes, and made her a slave, dividing not only all her goodly houses, and her whole territory, with all the riches therein contained,

^a Isa. 47. ^b Diod. l. 2. ^c Her. l. 1. ^d Isa. 47. 13.

among his soldiers; but bestowing the inhabitants themselves as bond-slaves upon those that had taken possession of their goods.

Touching the reign of *Cyrus*, and the time which he enjoy'd in rest and pleasure, I can say no more of it, than that it is generally agreed by all chronologers to have lasted only seven years: in which time he made such constitutions as differ little from the ordinances of all wise kings that are desirous to establish a royal power to themselves and their posterity.

SECT. VI.

The end of Cyrus.

THE last war, and the end of this great king *Cyrus*, is diversly written. *Herodotus* and *Justin* deliver, that after the conquest of *Asia* the less, *Cyrus* invaded the *Massagetes*, a very warlike nation of the *Scythians*, governed by *Tomyris* their queen: and that in an encounter between the *Persians* and these northern *Nomades*, *Tomyris* lost her army, and her son *Spargapises* that commanded it: in revenge whereof, this queen making new levies of men of war, and following the war against *Cyrus*, in a second battel, beat the *Persian* army, and taking *Cyrus* prisoner, cut off his head from his body, and cast the same into a bowl of blood, using these words, *Thou that hast all thy life time thirsted for blood, now drink thy fill and satiate thy self.*

It should hereby seem, that *Cyrus*, knowing the strength and multitude of those frozen nations, was persuaded to abate their fury by some forcible invasion and depopulation, because in the time of *Cyaxares*, father to *Astyages*, those *Scythians* invaded *Media* and *Asia* the less, and held the same in a servile subjection 28 years.

This war, which *Metasthenes* calleth *Tomyrique*, lasted (saith he) six years, and took end at the death of *Cyrus*.

But in this particular I believe with *Viginier*, that this *Scythian* war was rather the same which *Cyrus* made against the *Sacians*, before the conquest of *Lydia*, according to *Ctesias* before cited, who calleth *Tomyris*, *Sparetha*, tho' he deliver the success of that war otherwise than *Herodotus* doth: the rather (saith *Viginier*) because *Strabo* in his 11th book reciteth, that *Cyrus* surprized the *Sacians* by the same stratagem by which *Justin* saith, he defeated the son of *Tomyris*. And the same *Ctesias* also reporteth, that the last war which *Cyrus* made, was against *Amorrbæus* king of the *Derbicians*, a nation (as the rest) of *Scythia*; whom tho' he overcame, yet he then received the wound of his death, which he suffered three days after.

Strabo also affirmeth, that he was buried in his own city of *Pasagardes*, which himself had built, and where his epitaph was to be read in his time; which is said to have been this: *O vir, quicumque es, & undecumque advenis, neque enim te adventurum ignoravi: ego sum Cyrus qui Persis imperium constitui, pusillum hoc terræ quo meum tegitur corpus mihi ne invidias; O thou man, whosoever thou art, or whencesoever thou comest; for I was not ignorant that thou shouldst come: I am Cyrus that founded the Persian empire, do not envy unto me this little earth, with which my body is covered.*

This tomb was opened by *Alexander*, as *Quintus Curtius*, l. 1. reporteth, either upon hope of treasure, supposed to have been buried with him (or upon desire to honour his dead body with certain ceremonies)

in which there was found an old rotten target, two *Scythian* bows, and a sword. The coffin wherein his body lay, *Alexander* caused to be covered with his own garment, and a crown of gold to be set upon it. These things well considered, as they give credit to the reports of *Xenophon* and *Zonaras*, so they derogate much from *Herodotus*, who leaves his body in the hands of *Tomyris*.

And surely, had *Cyrus* lost the army of *Persia* in *Scythia*, it is not likely, that his son would so soon have transported all his remaining forces into *Egypt*, so far off from that quarter; the *Scythian* nation then victorious, and bordering *Media*: neither had *Cambyfes* been able in such haste to have undertaken and performed so great a conquest. Wherefore I rather believe *Xenophon*, saying, that *Cyrus* died aged, and in peace: and that finding in himself, that he could not long enjoy the world, he called unto him his nobility, with his two sons *Cambyfes* and *Smerdis*; or, after *Xenophon*, *Tanaoxares*: and, after a long oration, wherein he assured himself, and taught others, of the immortality of the soul, and of the punishments and rewards following the good and ill deserving of every man in this life; he exhorted his sons by the strongest arguments he had, to a perpetual concord and agreement. Many other things he uttered, which make it probable, that he received the knowledge of the true God from *Daniel*, when he governed *Susa* and *Persia*, and that *Cyrus* himself had read the prophecy of *Isaiab*, wherein he was expressly named, and by God (for the delivery of his people) preordained. Which act of delivering the *Jews* from their captivity, and of restoring the holy temple and city of *Jerusalem*, was in true consideration the noblest work that ever *Cyrus* performed. For in other actions he was an instrument of God's power, used for the chastising of many nations, and the establishing of a government in those parts of the world, which was not long to continue. But herein he had the Grace to be an instrument of God's goodness, and a willing advancer of his kingdom upon earth; which must last for ever, tho' heaven and earth shall perish.

SECT. VII.

Of Cyrus's decree for building the temple of God in Jerusalem.

HAVING therefore spoken of his great victories, mention'd by sundry historians, the glory of all which was a reward of this his service done unto him that was author of them and of all goodness: I hold it meet at length to speak of the decree made in the first of his reign, being perhaps the first that ever he made after his possession of the *Babylonian* empire: that the captive *Jews* should return again into their own territory, and re-build the house of God in *Jerusalem*, having now endured and finished 70 years captivity, by the prophets foretold. For the accomplishing whereof, he gave order to his treasurers to furnish them with all things necessary and wanting. He also restored unto them 5469 vessels of gold and silver, whereof *Nabuchodonosor*, the grandfather of *Balthasar*, had formerly robbed the temple.

The number of the *Jews* which returned out of *Chaldea* under their leader *Zorobabel*, the son of *Salathiel*, and nephew to king *Jeconias*, and *Jesus* or *Josua* the son of *Josadak*, were about 50000; where, as soon as they arrived, they built an altar to the living God, and sacrificed thereon, accord-

^a Vig. prim. part. Bib. ^b Ctes. l. 15. hist. part. ^c Strab. l. 15. ^d Xen. pad. 8. ^e Zon. l. 1. c. 20. ^f 1 Esd. 2. 2 Esd. 7. Phil. in bre

ing to their own law, and afterwards bethought themselves how to prepare materials for the rebuilding of the temple.

But no sooner did the *Jews* begin to lay any one stone, than the *Samaritans* and other idolatrous nations adjoining, gave all the impediment they could. So did the governours of those provinces under *Cyrus* altogether countenance the disturbers, and in no sort favoured the *Jews*, nor the labours nor purposes they had in hand. And not only those which were but provincial lieutenants, and other officers of less place, but *Cambyfes* himself; who having the charge of the whole empire, while *Cyrus* was busied otherwise, countermanded the building begun. And whereas some authors make doubt, that whatsoever *Cambyfes* did when himself had obtained the empire, yet during the life of *Cyrus* there was no such impediment or prohibition: they may herein resolve themselves out of *Esdra's*, that by the conspiracies of the neighbouring nations, the building was hindred all the time of king *Cyrus's* life, &c. And therefore it is true, what the *Jews* themselves affirm, as it is written in the 2d of *John*, that the temple was 46 years in setting up, having received so many hinderances from the first foundation to the second of *Darius*.

And if we seek the natural and politick courses which moved *Cambyfes* to withstand his father's decree, as well while he governed under him, as when himself became sole and sovereign monarch, we shall find them in that epistle remembred by *Esdra's*, written by *Belemus*, *Mithridates*, and the rest, presidents and counsellors in *Phenicia*, wherein they complain that the *Jews* were evermore rebellious and troublers of kings; that their city being once built, they would then refuse to pay tribute, and fall from the obedience of the empire, as they had formerly done in the times of other kings.

But that which for that present seemed the most forcible impediment, was, that *Cambyfes* having it in his resolution to invade *Egypt*, and that it was a common opinion, that the *Jews* were descended of those nations, because they issued thence under *Moses*, when they conquered *Judea*; their city being once repaired and fortified, they might return to their old vomit, and give the same disturbance to *Cambyfes's* conquest, which they did to *Sennacherib*, *Nabuchodonosor*, and other kings of *Babylon*. For, as it is written in *Ezekiel*,^b *Egypt was the confidence of the house of Israel*.

But it is to be understood, as *Codoman* and others have observed, that *Artaxerxes*, to whom the counsellors and governors of *Phenicia* complained against the *Jews*, did not precede, but succeed *Darius Hystaspes*, as in the 6th and 7th chapters of *Esdra's*, it is made plain: and also that those governours (whose epistle sheweth as much) did not withstand the building of the temple, but the fortifying and enclosing of the city, as by the reasons given in the said epistle, and by the king's answer, it is evident.

Also in the 6th of *Ezra*, the 14th verse, the kings are named in order as they governed, and *Artaxerxes* written after *Darius*; as: *And they built and finished it (to wit the temple) by the appointment of the God of Israel, and by the commandment of Cyrus and Darius, and Artahasthe kings of*

Persia. Lastly in the 7th of *Ezra* it is written, *Now after these things, in the reign of Artahasthe king of Persia: which was as much as to say, after the finishing of the temple in David's time. And therefore Artaxerxes in the 2d of Esdras is there named by anticipation, not in his own time and place.*

And thus much concerning the re-building of the city and temple of *Jerusalem*. Which action, tho' prospered by the hand of God, was very slowly pursued by the men whom it most concerned, but first set on foot by *Cyrus*. The other ordinances of *Cyrus*, with his form and manner of government, are to be found in *Xenophon*. At his death, he bequeathed the empire unto his eldest son *Cambyfes*, appointing *Smerdis* or *Tanaoxares* his younger son to be satrapa, or lieutenant of *Media*, *Armenia*, and *Cadusia*; and then died, after he had reigned (saith *Herodotus*) thirty-one years, or (according to *Justin*) but thirty.

SECT. VIII.

Of Cyrus's issue: and whether Atossa were his daughter, or (as some think) were the same with queen Esther.

CYRUS had issue two sons, *Cambyfes* and *Smerdis*, with three daughters, *Atossa*, *Meroe*, and *Artystona*: *Ctesias* addeth to these, *Amytis*. *Atossa* and *Meroe* their brother *Cambyfes* married; *Artystona*, *Darius Hystaspes* obtained; so did he *Atossa*, *Cambyfes* being dead: who (as some writers have supposed) inflamed both her husbands, *Darius* and *Xerxes* after him, to invade *Greece*, to be avenged of the whole nation for the cruel intent that *Aman* (whom the old translation calleth a *Macedonian*) had against the *Jews*, tho' the opinion of *Josephus* be more probable, who finds *Aman* to be an *Amalekite*. But it is hard to be understood how *Atossa*, the daughter of *Cyrus*, should have been *Esther*, whose history seems rather to appertain to the time of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, than of *Darius* the son of *Hystaspes* or *Xerxes*. The desire of *Atossa* to have *Greece* brought under the yoke of *Persia*, was partly grounded upon the honour which thereby she thought her husband might obtain, partly upon a feminine humour of getting many brave dames, *Corinthians*, *Athenians*, and others of that nation to be her bond-women. Wherefore I cannot give assent to the opinion of *Codoman*, who upon the near sound of the two names, *Atossa* and *Hadassa* (by the latter of which *Esther* was also called) makes them to have been one person. For tho' it be true that *Esther* concerning her parentage, a while might be taken for a great lady; yet *Codoman's* inference is nothing probable, that she should therefore, and for the great affection which the king bare unto her, be thought the daughter of *Cyrus*. Certain it is, that *Esther* did at length discover her kindred and nation; whereby, if histories could be kept free from this error, yet the people, and especially the nobility, must needs have understood the truth: who nevertheless did so well know the parentage of *Atossa*, that for her sake, as being daughter of *Cyrus*, her son *Xerxes* was preferred to the kingdom before his elder brother, against whom also he could have pretended a very weak claim. But of these things more hereafter in fitter place.

^a Esd. 3. 3. ^b Esd. 5. ^c Esd. 4. & 5. ^d Jos. 1. Ant. 11. ^e Esd. 2. 16. ^f Esd. 2. 16. ^g Esd. 5. 33. ^h Esd. 4. 5. ⁱ Esd. 4.

^b Ezek. 29.

C H A P. IV.

The estate of things from the death of Cyrus to the reign of Darius.

S E C T. I.

Of the number and names of the Persian kings.

OF the successors of *Cyrus*, and the continuance of the *Persian* empire, there are many opinions; as that of *Metaſthenes*, who hath numbred the *Persian* kings and their times as followeth.

<i>Darius Medus</i> , and <i>Cyrus</i> jointly	2 years.
<i>Cyrus</i> alone	22
<i>Prifcus Artaxerxes</i>	20
<i>Darius Longimanus</i>	37
<i>Darius Nothus</i>	19
<i>Artaxerxes Mnemon</i>	55
<i>Artaxerxes Ochus</i>	26
<i>Arſes</i> , or <i>Arſames</i>	4
<i>Darius</i> , the laſt, conquered by <i>Alexander</i>	6

To which *Philo* agreeth; which number of years added, make in all 191. But in this catalogue *Metaſthenes* hath left out *Cambyſes* and *Xerxes*, and names *Artaxerxes Affuerus*, for the immediate ſucceſſor of *Cyrus*; in place (ſaith *Melancthon*) of *Darius* the ſon of *Hyſtaſpes*: for *Metaſthenes*, as *Melancthon* conjectureth, doth not account *Cambyſes* in the catalogue, becauſe his reign was confounded with that of *Cyrus*.

There is a 2d opinion, tho' ridiculous, of *Sedar Olam*, who finds but four *Persian* kings from the beginning to the end of that empire.

Genebrard, *Schubert*, and *Beroaldus*, have alſo a differing account from the *Greeks*; whom nevertheless *Eusebius*, and moſt of the *Latins* follow, and ſo doth ^a *Krentzheim*, who hath fully answered, and as I take it, refuted all the former authors varying from that account. For in this ſort do the *Greeks* marshal the *Persian* kings with the times of their reigns.

^b <i>Cyrus</i> in all	30 years.
<i>Cambyſes</i> with the <i>Magi</i>	8
<i>Darius Hyſtaſpes</i>	36
^c <i>Xerxes</i>	21
<i>Artaxerxes Longimanus</i>	40
<i>Darius Nothus</i>	19
^d <i>Artaxerxes Mnemon</i>	43
^e <i>Artaxerxes Ochus</i>	23
<i>Arſames</i>	3
^f <i>Darius</i> the laſt	6

Which numbers put together, make in all two hundred and thirty.

This account (as I have ſaid) the moſt chronologers and the beſt learned approve. Theſe *Persian* princes, being all warranted by the authority of the ſcriptures, as *Peuceer* in his hiſtorical animadverſions, hath gathered the places; finding firſt *Cyrus* in 2 *Chron.* xxxvi. 22, 23. *Ezra* i. 1. and often elſewhere.

Secondly, *Cambyſes* in the 11th of *Daniel*, who may indeed be well eſteemed for one of thoſe three kings in the 2d verſe named, and ſo the marginal commentator upon the *Geneva* underſtands that

place; but under correction, miſtakes the matter greatly, when he ſaith in the ſame note, that *Darius Hyſtaſpes* was an enemy to the people of God, and ſtood againſt them: his great favour and liberality to the *Jews* being elſewhere proved.

Thirdly, Is *Darius Hyſtaſpes* found in 1 *Ezra* iv. 5. who in the 6th verſe is alſo named *Abaffuerus*.

Fourthly, In the 11th of *Daniel*, verſe the 2d, *Xerxes* is plainly foretold and deſcribed, and the great war which he ſhould make againſt the *Greeks* by *Daniel* remembred.

Fifthly, *Artaxerxes Longimanus* in *Ezra* ch. iv. verſe 7. who is alſo called *Arthabaſta*, c. 4. l. 1. *Ezra* 7. and vii. 7.

Sixthly, *Darius Nothus*, *Ezra* iv. 24. and v. 6. *Nehem.* xii. 22.

Seventhly, *Artaxerxes Mnemon* in *Nehem.* ii. 1. who was father to *Artaxerxes Ochus*, and *Arſames*: for *Darius* the laſt, he was of another family, the line of *Cyrus* the great ending in *Ochus*, who deſcended from *Xerxes* the ſon of *Atoſſa*, *Cyrus*'s daughter; and the iſſue-male of *Cyrus* failing with his own ſons.

But to proceed, *Eusebius*, with the *Latins*, following the *Greeks*, apply the beginnings and ends of every *Persian* king with their acts, to ſome certain *Olympiad*; as the war of *Aſtyages* (*Cyrus*'s maternal grandfather) and *Alyattes* (*Crefus*'s father) to the 49th *Olympiad*; the beginning of *Cyrus*'s reign, to the beginning of the 55th *Olympiad*; the taking of *Sardis* by *Cyrus*, to the 58th *Olympiad*; the invaſion of *Egypt* by *Cambyſes*, to the 3d year of the 63d *Olympiad*; and ſo of the reſt. Which reference with good agreement between ſeveral forms of computation, add the more credit unto both.

Again, this hiſtorical demonſtration is confirmed by the aſtronomical computation of ^g *Ptolemy*, who refers the death of *Alexander* the great, who died the 12th of *November*, in the beginning of the 140th *Olympiad*, to the 424th year after *Nabonaſſar*. And the *Aera* of *Nabonaſſar* began on the 26th of *February*: which, conſidered with the *Olympiad*, was in the 9th month of the 1ſt year of the 8th *Olympiad*; ſo that whether we follow the accounts of the *Olympiads*, as do the *Greek* hiſtorians, or that of *Nabonaſſar* with *Ptolemy*, we ſhall find every memorable accident to fall out right with each computation.

For *Ptolemy* reckons the time answerable to 224 *Julian* years, and 140 days from *Nabonaſſar* to the 16th of *July*, in the 7th year of *Cambyſes*.

The *Greeks*, and namely *Diodorus Siculus*, place the taking of *Egypt* by *Cambyſes* in the 2d or 3d year of the 63d *Olympiad*, and the beginning of *Cambyſes*'s 7th year, in the 1ſt of the 64th *Olympiad*: which 1ſt of the 64th *Olympiad* runs along with part of the 22d of *Nabonaſſar*. The like agreement is conſequently found about the beginning and end of *Cyrus*.

Likewiſe the 20th of *Darius*, who ſucceeded *Cambyſes*, is according to *Ptolemy* the 246th of *Nabonaſſar*, which (obſerving the differences of *Nabonaſſar*'s *Aera* and the *Olympiad*, viz. 28 years) agrees with the 3d of the 60th *Olympiad*, wherein it is placed by the *Greeks*. In this *Joſephus* agrees with

^a Chro. Kren. fol. 135.^b Melanct. gives *Cyrus* but 22^c Melanct. but 20^d Melanct. but 40.^e Melanct. 26.^f Melanct. 1^g Alm. l. 3. c. 6.

the *Greeks* throughout, saving that he joineth *Darius Medus*, whom *Xenophon* calleth *Cyaxares*, with *Cyrus* in the destruction of *Babylon*; which is true, and not contrary to the *Greek* computation, but may very well stand with it.

Lastly, The disagreements and confused accounts of those that follow the other catalogue of the *Persian* kings formerly rehearsed, doth give the greater credit to this of the *Greeks*, which being constant in it self, accordeth also with the computation of other historians, and astronomers, and likewise with the holy scriptures.

SECT. II.

Of *Cambyfes*, and the conquering of *Egypt* by him.

WE will therefore, according to the truth, give the empire of *Persia* to *Cambyfes*, the son of *Cyrus*, though degenerate in all things, saving the desire to encrease the greatness of his empire; whereof he was possess'd in his father's time, while *Cyrus* made war in the north. *Ctesias* with others give him a longer reign than agreeth with the *Grecian* account before received.

In the fifth year of his sole reign, and in the third year of the threescore and third *Olympiad*, according to *Diodore* and *Eusebius*, he invaded *Egypt*, and having overthrown the king thereof, *Pfammeniticus*, he not only caused him to be slain, but also did put to death all his kindred and dependents, with the most of his children.

Herodotus and *Ctesias* give for cause of this war (being no other indeed than the ambition of *Cambyfes*) that when he sent to *Amasis* king of *Egypt*, to have his daughter in marriage, *Amasis* presented him with *Nitetis* the daughter of *Apries*, his predecessor, which *Cambyfes* disdained.

Howsoever it were; true it is, that *Cambyfes* gathered an army fit for such an enterprise and caused the same to march. But before they enter'd *Egypt*, *Amasis* died, and left *Pfammeniticus*, whom *Ctesias* called *Amyrteus*, his successor; who enjoyed *Egypt* after his father (according to the best copies of *Herodotus*) but six months, though other chronologers give him six years.

But how long soever he held the crown, in one battle he lost it, and was himself taken prisoner.

It is said that *Cambyfes*, following therein the example of *Cyrus*, did not only spare life to the conquered king, but that he also trusted him with the government of *Egypt*, and that upon some revolt, or suspicion thereof, he caused him to be slaughter'd.

But the race of this king was not so extirpated, if we may believe *Herodotus* and *Thucydides*, but that he left a son called *Inarus*, who caused the *Egyptians* to revolt both from *Xerxes* and *Artaxerxes*.

That *Pfammeniticus*, was at the first entreated gently by *Cambyfes*, I hold it very improbable, if it be true which is also written of him, That he so much hated *Amasis* the king of *Egypt*, who died before his arrival, that he caused his body to be drawn out of the grave, and after divers indignities used, commanded the same to be burnt, contrary to the custom both of the *Egyptians* and *Persians*. For the *Egyptians* used to powder their dead bodies with salt and other drugs, to the end the worms might not devour them. The *Persians* durst not consume them with fire, which they esteemed as a God, and therefore feared to feed it with carrion.

SECT. III.

The rest of *Cambyfes's* acts.

AFTER this victory obtained in *Egypt*, *Cambyfes* sent an army into *Cyprus*, and constrained *Evelthon* king thereof to acknowledge him who before held that island of the *Egyptians*.

While *Cambyfes* yet busied himself in *Egypt*, he so much detested the idolatry of that nation, as he caused the images themselves, with the temples wherein they were worshipped, to be torn down and defaced. This done, he directed a part of his army into *Libya* to overturn the temple of *Jupiter Ammon*; but the devil, in defence of his oratory, raised such a tempest of Sand, wherewith the greatest part of the country is covered, as the *Persians* were therewith choaked and overwhelmed.

Notwithstanding which misadventure, *Herodotus* and *Seneca* report, that disdaining to be resisted, he prepared the rest of his army, which himself meant to conduct into those parts, but that finding a beginning of those inconveniences, which his first-sent troops had try'd, he chang'd his purpose. For tho' conquering kings have power over men, yet the elements do not obey them; according to that old *English* proverb: Go, saith the king; stay, saith the tide.

After his return from the attempt of *Ethiopia*, he caused *Apis*, the *Egyptian* bull, worshipped by that nation as God, to be slain: a deed very commendable, had it proceeded from true zeal, and been executed as in service of him that only is, and liveth. But soon afterwards, when in a dream it seem'd unto him that *Smerdis* did sit in the royal throne of *Persia* (which apparition was verified in *Smerdis* the *Magus*) he gave it in charge to his favourite *Praxaspes*, to murder *Smerdis* his brother. And having married his own sisters, contrary to the *Persian* laws, he committed a most causeless and most detestable murder upon the one of them called *Me-roë*, then by himself with child, because she bewailed the death of her brother *Smerdis*. I find it written of this *Cambyfes*, That because his predecessors observed religiously the ordinances of the empire, he assembled his judges and enquired of them, whether there were any law among the *Persians* that did permit the brother to marry his own sister; it being his own intent so to do: the judges (who had always either laws or distinctions in store to satisfy kings and times) made answer, That there was not any thing written allowing any such conjunction, but they notwithstanding found it in their customs, that it was always left to the will of the *Persian* kings, to do what best pleased themselves; and so, as *Nauclerus* terms it, *invenerunt occasionem*: that is as much as to say, The judges found a shift to please the king, and to secure themselves. And yet, where it concerned not the king's private satisfaction, he caused *Sifamnis*, one of his judges, and perchance one of those which favoured his incestuous match, to be slay'd alive, for an unjust judgment given, and his hide to be hung up over the judgment-seat. After which, bestowing the father's office on his son, he willed him to remember that the same partiality deserved the same punishment.

Among other his cruelties, that which he exercised against the son of his beloved *Praxaspes*, was very strange and ungrateful. For when he desired to be truly informed by him what the *Persians*

^a Lib. 2. c. 7. Her. l. 3. p. 83, 84, 85. ^b Neither did the Romans ever consume their dead to ashes, till the time of *Sylla* dictator, who caused him even to be devoured by that element, fearing the law called *Talio*, as the po. like, because himself had numbered the carcase of *Cornelius Marius* after his death. Her. l. 3. Plin. l. 6. c. 51. Suet. & Jul. l. 1. p. 82, 83 Her. l. 3. Sen. l. 7. c. 10. p. 80. 90.

thought of his conditions, *Praxaspes* answer'd, That his virtues were followed with abundant praise from all men, only it was by many observ'd, that he took more than usual delight in the taste of wine: with which taxation inflamed, he used this replication: And are the *Persians* double-tongu'd, who also tell me, that I have in all things excelled my father *Cyrus*? Thou *Praxaspes* shalt then witness, whether in this report they have done me right: for if at the first shot I pierce thy son's heart with an arrow, then is it false that hath been spoken; but if I miss the mark, I am then pleased that the same be accounted true, and my subjects believed. This being spoken, he immediately directed an arrow towards the innocent child, who falling down dead with the stroke, *Cambyfes* commanded his body to be opened, and his heart being broached on the arrow, this monstrous tyrant greatly rejoicing, shew'd it to the father, with this saying instead of an epitaph: Now *Praxaspes* thou may'st resolve thy self, that I have not lost my wits with wine, but the *Persians* theirs, who make such report.

Many other barbarous cruelties he exercised, till at the last, according to the phrase of our law, he became *felon de soy*. For when he was inform'd, that *Patizites*, and *Smerdis* the *Magi* (*Cedrenus* writeth them *Sphendanis* and *Cimerdius*) ministers of his domestical affairs, taking advantage of the great resemblance between *Smerdis* the king's brother, and *Smerdis* the *Magus*, possess'd themselves of the empire, he made all haste towards *Persia*; and in mounting hastily on horse-back, his sword dis-sheathing, pierced his own thigh, wherewith deadly wounded, falling into an over-late and remediless repentance of the slaughter which he had executed upon his own brother, he soon after gave up his wicked ghost, when he had reigned 8 years, accounting therein those 7 months in which the *Magi* govern'd while he was absent.

In *Cambyfes* the male-line of *Cyrus* failed. For he had no issue either by *Atossa* or *Meroe*: yet ^a*Zonaras* out of *Jerome* gives him a daughter called *Pantaptes*, and a son called *Orontes*; who being drowned in the river *Ophites* by *Antioch*, the same was afterwards in memory of the princes death, called *Orontes*.

He built the city of *Babylon* in *Egypt*, in the place where *Latopolis* was formerly seated, and that of *Meroe* in the Island of *Nilus*, calling it by the name of his sister *Meroe*.

S E C T. IV.

Of the Inter-regnum between *Cambyfes* and *Darius*.

CYRUS and his two sons being now dead, and the kingdom in the possession of one of the *Magi*, the counterfeit of *Smerdis*, the princes, or satrapa's, or provincial governours of the empire, (to wit *Otanes*, *Intaphernes*, *Gobrias*, *Megabyfus*, *Asphatines*, *Hidarnes*, and *Darius*, who were all descended from *Achemenes* the first *Persian* king) having discovered the fraud of this imposture, joined their forces together, surprized and rooted out the conspirator with his companions and assistants. In

which action (saith *Juslin*) *Intaphernes*, and *Asphatines* were slain; but *Herodotus* otherwise, that they were only wounded; for he avoweth, that all the seven princes were present at the election following.

For the empire being now without a governour, these princes grew into consultation how the same might be ordered from thenceforth. *Otanes* (one of the seven) did not fancy any election of kings, but that the nobility and cities should confederate, and by just laws defend their liberty in equality, giving divers reasons for his opinion, being, as it seemed, greatly terrified by the cruelties of *Cambyfes*: As first, that it was not safe to give all power to any one, seeing greatness it self, even in good men, doth often infect the mind with many vices, and that liberty and freedom in all things is most apt to insult, and to commit all manner of wicked outrage. Again, that tyrants do commonly use the service of wicked men, and favour them most; they usurp upon the laws of their country, take other men's wives by force, and destroy whom they please, without judgment.

Megabyfus was of another opinion, affirming that the tyranny of a multitude was thrice more intolerable than that of one. For the multitude do all things without judgment, run into business and affairs with precipitation, like raging and over-bearing floods.

He therefore thought it safest to make election of a few, and those of the best, wisest, and most virtuous, because it is ever found that excellent counsels are ever had from excellent men.

Darius gave the third judgment, who perswaded the creation of a king, because even among few diuturnity of concord is seldom found, and in great empires it doth ever happen, that the discord of many rulers hath enforced the election of one supreme. It were therefore, saith *Darius*, far safer to observe the laws of our country, by which kingly government hath been ordained.

The other four princes adhered to *Darius* and agreed to continue the same imperial government, by God established and made prosperous. And to avoid partiality, it was accorded that the morning following, these seven princes should mount on horse-back, and on him the kingdom should be conferr'd, whose horse, after the sun rising, should first neigh or bray. ^bIn the evening after this appointment was made, it is said, that *Darius* consulted with the master of his horse *Oebarus*, who, in the suburbs of the city, where the election was resolv'd of, caused the same horse, whercon in the morning *Darius* was mounted, to cover a mare, who, as soon as he came into the same place, was the first horse that brayed. Whereupon the other six princes descended from their horses, and acknowledged *Darius* for their lord and king.

Plato, in the third of his laws, affirmeth, that in memory of the seven princes, whereof *Darius* himself was one, that deliver'd the empire from the usurpation of the *Magi*, he divided the whole into seven governments; *Herodotus* saith, into twenty satrapies.

^a Zon. Com. 2. p. 117.

^b Her. 3. p. 100, 101.

CHAP. V.

Of DARIUS, the son of Hyftaspes.

SECT. I.

Of Darius's lineage.

DARIUS was descended of the ancient *Persian* kings, to wit, of the *Achæmenidæ*, of which *Cyrus* the great was the lineal successor. For in this sort *Herodotus* deriveth him, as before :

Cyrus the first, who had
Theispus, who begat
Ariaramnes, who was father of
Arfarnes, the father of
Hyftaspes, the father of
Darius, firnamed *Celus*, the father of *Xerxes*.

^a*Hyftaspes* accompanied *Cyrus* the great in the wars against the *Scythians*; at which time *Cyrus* being made jealous of *Darius* by a dream of his own, caused him to be sent into *Persia*; others say, to be imprisoned, from whence by the death of *Cyrus* he was deliver'd, and made governour of the *Persian Magi*. He afterwards followed *Cambyfes* into *Egypt*; he then join'd with the rest of the princes against the *Magi*, and either by the ^bneighing of his horse, or, as others affirm, by strong hand, he obtained the empire, which he the more assured to himself, by taking two of *Cyrus's* daughters, and as many of his nieces for his wives.

Hyftaspes, according to ^c*Herodotus*, had, besides *Darius*, these three sons, who were great commanders in the war which *Darius* made in *Asia* the less, *Thrace*, *Macedon*, and *Greece*; *Atarnes*, *Artaphernes*, and *Artabanus*, who dissuaded *Xerxes* from the second *Grecian* war. *Hyftaspes* had also a daughter married to *Gobrias*, the father of *Mardonius*, who commanded the army of *Darius* in *Macedon*, and married the daughter of *Darius Artofstre*, his cousin-german.

Reineccius gives to *Hyftaspes* five sons, *Darius* who succeeded *Cambyfes*, *Artabanus*, *Artaphernes*, *Otanes*, and *Atarnes*, with two daughters.

SECT. II.

Of Darius's government, and suppressing the rebellion of Babylon.

DARIUS devised equal laws whereby his subjects might be governed, the same being formerly promised by *Cyrus*. He gave access to all his subjects, and behaved himself so mildly to all men, that many nations desired and offered themselves to become his vassals: Only he laid divers payments and taxes on the people, which had not been accustomed in *Cyrus's* time, to the value of fourteen thousand five hundred and threescore talents, saith *Herodotus*.

The war which *Cambyfes* made afar off in *Egypt*, and the contention between the *Magi* and the princes of *Persia* for the empire, gave heart to the *Babylonians* to recover their liberty, and to shake off the *Persian* yoke; whereof *Darius* being advertised, he prepared an army to recover that city and state re-

volted. But finding the same a difficult work, he used the service of *Zopyrus*, who for the love he bare *Darius*, did cut off his own ears and nose, and with other wounds yet fresh bleeding, he seemed to fly to the *Babylonians* for succour, to whom he accused the cruelty of *Darius*; who, for having given him advice to give over the siege of their city, had in this sort dismember'd and deform'd him; whereupon the *Babylonians* gave him that credit, as they trusted him with the disposition and commandment of their greatest forces: which when *Zopyrus* had obtained, after some small colourable overthrows given to the *Persians* upon fallies, he ^ddelivered the city into *Darius's* hands, who had lain before it twenty months.

SECT. III.

Of Darius's favour to the Jews, in building the temple.

IN the second year of *Darius*, he gave order that the building of the temple at *Jerusalem* should go on, and commanded that the same should be finished at his own charge, and out of the revenues of the crown. And whereas the governours of those provinces, which are situate between *Euphrates* and the *Phenician* and mid-land sea (whom ^e*Ezra* calleth the captains beyond the river) had hinder'd the work in *Cambyfes's* time, *Darius* gave commandment, that they should not thenceforth come near unto *Jerusalem*, to give any impediment to the building; but that they should withdraw themselves, and get them far off, till all were finish'd and at an end. In the old *Latin* it is written, *Procul recedite ab illis*, *Withdraw yourselves far from them*; in our *English*, *Be ye far from thence*, to wit, from the city and temple now in building.

He also made a decree which concern'd his own subjects, that ^f*Whosoever should thenceforth hinder the setting up of the temple of God, that his house should be torn down, and the disturber hanged on the gallows made of the timber thereof*. He also in the same decree maketh invocation to God; ^g*That hath caused his name to dwell there, (to) destroy all kings and people that put their hands to alter and to destroy this house of God which is in Jerusalem, &c.* In four years after which decree (the Jews being really furnish'd with money and all things necessary from *Darius*) the temple was in all finish'd, to wit, in the beginning of the spring, in the sixth year of *Darius Hyftaspes*, and in the two and fortieth after their first return.

SECT. IV.

Of Darius's Scythian war.

AFTER the recovery of *Babylon* he invaded the *Scythians*, whose king ^h*Justin* calleth *Lautinus*, and saith, that *Darius* undertook this war against him, because he refused him his daughter in marriage. The better to convoy his army into *Scythia*, he built a bridge of small vessels over the river *Ister* or *Danubius*, and gave the custody

^a Cunt. l. 4. ^b Her. l. 1. 3. ^c Herodot. p. 154. p. 130. p. 101. and 202. p. 108, 109. Her. l. 1. c. p. 180. p. 186, 190. p. 179. p. 200, 204, and 213. 285, 286, p. 214, 254. De Reg. Persar. fol. 32. ^d Her. l. 3. ^e Ezra c. 6. ^f Ib 6. 11. ^g Ib. 6. 12. ^h Her. l. 1. 4. ⁱ Just. l. 2.

of the same in charge (among others of *Asia* the less) to the *Ionians* and *Eolians*, among whom was *Miltiades*, who persuaded the *Asian Grecians* to break down the bridge, to the end *Darius* might not return thereby, and it by any other way, then not without great difficulty; but the same was resisted by *Histiæus* prince of *Milet*, a city of *Ionia*, which nation, being a colony of the *Greeks*,^a *Diodorus* call-eth traitors to their country, because they joined themselves to *Darius*. But the *Scythians* more elegantly termed them good slaves, forasmuch as they would not run away from their master, but were more mindful of doing their duties, than of shaking off their bondage, when they were presented with as fair an occasion of liberty as could have been desired. For the great army of *Darius* entering the desert country call'd *Bessarabia*, found in it neither people to resist them, nor any sustenance to relieve them. For the *Scythians* were then, as are the *Chrim Tartars*, their posterity, at this day, all horse-men, using the bow and sword. They were not ploughmen, but graziers, driving their herds from one place to another, as opportunity of pasture led them. Standing towns they had none, but used for houses the waggon wherein they carried their wives and children. These waggon they place at every station in very good order, making streets and lanes in the manner of a great town, removeable at their pleasure. Neither hath the emperor himself, call'd now the great *Chrim*, any other city than such as *Agora* (as they name it) or town of carts. When as therefore *Darius* had wearied himself, and wasted his provision in those desolate regions, wherein he found neither ways to direct him, victuals to refresh him, nor any houses, fruitful trees or living creatures, nor any thing at all, which either he himself might make use of, or by destroying it might grieve his enemies, he began to perceive his own folly, and the danger into which he had brought himself. Yet setting a good face upon a bad game, he sent brave messages to the *Scythian*, bidding him to cease his flight, and either to make trial of his valour and fortune in plain battle; or, if he acknowledged himself the weaker, then to yield by fair means, and become his subject, giving him earth and water, which the *Persians* used to demand as a sign that all was yielded unto them. To this challenge the *Scythian* returned an hieroglyphical answer; sending a bird, a frog, a mouse, and five arrows: which dumb shew *Darius* interpreting by his own will, thought that he did yield all the elements wherein those creatures live, and his weapons withal into his hands. But *Gobryas*, one of the seven princes, who had slain the *Magi*, construed their meaning aright, which was thus: *O ye Persians, get ye wings like birds, or drive under the water or creep into holes in the earth, for else ye shall not escape our arrows.* And this interpretation was soon verified by the *Scythians* themselves, who assailed the *Persian* camp, drove the horse-men into the trenches, and vexed the army with continual alarms day and night; were so fearless of this great monarch, and so little regarded him, that within his hearing, and even in his sight, they did not forbear the pastime of coursing a hare, which they had started by chance. By this boldness of theirs, *Darius* was so discouraged, that he forsook his camp by night, making many fires, and leaving all that were sick, and weak behind him, and so with all speed marched away towards the river *Ister*. He was pursued hardly by the *Scythians*, who mis'd him; yet arriving at the bridge before him, persuaded the

Ionians to depart, assuring them that the *Persian* king should never more be able to do them either good or harm. Which words had certainly been proved true, had not *Histiæus* the *Milesian* prevailed with his people, to attend the coming of *Darius*, whom the *Scythians* did likewise fail to meet, when they returned from *Ister* to seek him out.

S E C T. V.

Some actions of the Persians in Europe, after the Scythian war.

DARIUS having thus escaped out of *Scythia*, determined the invasion of *Thrace* and *Macedon*, in which war he employed *Megabazus*, who master'd the *Peonians*, and transplanted them, and possess'd *Perinthus*, *Chalcedon*, *Byzantium*, and other places, being also soon after subjected, and added to the *Persian* empire by *Otanes* the son of *Sysamnes*, whom *Cambyfes* had excoriated for false judgement. So were the cities of ^b*Selybria*, and ^c*Cardia* likewise taken in from the *Persian*, who having now reduced under his obedience, the best part of *Thrace*, did send his ambassadors to *Amintas* king of *Macedon* adjoining, demanding of him by the earth and water, the sovereignty over that kingdom. *Amintas* doubting his own strength, entertain'd the ambassadors with gentle words, and afterwards invited them to a solemn and magnificent feast; the *Persians* greatly desired that the *Macedonian* ladies might be present: which being granted, the ambassadors, who were well filled with wine, and presumed upon their greatness and many victories, began to use such embracings, and other lascivious behaviour, towards those noble ladies, as *Alexander* the king's son, great grandfather to *Alexander* the Great, disdaining the *Persians* barbarous presumption, besought his father to withdraw himself from the assembly, continuing notwithstanding all honourable respect towards the ambassadors, whom withal he entreated that the ladies might refresh themselves for a while; promising their speedy return. This being obtained, *Alexander* caused the like number of well-favoured young men to cloath themselves in the same garments, and to use the same attires which the ladies had worn at the feast, giving them in charge, that when the *Persians* offered to abuse them, they should forthwith transpierce them with their long knives, of which they were provided for that purpose, which was accordingly perform'd. Charge was soon after given by *Darius* for a severe revenge of this murder: But *Alexander* somewhat before the death of *Amintas*, gave his sister *Gygea* in marriage to *Bubaris*, a principal commander of *Darius's* forces on that side, who persuaded her husband how helpful the alliance of *Macedon* would prove for the invasion of *Attica* intended, so prevail'd, as *Alexander* escaped that tempest, which threaten'd to fall upon him very suddenly; the war of *Asia* the less, called *Ionic*, falling out at the same time.

S E C T. VI.

The first occasion of the war which Darius made upon Greece, with a rehearsal of the government in Athens, whence the quarrel grew.

NOW the better to understand the reason and motives of that great war, which followed soon after, between the *Persians* and *Grecians*, it is necessary to make a short repetition of the state of *Athens*, which city endured the hardest and worst

^a Diod. l. 11. ^b Her. l. 5. ^c A maritime city of *Thrace* of the south of *Constantinople* a *Cardia*, a city upon the *Chersonesus* of *Thrace*, after ward *Lymachia*. Pto. Paul.

brunt of *Darius's* invasion on that side the sea, with admirable success. Neither do I hold it any impertinence to be large in unfolding every circumstance of so great a business as gave fire to those wars which never could be thoroughly quenched, until in the ruin of this great *Persian* monarchy, *Persepolis* the capital city of the empire, was at the request of an *Athenian* harlot consumed with a flame, as dreadful, as, in the pride of their greatness, the *Persians* had raised in *Athens*.

Now therefore as out of the former books it may be gathered how *Athens*, and other parts of *Greece*, were anciently governed, the same being already set down, tho' scatteringly, and in several times among other the contemporary occurrences of the eastern emperors, and the kings of *Judea*; so I thought it very pertinent in this place to remember again the two last changes in the state of *Athens*. As for the *Lacedemonians*, they maintained still their ancient polity under kings, tho' these also after some fifteen descents were bridled by the *Ephori*.

Codrus king of the *Athenians*, in the former books remember'd, who willingly died for the safety of his people, was therefore so honoured by them, as (thinking none worthy to succeed him) they changed their former government from monarchical to princes, for term of life, of which *Medon* the son of *Codrus* was the first, after whom they were called *Medontidae*; and of these were twelve generations besides *Medon*, to wit,

Agestus

Archippus, in whose times the *Greeks* transported themselves into *Ionia*, after *Troy* an hundred and fourscore years, according to *Eusebius*: which migration all other chronologers (such as follow *Eusebius* herein excepted) find in the year after *Troy* fallen one hundred and forty.

Thersippas

Phorbas

Mezades

Diogenetus, in whose time *Lycurgus* gave laws to the *Spartans*.

Pheredus

Ariphron

Theispius, in whose time the *Assyrian* empire was overthrown by *Belochus* and *Arbaces*

Agamnestor

Eschylus, in whose time the *Ephori* (according to ^a*Eusebius*) were erected in *Lacedemon*.

Alcamenon, the last prince for life, after whose death the *Athenians* elected decennial governours: the former princes for life having continued in all three hundred and sixteen years. The first of those that governed for ten years, or the first

Archon was

Charops, then

Esymedes

Etydicus

Hippomenes

Leocrates

Abfander

Erixias was the last *Archon* of the decennial governours, which, from continuing threescore and ten years, was then changed into annual magistrates, mayors, and burg-masters, of which *Theseus* was the first, according to *Pausanias*: others find *Leostratus*; and then

Anthothenes

Achimedus

Miltiades

Damifias

Draco

Megacles

Solon, and others who are the less to be regarded, by reason of the yearly change.

This *Solon* being a man of excellent wisdom, gave laws to the *Athenians*, which were published, according to *Gellius*, in the three and thirtieth year of *Tarquinius Priscus*, and were in after-ages derived unto the *Romans*, and by the *Decemviri* (magistrates in *Rome* created for that purpose) reduced into twelve tables, which were the ground of the *Roman* laws. But these goodly ordinances of *Solon* were in his own days violated, and for a while almost quite extinguished. For whereas they were framed unto the practice and maintenance of a popular government, the state of *Athens* was very soon changed into a monarchy by *Pisistratus* the son of *Hippocrates*; who finding the citizens distracted into two factions, whereof *Megacles* and *Lycurgus*, two citizens of noble families, were become the heads, took occasion by their contention and insolency to raise a third faction more powerful than the other two, and more plausible, for that he seemed a protector of the citizens in general. Having by this means obtained love and credit, he wounded himself, and feigned that by malice of his enemies he had like to have been slain for his love to the good citizens; he procured a guard for his defence, and with that band of men surprising the state-house, or citadel of *Athens*, he made himself lord of the town, *Hegesistratus* being then governor. But the citizens, who in every change of government had sought to remove themselves further and further from the form of a monarchy, could so ill brook this usurpation of *Pisistratus*, that he was driven, for lack of help, to fly the town, as soon as *Megacles* and *Lycurgus* (joining their forces) attempted his expulsion. Yet, as the building of his tyranny, founded upon the dissension of the citizens, was ruined by their good agreement; so was it soon after well re-edified by the new breaking out of the old factions. For when *Megacles* found the power of *Lycurgus* to grow greater than his own, he did (as is the usual practice of the weaker side) call in the common enemy *Pisistratus*, to whom he gave his daughter in marriage; by which alliance the family of the *Alcmaeonidae*, whereof *Megacles* was chief, became very powerful, yet so, that *Pisistratus* by their power was made master both of them and all the rest. But this agreement held not long; the *Alcmaeonidae*, and especially *Megacles*, being incensed against *Pisistratus* for his misdemeanour towards his wife. Wherefore they practised with the soldiers of the town, proceeding in their treason so secretly, and so far, that *Pisistratus* (upon the first discovery of their intent) perceived no other remedy for his affairs, than to withdraw himself from ^b*Eretria*, where he remained eleven years. Which time being expired, having hired soldiers out of many parts of *Greece*, he again recovered the principality of *Athens*, after which third obtaining his estate, he governed *Athens* seventeen years, according to *Aristotle*, and reigned in all thirty and three years, saith *Elanus*, but as *Justin* hath it, four and thirty; accounting the time belike as well before as after his several expulsions. *Herodotus* gives the father and the son six and thirty years; *Aristotle* five and thirty. But *Thucydides* affirmeth, that he died very old, leaving for his successors his two sons, *Hippias* and *Hipparchus*, who governed the *Athenians* with such moderation,

^a Paul. pag. 170. Dionis. l. 3. Paul. p. 169. Paul. 170. pag. 331. ^b Her. l. 12. Eretria a city of Euboea, by other called Melane, & Stephanus Eretria. Pol. 5. Heraclid. apud Elian. pag. 262. Just. p. 28. Her. l. 6. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 10.

as they rather seem'd the lineal successors of a natural prince than of a tyrant. But in the end, and some three years before *Hippias* was expell'd out of *Athens*, his brother *Hipparchus* was murder'd by *Harmodius* and *Aristogiton*. The cause why, and the manner how perform'd, *Thucydides* hath written at large. And, tho' *Hipparchus* was charged with unnatural lust after *Harmodius*, yet *Plato*, in his dialogue entitled *Hipparchus*, doth greatly magnify him, affirming that he was a prince of as many eminent virtues as that age had any, altogether condemning the murderers, and authors of that scandal. *Hippias* fearing that this enterprise upon his brother had more and deeper roots than were apparent, first sought to discover the further intents of *Harmodius* and *Aristogiton*, by a harlot of theirs call'd *Lemnia*; who because she would not reveal her companions, did cut out her own tongue. Then did *Hippias*, the better to strengthen himself, enter into a strait amity with *Aantides*, tyrant of the city ^a *Lampsacus*, whom he knew to be greatly favour'd by *Darius*, to whose son *Hypoclus* he gave one of his daughters in marriage. But some three years after the death of his brother, doubting I know not what strong practice against himself, he began to use the citizens with great severity, which neither *Pisistratus* the father, nor *Hippias* himself had ever exercised, during their usurpation, till this time. And therefore the *Athenians*, fearing that this disease might rather increase than diminish in *Hippias*, they stirred up *Cliftines*, one of the noblest and best able of their city, to practise their delivery: who, calling to his assistance the banish'd *Alcmenidae*, together with an army of the *Lacedemonians*, led by *Cleomenes* their king, so affrighted *Hippias*, as by composition he gave over his estate, and the possession of *Athens*, and from thence embarking himself, took land at ^b *Sigeum*, whence he went to *Lampsacus* in *Mysia*, govern'd by *Aantides*, who presented him to *Darius*. He was deprived of his estate, as *Herodotus* and *Thucydides* agree, twenty years before the battle of *Marathon*: all which time he continued, partly with *Aantides*, at other times with *Artaphernes*, lieutenant for *Darius* in *Sardis*, the metropolis of *Lydia*; persuading and practising the enterprise upon *Athens*, which *Darius* in the end to his great dishonour undertook, twenty years after *Hippias* had resign'd his estate.

Thus far I have digressed from *Darius*, to the end the reader may conceive the better the causes and motives of this war: whereof the hope that *Hippias* had to be restor'd to *Athens* by the help of *Darius*, which made him solicit and persuade the *Persians* to conquer *Greece*, was one, but not the most urgent.

SECT. VII.

Of the Ionian rebellion, which was the principal cause of the wars ensuing between Greece and Persia.

ANother, and a strong motive to this expedition was the *Ionian* war, breaking out into *Asia* about the same time. The colonies transported out of *Greece* into *Asia*, which occupied the greatest part of the sea-coast, having enjoyed their liberty about 500 years, even from the *Ionian* migration, to the time of *Cresus*, were by this *Lydian* king made tributaries, and afterwards as parcel of his dominions were taken in by *Cyrus*, and left as hereditary servants to the crown of *Persia*.

But as it is the custom of nations half-conquer'd (witness *Ireland*) to rebel again upon every advantage and opportunity; so did the *Ionians*, and other *Grecians*, both in *Cyrus's* life, and after him, seek by all means possible to free themselves.

At this time they found such men ready to spur them into rebellion, as had by the *Persian* been given unto them for bridles to hold them in subjection. Every one of those towns had a lord to rule it, whom they (abhorring the government of one man) called their tyrants. These lords were very true to the *Persian*, by whose only might they held the people in subjection. And this their dutiful affection they had well declared, when *Darius*, being in great extremity, they used all means to deliver him and his army (that otherwise had been lost) out of the *Scythians* hand. Of this great piece of service *Histiæus*, the tyrant of *Miletus*, expected the chief thanks, as having been chief author of their expecting *Darius*, when the rest, either persuaded by the *Scythians*, or carried away with their own desires, were ready to have abandon'd him. But it came so to pass, that *Darius* being more fearful of the harm that *Histiæus* (being powerful and crafty) might do to him in the future, than mindful of the good which he had already received at his hand, found means to carry him along to *Susa*, where he detain'd him with all kind usage of a friend, yet kept such good espial upon him, as an enemy, he could not start away. *Histiæus* had subtilty enough to discover the king's purpose, which ill agreed with his own desires. For he thought it more pleasant, and more honourable, to rule as a prince in one fair city, having a small territory, than to sit and feast at the great king's table, and hear the counsels by which a large empire was managed; being himself an idle beholder, and enjoying with much restraint of liberty, none other pleasures than a private man might bestow upon himself.

Wherefore he bethought himself of raising of some tumults in the lower *Asia*, to pacify which if he might be sent, as one that had great experience and authority in those quarters, it would afterwards be in his power to stay at home, and either satisfy the king with excuses, or deal as occasion should require. Resolving upon this course, he sent very secret instructions to *Aristagoras* his kinsman, whom he had left his deputy at *Miletus*, advising him to stir up some rebellion. These directions came seasonably to *Aristagoras*, who having fail'd in an enterprise upon the isle of *Naxos*, through the false dealing of a *Persian*, his associate, stood in fear of disgrace, if not of some further ill that might befall him, as one that had wasted the king's treasures to no good purpose.

Therefore he readily embraced the counsel: and the better to draw the whole country of *Ionian* into the same course which he determined to run, he abandon'd his tyranny, and set *Miletus* at liberty. This plausible beginning won unto him the hearts of the *Milesians*; and his proceeding with other *Ionian* tyrants (of whom some he took, and sold as slaves to their citizens, others he chased away) caused the whole nation to be at his command. The *Persian* fleet, whereof he lately had been admiral, in the enterprise of *Naxos*, he had surpris'd in his first breaking out, together with the principal officers and captains; so that now he thought himself able to deal with the great king's forces, lying thereabout either by land or sea. But likely it was that the power of all *Asia* would shortly be upon

^a *Lampsacus*, a city of *Mysia*, upon the *Hellepont*. Her. l. 5. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 1. ^b *Sigeum*, a promontory opposite to the isle of *Tenedos*, which *Aril*, in 5. *Animal*, calls *Idæ promontorium*.

his neck, and crush both him and his assistants to pieces, unless he were able to raise an army that might hold the field, which the *Ionians* alone were insufficient to perform. Therefore he took a journey to *Sparta*, where having assayed in vain with many arguments, and the offer of fifty talents, to win to his party *Cleomenes*, king of the *Lacedemonians*; he went from thence to *Athens*, and with better success besought the people to lend him their assistance. The *Athenian* ambassadors, which had been sent to the *Persian* king's lieutenants in the lower *Asia*, desiring them not to give countenance to *Hippias*, now a banish'd man, and lately their tyrant, were a while before this return'd with ill answers, having found very churlish entertainment. So that the evil which they were to expect in all likelihood from the *Persian*, made them willing to begin with him. To which purpose, their consanguinity with the *Ionians*, and the persuasions of *Aristagoras*, drew them on apace, if perhaps his treasure were not helping. Twenty ships the *Athenians* furnished for this voyage; to which the *Eretrians* furnish'd five more, in regard of the ancient kindness that had passed between the *Ionians* and them. With these and their own forces join'd, the *Ionians* enter'd the river *Caistrus*, which falleth into the sea by *Ephesus*: by which advantage they surpris'd *Sardis*, when no enemy was heard of, or suspected; insomuch as *Artaphernes*, who ruled as vice-roy in those parts, had no other hope of safety, than by retreating himself into the castle, which the *Grecians* could not force: from whence he beheld the slaughter of the citizens, and the city flaming.

The *Persians* at length, mix'd with the burgers, began to encourage them to defence, and recover'd the market-place, strengthen'd by the river *Paetolus*, which ran through it; and borrowing courage from desperation, they both defended themselves, and charged their enemies; who well advising themselves, made all the haste they could towards the sea-side. But *Artaphernes*, having gather'd all the strength he could, pursued the *Grecians*, and found them near *Ephesus*; where setting resolutely upon them, he slaughter'd a great part of their army, the rest saving themselves in *Ephesus*. In this fight *Eualcides*, captain of the *Eretrians*, perish'd; but his fame and memory was by that excellent poet *Simonides* preserv'd. After this overthrow, the *Athenians*, which were before sent unto *Aristagoras*, and to the *Ionians*, could by no arguments of theirs, no not by their tears, be persuaded to make any second trial of their fortunes on that side the sea.

Yet the burning of *Sardis* made a greater noise in the world, than the late good success which the *Persians* had in one or two skirmishes, could raise. Wherefore the *Ionians* bravely proceeding, won a great part of *Caria*; and sending their fleet into the *Hellepont*, got *Bizantium* and other towns into their hands. Yea, the *Cyprians*, lately subdued by *Cambyfes*, began hereupon to take heart; and entering into confederacy with the *Ionians*, who were able to give them aid by sea, rebelled against the *Persians*.

These news coming to the ear of *Darius*, filled him with great indignation, and with an extreme hatred of the *Athenians*; upon whom he vowed to take sharp revenge. As for the *Ionians*, his contempt of them, and their knowledge of his power, made him to think, that they would not have dared to attempt such things, but by the instigation of those

to whom the ignorance of his great might had afforded the courage to provoke him. This was the main ground of the war commenced by *Darius*; and pursued by *Xerxes*, against *Athens*: To which the sollicitation of *Hippias*, before remember'd, gave only some form and assistance; the business, when once it was thus far on foot, being like enough to have proceeded, tho' he had perish'd ere it were advanced any further.

Some other occurrences in this *Ionian* commotion extended the quarrel of *Darius* against many of the islanders, if not against the whole nation of the *Greeks*; for all of them gave to his rebels free harbour: the islanders moreover did help to furnish out a navy of three hundred and sixty sail against him. These provocations did rather breed in him a desire to abate their pride, than any fear of harm that they were like to do him. For what they had done at *Sardis* was but by surprise. In every fight they were beaten by the *Persians*, who had not yet lost the fruits of their discipline wherein *Cyrus* had trained them, nor all their ancient captains. In one sea-fight by the isle of *Cyprus*, the *Ionians* indeed had the upper-hand; but they were *Phenicians*, *Egyptians*, and *Cilicians*, whom they vanquish'd: neither was that victory of any use to them; the *Cyprians*, in whose aid they came, being utterly beaten by the *Persian* army at land, and reduced into their old subjection. So had the *Persians* likewise by open war and fair force overthrown the *Carians* in two battles, and reclaim'd that nation; as also they had recover'd the towns upon *Hellepont*, with some *Eolian* and *Ionian* cities, when *Aristagoras* with his friends quitting *Miletus*, fled into *Thrace*, desirous to set himself in *Amphipolis*, a colony of the *Athenians*. But the *Edonians*, on whose territory belike he landed, overthrew him, and cut his troops in pieces.

About the same time *Histiæus*, the first mover of this insurrection, came down into those quarters; who having undertaken the performance of great matters to *Darius*, was glad to flee from his lieutenants, by whom his double-dealing was detected.

But this evasion preserv'd him not long. For after many vain attempts that he made, he was taken in sight by the *Persians*, and hastily beheaded, lest the king should pardon him, upon remembrance of old good-turns; as it seems that he would have done, by the burial which he commanded to be given to his dead body that was crucified, and by his heavy taking of his death.

Histiæus had sought to put himself into *Miletus*; but the citizens, doubting his conditions, chose rather to keep him out, and make shift for themselves, without his help. The strength of their city by land, which had in old time withstood the *Lydian* kings, and their good fleet, which promised unto them the liberty of an open sea, embolden'd them to try the uttermost, when very few friends were left upon that continent to take their part. But their navy was broken as much by threatnings as by force; many of their companions and fellow-rebels forsaking them upon hope of pardon, and many being daunted with the causeless flight of those that should have assisted them. Neither was it long before the town itself, being assaulted both by land and sea, was taken by force, the citizens slain, their wives and children made slaves, and their goods a booty to the *Persians*, whom for six years space they had put to so much trouble.

SECT. VIII.

The war which Darius made upon Greece, with the battle of Marathon, and Darius's death.

THIS war with good success finish'd by the *Persians*, and some attempts made on *Europe* side with variable success; *Darius*, obstinate in the enterprize and conquest of *Greece* (tho' at first he pretended to make the war but against the *Athenians* and *Eretrians*, who jointly assisted the *Ionians* against him, and burnt *Sardis* in *Lydia*) did now by his embassadors demand an acknowledgment from them all: among whom, some of them not so well resolv'd as the rest, submitted themselves; as the *Æginets*, and others. Against these the *Athenians* being inflamed (by the assistance of the *Lacedemonians*) after divers encounters forced them to give pledges, and to relinquish the party of the *Persians*. *Cleomenes* led the *Lacedemonians* in this war, and caus'd his companion king *Demantus* to be depos'd: who thereupon fled to *Darius*, far the more confident of victory, by reason of these discords, alienations and civil wars among the *Greeks*. He therefore gave order to *Hippagoras* to prepare a fleet of ships, fit to transport his army over the *Hellepont*; the same consisting of an hundred thousand foot, and ten thousand horse. The charge in chief of his army he committed to *Datis*, accompanied and assisted by *Hippias*, the son of *Pisistratus*, expell'd out of *Athens* twenty years before, and by *Artaphernes* his brother, governour of *Sardis*, and the sea-coast of *Asia* the less. These commanders having their companies brought down to the sea-side, embark'd themselves in six hundred galleys and other vessels; and first of all attempted the islands, call'd *Cyclades*, which lay in the mid-way between *Asia* the less and *Greece*. For (obtaining those places) the *Persians* had then nothing to hinder the transportation of their forces over the *Ægean* sea; but on the contrary, they might always both relieve themselves in their passage, and shroud themselves from all sudden tempests and outrage.

To this end, they first possess'd themselves of *Samos*; secondly, they attempted *Naxos*; which island the inhabitants, despairing of their own forces, abandon'd. So did the people of *Delos*, of which *Apollo* was native; which island *Darius* did not only forbear to sack, but recalling the inhabitants, he gave order to beautify the places and altars of sacrifice to *Apollo* erected. And having recover'd these and other islands, the *Persians* directed their course for *Eretria* in *Eubœa*, for that city (as already hath been shew'd) had assisted the *Ionians* at the taking and firing of *Sardis*. In this island the *Persians* took ground, and besieged *Eretria* very straitly; and after six days assault, partly by force, and in part by the treason of *Euphabus* and *Philagius*, they took it, sack'd it, and burnt it to the ground. Thus far the winds of prosperous fortune fill'd their sails. From *Eubœa* the *Persians* pass'd their army into *Attica*, conducted and guided by *Hippias*, late prince of *Athens*, and marching towards it, they encamp'd at *Marathon*, in the way from the sea, where they landed, towards *Athens*.

The *Athenians*, finding the time arriv'd wherein they were to dispute with their own virtues against fortune, and to cast lots for their liberty, for their wives, their children, and their lives, put themselves in the best order they could to make resistance, and

withal sent away with speed to the *Lacedemonians* for succour, employing in that negotiation one *Phidippides*; who passing through *Arcadia*, encounter'd in the way a familiar devil, which he suppos'd to be *Pan*, who will'd him to assure the *Athenians* of victory, promising that some one of the gods should be present at the battle, to assist them and defend them against the multitude of their enemies. *Phidippides* at his return, seeing he could not bring with him any present succours from *Sparta*, yet he thought it greatly availing to bring news from the gods, and promise of assistance from heaven, which no doubt (tho' the device was somewhat likely to be his own, yet) it greatly encouraged the multitude and common people, who in all ages have been more stir'd up with fond prophecies, and other like superstitious fooleries, than by any just cause or solid reason.

The *Athenians* being now left to themselves, with one thousand only of the *Plateans* (who having been formerly defended by the *Athenians* against the *Thebans*, did in this extremity witness their thankfulness and grateful disposition) began to dispute, whether it were most for their advantage to defend the walls of *Athens*, or to put themselves into the field with such forces as they had, the same consisting of ten thousand *Athenians*, and one thousand of the *Plateans*. In the end, and after great diversity of opinions, *Miltiades*, who perswaded the trial by battle, prevail'd.

The armies being now in view, and within a mile of each other, the *Athenians* dispos'd themselves into three troops; two wings or horns, as they term them, and the body of a battle. The *Persians*, when they perceiv'd so small a troop advancing towards them, thought the *Athenians* rather dispos'd of their understandings, than possess'd with the resolution whereof they made shew. So invincible and resolute the *Persians* esteem'd their own numbers to be, and that small troop of their enemies then in view, rather to be despis'd than to be fought withal. But in conclusion, the victory being doubtfully balanced for a while, sometimes the virtue of the *Grecians*, and sometimes the numbers of the *Persians* prevail'd; the *Grecians* fighting for all that they had, the *Persians* for that they needed not: these great forces of *Darius* were disorder'd, and put to rout, the *Athenians* following their victory even to the sea-shore; where the *Persians*, so many of them as lost not their wits with their courage, sav'd themselves in their ships.

The *Persian* army consisted of an hundred thousand foot, and ten thousand horse; of which there were slain in the place six thousand three hundred, and of the *Grecians* an hundred fourscore and twelve. For howsoever it came to pass, either by strange visions, which were afterwards call'd *Pannici terrores*, or by some other affright, it seemeth that the invading army, after the first encounter, fought with their backs towards their enemy, and lost that number, by *Herodotus* set down, in their disorderly retreat, or rather in their flat running away. As for *Justin's* report, That two hundred thousand of the *Persian* army were slain, the same hath no appearance nor possibility of truth. In this sight *Hippias*, the persuader of the enterprize, was slain, saith *Justin* and *Cicero*; but *Suidas* tells, that he escaped, and died most miserably in *Lemnos*.

The greatest honour of this victory was call upon *Miltiades*, who both perswaded the trial by battle,

^a Herod. l. 6. *If either this city or people were of Peloponnesus in Sicynia, or of Ægæa between Thessalia and Macedon, I do not know; but those borders, and next the enemy, were more likely to compound than the rest far off. There is also a city, call'd Æginum, not far from Ægæa, Liv. 32, 33, &c.* ^b In Herod. ^c Ad Att.

and behaved himself therein answerably to the counsel which he gave. *Themistocles* had his first reputation in this fight, being but young and of the first beard. Those of the *Grecians*, of mark and commendment, that fell in the first encounter, were *Calimachus* and *Stesileus*. It is also said, That *Cynegyrus* following the *Persians* to their embarking, laid hands on one of their gallies, to have held it from putting off the shore; and having his right hand cut off, he yet offered to arrest it with his left; of which also being deprived, he took hold of it with his teeth. This encounter happened in the first year of the three-score and twelfth *Olympiad*, about the time of the war made by *Coriolanus* against his fellow *Romans*: *Alexander* the son of *Antintas* being then king of *Macedon*, and *Phanippus* then governour of *Athens*, according to ^a *Plutarch*, or *Hybilides*, after *Halicarnasseus*.

This great fray thus parted, and the *Persians* returned back into the lesser *Asia*, *Miltiades* fought and obtained an employment against the islanders of *Paros*, one of the *Cyclades*, and passing over his companies in three-score and ten gallies, after six and twenty days assault, he broke his thigh, in seeking to enter it by the temple of *Ceres*, wherewith himself being made unable, and his companies discourag'd, he return'd to *Athens*: where those ungrateful citizens forgetting all his services past, and that of all other the most renowned at the battel of *Marathon*, did, by the perswasion of *Xantippus*, the father of *Pericles* (who envied his fame) cast him into prison, and set on him a fine of fifty talents; where his weak and wounded body being not able

to endure the one; nor his estate to pay the other, he after a few days ended his life.

Which envy of the better sort to each other, with their private factions, assisted by the unthankful and witless people, brought them, not many years after, from a victorious and famous nation, to base subjection and slavery. *Miltiades* left behind him one son called *Cymon*, begotten on *Hegefpila*, daughter of *Olorus* king of *Thrace*, who (saith *Plutarch*) was neither inferior to his father in valour, nor to *Themistocles* in understanding, but exceeded them both in justice and good government.

Now *Darius* taking greater care how to recover his honour, than sorrow for the loss he received in *Greece*, gave order for new levies of men, and all other warlike provisions. But the *Egyptians* revolting from his obedience (a kingdom of great strength and revenue) greatly distracted his resolution for the re-invasion of *Greece*. The dissension also among his sons, of whom the younger being born after he was king, and by so great a mother as *Atossa*, disdained to give place to his elder brother, born before *Darius* obtained the empire, greatly vexed him. And lastly, death, who hath no respect of any man's affairs, gave end to all his consultations and enterprises, and joined him to the earth of his ancestors, about a year after the battel of *Marathon*, and after that he had reigned six and thirty years. He left behind him five sons, namely, *Artabanes*, born before he obtain'd the kingdom; *Xerxes*, who succeeded him; *Achemenes*, governour of *Egypt*; *Masistes* and *Ariabignes*.

^a In vita Arist.

CHAP. VI.

Of XERXES.

SECT. I.

The preparations of Xerxes against Greece.

XERXES received from his father, as hereditary, a double war, one to be made against the *Egyptians*, which he finished so speedily, that there is nothing remaining in writing how the same was performed: the other against the *Grecians*, of which it is hard to judge, whether the preparations were more terrible, or the success ridiculous. In the consultation for the prosecution of this war, which was chiefly bent against the *Athenians*, the princes of *Persia* were divided in opinion. *Mardonius*, who had formerly commanded in *Thrace* and *Macedon*, under *Darius*, and had also *Hystaspes* for his grandfather, as *Xerxes* had, and married *Xerxes's* sister *Artaxostres*, perswaded by many arguments the *European* war. But *Artabanus*, brother to the late *Darius*, and uncle to *Xerxes*, maintained the contrary counsel, laying before *Xerxes* the lamentable and ridiculous success of the two late invasions which *Darius* had made contrary to his counsel: the one in person upon the *Scythians*, the other by his lieutenants upon the *Greeks*; in each of which *Darius* left to his enemies both his army and his honour.

He therefore besought *Xerxes* to be right well advised before he did too far imbarck himself in

this business. For whatsoever undertaking hath deliberate and sound counsel for conductor, tho' the success do not always answer the probability, yet hath fortune nothing else thereof to vaunt, than the variableness of her own nature, which only the divine Providence, and not any human power, can constrain.

But so obstinate was the resolution of *Xerxes* in prosecution of his former intent, that *Artabanus*, whether terrified by visions (as it is written of him) or fearing the king's hatred, which he made known to all those that opposed his desire to this war (changing opinion and counsel) assisted the *Grecian* expedition with all the power he had.

After the war of *Egypt* was ended, four years were consumed in describing and gathering an army for this invasion: which being compounded of all nations subject to the *Persian* empire, consisted of seventeen hundred thousand foot, and eighty thousand horsemen, beside chariots, camels, and other beasts for carriage, if we may believe ^b *Herodotus*: for of this multitude, *Trogus* finds the number less by seven hundred thousand foot-men.

The commanders of the several nations were the princes of the blood of *Persia*, either by marriage in the king's house or otherwise; for to these were all commandments of this nature given, some few people excepted, who had of their own leaders.

The charge of the whole army was bestowed on *Mardonius*, the son of *Gobrias*, by a sister of *Darius*, to whom were joined some others of *Xerxes*'s nearest kindred, as generals over all; saving that the charge of ten thousand select *Persians*, called the immortal regiment (because if any one of the whole number died or were slain, there was another presently chosen in his stead) was given to *Hydarnes*; the eighty thousand horsemen were led by the sons of *Datis*, who commanded the late army of *Darius* in *Greece*.

The fleet of galleys were two thousand two hundred and eight, furnished by the *Phenicians*, who had commanders of their own nation, and by the *Cypriotes*, *Cilicians*, *Pamphilians*, *Lycians*, *Dorians*, *Carians*, *Ionians*, *Eolians*, and *Hellepontines*; who were trusted with the furnishing of their own vessels, tho' commanded by the princes of *Persia*, as by *Ariabignes*, the son of *Darius* and others. The rest of the vessels for transportation were three thousand. There were also certain galleys furnished by *Artemesia*, the daughter of *Lygdames*, prince of *Halicarnassus* and the islands adjoining, which her self commanded. Those galleys by her prepared and furnished, exceeded all the rest of the fleet, excepting those of *Zidon*, in which *Xerxes* himself was embarked.

S E C T. II.

Xerxes's army entertained by Pythius: his cutting off mount Athos from the continent: his bridge of boats over the Hellespont: and the discourse between him and Artabanus upon the view of the army.

WHEN this world of an army was thoroughly furnished, he caused all the nations, of which it was compounded, to make their rendezvous, and repair at *Sardis* in *Lydia*. And when he had assembled to the number of seventeen hundred thousand foot, as he enter'd the border of *Celenas*, he was by one *Pythius* a *Lydian* entertained, who out of his flocks and herds of cattle gave food to *Xerxes* and his whole army. The feast ended, he also presented him with two thousand talents of silver, and in gold four millions, wanting seven thousand of the *Persian Darici*; which make so many of our marks.

The king, overcome with the exceeding liberality of *Pythius*, did not only refuse his treasure offered, but commanded that seven thousand *Darici* should be given him to make up his four millions, of which so many thousands were wanting when he made the present. But soon after, when *Pythius* besought him to spare one of his five sons from his attendance into *Greece* (because himself was old and had none whom he could so well trust as his own son) *Xerxes* most barbarously caused the young man, for whom his father sought exemption, to be sundered into two parts, commanding that the one half of his carcase should be laid on the right, and the other half on the left hand of the common way by which the army marched.

Two things he commanded to be done before he came to the sea-side. The one was a passage for galleys to be cut behind mount *Athos*, making the same (with the half-island or head-land, whereon it stood) to be an entire island, sundering thereby from the continent of *Thrace* five cities, besides the mountain and the *Chersonesus*, or neck of land it self; a work of more ostentation, than of use, and yet an enterprise of no great wonder, the valley which held it to the continent having but twelve furlongs (which make about a mile and a half) to

cut through, and the ditch being broad enough only for two galleys to pass in front. The cities so severed from the main, were *Dion*, *Olophyxus*, *Acrothoon*, *Thysus* and *Cleonæ*.

He also gave order, that a bridge upon boats should be made over the *Hellespont* between *Abidus* and *Sestos*, the sea there having a mile of breadth, wanting an eighth part; which after the finishing, was by a tempest torn asunder and dissevered: wherewith *Xerxes* being more enraged than discouraged, commanded those to be slain that were masters of the work, and caused six hundred three-score and fourteen galleys to be coupled together, thereon to frame a new bridge; which, by the art and industry of the *Phenicians*, was so well anchored to resist both winds blowing into and from the *Euxine* sea, as the same being well boarded and railed, the whole army of seventeen hundred thousand foot, and fourscore thousand horse, with all the mules and carriages, pass'd over it into *Europe* in seven days and seven nights, without intermission. This transportation of armies did *Cesar* afterwards use. And *Caligula*, that mad emperor, in imitation of *Xerxes*'s bridge, did build the like.

The bridge finished, and the army brought near to the sea-side, *Xerxes* took a view of all his troops, assembled in the plains of *Abidus*, being carried up, and seated on a place over-topping the land round about it, and the sea adjoining: and after he had gloried in his own happiness, to behold and command so many nations and so powerful an army and fleet, he suddenly (notwithstanding) burst out into tears, moved with this contemplation, that in one hundred years there should not any one survive of that marvellous multitude: the cause of which sudden change of passion when he uttered to *Artabanus* his uncle, *Artabanus* spake to the king to this effect: That which is more lamentable than the dissolution of this great troop within that number of years remember'd by the king, is, that the life it self which we enjoy is yet more miserable than the end thereof: for in those few days given us in the world, there is no man among all these, or elsewhere, that ever found himself so accompanied with happiness, but that he oftentimes pleased himself better with the desire and hope of death, than of living; the incident calamities, diseases and sorrows whereto mankind is subject, being so many and inevitable, that the shortest life doth oftentimes appear unto us over-long; to avoid all which, there is neither refuge nor rest, but in desired death alone.

With this melancholy discourse *Xerxes* being not much pleased, prayed *Artabanus* not to overcast those joys which they had now in pursuit, with sad remembrances. And holding still a doubtful conceit, that *Artabanus* utterly condemned the invasion of *Greece*, against which he had formerly given many strong reasons, desired him to deal freely with him, whether he were return'd to his first resolution, that the enterprise of *Greece* could not be prosperous; or whether, according to the change of mind put into him by his late vision, he was confident of good success? *Artabanus*, notwithstanding that he assured himself of the king's resolution to go on, and dared not by any new arguments to batter the great purpose it self, yet he told the king, that there were two things which marvellously affrighted him, and which the king should find, as he feared, to be most adverse; to wit, the sea and the land: the sea, because it had no-where in that part of the world any port capable of so great a fleet; inso-much, as if any tempest should arise, all the continent of *Greece* could hardly receive them, nor all the havens thereof afford them any safety: and there-fore

fore when any such shelter shall be wanting unto them, he prayed him to understand, that in such a case of extremity, men are left to the will and disposition of fortune, and not fortune to the will and disposition of men. The land, besides other incommodities, will be found by so much the more an enemy, by how much the unsatiate desire of man to obtain more and more thereof, doth lead him forward: for were there no man found to give resistance, yet the want of means to feed such an army, and the famine which cannot be prevented, will, without any other violence offered, disenable and consume it. By these arguments *Artabanus* hoped to have diverted *Xerxes*, not daring perchance to utter what indeed he most feared, to wit, the overthrow of the army it self, both by sea and land, which soon after followed. These cautions were exceeding weighty, if *Xerxes's* obstinacy had not misprised them. For to invade by sea upon a perilous coast, being neither in possession of any port, nor succoured by any party, may better fit a prince presuming on his fortune, than enriched with understanding. Such was the enterprize of *Philip* the second upon *England* in the year 1588, who had belike never heard of this counsel of *Artabanus* to *Xerxes*, or forgotten it.

Now concerning the second point; it is very likely that *Xerxes's* army, which could not have in it less than two millions of souls, besides his beasts for service and carriage, should after a few days suffer famine; and using *Machiavel's* words, *Mourir sans cousteo; die without a knife*. For it was impossible for *Greece*, being a ragged, strait, and mountainous country, to yield food (besides what served themselves) for twenty hundred thousand strangers whom they never meant to entertain, but with the sharpned points of their weapons, destroying withal whatsoever they could not well inclose and defend. Nay, if we may believe *Herodotus*, the army of *Xerxes*, being reviewed at *Thermopylae*, consisted of five millions, two hundred eighty-three thousand, two hundred and twenty men, besides landresses, harlots and horses, and was therefore likely to endure a speedy famine.

The effect of *Xerxes's* answer, was, that it was impossible to provide for all things; and that whoever should enterprize any great matter, if he gave the hearing to all that could be objected of accidental inconveniencies, he should never pursue the same farther than the dispute and consultation: which if his predecessors, the *Persian* kings, had done, they had never grown to that greatness, or possess'd so many kingdoms and nations, as they now did; and therefore concluded, that great enterprizes were never undertaken without great peril. Which resolution of *Xerxes* was not to be condemned, if any necessity had inforced him to that war. But seeing the many nations newly conquered, which he already commanded, were more than could be constrained to obedience any longer than the powerful prosperity of the *Persians* endured, and that *Greece* were separated by the sea from the rest of *Xerxes's* dominions (of whose resolution his father *Darius* had made a dear experience) the fruit of this war was answerable to the plantation, and the success and end agreeable to the weak counsel whereon it was grounded. Furthermore, those millions of men which he transported, and yet in his own judgment not sufficient (for he gathered, in marching on, all the strength of *Thrace* and *Macedon*) were an argument, that he rather hoped to fright the *Greeks* by the fame of his numbers, than that he had any confidence in their valour and resolution whom he conducted. For it is wisely said of those unaccountable multitudes: *Non vires habent, sed pondus*; &

impedimenta potius sunt; quam auxilium; They are great in bulk, but weak in forces, and rather a luggage than an aid.

Besides, as it was impossible to marshal such a world of men in one army, so the divers nations, speaking divers languages, bred the same confusion among the *Persian* commanders when they came to fight, as it did to the builders of *Babel*, when they came to work. Whereas, if *Xerxes* had of his five millions compounded ten armies of fifty thousand chosen soldiers in each, and sent them yearly into *Greece* well victualled and furnished, he had either prevailed by the sword, or forced them to forsake their territory, or brought them into obedience by necessity and famine, which cannot be resisted. But while *Xerxes* resolved to cut down the banks of *Greece* and to let in a sea of men upon them, he was deceived both of his own hopes, and in their hearts whom he employed, and beaten by the *Greeks* both by land and sea; yea, he himself, conducted by his fear, fled shamefully into *Asia*. A great part of his army was buried in *Greece*: the remainder whereof, which winter'd in *Thessaly*, and led by *Mardonius* who perswaded the enterprize, was in the summer following utterly defeated, and himself slain.

SECT. III.

Of the fights at Thermopylae and Artemisium.

AFTER such time as *Xerxes* had transported the army over the *Hellepont*, and landed in *Thrace* (leaving the description of his passage along that coast, and how the river of *Liffus* was drunk dry by his multitudes, and the lake near to *Pissyrus* by his cattle, with other accidents in his marches towards *Greece*) I will speak of the encounters he had, and the shameful and incredible overthrows which he receiv'd. As first at *Thermopylae*, a narrow passage of half an acre of ground, lying between the mountains, which divide *Thessaly* from *Greece*, where sometime the *Phocians* had raised a wall with gates which was then for the most part ruined. At this entrance *Leonidas*, one of the kings of *Sparta*, with three hundred *Lacedemonians*, assisted with one thousand *Tegeate* and *Mantineans*, one thousand *Arcadians*, and other *Peloponnesians*, to the number of three thousand one hundred in the whole, besides one thousand *Phocians*, four hundred *Thebans*, seven hundred *Thespians*, and all the forces (such as they were) of the bordering *Locrians*, defended the passage two whole days together, against that huge army of the *Persians*. The valour of the *Greeks* appeared so excellent in this defence, that in the first day's fight, *Xerxes* is said to have three times leaped out of his throne, fearing the destruction of his army by one handful of those men, whom not long before he had utterly despised; and when the second day's attempt upon the *Greeks* had proved in vain, he was altogether ignorant how to proceed further: and so might have continued, had not a runaway *Grecian* taught him a secret way, by which part of his army might ascend the ledge of mountains, and set upon the backs of those who kept the straits. But when the most valiant of the *Persian* army had almost enclosed the small forces of the *Greeks*, then did *Leonidas*, king of the *Lacedemonians*, with his three hundred, and seven hundred *Thespians*, which were all that abode by him, refuse to quit the place which they had undertaken to make good, and with admirable courage not only resist that world of men which charged them on all sides; but issuing out of their strength, made so great a slaughter of their enemies, that they might well be called vanquishers, tho' all of them were slain upon the place. *Xerxes*, having

having lost in this last fight, together with twenty thousand other soldiers and captains, two of his own brethren, began to doubt what inconvenience might befall him by the virtue of such as had not been present at these battels, with whom he knew that he shortly was to deal. Especially of the *Spartans* he stood in great fear, whose manhood had appeared singular in this trial, which caused him very carefully to enquire what numbers they could bring into the field. It is reported of *Dieneces* the *Spartan*, that when one thought to have terrified him by saying, that the flight of the *Persian* arrows was so thick as would hide the sun, he answered thus: *It is very good news, for then shall we fight in the cool shade.*

Such notable resolution having as freely been expressed in deeds, as it was uttered in words, caused the *Persian* to stand in great doubt, when he heard that the city of *Sparta* could arm well-nigh eight thousand men of the like temper, and that the other *Lacedemonians*, tho' inferiour to those, were very valiant men. Wherefore he asked counsel of *Demaratus*, a banished king of the *Spartans*, who had always well advised and instructed him in the things of *Greece*, what course was fittest to be taken in his further proceedings. The opinion of *Demaratus* was, that all the land-forces should assemble together to defend *Isthmus*, that streight neck of ground which joineth *Peloponnesus* to the continent. For which cause he advised, that three hundred ships well manned, should be sent unto the coasts of *Laconia*, to spoil the country, and to hold the *Lacedemonians* and their neighbours busied at home; whilst *Xerxes*, at his leisure having subdued the rest, might afterwards bring his whole power upon them, who remaining destitute of succour, would be too weak alone to make resistance. To this purpose also the same *Demaratus* further advised; that the said fleet of three hundred ships should seize upon the island then call'd *Cythera*, now *Cerigo*, which lying near to the coast of *Laconia*, might serve as a fit place of rendezvous upon all occasions, either of their own defence, or endamaging the enemy: whereby that ancient speech of *Chilon* the *Lacedemonian* should be verified, that it were better for his countrymen to have that isle drowned in the sea, than stand so inconveniently for them as it did. What effect this counsel might have taken, had it been followed, it is not easy to guess. But a contrary opinion of *Achemenes*, brother to king *Xerxes*, was preferred as the safer. For the *Persian* fleet had been sorely vexed with a grievous tempest, which continued three whole days together, wherein were lost upon the coast of *Magnesia*, four hundred ships of war, besides other vessels innumerable, accordingly as *Arctabanus* had foreseen, that if any such calamity should overtake them, there would not be found any harbour wide enough to give them succour. Therefore *Achemenes* persuaded his brother not to disperse his fleet; for if (said he) after the loss of four hundred ships we shall send away other three hundred to seek adventures, then will the *Greeks* be strong enough by sea to encounter the rest of the navy, which, holding all together, is invincible. To this counsel *Xerxes* yielded, hoping that his land-army and fleet, should each of them stand the other in good stead, whilst both held one course, and lay not far asunder. But herein he was far deceived; for about the same time that his army had felt the valour of the *Greeks* by land, his navy likewise made a sorrowful proof of their skill and courage at sea. The *Grecian* fleet lay at that time at *Artemisium*, in the straits of *Eubœa*, where the *Persians* thinking to encompass them, sent two hundred sail about the island to fall upon them behind, using a like stratagem to that which

their king did practise against *Leonidas*, in a case not unlike, but with far different success. For that narrow channel of the sea, which divideth *Eubœa* from the main, was in the same sort held by a navy of two hundred and seventy-one sail against the huge *Persian* armada, as the straits of *Thermopylae* had formerly been maintained by *Leonidas*, till he was circumvented, as this navy might have been, but was not. The departure of those two hundred ships, that were sent about the island, and the cause of their voyage, was too well known in the *Persian* fleet, and soon enough disclosed to the *Greeks*, who setting sail by night, met them with a counter-surprise, taking and sinking thirty vessels, enforcing the rest to take the sea; where, being overtaken with foul weather, they were driven upon the rocks, and cast all away. Contrariwise, the navy of the *Greeks* were increased by the arrival of fifty-three *Athenian* ships, and one *Lemnian*, which came to their party in the last fight. As these new forces encouraged the one side, so the fear of *Xerxes's* displeasure stirr'd up the other to redeem their loss with some notable exploit. Wherefore setting aside their unfortunate policy, they resolved in plain fight to repair their honour, and casting themselves into the form of a crescent, thought so to inclose the *Greeks*, who readily did present them battel at *Artemisium*.

The fight endured from noon till night, and ended with equal loss to both parties. For, tho' more of the *Persians* ships were sunk and taken, yet the lesser loss fell altogether as heavy upon the *Grecian* fleet, which being small, could worse bear it. Herein only the *Barbarians* may seem to have had the worse, that they forsook the place of fight, leaving the wrack and spoils to the enemy, who nevertheless were fain to abandon presently even the passage which they had undertaken to defend; both for that many of their ships were sorely crush'd in the battel, and especially because they had received advertisement of the death of *Leonidas* at *Thermopylae*. Before they weigh'd anchors, *Themistocles*, general of the *Athenians*, engrav'd upon a stone at the watering-place an exhortation to the *Ionians*, that either they should revolt unto the *Greeks* or stand neutral; which persuasion, he hoped, would either take some place with them, or at the least make them suspected by the *Persians*.

SECT. IV.

The attempt of Xerxes upon Apollo's temple: and his taking of Athens.

WHEN *Xerxes* had pass'd the straits of *Thermopylae*, he wasted the country of the *Phocians*, and the regions adjoining: as for the inhabitants, they chose rather to fly, and reserve themselves to a day of battel, than to adventure their lives into his hands, upon hope of saving their wealth, by making proffer unto him of their service. Part of his army he sent to spoil the temple of *Delphi*, which was exceeding rich by means of many offerings that had been made by divers kings and great personages; of all which riches it was thought that *Xerxes* had a better inventory than of the goods left in his own palace. To make relation of a great astonishment that fell upon the companies which arrived at the temple to have sack'd it, and of two rocks that breaking from the mount *Parnassus*, overwhelmed many of the *Barbarians*, it were peradventure somewhat superstitious. Yet *Herodotus*, who lived not long after, saith, that the broken rocks remained even to his memory in the temple of *Minerva*, whither they rolled in their fall. And surely this attempt

attempt of *Xerxes* was impious; for seeing he believ'd that *Apollo* was a god, he should not have dared to entertain a covetous desire of enriching himself by committing sacrilege upon his temple. Wherefore it may possibly be true, that licence to chastise his impiety, in such manner as is reported, was granted unto the devil, by that holy one, who saith, ^a *Will a man spoil his gods?* and elsewhere, ^b *Hadst any nation changed their gods, which yet are no gods? Go to the isles of Kittim, and behold, and send to Kedar, and take diligent heed, and see whether there be any such things.* Now this impiety of *Xerxes* was the more inexcusable, for that the *Persians* alledg'd the burning of *Cybele's* temple by the *Athenians*, when they set fire on the city of *Sardis* in *Asia*, to be the ground and cause of the waste which they made in burning of cities and temples in *Greece*. Whereas indeed, in the enterprise against *Delphos*, this vizzor of holy and zealous revenge falling off, discover'd the face of covetousness so much the more ugly, by how much the more themselves had professed a detestation of the offence which the *Athenians* had committed in that kind by mere mischance.

The remainder of that which *Xerxes* did may be expressed briefly thus: *He came to Athens, which finding forsaken, he took and burnt the citadel and temple which was therein.* The citadel indeed was defended a while by some of more courage than wisdom, who literally interpreting *Apollo's* oracle, *That Athens should be safe in wooden walls*, had fortify'd that place with boards and palisadoes; too weak to hold out long, tho' by their desperate valour so well maintain'd at the first assault, that they might have yielded it upon tolerable conditions, had they not vainly relied upon the prophecy; whereof (being somewhat obscure) it was wisely done of *Themistocles*, to make discretion the interpreter, applying rather the words to the present need, than fashioning the business to words.

SECT. V.

How Themistocles the Athenian drew the Greeks to fight at Salamis.

THE *Athenians* had, before the coming of *Xerxes*, remov'd their wives and children into *Træzene*, *Ægina*, and *Salamis*, not so highly prizing their houses and lands, as their freedom, and the common liberty of *Greece*. Nevertheless this great zeal, which the *Athenians* did shew for the general good of their country, was ill requited by the other *Greeks*, who with much labour were hardly intreated to stay for them at *Salamis*, whilst they remov'd their wives and children out of the city. But when the city of *Athens* was taken, it was presently resolv'd upon, that they should forsake the isle of *Salamis*, and withdraw the fleet to *Isthmus*; which neck of land they did purpose to fortify against the *Persians*, and so to defend *Peloponnesus* by land and sea, leaving the rest of *Greece* as indefensible to the fury of the enemy. So should the islands of *Salamis* and *Ægina* have been abandon'd, and the families of the *Athenians* (which were there bestow'd as in places of security) have been given over into merciless bondage. Against this resolution, *Themistocles*, admiral of the *Athenian* fleet, very strongly made opposition, but in vain. For the *Peloponnesians* were so possess'd with fear of losing their own, which they would not hazard, that no persuasions could obtain of them, to regard the estate of their distressed friends and allies. Ma-

ny remonstrances *Themistocles* made unto them, to allure them to abide the enemy at *Salamis*; as first in private unto *Eurybiades* the *Lacedemonian*, admiral of the whole fleet, That the self-same fear, which made them forsake those coasts of *Greece*, upon which they then anchor'd, would afterwards (if it found no check at the first) cause them also to disperse the fleet, and every one of the confederates to withdraw himself to the defence of his own city and estate; then to the council of war, which *Eurybiades* upon this motion did call together (forbearing to object what want of courage might work in them hereafter) he shew'd that the fight at *Isthmus* would be in an open sea, whereas it was more expedient for them, having the fewer ships, to determine the matter in the straits; and that, besides the safeguard of *Ægina*, *Megara*, and *Salamis*, they should, by abiding where they then were, sufficiently defend *Isthmus*, which the *Barbarians* should not so much as once look upon, if the *Greeks* obtain'd victory by sea: which they could not so well hope for elsewhere, as in that present place which gave them so good advantage. All this would not serve to retain the *Peloponnesians*, of whom one, unworthy of memory, upbraided *Themistocles* with the loss of *Athens*, blaming *Eurybiades* for suffering one to speak in the council, that had no country of his own to inhabit. A base and shameful objection it was, to lay as a reproach that loss, which being voluntarily sustain'd for the common good, was in true estimation by so much the more honourable, by how much it was the greater. But this indignity did exasperate *Themistocles*, and put into his mouth a reply so sharp, as avail'd more than all his former persuasions. He told them all plainly, That the *Athenians* wanted not a fairer city, than any nation of *Greece* could boast of; having well-near two hundred good ships of war, the better part of the *Grecian* fleet, with which it was easy for them to transport their families and substance into any part of the world, and settle themselves in a more secure habitation, leaving those to shift as well as they might, who in their extremity had refused to stand by them. Herewithal he mention'd a town in *Italy*, belonging of old to the state of *Athens*, of which town he said an oracle had foretold, That the *Athenians* in process of time should build it anew, and there (quoth he) will we plant ourselves, leaving unto you a sorrowful remembrance of my words, and of your own unthankfulness. The *Peloponnesians*, hearing thus much, began to enter into better consideration of the *Athenians*, whose affairs depended not, as they well perceiv'd, upon so weak terms, that they should be driven to crouch to others; but rather were such, as might enforce the rest to yield to them, and condescend even to the uttermost of their own demands.

For the *Athenians*, when they first embraced that heroical resolution of leaving their grounds and houses to fire and ruin, if necessity should enforce them so far, for the preservation of their liberty; did employ the most of their private wealth, and all the common treasure, in building a great navy. By these means they hoped (which accordingly fell out) that no such calamity should befall them by land, as might not well be counterpois'd by great advantages at sea: knowing well, that a strong fleet would either procure victory at home, or a secure passage to any other country. The other states of *Greece* held it sufficient, if building a few new ships they did somewhat amend their navy.

^a Malac. 3. 8.

^b Jerem. 2. 9, 10.

Whereby it came to pass, that, had they been vanquish'd, they could not have expected any other fortune, than either present death, or perpetual slavery; neither could they hope to be victorious without the assistance of the *Athenians*, whose forces by sea did equal all theirs together; the whole consisting of more than three hundred and fourscore bottoms. Wherefore these *Peloponnesians*, beginning to suspect their own condition, which would have stood upon desperate points, if the fleet of *Athens* had forsaken them, were soon persuaded, by the greater fear of such a bad event, to forget the lesser, which they had conceiv'd of the *Persians*; and laying aside their insolent bravery, they yielded to that most profitable counsel of abiding at *Salamis*.

S E C T. VI.

How the Persians consulted about giving battle; and how Themistocles by policy held the Greeks to their resolution; with the victory at Salamis thereupon ensuing.

IN the mean season the *Persians* had enter'd into consultation, whether it were convenient to offer battle to the *Greeks*, or no. The rest of the captains giving such advice as they thought would best please the king their master, had soon agreed upon the fight; but *Artemisia*, queen of *Halicarnassus*, who follow'd *Xerxes* to this war in person, was of a contrary opinion. Her counsel was, that the king himself directly should march towards *Peloponnesus*, whereby it would come to pass, that the *Greek* navy (unable otherwise to continue long at *Salamis* for want of provision) should presently be discover'd; and every one seeking to preserve his own city and goods, they should, being divided, prove unable to resist him, who had won so far upon them when they held together. And as the profit will be great in forbearing to give battle, so on the other side the danger will be more (said she) which we shall undergo, than any need requireth us to adventure upon; and the loss, in case it fall upon us, greater than the profit of the victory which we desire. For if we compel the enemies to fly, it is no more than they would have done, we sitting still; but if they, as better seamen than ours, put us to the worst, the journey to *Peloponnesus* is utterly dash'd, and many that now declare for us will soon revolt unto the *Greeks*. *Mardonius*, whom *Xerxes* had sent for that purpose to the fleet, related unto his master the common consent of the other captains, and withal, this disagreeing opinion of *Artemisia*. The king was well pleased with her advice, yet resolved upon following the more general, but far worse counsel of the rest; which would questionless have been the same which *Artemisia* gave, had not fear and flattery made all the captains utter that as out of their own judgment, which they thought most conformable to their prince's determination. So it was indeed that *Xerxes* had entertained a vain persuasion of much good, that his own presence upon the shore, to behold the conflict, would work among the soldiers. Therefore he incamped upon the sea-side, pitching his own tent upon the mount *Egaeus*, which is opposite unto the isle of *Salamis*, whence at ease he might safely view all which might happen in that action, having scribes about him to write down the acts and behaviour of every captain. The near approach of the *Barbarians*, together with the news of that timorous diligence, which their countrymen shewed in fortifying *Isthmus*, and of a *Persian* army marching apace thither, did now again so terrify and amaze the *Peloponnesians*, that no in-

treaty nor contestation would suffice to hold them together. For they thought it mere madness to fight for a country already lost, when they rather should endeavour to save that which remained unconquered; propounding chiefly to themselves what misery would befall them, if losing the victory, they should be driven into *Salamis*, there to be shut up, and besieged round in a poor desolate island.

Hereupon they resolved forthwith to set sail for *Isthmus*: which had presently been done, if the wisdom of *Themistocles* had not prevented it. For he perceiving what a violent fear had stop'd up their ears against all good counsel, did practise another course, and forthwith labour to prevent the execution of this unwholsome decree; not suffering the very hour of performance to find him busy in wrangling altercation. As soon as the council broke up, he dispatched secretly a trusty gentleman to the *Persian* captains, informing them truly of the intended flight, and exhorting them to send part of their navy about the island, which encompassing the *Greeks*, might prevent their escape; giving them withal a false hope of his assistance. The *Persians* no sooner heard than believed these good news, well knowing that the victory was their own assured, if the *Athenian* fleet joined with them, which they might easily hope, considering what ability their master had to recompense, for so doing, both the captains with rich rewards, and the people with restitution of their city and territories. By these means it fell out, that when the *Greeks* very early in the morning were about to weigh anchor, they found themselves inclosed round with *Persians*, who had laboured hard all night, sending many of their ships about the isle of *Salamis*, to charge the enemy in rear, and landing many of their men in the isle of *Psyttalea*, which lieth over-against *Salamis*, to save such of their own, and kill such of the *Grecian* party, as by any misfortune should be cast upon the shore. Thus did mere necessity enforce the *Grecians* to undertake the battle in the straits of *Salamis*, where they obtained a memorable victory, stemming the foremost of their enemies, and chasing the rest, who falling foul one upon another, could neither conveniently fight nor fly. I do not find any particular occurrences in this great battle to be much remarkable. Sure it is, that the scribes of *Xerxes* had a wearisome task of writing down many disasters that befell the *Persian* fleet, which ill acquitted itself that day, doing no one piece of service worthy the presence of their king, or the registering of his notaries. As for the *Greeks*, they might well seem to have wrought out that victory with equal courage, were it not that the principal honour of that day was ascribed to those of *Agina*, and to the *Athenians*, of whom it is recorded, That when the *Barbarians* did fly towards *Phalerus*, where the land-army of *Xerxes* lay, the ships of *Agina* having possess'd the straits, did sink or take them, whilst the *Athenians* did valiantly give charge upon those that kept the sea, and made any countenance of resisting.

S E C T. VII.

Of things following after the battle of Salamis; and of the flight of Xerxes.

AFTER this victory, the *Greeks* intending, by way of security, to determine which of the captains had best merited of them, in all this great service; every captain, being ambitious of that honour, did in the first place write down his own name, but in the second place, as best deserving

next unto himself, almost every suffrage did concur upon *Themistocles*. Thus private affection yielded unto virtue, as soon as her own turn was served. The *Persian* king, as not amazed with this calamity, began to make new preparation for continuance of war; but in such fashion, that they, which were best acquainted with his temper, might easily discern his faint heart, through his painted looks. Especially *Mardonius*, author of the war, began to cast a wary eye upon his master, fearing lest his counsel should be rewarded according to the event. Wherefore, purposing rather to adventure his life in pursuit of the victory, than to cast it away by undergoing his prince's indignation, he advised the king to leave unto him three hundred thousand men; with which forces he promised to reduce all *Greece* under the subjection of the *Persian* scepter. Herewithal he forgot not to sooth *Xerxes* with many fair words, telling him, that the cowardise of those *Egyptians*, *Phenicians*, and *Cilicians*, with others of the like metal, nothing better than slaves, who had so ill behaved themselves in the late sea-service, did not concern his honour, who had always been victorious, and had already subdued the better part of *Greece*, yea, taken *Athens* itself, against which the war was principally intended. These words found very good acceptance in the king's ear, who presently betook himself to his journey homewards, making the more haste, for that he understood, how the *Greeks* had a purpose to sail to *Hellepont*, and there to break down his bridge, and intercept his passage. True it was, that the *Greeks* had no such intent, but rather wished his hasty departure, knowing that he would leave his army not so strong, as it should have been had he in person remained with it. And for this cause did *Eurybiades* give counsel, that by no means they should attempt the breaking of that bridge, lest necessity should inforce the *Persians* to take more courage, and rather to fight like men, than die like beasts. Wherefore *Themistocles* did, under pretence of friendship, send a false advertisement to this timorous prince, advising him to convey himself into *Asia* with all speed, before his bridge were dissolved: which counsel *Xerxes* took very kindly, and hastily followed, as before is shewed. Whether it were so that he found the bridge whole, and thereby repassed into *Asia*; or whether it were torn in sunder by tempests, and he thereby driven to embark himself in some obscure vessel, it is not greatly material; though the *Greeks* did most willingly embrace the latter of these reports. Howsoever it were, this flight of his did well ease the country, that was thereby disburdened of that huge throng of people, which, as locusts, had before overwhelmed it.

SECT. VIII.

The negotiations between Mardonius and the Athenians, as also between the Athenians and Lacedemonians, after the flight of Xerxes.

MARDONIUS, with his three hundred thousand, had withdrawn himself into *Thessaly*, whence he sent *Alexander*, the son of *Amyntas* king of *Macedon*, as ambassador to the *Athenians*, with promise of large amends for all their losses received, and of extending their territories as far as their own desires; allowing them to retain their liberty and laws, if they would make peace with *Xerxes*, and assist him in that war.

The *Athenians* had now re-enter'd their city, but not as yet brought back their wives and children;

forasmuch as they well perceived that the place could not be secure till the army of *Mardonius* were broken and defeated. Wherefore the *Lacedemonians*, understanding what fair conditions this ambassador would propound, were perplexed with very great fear, lest he should find good and ready acceptance. Hereupon they likewise very speedily dispatched their ambassadors for *Athens*, who arriving before the *Macedonian* had audience, used the best of their perswasion to retain the *Athenians* firm. They alleged that neither *Xerxes* nor *Darius* had any pretence of war against the rest of *Greece*, but had only threatened the subversion of *Athens*, till they and all their confederates, arming themselves in defence of that city, were drawn into the quarrel, wherein the *Athenians*, without much cruelty of injustice, could not leave them. We know, say they, that ye have endured great calamities, losing the fruit of the grounds, and being driven to forsake the town, the houses whereof be ruined, and unfit for your habitation; in regard whereof, we undertake to maintain, as our own, your wives and children amongst us, as long as the war shall continue, hoping that ye, who have always procured liberty to others, will not now go about to bring all *Greece* into slavery and bondage. As for the *Barbarians*, their promises are large, but their words and oaths are of no assurance. It was needless to use many arguments to the *Athenians*, who gave answer to *Alexander* in presence of the *Spartan* ambassadors: that whilst the sun continued his course they would be enemies to *Xerxes*, regarding neither gold nor any riches, with which he might seek to make purchase of their liberty. Concerning the maintenance of their wives and children, it was a burden which they promised to sustain themselves, only desiring the *Lacedemonians*, that with all speed they would cause their army to march; forasmuch as it was not likely, that *Mardonius* would long sit still in *Thessaly*, having once received such a peremptory answer. In this their opinion of *Mardonius's* readiness to invade *Attica*, they found themselves nothing deceived. For he, as soon as *Alexander* had returned their obstinate purpose of resistance, did forthwith lead his army towards them and their city; they having now the second time quitted it, and conveyed themselves into places of more security abroad in the country, where they expected the arrival of their confederates.

From *Athens* he sent his agent unto them with instructions, not only to perswade them to acceptance of the conditions before to them propounded, but with great promises to allure the principal of them to his party. His hope was, that either the people wearied with forsaking their houses so often, would be desirous to preserve them from fire, and to have those which were already laid waste, re-edified at the king's charges; or, if this affection took no place with them, but that needs they would rely upon their old confederates, whose succours did very slowly advance forwards; yet perhaps the leaders might be won with great rewards, to draw them to his purpose: all which projects if they should fail, the destruction of *Athens* would be a good means to please his master king *Xerxes*, who must thereby needs understand, that *Mardonius* kept his ground, and feared not to confront the whole power of *Greece*, in the strongest part of their own country. But his expectation was beguiled in all these. For the *Athenians* so little regarded his offers, that when one *Lycidas*, or (as *Demosthenes* calls him) *Cyrcilus* advised the senate to accept the conditions, and propound them to the people; all the senators, and as many as abiding without the council-house

cil-house heard what he had said, immediately set upon him and stoned him to death; not examining whether it were fear or money, that had moved him to utter such a vile sentence. Yea, the women of *Athens*, in the isle of *Salamis*, hearing of his bad counsel, and bad end, assembling together, did enter his house there, and put his wife and children to the like execution. All this bravery notwithstanding, when they perceived the slackness of the *Peloponnesians* in giving them aid, they were fain to betake themselves to *Salamis* again, the old place of their security. Remaining there, and seeing little forwardness in those whom it most concerned to assist them, they sent very severe messages to *Sparta*, complaining of their slackness, and threatening withal to take such course as might stand best with their own good, seeing that the common estate of all was so little regarded. These messengers were at the first entertained with dilatory answers, which every day grew colder, when as the *Peloponnesian* wall, built athwart the *Isthmus*, was almost finished. But as the *Lacedemonians* waxed careless and dull, so the *Athenians* hotly pressed them to a quick resolution, giving them plainly to understand, that if they should hold on in those dilatory courses, it would not be long ere the city of *Athens* took a new course, that should little please them. All this while the *Persian* fleet lay upon the coast of *Asia*, not daring to draw nearer unto *Greece*, as being now too weak at sea. Likewise the *Grecian* navy contained it self within the harbours upon *Europe* side; both to do service where need should require at home, and withal to shun the danger which might have befallen any part of it, that being distracted from the rest had adventured over-far. So mutual fear preserved in quiet the islands lying in the midst of the *Egean* seas. But it was well and seasonably observed by a counsellor of *Sparta*, that the wall upon *Isthmus* would serve to little purpose for the defence of *Peloponnesus*, if once the *Athenians* gave ear to *Mardonius*: considering that any doors would be opened into that demi-island, as soon as the enemy should, by winning the friendship of *Athens*, become the master of the seas about it. The *Lacedemonians* upon this admonition, making better perusal of their own dangers, were very careful to give satisfaction to the *Athenian* ambassadors, who not brooking their delays, were upon point of taking leave, yea, as it seemed, of renouncing their alliance. Wherefore, dispatching away five thousand *Spartans* in the evening, under conduct of *Pausanias*, they gave audience the next day to the ambassadors, whose complaints they answered with vehement protestations of their readiness; deeply swearing, that the army of *Sparta* was already far upon the journey; and giving them leave to take up other five thousand *Lacedemonians* out of the region adjoining, to follow after them.

The *Athenians*, though disasting such want of gravity, in a matter so important, were nevertheless contented with the final conclusion; and levying the number appointed of *Lacedemonian* soldiers, made what haste they could to encamp in *Attica*. The other *Grecians* were nothing slack in sending forth companies, whose near approach caused *Mardonius* to forsake *Attica* as a rough country, and therefore of much disadvantage to horse, wherein consisted the best of his power. Before his departure he burnt the city of *Athens*, beating down the walls of it, and ruining all that had formerly escaped the fury of war.

S E C T. IX.

The great battel of *Plataea*.

IT were too long a rehearsal to shew all that happened in many skirmishes between the *Greeks* and him, in the country of *Boeotia*, which *Mardonius* had chosen to be the seat of that war. Much time was spent before the quarrel was decided by the trial of one main battel: for both parties did stand upon their guard, each expecting when the other should assail them.

The army of *Mardonius* contained about three hundred thousand, which were by him chosen out of *Xerxes's* army; to whom were adjoined the forces of *Thebes*, *Macedon*, *Theffaly*, and other parts of *Greece*, that now siding with the *Persian*, furnished his camp with fifty thousand men. Against these the *Lacedemonians*, *Athenians*, and their confederates, had levied an army of one hundred and ten thousand, of which forty thousand were weightily armed, the rest were only assistants to these forty thousand, being armed more slightly, as rather to make excursions, and give chase, than to sustain any strong charges.

These two armies, having eleven days confronted one the other, without performing any memorable piece of service; *Mardonius*, whose victuals began to fail, resolved to begin the fray. The *Greeks* were promised the victory by an oracle, if they fought in the land of the *Athenians*, and in the plain of *Ceres* and *Proserpina*, making prayers unto certain gods, demi-gods, and nymphs. But it was hard to find the certain place which the oracle designed. For the plain of *Ceres* was indeed in the territory of *Athens*; but there was also an old temple of *Ceres* and *Proserpina*, near unto the place where they lay at that time encamped, as likewise the memorials of those nymphs, and demi-gods, were in the same place, upon mount *Citheron*, and the ground served well for foot-men against horse; only the land belonged unto the *Plataeans*, and not unto the *Athenians*.

Whilst the *Greeks* were perplexed about the interpretation of this doubtful oracle, the *Plataean*, to make all clear, did freely bestow their land on that side the town upon the *Athenians*.

This magnificence of the *Plataeans* caused *Alexander* the Great, many ages after, to re-edify their city, which was ruined in the *Peloponnesian* wars.

All things being ready for battel; the *Lacedemonian* general thought it most meet, that the *Athenians* should stand opposite that day to the *Medes* and *Persians*, whom they had formerly vanquished at *Marathon*; and that he, with his *Spartans*, should entertain the *Thebans* and other *Greeks* which followed *Mardonius*, as better acquainted with their fight, and having beaten them oftentimes before. This being agreed upon, the *Athenians* changed place with the *Lacedemonians*; which *Mardonius* understanding (whether fearing the *Athenians*, of whose valour the *Medes* and *Persians* had felt heavy proof, or desiring to encounter the *Spartans*, as thinking them the bravest soldiers in *Greece*) he did also change the order of his battel, and oppose himself to *Pausanias*. All the *Greeks* might well perceive how the enemy did shift his wings, and *Pausanias* thereupon returned to his former station; which *Mardonius* noting, did also the like. So one whole day was spent in changing to and fro. Some attempt the *Persians* made that day with their archers on horse-back, who did so molest the *Greeks* at their watering-place, that they were fain to enter into consultation of retiring; because they could not, without much loss to themselves, and none to the enemy,

lie near to that fountain which did serve all the camp. Having therefore concluded among themselves to dislodge, and part of the army being sent away before day-light, *Mardonius* perceived their departure in the morning, and thereupon being encouraged by their flight (which to him seemed to proceed out of meer cowardise) he charged them in the rear with great violence. It may well be recorded as a notable example of patient valour, that the *Lacedemonians* being overtaken by the enemy's horse, and overwhelmed with great flights of arrows, did quietly sit still, not making any resistance or defence, till the sacrifices for victory were happily ended, tho' many of them were hurt and slain, and some of special mark lost, before any sign of good success appeared in the entrails.

But, as soon as *Pausanias* had found in the sacrifice those tokens, which the superstition of that age and country accounted fortunate, he gave the signal of battle: and thereupon the soldiers, who till then did sit upon the ground, as was their manner, arose altogether, and with excellent courage received the charge of the *Barbarians*, that came thronging upon them without any fear of such notable resistance. The rest of the Greek army that was in march, being revoked by *Pausanias*, came in apace to succour the *Lacedemonians*: only that part of the army, which was led by the *Athenians*, could not arrive unto the place of the great battle, because the *Thebans*, and other *Greeks* confederated with the *Persians*, gave them check by the way. Nevertheless, the *Spartans*, with other their assistants, did so well acquit themselves, that the *Persians* were vanquished, and *Mardonius*, with many thousands more, slain in the field; the rest fled into the camp, which they had fortified with wooden walls, and there defended themselves with such courage as desperate necessity enforced them unto, holding out the longer, because the *Lacedemonians* were not acquainted with the manner of assaulting fortresses, and walls. In the mean time the *Athenians*, having found strong opposition of the *Thebans* and *Thessalians*, did with much labour and courage obtain victory, which having not long pursued, they came to help the *Lacedemonians*, whom they found wearily busied in assaulting the camp, with more valour than skill. Wherefore they themselves undertook it, and in short space forced a passage thro' the wall, at which breach first, and then on all sides, the *Greeks* entred, with such fury, and just desire of vengeance, that of three hundred thousand they are said not to have left three thousand alive, excepting those who fled away with *Artabazus*, when the *Persian* army first fell to rout.

If the execution were so great, as is reported, an especial cause of it was the foolish retreat, or rather flight into the camp. For tho' it were so, that the place was well fortified, and the number of those who cast themselves into it, greater than any of the assailants; yet they being of several nations and languages, and, having lost their general with other principal commanders, it was impossible that they in such a terror and astonishment should make good that piece of ground, lying in the heart of an enemy's country, against an army of men far more valiant than themselves, and inflamed with present victory. Therefore the same wall, which for a few hours had preserv'd their lives, by holding out the enemy, did now impale them, and leave them to the slaughtering fury of unpitiful victors. *Artabazus* fled into *Thrace*, telling the people of *Thessaly* and other countries in his way, that he was sent by *Mardonius* upon some piece of service: for he well knew, that had they understood any thing of that

great discomfiture, all places would have been hostile unto him, and sought with his ruin to purchase favour of the vanquishers. Therefore making so large marches, that many of his soldiers being feeble were left behind and lost, he came to *Byzantium*, whence he shipped his men over into *Asia*. Such was the end of the vain-glorious expedition, undertaken by *Xerxes* against the *Greeks*, upon hope of honour and great conquest; tho' sorting otherwise, accordingly as *Artabazus* had foreseen, and rather worse; forasmuch as it began the quarrel, which never ended, before the ruin of the *Persian* empire was effected, by that nation of the *Greeks* despised and sought to have been brought into slavery. Hereby it may seem, that the vision appearing to *Xerxes*, was from God himself, who had formerly disposed of those things, ordaining the subversion of the *Persian* monarchy by the *Greeks*, who thus provoked, enter'd into greater consideration of their own strength, and the weakness of their enemies.

S E C T. X.

The battle of Mycale, with a strange accident that fell out in the beginning of it: and examples of the like.

THE same day, on which the battle was fought at *Plateæ*, there was another battle fought at *Mycale*, a promontory, or head-land, in *Asia*, where the *Persian* fleet rode.

Leutychides the *Spartan*, with *Xantippus* the *Athenian*, admirals of the Greek navy, at the request of some islanders and *Ionians*, did sail into those parts, to deliver the *Samians*, and procure the *Ionians* to revolt from the *Persian*. *Xerxes* himself at this time lay at *Sardis*, a city in *Lydia*, not far from the sea side, having left threescore thousand under the command of *Tigranes*, for defence of *Ionia* and the sea-coast. Therefore, when *Artayntes* and *Ibrahimites*, admirals of the *Persian* fleet, understood that the *Greeks* bent their course towards them; they did forthwith draw their ships a-ground, fortifying with palissadoes and otherwise, as much ground as was needful for the encamping of all their land and sea-forces. *Leutychides*, at his arrival, perceiving that they meant to keep within their strength, and resolving to force them out of it, rowed with his gally close aboard the shore, and called upon the *Ionians* (who more for fear than good-will were encamped among the *Persians*) exhorting them in the Greek tongue to remember liberty, and use the fair occasion which they now had to recover it. Herein he did imitate *Themistocles*, who had done the like at *Enbæa*; trusting that either these persuasions would prevail; or, if the *Persians* did happen to understand them, that it would breed some jealousy in them, causing them to fight in fear of their own companions. It need not seem strange, that this very same stratagem, which little or nothing availed *Themistocles*, did now very happily succeed. For *Xerxes* being in his full strength, it was a matter of much difficulty, to persuade those inhabitants of *Asia* to revolt; who now, in his declining estate, gave a willing ear to the sweet sound of liberty. The *Persians* likewise, who in their former bravery little regarded, and less feared, any treason to be contrived by their subjects, were now so wary, that from the *Samians*, which were amongst them, they took away their arms; the *Milesians*, whom they did suspect, but would not seem to mistrust, they placed far from them, as it were for defence of the straight passages of *Mycale*; pretending that these *Milesians* did best of all

all others know those places. But these devices little availed them. For the *Samians*, perceiving that they were held as traitors, took courage in the heat of the fight, and, laying hold upon such weapons as came to hand, assailed the *Persians* manfully within the camp; which example the *Ionians* presently followed, being very glad to have found some that durst begin. It is said, that whilst the *Greeks* were yet in march towards the enemy's camp, a rumour suddenly ran in the army that *Mardonius* was overthrown in *Greece*, which (tho' perhaps it was given out by the captains to encourage the soldiers) was very true. For the battel of *Plataea* was fought in the morning, and this of *Mycale* in the evening of the same day.

The like report, of that great battel, wherein *Paulus Æmilius* overthrew *Persens* the last king of *Macedon*, was brought to *Rome* in four days, as *Livy* with others do record. And *Plutarch* hath many other examples of this kind. As that of the battel by the river *Sagra* in *Italy*, which was heard of the same day in *Peloponnesus*: that of the battel against the *Tarquinians* and the *Latins*, presently noised at *Rome*: and (which is most remarkable) the victory obtained against *Lucius Antonius*, who was rebel to *Domitian* the emperor. This *Lucius Antonius*, being lieutenant of the higher *Germany*, had corrupted his army with gifts and promises, drawing the barbarous people to follow him, with great hope to make himself emperor; which news much troubling the city of *Rome*, with fear of a dangerous war, it was suddenly reported that *Antonius* was slain, and his army defeated.

Hereupon many did offer sacrifice to the gods, and shew all manner of publick joy, as in such cases was accustomed. But when better inquiry was made, and the author of these tidings could not be found, the emperor *Domitian* betook himself to his journey against the rebel; and, being now with his army in march, he received advertisement by post, of the victory obtained, and the death of *Antonius*: whereupon remembring the rumour noised before in *Rome*, of the self-same victory, he found that the report and victory were born upon one day, tho' 20000 furlongs (which make about 2500 miles) asunder. It is truly said of *Plutarch*, that this last example gives credit unto many the like. And indeed it were very strange, if among so many rumours, begotten by forgery or mistakings, and fostered by credulous imagination, there should not be found (as happens in dreams among many thousand vain and frivolous) a few precisely true. Howbeit we may find, that God himself doth sometimes use to terrify those who presume upon their own strength, by these light means of tumultuous noises; as he raised the siege of *Samaria*, by causing a sound of horses and chariots to affright the *Amorites*; and as he threaten'd *Sennacherib*, saying: *Behold, I will send a blast upon him, and he shall bear a noise, and return to his own land.* Wherefore it may well have been true, that God was pleased by such means as this, to animate the *Greeks*; who (as *Herodotus* notes) went towards the enemies with heavy hearts, being in great fear, lest their own adventure should by no means fall out well; considering in what danger they had left their own country of *Greece*, which was ready to be subdued by *Mardonius*, whilst they went wandering to seek out enemies afar off, upon the coast of *Asia*. But the fame of the battel fought at *Plataea* being noised among them; every man desired that his own valour, in the present fight, might be some help to work out the full deliverance

of *Greece*. In this alacrity of spirit, they divided themselves into two battalions, whereof the *Athenians* led the one, by the way of the plain, directly towards the enemy's camp; the *Lacedemonians* conducted the other, by the mountains and straight passages, to win the higher ground. The *Athenians* did first set upon the camp (ere the *Lacedemonians* could arrive on the other part) and being desirous to get all the honour of the day to themselves, did so forcibly assault it, that they brake way through the palisadoes and gabions, and made themselves masters of the place, slaying all that could not save themselves by flight. In this fight the *Samians* did good service, as is formerly mentioned.

But the *Milesians*, who, upon the like jealousy, were placed by the *Persians* on the tops of *Mycale*, to defend the passages; did now (as if they had been set on purpose to keep them from running away) put as many to the sword as fell into their hands, letting none escape, except a very few, that fled thro' by-paths. The *Lacedemonians* that day did little service, for the business was dispatched ere they came in: only they broke such companies as retired in whole troops; making them fly dispersed in very much disorder, whereby the *Milesians* were enabled to do the greater execution upon them. This was the last fight of that huge army levied against *Greece*, which was now utterly broken, and had no means left to make offensive war.

SECT. XI.

Of the barbarous qualities of Xerxes: with a transition from the Persian affairs, to matters of Greece, which from this time grew more worthy of regard.

Xerxes lay at *Sardis*, not far from the place of this battel; but little mind had he to revenge either this or other his great losses, being wholly given over to the love of his brother's wife: with whom, when he could not prevail by intreaty, nor would obtain his desire by force, because he respected much his brother her husband, he thought it best to make a match between his own son *Darius* and the daughter of this woman; hoping by that means to find occasion of such familiarity, as might work out his desire. But whether it were so, that the chastity of the mother did still reject him, or the beauty of her daughter allure him; he soon after fell in love with his own son's wife, being a vicious prince, and as ill able to govern himself in peace, as to guide his army in war. This young lady having once desired the king to give her the garment which he then wore, being wrought by his own wife; it caused the queen thereby to perceive her husband's conversation with her, which she imputed not so much to the beauty of her daughter-in-law, as to the cunning of the mother, against whom thereupon she conceiv'd extream hatred. Therefore at a royal feast, wherein the custom was that the king should grant every request, she crav'd that the wife of *Masistes*, her husband's brother, the young lady's mother, might be given into her disposition. The barbarous king, who might either have reform'd the abuse of such a custom, or have deluded the importunate cruelty of his wife, by threatening her self with the like to whatsoever she should inflict upon the innocent lady, granted the request, and sending for his brother, persuaded him to put away the wife which he had, and take one of his daughters in her stead. Hereby it seems, that he understood how villanously that poor lady should be intreated, whom he knew to be virtuous,

and whom himself had loved. *Masistes* refused to put her away; alledging his own love, her deserving, and their common children, one of which was married to the king's son, as reasons important to move him to keep her. But in most wicked manner *Xerxes* reviled him, saying, *That he now should neither keep the wife which he had, nor have his daughter whom he had promised unto him.* *Masistes* was much griev'd with these words, but much more, when he returned home, he found his wife most butcherly mangled by the queen *Amestris*, who had caused her nose, lips, ears, and tongue to be cut off, and her breasts in like manner, which were cast unto dogs. *Masistes*, enraged with this villany, took his way with his children, and some friends, towards *Bactria*, of which province he was governor, intending to rebel and avenge himself. But *Xerxes* understanding his purpose, caused an army to be levied, which cut him off by the way, putting him and all his company to the sword. Such was the tyrannical condition of the *Persian* government; and such are generally the effects of luxury, when it is joined with absolute power.

Yet of *Xerxes* it is noted, that he was a prince of much virtue. And therefore *Alexander* the great, finding an image of his overthrown, and lying upon the ground, said, that he doubted, whether, in regard of his virtue, he should again erect it, or, for the mischief done by him to *Greece*, should let it lie. But surely whatsoever his other good qualities were, he was foolish, and was a coward, and consequently merciless.

Therefore we may firmly believe, that the virtue of *Cyrus* was very great, upon which the foundation of the *Persian* empire was so surely laid, that all the wickedness and vanities of *Xerxes*, and other worse princes, could not overthrow it, until it was broken by a virtue almost equal to that which did establish it. In wars against the *Egyptians*, the fortune of *Xerxes* did continue, as at the first it had

been, very good; but against the general estate of *Greece*, neither he, nor any of his posterity, did ever make offensive war, but received many losses in *Asia*, to which the last at *Mycale* serv'd but as an introduction; teaching the *Greeks*, and especially the *Athenians*, that the *Persian* was no better soldier at his own doors, than in a foreign country: whereof good trial was made forthwith, and much better proof as soon as the affairs of *Athens* were quietly settled and assured.

From this time forward I will therefore pursue the history of *Greece*, taking in the matters of *Persia*, as also the estate of other countries, collaterally, when the order of time shall present them. True it is, that the *Persian* estate continued in her greatness many ages following, in such wise, that the known parts of the world had no other kingdom representing the majesty of a great empire.

But this greatness depended only upon the riches and power that had formerly been acquired, yielding few actions or none that were worthy of remembrance, excepting some tragedies of the court, and examples of that excessive luxury, wherewith both it, and all, or the most of empires that ever were, have been enervated, made unweildy, and (as it were) fatten'd for the hungry swords of poor and hardy enemies. Hereby it came to pass, that *Xerxes* and his successors were fain to defend their crowns with money and base policies; very seldom or never (unless it were with great advantage) daring to adventure the trial of plain battel with that little nation of *Greece*, which would soon have ruined the foundations laid by *Cyrus*, had not private malice and jealousy urged every city to envy the height of her neighbours walls, and thereby diverted the swords of the *Greeks* into their own bowels, which after the departure of *Xerxes* began very well, and might better have continued to hew out the way of conquest on the side of *Asia*.

C H A P. VII.

Of things that passed in Greece from the end of the Persian war to the beginning of the Peloponnesian.

S E C T. I.

How Athens was rebuilt and fortified.

AFTER that the *Medes* and *Persians* had received their last blow, and were utterly beaten at *Mycale*: *Leotychides*, who then commanded the *Grecian* army, leaving the pursuit of the war to the *Athenians*, assisted by the revolted *Ionians*, returned with the *Lacedemonians* and other *Peloponnesians* to *Sparta*, and other places, out of which they had been levied. The *Athenians* in the mean while besieged *Sestos*, a city on the strait of the *Hellepont*, between which and *Abydos*, *Xerxes* had lately fallen'd his bridge of boats: where the inhabitants, desperate of succour, did not long dispute the defence thereof, but quitted it to the *Greeks*, who entertained themselves the winter following on that side the *Hellepont*. In the spring they drew homeward, and having left their wives and children, since the invasion of *Attica*, and the abandoning of *Athens*, in divers islands, and at *Troezen*,

they now found them out, and returned with them to their own places.

And tho' the most part of all their houses in *Athens* were burnt and broken down, and the walls of the city overturn'd, yet they resolv'd first on their common defence, and to fortify their city, before they cared to cover themselves, their wives and children, with any private buildings: whereof the *Lacedemonians* being advertised, and mistaking the fortifying of *Athens*, both in respect that their own city of *Sparta* was unwalled, as also because the *Athenians* were grown more powerful by sea, than either themselves or any other state of *Greece*, they dispatched messengers to the *Athenians* to dissuade them; not acknowledging any private dislike or jealousy, but pretending, that if the *Persians* should return to invade *Greece* a third time, the *Athenians* being in no better state to defend themselves than heretofore, the same would serve to receive their enemies, and to be made a seat of war, as *Thebes* had lately been. To this the *Athenians* promised

to give them satisfaction by their own ambassadors very speedily. But being resolved to go on with their works by the advice of *Themistocles*, they held the *Lacedemonians* in hope of the contrary, till they had raised their walls to that height, as they cared not for their mislikes, nor doubted their disturbance; and therefore (to gain time) they dispatched *Themistocles* towards *Lacedemon*, giving him for excuse, that he could not deliver the *Athenians* resolutions, till the arrival of his fellow-commissioners, who were of purpose retarded. But after a while, the *Lacedemonians* expectation being converted into jealousy (for by the arrival of divers persons out of *Attica*, they were told for certain, that the walls of *Athens* were speedily grown up beyond expectation) *Themistocles* prayed them not to believe reports and vain rumours, but that they would be pleased to send some of their own trusty citizens to *Athens*, from whose relation they might resolve themselves, and determine accordingly. Which request being granted, and commissioners sent, *Themistocles* dispatched one of his own, by whom he advised the *Athenians*, first to entertain the *Lacedemonians* with some such discourse as might retain them a few days, and in conclusion to hold them among them till himself and the other *Athenian* ambassadors, then at *Sparta*, had their liberty also to return. Which done, and being also assured by his associates and *Aristides*, that *Athens* was already defensible on all parts, *Themistocles* demanding audience, made the *Lacedemonians* know, that it was true, that the walls of *Athens* were now raised to that height, as the *Athenians* doubted not the defence of their city; praying the *Lacedemonians* to believe, that whensoever it pleased them to treat with the *Athenians*, they would know them for such, as right well understood what appertained to a common-wealth and their own safety, without direction and advice from any other: That they had in the war of *Xerxes* abandoned their city, and committed themselves to the wooden walls of their ships, from the resolution of their own counsels and courage, and not there-to taught or perswaded by others: and finally, in all that perilous war against the *Persians*, they found their own judgments, and the execution thereof in nothing inferior, or less fortunate, than that of any other nation, state, or common-wealth among the *Greeks*; and therefore concluded, that they determined to be masters and judges of their own affairs, and thought it good reason that either all the cities confederated within *Greece* should be left open, or else that the walls of *Athens* should be finished and maintained.

The *Lacedemonians* finding the time unfit for quarrel, dissembled their mislike, both of the fortifying of *Athens*, and of the division, and so suffered the *Athenians* to depart, and received back from them their own ambassadors.

The walls of *Athens* finished, they also fortified the port *Pyreus*, by which they might under covert embark themselves upon all occasions.

S E C T. II.

The beginning of the Athenian greatness and prosperous wars made by that state upon the Persian.

THE *Athenians* having settled things in good order at home, prepared thirty galleys for the pursuit of the war against the *Persians*, to which the *Lacedemonians* added other twenty; and with this fleet, strengthened by the rest of the cities of *Greece* confederated, they set sail for *Cyprus*, under the conduct of *Pausanias* the *Lacedemonian*; where, after their landing, having posses'd themselves of

many principal places, they embarked the army again, and took land in *Thrace*, recovering from the *Persians* by force the city *Bizantium*, now *Constantinople*: from whence, *Pausanias* behaving himself more like a tyrant than a captain, especially towards the *Ionians* lately revolted from *Xerxes*, was called back by the council of *Lacedemon*, and not only accused of many insolent behaviours, but of intelligence with the *Medes*, and treason against his country. In his stead they employed *Dacres*, who either gave the same cause of offence, or else the *Athenians*, who affected the first commandment in that war, practised the soldiers to complain; though indeed the wise and virtuous behaviour of *Aristides*, general of the *Athenian* forces, a man of rare and incomparable sincerity, had been able to make a good commander seem ill in comparison of himself; and therefore was much more available in rendering those detested, whose vices afforded little matter of excuse. Howsoever it were, the *Lacedemonians*, being no less wearied of the war than the *Athenians* were eager to pursue it, the one obtained their ease, and the other the execution and honour, which they desired: for all the *Greeks* (those of *Peloponnesus* excepted) willingly subjected themselves to the commandment of the *Athenians*, which was both the beginning of their greatness in that present age, and of their ruin the next succeeding. For the charge of the war being now committed unto them, they began to rate the confederated cities, they appointed receivers and treasurers, and began to levy money according to their discretion, for the maintenance of the general defence of *Greece*, and for the recovering of those places on *Europe* side in *Asia* the less, and the islands, from the *Persians*. This tribute (the first that was ever paid by the *Greeks*) amounted to four hundred and threescore talents, which was raised easily by the honest care of that just man *Aristides*, to whose discretion all the confederates referred themselves, and no man found occasion to complain of him. But as the virtue of *Aristides*, and other worthy citizens, brought unto the *Athenians* great commodity; so the desire which they conceived of encreasing their commodity, corrupted their virtue, and robbing them of the general love which had made them powerful, abandoned their city to the defence of her treasure, which with her in the next age perished. For it was not long ere these four hundred and threescore talents were raised to six hundred, nor long after that, ere their covetous tyranny had converted their followers into slaves, and extorted from them yearly thirteen hundred talents. The isle of *Delos* was at the first appointed for the treasure-house wherein these sums were laid up; and where, at the general assembly, the captains of those forces, sent by the confederates, were for form sake called to consultation. But the *Athenians*, who were stronger by sea than all *Greece* besides, had lock'd up the common treasure in an island under their own protection, from whence they might transport it at their pleasure, as afterwards they did.

The general commander of this war, was *Cimon* the son of *Miltiades*, who first took *Eion*, upon the river *Strimon*; then the isle of *Sciros*, inhabited by the *Dolopes*: they mastered the *Caristii*, and brought into servitude the *Naxii*, contrary to the form of the confederacy: so did they other the inhabitants of *Greece*, if at any time they failed of their contribution, or disobeyed their commandments; taking upon them and usurping a kind of sovereign authority over the rest: which they exercised the more assuredly, because they were now become lords of the sea, and could not be resisted.

For

For many of the confederated cities and nations, weary of the war in their own persons, and given up altogether to their ease, made choice rather to pay their parts in money, than either in men of war, or in ships; leaving the provision of both to the *Athenians*. Hereby the one grew weak in all their sea-defences, and in the exercise of the wars; the other greatly strengthened their navy and their experiences, being always armed and employed in honourable services, at the cost of those who having lifted them into their saddles, were now enforced to become their footmen. Yet was the tribute-money, levied upon these their confederates, employed so well by the *Athenians* at the first (as ill proceedings are often founded upon good beginnings) that no great cause of repining was given. For they rigged out a great fleet of gallies, very well mann'd, wherewith *Cimon* the admiral scouring the *Asiatick* seas, took in the city of *Phaselis*; which having formerly pretended neutrality, and refused to relieve, or any way assist the *Greeks*, were enforced to pay ten talents for a fine, and so to become followers of the *Athenians*, paying yearly contribution.

From thence he set sail for the river *Eurymedon* in *Pamphylia*, where the *Persian* fleet rode, being of six hundred sail, or (according to the most sparing report) three hundred and fifty; and having a great land-army, encamped upon the shoar: All which forces having been provided for advancing the king's affairs in *Greece*, were utterly defeated in one day, and two hundred ships taken by the *Athenians*, the rest being broken to pieces, or sunk ere ever they had swam in the *Grecian* seas. *Cimon* having in one day obtained two great victories, the one by sea, and the other by land; was very soon presented with a third. For fourscore sail of *Phenicians* (who were the best of all sea-men, under the *Persian* command) thinking to have joined themselves with the fleet before destroyed, arrived upon the same coast, ignorant of what had passed, and fearing nothing less than what ensued. Upon the first notice of their approach *Cimon* weighed anchor, and meeting them at an head-land called *Hydra*, did so amaze them, that they only sought to run themselves on ground; by which means preserving few of their men, they lost all their ships. These losses did so break the courage of the *Persian*, that, omitting all hope of prevailing upon *Greece*, he condescended to whatsoever articles it pleased the *Athenians* to propound, granting liberty unto all the *Greeks* inhabiting *Asia*; and further covenanting, that none of his ships of war should sail to the westward of the isles, called *Cyaneæ* and *Chelidoniæ*.

This was the most honourable peace that ever the *Greeks* made; neither did they in effect, after this time, make any war, that redounded to the profit or glory of the whole nation, till such time as under *Alexander*, they overthrew the empire of *Persia*; in which war few, or perhaps none of them, had any place of great command, but served altogether under the *Macedonians*.

S E C T. III.

The death of Xerxes by the treason of Artabanus.

BESIDES these losses, which could not easily have been repaired, the troubles of the empire were at this time such, as gave just cause to the *Persian* of seeking peace upon any terms not altogether intolerable. For *Artabanus*, the uncle of *Xerxes*, perceiving that the king his master did easily take small occasions to shed the blood of such, as in kin-

dred or place were near unto him, began to repose less hope of safety in remaining faithful, than of obtaining the sovereignty, by destroying a prince that was so hated for his cruelty, and despised for his cowardise and misfortunes. Having conceived this treason, he found means to execute it by *Mithridates* an eunuch, in such close manner, that (as if he himself had been innocent) he accused *Darius* the son of *Xerxes*, and caused him to suffer death as a parricide. Whether it be true, that by this great wickedness he got the kingdom, and held it seven months; or whether intending the like evil to *Artaxerxes* the son of *Xerxes*, he was by him prevented and surprized, it were hard to affirm any certainty. But all writers agree upon this, that taken he was, and with his whole family put to death by extreme torments, according to the sentence, whereof the truth is more ancient than the verse.

*Raro antecedentem scelestam
Deseruit pede pœna claudo.*

Seldom the villain, though much haste he make,
Lame-footed vengeance fails to overtake.

S E C T. IV.

The banishment of Themistocles: His flight to Artaxerxes newly reigning in Persia; and his death.

ARTAXERXES being established in his kingdom, and having so compounded with the *Athenians*, as the present necessity of his affairs required, began to conceive new hopes of better fortune against the *Greeks*; than he or his predecessors had ever hitherto found. For the people of *Athens*, when the *Persians* were chased out of *Greece*, did so highly value their own merits in that service, that they not only thought it fit for themselves to become the commanders over many towns, and islands of the *Greeks*, but even within their own walls they would admit none other form of government than merely democratical. Herein they were so insolent; that no integrity nor good desert was able to preserve the estate of any such as had borne great office, longer than, by flattering the rascally multitude, he was contented to frame all his words and deeds to their good liking.

This their intolerable demeanor much offended *Themistocles*; who, though in former times he had laid the foundations of his greatness upon popularity, yet now presuming upon his good services done to the state, he thought that with great reason they might grant him the liberty to check their inordinate proceedings. But contrariwise, they were so highly offended with his often rehearsing the benefits which they had received from him, that they laid upon him the punishment of *Ostracism*, whereby he was banished for ten years, as a man overburthened to the common-wealth.

Before the time of his return was half expired, a new accusation was brought against him by the *Lacedemonians*, who charged him of consulting with *Pausanias*, about betraying the whole country of *Greece* unto *Xerxes*. Hereupon *Themistocles*, finding no place of security against the malice of two such mighty cities, was driven, after many troublesome flights, and dangerous removings, to adventure himself into *Persia*; where he found *Artaxerxes* newly settled, and was by him very honourably entertained. But the great hope which *Artaxerxes* had conceived of advancing his affairs by the counsel and assistance of *Themistocles*, proved altogether fruitless. For when the *Athenians*, in favour of *Inarus* the *Libyan* (who infested *Egypt*, causing it to rebel against

against the *Persian*) had sent a fleet to sea, landing an army in *Egypt*, and scouring those eastern seas, to the great hindrance of *Artaxerxes*, and (for ought that I can understand) to the manifest breach of that peace, which to their great honour they had concluded with *Xerxes*; then did the king send his letters to *Themistocles*, requiring him to make good the hopes which he had given, of assuring the *Persian* estate against the *Greeks*.

But whether *Themistocles* perceived much unlikelihoods of good success, in leading a great army of dastardly *Persians* against the warlike people of *Greece*; or else (as in favour of his virtue it is more commonly reported) the love of his country would not permit him to seek honour by the ruin of it: sure it is, that being appointed by *Artaxerxes* to undertake the conduct of great forces against the *Athenians*, he decided the great conflict between thankfulness to his well-deserving prince, and natural affection to his own ill-deserving people, by finishing his life with a cup of poison.

S E C T. V.

How the Athenians, breaking the peace, which to their great honour they had made with the Persian, were shamefully beaten in Egypt.

THEN was *Artaxerxes* driven to use the service of his own captains in the *Egyptian* war, wherein it appeared well, That a just cause is a good defence against a strong enemy. An *Athenian* fleet of two hundred sail strong was sent forth under *Cimon*, to take in the isle of *Cyprus*: which conquest seemed easy both to make, and to maintain, the *Persian* being utterly broken at sea, and thereby unable to relieve the island. Now although it were so, that a peace had been concluded, which was likely to have been kept sincerely by the *Persian*, who had made so good proof of the *Grecian* valour, that he was nothing desirous to build any ships of war (without which the *Greeks* could receive no harm from him) whereof if any one should be found sailing towards *Greece*, the peace was immediately broken, and if not, his whole estate; yet all the sea-coast (no small part of his dominions) exposed to the waste of an enemy too far over-matching him. Yet whether the *Athenians* were in doubt, lest the league, which in his own worse fortunes he had made with them, he would break in theirs; and therefore sought to get such assurance into their hands, as might utterly disable him from attempting ought against them; or whether the increase of their revenues and power, by adding that rich and great island to their empire, caused them to measure honour by profit; they thought it the wisest way, to take whilst they might, whatsoever they were able to get and hold, and he unable to defend.

The isle of *Cyprus*, lying in the bottom of the straits between *Cilicia*, *Syria* and *Egypt*, is very fitly seated for any prince of state, that being mighty at sea, doth either seek to enrich himself by trade with those countries, or to interst one or more of them when they are his enemies. And this being the purpose of the *Athenians*, their ambition, which had already devoured, in conceit, this island, was on the sudden well-nigh choaked with a greater morsel, to snatch at which, they let *Cyprus* alone, which they might easily have swallowed and digested. For *Iarus*, king of the *Libyans*, confining *Egypt*, having found how greatly the country was exhausted by the late wars, and how weakly defended by very slender *Persian* garrisons, conceived rightly, that if such small forces as the satrap or viceroy

could make on the sudden of his own guards, or levy out of the ordinary garrisons, were by him defeated, the naturals of the country, not long since oppressed by *Cambyses*, and after a revolt very lately subdued by *Xerxes*, would soon break faith with him who had no other title to that kingdom than a good sword. Further, he persuaded himself that the people, unable to defend themselves against the *Persian* without his assistance, would easily be drawn to accept him the author of their deliverance, for king. Neither did this hope deceive him: for having taken and cruelly slain *Achemenes* the viceroy, divers cities forthwith declared themselves for him, and proclaiming him king, shewed the most of their endeavour for prosecution of the war. But he considering his own weakness, and that the means of the *Egyptians* his adherents were not answerable to their desires, perceived well, that to resist the power of *Artaxerxes*, far greater forces than his and theirs were to be procured, at what price soever he obtained them. Therefore hearing of the great *Athenian* fleet, and knowing well the virtue of the soldiers therein embark'd; he invited the commanders to share with him the kingdom of *Egypt* as a far greater reward of their adventure, than such an addition as that of *Cyprus* could be to their estate. Whether he or they (if things had wholly sorted according to their expectation) would have been contented with an equal share, and not have fallen out in the partition, were perhaps a divination unnecessary. He was possessed of the people's love; they were of most power. But the issue of those affairs was such as left them nothing to communicate but misfortunes, which they shared somewhat equally. Yet had the beginnings of their enterprise very good and hopeful success: for they enter'd the land as far as to *Memphis*, the principal city; and of the city it self they took two parts: to the third part, which was called the *White Wall*, they laid such hard siege, that neither those forces of the *Persians*, which then were in *Egypt*, were strong enough to remove them; neither could *Artaxerxes* well devise what means to use for the recovery of that which was lost, or for the preservation of the remainder. The best of his hope was by setting the *Lacedemonians* upon *Athens*, to enforce the *Athenians* to look homewards to their own defence. This was the first time that the *Persian* sought to procure the assistance of the *Greeks* one against the other, by stirring them up with gold to the entertainment of private quarrels, for the good of their common enemy. To this purpose he sent *Magabazus* to *Sparta* with much treasure; who, after great expence, finding that the *Lacedemonians* were nothing forward in employing their whole force against the *Athenians*, whom in many conflicts of great importance they had found to be their matches, notwithstanding the absence of their army in *Egypt*; he thought it his wisest way to employ the rest of his money and means to their relief, who had now the space of six years defended his master's right in *Egypt*. Therefore he hastily dispatched another of his name, the son of *Zopyrus*, who arriving in *Egypt*, was first encounter'd by the revolted people; over whom he obtained victory, which made him master of the country, whilst the *Athenians* lay busied about *Memphis* the great city. It cannot be doubted, but that long abode in a strange air, and want of supply, had much enfeebled the *Athenians*: sure it is, that when *Magabazus*, having reduced the country to obedience, attempted the city it self, whether his former success had amended the courage of the *Persian*, or want of necessities made the *Athenians* inferior to themselves, he

he chased them out of *Memphis*, and pursued them so near, as they were forced to fortify themselves in the isle of *Prosopites*, where *Magabazus*, after eighteen months siege turning away one part of the river by divers trenches, assaulted the *Athenians* without impediment of waters, took their gallies, and put all to the sword, save a few that saved themselves by flight into *Libya*; the same entertainment had fifty other gallies, which they sent to the succour of the first two hundred. For those *Athenians* having heard nothing that their fleet and army was consumed, enter'd by the branch of *Nilus*, called *Mendesium*, and fell unawares among the *Phenician* gallies and the *Persian* army; so as the *Persians* recovered all *Egypt*, but that part held by *Amyrteus*, and *Inarus* the king of *Libya*, being by them taken and hanged. This was the end of the *Athenians* six years war in *Egypt*, and the reward of their vanity and indiscretion to undertake many enterprizes at once.

S E C T. VI.

Of other wars made by the Athenians for the most part with good success, about the same time.

NOTwithstanding these overthrows in *Egypt*, yet the *Athenians* in their home-wars waded through many difficulties, and held the reputation of their forces against the *Lacedemonians*, *Corinthians*, and others, rather to their advantage than otherwise. For as they were beaten near unto *Halia* by the *Corinthians* and *Epidaurians*, so they obtained two great victories soon after; the one over the *Peloponnesians*, near unto *Cecryphalia*; the other over the *Aeginets*, near unto *Agina*; where they sunk and carried away threescore and ten gallies of their enemies. Furthermore, they landed their forces on the sudden, and besieged *Agina*, from whence they could not be moved, notwithstanding that the *Corinthians*, to divert them, invaded *Megara*; where, after a great fight, with equal loss, the *Corinthians*, when they returned again to set up their trophy, as victors in the former battel, were utterly broken and slaughtered by the *Athenian* garrisons, and *Megarians*, to their great loss and dishonour.

Again, as the *Athenians* were discomfited near to *Tanagra* by the *Lacedemonians*, who returned from the succour of the *Dorians* against the *Phocians* (at which time the *Theffalian* horsemen turned from their allies, the *Athenians*, and fought against them) so about threescore days after, the *Athenians* enter'd *Boeotia* under the conduct of *Myronides*, where beating that nation, they won *Phocis* on the gulf *Oeteus*, and evened the walls of *Tanagra* to the ground. Finally, they enforced *Agina* to render upon most base conditions; as to beat down the walls of their city, and to give them hostages for tribute; the siege whereof they had continued, notwithstanding all their other brabbles and attempts elsewhere. Besides these victories, they sack'd and spoil'd many places upon the sea-coast of *Peloponnesus*, belonging to the *Lacedemonians*; war upon the *Corinthians*, and overthrew the *Sicyonians* that came to their succour. These were the undertakings of the *Athenians*, and their allies, during the time of those six years that a part of their forces made war in *Egypt*. In the end whereof they attempted *Theffaly*, perswaded thereunto by *Orestes*, but were resisted by the king *Pharsalus*, who had chased *Orestes* out of his dominions. They also landed in

Sicyonia, and had victory over those that resisted; after which, they made truce with the *Peloponnesians* for five years, and sent *Cimon* into *Cyprus* with two hundred ships, but they were again allured by *Amyrteus*, one of the race of their former kings, who held the marish and woody parts of *Egypt* from the *Persians*, to whom they sent sixty of their ships. The rest of their army failing in their enterprize of *Cyprus*, and their fortunate and victorious leader *Cimon* dying there, as they coasted the island, encounter'd a fleet of the *Phenicians* and *Cilicians*, over both which nations they returned victorious into *Greece*; as also those returned safe which were sent into *Egypt*.

S E C T. VII.

Of Artaxerxes Longimanus, that he was Ahasuerus, the husband of queen Esther.

THESE *Egyptian* troubles being ended, the reign of *Artaxerxes* continued peaceable; whereof the length is by some restrained into twenty years, but the more and better authors give him forty, some allow him four and forty. He was a prince of much humanity, and noted for many examples of gentleness. His favour was exceeding great to the *Jews*, as appeareth by the histories of *Esdra*s and *Nehemias*, which fell in his time.

To prove that this was the king who gave countenance and aid to that great work of building the temple, it were a needless travail; considering that all the late divines have taken very much pains to shew, that those two prophets were licensed by him, and succoured in that building, in such sort as appears in their writings.

This was likewise that king *Ahasuerus* who married *Esther*. Whereof if it be needful to give proof, it may suffice; that *Ahasuerus* lived in *Susa*, reigning from *India* to *Ethiopia*, and therefore must have been a *Persian*; that he lived in peace, as appears by the circumstances of the history, and used the counsel of the seven princes, the authority of which princes began under *Darius*, the son of *Hystaspes*; wherefore he could be neither *Cyrus* nor *Cambyfes*.

The continual wars which exercised king *Darius*, the son of *Hystaspes*, together with the certainty of his marriages with sundry wives, from none of whom he was divorced, but left his first wife *Atossa*, the daughter of *Cyrus*, alive in great honour, she being mother to *Xerxes* the succeeding king; do manifestly prove that *Esther* was not his. Whereunto is added by *Philo* the *Jew*, that at the persuation of *Mardocheus*, *Joiakim* the high priest, the son of *Jesua*, caused the feast of *Purim* to be instituted in memory of that deliverance. Now the time of *Joiakim* was in the reign of *Artaxerxes*, at the coming of *Esdra*s and *Nehemias*; *Jesua* his father dying about the end of *Darius*.

The same continuance of wars, with other his furious and tragical loves, wherewith *Xerxes* did consume such little time as he had free from war, are enough to prove that the story of *Esther* pertained not unto the time of *Xerxes*, who lived but one and twenty years, whereas the two and thirtieth of *Ahasuerus* or *Artaxerxes* is expressed by *Nehemias*. Again, it is well known, that *Xerxes* in the seventh year of his reign (wherein this marriage must have been celebrated) came not near to *Susa*. Of the princes that succeeded *Artaxerxes Longima-*

^a *Prosopites* an island between the rivers of *Taly* and *Pharmutiacus*, two of the out-lets of *Nilus*, towards *Alexandria*. ^b *Mendesius* is an island in the mouth of *Nilus*, between the outlets called *Bulieticus* and *Dibicos*. But the branch of *Nilus*, call'd *Mendesium* runneth into the sea by the city *Pamphyfia*.

nus, to prove that none of them could be *Abasbuerus*, it is enough to say, that *Mardocheus*, having been carried from *Jerusalem* captive with *Jeconia*, by *Nebuchadnezzar*, was unlikely to have lived unto their times.

But of this *Artaxerxes* it is true, that he lived in *Susa*, reigned from *India* to *Ethiopia*, lived in peace, was contemporary with *Joiachim* the high priest: and further, he had happily by his lieutenants reclaimed the rebellious *Egyptians* in that seventh year of his reign; which good fortune might well give occasion to such a royal feast as is described in the beginning of the book of *Esther*. This is the sum of the arguments, brought to prove the age of *Esther*'s story by the learned and diligent *Krentzbemius*, who adds the authorities of *Josephus*, affirming the same, and of *Philo*, giving to *Mardocheus* eighteen years more than *Isaac* the patriarch lived; namely, one hundred fourscore and eighteen years in all, which expire in the five and thirtieth year of this *Artaxerxes*, if we suppose him to have been carried away captive, being a boy of ten years old.

SECT. VIII.

Of the troubles in Greece, foregoing the Peloponnesian war.

BUT it is fit that we now return to the affairs of the *Greeks*, who from this time forward, more vehemently prosecuting their civil wars, suffered the *Persians* for many ages to rest in peace, this *Egyptian* expedition being come to nought. Soon after this, the *Lacedemonians* undertook the war, called sacred, recovered the temple and isle of *Delphos*, and delivered both to the inhabitants; but the *Athenians* regained the same, and gave it in charge to the *Phocians*. In the mean while the banished *Beotians* re-enter'd their own land, and mastered two of their own towns, possess'd by the *Athenians*, which they soon recovered again from them; but in their return towards *Athens*, the *Beotians*, *Eubeans*, and *Locrians* (nations oppress'd by

the *Athenians*) set upon them with such resolution, as the *Athenians* were in that fight all slain or taken, whereby the *Beotians* recovered their former liberty, restoring to the *Athenians* their prisoners. The islanders of *Eubœa* took such courage upon this, that they revolted wholly from the *Athenians*, whom when *Pericles* intended to reconquer, he was advertised that the *Megarians* (who first left the *Lacedemonians*, and submitted themselves to *Athens*) being now weary of their yoke, had slain the *Athenian* garrisons, and joined themselves with the *Corinthians*, *Sicyonians*, and *Epidaurians*. These news hastened *Pericles* homeward with all possible speed; but ere he could recover *Attica*, the *Peloponnesians*, led by *Plistoanax*, the son of *Pausanias*, had invaded it, pillaged, and burnt many parts thereof; after whose return, *Pericles* went on with his first intent, and recovered *Eubœa*. Finally, the *Athenians* began to treat of peace with the *Peloponnesians*, and yielded to deliver up all the places which they held in the country of *Peloponnesus*; and this truce was made for thirty years. After six of these years were expired, the *Athenians* (favouring the *Milesians* against the *Samians*) invaded *Samos* by *Pericles*, and after many repulses, and some great losses, both by sea and land, the citizens were forc'd to yield themselves upon most lamentable conditions; namely, to deliver up all their ships, to break down their own walls, to pay the charge of the war, and to restore whatsoever had been taken by themselves, or by their practice from the *Athenians*. In the neck of which followed that long and cruel *Peloponnesian* war, whereof I have gathered this brief following; the same contention taking beginning fifty years after the flight of *Xerxes* out of *Greece*. But because there was no city thereof, which either in the beginning of this war, or in the continuance of it, was not drawn into the quarrel, I hold it convenient now at the first to shew briefly the estate of the country at that time, and especially the condition of those two great cities, *Athens* and *Sparta*, upon which all the rest had most dependance.

C H A P. VIII.

Of the Peloponnesian war.

SECT. I.

Upon what terms the two principal cities of Greece, Athens and Sparta, stood, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

GREECE was never united under the government of any one prince or estate, until *Philip* of *Macedon*, and after him *Alexander* brought them rather to a union and league against the *Persian*, whereof they were captains, than into any absolute subjection. For every estate held their own, and were governed by laws far different and by their own magistrates, notwithstanding the power of the *Macedonians*, to whom they did yield obedience no otherwise than as to such, who were (perforce) their leaders in the *Persian* war (deemed the general quarrel of *Greece*) and took the profit and honour of the victory to their own use and increase of greatness. But the kings which afterwards reigned in *Macedonia*, did so far enlarge their authority, that all *Greece* was by them brought under such obedience, as differed little from servitude; very few

excepted, who could hardly, sometimes with arms, and sometimes with gifts, preserve their liberty; of whom the *Lacedemonians* and *Athenians* were chief: which two people deserved best the plague of tyranny, having first given occasion thereunto by their great ambition, which wearied and weakened all the country by perpetual war. For, until these two cities of *Athens* and *Sparta* distracted all *Greece*, drawing every state into the quarrel, on the one or other side, and so gave beginning to the *Peloponnesian* war (the effects whereof in true estimation ceased not, before the time that *Philip* had over-master'd all, forasmuch as every conclusion of one war afforded henceforth matter to some new distraction of the whole country) the wars, commenced between one city of *Greece* and another, were neither great nor of long continuance. All controversies were soon decided, either by the authority of the *Amphictiones*, who were the general council of *Greece*; or by the power of the *Lacedemonians*, whose aid was commonly held as good as the assurance of victory.

These

These *Lacedemonians* had lived about 400 years under one form of government, when the *Peloponnesian* war began. Their education was only to practise feats of arms; wherein they so excelled, that a very few of them were thought equal to very great numbers of any other people. They were poor, and cared not much for wealth; every one had an equal portion of the common field, which sufficed to maintain him in such a manner of life as they used. For bravery they had none, and curious building or apparel they regarded not. Their diet was simple, their feasts and ordinary meals being in common halls, where all fared alike. They used money of iron, whereof they could not be covetous nor great hoarders. Briefly, they liv'd *Utopian*-like, save that they used no other occupation than war, placing all their felicity in the glory of their valour. Hereby it came to pass, that in all enterprises, whereof they were partakers, the leading and high command was granted to them, and all *Greece* followed their conduct. But the *Athenians* were in all points contrary to this: for they sought wealth, and measured the honours of their victories by the profit; they used mercenary soldiers in their wars, and exacted great tribute of their subjects, which were for the most part islanders, compelled to obey them, because the *Athenian* fleet was great.

As in form of policy, and in course of life, so in conditions natural, the difference between these two people was very much. The *Athenians* were eager and violent, sudden in their conclusions, and as hasty in the execution: the *Lacedemonians* very slow in their deliberations, full of gravity, but very resolute, and such as would in cold blood perform what the *Athenians* did usually in flagrant. Whereby it came to pass that the *Lacedemonians* had all the estates of *Greece* depending upon them, as on men firm and assured, that sought honour and not riches; whereas the *Athenians* were followed by such as obey'd them perforce, being held in straight subjection. But the feignory of the *Athenians* was nothing large, until such time as the *Persian Xerxes* had invaded *Greece*, pretending only a quarrel to *Athens*. For then the citizens perceiving well, that the town of *Athens* could not be defended against his great army of 1700000 men, bestowed all their wealth upon a navy, and (assisted by the other *Grecians*) overthrew the fleet of *Xerxes*, whose land-forces were soon after discomfited by them, and the *Greeks*, who all served under conduct of the *Spartans*. After these victories, the *Athenians* being now very mighty in fleet, reduced all the islands of the *Grecian* seas under their obedience; imposing upon them a hard tribute, for maintenance (as they pretended) of war against the *Persian*; tho' indeed they employ'd their forces chiefly to the conquest of such islands, and haven towns, of their own countrymen, as stood out against them. All which was easily suffered by the *Lacedemonians*, who were in-landers, and men that delighted not in expeditions to be made far from home. But afterwards perceiving the power of the *Athenians* to grow great, they held them in much jealousy, and were very apt to quarrel with them; but much more willing to breed contention between them and other estates. Wherefore at such time as the *Thebans* would have oppress'd the *Plataeans*, when they of *Platae* repaired to *Sparta* for succour, they found there no other aid, than this advice, that they should seek help at *Athens*. Hereby it was thought, that the *Athenians* should be entangled in a long and tedious war with their neighbours of *Thebes*. But it prov'd otherwise; for their force was now so great,

that all such occasions did only serve to increase their honour and puissance.

SECT. II.

How Sparta and Athens entered into a war.

NEVERTHELESS many estates of *Greece* were very ill affected to *Athens*, because that city grew very insolent upon sudden prosperity, and maintaining the weaker towns against the stronger, incroached apace upon their neighbours, taking their dependants from them. Especially the *Corinthians* were much enraged, because the people of the island *Corcyra*, their colony, which had rebelled against them, and given them a great overthrow by sea, was by the *Athenians* (who desired to increase their fleet by adjoining that of *Corcyra* unto it) taken into protection, and the *Corinthians* thereby impeached of that revenge which else they would have taken. Now, howsoever it were so, that these dealings of the *Athenians* were not directly against the conditions of peace agreed upon among the *Greeks*, yet were the complaints made at *Sparta* so vehement, that (tho' with much ado) they concluded to redress by war the injuries done to their allies.

First therefore seeking religious pretences, they required the *Athenians* to expiate certain offences committed against the gods; whereunto having for answer, that they themselves should expiate other the like offences, committed in *Sparta*; they began to deal plainly, and required that the people of some towns, oppress'd by the estate of *Athens*, should be set at liberty; and that a decree made against those of *Megara*, whereby they were forbidden to enter any port of the *Athenians*, should be reversed. This last point they so earnestly pressed, that if they might obtain it, they promised to abstain from their purpose of making war.

This they desir'd, not as a matter of any great importance (for it was a trifle) but only that by seeming to have obtain'd somewhat, they might preserve their reputation without entering into a war, which threatned them with greater difficulties apparent, than they were very willing to undergo.

But the *Athenians* would yield to nothing; for it was their whole desire that all *Greece* should take notice, how far they were from fear of any other city. Hereupon they prepared on both sides very strongly, all that was needful to the war; wherein the *Lacedemonians* were superiour, both in number and quality, being assisted by most of the cities in *Greece*; and having the general favour, as men that pretended to set at liberty such as were oppress'd: but the *Athenians* did as far exceed them in all provisions, of money, shipping, engines, and absolute power of command among their subjects; which they held, and afterwards found, of greater use in such need, than the willing readiness of friends, who soon grow weary, and are not easily assembled.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

THE first and second years expedition was very grievous to the city of *Athens*. For the fields were wasted; the trees cut down; the country people driven to flee, with their wives, children, and cattle into the town; whereby a most furious pestilence grew in the city, such as before they had never felt, nor heard of. Hereunto was added the revolt of the *Mytilenians*, in the isle of *Lesbos*, and the siege of *Platae* their confederated city, which they durst not adventure to raise, be-

sides

sides some small overthrow received. The *Lacedemonians* assembling as great forces as they could raise out of *Peloponnesus*, did in the beginning of summer enter the country of *Attica*, and therein abide, until victuals began to fail, wasting and destroying all things round about: the governours of the *Athenians* would not suffer the people to issue into the field against them; for they knew the valour of their enemies; but used to send a fleet into *Peloponnesus*, which wasted as fast all the sea-coast of their enemies, whilst they were making war in *Attica*. So the *Peloponnesians* being the stronger by land, won the town of *Plateæ*, which wanted rescue; the *Athenians* likewise being more mighty by sea, did subdue *Mytilene*, which had rebelled, but could not be succoured from *Sparta*. By these proceedings in that war, the *Lacedemonians* began to perceive how unfit they were to deal with such enemies. For, after that *Attica* was thoroughly wasted, it lay not greatly in their power to do any offence equal to such harm as they themselves might, and did receive. Their confederates began to set forward very slowly in their expeditions into *Attica*; perceiving well, that *Athens* was plentifully relieved with all necessities, which came by sea from the islands that were subject unto that estate; and therefore these invaders took but small pleasure in beholding the walls of that mighty city, or in wasting a forsaken field, which was to them a pattern of the calamities, with which their own territory was the while afflicted. Wherefore they began to set their care to build a strong navy, wherein they had little good success, being easily vanquished by the *Athenians*, who both had more and better ships; and were so skilful in sea-fights, that a few vessels of theirs durst undertake a great number of the *Peloponnesians*.

SECT. IV.

Of the great loss which the Spartans received at Pylus.

AMong other losses which the *Spartans* had felt by sea, they received at *Pylus* a very fore blow, that compelled them to sue for peace. A fleet of *Athenian* ships, bound for *Corcyra*, wasting in that passage, as their manner was, the coast of *Laconia*, and all the half-isle of *Peloponnesus*, was by contrary winds detained at *Pylus*, which is a ragged promontory, joining to the main, by a straight neck of land. Before it, there lies a small barren island of less than two miles compass, and within that a creek, which is a good harbour for ships, the force of weather being borne off by the head-land and isle. This promontory the *Athenians* fortified, as well as in haste they might; and what was wanting in their artificial fortification, was supplied by the natural strength and site of the place. By holding this piece of ground and haven, they reasonably expected many advantages against their enemies. For the country adjoining was inhabited by the *Messenians*, who in ancient times had held very strong and cruel war with *Sparta*; and, tho' quite subdu'd, they were held in straight subjection; yet was not the old hatred so extinguished, that by the near neighbourhood and assistance of the *Athenians*, it might not be revived. Furthermore, it was thought, that many ill-willers to the *Lacedemonians*, and as many of their bond-slaves as could escape from them, would repair to *Pylus*, and from thence make daily excursions into *Laconia*, which was not far off; or, if other hopes failed, yet would the benefit of this haven, lying almost in the midway between them and *Corcyra*, make them able to surround all *Peloponnesus*, and

waste it at their pleasure. The news of these doings at *Pylus*, drew the *Peloponnesians* thither in all haste out of *Attica*, which they had entered a few days before with their whole army: but now they brought not only their land-forces, but all their navy, to recover this piece, which how bad a neighbour it might prove in time, they well foresaw. Little fearing the grievous loss at hand, which they therein a few days received. For when they in vain made a general assault on all sides, both by sea and land, finding that small garrison which the *Athenians* had left, very resolute in the defence; they occupied the haven, placing 420 choice men, all of them citizens of *Sparta*, in the island beforementioned; at each end whereof is a channel, that leads into the port, but so narrow, that only two ships in front could enter between the isle and *Pylus*; likewise but 7 or 8 ships could enter at once by the further channel, between the island and the main. Having thus taken order to shut up this new town by sea, they sent part of their fleet to fetch wood, and other stuff, wherewith to fortify round about, and block up the piece on all sides. But in the mean season, the *Athenian* fleet, hearing of their danger that were left at *Pylus*, return'd thither, and with great courage entering the haven, did break and sink many of their enemies vessels; took five, and enforced the residue to run themselves a-ground.

Now was the town secure, and the *Spartans* abiding in the island as good as lost: wherefore the magistrates were sent from *Sparta* to the camp (as was their custom in great dangers) to advise what were best for the publick safety; who, when they did perceive that there was no other way to rescue their citizens out of the isle, than by composition with their enemies; they agreed to intreat with the *Athenians* about peace, taking truce in the mean while with the captains at *Pylus*. The conditions of the truce were, That the *Lacedemonians* should deliver up all the ships which were in the coast, and that they should attempt nothing against the town, nor the *Athenians* against the camp: That a certain quantity of bread, wine, and flesh, should be daily carried into the isle, but that no ships should pass into the island secretly: That the *Athenians* should carry the *Lacedemonian* ambassadors to *Athens*, there to treat of peace; and should bring them back, at whose return the truce should end; which, if in the mean time it were broken in any one point, should be held utterly void in all: That when the truce was expired, the *Athenians* should restore the *Peloponnesian* ships, in as good case as they receiv'd them. The ambassadors coming to *Athens*, were of opinion, that as they themselves had begun the war, so might they end it when they pleased: wherefore they told the *Athenians* how great an honour it was that the *Lacedemonians* did sue to them for peace; advising them to make an end of the war, whilst with such reputation they might. But they found all contrary to their expectation: for instead of concluding upon even terms, or desiring of meet recompence for loss sustained, the *Athenians* demanded certain cities to be restored to them, which had been taken from them by the *Lacedemonians* long before this war began; refusing likewise to continue the treaty of peace, unless the *Spartans*, which were in the isle, were first rendred unto them as prisoners. Thus were the ambassadors return'd without effect, at which time the truce being ended, it was desired of the *Athenian* captains, that they should, according to their covenant, restore the ships, which had been put into their hands. Whereto answer was made, that the condition of the

the truce was, That if any one article were broken, all should be held void ; now (said the *Athenians*) ye have assaulted our garrisons, and thereby are we acquitted of our promise to restore the ships. This and the like frivolous allegations which they made, were but meer shifts ; yet profit so far over-weighed honour, that better answer none could be got. Then were the *Lacedemonians* driven to use many hard means, for conveyance of victuals into the isle, which finally was taken by force, and the men that were in it carried prisoners to *Athens* ; where it was decreed, that when the *Peloponnesians* next invaded *Attica*, these prisoners should all be slain. Whether fearing the death of these men, or withheld by the troubles, which (according to the *Athenians* hope) fell upon them, the *Lacedemonians* were so far from wasting *Attica*, that they suffered their own country to be continually over-run, both by the *Athenians*, who landed on all parts of their coast, and by those who issued out of *Pylus* ; which became the rendezvous of all that were ill-affected unto them.

SECT. V.

How the Lacedemonians hardly, and to their great disadvantage, obtained a peace, that was not well kept.

Therefore they endeavoured greatly to obtain peace ; which the *Athenians* would not hearken unto. For they were so puffed up with the continuance of good success, that having sent a few bands of men into *Sicily*, to hold up a faction there, and make what profit they might of the *Sicilians* quarrels ; when afterwards they heard that the differences in that isle were taken away, and their bands return'd without either gain or loss ; they banished the captains, as if it had been merely through their default that the isle of *Sicily* was not conquered ; which (besides the longer distance) was in power to offend others, or defend it self ; no whit inferiour unto *Peloponnesus*. Yet was this their overweening much abated shortly after, by some disasters received, especially in *Thrace*, where, in a battel which they lost at *Amphipolis*, *Cleon*, and *Brasidas*, generals of the *Athenian* and *Lacedemonian* forces, were both slain ; which two had most been adversaries to the peace. As the *Athenians* by their losses were taught moderation ; so the *Lacedemonians*, who not only felt the like wounds, but thro' the great navy which they had receiv'd at *Pylus*, were fain to proceed lamely in the war, against such as, thro' commodity of their good fleet, had all advantages that could be found in expedition, were fervently desirous to conclude the business, ere fortune by any new favour should revive the insolence, which was at this time well mortified in their enemies. Neither was it only a consideration of their present estate, that urged them to bring the treaty of peace to a good and speedy effect ; but other dangers hanging over their heads, and ready to fall on them, which unless they compounded with the *Athenians*, they knew not how to avoid. The estate of *Argos*, which had ancient enmity with them, was now, after a truce of 30 years well nigh expired, ready to take the benefit of their present troubles, by joining with those who alone found them work enough. *Argos* was a rich and strong city, which, tho' inferiour to *Sparta* in valour, yet was not so unwarlike, nor held such ill correspondence with the neighbouring estates, that the *Lacedemonians* could ever far prevail upon it, when they had little else to do. This was a thing that in the beginning of this war had not been regarded : for it was then thought,

that by wasting the territory of *Athens* with sword and fire, the quarrel should easily, and in short time, have been ended ; whereby not only the *Athenians* should have been brought to good order, but the *Corinthians* and others, for whose sake the war was undertaken, have been so firmly knit to the *Lacedemonians*, that they should for love of them have abandoned the *Argives* to their own fortunes. But now the vanity of those hopes appeared, in that the *Athenians*, abounding in ready money, and means to raise more, were able to secure themselves by a strong fleet, from any great harm : that the *Peloponnesians*, wanting wherewith to maintain a navy, could do unto them ; yea, as masters of the sea, to weary them out, as in effect already they had done. As for the confederates of *Sparta*, they could now endure neither war nor peace ; their daily travels, and many losses had so wearied and incensed them. Wherefore the *Lacedemonians* were glad to use the occasion, which the inclination of their enemies did then afford, of making a final peace ; which with much ado they procured, as seemed equal and easy ; but was indeed impossible to be performed, and therefore all their travel was little effectual.

The restitution of prisoners and places taken being agreed upon, it fell out by lot, that the *Lacedemonians* should restore first. These had won more towns upon the continent from the *Athenians*, than the *Athenians* had from them ; but what they had won, they had not won absolutely. For they had restored some towns to such of their allies, from whom the state of *Athens* had taken them ; some, and those the most, they had set at liberty (as reason required) which had opened their gates unto them, as to their friends and deliverers, and not compelled them to break in as enemies. Now, concerning the towns which were not in their own hands, but had been rendered unto their confederates, the *Spartans* found means to give some satisfaction, by permitting the *Athenians* to retain other, which they had gotten in the war ; as for the rest, they promised more than afterwards they could perform. The cities, which they had taken into protection, could not endure to hear of being abandon'd ; neither would they by any means yield themselves into the hands of their old lords, the *Athenians*, whom they had offended by revolting, notwithstanding whatsoever articles were drawn and concluded, for their security, and betterance in time to come. This dull performance of conditions on the side of the *Spartans*, made the *Athenians* become as backward in doing those things which on their part were required ; so that restoring only the prisoners which they had, they deferred the rest, until such time as they might receive the full satisfaction according to the agreement. But before such time, as these difficulties broke out into matter of open quarrel, the *Lacedemonians* entered into a more straight alliance with the *Athenians* ; making a league offensive and defensive with them. Hereunto they were moved by the backwardness of the *Argives*, who being (as they thought) likely to have sued for peace at their hands, as soon as things were once compounded between *Athens* and *Sparta*, did shew themselves plainly unwilling to give ear to any such motion. Thinking therefore, that by cutting from *Argos* all hope of *Athenian* succour, they should make sure work ; the *Spartans* regarded not the affections of other states, whom they had either bound unto them by well-deserving in the late war, or found so troublesome, that their enmity (if perhaps they durst let it appear) were little worse than friendship. It bred great jealousy in all the cities of *Greece*, to perceive such a conjunction between two

so powerful signiories ; especially one clause threatening every one, that was any thing apt to fear, with a secret intent, that might be harboured in their proud conceits, of subduing the whole country, and taking each what they could lay hold on. For, besides the other articles, it was agreed, that they might by mutual consent add new conditions, or alter the old at their own pleasures. This impression wrought so strongly in the *Corinthians*, *Thebans*, and other ancient confederates of *Sparta*, that the hate which they had borne to the *Athenians* their professed enemies, was violently thrown upon the *Lacedemonians* their unjust friends ; whereby it came to pass, that they, who had lately borne chief sway in *Greece*, might have been abandon'd to the discretion of their enemies, as already in effect they were, had the enemies wisely used the advantage.

SECT. VI.

Of the negotiations, and practices, held between many states of Greece, by occasion of the peace that was concluded.

THE admiration wherein all *Greece* held the valour of *Sparta* as irresistible, and able to make way through all impediments, had been so excessive, that when by some sinister accidents, that city was compelled to take and seek peace, upon terms not founding very honourable, this common opinion was not only abated, but (as happens usually in things extreme) was changed into much contempt. For it was never thought that any *Lacedemonian* would have endured to lay down his weapons, and yield himself prisoner ; nor that any misfortune could have been so great, as should have drawn that city to relieve it self otherwise than by force of arms. But when once it had appeared, that many of their citizens, among whom were some of especial mark, being overlaid by enemies, in the island before *Pylus*, had rather chosen to live in captivity, than to die in fight ; and that *Pylus* it self, sticking as a thorn in the foot of *Laconia*, had bred such anguish in that estate, as utterly wearying the accustomed *Spartan* resolution, had made it sit down, and seek to refresh it self by dishonourable ease : then did not only the *Corinthians* and *Thebans* begin to conceive basely of those men which were virtuous, tho' unfortunate ; but other lesser cities, joining with these in the same opinion, did cast their eyes upon the rich and great city of *Argos*, of whose ability, to do much, they conceived a strong belief, because of long time it had done nothing. Such is the base condition, which thro' foolish envy is become almost natural in the greater part of mankind. We curiously search into their vices, in whom had they kept some distance, we should have discern'd only the virtues ; and comparing injuriously our best part with their worst, are justly plagued with a false opinion of that good in strangers which we know to be wanting in our selves.

The first that published their dislike of *Sparta*, were the *Corinthians*, at whose vehement entreaty (tho' moved rather by envy at the greatness of *Athens* daily increasing) the *Lacedemonians* had entered into the present war. But these *Corinthians* did only murmur at the peace, alledging as grievances, that some towns of theirs were left in the *Athenians* hands. The *Mantineans*, who, during the time of war, had procured some part of the *Arcadians* to become their followers, and forsake their dependency upon the state of *Sparta*, did more freely and readily discover themselves ; fear of revenge to come, working more effectually than indignati-

on at things already past. The *Argives* feeling the gale of prosperous fortune that began to fill their sails, prepared themselves to take as much of it as they could stand under ; giving for that purpose unto 12 of their citizens, a full and absolute commission to make alliance between them and any free cities of *Greece* (*Athens* and *Sparta* excepted) without any further trouble of propounding every particular business to the multitude. When the gates of *Argos* were thus set open to all comers, the *Mantineans* began to lead the way, and many cities of *Peloponnesus* following them, entered into this new confederacy ; some incited by private respects, others thinking it the wisest way to do as the most did. What inconvenience might arise to them by these courses, the *Lacedemonians* easily discerned ; and therefore sent ambassadors to stop the matter at *Corinth*, where they well perceived that the mischief had been hatched. These ambassadors found in the *Corinthians* a very rough disposition, with a gravity expressing the opinion which they had conceived of their present advantage over *Sparta*. They had caused all cities which had not entered yet into the alliance with *Argos*, to send their agents to them, in whose presence they gave audience to the *Lacedemonians* ; the purport of whose embassy was this : that the *Corinthians*, without breach of their oath, could not forsake the alliance, which they had long since made with *Sparta*, and that reason did as well bind them to hold themselves contented with the peace lately made, as religion enforced them to continue in their ancient confederacy ; forasmuch as it had been agreed between the *Spartans* and their associates, that the consent of the greater part (which had yielded unto peace with *Athens*) should bind the lesser number to perform what was concluded, if no divine impediment withstood them. Hereunto the *Corinthians* made answer, that the *Spartans* had first begun to do them open wrong, in concluding the war wherein they had lost many places, without provision of restitution ; and that the very clause alledged by the ambassadors, did acquit them from any necessity of subscribing to the late peace ; forasmuch as they had sworn unto those people whom they perswaded to rebel against *Athens*, that they would never abandon them, nor willingly suffer them to fall again into the tyrannous hands of the *Athenians*. Wherefore they held themselves bound both in reason and religion, to use all means of upholding those, whom by common consent they had taken into protection ; for that an oath was no less to be accounted a divine impediment, than were pestilence, tempest, or any the like accident, hindering the performance of things undertaken. As for the alliance with *Argos*, they said that they would do as they should find cause. Having dismiss'd the ambassadors with this answer, they made all haste to join themselves with *Argos*, and caused other states to do the like ; so that *Sparta* and *Athens* were in a manner left to themselves, the *Thebans* and *Megarians* being also upon the point to have entered into this new confederacy. But as the affections were divers, which caused this hasty confluence of sudden friends to *Argos*, it so likewise came to pass, that the friendship it self, such as it was, had much diversity both of sincerity and of continuance. For some there were that hated or feared the *Lacedemonians* ; as the *Mantineans* and *Eleans* : these did firmly betake themselves to the *Argives*, in whom they knew the same affection to be inveterate ; others did only hate the peace concluded ; and these would rather have followed the *Spartans* than the *Argives* in war, yet rather the *Argives* in war than the *Lacedemonians* in peace :

peace; of this number were the *Corinthians*, who knowing that the *Thebans* were affected like unto themselves, dealt with them to enter into the society of the *Argives*, as they had done: but the different forms of government, used in *Thebes* and *Argos*, caused the *Thebans* to hold rather with *Sparta*, that was ruled by the principal men, than to incur the danger of innovation, by joining with such as committed the whole rule to the multitude.

This business having ill succeeded, the *Corinthians* began to bethink themselves of their own danger, who had not so much as any truce with *Athens*, and yet were unprepared for war. They sought therefore to come to some temporary agreement with the *Athenians*, and hardly obtained it. For the *Athenians*, who had dealt with all *Greece* at one time, did not greatly care to come to any appointment with one city, that had shewed against them more stomach than force; but gave them to understand, that they might be safe enough from them, if they would claim the benefit of that alliance, which *Athens* had lately made with *Sparta* and her dependants; yet finally, they granted unto these *Corinthians* (which were loth to acknowledge themselves dependants of *Sparta*) the truce that they desired; but into private confederacy they would not admit them, it being an article of the league between them and the *Spartans*, that the one should not make peace nor war without the other.

Herein, as in many other passages, may clearly be seen the great advantage which absolute lords have as well in peace as in war, over such as are served by voluntaries. We shall hardly find any one signiory, that hath been so constantly followed as *Sparta* was, by so many states, and some of them little inferior to it self, being all as free: whereas contrariwise, the *Athenians* had lately, and by compulsive means, gotten their dominion, wherein they demeaned themselves as tyrants. But in performance of conditions agreed upon, the *Athenians* were able to make their words good, by excluding any state out of their confederacy, and giving up such places as were agreed upon: of which the *Lacedemonians* could do neither the one nor the other. For such towns as their old allies had gotten by their means in the late war, could not be restored without their consent, which had them in present possession; and particularly the town of *Panaete*, which the *Thebans* held, could by no means be obtained from them by the *Lacedemonians* (who earnestly desired it, that by restitution thereof unto the *Athenians*, as earnestly demanding it, themselves might recover *Pylus*) unless they would agree to make a private alliance with *Thebes*; which thereupon they were constrain'd to do, tho' knowing it to be contrary to the last agreement between them and *Athens*.

The *Lacedemonians* having broken one article of the league made between them and the *Athenians*, that by so doing they might enable themselves to the performance of another, were shamefully disappointed of their hopes by the *Thebans*, who did not give up the town of *Panaete*, till first they had utterly demolished it, and made it of no worth to the *Athenians*. This was sought to have been excused by the *Lacedemonian* ambassadors, who coming to *Athens* (whither they had sent home all prisoners that had been detained at *Thebes*) hoping with gentle words to salve the matter; saying, that from henceforth no enemy to *Athens* should nestle in *Panaete*, for it was destroyed. But these ambassadors had not to deal with tame fools: for the *Athenians* told them in plain terms, that of three principal conditions agreed upon in their late league,

they had not performed any one, but used such base collusion as stood not with their honour: having made private alliance with the *Thebans*; having destroyed a town that they should have restored; and not having forced their dependants by war, to make good the covenants of the late concluded peace. Hereupon they dismissed the ambassadors with rough words, meaning with as rough deeds to anger those that sent them.

There were at that time both in *Athens* and *Sparta*, many that were ill contented with the peace; among whom were the *Ephori*, chosen for that year, in *Sparta*; and *Alcibiades*, a powerful young gentleman in *Athens*. But the *Ephori*, though desiring to renew the war, yet wished that first they might get from the *Athenians* as much as was to be render'd to them by covenant, especially *Pylus*, that had so sorely troubled them. *Alcibiades*, whose nobility, riches and favour with the people, made him desire war, as the means, whereby himself might procure some honourable employment, used all means to set the quarrel on foot, whilst the *Athenians* had yet both advantage enough, as not having render'd ought save their prisoners, and pretence enough to use that advantage of breaking the peace, by reason that the *Lacedemonians* (though indeed against their wills) had broken all covenants with them. Now the state of *Athens* had fully determined to retain *Pylus*, and to perform nothing that the *Lacedemonians* should and might require, until they had first, without any longer halting, fulfilled all articles whereunto they were bound, even to the utmost point. This was enough to make them sweat, who having already done the most that they could, had as yet got nothing in recompence, except the delivery of their citizens which were prisoners. But *Alcibiades* wishing a speedy beginning of open war, sent privily to the *Argives*, and gave them to understand how fitly the time served for them to associate themselves with *Athens*, which was enough to give them security against all enemies.

The *Argives*, upon the first confluence of many estates unto their society, had embraced great hopes of working wonders, as if they should have had the conduct of all *Greece* against the *Athenians*, robbing *Sparta* of that honour, as having ill used it, and thereby leaving their old enemies in case of much contempt and disability. But these sudden apprehensions of vain joy, were suddenly changed into as vain fear; which ill agreed with the great opinion that had lately been conceived of *Argos*. For when the *Thebans* had refused their alliance; when the *Corinthians* had sought security from *Athens*; and when a false rumour was noised abroad, that *Athens*, *Thebes*, and *Sparta*, were come to a full agreement upon all points of difference; then began the *Argives* to let fall their crests, and sue for peace unto the *Lacedemonians*, who needing it as much as they, or more, yet held their gravity, and were not over-hasty to accept it. At this time, and in this perturbation, the message of *Alcibiades* came very welcome to the *Argives*, which were not now consulting how to become the chief of all others, but how to save themselves. Wherefore they sent away presently to *Athens* their own ambassadors, accompanied with the *Mantineans* and *Eleans*, to make a league offensive and defensive, between their estates and the *Athenians*.

Of this business the *Lacedemonians* knew not what to think: for well they saw, that such a combination tended to their great hurt, and therefore were desirous to prevent it; but to keep the love of the *Athenians*, the new *Ephori* thought that more was already

already done, than stood with their honour or profit; others held it the wisest way, having done so much, not to stick at a little more; but rather by giving full satisfaction to retain the friendship of that state, which was more to be valued than all the rest of Greece. This resolution prevailing, they sent away such of their citizens as were best affected to the peace; who coming to Athens with full commission to make an end of all controversies, did earnestly labour in the council-house, to make the truth of things appear; saying, that their confederacy with the Thebans had tended to none other end than the recovery of *Panæte*: concerning which town, or any other business, that it much grieved the Lacedemonians, to see things fall out in such wise as might give to the Athenians cause of displeasure; but that all should be done which in reason might be required for making matters even between them; to which purpose they shewed that themselves had absolute commission. Wherefore they desired that *Pylus* might be restored unto them, and especially for the present, that the negotiations with the Argives might be called aside. Favourable audience was given to this proposition; the rather, because they, which promised amends, had power to make their words good. But all this fair likelihood of good agreement was dash'd on the sudden, by the practice of *Alcibiades*, who secretly dealing with the Lacedemonian ambassadors, perswaded them well of his friendship towards their city, and advised them to take all care, that their absolute power to conclude what they pleased in the name of *Sparta*, might not be known to the commonalty of Athens, lest the insolent multitude should thereupon grow peremptory, and yield to nothing, unless they could draw them to unreasonable conditions. The ambassadors believed him, and fashioned their tale in the assembly of the people as he had advised them. Hereupon the same *Alcibiades* taking presently the advantage, which their double-dealing afforded, inveighed openly against them, as men of no sincerity, that were come to Athens for none other purpose, than to hinder the people from strengthening themselves with friends, meaning to draw the Argives and their adherents to their own alliance, as (contrary to their oath) already they had the Thebans. The people of Athens, whom a pleasing errand would hardly have satisfied, or brought into a good opinion of the Lacedemonians (whose honest meanings had so ill been seconded with good performance) were now so incensed with the double-dealing of the ambassadors, and the strong perswasions of *Alcibiades*, that little wanted of concluding the league with Argos. Yet for the present, so far did *Nicias*, an honourable citizen, and great friend to the peace, prevail with them, that the business was put off, till he himself with other ambassadors might fetch a better answer from *Sparta*.

It may seem a great wonder, how so poor a trick of *Alcibiades* was able to carry a matter of such importance, when the Spartan ambassadors might have cast the load upon his own shoulders, by discovering the truth. But the gravity which was usually found in the Lacedemonians, hinder'd them (perhaps) from playing their game handsomely against so nimble a wit; and they might well have been thought untrusty men, had they professed themselves such as would say and unsay for their most advantage.

Nicias and his companions had a sower message to deliver at *Sparta*, being peremptorily to require performance of all conditions, and among the rest, that the Lacedemonians should take the pains to rebuild *Panæte*, and should immediately renounce

their alliance made with the Thebans; letting them understand, that otherwise the Athenians, without further delay, would enter into confederacy with the Argives and their adherents. The Ephori at *Sparta* had no mind to forsake the Thebans, assured friends to their state; but wrought so hard, that the anger of the Athenians was suffered to break out what way it could, which to mitigate they would do no more, than only (at the request of *Nicias* their honourable friend, who would not seem to have effected nothing) swear anew to keep the articles of the league between them and Athens. Immediately therefore upon return of the ambassadors, a new league was made between the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans and Eleans, with very ample provision for holding the same common friends and enemies; wherein, though the Lacedemonians were passed over with silence, yet was it manifest that the whole intent of this confederacy did bend it self chiefly against them, as in short while after was proved by effect.

At this time the Lacedemonians were in ill case, who having restored all that they could unto the Athenians, and procured others to do the like, had themselves recovered nothing of their own (prisoners excepted) for default of restoring all that they should. But that which did most of all disable them was the loss of reputation, which they had not more impaired in the late war by misfortunes, than in sundry passages between them and the Athenians: to procure and keep whose amity, they had left sundry of their old friends to shift for themselves. Contrariwise, the Athenians, by the treaty of peace, had recovered the most part of that which they lost in war; all their gettings they had retained, and were strengthened by the access of new confederates.

SECT. VII.

How the peace between Athens and Sparta was ill kept, though not openly broken.

IT was not long ere the Argives and their fellows had found business wherewith to set the Athenians on work, and make use of this conjunction. For, presuming upon the strength of their side, they began to meddle with the Epidaurians, whom it concerned the state of *Sparta* to defend. So, many acts of hostility were committed, wherein Athens and *Sparta* did not (as principals) infect each the other, but came in collaterally, as to the aid of their several friends.

By these occasions, the Corinthians, Beotians, Phocians, Locrians, and other people of Greece, began anew to range themselves under the Lacedemonians, and follow their ensigns. One victory, which the Lacedemonians obtained by their mere valour in a set battle near to *Mantineæ*, against the Argive side, helped well to repair their decayed reputation, tho' otherwise it yielded them no great profit. The civil dissension, arising shortly after within Argos it self, between the principal citizens and the commons, had almost thrown down the whole frame of the new combination. For the chief citizens getting the upper hand, made a league with *Sparta*, wherein they proceeded so far as to renounce the amity of the Athenians in express words, and forced the Mantineans to the like. But in short space of time the multitude prevailing, reversed all this, and having chased away their ambitious nobility, applied themselves to the Athenians as closely as before.

Besides these uproars in *Peloponnesus*, many essays were made to raise up troubles in all parts of Greece,

Greece, and likewise in *Macedon*, to the *Athenians*; whose forces and readiness for execution prevented some things, revenged other, and requited all with some prosperous attempts. Finally, the *Athenians* wanting matter of quarrel, and the *Lacedemonians* growing weary, they began to be quiet, retaining still that enmity in their hearts, which they had sufficiently discovered in effects, tho' not yet breaking out into terms of open war.

S E C T. VIII.

The Athenians sending two fleets to sack Syracuse, are put to flight and utterly discomfited.

DURING this intermission of open war the *Athenians* re-entertained their hopes of subduing *Sicil*, whither they sent a fleet so mighty as never was set forth by *Greece* in any age before or after.

This fleet was very well mann'd, and furnished with all necessaries to so great an expedition. All which came to nought; partly by the factions in *Athens*, whence *Alcibiades* author of that voyage, and one of the generals of their fleet, was driven to banish himself, for fear of such judgment, as else he was like to have undergone among the incensed people; partly by the invasion which the *Lacedemonians* made upon *Attica*, whilst the forces of that state were so far from home. Hereunto was added the aid of the king of *Persia*, who supplied the *Peloponnesians* with money.

Neither was the success of things in *Sicil* such, as without help from *Athens*, could give any likelihood of a good end in that war. For although in the beginning, the enterprize had so well succeeded, that they besieged *Syracuse*, the chief city of the island, and one of the fairest towns which the *Greeks* inhabited, obtaining the better in sundry battles by land and sea; yet when the town was relieved with strong aid from *Peloponnesus*, it came to pass that the *Athenians* were put to the worse on all sides, in such wise, that their fleet was shut up into the haven of *Syracuse*, and could not issue out.

As the *Athenian* affairs went very ill in *Sicil*, so did they at home stand upon hard terms, for that the *Lacedemonians*, who had been formerly accustomed to make wearisome yearly journeys into *Attica*, which having pill'd and foraged, they returned home; did now by counsel of *Alcibiades* (who seeking revenge upon his own citizens, was fled unto them) fortify the town of *Decelea*, which was near to *Athens*, whence they ceased not with daily excursions to harry all the country round about, and sometimes give alarm unto the city it self.

In these extremities, the perverse obstinacy of the *Athenians* was very strange; who leaving at their backs, and at their own doors, an enemy little less mighty than themselves, did yet send forth another fleet into *Sicil*, to invade a people no less puissant, which never had offended them.

It often happens, that prosperous events makes foolish counsel seem wiser than it was, which came to pass many times among the *Athenians*, whose vain conceits *Pallas* was said to turn unto the best. But where unsound advice finding bad proof, is obstinately pursued, neither *Pallas* nor fortune can be justly blamed for a miserable issue. This second fleet of the *Athenians*, which better might have served to convey home the former, that was defeated; after some attempts made to small purpose against the *Syracusans*, was finally (together with the other part of the navy, which was there before) quite vanquished, and barr'd up in the haven

of *Syracuse*, whereby the camp of the *Athenians*, utterly deprived of all benefit by sea, either for succour or departure, was driven to break up and fly away by land; in which flight they were overaken, routed, and quite overthrown in such wise, that scarce any man escaped.

This mischief well deservedly fell upon the *Athenians*, who had wickedly condemned into exile, *Sophocles* and *Pthiodorus*, generals, formerly sent into that isle, pretending that they had taken money for making peace in *Sicil*; whereas indeed there was not any means or possibility to have made war. Hereby it came to pass, that *Nicias*, who had the chief command in this unhappy enterprize, did rather choose to hazard the ruin of his country, by the loss of that army, wherein consisted little less than all the power of *Athens*, than to adventure his own estate, his life, and his honour, upon the tongues of shameless accusers, and the sentence of judges before his tryal resolved to condemn him, by retiring from *Syracuse*, when wisdom and necessity required it. For (said he) *they shall give sentence upon us, who know not the reason of our doings, nor will give ear to any that would speak in our behalf; but altogether hearken to suspicious and vain rumours that shall be brought against; yea, these our soldiers, who now are so desirous to return in safety, will in our danger be well contented to frame their tales to the pleasure of the lewd and insolent multitude.*

This resolution of *Nicias*, tho' it cannot be commended (for it is the part of an honest and valiant man, to do what reason willeth, not what opinion expecteth; and to measure honour or dishonour by the assurance of his well informed conscience, rather than by the malicious report and censure of others) yet it may be excused; since he had before his eyes the injustice of his people, and had well understood that a wicked sentence is infinitely worse than a wicked fact, as being held a precedent and pattern, whereby oppression beginning upon one, is extended as warrantable upon all. Therefore his fear of wrongful condemnation was such, as a constant man could not easily have over-master'd; but when afterwards the army, having no other expectation of safety than the faint hope of a secret flight, he was so terrified with an eclipse of the moon, happening when they were about to dislodge, that he would not consent to have the camp break up till seven and twenty days were pass'd. His timoroufness was even as foolish and ridiculous, as the issue of it was lamentable. For he should not have thought that the power of the heavens, and the course of nature would be as unjust as his *Athenians*; or might pretend less evil to the slothful, than to such as did their best. Neither do I think that any astrologer can alledge this eclipse, as either a cause or prognostication of that army's destruction, otherwise than as the folly of men did, by application, turn it to their own confusion. Had *C. Cassius*, the *Roman*, he, who slew *Julius Cesar*, imitated this superstition of *Nicias*, he had surely found the same fortune in a case very like. But when, he retiring, the broken remainder of *Cassius's* army defeated by the *Parthian* archers, was advised, upon such an accident as this, to continue where he then was, till the sun were past the sign of *Scorpio*; he made answer, that he stood not in such fear of *Scorpio*, as of *Sagittarius*. So adventuring rather to abide the frowning of the heavens, than the nearer danger of enemies upon earth, he made such a safe and honourable retreat, as did both shew his noble resolution, and give a fair example to that good rule,

— *Sapiens dominabitur astris.*

Thus we see that God, who ordinarily works by concatenation of means, deprives the governours of understanding, when he intends evil to the multitude; and that the wickedness of unjust men is the ready means to weaken the virtue of those who might have done them good.

S E C T. IX.

Of the troubles wherein the state of Athens fell, after the great loss of the fleet and army in Sicilia,

THE loss of this army was the ruin of the *Athenian* dominion, and may be well accounted a very little less calamity to that estate, than was the subversion of the walls, when the city about seven years after was taken by *Lysander*. For now began the subjects of the *Athenian* estate to rebel; of whom, some they reduced under their obedience, others held out; some for fear of greater inconvenience were set at liberty, promising only to be their good friends, as formerly they had been their subjects; others, having a kind of liberty offered by the *Athenians*, were not therewith contented, but obtained a true and perfect liberty by force. Among these troubles it fell out very unseasonably, that the principal men of *Athens* being wearied with the people's insolency, took upon them to change the form of that estate, and bring the government into the hands of a few. To which purpose conspiring with the captains which were abroad, they caused them to set up the form of an aristocracy in the towns of their confederates; and in the mean time, some that were most likely to withstand this innovation, being slain at *Athens*, the commonalty were so dismay'd, that none durst speak against the conspirators, whose number they knew not; but every man was afraid of his neighbour, lest he should be a member of the league. In this general fear the majesty of *Athens* was usurped by four hundred men, who observing in shew the ancient form of proceeding, did cause all matters to be propounded unto the people, and concluded upon by the greater part of voices: but the things propounded were only such as were first allowed in private among themselves; neither had the commonalty any other liberty, than only to approve and give consent, for whosoever presumed any further, was quickly dispatched out of the way, and no enquiry made of the murder. By these means were many decrees made, all tending to the establishment of this new authority, which nevertheless endured not long. For the fleet and army which then was in the isle of *Samos*, did altogether detest these dealings of the four hundred usurpers, and held them as enemies; whereupon they revoked *Alcibiades* out of banishment, and by his assistance procured that the supplies which the *Persian* king had promised unto the *Lacedemonians*, were by *Tissaphernes* his lieutenant, made unprofitable through the slow and bad performance. *Alcibiades* had at the first been very well entertain'd in *Sparta*, whilst his services done to that state was not grown to be the object of envy. But when it appeared that in counsel and good performance he so far excelled all the *Lacedemonians*, that all their good success was ascribed to his wit and valour, then were all the principal citizens weary of his virtue; especially *Agis*, one of their kings, whose wife had so far yielded herself to the love of this *Athenian*, that among her inward friends she could not forbear to call her young child by his name. Hereupon order was taken that *Alcibiades* should be killed out of the way. But he discovering the *Spartan* trea-

chery, conveyed himself unto *Tissaphernes*, whom he so bewitched with his great beauty, sweet conversation, and sound wit, that he soon became the master of that barbarous vice-roy's affections, who had free power to dispose the great king's treasures and forces in those parts. Then began he to advise *Tissaphernes*, not so far forth to assist the *Lacedemonians*, that they should quite overthrow the state of *Athens*, but rather to help the weaker side, and let them one consume another, whereby all should fall at length into the hands of the *Persian*. By this counsel he made way to other practices, wherein by strength of his reputation (as the only favourite of so great a potentate) he play'd his own game, procuring his restitution. At length his banishment being repealed by the army, but not by the citizens (who then were oppress'd by the four hundred) he laboured greatly to reconcile the soldiers to the governours; or at least to divert their heat another way, and turn it upon the common enemy. Some of the four hundred approved his motion, as being weary of the tyranny whereof they were partakers; partly because they saw it could not long endure, and partly for that themselves, being less regarded by the rest of their companions, than stood with their good liking, sought to acquit themselves of it as honestly as they might. But the most of that faction laboured to obtain peace of the *Lacedemonians*, desiring chiefly to maintain both their own authority, and the greatness of their city, if they might; but if this could not be, they did rather wish to preserve their own power, or safety at least, than the good estate of the commonwealth. Therefore they made sundry overtures of peace to the *Lacedemonians*, desiring to compound in as good terms as they might, and affirming that they were fitter to be trusted than the wavering multitude; especially considering that the city of *Sparta* was governed by an aristocracy, to which form they had now reduced *Athens*. All these passages between the four hundred (or the most and chief of them) and the *Lacedemonians*, were kept as secret as might be. For the city of *Athens* hoping, without any great cause, to repair their losses, was not inclined to make composition; from which upon juster ground the enemy was much more averse, trusting well that the discord of the *Athenians* (not unknown abroad) might yield some fair opportunity to the destruction of it self, which in effect (though not then presently) came to pass. And upon this hope king *Agis* did sometimes bring his forces from *Decelea* to *Athens*, where doing no good, he received some small losses. Likewise the navy of *Peloponnesus* made shew of attempting the city, but seeing no likelihood of success, they bent their course from thence to other places; where they obtained victories, which in the better fortune of the *Athenians* might more likely have been regarded, than in this their decayed estate. Yet it seems, without any disparagement to their wisdom, they should rather have forbore to present unto the city, or to the countries near adjoining any terror of the war. For the dissension within the walls might soon have done more hurt than could be received from the fleet or army without; which indeed gave occasion to set the citizens at unity, though it lasted not very long. The four hundred, by means of these troubles, were fain to resign their authority, which they could not now hold, when the people having taken arms to repel foreign enemies, would not lay them down, till they had freed themselves from such as oppress'd the state at home. Yet was not this alteration of government a full restitution of the sovereign command unto the people,

ple, or whole body of the city, but only to five thousand; which company the four hundred (when their authority began) had pretended to take unto them as assistants: herein seeming to do little wrong or none to the commonalty, who seldom assembled in greater number. But now when the highest power was come indeed into the hands of so many, it was soon agreed that *Alcibiades* and his companions should be recalled from exile, and that the army at *Samos* should be requested to undertake the government; which was forthwith reformed according to the soldiers desire.

SECT. X.

How Alcibiades won many important victories for the Athenians, was recalled from exile, made their general, and again deposed.

THIS establishment of things in the city, was accompanied with some good success in the wars. For the *Lacedemonians* were about the same time overthrown at sea, in a great battle, by the *Athenian* fleet, which had remained at *Samos*; to which *Alcibiades* afterwards joining such forces as he could raise, obtain'd many victories. Before the town of *Abydos*, his arrival with 18 ships gave the honour of a great battle to the *Athenians*; he overthrew and utterly destroy'd the fleet of the *Lacedemonians*, commanded by *Mindarus*, took the towns of *Cyzicus* and *Perinthus*, made the *Selymbrians* ransom their city, and fortify'd *Chrysopolis*. Hereupon letters were sent to *Sparta*, which the *Athenians*, intercepting, found to contain the distress of the army in these few words: *All is lost, Mindarus is slain, the soldiers want victuals, we know not what to do.*

Shortly after this, *Alcibiades* overthrew the *Lacedemonians* in fight by land at *Chalcedon*, took *Selymbria*, besieged and won *Byzantium*, now called *Constantinople*, which even in those days was a goodly, rich, and very strong city. Hereupon he returned home with very great welcome, and was made high admiral of all the navy.

But this his honour continued not long; for it was taken from him, and he driven to banish himself again; only because his lieutenant, contrary to the express command of *Alcibiades*, fighting with the enemies in his absence, had lost a great part of the fleet.

The second banishment of *Alcibiades* was to the *Athenians* more harmful than the first; and the loss which they thereupon received was (tho' more heavy to them, yet) less to be pitied of others, than that which ensued upon his former exile. For whereas at the first, he had fought revenge upon his own city; now, as inured to adversity, he rather pitied their fury, who in time of such danger had cast out him that should have repaired their weak estate, than sought by procuring or beholding the calamity of his people, to comfort himself after injury received. Before they, who were instituted in the place of *Alcibiades*, arrived at the fleet, he presented battle to *Lyfander* the *Lacedemonian* admiral, who was not so confident upon his former victory, as to undertake *Alcibiades* himself, bringing more ships in number (notwithstanding the former loss of 15) than his enemies had, and better ordered than they had been under his lieutenant. But when the decree of the people was published in the navy, then did *Alcibiades* withdraw himself to a town upon *Hellefpont*, called *Bizantbe*, where he had built a castle.

SECT. XI.

The battle at Arginusæ, and condemnation of the victorious Athenian captains by the people.

AFTER this time the *Athenians*, receiving many losses and discomfitures, were driven to flee into the haven of *Mytelene*, where they were straightly besieged both by land and sea. For the raising of this siege necessity enforced them to man all their vessels, and to put the uttermost of their forces into the hazard of one battle. This battle was fought at *Arginusæ*, where *Callicratidas*, admiral of the *Lacedemonians*, losing the honour of the day, preserved his own reputation by dying valiantly in the fight. It might well have been expected, that the ten captains, who jointly had command in chief over the *Athenian* fleet, should for that good day's service, and so happy a victory, have received great honour of their citizens. But contrariwise they were forthwith called home, and accused, as if wilfully they had suffered many of the citizens, whose ships were broken and sunk, to be cast away, when by appointing some vessels to take them up, they might have saved them from being drowned. Hereto the captains readily made a very just answer; that they pursuing the victory, had left part of the fleet, under sufficient men, to save those that were wrack'd; which if it were not well accomplished, it was, because a tempest arising about the end of the fight, had hindered the performance of that, and other their intendments. This excuse availed not: for a lewd fellow was brought forth, who said, that he himself escaping in a meal-tub, had been intreated by those who were in perill of drowning, to desire of the people revenge of their deaths upon the captains. It was very strange, that upon such an accusation, maintained with so slender evidence, men, that had well deserved of their country, should be overthrown. But their enemies had so incensed the rascally multitude, that no man durst absolve them, save only *Socrates* the wise and virtuous philosopher, whose voice in this judgment was not regarded. Six of them were put to death, of whom one had hardly escaped drowning, and was with much ado relieved by other vessels in the storm: but the captains which were absent escaped; for when the fury of the people was over-pass'd, this judgment was reversed, and the accusers called into question for having deceived and perverted the citizens. Thus the *Athenians* went about to free themselves from the infamy of injustice; but the divine justice was not asleep, nor would be so deluded.

SECT. XII.

The battle at Ægos-Potamos, wherein the whole state of Athens was ruined; with the end of the Peloponnesian war.

THE *Peloponnesian* fleet under *Lyfander*, the year next following, having scoured the *Ægean* seas, entered *Hellefpont*, where (landing soldiers) it besieged and took the town of *Lampfacus*. Hereupon all the navy of *Athens*, being an hundred and fourscore sail, made thither in haste; but finding *Lampfacus* taken before their coming, they put in at *Sestos*, where having refreshed themselves, they sailed to the river, called *Ægos-Potamos*, which is (as we might name it) *Goats-brook*, or the river of the *Goat*, being on the continent, opposite to *Lampfacus*; and there they cast anchors, not one whole league off from *Lyfander*, who rode at *Lampfacus* in the harbour. The next day after their arrival, they presented fight unto the *Peloponnesians*.

nesians, who refus'd it ; whereupon the *Athenians* returned again to *Ægos-Potamos* ; and thus they continued five days, braving every day the enemy, and returning to their own harbour when it drew towards evening.

The castle of *Alcibiades* was not far from the navy, and his power in those places was such as might have greatly availed his countrymen, if they could have made use of it. For he had waged mercenaries, and making war in his own name upon some people of the *Thracians*, had gathered much wealth, and obtained much reputation among them. He perceiving the disorderly course of the *Athenian* commanders, repaired unto them, and shewed what great inconvenience might grow, if they did not soon fore-see and prevent it. For they lay in a road subject to every weather, neither near enough to any town where they might furnish themselves with necessaries ; nor so far off as had been more expedient. *Sestos* was the next market-town ; thither both soldiers and mariners resorted, flocking away from the navy every day, as soon as they were returned from braving the enemy. Therefore *Alcibiades* willed them either to lie at *Sestos*, which was not far off ; or at the least, to consider how near their enemy was, whose fear proceeded rather from obedience to their general, than from any cowardise. This admonition was so far despised, that some of the commanders willed him to meddle with his own matters, and to remember that his authority was out of date. Had it not been for these opprobrious words, he could (as he told his familiars) have compelled the *Lacedemonians* either to fight upon unequal terms, or utterly to quit their fleet. And like enough it was that he might so have done, by transporting the light-armed *Thracians* his confederates, and others his followers, over the straits, who assaulting the *Peloponnesians* by land, would either have compelled them to put to sea, or else to leave their ships to the mercy of the *Athenians*. But finding their acceptance of his good counsel no better than hath been rehearsed, he left them to their fortune, which how evil it would be he did prognosticate.

Lyfander all this while defending himself by the advantage of his haven, was not careless in looking into the demeanour of the *Athenians*. When they departed, his manner was to send forth some of his swiftest vessels after them, who observing their doings, related unto him what they had seen. Therefore understanding in what careless fashion they roamed up and down the country, he kept all his men aboard after their departure, and the 5th day gave especial charge to his scouts, that when they perceived the *Athenians* disembarking, as their custom was, and walking towards *Sestos*, they should forthwith return, and hang up a brazen shield in the prow, as a token for him to weigh anchor.

The scouts performed their charge, and *Lyfander* being in a readiness, made all speed that strength of oars could give, to *Ægos-Potamos*, where he found very few of his enemies aboard their ships, not many near them, and all in great confusion, upon the news of his approach.

Inasmuch that the great industry which the *Athenians* then shewed, was in the escape of 8 or 9 ships, which knowing how much that loss imported, gave over *Athens* as desperate, and made a long flight unto the isle of *Cyprus* ; all the rest were taken, and such of the soldiers as came in to the rescue cut in pieces. Thus was the war, which had lasted 27 years, with variable success, concluded

in one hour ; and the glory of *Athens* in such wise eclipsed, that she never after shone in her perfect light.

Immediately upon this victory, *Lyfander*, having taken such towns as readily did yield upon the first fame of his exploit, he set sail for *Athens*, and joining his forces with those of *Agis* and *Pausanias*, kings of *Sparta*, summoned the city, which finding too stubborn to yield, and too strong to be won on the sudden, he put forth again to sea ; and rather by terror than violence, compelling all the islands, and such towns of the *Ionians*, as had formerly held of the *Athenians*, to submit themselves to *Sparta*, he did thereby cut off all provision of victuals and other necessaries from the city, and enforced the people by mere famine to yield to these conditions : That the long walls leading from the town to the port, should be thrown down ; that all cities subject to their estate, should be set at liberty ; that the *Athenians* should be masters only of their own territories, and the fields adjoining to their town ; and that they should keep no more than twelve ships ; that they should hold as friends or enemies, the same whom the *Lacedemonians* did, and follow the *Lacedemonians* as leaders in the wars.

These articles being agreed upon, the walls were thrown down with great rejoicing of those who had borne displeasure to *Athens* ; and not without some consultation of destroying the city, and laying waste the land about it. Which advice, altho' it was not entertained, yet were thirty governours, or rather cruel tyrants, appointed over the people, who recompensed their former insolency and injustice over their captains, by oppressing them with all base and intolerable slavery.

The only small hope then remaining to the *Athenians*, was, that *Alcibiades* might perhaps repair what their own folly had ruined. But the thirty tyrants perceiving this, advertised the *Lacedemonians* thereof, who contrived, and (as now domineering in every quarter) soon effected his sudden death.

Such end had the *Peloponnesian* war. After which, the *Lacedemonians* abusing the reputation and great power, which they had therein obtained, grew very odious to *Greece* ; and by combination of many cities against them, were dispossessed of their high authority, even in that very age, in which they had subdued *Athens*. The greatest foil that they took was of the *Thebans*, led by *Epaminondas*, under whom *Philip* of *Macedon*, father to *Alexander* the Great, had the best of his education. By these *Thebans*, the city of *Sparta* (besides other great losses received) was sundry times in danger of being taken. But these haughty attempts of the *Thebans* came finally to nothing ; for the several estates and signories of *Greece* were grown so jealous of one another's greatness, that the *Lacedemonians*, *Athenians*, *Argives*, and *Thebans*, which were the mightiest, associating themselves with the weaker party, did so counterpoise the stronger, that no one city could extend the limits of her jurisdiction so far as might make her terrible to her neighbours. And thus all parts of the country remained rather evenly balanced, than well agreeing, till such time as *Philip*, and after him *Alexander*, kings of *Macedon* (whose forefathers had been dependants, and followers, yea, almost mere vassals to the estates of *Athens* and *Sparta*) found means, by making use of their factions, to bring them all into servitude, from which they never could be free, till the *Romans* presenting them with a shew of liberty, did themselves indeed become their masters.

C H A P. IX.

Of matters concerning the Peloponnesian war, or shortly following it.

S E C T. I.

How the affairs of Persia stood in these times.

DURING the times of this *Peloponnesian* war, and those other less expeditions foregoing it, *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, having peaceably enjoy'd a long reign over the *Persians*, left it by his death either to *Darius*, who was called *Darius Notbus*, or the *Bastard*, whom the *Greek* historians (lightly passing over *Xerxes* the second, and *Sogdianus*, as usurpers, and for their short reign little to be regarded) place next unto him, or to *Xerxes* the second, who, and his brother *Sogdianus* after him (seeming to have been the sons of *Hester*) held the kingdom but one year between them, the younger succeeding his elder brother. It is not my purpose (as I have said before) to pursue the history of the *Persians* from henceforth, by rehearsal of all the particulars, otherwise than as they shall be incident to the affairs of *Greece*. It may therefore suffice to say, that *Xerxes* the second being a vicious prince, did perish after a month or two, if not by surfeit, then by treachery of his, as riotous, brother *Sogdianus*. Likewise of *Sogdianus* it is found, that being as ill as his brother, and more cruel, he slew unjustly *Bagorazus* a principal eunuch, and would have done as much to his brother *Darius* the bastard, had not he foreseen it, and by raising a stronger army than this hated king *Sogdianus* could levy, seiz'd at once upon the king and kingdom. *Darius* having slain his brother, held the empire 19 years. *Amyrtaeus* of *Sais* an *Egyptian* rebelled against him, and having partly slain, partly chased out of the land the *Persian* garrisons, allied himself so firmly with the *Greeks*, that by their aid he maintained the kingdom, and delivered it over to his posterity, who (notwithstanding the fury of their civil wars) maintained it against the *Persian*, all the days of this *Darius*, and of his son *Artaxerxes Mnemon*. Likewise *Amorges*, a subject of his own, and of the royal blood, being lieutenant of *Caria*, rebelled against him; confederating himself with the *Athenians*. But the great calamity, before spoken of, which fell upon the *Athenians* in *Sicil*, having put new life into the *Spartans*, and given courage to the islanders and others, subject to the state of *Athens*, to shake off the yoke of their long continued bondage: it fell out well for *Darius*, that the *Lacedemonians* being destitute of money, wherewith to defray the charge of a great navy, without which it was impossible to advance the war against the state of *Athens*, that remained powerful by sea, were driven to crave his assistance, which he granted unto them, first upon what conditions best pleased himself, tho' afterwards the articles of the league between him and them were set down in more precise terms, wherein it was concluded, that he and they should make war jointly upon the *Athenians*, and upon all that should rebel from either of them, and (which was highly to the king's honour and profit) that all the cities of *Asia*, which had formerly been his, or his predecessors, should return to his obedience. By this treaty, and the war ensuing (of which I have already spoken) he recovered all that his grandfather and father had lost in *Asia*. Likewise by assistance of the *Lacedemonians*, he got *Amorges* alive into his hands, who was taken in the city of *Jafus*; the *Athenians* wanting either force

or courage to succour him. Nevertheless *Egypt* still held out against him; the cause whereof cannot be the employment of the *Persian* forces on the parts of *Greece*, for he abounded in men, of whom he had enough for all occasions, but they wanted manhood, which caused him to fight with gold, which effected for him by soldiers of other nations, and his natural enemies, what the valour of his own subjects was insufficient to perform. *Darius* had in marriage *Parysatis* his own sister, who bare unto him (besides other children) *Artaxerxes* called *Mnemon*, that is to say, the mindful, or the rememberer, who succeeded him in the kingdom; and *Cyrus* the younger, a prince of singular virtue, and accounted by all that knew him, the most excellent man that ever *Persia* bred after *Cyrus* the great. But the old king *Darius* intending to leave unto his elder son *Artaxerxes* the inheritance of that great empire, did cast a jealous eye upon the doings of young *Cyrus*, who being lieutenant of the lower *Asia*, took more upon him than befitted a subject: for which cause his father sent for him, with intent to have taken some very sharp course with him, had not his own death prevented the coming of his younger son, and placed the elder in his throne. Of the war between these brethren, and summarily of *Artaxerxes*, we shall have occasion to speak somewhat in more convenient place.

S E C T. II.

How the thirty tyrants got their dominion in Athens.

I Hold it in this place very convenient to shew the proceedings of the *Greeks*, after the subversion of the walls of *Athens*, which gave end to that war called the *Peloponnesian* war, but could not free the unhappy country of *Greece* from civil broils. The 30 governours, commonly called the 30 tyrants of *Athens*, were chosen at first by the people to compile a body of their law, and make a collection of such ancient statutes as were meet to be put in practice: the condition of the city standing as it did in that so sudden alteration. To this charge was annexed the supreme authority, either as a recompence of their labours, or because the necessity of the times did so require it, wherein the law being uncertain, it was fit that such men should give judgment in particular causes, to whose judgment the laws themselves, by which the city was to be ordered, were become subject. But these 30 having so great power in their hands, were more careful to hold it, than to deserve it by faithful execution of that which was committed to them in trust.

Therefore apprehending such troublesome fellows, as were odious to the city, though not punishable therefore by law, they condemned them to death; which proceeding was by all men highly approved, who considered their lewd conditions, but did not withal bethink themselves, how easy a thing it would be unto these 30 men, to take away the lives of innocents, by calling them perturbors of the peace, or what else they listed, when condemnation without due trial and proof had been once well allowed. Having thus plausibly entered into a wicked course of government, they thought it best to fortify themselves with a sure guard, ere they broke out into those disorders, which they must needs

needs commit for the establishing of their authority. Wherefore dispatching two of their own company to *Sparta*, they informed the *Lacedemonians*, that it was the full intent of the thirty, to keep the city free from all rebellious motions, to which purpose it behoved them to cut off such as were seditious; and therefore desired the *Lacedemonians* to send them a garrison, which they promised at their own cost to maintain. This motion was well approved, and a guard sent, the captain of which was so well entertained by the thirty, that none of their misdeeds could want his high commendations at *Sparta*. Hereupon the tyrants began to take heart, and looking no more after base and detested persons, invaded the principal men of the city, sending armed men from house to house, who drew out such as were of great reputation, and likely, or able, to make any head against this wicked form of government: whereby there was such effusion of blood, as to *Theramenes* (one of the thirty) seemed very horrible, and unable to escape vengeance. His dislike of their proceedings being openly discovered, caused his fellows to bethink themselves, and provide for their own security, and his destruction, lest he should make himself a captain of the discontented (which were almost the whole city) and redeem his own peace with their ruin. Wherefore they selected three thousand of the citizens, whom they thought meetest, and gave unto them some part of publick authority, the rest they disarmed; and having thus increased their own strength, and weakened their opposites, they began afresh to shed the blood not only of their private enemies, but of such whose money or goods might enrich them, and enable them for the payment of their guard. And to this purpose they concluded, that every one of them should name one man upon whose goods he should seize, putting the owner to death. But when *Theramenes* uttered his detestation of so wicked an intent, then did *Critias*, who of all the thirty was most tyrannical, accuse him to the council as a treacherous man, and (whereas one main privilege of the three thousand was, that none of them should suffer death at the appointment of the thirty, but have the accustomed tryal) he took upon him to strike out of that number the name of *Theramenes*, and so reduced him under the tryal and sentence of that order. It was well alledged by *Theramenes*, that his name was not more easy to be blotted out of the catalogue than any other man's, upon which consideration, he advised them all to conceive no otherwise of his case, than as of their own, who were liable to the same form of proceeding; but (every man choosing rather to preserve his own life by silence, than presently to draw upon himself the danger, which as yet concerned him little, and perhaps would never come near him) the tyrants interpreting silence as consent, condemned him forthwith, and compelled him to drink poison.

SECT. III.

The conspiracy against the thirty tyrants, and their deposing.

AFTER the death of *Theramenes*, the thirty began to use such outrage, as excelled their former villanies. For having three thousand (as they thought) firm unto them, they robbed all others without fear or shame, despoiling them of lands and goods, and causing them to fly into banishment for safeguard of their lives. This flight of the citizens procured their liberty, and the general good of the city. For the banished citizens, who were fled to *Thebes*, enter'd into consultation, and resolved to

hazard their lives in setting free the city of *Athens*.

The very thought of such a practice had been treason at home, which had no other danger abroad than might be found in the execution. Seventy men, or thereabouts, were the first undertakers, who with their captain *Thrasybulus* took *Phyla*, a place of strength in the territory of *Athens*. No sooner did the thirty hear of their exploit, than seek means to prevent further danger; assembling the three thousand and their *Lacedemonian* guard, with which force they attempted *Phyla*, but were with some loss of their men repelled. Finding the place too strong to be taken by assault, they intended to besiege it; which purpose came to nought by means of snow that fell, and other stormy weather, against which they had not made provision. Retiring therefore to the city, which above all they were to make good, they left the most of their guard, and two companies of horse to weary out them which lay in *Phyla*, with a flying siege. But it was not long ere the followers of *Thrasybulus* were increased from seventy to seven hundred, which adventured to give charge upon those guards, of whom they cut off above an hundred and twenty. These small, but prosperous beginnings, added more to the number of those in *Phyla*, who now with a thousand men got entrance into *Pireus*, the suburb of *Athens*, lying on the port. Before their coming, the thirty had resolved to fortify the town of *Eleusine*, to their own use, wherein to they might make an easy retreat, and save themselves from any sudden peril. It may well seem strange, that whereas their barbarous manner of government had brought them into such danger, they were so far from seeking to obtain mens good will, that contrariwise, to assure themselves of *Eleusine*, they got all of the place who could bear arms into their hands by a train, and wickedly (tho' under form of justice) murdered them all. But *Sceleribus tutum per scelera est iter*, the mischiefs which they had already done were such as left them no hope of going backward, nor any other apparent likelihood of safety, than by extending their cruelty unto all, seeing few or none were left, whom they could trust. When *Thrasybulus* and his fellows, who as yet were termed conspirators, had taken the *Pireus*, then were the three thousand armed again by the tyrants, and brought to assault it; but in this enterprise *Thrasybulus* had the better, and repelled his enemies, of whom altho' there were slain to the number of seventy only, yet the victory seemed the greater, because *Critias*, and one other of the thirty, perished in that fight. The death of *Critias*, and the stout defence of *Pireus*, together with some exhortations used by *Thrasybulus* to the citizens, wrought such effect, that the thirty were deposed. Nevertheless there were so many of the three thousand who having communicated with the thirty in their misdeeds, feared to be called to a sharp account, that no peace, nor quiet form of government could be established. For ambassadors were sent to *Sparta*, who craving aid against *Thrasybulus*, and his followers, had favourable audience, and a power sent to their assistance, both by land and sea, under the conduct of *Iysander*, and his brother; whom *Pausanias* the *Spartan* king did follow, raising an army of the cities confederate with the *Lacedemonians*. And here appeared first the jealousy wherein some people held the state of *Sparta*. The *Beotians* and *Corinthians*, who in the late wars had been the most bitter enemies to *Athens*, refused to follow *Pausanias* in this expedition; alledging that it stood not with their oaths, to make war against that people, who had not hitherto broken any one article of the league: but fear-

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ing, indeed, lest the *Lacedemonians* should annex the territory of *Athens* to their own demains. It is not to be doubted that *Pausanias* took this answer in good part. For it was not his purpose to destroy those against whom he went, but only to cross the proceedings of *Lyfander*, whom he envied. Therefore having in some small skirmishes against them of *Thrasybulus's* party, made a shew of war, he finally wrought such means, that all things were compounded quietly: the thirty men, and such others as were like to give cause of tumult, being sent to

Sparta. The remainder of that tyrannical faction, having withdrawn themselves to *Eleusine*, were shortly after found to attempt some innovation; whereupon the whole city rising against them, took their captains as they were coming to parly, and slew them: which done, to avoid further inconvenience, a law was made, that all injuries past should be forgotten, and no man called into question for wrongs committed. By which order, wisely made, and carefully observed, the city returned to their former quietness.

CHAP. X.

The expedition of Cyrus the younger.

SECT. I.

The grounds of Cyrus's attempt against his brother.

THE matters of *Greece* now standing upon such terms, that no one estate durst oppose itself against that of *Lacedemon*; young *Cyrus*, brother to *Artaxerxes*, king of *Persia*, having in his father's life time very carefully prosecuted the war against *Athens*, did send his messengers to *Sparta*, requesting that their love might appear no less to him, than that which he had shewed towards them in their dangerous war against the *Athenians*. To this request, being general, the *Lacedemonians* gave a suitable answer, commanding their admiral to perform unto *Cyrus* all service that he should require of him. If *Cyrus* had plainly discovered himself, and the *Lacedemonians* bent their whole power to his assistance, very likely it is, that either the kingdom of *Persia* should have been the recompence of his deserts; or that he perishing in battel, as after he did, the subversion of that empire had forthwith ensued. But it pleased God, rather to shew unto the *Greeks* the ways, which under the *Macedonian* ensigns, the victorious footsteps of their posterity should measure; and opening unto them the riches, and withal the weakness of the *Persian*, to kindle in them both desire and hope of that conquest, which he reserved to another generation; than to give into their hands that mighty kingdom, whose hour was not yet come. The love which *Parysatis* the queen-mother of *Persia* bare unto *Cyrus* her younger son, being seconded by the earnest favour of the people, and ready desires of many principal men, had moved this young prince, in his father's old age to aspire after the succession. But being sent for by his father (as hath before been shewed) whose meaning was to curb this ambitious youth; he found his elder brother *Artaxerxes* established so surely by the old king's favour, that it were not safe to attempt any means of displanting him, by whose disfavour himself might easily lose the place of a viceroy, which he held in *Asia* the less, and hardly be able to maintain his own life. The nearest neighbour to *Cyrus* of all the king's deputies in the lower *Asia*, was *Tissaphernes*, a man compounded of cowardice, treachery, craft, and all vices which accustomably branch out of these. This man accompanied *Cyrus* to his father, using by the way all fair shews of friendship, as to a prince, for whom it might well be thought that queen *Parysatis* had obtained the inheritance of that mighty

empire. And it was very true that *Parysatis* had used the best of her endeavour to that purpose, alledging that (which in former ages had been much available to *Xerxes*, in the like disceparation with his elder brother) *Artaxerxes* was born whilst his father was a private man, but *Cyrus*, when he was a crowned king. All which not sufficing; when the most that could be obtained for *Cyrus*, was the pardon of some presumptuous demeanour, and confirmation of his place in *Lydia*, and the parts adjoining; then did this *Tissaphernes* discover his nature, and accuse his friend *Cyrus* to the new king *Artaxerxes*, of a dangerous treason intended against his person. Upon this accusation, whether true or false, very easily believed, *Cyrus* was arrested, and by the most vehement intreaty of his mother very hardly delivered, and sent back into his own province.

SECT. II.

The preparations of Cyrus, and his first entry into the war.

THE form of government which the *Persian* lieutenants used in their several provinces, was in many points almost regal. For they made war and peace, as they thought it meet, not only for the king's behoof, but for their own reputation; usually indeed with the king's enemies, yet sometimes one with another: which was the more easily tolerated, because their own heads were held only at the king's pleasure; which caused them to frame all their doings, to his will, whatsoever it were, or they could conjecture it to be. *Cyrus* therefore, being settled in *Lydia*, began to consider with himself, the interest that he had in the kingdom; the small assurance of his brother's love, held only by his mother's intercession; the disgrace endured by his late imprisonment; and the means which he had by love of his own people, and that good neighbourhood of the *Lacedemonians*, whom he had bound unto him, to obtain the crown for himself. Neither was it expedient that he should long sit idle, as waiting till occasion should present it self; but rather enterprise somewhat whilst yet his mother lived, who could procure a good interpretation to all his actions, if they were no worse than only questionable. Hereupon he first began to quarrel with *Tissaphernes*, and seized upon many towns of his jurisdiction, annexing them to his own province; which displeased not *Artaxerxes* at all, who (besides that he was of condition somewhat simple) being truly paid by *Cyrus* the

the accustomed tributes out of those places, was well contented to see his brother's hot spirit exercised in private quarrels. But *Tissaphernes*, whose base conditions were hated, and cowardice despised, although he durst not adventure to take arms against *Cyrus*, yet perceiving that the *Milesians* were about to give up themselves into the hands of that young prince, as many other towns of the *Ionians* had done, thought by terror to preserve his reputation, and keep the town in his own hands. Wherefore he slew many, and many he banished, who flying to *Cyrus*, were gently entertained, as bringing fair occasion to take arms, which was no small part of his desire. In levying soldiers he used great policy; for he took not only the men of his own province, or of the countries adjoining, whose lives were ready at his will; but secretly he furnished some *Grecian* captains with money, who being very good men of war, entertained soldiers therewith, some of them warring in *Thrace*, others in *Thessaly*, others elsewhere in *Greece*; but all of them ready to cross the seas, at the first call of *Cyrus*, till which time they had secret instructions to prolong their several wars, that the soldiers might be held in continual exercise, and ready in arms upon the sudden. *Cyrus* having sent a power of men to besiege *Miletus*, forthwith summoned these bands of the *Greeks*, who very readily came over to his assistance, being 13000 very firm soldiers, and able to make head (which is almost incredible) against the whole power of *Artaxerxes*. With this army, and that which he had levy'd before, he could very easily have forced *Miletus*, and chased away *Tissaphernes* out of *Asia* the less: but his purpose was not so to lose time in small matters, that was to be employ'd in the accomplishment of higher designs. Pretending therefore that the *Pisidians*, a people of *Asia* the less, not subject to the *Persian*, had invaded his territory, he raised the siege of *Miletus*, and with all speed marched eastward, leaving *Tissaphernes* much amazed, who had no leisure to rejoice that *Cyrus* had left him to himself, when he considered that so great an army, and so strong, was never levy'd against the rovers of *Pisidia*, but rather against the great king his master. For which cause taking a band of 500 horse, he posted away to carry tidings to the court, of this great preparation.

S E C T. III.

How Cyrus took his journey into the higher Asia, and came up close to his brother.

THE tumult which his coming brought was very great, and great the exclamations of the queen *Statira*, against *Parysatis*, the queen-mother, whom she called the author and occasioner of the war. But whilst the king in great fear was arming the high countries in his defence, the danger hastened upon him very fast. For *Cyrus* made great marches, having his numbers much increased, by the repair of his countrymen, tho' most strengthened by the access of 700 *Greeks*, and of other 400 of the same nation, who revolted unto him from the king. How terrible the *Greeks* were to the *Barbarians*, he found by trial in a muster, which (to please the queen of *Cilicia*, who had brought him aid) he made in *Phrygia*: where the *Greeks* by his direction making offer of a charge upon the rest of his army, which contained an hundred thousand men; the whole camp (not perceiving that this was but a bravery) fled again, the victuallers and baggagers forsaking their cabins, and running all away for very fear. This was to *Cyrus* a joyful spectacle, who

knew very well, that his brother was followed by men of the same temper, and the more unlikely to make resistance, because they were press'd to the war against their will and dispositions; whereas his army was drawn along by meer affection and good will. Nevertheless he found it a hard matter to persuade the *Greeks* to pass the river of *Euphrates*. For the very length of the way which they had trodden, wearied them with the conceit of the tedious return. Therefore he was driven, being in *Cilicia*, to seek excuses, telling them, that *Abrocomas*, one of the king's principal captains, and his own great enemy, lay by the river, against whom he requested them to assist him. By such devices, and excessive promise of reward, he brought them to *Euphrates*, where some of the *Greeks* considering, that who so passed the river first, should have the most thanks, and might safely return if the rest should refuse to follow them, they entered the fords, whereby were all finally persuaded to do as some had begun; and being allured by great hopes, they resolved to seek out *Artaxerxes*, wheresoever he was to be found. The king in the mean time having raised an army of nine hundred thousand men, was not so confident upon this huge multitude, as to adventure them in trial of a plain battle. *Abrocomas*, who with three hundred thousand men had undertaken to make good the straits of *Syria*, which were very narrow, and fortified with a strong wall, and other defences of nature and art, which made the place seem impregnable, had quitted the passage, and retired himself towards the king's forces, not daring to look *Cyrus* in the face, who despairing to find any way by land, had procured the *Lacedemonian* fleet, by the benefit whereof to have transported his army. I do not find that this cowardice of *Abrocomas*, or of his soldiers, who arrived not at the camp till five days were pass'd after the battle, received either punishment or disgrace; for they, towards whom he withdrew himself, were all made of the same metal.

Therefore *Artaxerxes* was upon the point of retiring to the uttermost bounds of his kingdom, until by *Teribazus*, one of his captains, he was persuaded not to abandon so many goodly provinces to the enemy, who would thereby have gathered addition of strength, and (which in the sharp disputation of title to a kingdom is most available) would have grown superiour in reputation. By such advice the king resolved upon meeting with his brother, who now began to be secure, being fully persuaded that *Artaxerxes* would never dare to abide him in the field. For the king having cast up a trench of almost forty miles in length, about thirty foot broad, and eighteen foot deep, intended there to have encamped: but his courage failing him, he abandoned that place, thinking nothing so safe as to be far distant from his enemies.

S E C T. IV.

The battle between Cyrus and Artaxerxes.

THE army of *Cyrus* having overcome many difficulties of evil ways, and scarcity of victuals, was much encouraged by perceiving this great fear of *Artaxerxes*; and being pass'd this trench, marched carelessly in great disorder, having bestowed their arms in carts, and upon beasts of carriage; when on the sudden one of their vanguard-brought news of the king's approach. Hereupon with great tumult they armed themselves, and had ranged their battels in good order upon the side of the river *Euphrates*, where they waited for the coming of their enemies, whom they saw

saw not till it was after noon. But when they saw the cloud of dust raised by the feet of that huge multitude, which the king drew after him, and perceived by their near approach how well they were marshalled, coming on very orderly, in silence; whereas it had been expected, that rushing violently with loud clamours, they should have spent all their force upon the first brunt; and when it appeared that the fronts of the two armies were so unequal in distant, being all embattled in one body and square, that *Cyrus* taking his place (as was the *Persian* manner) in the midst of his own, did not with the corner and utmost point thereof, reach to the half breadth of *Artaxerxes's* battel, who carried a front proportionable to his number, exceeding nine times that of *Cyrus*: then did the *Greeks* begin to distrust their own manhood, which was not accustomed to make proof of it self, upon such excessive odds. It was almost incredible, that so great an army should be so easily chased. Nevertheless, it quickly appeared, that these *Persians*, having learned (contrary to their custom) to give charge upon their enemies with silence, had not learned (for it was contrary to their nature) to receive a strong charge with courage. Upon the very first offer of onset made by the *Greeks*, all that beastly rabble of cowards fled amain, without abiding the stroke, or staying till they were within reach of a dart. The chariots armed with hooks and scythes (whereof *Artaxerxes* had two hundred, and *Cyrus* not twenty) did small hurt that day, because the drivers of them leaping down, fled away on foot. This base demeanor of his enemies gave so much confidence to *Cyrus*, and his followers, that such as were about him forthwith adored him as king. And certainly the title had been assured unto him that day, had not he fought how to declare himself worthy of it, ere yet he had obtained it. For, perceiving that *Artaxerxes*, who found that part of the field which lay before him void, was about to encompass the *Greeks*, and to set upon them in the rear, he advanced with six hundred horse, and gave so valiant a charge upon a squadron of six thousand which lay before the king, that he broke it, slaying the captain thereof, *Artagerfes*, with his own hands, and putting all the rest to flight. Hereupon his whole company of six hundred, very few excepted, began to follow the chase, leaving *Cyrus* too ill attended, who perceiving where the king stood in troupe, uncertain whether to fight, or leave the field, could not contain himself, but said, *I see the man*; and presently with a small handful of men about him ran upon his brother, whom he struck thro' the cuirass, and wounded in the breast. Having given this stroke, which was his last, he received immediately the fatal blow, which gave period at once to his ambition and life, being wounded under the eye with a dart, thrown by a base fellow; where-with astonished, he fell dead from his horse, or so hurt, that it was impossible to have recovered him, tho' all which were with him did their best for his safety; not caring afterwards for their own lives, when once they perceived that *Cyrus* their master was slain. *Artaxerxes* caused the head and right hand of his brother to be forthwith struck off, and shewed to his people, who now pursuing them, fled apace, calling upon the name of *Cyrus*, and desiring him to pardon them. But when this great accident had breathed new courage into the king's troops, and utterly dismay'd such *Persian* captains, as were now, even in their own eyes, no better than rebels; it was not long ere the camp of *Cyrus* was taken, being quite abandoned; from whence *Artaxerxes*, making all speed, arrived quickly at

No. XXVIII.

the quarters of the *Greeks*, which was about three miles from the place where *Cyrus* fell. There he met with *Tissaphernes*, who having made way thro' the battel of the *Greeks*, was ready now to join with his master in spoiling their tents. Had not the news, which *Artaxerxes* brought with him of his brother's death, been sufficient to countervail all disasters received, the exploit of *Tissaphernes* in breaking thro' the *Greeks* would have yielded little comfort. For *Tissaphernes* had not slain any one man of the *Greeks*; but contrariwise, when he gave upon them, they opening their battel, drove him with great slaughter thro' them, in such wise, that he rather escaped as out of an hard passage, than forced his way thro' the squadron of the *Greeks*. Hereof the king being informed by him, and that the *Greeks*, as masters of the field, gave chase to all that came in their sight; they ranged their companies into good order, and followed after these *Greeks*, intending to set upon them in the rear. But these good soldiers perceiving the king's approach, turned their faces, and made head against him; who not intending to seek honour with danger of his life, wheeled about and fled, being pursued unto a certain village, that lay under a hill, on the top whereof he made a stand, rather in a bravery, than with a purpose to attempt upon these bold fellows any further. For he knew well that his brother's death had secured his estate, whom he would seem to have slain with his own hand, thinking that fact alone sufficient to give reputation to his valour; and this reputation he thought that he might now preserve well enough, by shewing a manly look half a mile off. On the top of this hill therefore he advanced his standard, a golden eagle display'd on the top of a spear. This ensign might have encouraged his people, had not some of the *Greeks* espied it, who not meaning that he should abide so near them, with all their power marched towards him. The king discovering their approach, fled upon the spur, so that none remained in the place of battle, save only the *Greeks*, who had lost that day not one man, nor taken any other harm, than that one of them was hurt with an arrow. Much they wondered that they heard no news of *Cyrus*, but thinking that he was pursuing the army, they thought it was fittest for them, having that day done enough, to return to their quarters, and take their supper, to which they had good appetite, because the expectation of the king's coming had given them no leisure to dine.

S E C T. V.

The hard estate of the Greeks after the fight; and how Artaxerxes in vain sought to have made them yield unto him.

IT was now about the setting of the sun, and they bringing home dark night with them, found their camp spoiled, little or nothing being left, that might serve for food: so that wanting victuals to satisfy their hunger, they refreshed their weary bodies with sleep. In the mean season *Artaxerxes* returning to his camp, which he entered by torch-light, could not enjoy the pleasure of his good fortune entire, because he perceived that the baseness of his people, and weakness of his empire, was now plainly discovered to the *Greeks*: which gave him assurance, that if any of these who had beheld the shameful demeanor of his army, should live to carry tidings home, it would not be long ere with greater forces they disputed with him for his whole signiory. Wherefore he resolved to try all means, whereby he might bring them to destruction, and not let one escape to carry tidings of that which he had

seen:

seen: to which purpose he sent them a brave message the next morning. Charging them to deliver up their arms, and come to his gates, to wait there upon his mercy. It seems that he was in good hope to have found their high courages broken, upon report of his brother's death; but he was greatly deceived in that thought: for the *Greeks* being advertised that morning from *Ariæus*, a principal commander under *Cyrus*, that his master being slain, he had retired himself to the place of their last encamping, about eight miles from them, whence intending to return into *Ionia*, his meaning was to dislodge the next day, awaiting for them so long if they would join with him, but resolving to stay no longer: they sent answer back to *Ariæus*, that having beaten the king out of the field, and finding none that durst resist them, they would place *Ariæus* himself on the king's throne, if he would join with them, and pursue the victory. Before they received any reply to this answer, the messengers of *Artaxerxes* arrived at the camp, whose errand seem'd to the captains very insolent: one told them that it was not for the vanquishers to yield their weapons; another, that he would die ere he yielded to such a motion; a third asked, whether the king, as having the victory, required their weapons; if so, why did he not fetch them? or, whether he desired them in way of friendship? for then would they first know, with what courtesy he meant to requite their kindness. To this question *Phalimus*, a *Grecian*, waiting upon *Tissaphernes*, answered; that the king having slain *Cyrus*, knew no man that could pretend any title to his kingdom, in the midst whereof he held them fast inclosed with great rivers, being able to bring against them such numbers of men, as they wanted strength to kill if they would hold up their throats, for which cause he accounted them his prisoners. These words, to them, who knew themselves to be free, were nothing pleasant. Therefore one told *Phalimus*, that having nothing left but their arms and valour, whilst they kept their arms their valour would be serviceable; but should they yield them, it was to be doubted, that their bodies would not long remain their own. Hereat *Phalimus* laughed, saying, this young man did seem a philosopher, and made a pretty speech; but that his deep speculation shewed his wits to be very shallow, if he thought with his arms and his valour to prevail against the great king. It seems that *Phalimus* being a courtier, and employ'd in a business of importance, thought himself too profound a statesman, to be check'd in his embassy by a bookish discourter. But his wisdom herein failed him. For whatsoever he himself was (of whom no more is known than that he brought an dishonest message to his own countrymen, persuading them basely to surrender their weapons and lives to the merciless *Barbarians*) this young scholar by him despised, was that great *Xenophon*, who, when all the principal commanders were surpris'd by treachery of the *Persians*, being a private gentleman, and having never seen the wars before, undertook the conduct of the army, which he brought safe into *Greece*, freeing it from all those, and from greater dangers than *Phalimus* could propound. Some there were who promised to be faithful to the king, as they had been to *Cyrus*, offering their service in *Egypt*, where they thought *Artaxerxes* might have use of them. But the final answer was, that without weapons they could neither do the king good as friends, nor defend themselves from him as enemies. Hereupon *Phalimus* delivered the king's further pleasure, which was to grant them truce, whilst they abode where they then were, denouncing war if they stirr'd thence;

whereunto he required their answer. *Clearchus* the general told him, they liked it. How (saith *Phalimus*) must I understand you? as choosing peace if we stay, or otherwise war, said *Clearchus*. But whether war or peace? quoth this politick ambassador. To whom *Clearchus* (not willing to acquaint him with their purpose) Let our doings tell you; and so dismissed him no wiser than he came. All that day the *Greeks* were fain to feed upon their horses, asses, and other beasts, which they roasted with arrows, darts, and wooden targets thrown away by the enemies.

S E C T. VI.

How the Greeks began to return homewards.

AT night they took their way towards *Ariæus*, to whom they came at midnight, being forsaken by 400 foot, and 40 horse, all *Thracians*, who fled over to the king, by whom how they were entertained, I do not find. Like enough it is, that they were cut in pieces; for had they been kindly used, it may well be thought that some of them should have accompanied *Tissaphernes*, and served as steales to draw in the rest. *Ariæus* being of too base a temper and birth, to think upon seeking the kingdom for himself, with such assistance as might have given it unto *Cyrus*, was very well pleased to make covenant with them for mutual assistance unto the last: whereunto both parts having sworn, he advised them to take another way homeward, which should be somewhat longer, yet safer and fitter to relieve them with victuals, than that by which they came. The next day, having made a wearisome march, and tired the soldiers, they found the king's army which had coasted them, lodged in certain villages, where they purposed themselves to have encamped: towards which *Clearchus* made directly, because he would not seem by declining them to shew fear or weakness. That the king's men were contented to remove, and give place to their betters, it cannot be strange to any that hath considered their former behaviour; nor strange, that the *Grecians*, being weary and hungry, and lying among enemies in an unknown country, should be very fearful; but it is almost past belief, that the noise which was heard of these poor men, calling one to another tumultuously, as the present condition enforced them to do, should make the *Persians* fly out of their camp, and so affright the great king, that instead of demanding their arms, he should crave peace of them. The next day very early, came messengers from *Artaxerxes*, desiring free access for ambassadors to intreat of peace. Were it not that such particulars do best open the quality of the persons, by whom things were managed, I should hold it fitter to run over the general passages of those times, than to dwell among circumstances. But surely it is a point very remarkable, that when *Clearchus* had willed the messengers to bid the king prepare for battel, because the *Greeks* (as he said) wanting whereupon to dine, could not endure to hear of truce till their bellies were full; *Artaxerxes* dissembling the indignity, was contented sweetly to swallow down this pill, sending them guides, who conducted them to a place where was plenty of victuals to relieve them.

S E C T. VII.

How Tissaphernes, under colour of peace, betray'd all the captains of the Greeks.

HItherto the *Greeks* relying upon their own virtue, had rather advanced their affairs, than

than brought themselves into any straits or terms of disadvantage. But now came unto them the subtil fox *Tissaphernes*, who circumventing the chief commanders by fine slights, did mischievously entrap them, to the extream danger of the army. He told them, that his province lying near unto *Greece*, had caused him greatly to desire that their deliverance might be wrought by his procurement; knowing well, that in time to come, both they and their countrymen at home, would not be unthankful for such a benefit. Herewithal he forgot not to rehearse the great service that he had done to his master, being the first that advertised him of *Cyrus's* intent, and having not only brought him a good strength of men, but in the day of battel shewed his face to the *Greeks*, when all others turned their backs: that he, together with the king, did enter their camp, and gave chase to the *Barbarians* that stood on the part of *Cyrus*. All this (quoth he) did I alledge to the king, intreating that he would give me leave to conduct you safe into *Greece*; in which suit I have good hope to speed, if you will send a mild answer to him, who hath willed me to ask you, for what cause you have borne arms against him. The captains hearing this, were contented to give gentle words, which *Tissaphernes* relating to the king, procured (though very hardly as he said) that peace should be granted: the conditions whereof were; that they should pass freely thro' all the king's dominions, paying for what they took, and committing no spoil: yet that it should be lawful for them to take victuals by force, in any place that refused to afford them an open market. Hereupon both parties having sworn, the league was concluded, and *Tissaphernes* returning to the king to take leave, and end all business, came unto them again after twenty days, and then they set forward. This interim of twenty days, which *Tissaphernes* did spend at the court, ministered great occasion of mistrust to his new confederates. For besides his long absence, which alone sufficed to breed doubt; the brethren and kindred of *Ariæus* repairing daily to him, and other *Persians* to his soldiers, did work him and them so with assurance of pardon, and other allurements, that he daily grew more strange to the *Greeks* than formerly he had been. This caused many to advise *Clearchus*, rather to pass forward as well as he might, than to rely upon covenants, and sit still whilst the king laid snares to entrap them. But he on the contrary perswaded them to rest contented whilst they were well, and not to cast themselves again into those difficulties, out of which they were newly freed by the late treaty; reciting withal their own wants, and the king's means, but especially the oaths mutually given and taken, wherewith he saw no reason why the enemy should have clogged himself if he meant mischief, having power enough to do them harm by a fair and open war.

Tissaphernes was a very honourable man (if honour may be valued by greatness and place in court) which caused his oath to be the more esteemed; forasmuch as no inforcement, or base respect was like to have drawn it from him. But his falshood was such, both in substance and in success, as may fitly expound that saying, which proceeded from a fountain of truth, *I hate a rich man a liar*. A lye may find excuse when it grows out of fear: for that passion hath his original from weakness. But when power, which is a character of the Almighty, shall be made the supporter of untruth, the falshood is most abominable; for the offender, like proud lucifer, advancing his own strength against the Divine Justice, doth commit that sin with an

high hand, which commonly produceth lamentable effects, and is followed with sure vengeance. It was not long ere *Tissaphernes* found means to destroy all the captains, whom he subtilly got into his power by a train; making the general *Clearchus* himself the means to draw in all the rest. The business was contrived thus: having travelled some days together in such wise, that the *Persians* did not encamp with the *Greeks*, who were very jealous of the great familiarity appearing between *Tissaphernes*, and *Ariæus*; *Clearchus* thought it convenient to root out of *Tissaphernes's* brains all causes of distrust, whereof many had grown in that short time. To which purpose obtaining private conference with him, he rehearsed the oath of confederacy, which had passed between them, shewing how religiously he meant to keep it; and repeating the benefits, which the *Greeks* did receive by the help of *Tissaphernes*, he promised that their love should appear to him not unfruitful, if he would make use of their service against the *Myfians* or *Pisidians*, who were accustomed to infest his province; or against the *Egyptians*, who were then rebels to the great king. For which cause he desired him, that whereas all divine and human respects had linked them together, he would not give place to any close accusation or suspicion, whereby might grow sudden inconvenience to either of them, upon no just ground. The faithless *Persian* was very much delighted with this speech, which ministered fair occasion to the execution of his purpose. Therefore he told *Clearchus*, that all this was by him wisely considered, wishing him further to call to mind how many ways he could have used to bring them to confusion, without peril to himself, especially by burning the country, thro' which they were to pass, whereby they must needs have perished by mere famine. For which cause he said that it had been great folly to seek by perjury, odious to God and man, the destruction of such as were already in his hands: but the truth was, that his own love to them had moved him to work their safety; not only for those ends which *Clearchus* had recounted, of pleasures that might redound to himself, and the king, by their assistance; but for that he might, by their friendship, hope to obtain what *Cyrus* had mis'd. Finally, he invited the credulous gentleman to supper, and sent him away so well assured of his good will, that he promised to bring all the captains with him to the same place, where, in presence of them all, *Tissaphernes* likewise promised to tell openly, which of them had by secret information sought to raise dissension between them. *Clearchus* himself being thus deceived, with great importunity drew all the chief commanders, and many of the inferior leaders, to repair with him to the camp of *Tissaphernes*, whither followed them about two hundred of the common soldiers, as it had been to some common fair. But being there arrived, *Clearchus* with other the five principal colonels were called into the tent, the rest staying without, where they had not waited long ere a sign was given, upon which they within were apprehended, and the residue slain. Forthwith certain bands of *Persian* horse-men scoured the field, killing as many *Greeks* as they met; and riding up to the very camp of the *Greeks*, who wondered much at the tumult, whereof they knew not the cause, till one, escaping sorely wounded, informed them of all that had been done. Hereupon the *Greeks* took arms in haste, thinking that the enemy would forthwith have assailed their camp. Anon they might perceive the ambassadors of *Tissaphernes*, among whom were his own brother, and *Ariæus*, followed with three hundred horse, who

called

called for the principal men in the army, saying, that they brought a message from the king, which *Arieus* delivered to this effect: That *Clearchus*, having broken his faith, and the league made, was justly rewarded with death; that *Menon* and *Proxenus*, two other of the five colonels, for detecting his treachery, were highly honoured; and finally, that the king required them to surrender their arms, which were due to him, as having belonged unto his servant *Cyrus*. When some alteration had followed upon this message, *Xenophon* told the ambassadors, that if *Clearchus* had in such sort offended, it was well that he was in such sort punished; but he willed them to send back *Menon* and *Proxenus*, whom they had so greatly honoured, that by them, as by common friends to both nations, the *Greeks* might be advised how to answer the *Persian*. Hereunto the ambassadors knew not how to frame any reply, and therefore departed without speaking one word more. *Clearchus*, and the other four were sent to *Artaxerxes*, by whose commandment their heads were struck off. I hold it not amiss to prevent the order of time, annexing to this perfidiousness of *Tissaphernes*, the reward which he afterward received. He saw his province wasted by the *Greeks*, against whom, receiving from his master convenient aid of men and money, he did so ill manage his affairs, that neither subtilty nor perjury (to which he failed not to have recourse) availing him; finally, the king was jealous of his cunning head, and sent a new lieutenant into those parts, who took it from his shoulders. Such was the recompence of his treachery, which made him so mistrusted at home, that the service which he could not do, he was thought upon private ends to neglect; and so hated abroad, that he knew not which way to fly from the stroke, all the world being shut against him. But now let us return to the prosperity, wherein he triumphed without great cause, having betrayed braver men than himself, and intending to bring the like mischief upon the whole army.

S E C T. VIII.

How Xenophon heartned the Greeks, and in despite of Tissaphernes went off safely.

GREAT was the heaviness of the soldiers, being now left destitute of leaders, and no less their fear of the evil hanging over their heads, which they knew not well how to avoid. Among the rest, *Xenophon*, whose learning supplied his want of experience, finding the deep sadness of the whole army to be such, as hindered them from taking any course of preventing the danger at hand, began to advise the under-officers of *Proxenus's* companies, whose familiar friend he had been, to bethink themselves of some means, whereby their safety might be wrought, and the soldiers encouraged; setting before their eyes whatsoever might serve to give them hope, and above all, perswading them in no wise to yield to the mercy of their barbarous enemies.

Hereupon they desired him to take upon him the charge of that regiment; and so together with him, the same night calling up such as were remaining of any account, they made choice of the fittest men to succeed in the places of those who were slain, or taken. This being done, and order set down for disburdening the army of all superfluous impediments, they easily comforted themselves for the loss of *Tissaphernes's* assistance, hoping to take victuals by force better cheap than he had been wont to sell them: to which purpose they intend-

ed to take up their lodging two or three miles further, among some plentiful villages, and so to proceed, marching towards the heads of those great rivers, which lay in their way, and to pass them where they were fordable. Many attempts were made upon them by *Tissaphernes*, whom they, serving all on foot, were not able to requite for the harm which they received by the *Persian* archers, who shot at a farther distance than the *Greeks* could reach. For this cause did *Xenophon* provide slings, wherewith he over-reached the enemy; and finding some horses fit for service, that were employed among the carriages, he set men upon them; training likewise his archers, to shoot compass, who had been accustomed to the point-blank. By these means did he bear off the *Persians* who assailed him; and sometimes gave them chase with that band of fifty horse, which being well back'd, with a firm body of foot-men, and seconded with troops of the light-armed-shot and slingers, compelled the enemy to lie a-loof. *Tissaphernes*, not daring to come to handy-gripes with these resolute men, did possess the tops of mountains, and places of advantage, by which they were to pass. But finally, when their valour made way through all such difficulties, he betook himself to that course, which was indeed the surest, of burning the country. With great sorrow did the *Greeks* behold the villages on fire, and thereby all hope of victuals cut off. Some advised to defend the country, as granted by the enemy himself to be theirs; others, to make more fires; if so, perhaps the *Persians* might be ashamed to do that which were the desire of such as made passage in hostile manner; but these were faint comforts. The best counsel was, that being near unto the *Carduchi*, a people enemy to the *Persian*, they should enter into their country, passing over some high mountains which lay between them. This course they followed, which could not have availed them, if *Tissaphernes* had begun sooner to cut off their victuals, rather than to seek to force, or to circumvent them by his fine wit.

S E C T. IX.

The difficulties which the Greek army found in passing through the land of the Carduchi.

ENTERING upon the land of the *Carduchi*, they were encounter'd with many difficulties of ways, but much more afflicted by the fierce inhabitants, who, accustomed by force to defend themselves against the huge armies of the *Persian*, were no way inferior to the *Greeks* in daring, but only in the art of war. They were very light of foot, skilful archers, and used the sling well; which weapons in that mountainous country, were of much use against these poor travellers, afflicting them in seven days, which they spent in that passage, far more than all the power of the great king had done. Between the territory of these *Carduchi*, and the parts of *Armenia* confining them, ran *Centrites*, a great river, upon which the *Greeks* refreshed themselves one day, rejoicing that they had so well escaped these dangers, and hoping that the remainder would prove easy. But the next morning they saw certain troops of horse, that lay to forbid their passage. These were levied by the king's deputies in those parts; *Tissaphernes* and his companies having taken their way towards *Ionia*. The river was broad and deep, so that it was not possible for such as would enter it, to make resistance against those which kept the opposite banks. To encrease these dangers, the *Carduchi* followed upon them, lay on the side of a mountain, within less than a mile of the water. But it

it was their good hap to discover a ford, by which the greater number of them passing over, did easily chase away the subjects of the *Persian*; and then sending back the most expedite men, gave succour to the rearward, against which the *Carduchi* being slightly armed, could not on plain ground make resistance hand to hand. These *Carduchi* seem to have inhabited the mountains of *Niphates*, which are not far from the spring of *Tigris*; tho' *Ptolemy* place them far more to the east upon the river of *Cyrus* in *Media*, wherein he differs much from *Xenophon*, whose relation being grounded upon his own knowledge, doth best in this case deserve credit. Of the river *Centrites* (as of many other rivers, towns, and places, mentioned by *Xenophon*) I will not labour to make a conjecture, which may endure the severity of a critick. For *Ptolemy*, and the whole nation of geographers, add small light to this expedition; only of this last, I think it the same which falleth into *Tigris*, not much above *Artasigarta*, springing out of *Niphates*, and running by the town of *Sardeva* in *Gordene*, a province of *Armenia* the great, wherein the *Greeks*, having passed *Centrites*, did arrive.

SECT. X.

How Teribazus, governour of Armenia, seeking to entrap the Greeks with terms of feigned peace, was disappointed, and shamefully beaten.

THE army finding in *Armenia* good provision, marched without any disturbance about fifty or threescore miles to the heads of the river *Tigris*, and passing over them, travelled as far further without resistance, till they were encountered by *Teribazus*, at the river *Teleboa*, which *Xenophon* commends as a goodly water, though small; but *Ptolemy* and others omit it. *Teribazus* governed that country for the *Persian*, and was in great favour with *Artaxerxes*, whose court may seem to have been a school where the art of falsehood was taught as wisdom. He desired peace of the *Greeks*, which was made upon this condition, That they should take what they pleased, but not burn down the towns and villages in their way. As soon as he had made this league, he levied an army, and besetting the straits of certain mountains which they were to pass, hoped well to make such benefit of their security, as might give him the commendations of being no less craftily dishonest than *Tissaphernes*. Yet his cunning failed of success. For a great snow fell, which caused the *Greeks* to make many fires, and some of his men wandered about seeking relief. By the fires he was discovered, and by a soldier of his that was taken prisoner, the whole plot was revealed. Hereupon the *Greeks*, taking this captive with them for a guide, sought him out; and coming upon his camp, did so afright him, that before the whole army could arrive there, the shout which was raised by the vant-currors, chased him away. They took his pavilion, wherein (besides many slaves, that were artificers of voluptuousness) very rich furniture was left by the treacherous coward, who returned no more to challenge it. From hence the army went north-ward, and passing *Euphrates*, not far below the springs thereof, travelled with much difficulty through deep snow, being followed aloof by the enemy, who durst not approach them, but did cut off such as they found stragling behind. The inhabitants of the country, through which they marched, had their wintering-houses under ground, wherein was found great plenty of vic-

tuals, and of cattel, which likewise did winter in the same cellars with the owners. Having refreshed themselves in those parts, and taken sufficient ease after the miserable journey, which had consumed many of them with extream cold; they departed, leading with them many bond-slaves; and taking away (besides other horses and cattel) some colts that were bred up for the great king.

SECT. XI.

The passage of the army to Trabifond, through the countries bordering upon the river of Phasis, and other obscure nations.

SO without impediment they came to the river *Phasis*, near whereunto the people called *Phasian Tacchi*, and *Chalybes* were seated. These nations were joined together, and occupying the tops of a ledge of mountains, which the *Greeks* were to pass, made countenance of war: but some companies being sent by night to seize upon a place of equal height to that whereon the enemies lay, making good the piece of ground which they had taken, secured the ascent of the rest; which caused these people to fly, every one retiring to the defence of his own. The first upon whose country the *Greeks* did enter were the *Tacchi*, who conveying all their provision of victuals into strong holds, brought the army into much want, until with hard labour one place was forced, wherein great store of cattel were taken; the people, to avoid captivity, threw themselves headlong down the rocks, the very women throwing down first their own children, and then casting themselves upon them. Here was taken a great booty of cattel, which served to feed them, travelling through the land of the *Chalybes*, of whom they got nothing but strokes. The *Chalybes* were a very stout nation, well armed at all points, and exceeding fierce. They encounter'd the *Greeks* hand to hand, killing as many as they took prisoners, and cutting off their heads, which they carried away, singing and dancing, to the great grief of their companions living; who were glad, when after seven days journey they escaped from those continual skirmishes, wherewith they had been vexed by these *Barbarians*. Hence travelling through a good corn-country, inhabited by an obscure nation, called the *Scythini*, they came to a rich town, the lord whereof, and of the region adjoining, used them friendly, and promised to guide them to a mountain, whence they might discover the *Euxine* sea. From *Gymnias* (which was the name of his town) he led them through the territory of his enemies, desiring them to waste it with sword and fire. After five days march, they came to a mountain called *Teches*, being (as I think) a part of the mountains called *Moschici*, whence their guide shewed them the sea; towards which they bent their course, and passing friendly through the region of the *Macrones* (with whom by means of an interpreter, found among themselves, who born in that place had been sold into *Greece*, they made a good peace) they arrived in the land of *Colchos*, wherein stands the city of *Trabifond*, called then *Trapezus*, a colony of the *Greeks*. The *Colchi* entertaining them with hostility, were requited with the like; for the army, having now good leisure to repose themselves among their friends the *Trapezuntians* did so spoil the country thirty days together, forbearing only the borderers upon *Trabifond*, at the citizens request.

S E C T. XII.

How the army began at Trabifond to provide a fleet, wherewith to return home by sea: how it came into the territory of Sinope, and there prosecuted the same purpose.

HAVING now found a haven-town, the soldiers were desirous to take shipping, and change their tedious land-journeys into an easy navigation. To which purpose *Cberisophus*, a *Lacedemonian*, one of the principal commanders, promised by means of *Anaxibius* the *Lacedemonian* admiral, who was his friend, that he would provide vessels to embark them. Having thus concluded, they likewise took order for the staying of such ships as should pass that way, meaning to use them for their navigation. Lest all this provision should be found insufficient for the transportation of the whole army, *Xenophon* perswaded the cities adjoining to clear the ways, and make an easy passage for them by land; whereunto the soldiers were utterly unwilling to give ear, being desirous to return by sea: but the country, fearing what inconvenience might grow by their long stay, did readily condescend to *Xenophon's* request. Two ships they borrowed of the *Trapezuntians*, which they manned and sent to sea; the one of them sailed directly into *Greece*, forsaking their companions who had put them in trust to bring ships into the port of *Trabifond*: the other took merchants and passengers, whose goods were safely kept for the owners, but the vessels were stay'd to increase the fleet. After long abode, when victuals began to fail, by reason that all the land of the *Colchi*, near unto the camp, was already quite wasted, they were fain to embark their sick men, with the women, children, and such of the baggage as might best be spared, in those few ships which they had already provided. The rest of the army took their way by land to *Cerasus*, a *Greek* town, where the fleet likewise arrived. Here the army being mustered, was found to consist of eight thousand and six hundred men. From hence they passed through the country of the *Mosynaci*, who were divided into factions. The stronger party despising their friendship, caused them to join with the weaker, whom they left masters of all.

The next place of their abode was *Cotyora*, a *Greek* town likewise, and a colony of the *Sinopians*, as *Trapezus* and *Cerasus* were; but the entertainment which they here found was very churlish, having neither an open market afforded to them, nor the sick men that were among them admitted into any house. Hereupon the soldiers enter'd the town by force, and (committing no outrage) bestowed those which were sick in convenient lodgings, taking into their own hands the custody of the gates. Provision for the army they made by strong hand, partly out of the territory of the *Paphlagonians*, partly out of the lands belonging to the town. These news were unwelcome to *Sinope*, whence ambassadors were sent to the camp, who complaining of these dealings, and threatening to join with the *Paphlagonians*, if redress could not otherwise be had, were roundly answered by *Xenophon*, that mere necessity had enforced the army to teach those of *Cotyora* good manners in so bad a method; letting them know, that he feared not to deal with them and the *Paphlagonian* at once, though perhaps the *Paphlagonian* would be glad to take *Sinope* itself; to which, if cause were given, they would lend

assistance. Upon this answer the ambassadors grew better advised, promising all friendship that the state of *Sinope* could shew; and commanding the town of *Cotyra* to relieve the soldiers as well as they might. Further, they promised to assist them with shipping, letting them understand how difficult the passage by land would prove, in regard of the many and great rivers, as *Thermodon*, *Iris*, *Halys*, and *Parthenius*, which crossed their way. This good counsel, and the fair promises accompanying it, were kindly accepted by the army, which well perceived, that the city of *Sinope* would spare for no cost, to be freed from such a neighbourhood. It was therefore decreed, that they would pass the rest of the way by sea; provided, that if there should want such number of vessels as might serve to embark every one of them, then would they not put from the shore.

S E C T. XIII.

Of dissension which arose in the army; and how it was embarked.

HITHERTO the danger of enemies, and miseries of weather and wants, had kept the company in firm unity; which now began to dissolve and to thaw, by the neighbouring air of *Greece*, warming their heads with private respects to their several ends and purposes. Whilst they, who were sent as agents from the camp, remained at *Sinope*; *Xenophon* considering the strength and valour of his men, and the opportunity of the coast whereon they lay, thought it would be an honourable work to build a city in those parts, which were soon like to prove great and wealthy, in regard both of their own puissance, and of the great repair of the *Greeks* into that quarter. For this cause he made sacrifice, according to the superstition of his time and country, divining of his success by the entrails of beasts. The soothsayer whom he employ'd, had received a great reward of *Cyrus*, for conjecturing aright, that *Artaxerxes* would not give battel in ten days: he therefore having preserved his money carefully, was desirous to be soon at home, that he might freely enjoy his gettings. By him the purpose of *Xenophon* was divulged, which was interpreted according to the diversity of mens opinions; some approving the motion, but the greater part rejecting it. They of *Sinope* and *Heraclea*, being informed of this consultation, were sore afraid, lest the poverty of the soldiers, who had not wherewith to maintain themselves at home, should give success to the project. Which to prevent, they promised to supply the army with a sufficient fleet, and likewise offered money to some of the captains, who thereupon undertook to give the soldiers pay, if they would presently set sail for *Greece*. One of these captains being a banished man, desired them to follow him into *Troas*; another offered to lead them into *Cherronesus*. *Xenophon*, who only desired the common good, was pleased greatly with these propositions, and professed openly that he would have them to set forward, and hold together in any case, punishing him as a traitor that should forsake the army, before such time as they were arrived at their journey's end. *Silanus* the sooth-sayer, who had uttered *Xenophon's* purpose, was hereby stay'd from outrunning his fellows, and driven to abide with his wealth among poor men, longer than stood with his good liking. Also the other captains were much trou-

* *Mosynaci* a nation of Pontus Cappadocia, Syria, a colony of the Milesians.

b *Cotyora*, a port-town in the same region.

c *Sinop* a port-town in Leuce-

bled and afraid, when they perceived that ships were prepared sufficient for their navigation, but that the money promised to them, and by them to the soldiers, came not. For the people of *Sinope* and *Heraclea*, knowing that the army was now resolved for the voyage, and that *Xenophon*, whom they feared, had perswaded them to this resolution, thought it the wisest way to furnish them with a navy whilst they were in good readiness to depart, but to keep the money to themselves. The captains therefore who being disappointed by these towns, found themselves in great danger of their men, whom they had deceived with fair hopes, repented much of their hasty offers, and signifying as much to *Xenophon*, pray'd him to make proposition to the army, of taking the ships, and sailing to *Phasis*, where they might seize upon lands, and plant themselves in such wise as should stand best with their good liking. But finding him cold in the business, they began to work the principal of their own followers, hoping by them to draw in all the rest. This news becoming publick, bred a suspicion of *Xenophon*, as if he had won the rest of the captains to his purpose, and meant now to carry the army quite another way from their own home. Wherefore assembling the companies, he gave them satisfaction, and withal complained of some disorders, which he caused them to redress. A general inquisition was likewise made of offences committed since the death of *Cyrus*; which being punished, all things were in quiet. Shortly after came ambassadors from *Corylas*, lord of the *Paphlagonians*, who sending presents desired peace of the *Greeks*: the ambassadors were friendly entertained, and peace concluded, which needed not to have been fought, for that the *Greeks* having now their fleet in a readiness, did soon weigh anchors, and set sail for *Harmene* the port of *Sinope*, whether *Cherisophus* came, bringing with him a few gallies from the admiral *Anaxibius*, who promised to give the army pay as soon as they came into the parts of *Greece*.

SECT. XIV.

Another great dissension and distraction of the army. How the mutineers were beaten by the Barbarians, and rescued by Xenophon.

THE nearer they approached to *Greece*, the greater was their desire to make provision for themselves, that they might not return home empty-handed. Wherefore trusting well, that if the charge of the army were absolutely committed to one sufficient man, he might the more conveniently procure the good of them all, they determined to make *Xenophon* sole commander of all; in whose favour, as well the captains as the common soldiers were very earnest and violent. But he, either fearing to displease the *Lacedemonians*, who were jealous of him already (being incensed by that fugitive who forsook the army at *Trabizond*, flying with one of their two ships) or moved by some tokens appearing to him in the entrails, that threatened ill success to his government, procured with vehement contention, that this honour was laid upon *Cherisophus* a *Lacedemonian*. It seems that *Xenophon*, considering the vexations incident to the conduct of a voluntary army, wanting pay, did wisely in yielding to such tokens as forbad him to accept it: especially, knowing so well their desire, which was, by right or by wrong to get wealth wherefoever it might be found, without all regard of friend or of foe. *Cherisophus* had been general but six or seven days when he was deposed, for having been unwilling to rob the town of *Heraclea*, which had

sent presents to the camp, and been very beneficial unto them in lending ships for their transportation. Two days they had sailed by the coast of *Asia*, when being pass'd those great rivers, which would have given impediment to their journey by land, they touched at *Heraclea*, where consulting how to take their way onwards, whether by land or sea, one seditious man began to put them in mind of seeking to get somewhat for themselves; telling them that all their provision would be spent in three days, and that being now come out of the enemies country, victuals and other necessaries could not be had without money; for which cause he gave advice to send messengers into the town of *Heraclea*, giving the citizens to understand what their wants were, and demanding of them three thousand pieces of money, called *Cyzicens*, which sum amounteth to two thousand and five hundred pounds sterling, or thereabouts. This motion was greatly applauded, and the sum raised to ten thousand *Cyzicens* at least: which to require, they thought *Cherisophus*, as being general, the fittest man; others had more desire to send *Xenophon*: but in vain, for they both refused it, and renounced the action as dishonest. Left therefore either of these should fail in managing the business which agreed not with his disposition, others of more impudence and less discretion were sent, who in such wise delivered their insolent message; that the citizens taking time to deliberate upon their request, brought what they could out of the fields into the town, and shutting the gates, did forthwith man the walls. When the soldiers perceived themselves to be disappointed of their ravenous purpose, they fell to mutiny, saying, that their leaders had betray'd them: and being for the more part of them *Arcadians*, and *Acbeans*, they forsook immediately *Cherisophus* and *Xenophon*, choosing new leaders out of their own number. Above four thousand five hundred they were, all heavily arm'd, who electing ten captains, sailed unto the port of *Calpas*, which is the mid-way between *Heraclea* and *Bizantium*, with purpose to assail the *Bythinians* on the sudden. With *Cherisophus* there abode two thousand and one hundred, of whom, one thousand and four hundred were armed weightily: *Xenophon* had two thousand foot, three hundred whereof were lightly armed, and forty horse, which small band had done good service already, and could not have been spared now. *Cherisophus* had agreed with *Cleander* governor of *Bizantium*, to meet him at the mouth of the river *Calpas*, whither *Cleander* promised to bring some gallies to convey him over into *Greece*; for which cause he took his way thither by land, leaving to *Xenophon* such shipping as he had, who passing some part of the way by sea, landed upon the confines of *Heraclea*, and *Thracia Asiatica*, intending to make a cut thro' the mid-land country to the *Propont*. The mutineers, who had landed at *Calpas* by night, with purpose to take spoils in *Bythynia*, divided themselves into ten companies, every captain leading his own regiment into some village, five or six miles from the sea: in the greater towns were two regiments quartered, and so was that part of the country surpris'd on the sudden, and sacked all at one time. The place of rendezvous was an high piece of ground, where some of them arrived, finding no disturbance; others, not without much trouble and danger; two companies were broken and defeated, only eight men escaping, the rest were all put to the sword. For the *Thracians*, which had slip'd at first out of the soldiers hands, did raise the country, and finding the *Greeks* laden with booty, took the advantage of their disorder, cutting in pieces those two regiments: which done, they

they attempted the rest, encompassing the hill whereon they encamped. One great advantage the *Thracians* had, that being all light-armed, they could at pleasure make retreat from these *Arcadians* and *Asians*: who wanting the assistance of horse, and having neither archers nor slingers among them, were driven to stand merely upon their defence, bearing off with great danger, and many wounds received, the darts and arrows of the *Barbarians*, till finally they were driven from their watering place, and enforced to crave parley. Whatsoever the articles of composition were, the *Thracians* yielded to all; but pledges of assurance they would give none, without which the *Greeks* well knew, that all promises of such people, especially incensed, were nothing worth. In the mean time *Xenophon*, holding his way quietly thro' the inland region, did enquire of some travellers, whether they knew ought of any *Grecian* army passing along those parts: and receiving by them true information of the desperate case into which these gallants had foolishly thrown themselves, he marched directly towards the place where they lay, taking with him for guides, them who gave him the intelligence. His horsemen he sent before to discover and to scour the ways; the light-armed footmen took the hill-tops on either hand; all of them setting fire on whatsoever they found combustible, whereby the whole country seemed to be on a light flame, to the great terror of the enemies, who thought that some huge army had approached. That night he encamped on a hill, within five miles of the *Arcadians*, encircling still the number of his fires, which he caused hastily to be quenched soon after supper. The enemies perceiving this, thought certainly that he would have fallen upon them in the dark, which caused them in all haste to dislodge. Early the next morning *Xenophon* coming thither in very good order, to have given battle, found that his advice to affright the *Thracians*, had taken full effect; but he marvelled that the *Greeks* were also departed, concerning whom he learned by enquiry, that they removed at break of day, and perceived by signs, that they had taken the way to the port of *Calpas*, in which journey he overtook them. They embraced him and his with great joy, confessing that they themselves had thought the same which the enemies did, looking that he should have come by night, wherein finding themselves deceived, they were afraid lest he had forsaken them, and therefore hastened away to overtake him, and join with him. So they arrived at the haven of *Calpas*, where it was decreed, that whosoever from thenceforth made any motion to disjoin the army, should suffer death.

S E C T. XV.

Of divers pieces of service done by Xenophon; and how the army returned into Greece. The occasions of the war between the Lacedemonians and the Persian.

THE haven of *Calpas* lay under a goodly headland, that was very strong, and abounding with all kind of grain and fruits, except olives. There was also timber for building and shipping, and a very convenient seat for a great city. All which commodities that might have allured the soldiers to stay there and to plant, caused them to haste away, fearing lest *Xenophon* should find some device to have settled himself and them in that place. For the greater part of them had good means to live at home, neither did they so much for hope of gain follow *Cyrus* in that war, as in regard of

his honour, and the love which they bare unto him: the poorer sort were such as left their parents, wives and children, to whom (tho' failing of the riches which they had hoped to purchase) they were now desirous to return. But whether *Xenophon* found advantage by their own superstition, to make them stay, which they greatly suspected; or whether the signs appearing in the entrails, did indeed forbid their departure: so long they were enforced to abide in the place till victuals failed, neither would the captains lead them forth to forage the country, until the sacrifices should promise good success. *Cherisophus* was dead of an ague, and his ships were gone, being returned to the *Heracleans*, of whom they were borrowed. His followers were joined to the rest of the army, which the greater it was, the more provision it needed, and the sooner felt want. For which cause, he that was chosen colonel into the place of *Cherisophus*, would needs adventure to gratify the soldiers with the spoil of some villages that stood near at hand; in which enterprise he found ill success, the whole country lying in wait to entrap him, and an army of horse being sent by *Pharnabazus*, the satrapa or viceroy of *Phrygia*, to the assistance of these *Bitynian Thracians*, which troops falling upon the *Greeks* that were scattered abroad in seeking booty, slew five hundred of them, and chased the rest to a certain mountain there by. The news of this overthrow coming to *Xenophon*, he led forth a part of the army to the rescue of those that survived, and brought them safe to the camp, upon which the *Bitynians* made an offer that night, and breaking a *Corps du garde*, slew some, pursuing the rest to the very tents. This new courage of the enemy, together with the present condition of the army, so disheartned and unfurnished of necessities, caused the *Greeks* to remove their camp to a place of more strength; which having intrench'd, and committed to the defence of such as were least able to endure travail, *Xenophon* with the firmest and best able men went forth, both to bury those which were lately slain, and to abate the pride of the *Thracians*, and their assistants. In this journey his demeanour was very honourable. For having given burial to the dead, the enemy was discover'd, lying on the tops of the hills adjoining, to whom (notwithstanding that the way was very rough and troublesome, so that some thought it a matter of too great danger, to leave at their backs a wood scarce passable) he marched directly, telling his men plainly, that he had rather follow the enemy with half the number, than turn his back to them with twice as many, and letting them further know, that if they did not charge the *Barbarian*, he would not fail with the greater resolution to pursue them; from whom, if they could safely retire to the camp, yet what should they do there, wanting victuals to sustain them in the place, and ships to carry them away? wherefore he willed them rather to fight well that day, having eaten their dinners, than another day fasting; and not to regard the uneasy return, which might serve to stay cowards from running away, but to wish unto the enemy a fair and easy way, by which he might fly from them. These persuasions were followed with so valiant execution, that both *Persians* and *Bitynians* being chased out of the field, abandoned the country forthwith, removing their families, and leaving all that could not suddenly be convey'd away to the discretion of the *Greeks*, who at good leisure gather'd the harvest of these bad neighbours fields. This was the last fight which they had on the side of *Asia*. For they were not only suffered quietly to enjoy the spoil of the country, but when the opinion grew common

in those parts, that it was the intent of *Xenophon* to plant a colony on the port of *Calpas*, ambassadors were sent from the neighbour-people, to desire friendship, and make offer of their best assistance. But the soldiers had no mind to stay. Wherefore entering further into *Bitbunia*, they took a great booty, which they carried away to *Chrysopolis*, a city near unto *Chalcedon*, where they sold it. *Pharnabazus*, lieutenant in *Phrygia* to *Artaxerxes*, did greatly fear, lest their long stay in that country might breed in them a desire to visit his province, where they might have found great wealth, and little power to guard it. Therefore he sent to the *Lacedemonian* admiral, entreating him with much instance and large promises to waite them over into *Europe*; to whom *Anaxibius* the admiral condescending, promised to give the soldiers pay, as soon as they arrived at *Bizantium*. So were they carried out of *Asia* at the entreaty of the *Persian*, who in the height of his pride, had thought them so surely imprisoned with mighty rivers, that he not only denied to permit their quiet departure, but willed them to surrender their arms into his hands, and so to yield their lives to his discretion. How discourteously they were intreated by *Anaxibius*; and how to requite his injurious dealings, they seized upon *Bizantium*, which by *Xenophon's* perswasion they forbore to sack, I hold it superfluous to relate. For the residue of their doings appertain little to

the general course of things. But this expedition; as in all ages it was glorious, so did it both discover the secrets of *Asia*, and stir up the *Greeks* to think upon greater enterprises than ever their forefathers had undertaken. Likewise it was the only remarkable action which the time afforded. For the *Roman* wars did hitherto extend no further than to the next neighbouring towns of *Italy*; and in *Greece* all things were quiet, the *Lacedemonians* ruling insolently, but without disturbance. True it is, that the seeds of the war shortly following, which the *Lacedemonians* made upon *Artaxerxes*, were already sown, before these companies returned out of the high countries of *Asia*. For the towns of *Ionia*, which had sided with young *Cyrus* against *Tissaphernes*, if not against the great king, prepared to rebel, which they thought safer than to fall into the hands of *Tissaphernes*, who was now appointed lieutenant, both of his old province, and of all that had belonged to *Cyrus*. Wherefore the *Ionians* besought the *Lacedemonians* to send them aid, whereby to recover their liberty; and obtained their request.

For a power was sent over, under conduct of *Thimbro* a *Spartan*, who bestowed his men in such towns as had already revolted, to secure the cities and their fields, but not to make any offensive war.

C H A P. XI.

Of the affairs of Greece, whilst they were managed by the Lacedemonians.

S E C T. I.

How the Lacedemonians took courage by example of Xenophon's army, to make war upon Artaxerxes.

IT seems that the *Lacedemonians* did well perceive in how ill part *Artaxerxes* took their favour shewed unto his brother, and yet were timorous in beginning an open war against him, thinking it sufficient to take all care that no advantage might slip, which could serve to strengthen their estate, by finding the *Persian* work beyond the sea. But when *Xenophon's* army had revealed the baseness of those effeminate *Asiatics*, and rehearsed the many victories which they themselves had gotten, upon terms of extreme disadvantage; then was all *Greece* filled with desire of undertaking upon this huge unweildy empire, thinking it no hard matter for the joint forces of that whole nation, to hew out the way to *Susa*, whereof one handfull had opened the passage to *Babylon*; and further, finding no power that was able to give them resistance, in all that long journey of 34255 furlongs, spent in going and returning, which make of *English* miles about 4281, a very painful march of one year and three months. Nevertheless the civil distraction wherewith *Greece* was miserably torn, and especially that hot fire of the *Theban* war, which, kindled with *Persian* gold, brake forth suddenly into a great flame, drew back out of *Asia* the power of the *Lacedemonians*, to the defence of their own estate; leaving it questionable whether *Agessilaus*, having both the same, and far greater forces, could have wrought proportionable effects. Sure it is, that in the whole space of two years, which he spent

No. 23.

in *Asia*, his deeds procured more commendation of magnanimity and fair behaviour, than of stout courage, and great, or profitable achievements. For how highly soever it pleased *Xenophon*, who was his friend, and follower in this, and in other wars, to extol his virtue; his exploits being only a few incursions into the countries lying near the sea, carry no proportion to *Xenophon's* own journey, which I know not whether any age hath paralleled: the famous retreat of *Canon* the *Briton* with 6000 men from *Aquileia*, to his own country, thro' all the breadth of *Italy*, and length of *France*, in despite of the emperor *Theodosius*, being rather like it than equal. But of *Agessilaus*, and his wars in *Asia* and *Greece*, we shall speak more in due place.

S E C T. II.

The prosperous beginnings of the war in Asia.

THIMBRO receiving *Xenophon's* men, began to take in towns, and to entertain all such as were willing to revolt from the *Persian*, who were many, and some of them such, as had been highly beholden to the king; who seem to have had no other cause of discontent, than that they were to live under the government of *Tissaphernes*, whom all others did as vehemently hate, as the king his master did love him. The managing of the war begun by *Thimbro*, was for his oppressions taken out of his hands, and committed to *Dercyllidas* a *Spartan*, who behaved himself as a good man of war, and a wise commander. For whereas the rule of the low countries of *Asia* was divided between *Pharnabazus* and *Tissaphernes*, who did ill agree;

Pharnabazus

Pharnabazus being the worthier man, but the other by his prince's favour the greater, and having the chief command in those wars against the *Greeks*; *Dercyllidas*, who did bear a private hatred to *Pharnabazus* (knowing well that *Tissaphernes* was of a mischievous nature, and would not be sorry to see his corival thoroughly beaten, tho' to the king's loss) made an appointment with *Tissaphernes*, and forthwith entered *Æolis*, which was under the jurisdiction of *Pharnabazus*, which province, in few days, he brought into his own power.

That country of *Æolis* had about the same time suffered a violent alteration, which gave easy success to the attempts of *Dercyllidas*. *Zenis*, a *Dardanian*, had been deputy to *Pharnabazus* in those parts; after whose death, his wife *Mania* procured his office, wherein she behaved her self so well, that she not only was beloved of the people under her government, but enlarged her territory, by the conquest of certain towns adjoining; and sundry times gave assistance to *Pharnabazus* in his wars against the *Myrians* and *Persians*. For she had in pay some companies of *Greeks*, whose valour by her good usage did her great service. But somewhat before the arrival of *Dercyllidas* in those parts, a son-in-law of hers, called *Midias*, whom she trusted and loved much, being blinded with ambition, found means to stifle her, and kill her son of 17 years old; which done, he seized upon two of her principal towns, wherein her treasure lay, hoping to have been admitted into possession of her whole estate. Being denied entrance by her soldiers that lay in garrison, he sent messengers with presents to *Pharnabazus*, desiring him to make him governor in the place of *Mania*. His presents were not only rejected by *Pharnabazus*, but revenge of his foul treason threatened; whereby the wicked villain was driven into terms of almost utter desperation. In the mean time came *Dercyllidas*, to whom the towns of *Mania*, that held against *Midias*, did quickly open their gates. One only town stood out four days (against the will of the citizens, who were covetous of liberty) the governor striving in vain to have kept it to the use of *Pharnabazus*. Now remaining only two cities, *Gergethe* and *Scepsis*, which the traitor held, who fearing all men, as being loved of none, sent ambassadors to *Dercyllidas*, desiring leave to speak with him, and pledges for his security: upon the delivery of which he issued out of *Scepsis*, and coming into the camp, made offer to join with the *Greeks* upon such conditions, as might seem reasonable. But he was plainly told by *Dercyllidas*, that other conditions there were none, than to set the citizens freely at liberty. And presently upon these words they marched toward *Scepsis*. When *Midias* perceived that it was in vain to strive against the army, and the townsmen, who were all of one mind, he quietly went along with *Dercyllidas*; who remaining but a few hours in the city, did a sacrifice to *Minerva*, and then leading away the garrison of *Midias*, he left the city free, and departed towards *Gergethe*. *Midias* did not forsake his company, but followed him, earnestly entreating that he might be suffered to retain *Gergethe*: but coming to the gates, he was bidden to command his soldiers that they should be opened; for (quoth *Dercyllidas*) I must here likewise do a sacrifice to *Minerva*. The traitor not daring to make denial, caused his mercenaries to open the gates, whereby *Dercyllidas*, taking possession of the place, tendered pay to the garrison, who did not refuse to serve under his ensigns. This done, all the goods of *Mania* were seized upon, as belonging to one that had been subject to *Pharna-*

bazus, who was enemy to the *Greeks*: and so the murderous wretch was sent away naked, not knowing in what part of the world he might find any place to hide his detested head. *Dercyllidas*, having in 8 days taken 9 cities, purposed for the ease of his confederates, to winter in *Bitthynia*, to which end he took truce with *Pharnabazus*, who had not any desire of war. That winter, and the summer ensuing, the truce being re-continued held; in which time, besides the wasting of *Bitthynia*, the neck of land joining *Cherronea* to the main was fortified, being 4 or 5 miles in breadth, by which means 11 towns, with much good land belonging to them, were freed from the incursions of the wild *Thracians*, and made fit and able to victual the camp. Likewise the city of *Aterne* was taken, which was of great strength, and very well stored with provision. After this, *Dercyllidas* had command from *Sparta*, to divert the war into *Caria*, where was the seat of *Tissaphernes*; for that hereby it was thought not uneasy to recover all the towns of *Ionia*: *Pharax*, the admiral of the fleet (which was a yearly office) being appointed to join with him. Tho' it was manifest that *Tissaphernes* had neglected *Pharnabazus* in time of necessity, yet was he not in his own danger requited with the like. For *Pharnabazus* having respect to the king's service, came to assist his private enemy *Tissaphernes*, and so passing into *Caria*, they thrust garrisons into all places of strength; which done, they march'd towards *Ionia*, hoping to find the towns ill manned for resistance. As these *Persians* were desirous to keep the war from their own doors, so was *Dercyllidas* willing to free his confederates the *Ionians* from the spoil and danger of the war, by transferring it into *Caria*. For which cause he passed the river *Meander*, and not looking to have been so soon encountered, marched carelessly thro' the country; when on the very sudden the whole army of *Tissaphernes* and *Pharnabazus* was discovered, consisting of *Persians*, *Carians*, and some mercenary *Greeks*, who were all marshalled in very good order to present battle. The odds was too apparent, both in numbers of men, and in readiness, as also in advantage of ground: for the *Persian* had a great multitude of horse, the *Greek* very few and feeble, being to fight in an open plain. Therefore all the *Ionians*, together with the islanders and others, of such places as bordered upon the king's dominions, did either betake themselves to present flight; or, abiding a while for shame, did plainly discover by their looks, that they meant not to be more bold than wise. Only *Dercyllidas* with his *Peloponnesians*, regarding their honour, prepared to endure the fight; which must needs have brought them to destruction, if the counsel of *Pharnabazus* had been followed, who perceiving the opportunity of so great a victory, was not willing to let it slip. But *Tissaphernes*, who naturally was a coward, seeing that countenance of resistance was made, began to consider what strange defence the soldiers of *Xenophon* had shewed, and thinking that all the *Greeks* were of the like resolution, held it the wisest way to crave parley; the conclusion of which was, that a truce should be made, to last until *Tissaphernes* might receive answer from the king, and *Dercyllidas* from *Sparta*, concerning the demands propounded in the treaty; which were on the one part, that all the *Greeks* in *Asia* might enjoy their own liberty and laws; but contrariwise on the other side, that the *Lacedemonians* should depart *Asia*, and leave the towns to the king's pleasure. This treaty was of none effect; only it served to free the *Greeks* from the present danger, and to gain time unto *Tissaphernes*, who desired

desired to avoid the war by procrastination; which he durst not adventure to finish by tryal of a bat-tel.

SECT. III.

How the Lacedemonians took revenge upon the Eleans for old displeasure. The discontents of the Corinthians and Thebans, conceived against the state of Sparta.

IN the mean season the *Lacedemonians*, who found none able to withstand them in *Greece*, began to call the *Eleans* to account for some disgraces received by them during the late wars, when leisure was wanting to the requital of such petty injuries. These *Eleans* being presidents of the *Olympian* games, had set a fine upon the city of *Sparta*; for non-payment of which, they forbade them to come to the solemnity, and publickly whip'd one of them, that was a man of note, for presuming to contend against their decree. Likewise they hindered *Agis*, king of *Sparta*, from doing sacrifice to *Jupiter*; and in all points used great contempt toward the *Spartans*, who now had no business that could hinder them from taking revenge: and therefore sent a peremptory message to the *Eleans*, commanding them to set at liberty the cities which they held in subjection. This was the usual pretence which they made the ground of all their wars; though little they cared for the liberty of such towns, which they caused afterwards to become followers, and little better than mere vassals to themselves. In their late wars with *Athens*, the strong opposition which they found caused this goodly title of liberty to work very slowly: but having now to do with a state of great spirit and small force, it gave present success to their desires. Two years together they sent an army into the country of the *Eleans*: the first year an earthquake (held in those times a prodigious sign, and which did always forbid the prosecution of any enterprise in hand) caused them to retire: the second year, all the towns of the *Eleans* did hastily revolt, and the city it self was driven to submission; consenting both to suffer their old subjects freely to enjoy their liberty, and to have her own walls thrown down. Only the presidentship of the *Olympian* games was left unto them; which it was not to be doubted that they would, in time coming, use modestly, finding themselves to stand at the mercy of *Sparta*. In this expedition all the *Greeks* were assistant to the *Lacedemonians*, excepting the *Corinthians* and *Beotians*, whose aid having been of as much importance in the late *Peloponnesian* war, as the force of *Sparta* it self, they could not smother their dislike of their unequal division following the victory; which gave to *Sparta* the command of all *Greece*; to *Thebes* and *Corinth*, only security against *Athens*; but such a security as was worse than the danger. For when the equal greatness of two mighty estates did counterpoise each the other, it was in the power of these neutral common-wealths to adhere to either, as the condition of their affairs required: but when to revenge injuries, they had by mortal hatred prosecuted the war to extremity, leaving the one city naked of power and friends, the other mightily increased in both, it was then (if not necessary to obey the greatness which themselves had made, yet) foolish and dangerous to provoke it. Nevertheless, it was not the purpose of the *Spartans* to take occasion of any quarrel, which they could not finish at pleasure, till such time as they had by victory or composition made some good end with the *Persian*, toward whom they bent all their care and forces.

SECT. IV.

The passage of Agesilaus into Asia. His war with Tissaphernes. How Tissaphernes was put to death, and the war diverted into another province, thro' perswasion and gifts of Tithraustes his successor. How careless the Persian lieutenants were of the king's good.

AGESILAUS, newly made king of *Sparta*; was desirous to have the honour of the victory, which, not without cause, he expected upon those of *Asia*; and therefore procuring a great army to join with that of *Dercyllidas*, he took his way in great pomp to *Aulis* in *Beotia*, a haven lying opposite to the island of *Eubœa*, in which place *Agamemnon* (leading the power of all *Greece* to the war against *Troy*, many ages before) had embark'd his men. In imitation of *Agamemnon* he meant also to do sacrifice in *Aulis*, which the *Thebans*, lords of that country, would not permit; but saying, that the performance of such ceremonies in that place belonged unto their officers; they were so unable to conceal their malice, that sending some companies of horse, they threw down his sacrifice from the altar. It was not then convenient time for *Agesilaus* to entangle himself and his country in a new war; therefore, waiting better opportunity of revenge, he quietly swallowed the contumely, and followed his main intendment. Having landed his men at *Ephesus*, he was entertained by *Tissaphernes* with a treaty of peace, wherein *Agesilaus* peremptorily requiring that the *Persian* should restore to liberty all the *Greek* towns in *Asia*, was promised that the king, being first informed of his demand, should send answer to his good liking, if he would in the mean while make truce. Truce was therefore made, which *Tissaphernes* had sought only to win time of making provision for the war, and getting supply of men and money from *Artaxerxes*; whilst *Agesilaus* was busy in settling the estates of his confederate cities on that side of the sea. The end of this long vacation from war, was at the coming down of the forces which *Artaxerxes* had sent; at what time *Agesilaus* received a plain message from *Tissaphernes*, that either he must forthwith depart out of *Asia*, or make good his abode by strong hand. *Agesilaus* returning word that he was glad to hear that his enemies had by perjury deserved vengeance from heaven, prepared to invade them; and sending word to all the towns which lay between him and *Caria*, that they should provide victuals, and other necessities for his army, did easily make *Tissaphernes* believe, that his intent was to invade that province wherein *Tissaphernes* dwelt, and which was unfit for horse, in which part of his forces the *Persian* had most confidence. Therefore *Tissaphernes* bestowing all his companies of foot in *Caria*, enter'd with his horse into the plains of *Meander*, hoping thereby to stop the passage of a heavy foot-army, not suffering them to pass into that country which was fittest for their service. But the *Greeks* left him waiting there in vain, and marched directly into *Phrygia*, where they took great spoil without resistance, till such time as the horse-men of *Pharnabazus* met him, who in a small skirmish having the better of the *Greeks*, were the occasion that *Agesilaus* returned to *Ephesus*. Although in this last fight only twelve men were lost, yet *Agesilaus* perceiving by that tryal how hard it would be to prevail, and hold the mastery of the field, without a greater strength of horse, took all possible care to encrease that part of his forces. By which means having enabled himself, whilst winter

ter lasted, he enter'd upon the country of *Tissaphernes*, as soon as the season of the year would permit, and not only took a great booty, but finding the horse-men of *Tissaphernes* in the plain of *Meander*, without assistance of their infantry, he gave them battel, and had a great victory, taking their camp, in which he found great riches. The blame of this loss fell heavy upon *Tissaphernes*, who either upon cowardise had absented himself from the battel, or following some other business, was then at *Sardes*. For which cause his master having him in distrust, and thinking that peace might be the sooner had, which he much desired, if the man, so odious to the whole nation of the *Greeks*, were taken out of the way, he sent into those parts *Tithraustes*, a *Persian*, to cut off the head of *Tissaphernes*, and succeed him in the government. Such was the end of this base and cowardly politician, who little cared to offend heaven, when by perjury he could advance his purposes on earth, failed at the last thro' too much over-weening of his own wisdom, even in that part of cunning wherein he thought himself most perfect. For supposing, that by his great skill in subtil negotiation he should one way or other circumvent the *Greeks*, and make them weary of *Asia*; he did not seek to finish the war, and, according to his master's wish, bring all things speedily to quiet; but rather to temporise till he might find some opportunity of making such end as best might stand with the king's honour and his own. Wherein it seems that he much mistook his prince's disposition, who, though he had highly rewarded him for the aid which he did bring in his time of danger, yet would he much more gladly have taken it, if he could have found such means whereby the danger it self might have been avoided: as not loving to have war, whilst by any conditions (honourable or not) he might obtain peace. And this appeared well by the course which *Tithraustes* took at his first possession of the low countries. For he sent embassadors to *Agésilas* in very friendly sort, letting him know, that the man who had been author of the war, was now taken out of the way; and that it was the king's pleasure to let the *Greeks* enjoy their own laws and liberty, upon condition that they should pay him the tribute accustomed, and the army be forthwith dismissed. The answer to this proposition, was by *Agésilas* referr'd to the counsel of *Sparta*; in the mean season he was content to transfer the war into the province of *Pharnabazus*, at the request of *Tithraustes*, who bought his departure with thirty talents.

This was a strange manner of war, both on the offensive and on the defensive part. For *Agésilas*, having entertained great hopes of vanquishing the great king, was contented to forbear his several provinces, at the entreaty of the lieutenants: and those lieutenants being employed by the king to maintain his estates against all enemies (wherein if they failed, they knew that their heads might easily be taken from their shoulders) were little offended at any loss that fell on their next neighbour-princes, which were subject likewise to the same crown of *Persia*, so long as their own government could be preserved free from waste and danger. The cause of this disorder on the *Persian* side, I can ascribe to nothing so deservedly, as to the corrupted estate of the court, wherein eunuchs, concubines, and ministers of pleasure, were able by partial construction to countenance or disgrace the actions of such as had the managing of things abroad; and to that foolish manner of the king's (which was so usual that it might be called a rule) to reward or punish the provincial governour, according to the benefit or loss, which

the country given in charge unto each of them received, during the time of his rule. Whereby it came to pass, that as every one was desirous to make his own territory yield a large increase of the king's treasure; so no man was careful to assist his borderers, if loss or danger might thereby grow to himself and his; but sat still as an idle beholder, when perhaps by joining their forces, it had not been uneasy to recompense the spoil of one country, by conquering another, or defending a third from far greater miseries.

S E C T. V.

The war and treaty between Agésilas and Pharnabazus.

A G E S I L A U S, having thus compounded with *Tithraustes*, enter'd *Phrygia*, burning and wasting the country without resistance. He took the palace of *Pharnabazus*, and by his lieutenant drove him out of his camp. These actions, together with his honourable behaviour, which added much to their lustre, were more glorious than profitable. For he did not win cities and places of strength, which might have encreased his power, and given assurance to the rest of his proceedings: but purchased fame and high reputation, by which he drew unto him some that were discontented and stood upon bad terms with the great king, whom he lost again as easily, by means of some slight injury done to them by his under-captains. *Pharnabazus* did not enclose himself in any town for fear of being besieged, but kept the field, lying as near as he could safely to the enemies, with whom it was not his purpose to fight, but to make some good end by composition, which he found not uneasy to do. For the pleasures, by him formerly done to the state of *Sparta*, in the times of their most necessity, had been so great, that when he (obtaining parly) did set before their eyes his bounty towards them, and his love (which had been such, that besides many other hazards of his person, he had for the rescue of their fleet, when it was driven to run ashore at *Abidus*, adventured to ride into the sea, as far as he could find any ground, and fight on horseback against the *Athenians*) together with his faith, which had never been violated in word or deed: they knew not how to excuse their ingratitude, otherwise than by telling him, that having war with his master, they were forced against their will to offend him. *Agésilas* did make a fair offer to him, that if he would revolt from the king to them, they would maintain him against the *Persian*, and establish him free prince of the country wherein he was at that time only deputy to *Artaxerxes*. But *Pharnabazus* told him plainly, that if the king his master did put him in trust to make war against them, he would not fail to do the best that he could as their enemy; if the charge were taken out of his hand, and he commanded to obey another, he would then shift side, and betake himself to their alliance. The issue of this parly was, that the army should no longer abide in *Phrygia*, nor again return into it, whilst employment could be found elsewhere. The excuse made by *Agésilas*, and the withdrawing of his forces out of those parts, were not sufficient to appease *Pharnabazus*, whom he had not invaded for want of more necessary business elsewhere; but because his country would yield great booty; and for the hire of thirty talents. By this means the *Lacedemonians* changed an honourable friend into a hot enemy, who afterwards requited their unthankfulness with full revenge.

SECT. VI.

The great commotions raised in Greece by the Thebans and others, that were hired with gold from the Persian.

IN the mean while *Tithraustes*, perceiving that *Agésilas* meant nothing less than to return into Greece, and let *Artaxerxes* rest quietly in Asia, took a wise course, whereby the city of *Sparta* was not only driven to look to her own, and give over her great hopes of subverting the empire, but was beaten out of all that had been gotten by many late victories, and saw her dominion restrained unto the narrow bounds of her own territory. He sent into Greece fifty talents of silver, to be employed in raising war against the *Lacedemonians*; which treasure was, by the subtle practice of him that was put in trust with it, in such wise dispersed, among the principal men of the *Thebans*, *Argives*, and *Corinthians*, that all those estates having formerly borne secret hate to that of *Sparta*, were now desirous of nothing so much as of open war. And lest this great heat of the incensed multitude should, for want of present exercise, begin to faint, and vanish away in idle words, occasion was found out to thrust the *Lacedemonians* into arms, that they themselves might seem authors of the quarrel. Some land there was in the tenure of the *Locrians*, to which the *Thebans* had in former time laid claim; but the *Phocians*, either having the better title, or finding the greater favour, had it adjudged unto them, and received yearly money for it. This money the *Locrians* were either hired or persuaded to pay now to the *Thebans*, who readily accepted it. The *Phocians*, not meaning so to lose their rent, made a distress by strong hand, recovering a great deal more than their own; which the *Thebans* (as in protection of their new tenants) requited with an invasion made upon *Phocis*, wasting that country in the manner of open war. Such were the beginnings of professed hostility between *Thebes* and *Sparta*, and the first breaking out of their close enmity, that had long time, tho' hardly been concealed. For when the *Phocian* ambassadors came to *Sparta*, complaining of the violence done by the *Thebans*, and requesting succour, they had very favourable audience, and ready consent to their suit; it being the manner of the *Lacedemonians*, to defer the acknowledgment of injuries received, until occasion of revenge were offered, and then to discover their indignation in cold blood. At this time they had very good opportunity to work their own wills, having no other war to disturb them in Greece, and hearing out of Asia no news that could offend or trouble them. Wherefore they sent *Lyfander* to raise all the countries about *Phocis*, and with such forces as he could levy, to attend the coming of *Pausanias*, king of *Sparta* (for *Sparta*, as hath been shewed before, had two kings) who should follow him with the strength of *Peloponnesus*. *Lyfander* did as he was appointed, and being of great reputation in those parts, he drew the *Orchomenians* to revolt from *Thebes*. *Pausanias* likewise raised all *Peloponnesus*, except the *Corinthians* (who refused to assist him in that enterprise) meaning to join with *Lyfander*, and make a speedy end of the war. The consideration of so great a danger approaching so swiftly, caused the *Thebans* to seek what help they could abroad, so far as their own strength was far too little to make resistance against such mighty preparations. It was not unknown to them, that many followers of the *Lacedemonians* were otherwise affected in heart than they

durst utter in countenance; but the good wishes of such people were little available, considering that the most which could be expected from them was, that they should do as little hurt as they could: by which manner of tergiversation, the *Corinthians* did at that present cast themselves into the displeasure of the *Spartans*, to the no great benefit of *Thebes*. Wherefore it was thought the safest course to procure the assistance of some estate, that might presently declare itself on their side, which would cause many others to follow the example, and make their party strong. To this end they sent ambassadors to *Athens*, excusing old offences, as either not committed by publick allowance, or done in time of the general war, and recompensed with friendship lately shewn in their refusal of assisting *Pausanias*, when he came in behalf of the thirty tyrants, against the good citizens of *Athens*. In regard of which, and for their own honour's sake, they requested them of aid in the present war, offering to do the best that they could for the restoring of *Athens* to her former estate and dignity. *Thrasylbulus* and his friends, who, persecuted by the thirty, had been well entertained at *Thebes*, procured now the city to make a large requital of the courtesy which they had received. For it was decreed, that the state of *Athens* should not only refuse to aid the *Lacedemonians* in this war, but that it should assist the *Thebans*, and engage itself in their cause. Whilst *Pausanias* lay still, waiting the arrival of his confederates, *Lyfander*, being desirous to do somewhat that might advance the business in hand, came to *Haliartus*, where, tho' *Pausanias* did not meet him, as had been appointed, yet he attempted the town, and was slain in fight by the *Thebans*, who came hastily to the rescue. As this victory did encourage the *Thebans*, so the coming of *Pausanias* with his great army did again amaze them, with presentation of extreme danger; but their spirits were soon revived by the strong succour which was brought from *Athens*; in consideration of which, and of the late battle, *Pausanias* durst not hazard a new fight with them, but receiving the bodies of those that were slain, by composition, departed out of their territory; for which, either cowardise or indiscretion, he was, at his return to *Sparta*, condemn'd as a traitor, and driven to fly into *Tegea*, where he ended his days in banishment.

SECT. VII.

How Agésilas was called out of Asia to help his country. A victory of the Spartans. Conon, the Athenian, assisted by Pharnabazus, overcomes the Lacedemonian fleet, recovers the mastery of the seas, and rebuilds the walls of Athens.

THIS good success, and the confederacy made with *Athens*, gave such reputation to the *Thebans*, that the *Argives*, *Corinthians*, *Eubceans*, *Locrians*, and *Acarnanians*, did forthwith side with them, and raising a strong army, determined to give battle to the *Lacedemonians*, as near as they might to their own doors; considering that the force of *Sparta* itself was not great, but grew more and more by the adjunction of their confederates. The magistrates of *Sparta* perceiving the danger, sent for *Agésilas*, who readily obeyed them, and promising his friends in Asia to return speedily to their assistance, passed the streights of *Hellespont* into Europe. In the mean time the cities of the new league had given battle to the *Lacedemonians*, and the remainder of their associates, but with ill success. For when the right wing of each part had gotten the

better

better hand, the *Argives* and *Thebans* returning from the chase in some disorder, were broken and defeated by the *Lacedemonians*, who meeting them in good order, won from them the honour which they had gotten by forcing the left wing of the *Lacedemonians*, and made the victory of that day entirely their own. The report of this battle meeting *Agessilaus* at *Amphipolis*, were by him sent over into *Asia*, where it is not likely that they brought much comfort unto his friend, who had since his departure seen the *Spartan* fleet beaten, and *Lyfander* the admiral slain. The same man, whose endeavour had brought the *Athenians* into order, by advancing the sea-forces of the *Lacedemonians* with money, and all manner of supplies, was now the occasion that the power of *Athens* grew strong at sea, when the city was despoiled of her old reputation, and scarcely able to maintain an army by land for her own defence. *Pharnabazus* considering how much it imported the king his master, to have the *Greeks* divided into such factions, as might utterly disable them from undertaking abroad, thought it the safest way for himself, during these broils, to take such order, that he should not need any more to seek peace by entreaty, and commemoration of old benefits, at their hands, who unprovoked had sold his love for thirty talents. To which purpose he furnished *Conon* the *Athenian* with eight ships, who had escaped, when the fleet of *Athens* was surpris'd by *Lyfander* at *Ægos-Potamos*; giving him the command of a great navy, wherewith he requited the loss received at *Ægos-Potamos*, by repaying the *Lacedemonians* with the like destruction of their fleet at *Cnidus*. After this victory *Conon* sail'd to *Athens*, bringing with him, partly as the liberality of *Pharnabazus*, partly as the fruit of his victory, so strong a navy, and so much gold, as encouraged the *Athenians* to rebuild their walls, and think more hopefully upon recovering the signiory which they had lost.

S E C T. VIII.

Of sundry small victories gotten on each part. The Lacedemonians lose all in Asia. The Athenians recover some part of their old dominion.

N Evertheless the *Lacedemonians*, by many victories at land, maintained for some years the honour of their estate, endangered very greatly by this loss at sea. For *Agessilaus* obtained the better with his horsemen, from the *Theffalians*, who were accounted the best riders in *Greece*: He wast'd *Bæotia*, and fought a great battle at *Coronea* against the *Thebans*, and their allies, whom he overthrew; and by his marshal *Gylis* foraged the country of *Locris*: which done, he return'd home.

The gain of these victories was not great, and the reputation of them was, by many losses, much defaced. For the *Thebans* did, in the battle of *Coronea*, vanquish the *Orchomenians*, who stood opposite unto them, and retired unbroken to mount *Helicon*, opening way perforce when *Agessilaus* charged them in their return from the pursuit. Likewise *Gylis* was slain, with a great part of his army, by the *Locrians*; and some other exploits by the *Lacedemonians*, performed against the *Corinthians*, were repay'd with equal damage receiv'd in the parts adjoining; many towns being easily taken, and as easily recover'd. The variety of which inter-seats was such, that the *Thebans* themselves were drawn, by the loss of the haven of *Corinth*, to sue for peace, but could not get audience, till such time as the news came of a great victory obtained by *Iphicrates*, general of the *Athenian* forces at *Lochaum*;

whereupon the *Theban* ambassadors being sent for, and willed to do their message, required only in scorn, to have a safe conduct given them, that they might enter into *Corinth*. From this time forward the war was made for a while only by incursions; wherein the *Acheans*, confederates of *Sparta*, felt most loss; their whole state being endanger'd by the *Acaruanians*, who held with the contrary side, until *Agessilaus* repayed these invaders with equal or greater calamities, brought upon their own lands, which did so afflict the *Acaruanians*, that they were driven to sue for peace. But the affairs at sea were of most consequence, upon which the success of all depended. For when the towns of *Asia* perceiv'd, that the *Lacedemonians* were not only entangled in an hard war at home, but almost disabled to pass the seas, having lost their fleet at *Cnidus*; they soon gave ear to *Pharnabazus*, who promised to allow that they should use their own laws, if they would expel the *Spartan* governours. Only the city of *Abydos* did stand firm, wherein *Dercyllidas* lay, who did his best to contain all the towns about *Hellespont*, in the alliance of the *Lacedemonians*; which he could not do, because the *Athenian* fleet under *Thrasybulus* took in *Byzantium*, *Chalcedon*, and other places thereabout, reducing the isle of *Lesbos* to their ancient acknowledgment of *Athens*.

S E C T. IX.

The base conditions offered unto the Persians by the Lacedemonians. Of sundry fights, and other passages in the war. The peace of Antalcidas.

A BOUT this time the *Spartans* began to perceive, how uneasy a thing it would be, to maintain the war against men as good as themselves, assisted with the treasures of *Persia*; wherefore they craved peace of *Artaxerxes*, most basely offering, not only to renounce the *Greeks* inhabiting *Asia*, and to leave them to the king's disposition, but withal to set the islanders, and every town in *Greece*, as well the little as the great, at full and absolute liberty, whereby they said that all the principal estates of their country would so be weakened, that no one, nor all of them, should be able to stir against the great king. And sure it was, that the power of the country being so broken, and rent into many small pieces, could neither have disquieted the *Persian*, by an offensive war, nor have made any good defence against him, but would have left it easy for him, in continuance of time, to have taken the cities one after another, till he had made himself master of all. The *Spartans* were not ignorant of this, but were so carried with envy, that perceiving how the dominion of the seas was like to return to *Athens*, they chose rather to give all from themselves and others, and make all alike weak, than to permit that any of their own nation should grow stronger than themselves, who so lately had commanded all. Yet this great offer was not at the first accepted, both in regard that the other estates of *Greece*, who had in the king's behalf join'd together against the *Lacedemonians*, did by their several ambassadors oppose themselves unto it; and for that it was thought safest for *Artaxerxes*, rather to weaken the *Lacedemonians* yet more, than by interposing himself to bring friends and foes on the sudden to an equality. Especially *Struthas*, whom *Artaxerxes* had sent as his lieutenant into the low countries, did seek to repay the harm done by *Agessilaus* in those parts: which his intent appearing plain, and all hope of the peace being thereby cut off, *Thimbro* was sent into *Asia*, to make war

war upon *Struthas*; and others were appointed to other places, whereby the war, being scattered about all the isles and towns on the firm land grew almost to the manner of piracy and robbery, affording many skirmishes, but few great actions worthy of remembrance. *Thimbro* was slain by *Struthas*, and in his place *Diphridas* was sent, who demeaned himself more warily. *Dercyllidas* was removed from his charge at *Abydos*, because he had not impeached *Thrasybulus* in his enterprises about *Hellepont*; *Anaxibius*, who succeeded him, was surprised and slain in a skirmish by *Iphicrates* the *Athenian*. *Thrasybulus*, departing from *Lesbos* towards *Rhodes*, was slain by the way at *Aspendus*; the city of *Rhodes* had long before joined with the *Lacedemonians*, who erected there (as was their manner) an *Aristocracy*, or the government of a few the principal citizens; whereas contrariwise, the *Athenians* were accustomed to put the sovereignty into the hands of the people, each of them seeking to assure themselves, by erecting in the towns of their confederates a government like unto their own: which doing (where more especial cause did not hinder) caused the nobility to favour *Sparta*, and the commons to incline to *Athens*. The people of *Agina* roved upon the coast of *Attica*, which caused the *Athenians* to land an army in *Agina*, and besieged their town; but this siege being raised by the assistance of the *Lacedemonian* fleet, the islanders began anew to molest *Attica*, which caused the *Athenians* to man their ships again, that returned beaten, having lost 4 of 13. The loss of these ships was soon recompensed by a victory which *Chabrias* the *Athenian* general had in *Agina*; whereupon the islanders were fain to keep home, and leave to the *Athenians* the seas free. It may well seem strange that the city of *Athens*, having but newly raised her walls, having not by any fortunate and important battle secured her estate from dangers by land; but only depending upon the assistance of such confederates, as carried unto different ends, had often discovered themselves irresolute in the common cause, would send a fleet and an army to *Cyprus*, in defence of *Evagoras*, when the mastery of the seas was so ill assured, that an island lying in the eye of *Piræus*, had ability to vex the coast of *Attica*. But as the over-weening of that city did cause it usually to embrace more than it could compass; so the insolency and shameless injustice of the people, had now bred in the chief commanders, a desire to keep themselves far out of fight, and to seek employments at such distance as might secure them from the eyes of the envious, and from publick judgments, out of which few or none escaped. For which cause *Timotheus* did pass away much part of his time in the isle of *Lesbos*; *Iphicrates* in *Thrace*, and *Chabrias* did now carry away into *Cyprus* a greater force than his country well could have spared; with which he returned not when the business in *Cyprus* came to an end, but sought new adventures in *Egypt*, whereby arose neither thanks to himself, nor profit to his city, tho' honour both to him and it. The *Athenians* being thus careless of things at hand, had a notable blow given unto them, shortly after that *Chabrias* was gone to *Cyprus*, even within their own haven. For *Teutias*, a *Lacedemonian*, being made governour of *Agina*, conceived a strong hope of surprising the navy of *Athens*, as it lay in *Piræus*; thinking aright, that it was an harder matter to encounter with ten ships prepared for the fight, than with twenty lying in harbour, whose mariners were asleep in their cabins, or drinking in taverns. Wherefore he sail'd by night unto the

mouth of the port, which entering at the break of day, he found (according to his expectation) most of the men on shore, and few or none left aboard to make resistance; by which means he took many ships laden with merchandises, many fisher-men, passengers, and other vessels; also three or four galleys, having sunk or broken, and made unserviceable, as many of the rest as the time would suffer. About this time, *Pharnabazus*, the lieutenant of *Phrygia*, had one of the king's daughters given to him in marriage, with whom he lived about the court; and many officers that favoured the *Lacedemonians* were placed in the lower *Asia*; by whose assistance, the fleet of *Sparta* grew victorious about *Hellepont*; in such wise, that perhaps they should not have needed the peace, which they themselves procured by *Antalcidas*, from the great king, the conditions whereof were such as are mentioned before, giving freedom to all the cities of *Greece*, and dividing the country into as many several states as there were petty boroughs in it. Thus *Artaxerxes*, having bought his own peace with money, did likewise by his money become arbitrator and decider of controversies between the *Greeks*, disposing of their business in such wise as stood best with his own good. The tenor of *Artaxerxes*'s decree was, that all *Asia* and *Cyprus* should be his own; the isles of *Lemnos*, *Imbrus*, and *Sicrus* be subject to *Athens*; all other *Greek* towns, as well the little as the great, be set at liberty; and that whosoever should refuse this peace, upon them the approvers of it should make war, the king assisting them by land and sea, with men, and ships, and treasure. The *Athenians* were so discouraged by their losses at sea; the *Lacedemonians* by revolt of their confederates, and the necessity of maintaining many garrisons, for which they wanted money; and other states by the miseries of the war, whereof they saw no end; that all (excepting the *Theban*) did consent unto these articles. This was called the peace of *Antalcidas*: whereof the *Lacedemonians* taking upon themselves the execution, did not only compel the *Argives* to depart out of *Corinth* (which under pretence of defending they held by garrisons, lately thrust into it, not as patrons, but as lords) and the *Thebans* to leave *Boeotia* free, of which province *Thebes* had always held the government: the *Thebans* themselves being also comprehended under the name of *Beotians*, but caused the *Mantineans* to throw down their own city, and to dwell in villages; alleging, that they had formerly been accustomed so to do, tho' purposing indeed to chastise them, as having been ill affected to *Sparta* in the late war. By these courses the *Lacedemonians* did hope that all the small towns in *Greece* would, when occasion should require it, willingly follow them in the wars, as authors of their liberty; and that the great cities having lost all their dependants, would be unable to make opposition.

SECT. X.

The war which the Lacedemonians made upon Olynthus. They take Thebes by treason, and Olynthus by famine.

WHILST these wars, which ended without either victory or profit, consumed the riches and power of *Greece*, the city of *Olynthus* in *Thrace* was grown so mighty, that she did not only command her neighbour-towns, but was also become terrible to places far removed, and to *Sparta* it self. Great part of *Macedonia*, together with *Pella*, the principal city of that kingdom, was taken by the *Olynthians*, who following the usual pretence of

of the *Lacedemonians*, to set at liberty the places over which king *Amyntas* did tyrannize, had almost now driven him out of his dominions, and taken all to themselves. The citizens of *Acanthus* and of *Apollonia*, being nearest unto the danger of those incroaching neighbours, acquainted the *Lacedemonians* with their fear, affirming that this dominion of the *Olynthians* would be too strong for all *Greece*, if continuance of time should give it reputation, which only it wanted; wherefore they requested assistance, but in such terms as did sound of compulsion; protesting that either they must war upon *Olynthus*, or become subject unto her, and fight in her defence. Hereupon was made a hasty levy of men, two thousand being presently sent away with promise to be seconded by a greater army. Whilst these two thousand gave such beginning to the war, as agreed with their small number, the body of the army following them surprized the citadel of *Thebes*, which was betrayed into the hand of *Phebidas* the *Lacedemonian*, by some of the magistrates, who sought to strengthen their faction by the slavery of their country. The *Thebans* were ill affected to *Sparta*, but had not in any one point violated the peace lately made between them; which caused the *Lacedemonians* to doubt whether this act of *Phebidas* were more worthy of reward or of punishment: in conclusion, profit so far over-weighed honesty, that the deed was approved, many principal citizens of *Thebes* condemned to death, many driven into banishment, and the traitors rewarded with the government of the city; by whose authority, and the force of the garrison, the *Thebans* were compelled to serve the *Lacedemonians*, in all, and more than all that they could require. This access of power having strengthened the *Lacedemonians*, caused them to entertain the greater forces about *Olynthus*, which (notwithstanding the loss of one great battel, and some other disasters) they compelled at length by famine to render it self to their obedience.

S E C T. XI.

How the Thebans recovered their liberty, driving out the Lacedemonian garrison.

AFTER this *Olynthian* war, which endured almost three years, it seemed that no estate in *Greece* was able to make head against that of *Sparta*: but it was not long ere the *Thebans* found means to shake off their yoke, and gave both example and means to others to do the like. One of the banished men found by conference with a scribe of the *Theban* magistrates coming to *Athens*, that the tyranny wherewith his country was oppressed, pleased him no better than it did those who for fear of it were fled from home. Whereupon a plot was laid between these two, that soon found very good success, being managed thus. Seven of the banished men forsook *Athens* privily, and enter'd by night into the fields of *Thebes*; where spending the next day secretly, they came late in the evening to the gates like husband-men returned from work, and so passed undiscovered unto the house of *Charon*, whom *Phyllidas* the scribe had drawn

into the conspiracy. The day following, a solemn feast being then held in the city, *Phyllidas* promised the governours, who were insolent and lustful men, that he would convey unto them that night the most beautiful dames of the town, with whom they should take their pleasure. Having cheered them with such hope, and plenty of good wine, he told them when the time of performance (which they urged) came, that he could not make good his promise, unless they would dismiss their followers; because the gentlewomen, who attended without in a chamber, would not endure, that any of the servants should see their faces. Upon this occasion the attendants were dismissed, and the conspirators, attired like ladies and their maids, brought into the place; who taking advantage of the governours loose behaviour, slew them all upon the sudden with daggers, which they brought hidden under their garments. Then presently casting off their disguise, they went to other places, where feigning themselves to come to the governours upon business, they got admittance, and likewise slew those that were of the *Lacedemonian* faction. By the like device they broke into the prison, slew the goaler, and set at liberty such as they thought meet; and being followed by these desperate men, proclaimed liberty, making the death of the tyrants known. The captain of the castle hearing the sudden proclamation, thought the rebels to be stronger than indeed they were: the citizens contrariwise mistrusted, that it was a practice to discover such, as would be forward upon occasion of revolting. But as soon as day-light revealed the plain truth, all the people took arms, and besieged the castle, sending hastily to *Athens* for succour. The garrison also sent for aid unto the towns adjoining, whence a few broken troops coming to the rescue, were defeated on the way, by the horse-men of *Thebes*. On the other side, the banished *Thebans* did not only make speed to assist their country-men, but procured some *Athenians* to join with them, and thereby came so strong into the city, that the castle was yielded more through fear than any necessity, upon condition that the soldiers might quietly depart with their arms; for which composition the captain at his return to *Sparta* was put to death. When the news of the doings at *Thebes*, and the success arrived at *Sparta*, an army was raised forthwith, and all things prepared as earnestly for the recovering of that city, as if some part of their ancient inheritance had been taken from the *Lacedemonians*, and not a town perfidiously usurped by them, restored to her own liberty. *Cleombrotus*, one of the kings, was sent on this expedition; who, having wearied his followers with a toilsome winter's journey, returned home without any good or harm done; leaving *Sphodrias*, with part of his army, at *Thebes*, to molest the *Thebans*; who, doing them some displeasures, made large amends by a foolish attempt upon the haven of *Athens*, which failing to take, he wasted the country adjoining, and drove away cattle, causing by this outrage the *Athenians* to enter with all their power into the war, out of which they were before very carefully seeking how to withdraw themselves.

C H A P. XII.

Of the flourishing estate of Thebes, from the battel of Leuctra to the battel of Mantinea.

S E C T. I.

How Thebes and Athens joined together against Sparta. How the Athenians made peace for themselves and others, out of which the Thebans were excluded. The battel of Leuctra, and beginning of the Theban greatness.

THE Lacedemonians were men of great resolution, and of much gravity in all their proceedings, but one dishonourable rule they held, that all respects withstanding the commodity of Sparta were to be neglected; the practice of which doctrine, even by the best and wisest of them, did greatly blemish that estate; but when it was put in execution by insufficient over-weening men, it seldom failed to bring upon them, instead of profit unjustly expected, both shame and loss. And so it befel them in these enterprizes of Pheidias, upon the castle of Thebes, and Sphodrias upon the Pireus. For howsoever Agesilaus did spoil the country about Thebes, in which he spent two summers, yet the diligence of the Thebans repaired all, who by the good success of some attempts grew stronger than they were at the first.

The Athenians likewise began to look abroad, failing to the isle of Corcyra, where they ordered things at their pleasure, and, having in some fights at sea prevailed, began, as in the Peloponnesian war, to surround Peloponnesus with a navy; afflicting so the Lacedemonians, that had not the Thebans by their insolency wearied their friends, and caused them to seek for peace, it had been very likely that the course of this war should have soon come to a good end, which nevertheless being prosecuted by the Thebans (who opposed at once both these two great estates) left the city of Sparta as much dejected, as the beginning found it proud and tyrannous. But the Athenians perceiving how Thebes encroach'd every day upon her weak neighbours, not sparing such as had been dependants upon Athens, and finding themselves, whilst engaged in such a war, unable to relieve their complaining friends, resolved to settle the affairs of Greece, by renewing that form of peace which Antalcidas had brought from the Persian. Wherefore they sent messengers to Thebes, peremptorily signifying, that it was their intent to finish the war; to which purpose they willed the Thebans to send ambassadors along with them to Sparta; who readily condescended, fearing otherwise that they should be left out of the treaty of peace, which came to pass, being so wrought by the courageous wisdom of Epaminondas, who understood far better than his countrymen, what was to be feared or hoped. In this treaty the Lacedemonians and Athenians did soon agree; but when the Thebans offered to swear to the articles in the name of the Beotians, Agesilaus required them to swear in their own name, and to leave the Beotians free, whom they had lately reduced under their obedience. Whereunto Epaminondas made answer, that the city of Sparta should give example to Thebes, by setting the Laconians free; for that the signiory of Beotia did by as good right appertain to the Thebans, as that of Laconia to the Spartans. This was well and truly spoken; but was heard with no patience:

No. XXIX.

For Agesilaus bearing a vehement hatred unto those of Thebes, by whom he was drawn back out of Asia into Greece, and disappointed of all the glory which he had hoped to achieve by the Persian war, did now passionately urge that point of setting the Beotians at liberty, and finding it as obstinately refused, he dash'd the name of the Thebans out of the league. At the same time Cleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, lay in Phocis, who received command from the governours of Sparta forthwith to enter upon the land of the Thebans with all his power, which he did, and was there slain at Leuctra; and with him the flower of his army. This battel of Leuctra being one of the most famous that ever were fought between the Greeks, was not so notable for any circumstance foregoing it, or for the managing of the fight it self, as for the death of the king, and many citizens of Sparta; but especially, for that after this battel (between which and the conclusion of the general peace, there passed but twenty days) the Lacedemonians were never able to recover the strength and reputation which had formerly made them redoubted far and near; whereas contrariwise the Thebans, whose greatest ambition had in former times confined it self unto the little region of Beotia, did now begin to undertake the leading and command of many people and estates, in such wise, that soon after they brought an army of threescore and ten thousand strong unto the gates of Sparta. So much do the afflictions of an hard war valiantly endured, advance the affairs of the distressed, and guide them into the way of conquest by stiffening that resolution with a manly temper, which wealth and ease had through luxury, rechiefness, and many other vices or vanities, made rusty and effeminate.

S E C T. II.

How the Athenians took upon them to maintain the peace of Greece. New troubles hence arising, Epaminondas invadeth and wasteth the territory of Lacedemon.

THE Athenians refusing to take advantage of this overthrow fallen upon their old enemies and new confederates the Lacedemonians; did nevertheless finally give them to understand, that their dominion was expired, and therefore their pride might well be laid away. For, taking upon themselves the maintenance of the peace lately concluded, which Agesilaus (perhaps of purpose to make benefit of quarrels that might arise) had left unperfect, they assembled the deputies of all the estates confederated at Athens; where the general liberty of all towns, as well small as great, was ratified, under the stile of the Athenians, and their associates. Hereupon began fresh garboils. The Mantineans claiming power by this decree to order their affairs at their own pleasure did (as it were) in despite of the Spartans, who had enforced them to raise their town, re-edify it, and ally themselves with such of the Arcadians as stood worst affected to Sparta. The Arcadians, a strong nation, consisting of many cities, were distracted with factions; some desiring to hold good correspondence with the Lacedemonians,

some to weaken and keep them low; yet all pretending other ends. The *Lacedemonians* durst not give impeachment to the *Mantineans*; nor take upon them to correct their ill-willers among the *Arcadians*, till such time as the factions broke out into violence, and each part called in foreign help. Then was an army sent from *Sparta*, as it were in defence of the people of *Tegea*, against the *Mantineans*, but indeed against them both. *Agefilas* had the leading of it, but effected nothing. The *Thebans* had by this time subdued the *Phocians*, and were become head of the *Locrians*, *Acarnians*, *Eubeans*, and many others; with the power of which countries, they enter'd *Peloponnesus* in favour of the *Arcadians*, who had, upon expectation of their coming, abstained from giving battel to *Agefilas*. The army of the *Spartans* being dismissed, and *Epaminondas* joined with the *Arcadians*, the region of *Laconia* was invaded and spoiled: a thing so strange, that no oracle could have found belief if any had foretold it. Almost six hundred years were spent, since the *Dorians*, under the posterity of *Hercules*, had seized upon *Laconia*, in all which time, the sound of an enemy's trumpet was not heard in that country: ten years were not fully past since all *Greece* was at the devotion of the *Spartans*: but now the region which neither *Xerxes* with his huge army could once look upon, nor the mighty forces of *Athens*, and other enemy-states had dared to set foot on, saving by stealth, was all on a light fire, the very smoak whereof the women of *Sparta* were ashamed to behold. All which indignity notwithstanding, the *Lacedemonians* did not issue out of *Sparta* to fight, but fought how to preserve the town, setting at liberty as many of their *Heilotes* or slaves, as were willing to bear arms in defence of the state, and somewhat pitifully entreated the *Athenians* to give them succour. From *Corinth* and some towns of *Peloponnesus* they received speedy assistance; the *Athenians* came forward more slowly, so that *Epaminondas* returned without battel, having rebuilt the city of *Messene*, and peopled it anew by calling home the ancient inhabitants, whom the *Lacedemonians* many ages before had chased away into other countries, possessing their territories themselves.

S E C T. III.

The composition between Athens and Sparta for command in war against the Thebans; who again invade and spoil Peloponnesus. The unfortunate presumption of the Arcadians.

THIS journey therefore utterly defaced the reputation of the *Spartans*, in such wise that they did no longer demand the conduct of the army which was to be raised, nor any manner of precedence: but sending ambassadors from *Sparta*, and from all the cities which held league with it, unto *Athens*, they offered to yield the admiralty to the *Athenians*, requesting that they themselves might be generals by land. This had been a composition well agreeing with the situation and quality of these two cities; but it was rejected, because the mariners and others that were to be employed at sea, were men of no mark or estimation, in regard of those companies of horse and foot whereof the land army was compounded, who being all gentlemen or citizens of *Athens* were to have served under the *Lacedemonians*. Wherefore it was agreed that the authority should be divided by time, the *Athenians* ruling five days, the *Lacedemonians* other five, and so successively that each of them should have command of all, both by land and sea. It is manifest,

that in this conclusion vain ambition was more regarded than the common profit, which must of necessity be very slowly advanced, where consultation, resolution, and performance are so often to change hands. This appeared by a second invasion of *Peloponnesus*, wherein the *Thebans* found their enemies so unable to impeach them, that having fortified *Isthmus* from sea to sea, as in former times they had done against *Xerxes*, they were driven out of their strength by *Epaminondas*, who foraged the country without resistance. But as the articles of this league between *Athens* and *Sparta* did, by dividing the conduct in such manner, disable the society, and make it insufficient to those ends for which it was concluded; so the example of it wrought their good, by filling the enemies heads with the like vanity. For the *Arcadians* considering their own numbers which they brought into the field, and having found by many tryals that their people were not inferior to others in strength of body, in courage, or in good foldiership, thought it good reason that they should in like manner share the government with their friends the *Thebans*; and not always continue followers of others, by encreasing whose greatness, they should strengthen their own yoke. Hereupon they began to demean themselves very insolently, whereby they grew hateful to their neighbours, and suspected of the *Thebans* in an ill time. For a motion of general peace having been made (which took not effect, because the city of *Messene* was not abandoned to the *Lacedemonians*) the next enterprize of the *Spartans* and their friends was upon these *Arcadians*, who relying too much upon their own worth, were overthrown in a great battel, their calamity being as pleasing to their confederates as to their enemies.

S E C T. IV.

The great growth of the Theban estate. Embassages of the Greeks to the Persian; with the reasons why he most favoured the Thebans. Troubles in the Persian empire. The fruitless issue of the embassages.

THE *Thebans* especially rejoiced at the *Arcadians* misfortune, considering, that, without their aid, the success of all enterprizes proved so ill; whereas they themselves had by their own power accomplished very well whatsoever they took in hand, and were become not only victorious over the *Lacedemonians*, but patrons over the *Thessalians*, and moderators of the great quarrels that had risen in *Macedonia*, where compounding the differences about that kingdom, as pleased them best, they carried *Philip* the son of *Amyntas*, and father of *Alexander* the Great, as an hostage unto *Thebes*. Having therefore obtained such reputation that little seemed wanting to make them absolute commanders of all *Greece*, they sought means of alliance with the *Persian* king, to whom they sent ambassador the great and famous captain *Pelopidas*, whose reputation drew *Artaxerxes* to grant unto the *Thebans* all that they desired; whereof two especial points were, that *Messene* should remain free from the *Lacedemonians*, and that the *Athenians* should forbear to send their ships of war to sea; only the latter of these two was somewhat qualified with reference to farther advice. The other states of *Greece* did also send their ambassadors at the same time, of whom few or none received much contentment. For the king having found by long experience, how far it concerned him to maintain a sure party in *Greece*, did upon many weighty considerations resolve

solve to bind the *Thebans* firmly unto him; justly expecting, that their greatness should be on that side his own security. The *Athenians* had been ancient enemies to his crown, and, having turn'd the profit of their victories upon the *Persian*, to the purchase of a great estate in *Greece*, maintain'd their signiory in such puissant manner, that (fundry grievous misfortunes notwithstanding) they had endur'd a terrible war, wherein the *Lacedemonians* being follow'd by most of the *Greeks*, and supply'd with treasure, and all sorts of aid, by *Darius Notus*, were not able to vanquish them, till their own indiscretion brought them on their knees. The *Lacedemonians* being victorious over *Athens*, had no sooner established their dominion at home, than they undertook the conquest of *Asia*, from which, tho' by the commotion rais'd in *Greece* with *Persian* gold, they were called back; yet having renew'd their power, and settled things in *Greece*, it was not unlikely that they should upon the next advantage have pursued the same enterprise, had not they been impeached by this *Theban* war. But the *Thebans* contrariwise had always discovered a good affection to the crown of *Persia*. They had sided with *Xerxes*, in his invasion of *Greece*; with *Darius* and the *Lacedemonians*, against *Athens*; and finally, having offer'd much contumely to *Agessilus*, when he put to sea, they drew him home by making war on the confederates of *Sparta*. Besides all these their good deservings, they were no sea-men, and therefore unlikely to look abroad, whereunto if perchance they should have any desire, yet were they disabled by the want of good haven towns, which they could not seize upon without open breach of that peace, whereof they intended to become the executors, giving liberty to all cities that had at any time been free. Wherefore *Artaxerxes* did wholly condescend unto the requests of *Pelopidas*, as far forth as he might without giving open defiance to the rest of *Greece*; and by that means he purchased his own quiet, being never afterwards molested by that nation in the lower *Asia*. The ill means, which the *Greeks* had to disturb *Artaxerxes*, was very beneficial to the estate of *Persia* shortly after these times, in that great rebellion of all the maritime provinces. For had then the affairs of *Greece* been so composed, that any one city might, without impeachment of the rest, have transported an army to assist the revolting *Satrapæ*, or viceroys of *Caria*, *Phrygia*, *Lydia*, *Mysia*, *Lycia*, *Pisidia*, *Pamphilia*, *Cilicia*, *Syria*, and *Phenicia*, human reason can hardly find the means, by which the empire could have been preserv'd from that ruin, which the divine council had deserv'd unto the days of *Alexander*. But this great conspiracy of so many large and wealthy provinces, wanting a firm body of good and hardy soldiers, was in short space discuss'd and vanish'd like a mist, without effect: these effeminate *Asiatics*, wearied quickly with the travels and dangers incident to war, forsaking the common cause, and each man striving to be the first that, by treason to his company, should both redeem the former treason to his prince, and purchase withal his own promotion with increase of riches. Of this commotion, which in course of time follow'd some actions not as yet related, I have rather chosen to make short mention in this place, than hereafter to interrupt the narration of things more important; but for that it was likely a sudden storm, rashly commenced, idly follow'd, and foolishly laid down, having made a great noise with out effect, and having small reference to any other action regardable; as also because in the whole reign of *Artaxerxes*, from the

war of *Cyrus* to the invasion of *Egypt*, I find nothing (this insurrection, and a fruitless journey against the *Cadusians* excepted) worthy of any mention, much less of digression from the course of the business in *Greece*. All, or the most of his time, pass'd away so quietly, that he enjoy'd the pleasures which an empire so great and wealthy could afford unto so absolute a lord, with little disturbance. The troubles which he found were only or chiefly domestical; growing out of the hatred, which *Parysatis*, the queen-mother, bare unto his wife *Statira*, and to such as had been the greatest enemies to her son *Cyrus*, or gloried in his death: upon whom, when by poison and mischievous practices she had satisfy'd her feminine appetite of revenge, thenceforth she wholly apply'd herself to the king's disposition, cherishing in him the leud desire of marrying his own daughter; and filling him with the persuasion, which princes, not endued with an especial grace, do readily entertain, That his own will was the supreme law of his subject, and the rule by which all things were to be measured, and adjudg'd to be good or evil. In this imaginary happiness *Pelopidas*, and the other ambassadors of *Greece*, both found and left him; but left him by so much more assured than they found him, by how much the conclusion of his treaty with them, being altogether to his own advantage, did seem to promise, if not the perpetuity, a long endurance of the same felicity to him and his; or (at the least) a full security of danger from *Greece*, whence only could any danger be fear'd. But such foundations of eternity laid by mortal men in this transitory world, like the tower of *Babel*, are either shaken from heaven, or made vain and unprofitable, ere the frame can be rais'd to full height, by confusion of tongues among the builders. Hereof was found a good example in the *Thebans*, and other estates of *Greece*, that had sent ambassadors to the *Persian*. For whereas it had been concluded, that all towns, as well the little as the great, should be set at liberty, and the *Thebans* made protectors of this common peace, who thereby should become the judges of all controversies that might arise, and leaders in war of all that would enter into this confederacy; the king's letters being solemnly publish'd at *Thebes*, in the presence of ambassadors, drawn thither from all parts of *Greece*; when an oath was required for observation of the form of peace therein set down, a dilatory answer was made by the ambassadors, who said that they were sent to hear the articles, not to swear unto them. Hereby the *Thebans* were driven to send unto each of the cities to require the oath, but in vain. For when the *Corinthians* had boldly refused it, saying, That they did not need it; others took courage by their example to do the like, disappointing the *Thebans* of their glorious hopes, to whom this negotiation with *Artaxerxes* gave neither addition nor confirmation of greatness, but left them as it found them, to rely upon their own swords.

S E C T. V.

How all Greece was divided, between the Athenians and Lacedemonians on the one side, and Thebans on the other. Of the great tumults rising in Arcadia.

THE condition of things in *Greece* at that time did stand thus. *Athens* and *Sparta*, which in former times had commanded all that nation, and each upon envy of the other's greatness drawn all their followers into a cruel intestine war, by which the whole country, and especially the estate of these

two cities, was brought very low, did now conjoin their forces against the *Thebans*, who sought to make themselves lords of all. The *Eleans*, *Corinthians*, and *Achaïans*, followed the party of these ancient governing cities; either for the old reputation of them, and benefits received; or in dislike of those who by strong hand were ready to become rulers, to which authority they could not suddenly aspire without some injury and much envy. The city of *Thebes* abounding with men whom necessity had made warlike, and many victories in few years had filled with great spirits, and being so mighty in dependants, that she had reduced all the continent of *Greece* without *Peloponnesus* (the region of *Attica*, and very little part beside excepted) under such acknowledgment, as wanted not much of mere vassalage, did hope to bring all *Peloponnesus* to the like obedience, wherein already she had set good footing by her conjunction with the states of *Argos*, and of *Arcadia*. The *Argives* had been always bad neighbours to the *Spartans*, to whom they thought themselves in ancient nobility superiors; but were far under them in valour, having been often beaten out of the field by them, and put in danger of losing all; which caused them to suspect and envy nothing more than the greatness and honour of *Sparta*; taking truce with her when she was at rest, and had leisure to bend her whole force against them; but firmly joining with her enemies whensoever they found her entangled in a difficult war. As the *Argives* were, in hatred of *Sparta*, sure friends of *Thebes*, so the *Arcadians*, transported with a great opinion of their own worthiness, had formerly renounced and provoked against them their old confederates and leaders, the *Lacedemonians*, and were now become very doubtful adherents to the *Thebans*. In which regard it was thought convenient by *Epaminondas*, and the state of *Thebes*, to send an army into *Peloponnesus*, before such time as these wavering friends should fall further off, and become either neutral, or, which was to be feared, open enemies. And surely great cause there was to suspect the worst of them, considering that without consent of the *Thebans*, they had made peace with *Athens*; which was very strange, and seemed no less to the *Athenians* themselves, who holding a firm league with *Sparta* at the same time when the *Arcadians* treated with them, did nevertheless accept this new confederacy, not relinquishing the old, because they found that, howsoever these *Arcadians* were enemies to the *Lacedemonians*, they should hereby be drawn somewhat further from their alliance with *Thebes*, which without them was unlikely to invade *Peloponnesus* with a strong army. But this did rather hasten, than by any means stay, the coming of *Epaminondas*; who finding the way somewhat more clear for him (because the city of *Corinth*, which lay upon the isthmus, and had been adverse to *Thebes*, was now, by miseries of this grievous war, driven to become neutral) took occasion hereby, and by some disorders among the *Arcadians*, to visit *Peloponnesus* with an army, consisting of all the power of *Thebes*. A great tumult had risen in *Arcadia* about consecrated money, which many principal men among them had laid hands on, under pretence of employing it to publick uses. In compounding the differences grown upon this occasion, such as had least will to render account of the money which had come into their hands, procured the captain of some *Theban* soldiers, lying in *Tegea*, to take prisoners many of their countrymen, as people desirous of innovation. This was done: but the uproar thereby caused was so great, that the prisoners were forthwith enlarged,

and the *Arcadians*, who had in great numbers taken arms, with much ado scarce pacified. When complaint of the captains' proceedings came to *Thebes*, *Epaminondas* turned all the blame upon them who had made the peace with *Athens*, letting them know, that he would be shortly among them, to judge of their fidelity, by the assistance which they should give him in that war which he intended to make in *Peloponnesus*. These lordly words did greatly amaze the *Arcadians*; who needing not the aid of so mighty a power as he drew along with him, did vehemently suspect that great preparation to be made against themselves. Hereupon such of them, as had before sought means to settle the affairs of their country, by drawing things to some good conclusion of peace, did now forthwith send to *Athens* for help; and withal dispatched some of the principal among them as ambassadors to *Sparta*, by whom they offered themselves to the common defence of *Peloponnesus*, now ready to be invaded. This embassy brought much comfort to the *Lacedemonians*, who feared nothing more than the coming of *Epaminondas*, against whom they well knew that all their forces, and best provisions, would be no more than very hardly sufficient. Forbearing therefore to dispute about prerogatives, they (who had been accustomed unto such a supremacy, as they would in no wise communicate with the powerful city of *Athens*, till other hope of securing their own estate could not be thought upon) did now very gently yield to the *Arcadians*, that the command of the army in chief should be given, for the time, to that city, in whose territory it lay.

S E C T. VI.

A terrible invasion of Peloponnesus by Epaminondas.

CERTAIN it is, that the condition of things did at that time require a very firm consent, and uniform care of the common safety. For besides the great forces raised out of the other parts of *Greece*, the *Argives* and *Messenians*, prepared with all their strength to join with *Epaminondas*; who having lain a while at *Nemea*, to intercept the *Athenians*, received there intelligence, that the army coming from *Athens* would pass by sea; whereupon he dislodged, and came to *Tegea*, which city, and the most of all *Arcadia* besides, forthwith declared themselves his. The common opinion was, that the first attempt of the *Thebans*, would be upon such of the *Arcadians* as had revolted; which caused the *Lacedemonian* captains to fortify *Mantineia* with all diligence, and to send for *Agésilas* to *Sparta*, that he bringing with him all that small force of able men, which remained in the town, they might be strong enough to abide *Epaminondas* there. But *Epaminondas* held so good espial upon his enemies, that had not an unknown fellow brought hastily advertisement of his purpose to *Agésilas*, who was then well onward in the way to *Mantineia*, the city of *Sparta* had suddenly been taken. For thither with all speed and secrecy did the *Thebans* march, who had surely carried the city, notwithstanding any defence that could have been made by that handful of men remaining within it; but that *Agésilas* in all flying haste got into it with his companies, whom the army of his confederates followed thither to the rescue as fast as it was able. The arrival of the *Lacedemonians* and their friends, as it cut off all hope from *Epaminondas* of taking *Sparta*, so it presented him with a fair advantage upon *Mantineia*. It was the time of harvest, which made

made it very likely that the *Mantineans*, finding the war to be carried from their walls into another quarter, would use the commodity of that vacation, by fetching in their corn, and turning out their cattle into their fields, whilst no enemy was near that might impeach them. Wherefore he turned away from *Sparta* to *Mantineia*, sending his horsemen before him, to seize upon all that might be found without the city. The *Mantineans* (according to the expectation of *Epaminondas*) were scattered abroad in the country; far more intent upon their harvest-business, than upon the war, whereof they were secure, as thinking themselves out of distance. By which presumption it fell out, that great numbers of them, and all their cattle, being unable to recover the town, were in a desperate case; and the town it self in no great likelihood of holding out, when the enemy should have taken all their provision of victuals with so many of the people, as had not over-dearly been redeemed, by that city's returning to society with *Thebes*. But at the same time, the *Athenians* coming to the succour of their confederates, whom they thought to have found at *Mantineia*, were very earnestly entreated by the citizens to rescue their goods, and people, from the danger whereinto they were fallen, if it were possible by any couragious adventure to deliver those who otherwise were given as lost. The *Thebans* were known at that time to be the best soldiers of all the *Greeks*; and the commendation of good horfeman-ship had always been given to the *Theffalians*, as excelling in that quality all other nations; yet the regard of honour so wrought upon the *Athenians*, that for the reputation of their city, which had entered into this war, upon no necessity of her own, but only in desire of relieving her distressed friends, they issued forth of *Mantineia*, not abiding so long as to refresh themselves, or their horses with meat; and giving a lusty charge upon the enemy, who as bravely received them, after a long and hot fight, they remained masters of the field, giving by this victory a safe and easy retreat to all that were without the walls. The whole power of the *Beotians* arrived in the place soon after this battel, whom the *Lacedemonians* and their assistants were not far behind.

SECT. VII.

The great battel of Mantinea. The honourable death of Epaminondas, with his commendation.

E*paminondas*, considering that his commission was almost now expired, and that his attempts of surprizing *Sparta* and *Mantineia* having failed, the impression of terror, which his name had wrought in the *Peloponnesians*, would soon vanish, unless by some notable act he should abate their courage in their first growth, and leave some memorable character of his expedition; resolved to give them battel, whereby he reasonably hoped both to settle the doubtful affections of his own associates, and to leave the *Spartans* as weak in spirit and ability as he found them, if not wholly to bring them into subjection. Having therefore warned his men to prepare for that battel, wherein victory should be rewarded with lordship of all *Greece*; and finding the alacrity of his soldiers to be such, as promised the accomplishment of his own desire; he made shew of declining the enemy, and intrenching himself in a place of more advantage, that so by taking from them all expectation of fighting that day, he might allay the heat of their valour, and afterwards strike their senses with amazement, when he should come upon them unexpected. This opinion decei-

ved him not: for with very much tumult, as in so great and sudden a danger, the enemy ran to arms, necessity enforcing their resolution, and the consequence of that day's service urging them to do as well as they might. The *Theban* army consisted of 30000 foot, and 3000 horse; the *Lacedemonians* and their friends were short of this number, both in horse and foot, by a third part. The *Mantineans* (because the war was in their country) stood in the right wing, and with them the *Lacedemonians*; the *Athenians* had the left wing, the *Acheans*, *Eleans*, and others of less account, filled the body of the army. The *Thebans* stood in the left wing of their own battel, opposite to the *Lacedemonians*; having by them the *Arcadians*; the *Eubceans*, *Locricians*, *Sicyonians*, *Messenians*, and *Theffalians* with others, compounding the main battel; the *Argives* held the right wing, the horsemen on each part were placed in the flanks, only a troop of the *Eleans* were in rear. Before the footmen could join, the encounter of the horse on both sides was very rough, wherein finally the *Thebans* prevailed, notwithstanding the valiant resistance of the *Athenians*: who not yielding to the enemy either in courage or skill, were over-laid with numbers, and so beaten upon by *Theffalian* slings, that they were driven to forsake the place, and leave their infantry naked. But this retreat was the less disgraceful, because they kept themselves together, and did not fall back upon their own footmen; but finding the *Theban* horse to have given them over, and without discovering some companies of foot, which had been sent about by *Epaminondas*, to charge their battel in the rear, they broke upon them, routed them, and hewed them all in pieces. In the mean season the battel of the *Athenians* had not only to do with the *Argives*, but was hardly pressed by the *Theban* horsemen, in such wise that it began to open, and was ready to turn back, when the *Elean* squadron of horse came up to the relief of it, and restored all on that part. With far greater violence did the *Lacedemonians* and *Thebans* meet, these contending for dominion, the other for the maintenance of their ancient honour; so that equal courage and equal loss on both sides made the hope and appearance of victory to either equally doubtful; unless perhaps the *Lacedemonians* being very firm abiders, might seem the more likely to prevail, as having borne the first brunt and fury of the onset, which was not hitherto remitted; and being framed by discipline, as it were by nature, to excel in patience, whereof the *Thebans*, by practice of a few years, cannot be thought to have gotten a habit so sure and general. But *Epaminondas* perceiving the obstinate stiffness of the enemies to be such, as neither the bad success of their own horse, nor all the force of the *Beotian* army, could abate so far, as to make them give one foot of ground; taking a choice company of the most able men, whom he cast into the form of a wedge, or diamond, by the advantage of that figure against a squadron, and by his own exceeding virtue, accompanied with the great strength and resolution of them which followed him, did open their ranks, and cleave the whole battel in despite of all resistance. Thus was the honour of that day won by the *Thebans*, who may justly be said to have carried the victory, seeing that they remained masters of the ground whereon the battel was fought, having driven the enemy to lodge farther off. For that which was alledged by the *Athenians*, as a token that the victory was partly theirs, the slaughter of those mercenaries upon whom they lighted by chance in their own flight, finding them behind their army,

and the retaining of their dead bodies; it was a ceremony regardable only among the *Greeks*, and served merely for ostentation, shewing that by the fight they had obtained somewhat, which the enemy could not get from them otherwise than by request. But the *Thebans* arrived at the general immediate end of battel; none daring to abide them in the field: whereof a manifest confession is expressed from them, who forsake the place which they had chosen or accepted, as indifferent for tryal of their ability and prowess. This was the last work of the incomparable virtue of *Epaminondas*, who being in the head of that warlike troop of men, which broke the *Lacedemonian* squadron, and forced it to give back in disarray, was furiously charged on the sudden by a desperate company of the *Spartans*, who all at once threw their darts at him alone; whereby receiving many wounds, he nevertheless with a singular courage maintained the fight, using against the enemies many of their darts, which he drew out of his own body; till at length by a *Spartan*, called *Anticrates*, he received so violent a stroke with a dart, that the wood of it broke, leaving the iron and a piece of the trunchion in his breast. Hereupon he sunk down, and was soon conveyed out of the fight by his friends; having by his fall somewhat animated the *Spartans* (who fain would have got his body) but much more enflamed with revengeful indignation, the *Thebans*, who raging at this heavy mischance, did with great slaughter compel their disordered enemies to leave the field; though long they followed not the chase, being wearied more with the sadneis of this disaster, than with all the travel of the day. *Epaminondas* being brought into his tent, was told by the physicians, that when the head of the dart should be drawn out of his body, he must needs die. Hearing this, he called for his shield, which to have lost was held a great dishonour: it was brought unto him. He bad them tell him which part had the victory, answer was made, that the *Boeotians* had won the field. Then said he, it is fair time for me to die; and withal sent for *Isidas* and *Diophantes*, two principal men of war that were both slain; which being told him, he advised the *Thebans* to make peace, whilst with advantage they might, for that they had none left that was able to discharge the office of a general. Herewithal he willed that the head of the weapon should be drawn out of his body; comforting his friends that lamented his death, and want of issue, by telling them that the victories of *Leuctra* and *Mantineia* were two fair daughters, in whom his memory should live.

So died *Epaminondas*, the worthiest man that ever was bred in that nation of *Greece*, and hardly to be matched in any age or country: for he equalled all others in the several virtues, which in each of them were singular. His justice, and sincerity, his temperance, wisdom, and high magnanimity, were no way inferior to his military virtue; in every part whereof he so excelled, that he could not properly be called a wary, a valiant, a politic, a bountiful or an industrious, and a provident captain; all these titles, and many other, being due unto him, which with his notable discipline, and good conduct, made a perfect composition of an heroic general. Neither was his private conversation unanswerable to those high parts, which gave him praise abroad. For he was grave, and yet very affable and courteous; resolute in publick business, but in his own particular easy, and of much mildness; a lover of his people, bearing with mens infirmities, witty and pleasant in speech, far from insolence, master of his own affections, and furnished with all qualities

that might win and keep love. To these graces were added great ability of body, much eloquence and very deep knowledge in all parts of philosophy and learning, wherewith his mind being enlightened, rested not in the sweetness of contemplation, but broke forth into such effects as gave unto *Thebes* which had evermore been an underling, a dreadful reputation among all people adjoining, and the highest command in *Greece*.

SECT. VIII.


Of the peace concluded in Greece after the battel of Mantineia. The voyage of Agesilaus into Egypt. His death and qualities; with an examination of the comparison made between him and Pompey the Roman.


THIS battel of *Mantineia* was the greatest that ever had been fought in that country, between the naturals, and the last. For at *Marathon* and *Platea*, the populous armies of the barbarous nations gave rather a great fame, than a hard tryal to the *Grecian* valour; neither were the practice of arms and art military so perfect in the beginnings of the *Peloponnesian* war, as long continuance and daily exercise had now made them. The times following produced no actions of worth or moment, those excepted which were undertaken against foreign enemies, proving for the most part unfortunate. But in this last fight, all *Greece* was interested, which never had more able soldiers, and brave commanders, nor ever contended for victory with greater care of the success, or more obstinate resolution. All which notwithstanding, the issue being such as hath been related, it was found best for every particular estate, that a general peace should be established, every one retaining what he presently had, and none being forced to depend upon another. The *Messenians* were by name comprised in this new league, which caused the *Lacedemonians* not to enter into it. Their standing out hindered not the rest from proceeding to conclusion; considering that *Sparta* was now too weak to offend her neighbours, and therefore might well be allowed to shew that anger in ceremonies which had no power to declare it self in execution. This peace, as it gave some breath and refreshing to all the country, so to the cities of *Athens* and *Sparta* it afforded leisure to seek after wealth by foreign employment in *Egypt*, whither *Agesilaus* was sent with some small forces to assist, or indeed, as a mercenary, to serve under *Tachos* king of *Egypt*, in his war upon *Syria*. *Chabrias* the *Athenian*, who had before commanded under *Acoris* king of *Egypt*, went now as a voluntary, with such forces as he could raise by entreaty, and offer of good pay, to the same service. These *Egyptian* kings descended from *Amyntus* of *Sais*, who rebelled against *Darius* *Nothus*, having retained the country notwithstanding all intestine dissensions and foreign invasions, during three generations of their own race, were so well acquainted with the valour of the *Greeks*, that by their help (easily procured with gold) they conceived great hope, not only to assure themselves, but to become lords of the provinces adjoining, which were held by the *Persian*. What the issue of this great enterprise might have been, had it not fallen by domestick rebellion, it is uncertain. But very likely it is, that the rebellion it self had soon come to nothing, if *Agesilaus* had not proved a false traitor, joyning with *Nectanebus*, who rose against his prince, and helping the rebel with that army which the money of *Tachos* had waged. This falshood *Agesilaus* executed,

sed, as tending to the good of his own country ; though it seems rather, that he grudged because the king took upon himself the conduct of the army, using his service only as lieutenant, who had made full account of being appointed the general. Howsoever it came to pass, *Tachos* being shamefully betrayed by them, in whom he had reposed his chief confidence, fled unto the *Perſian*, who upon his ſubmiſſion gave him gentle entertainment ; and *Neſtanebus* (who ſeems to have been the nephew of *Tachos*) reigned in his ſtead. At the ſame time the citizens of *Mendes* had ſet up another king, to whom all, or moſt of the *Egyptians* yielded their obedience. But *Ageſilaus* fighting with him in places of advantage, prevailed ſo far, that he left *Neſtanebus* in quiet poſſeſſion of the kingdom ; who in recompenſe of his treaſon to the former king *Tachos*, and good ſervice done to himſelf rewarded him with two hundred and thirty talents of ſilver, with which booty ſailing homewards, he died by the way. He was a prince very temperate and valiant, and a good leader in war ; free from covetouſneſs, and not reproached with any blemiſh of luſt ; which praiſes are the leſs admirable in him, for that the diſcipline of *Sparta* was ſuch as did endue every one of the citizens (not carried away by the violent ſtream of an ill nature) with all, or the chief, of theſe good qualities. He was nevertheless very arrogant, perverſe, unjuſt, and vain-glorious, meaſuring all things by his own will, and obſtinately proſecuting thoſe courſes whoſe ends were beyond hope. The expedition of *Xenophon* had filled him with an opinion, that by his hand the empire of *Perſia* ſhould be overthrown ; with which conceit being tranſported, and finding his proceedings interrupted by the *Thebans*, and their allies, he did ever after bear ſuch hatred unto *Thebes*, as compelled that eſtate by mere neceſſity to grow warlike, and able, to the utter diſ-

honour of *Sparta*, and the irreparable loſs of all her former greatneſs. The commendations given to him by *Xenophon* his good friend, have cauſed *Plutarch* to lay his name in the balance againſt *Pompey* the Great ; whoſe actions (the ſolemn gravity of carriage excepted) are very diſproportionable. Yet we may truly ſay, That as *Pompey* made great wars under ſundry climates, and in all the provinces of the *Roman* empire, exceeding in the multitude of employments all that were before him ; ſo *Ageſilaus* had at one time or other ſome quarrel with every town in *Greece* ; had made a war in *Aſia*, and meddled in the buſineſs of the *Egyptians*, in which variety, he went beyond all his predeceſſors : yet not winning any countries, as *Pompey* did many, but obtaining large wages, which *Pompey* never took. Herein alſo they are very like, each of them was the laſt great captain which his nation brought forth in time of liberty, and each of them ruined the liberty of his country by his own lordly wilfulneſs. We may therefore well ſay, *Similia magis omnia quam paria* ; The reſemblance was nearer than the equality. Indeed the freedom of *Rome* was loſt with *Pompey*, falling into the hands of *Cæſar*, whom he had enforced to take arms ; yet the *Roman* empire ſtood, the form of government only being changed : but the liberty of *Greece*, or of *Sparta* it ſelf, was not forfeited unto the *Thebans*, whom *Ageſilaus* had compelled to enter into a victorious war ; yet the ſignior, and ancient renown of *Sparta* was preſently loſt : and the freedom of all *Greece* being wounded in this *Theban* war, and after much blood loſt, ill healed by the peace enſuing, did very ſoon upon the death of *Ageſilaus* give up the gholt, and the lordſhip of the whole country was ſeized by *Philip* king of *Macedon*, whoſe actions are now on foot, and more to be regarded than the contemporary paſſages of things, in any other nation.

The End of the Third Book.





THE
HISTORY
OF THE
WORLD:

INTREATING of the

*Times from the Reign of PHILIP of MACEDON,
to the establisbing of that Kingdom in the Race
of ANTIGONUS.*


The FOURTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Of Philip, the Father of Alexander the Great, King of Macedon.

SECT. I.

What kings reigned in Macedon before Philip.



THE *Greeks*, of whom we have already made large discourse, not as yet wearied with intestine war, nor made wise by their vain contention for superiority, do still, as in former times, continue the invasion and vastation of each other.

Against *Xerxes*, the greatest monarch of that part of the world, they defended their liberty with as happy success as ever nation had, and with no less honour than hath ever been acquired by deeds of arms. And having had a tryal, and experience, more than fortunate, against those nations, they so little regarded what might come from them, who had so often forfeited the reputation of their forces,

as whatsoever could be spared from their own distraction at home, they transported over the *Hellspont*, as sufficient to entertain and busy them withal.

But, as it commonly falleth out with every man of mark in the world, that they under-fall and perish by the hands and harms which they least fear; so fared it at this time with the *Greeks*. For of *Philip of Macedon* (of whom we are now to speak) they had so little regard, as they grew even then more violent in devouring each other, when the fast growing greatness of such a neighbour-king should, in regard of their own safeties, have served them for a strong argument of union and accord. But the glory of their *Persian* victories, wherewith they

they were pamper'd and made proud, taught them to neglect all nations but themselves, and the rather to value at little the power and purposes of the *Macedonians*, because those kings and states, which sat nearer them than they did, had in the time of *Amyntas*, the father of *Philip*, so much weakened them, and won upon them, that they were not (as the *Grecians* perswaded themselves) in any one age, likely to recover their own, much less to work any wonders against their borderers. And indeed it was not in their philosophy to consider, that all great alterations are storm-like, sudden and violent; and that it is then over-late to repair the decayed and broken banks, when great rivers are once swollen, fast running, and enraged. No, the *Greeks* did rather imploy themselves, in breaking down those defences which stood between them and this inundation, than seek to rampare and re-enforce their own fields, which by the level of reason they might have found to have lain under it. It was therefore well concluded by *Orosius*, *Græciæ civitates dum imperare singulæ cupiunt, imperium omnes perdiderunt*; The cities of *Greece* lost their command, by striving each of them to command all.

The kingdom of *Macedon*, so called of *Macedon*, the son of *Osiris*, or, as other authors affirm, of *Jupiter* and *Ethra*, is the next region towards the north which bordereth *Greece*; it hath to the east, the *Egean* sea; it is bounded on the north and north-west, by the *Thracians* and *Illyrians*; and on the south and south-west, by *Thessaly* and *Epirus*.

Their kings were of the family of *Temenus*, of the race of *Hercules*, and by nation *Argives*; who are listed as followeth. About some six years after the translation of the *Affyrian* empire, *Arbaces* then governing *Media*, *Caranus* of *Argos*, commanded by an oracle to lead a colony into *Macedon*, departed thence with many people, and as he was marching through that country, the weather being rainy and tempestuous, he espied a great herd of goats, which fled the storm as fast as they could, hasting them to their known place of covert. Whereupon *Caranus* calling to mind, that he had also by another oracle been directed to follow the first troop of beasts, that should either lead him or fly before him, he pursued these goats to the gates of *Edeffa*, and being undiscovered by the inhabitants, by reason of the darkness of the air, he enter'd their city without resistance, and possess'd it. Soon after this, by the overthrow of *Cisseus*, *Caranus* became lord of the rest of *Macedon*, and held it eight and twenty years. *Cenus* succeeded *Caranus*, and reigned twelve years. *Tyrinus* followed *Cenus*, and ruled eight and twenty years.

Perdiccas the first, the son of *Tyrinus*, governed one and fifty years: a prince, for his great valour, and many other virtues, much renowned. *Solinus*, *Pliny*, *Justin*, *Eusebius*, *Theophilus*, *Antiochennus*, and others affirm, that he appointed a place of burial for himself, and for all the kings of *Macedon* his successors, at *Ege*; assuring them that the kingdom should so long continue in his line and race, as they continued to lay up their bodies in that sepulchre; wherein it is said, that because *Alexander* the great failed, therefore the posterity of the *Temenide* failed in him: a thing rather devised after the effect, as I conceive, than foretold by *Perdiccas*.

Agæus succeeded unto *Perdiccas*, and ruled eight and twenty years.

Philip the first, his successor, reigned twenty eight years:

Europus followed *Philip*, and governed six and twenty years: in whose infancy the *Illyrians* invaded *Macedon*, and having obtained a great victory, they pursued the same to the great danger of that state. Whereupon the *Macedonians* gathering new forces, and resolving either to recover their former loss, or to lose at once both their kingdom and their king, they carried him with them in his cradle into the field, and returned victorious; for they were either confident that their nation could not be beaten (their king being present) or rather they perswaded themselves that there was no man so void of honour and compassion, as to abandon their natural lord, being an infant, and no way (but by the hands of his servants) able to defend himself from destruction. The like is reported by *Aimonius*, of *Clotarus* the son of *Fredegunda*.

Alcetas succeeded *Eropus*, and ruled nine and twenty years.

Amyntas the first succeeded *Alcetas*, and reigned fifty years; he lived at such time as *Darius Hyaspes*, after his unprosperous return out of *Scythia*, sent *Magabazus* with an army into *Europe*, who, in *Xerxes*'s name required *Amyntas* to acknowledge him for his supreme lord, by yielding unto him earth and water. But his ambassadors, as you have heard before, were, for their insolent behaviour towards the *Macedonian* ladies, slain by the direction of *Alexander*, who was the son of *Amyntas* and his successor.

Alexander surnamed the rich, the son of *Amyntas*, governed *Macedon* three and forty years. He did not only appease the wrath of *Magabazus*, for the slaughter of the *Persian* ambassadors, by giving *Gygea* his sister, to *Bubares* of the blood of *Persia*, but by that match he grew so great in *Xerxes*'s grace, as he obtained all that region between the mountains of *Olympus* and *Hemus*, to be united to the kingdom of *Macedon*. Yet could not these benefits buy his affection from the *Greeks*. For *Xerxes* being returned into *Asia*, and *Mardonius* made general of the *Persian* army, *Alexander* acquainted the *Greeks* with all his intents and purposes against them. He had three sons, *Perdiccas*, *Alcetas*, and *Philip*.

Perdiccas the second, the son of *Alexander*, lived in the time of the *Peloponnesian* war, and reigned in all eight and twenty years. The wars which he made were not much remarkable: the story of them is found here and there by pieces, in *Thucydides*'s first six books. He left behind him two sons; *Perdiccas*, who was very young, and *Archelaus*, who was base born.

Perdiccas the third, being delivered to the custody and care of *Archelaus*, was at seven years of age cast into a well and drowned by his false guardian: who excusing this fact to *Cleopatra* the mother of the young king, said, that the child in following a goose hastily fell thereinto by misadventure. But *Archelaus* stayed not here: for having thus dispatched his brother, he slew both his uncle *Alcetas*, the son of *Alexander* the rich, and *Alexander* the son of this *Alcetas*, his cousin-german, and enjoyed the kingdom of *Macedon* himself four and twenty years.

This *Archelaus*, of whom both *Plato* and *Aristotle* make mention, though he made himself king

^a *Orosius*, l. 3. c. 12.
^c *Euseb.* in *Chron.*
⁸ *Plut.* *Euseb.* *Just.* &c.

^b *Paul.* *Dion.* *Chass.* *Theop.* *Antiof.* 6.
^f *Euseb.* *Justin.* *Ammian.* *The.* *Ant.* &c. *Aimon.* l. 3. c. 82.
¹ *Plat.* in *Gorg.* *Arist.* in *Pol.* 5

^e *Euseb.* in *Chron.*
^h *Her.* *Euseb.* *Justin.* &c.

⁴ *Sol.* c. 14. *Plin.* l. 4. c. 10.
^h *Her.* l.

by wicked murder, yet he performed many things greatly to the profit of his nation. It is said, That he fought by all means to draw *Socrates* unto him, and that he greatly loved and honoured *Euripides* the *Tragedian*. He had two sons, *Archelaus* and *Orestes*.

Archelaus the second succeeded his father, and having reigned seven years, he was slain in hunting, either by chance or of purpose, by *Cræteus*.

Orestes his younger son was committed to the education of *Æropus*, of the royal blood of *Macedon*, and had the same measure which *Archelaus* had measured to his pupil; for *Æropus* murdered him and usurped the kingdom, which he held some six years: the same who denied passage to *Agésilas* king of *Sparta*, who desired after his return from the *Asian* expedition, to pass by the way of *Macedon* into *Greece*.

^a This usurper left three sons, *Pausanias*, *Argæus*, and *Alexander*. *Pausanias* succeeded his father *Æropus*, and having reigned one year, he was driven out by *Amyntas* the son of *Philip*, the son of the first *Perdiccas*, the son of *Alexander* the rich; which *Philip* was then preserved, when *Archelaus* the bastard slew his brother *Perdiccas*, his uncle *Acetas*, and his son *Alexander*. This *Amyntas* reigned (tho' very quietly) 24 years; for he was not only infested by *Pausanias*, assisted by the *Thracians*, and by his brother *Argæus*; encouraged by the *Illyrians*; and by the said *Argæus*, for two years dispossess'd of *Macedon*: but on the other side, the *Olynthians*, his neighbours near the *Ægean* Sea, made themselves for a while masters of *Pella*, the chief city of *Macedon*.

Amyntas the second had by his wife *Eurydice* the *Illyrian*, three sons; *Alexander* the second, *Perdiccas* the third, and *Philip* the second, father of *Alexander* the great; and one daughter called *Euryone* or *Exione*: he had also by his second wife *Gygea*, three sons; *Archelaus*, *Argæus*, and *Mene-laüs*, afterwards slain by their brother *Philip*. He had more by a concubine, *Ptolemy*, surnamed *Alorites*, of the city *Alorus*, wherein he was born.

Alexander the second reigned not much above one year, in which time he was invaded by *Pausanias*, the son of *Æropus*, but defended by *Iphicrates* the *Athenian*, while he was at that time about *Amphipolis*. He was also constrained (for the payment of a great sum of money) to leave his youngest brother *Philip* in hostage with the *Illyrians*, who had subjected his father *Amyntas* to the payment of tribute. After this, *Alexander* being invited by the *Alcivade* against *Alexander* the tyrant of *Pheres* in *Thessaly*, having redeemed his brother *Philip*; to draw the *Thebans* to his assistance, entered into confederacy with *Polopidas*, being at that time in the same country, with whom he also left *Philip*, with divers others principal persons for the gage of his promises to *Polopidas*. But *Eurydice* his mother falling in love with her son-in-law, who had married her daughter *Euryone* or *Exione*, practised the death of *Alexander* her son, with a purpose to confer the kingdom on her paramour, which *Ptolemy Alorites* did put in execution: by means whereof he held *Macedon* for three years, but was soon after slain by *Perdiccas* the brother of *Alexander*. ^b *Diodore* hath it otherwise of *Philip's* being made pledge; and saith, That *Amyntas* his father delivered him for hostage to the *Illyrians*, by whom he was conveyed to *Thebes*, there to be kept; others report that *Philip* (while his father was yet living) was first engaged to the *Thebans*, and

delivered for hostage a second time by *Alexander* his brother.

Perdiccas the third, after he had slain *Alorites* his base brother, governed *Macedon* five years, and was then slain in battel against the *Illyrians*, according to *Diodorus*; but *Justin* affirmeth, that he perished by the practice of *Eurydice* his mother, as *Alexander* did.

SECT. II.

The beginning of Philip's reign, and how he delivered Macedon from the troubles wherein he found it entangled.

Philip the second, the youngest son of *Amyntas* by *Eurydice*, having been instructed in all knowledge requisite unto the government of a kingdom, in that excellent education which he had under *Epaminondas*, ^c making an escape from *Thebes*, returned into *Macedon*, in the first year of the hundred and fifth *Olympiad*, which was after the building of *Rome* three hundred fourscore and thirteen years: and finding the many enemies and dangers wherewith the kingdom was invironed, he took on him, not as king (for *Perdiccas* left a son, tho' but an infant) but as the protector of his nephew, and commander of the men of war. Yet his fruitful ambition soon overgrew his modesty, and he was easily persuaded by the people to accept both the title of king, and withal the absolute rule of the kingdom. And to say the truth, the necessity of the state of *Macedon* at that time required a king both prudent and active. For, besides the incursions of the *Illyrians* and *Pannonians*, the king of *Thrace* did set up in opposition *Pausanias*; the *Athenians*, *Argæus*; sons of the late usurper *Æropus*: each of these labouring to place in *Macedon* a king of their own election. These heavy burthens when *Philip* could not well bear, he bought off the weightiest by money, and by fair promises unloaded himself of so many of the rest, as he ran under the remainder happily enough. For, notwithstanding that his brother *Perdiccas* had his death accompanied with four thousand *Macedonians*, besides these that were wounded and taken prisoners; and that the *Pannonians* were destroying all before them in *Macedon*: and that the *Athenians* with a fleet by sea, and three thousand soldiers by land under *Mantias*, did beat upon him on all sides and quarters of his country: yet after he had practised the men of war of *Pannonia*; and corrupted them with gifts; and had also bought the king of *Thrace* from *Pausanias*, he forthwith made head against the *Athenians* his stiffest enemies; and, for the first, he prevented their recovery of *Amphipolis*, a city on the frontier of *Macedon*: and did then pursue *Argæus* the son of *Æropus*, set against him by the *Athenians*, and followed him so hard at the heels in his retreat from *Æges*, that he forced him to abide the battel: which *Argæus* lost, having the greatest part of his army slain in the place. Those of the *Athenians*, and others which remained unbroke, took the advantage of a strong piece of ground at hand, which tho' they could not long defend, yet avoiding thereby the present fury of the soldiers, they obtained of the vanquishers life and liberty to return into *Attica*. Whereupon a peace was concluded between him and the *Athenians* for that present, and for this clemency he was greatly renowned and honoured by all the *Greeks*.

^a Plut. Polyan. Plut. in Demet.

^b Died 1. 15 & 16.

^c Ibid 1.

^d Died 1. 10.

S E C T. III.

The good success which Philip had in many enterprises.

NOW had Philip leisure to look northward, and to attend the *Illyrians* and *Peonians*, his irreconcilable enemies and borderers: both which he invaded with so prosperous success, as he slew *Bardillas*, king of the *Illyrians*, with seven thousand of his nation, and thereby recovered all those places, which the *Illyrians* held in *Macedon*; and withal, upon the death of the king of *Pannonia*, he pierced that country, and, after a main victory obtained, he enforced them to pay him tribute. This was no sooner done, than (without staying to take longer breath) he hastened speedily towards *Larissa*, upon the river *Peneus* in *Thessaly*, of which town he soon made himself master; and thereby he got good footing in that country, whereof he made use in time following. Now altho' he resolved either to subdue the *Thessalians*, or to make them his own against all others, because the horsemen of that country were the best, and most feared in that part of *Europe*; yet he thought it most for his safety to close up the entrances out of *Thrace*, lest while he invaded *Thessaly* and *Greece* towards the south, those ample nations, lying towards the north, should either withdraw him, or over-run *Macedon*, as in former times. He therefore attempted *Amphipolis*, seated on the famous river of *Strimon*, which parteth *Thrace* from *Macedon*, and won it. He also recovered *Pydna*; and (to the north of *Amphipolis*) the city of *Crenides* (sometime *Datus*) and called it after his own name *Philippi*: to the people whereof *St. Paul* afterward directed one of his epistles. This place, wherein *Philippi* stood, is very rich in mines of gold, out of which, greatly to the advancement of *Philip's* affairs, he drew yearly 1000 talents, which make 600000 *French* crowns.

And that he might with the more ease disburden the *Thracian* shores of the *Athenian* garrisons, to which he had given a great blow by the taking in of *Amphipolis*, he entered into league with his father's malicious enemies, the *Olynthians*; whom the better to fasten unto him, he gave them the city of *Pydna*, with the territory, meaning nothing less than that they should enjoy it, or their own estate many years.

Now that he might by degrees win ground upon the *Greeks*, he took the fair occasion to deliver the city of *Pheres* in *Thessaly*, from the tyranny of *Lycophron* and *Tisiphonus*. Who, after they had conspired with *Thebe* the wife of *Alexander*, who usurped upon the liberty of that state, they themselves (*Alexander* being murdered) held it also by the same strong hand and oppression that *Alexander* did, till by the assistance of *Philip* they were beaten out, and *Pheres* restored to her former liberty. Which act of *Philip* did for ever after fasten the *Thessalians* unto him, and, to his exceeding great advantage, bind them to his Service.

S E C T. IV.

Of the Phocian war, which first drew Philip into Greece.

ABOUT this time, to wit, in the second year of the hundred and sixth *Olympiad*, eight years after the battel of *Mantineia*, and about

the eight year of *Artaxerxes Ocbass*, began that war, called *Sacred*. Now, as all occasions concur towards the execution of eternal providence and of every great alteration in the world, there is some preceding preparation, tho' not at the first easily discerned; so did this revengeful hatred by the *Thebans*, *Thessalians*, and *Locrians*, conceived against the *Phocians*, not only teach *Philip* how he might with half a hand wrest the sword out of their fingers; but the *Greeks* themselves beating down their own defences, to give him an easy passage, and beating themselves, to give him victory without peril, left nothing unperformed towards their own slavery, saving the title and imposition. Of this war the *Thebans* (made over-proud by their victory at *Leuctres*) were the inflamers. For at the council of the *Amphyctiones*, or of the general estates of *Greece*, in which, at that time, they swayed most, they caused both the *Lacedemonians* and *Phocians* to be condemned in greater sums of money than they could well bear; the one for surprising the castle of *Cadmea* in the time of peace; the other for ploughing up a piece of ground belonging to the temple of *Delphos*. The *Phocians* being resolved not to obey this edict, were secretly set on and encouraged by the *Lacedemonians*: and for refusal were exposed as *Sacrileggers*, and accursed to all their neighbour-nations, for whom it was then lawful to invade and destroy them at their pleasures.

The *Phocians*, persuaded thereunto by *Philomelus*, a captain of their own, cast the same dice of hazard that *Cesar* after many ages following did; but had not the same chance. Yet they dealt well enough with all the enemies of their own nation. And the better to bear out an ungracious quarrel, of which there was left no hope of composition, they resolved to sack the temple it self. For seeing, that for the ploughing of a piece of *Apollo's* ground, they had so much offended their neighbour-god, and their neighbour-nations, as worse could not befall them than already was intended; they resolved to take the gold with the ground, and either to perish for all, or to prevail against all that had commission to call them to account. The treasure which they took out of the temple in the beginning of the war was 10000 talents, which in those days served them to wage a great many men, and such was their success in the beginning of the war, as they won three great battels against the *Thebans*, *Thessalians*, and *Locrians*, but being beaten in the fourth, their leader *Philomelus* cast himself headlong over the rocks.

In the mean while the cities of *Cherfoneus*, both to defend themselves against their bad neighbour *Philip*, who encroached upon them, and to draw others into their quarrel, rendred themselves to the *Athenians*. *Philip* prepareth to get them into his hands, and at the siege of *Metone* lost one of his eyes. It is said, that he that shot him did purposely direct his arrow towards him, and that it was written on the shaft thereof: "After *Philippo*, After to *Philip*"; for so he was called, that gave him the wound. This city he evened with the soil.

The tyrant *Lycophron* before-mentioned, while *Philip* was busied on the border of *Thrace*, and the *Thessalians* engaged in the holy war, entered *Thessaly* with new forces, being assisted by *Onomarchus*, commander of the *Phocian* army, in place of *Philomelus*. For hereby the *Phocians* hoped so to entertain the *Thessalians* at home, as they should not find leisure to invade them. Hereupon was *Philip*

the second time called into *Thessaly*; but both the *Thessalians* and *Macedonians* (*Philip* being present) were utterly overthrown by *Onomarchus*; and great numbers of both nations lost. From *Thessaly*, *Onomarchus* drew speedily towards *Boeotia*, and with the same victorious army brake the forces of the *Beotians*, and took from them their city of *Coronea*. But *Philip*, impatient of his late misadventure, after he had reinforced his army, returned with all speed into *Thessaly*, there to find again the honour which he lately lost: and was the second time encounter'd by *Onomarchus*, who brought into the field twenty thousand foot, and five hundred horse. All this great preparation sufficed not; for *Onomarchus* was by *Philip* surmounted, both in number and good fortune, his army overturned, six thousand slain, and three thousand taken; of which number, himself being one, was among others hanged by *Philip*. Those that fled were in part received by the *Athenian* gallies, which sailed along the coast, commanded by *Chares*; but the greatest number of those that took the sea, were therein devoured ere they recovered them. *Lycophron* was now again driven out of *Thessaly*, and *Pheres* made free as before.

S E C T. V.

Of the Olynthian war. The ambitious practices of Philip.

FROM hence *Philip* resolved to invade *Phocis* it self, but the *Athenians* did not favour his entrance into those parts; and therefore with the help of the *Lacedemonians* they retrench'd his passage at the streights of *Thermopylis*. Whereupon he returned into *Macedon*, and after the taking of *Micyberne*, *Torone*, and other towns, he quarrelled with the *Olynthians*, whom not long before he had wooed to his alliance, and bought his peace of them. For the *Olynthians* were very strong, and had evermore both braved and beaten the *Macedonians*. It is said, that *Philip* having put to death *Archelaus* his half-brother (for *Amyntas* had three sons by *Eurydice* the mother of *Philip*, and three other sons by *Gygea*: but *Philip's* elder brothers by the same mother being dead, he determin'd to rid himself also of the rest) the two younger held themselves within *Olynthus*; and that the receiving of them by the *Olynthians* was the cause of the war, ^a *Justin* affirmeth. But just quarrels are ballanced by just princes; for to this king all things were lawful that might any way serve his turn; all his affections and passions, how diverse soever in other men, were in his ambition swallowed up, and thereinto converted. For he neither forbore the murder of his own brothers, the breach of faith, the buying of other mens fidelity; he esteem'd no place strong where his arms laden with gold might enter; nor city or state unconquerable, where a few of the greatest, to be made greater, could lose the sense of other mens sorrow and subjection. And because he thought it vain to practise the winning of *Olynthus*, till he had inclosed all the power they had within their own walls, he enter'd their territory, and by the advantage of a well-compounded and trained army, he gave them two overthrows ere he sat down before the city it self: which done, he bought *Euticrates* and *Lasibene* from their people, and from the service of their country and common-weal; by whose treason he enter'd the town, slew his brothers therein, sack'd it, and sold the inhabitants for slaves by the drum.

By the spoil of this place he greatly enriched himself, and had treasure sufficient to buy in other cities withal, which he daily did. For so was he advised by the oracle in the beginning of his undertaking, *That he should make his assaults with silver spears*: Whereupon ^b *Horace* well and truly said,

—*Diffidit urbium*

*Portas vir Macedo, & subruit amulos
Reges muneribus.* —

By gifts the *Macedon* clave gates asunder,
The kings envying his estate brought under.

And it is true that he won more by corruption and fraud, than he did by force. For, as he had in all the principal cities of *Greece* his secret workers (which way of conquest was well followed by *Philip* the second of *Spain*:) so when in the contention between the competitors for the kingdom of *Thrace*, he was chosen the arbitrator, he came not to the council accompanied with piety and justice, but with a powerful army, and having beaten and slain both kings, gave sentence for himself, and made the kingdom his own.

S E C T. VI.

How Philip ended the Phocian war.

THE war still continuing between the *Phocians* and the associates of the holy war, the *Beotians*, finding themselves unable to subsist without some present aid, sent unto *Philip* for succour, who willingly yielded to their necessities, and sent them such a proportion of men as were neither sufficient to master their enemies, nor to assure themselves; but yet to enable them to continue the war, and to waste the strength of *Greece*. They also sent to *Artaxerxes Ochus* for supply of treasure, who lent them thirty talents, which makes an hundred and fourscore thousand crowns; but when with these supplies they had still the worst in all their attempts against the *Phocians*, who held from them three of their strongest cities within *Boeotia* it self; they then besought *Philip* of *Macedon* that he would assist them in person, to whom they would give an entrance into their territory, and in all things obey his commandments in that war.

Now had *Philip* what he longed for; for he knew himself in state to give the law to both; and so quitting all his other purposes towards the north, he marched with a speedy pace towards *Boeotia*; where being arrived, *Phaltecus*, who commanded the *Phocian* army, fearing to shock with this victorious king, made his own peace, and withdrew himself with a regiment of eight thousand soldiers into *Peloponnesus*, leaving the *Phocians* to the mercy of the conqueror; and for conclusion, he had the glory of that war, called *Sacred*, which the *Grecians* with so many mutual slaughters had continued for ten years; and, besides the glory, he possess'd himself of *Orchomene*, *Coronea*, and *Corisia*, in the country of the *Beotians*, who invited him to be victorious over themselves. He brought the *Phocians* into servitude, and wasted their cities, and gave them but their villages to inhabit, reserving to himself the yearly tribute of threescore talents, which make thirty six thousand *French* crowns. He also hereby (besides the fame of piety for service of the gods) obtained the same double voice in the council of the *Amphytioms*, which the *Phocians* had, with the superintendency of the *Pythian* games

^a Just. l. 8

^b Hor. Carm. Od. 16.

forfeited by the *Corinthians*, by being partakers in the *Phocian* sacrilege.

S E C T. VII.

How Philip with ill success attempted upon Perinthus, Byzantium, and the Scythians.

Philip, after his triumphant return into *Macedon*, by the lieutenant of his army *Parmenio*, slaughtered many thousands of the *Illyrians* and *Dardanians*, and brought the *Thracians* to pay him the tenth part of all their revenues. But his next enterprise against the *Perinthians* staid his fury. *Perinthus* was a city of *Thrace* seated upon *Propontis*, in the mid-way between *Sestos* and *Byzantium*; a place of great strength, and a people resolved to defend their liberty against *Philip*, where the *Athenians* encouraged and assisted them. *Philip* sat down before it with a puissant army, made many fair breaches, gave many furious assaults, built many over-topping and commanding towers about it. But he was repelled with equal violence. For whereas *Philip* thought by his continual assaults to weary them, and waste both their men and munition, they were supplied not only from the *Persian* with men and money, and succoured from *Byzantium*, which stood upon the same sea-coast, but they were relieved from *Athens*, *Chio*, and *Rhodes*, by the conduction of *Phocion*, with whatsoever was wanting to their necessity. But because those of *Byzantium*, by reason of their neighbourhood, and the easy passage by water, gave them often and ready help, *Philip* removed with the one half of his army and besieged it, leaving fifteen thousand foot before *Perinthus*, to force it if they could; but to be short, he failed in both attempts (as all princes commonly do that undertake divers enterprises at one time) and returned into *Macedon* with no less dishonour than loss: whereupon he made an overture of peace with the *Athenians*, and greatly desired it; to which tho' *Phocion* perswaded them in all he could, and that by the occasion offered they might greatly advantage their conditions, yet *Demosthenes* with his eloquence prevailed in the refusal. In the mean while, *Philip* having digested his late affront, and supplied his expence by the taking of an hundred and threescore and ten merchants ships, he gathered new forces, and being accompanied with his son *Alexander*, led them into *Scythia*; but he was also unprosperous in this enterprise: for the *Triballi*, a people of *Masja*, set on him in his return, wounded him, and took from him the greatest part of the spoils which he had gathered.

S E C T. VIII.

How Philip, overthrowing the Greeks in the battel of Chaeronea, was chosen captain-general of Greece. The death of Philip.

AMONG these northern nations (part of which he suppress'd, and part quieted) he spent some eight years; and in the ninth year, after the end of the holy war, he was to his great advantage invited again by the *Greeks* to their assistance. For the citizens of *Amphissa* having disobeyed the decree of the *Amphyttiones*, in which *Philip* had a double voice, and who, by reason that the *Thebans* and *Locrians* gave countenance and aid to the *Amphissenians*, the rest were not of themselves able to constrain them, they besought *Philip* to come in person to their assistance. Now you must think that *Philip* was not long in resolving upon this enterprise; he needed no drawing on, whom nothing

could keep back; nor other dissuasion than a mastering power could hold thence. He therefore commanded his army forthwith to march; the same being compounded of thirty thousand foot, and two thousand horse; and with as much expedition as could be made, he enter'd *Phocis*, won *Platea*, and brought into subjection all that region.

The rest, and especially the *Athenians*, although they had good cause to fear that a great part of this storm would fall on themselves, yet were they dissuaded by *Demosthenes* from accepting such reasonable conditions of peace as *Philip* offered, and rather made choice (having drawn the *Thebans* to join with them) to leave the enjoying of their estates and their freedom to the chance of one battel, than to hold it either by composition, or by the grace of *Philip*. But this their orator's eloquence cost them dear. It is true, that he could far more easily mind them of the virtue of their ancestors; than make them to be such as they were. He might repeat unto them (with words moving passion) the wonders they wrought at *Marathon*, but he could not transform the *Macedonians* into *Persians*, or draw from the dead, a *Miltiades*, an *Aristides*, a *Themistocles*, or a *Cimon*, or any of those famous commanders, whose great virtues they had paid with the greatest ingratitude that ever nation did. A *Phocion* they had, but by the strength of a contrary faction he was at this time in disgrace, and not employed: in so much as when the armies of *Philip* and the confederates encounter'd, although some thousand of the *Athenians* did abide the killing, and the like number well near of the *Thebans* died with them; yet the want of worthy men on that side to hold up the rest, and to draw them on, and the many choice captains of the *Macedonians*, encouraged by a king of a growing fortune, as it gave to *Philip* so shining a victory, that *Alexander* by the light thereof found his way (in despite of all the nations interjacent) into *Persia*, *India*, and *Egypt*; so it cut to the ground, and gave end and date to all the *Grecian* glory: yea, their liberty (saith *Curtius*) with their large dominion won with so many difficulties, continued for so many ages, and so often defended against the greatest kings, was now lost in a moment, and for ever lost.

Now this advised king (never passionate to his disadvantage) to the end he might obtain the sovereignty over all *Greece*, and be acknowledged for their captain-general against the *Persians*, without any further hazard or trouble, was content to let go those *Athenians* that were taken at this battel of *Chaeronea*, as he also forbore to attempt any thing against their city: but in *Thebes* (which lately by the virtue of *Epaminondas* triumphed over the rest) he lodged a garrison of *Macedonians*. And being soon after (according unto the long desire which he had nourished of this sovereignty) by the general states of *Corinth*, stiled the first commander of all the *Greeks*, and contribution of men and money granted him, he compounded an army of great strength, and under the commandment of *Attalus* and *Parmenio*, transported the same over the *Hellespont* into *Asia*, to begin the war. Of his enterprise against *Persia*, he sought the success from the oracle at *Delphos*, from whence he received such another convertible riddle, as *Cresus* did when he attempted *Cyrus*, and was in like sort mistaken in the exposition.

But as it is hard to discern and withstand the flatteries of our own appetites, so did *Philip's* ambitious desire to invade *Persia* abuse his judgment so

far, that the death, wherewith himself was threatened, he understood to be delivered of his enemy, whom he intended presently to invade. Before his purposed departure into *Asia*, he prepared for the marriage of his daughter *Cleopatra* with *Alexander*, king of *Epirus*; to which feast and pastimes thereat appointed, he invited all his friends and allies, with the principal persons of the *Grecian* cities, from whom he received much honour and many rich presents; but this was indeed the feast of his funeral. For having refused to do justice to one *Pausanias*, a gentleman of his guard, whom *Attalus* (greatly favoured by *Philip*) had first made drunk, and then left to be carnally abused by divers base persons, this *Pausanias* grew into so great detestation of the king's partiality in so foul a fact, as when *Philip* was passing towards the theatre, he drew a sword from under his long garment and wounded him to death, when he had lived six and forty years, and reigned five and twenty. ^a*Justin* reports it, that *Olympias* encouraged *Pausanias* to murder the king her husband, which after his death she boldly avowed, by the honour she did unto *Pausanias*, in crowning his dead body, in consecrating his sword unto *Apollo*, by building for him a monument, and other like graces.

S E C T. IX.

What good foundations of Alexander's greatness were laid by Philip. Of his laudable qualities, and issue.

NOW although he were then taken from the world, when he had mastered all opposition on that side of the sea, and had seen the fruits of his hopes and labours changing colour towards ripeness and perfection, yet he was herein happy, that he lived to see his son *Alexander* at mans estate, and had himself been an eye-witness of his resolution, and singular valour in this last battel.

The foundation of whose future greatness he had laid so soundly for him, with so plain a pattern of the buildings which himself meant to erect, as the performance and finishing was far more easy to *Alexander*, though more glorious, than the beginnings were unto *Philip*, though less famous. For besides the recovery of *Macedon* it self, in competition between him and the sons of *Eropus*, the one assisted by the *Thracians*, the other by the *Athenians*; and besides the regaining of many places possess'd by the *Illyrians*, the crushing of all those northern kings his neighbours, the overthrow of *Olynthus*, a state that despised the power of his father, the many maritime cities taken, of great strength and ancient freedom, and the subjection of that famous nation of *Greece*, which for so many ages had defended it self against the greatest kings of the world, and won upon them: he left unto his son, and had bred up for him, so many choice commanders, as the most of them both for their valour and judgment in the war, were no less worthy of crowns, than himself was that wore a crown: for it was said of *Parmenio* (whom *Alexander*, ungrateful to so great virtue, impiously murdered) that *Parmenio* had performed many things challenging eternal fame, without the king; but the king, without *Parmenio*, never did any thing worthy of renown; as for the rest of his captains, though content to obey the son of such a father,

yet did they not after *Alexander's* death endure to acknowledge any man superiour to themselves.

Of this prince it is hard to judge, whether his ambition had taught him the exercise of more vices, than nature and his excellent education had enriched him with virtues. For besides that he was valiant, wise, learned, and master of all his affections, he had this savour of piety, that he rather laboured to satisfy those that were grieved, than to suppress them. Whereof (among many other) we find a good example in his dealing with *Arcadion* and *Nicanor*; whom when for their evil speech of *Philip*, his familiars perswaded him to put to death; he answered them, that first it ought to be considered, whether the fault were in them that gave him ill language, or in himself: secondly, that it was in every man's own power to be well spoken of; and this was shortly proved; for after *Philip* had relieved their necessities, there was none within his kingdom that did him more honour than they did. Whereupon he told those that had perswaded him to use violence, that he was a better physician for evil speech than they were.

His epistles to *Alexander* his son are remembred by ^b*Cicero* and *Gellius*; and by *Dion* and *Chrysostom* exceedingly commended. His stratagems are gathered by *Polyenus* and *Frontinus*, his wife sayings by *Plutarch*. And albeit he held *Macedon* as in his own right all the time of his reign, yet was he not the true and next heir thereof: for *Amyntas* the son of his brother *Perdiccas* (of whom he had the protection during his infancy) had the right. This *Amyntas* he married to his daughter *Cyna*, who had by him a daughter called *Eurydice*, who was married to *Philip's* base son *Arideus*, her uncle by the mother's side: both which *Olympias*, *Philip's* first wife, and mother to *Alexander* the great, put to death; *Arideus* by extream torments, *Eurydice* she strangled.

Philip had by this *Olympias*, the daughter of *Neoptolemus*, king of the *Molossians* (of the race of *Achilles*) *Alexander* the great, and *Cleopatra*. *Cleopatra* was married to her uncle *Alexander*, king of *Epirus*, and was after her brother *Alexander's* death slain at *Sardis*, by the command of *Antigonus*.

By *Andata*, an *Illyrian*, his second wife, he had *Cyna*, married as is shewed before.

By *Nicasipolis*, the sister of *Jason*, tyrant of *Pheres*, he had *Thessalonica*, whom *Cassander*, after he had taken *Pidna*, married; but she was afterwards by her father-in-law, *Antipater*, put to death.

By *Cleopatra*, the niece of *Attalus*, he had ^c*Caranus*, whom others call *Philip*: him, *Olympias*, the mother of *Alexander* the great, caused to be roasted to death in a copper pan. Others lay this murder to *Alexander* himself. By the same *Cleopatra* he had likewise a daughter, called *Europa*, whom *Olympias* also murdered at the mother's breast.

By *Phila* and *Meda* he had no issue.

He had also two concubines, *Arfince*, whom, after he had gotten with child, he married to an obscure man, called *Lagus*, who bear *Ptolemy*, king of *Egypt*, called the son of *Lagus*, but esteemed the son of *Philip*: by *Philmna*, his second concubine, a publick dancer, he had *Arideus*, of whom we shall have much occasion to speak hereafter.

^a *Just.* l. 9.^b *Cic.* *Off.* 2. *Gell.* l. 9. c. 3. *Dion.* 2. de Rege.^c *Athen.* l. 13. c. 2. *Just.* l. 3.

CHAP. II.

Of ALEXANDER the Great.

S E C T. I.

A brief rehearsal of Alexander's doings, before he invaded Asia.

ALEXANDER, afterwards called the great, succeeded unto *Philip* his father; being a prince no less valiant by nature, than by education; well instructed, and enriched in all sorts of learning and good arts. He began his reign over the *Macedonians* four hundred and seventeen years after *Rome* built, and after his own birth twenty years. The strange dreams of *Philip* his father, and that one of the gods, in the shape of a snake, begat him on *Olympias* his mother, I omit as foolish tales; but that the temple of *Diana* (a work the most magnificent of the world) was burnt upon the day of his birth, and that so strange an accident was accompanied with the news of three several victories, obtained by the *Macedonians*, it was very remarkable, and might with the reason of those times be interpreted for ominous, and fore-shewing the great things by *Alexander* afterwards performed. Upon the change of the king, the neighbour-nations, whom *Philip* had oppress'd, began to consult about the recovery of their former liberty, and to adventure it by force of arms. *Alexander's* young years gave them hope of prevailing, and his suspected severity increased courage in those who could better resolve to die, than to live slavishly. But *Alexander* gave no time to those swelling humours, which might speedily have endangered the health of his estate. For after revenge taken upon the conspirators against his father, whom he slew upon his tomb; and the celebration of his funerals, he first fastened unto his own nation, by freeing them from all exactions and bodily slavery, other than their service in his wars; and used such kingly austerity towards those that contemned his young years, and such clemency to the rest that perswaded themselves of the cruelty of his disposition, as all affections being pass'd at home, he made a present journey into *Peloponnesus*, and so well exercised his spirits among them, as by the council of the states of *Greece*, he was, according to the great desire of his heart, elected captain-general against the *Persians*, upon which war *Philip* his father had not only resolved (who had obtained the same title of general commander) but had transported under the leading of *Pammenio* and *Attalus*, a part of his army, to recover some places on *Asia* side, for the safe descent of the rest.

This enterprise against the *Persian* occupied all *Alexander's* affections; those fair marks of riches, honour, and large dominion, he now shot at both sleeping and waking: all other thoughts and imaginations were either grievous or hateful. But a contrary wind ariseth; for he receiveth advertisement that the *Athenians*, *Thebans*, and *Lacedemonians*, had united themselves against him, and, by assistance from the *Persian*, hoped for the recovery of their former freedom. Hereto they were perswaded by *Demosthenes*, himself being thereto perswaded by the gold of *Persia*; the device he used was more subtle than profitable, for he caused it to be bruited that *Alexander* was slain in a battel against the *Triballes*, and brought into the assembly a companion whom he had corrupted to affirm,

that himself was present and wounded in the battel. There is indeed a certain doctrine of policy (as policy is now adays defined by falshood and knavery) that devised rumours and lies, if they serve the turn, but for a day or two, are greatly available. It is true, that common people are sometimes mock'd by them, as soldiers are by false alarms in the wars; but in all that I have observed, I have found the success as ridiculous as the invention. For as those that find themselves at one time abused by such like bruits, do at other times neglect their duties, when they are upon true reports, and in occasions perillous, summoned to assemble; so do all men in general condemn the venters of such trumpery, and for them fear upon necessary occasions to entertain the truth it self. This labour unlooked for, and loss of time, was not only very grievous to *Alexander*, but by turning his sword from the ignoble and effeminate *Persians*, against which he had directed it, towards the manly and famous *Grecians*, of whose assistance he thought himself assured, his present undertaking was greatly disorder'd. But he that cannot endure to strive against the wind, shall hardly attain the port which he purposeth to recover: and it no less becometh the worthiest men to oppose misfortunes, than it doth the weakest children to bewail them.

He therefore made such expedition towards these revolvers, as that himself, with the army that followed him, brought them the first news of his preparation. Hereupon all stagger, and the *Athenians*, as they were the first that moved, so were they the first that fainted, seeking by their ambassadors to pacify the king, and to be received again into his grace. *Alexander* was not long in resolving; for the *Persians* perswaded him to pardon the *Grecians*. Wise men are not easily drawn from great purposes by such occasions as may easily be taken off; neither hath any king ever brought to effect any great affair, who hath entangled himself in many enterprises at once, not tending to one and the same certain end.

And having now quieted his borderers towards the south, he resolved to assure those nations which lay on the north-side of *Macedon*, to wit, the *Thracians*, *Triballes*, *Peones*, *Getes*, *Agrians*, and other savage people, which had greatly vexed with incursions, not only others of his predecessors, but even *Philip* his father: with all which, after divers overthrows given them, he made peace, or else brought them into subjection. Notwithstanding this good success, he could not yet find the way out of *Europe*. There is nothing more natural to man than liberty; the *Greeks* had enjoy'd it overlong, and lost it too late to forget it; they therefore shake off the yoke once again. The *Thebans*, who had in their citadel a garrison of a thousand *Macedons*, attempt to force it; *Alexander* hasteth to their succour, and presents himself with thirty thousand foot, all old soldiers, and three thousand horse, before the city; and gave the inhabitants some days to resolve, being even heart-sick with the desire of passing into *Asia*. So unwilling indeed he was to draw blood of the *Grecians*, by whom he hoped to serve himself elsewhere, that he offered the *Thebans* remission, if they would only deliver into his hands *Phanix* and

Prothytes,

Prothytes, the stirrers up of the rebellion. But they, opposing the mounting fortune of *Alexander*, (which bare all resistance before it, like the breaking-in of the ocean-sea) instead of such an answer, as men besieged and abandoned should have made, demanded *Philotas* and *Antipater* to be delivered unto them; as if *Thebes* alone, then laid in the ballance of fortune with the kingdom of *Macedon*, and many other provinces, could either have evened the scale, or swayed it. Therefore in the end they perished in their obstinacy. For while the *Thebans* oppose the army assailable, they are charged at the back by the *Macedonian* garrison, their city taken and razed to the ground, six thousand slain, and thirty thousand sold for slaves, at the price of 440 talents. This the king did, to the terror of the other *Grecian* cities.

Many arguments were used by *Cleadas*, one of the prisoners, to persuade *Alexander* to forbear the destruction of *Thebes*. He prayed the king to believe, that they were rather misled by giving hasty credit to false reports, than any way malicious; for being persuaded of *Alexander's* death, they rebelled but against his successor. He also besought the king to remember, that his father *Philip* had his education in that city; yea, that his ancestor *Hercules* was born therein: but all persuasions were fruitless; the times wherein offences are committed, do greatly aggravate them. Yet for the honour he bare to learning, he pardoned all of the race of *Pindarus* the poet, and spared, and set at liberty *Timoclea*, the sister of *Theagenes*, who died in defence of the liberty of *Greece* against his father *Philip*. This noble woman being taken by a *Thracian*, and by him ravished, he threatened to take her life, unless she would confess her treasure; she led the *Thracian* to a well, and told him that she had therein cast it; and when the *Thracian* stooped to look into the well, she suddenly thrust him into the mouth thereof, and stoned him to death.

Now, because the *Athenians* had received into their city so many of the *Thebans*, as had escaped and fled unto them for succour, *Alexander* would not grant them peace, but upon condition to deliver into his hands both their orators, which persuaded this second revolt, and their captains; yet in the end, it being a torment unto him to retard the enterprise of *Persia*, he was content that the orators should remain, and accepted of the banishment of the captains, wherein he was exceeding ill advised, had not his fortune, or rather the providence of God, made all the resistance against him unprofitable: for these good leaders of the *Grecians* betook themselves to the service of the *Persian*, whom after a few days he invadeth.

SECT. II.

How Alexander passing into Asia, fought with the Persians upon the river of Granicus.

WHEN all was now quieted at home, *Alexander*, committing to the trust of *Antipater*, both *Greece* and *Macedon*, in the first of the spring did pass the *Hellepont*, and being ready to disembark, he threw a dart towards the *Asian* shore, as a token of defiance, commanding his soldiers not to make any waste in their own territory, or to burn or deface those buildings, which themselves were presently, and in the future, to possess. He landed his army, consisting of two and thirty thousand foot, and five thousand horse, all old soldiers, near unto *Troy*, where he offer'd a

solemn sacrifice upon *Achilles's* tomb, his maternal ancestor.

But before he left his own coast, he put to death, without any offence given him, all his mother-in-law's kinsmen, whom *Philip* his father had greatly advanced, not sparing such of his own as he suspected. He also took with him many of his tributary princes, of whose fidelity he doubted; thinking by unjust cruelty to assure all things, both in the present and future. Yet the end of all fell out contrary to the policy which his ambition had commended unto him, tho' agreeing very well with the justice of God; for all that he had planted, was soon after withered, and rooted up; those whom he most trusted, were the most traitorous; his mother, friends, and children, fell by such another merciless sword as his own, and all manner of confusion followed his dead body to the grave, and left him there.

When the knowledge of *Alexander's* landing on *Asia* side was brought to *Darius*, he so much scorned the army of *Macedon*, and had so contemptible an opinion of *Alexander* himself, as having stiled him his servant in a letter which he wrote unto him, reprehending his disloyalty and audacity (for *Darius* entituled himself king of kings, and the kinsman of the gods) he gave order withal to his lieutenants of the lesser *Asia*, that they should take *Alexander* alive, whip him with rods, and then convey him to his presence: that they should sink his ships, and send the *Macedons* taken prisoners beyond the *Red* sea, belike into *Ethiopia*, or some other unhealthful part of *Africa*.

In this sort did this glorious king, confident in the glittering but heartless multitude which he commanded, dispose of the already-vanquished *Macedonians*: but the ill destinies of men bear them to the ground, by what strong confidence forever armed. The great numbers which he gathered together, and brought in one heap into the field, gave rather an exceeding advantage to his enemies, than any discouragement at all. For, besides that they were men utterly unacquainted with dangers; men, who by the name and countenance of their king, were wont to prevail against those of less courage than themselves; men, that took more care to embroider with gold and silver their upper garments, as if they intended the invasion but of the sun-beams, than they did to arm themselves with iron and steel against the sharp pikes, swords, and darts of the hardy *Macedonians*: I say, besides all these, even the opinion they had of their own numbers, of which every one in particular hoped that it would not fall to his turn to fight, filled every one of them with the care of their own safety, without any intent at all to hazard any thing but their own breath, and that of their horses, in running away. The *Macedonians* as they came to fight, and thereby to enrich themselves with the gold and jewels of *Persia*, both which they needed, so the *Persians*, who expected nothing in that war but blows and wounds, which they needed not, obeyed the king, who had power to constrain them in assembling themselves for his service; but their own fears and cowardice, which in time of danger had most power over them, they only then obeyed, when their rebellion against so servile a passion did justly and violently require it. For saith *Vegetius*: *Quemadmodum bene exercitatus miles praelium cupit, ita formidat indoctus; nam sciendum est in pugna usum amplius prodesse quam vires*; As the well-practised soldier desires to come to battle, so the raw one fears it: for we must understand, that in fight it

more

more avails to have been accustomed unto the like, than only to have rude strength. What manner of men the *Persians* were, *Alexander* discovered in the first encounter, before which time it is said, by those that writ his story, that it was hard to judge, whether his daring to undertake the conquest of an empire so well peopled, with a handful of men, or the success he had, were more to be wonder'd at. For at the river of *Granick*, which severeth the territory of *Troy* from *Propontis*, the *Persians* sought to stop his passage, taking the higher ground and bank of the river to defend, which *Alexander* was forced (as it were) to climb up unto, and scale from the level of the water; great resistance (saith *Curtius*) was made by the *Persians*, yet in the end *Alexander* prevailed. But it seems to me, that the victory then gotten was exceeding easy, and that the twenty thousand *Persian* foot-men said to be slain, were rather kill'd in the back in running away, than hurt in the bosoms by resisting. For had those twenty thousand foot, and two hundred and fifty horse-men, or, after *Plutarch*, two thousand and five hundred horse-men, died with their faces towards the *Macedonians*, *Alexander* could not have bought their lives at so small a rate as with the loss of four and thirty of all sorts of his own. And if it were also true, that *Plutarch* doth report, how *Alexander* encounter'd two of the *Persian* commanders *Spithridates* and *Rhæfates*, and that the *Persian* horse-men fought with great fury, tho' in the end scattered; and lastly, how those *Grecians* in *Darius's* pay, holding themselves in one body upon a piece of ground of advantage did (after mercy was refused them) fight it ought to the last; how doth it then resemble truth, that such resistance having been made, yet of *Alexander's* army there fell but twelve foot-men, and two and twenty horse-men.

SECT. III.

A digression concerning the defence of hard passages. Of things following the battel of Granick.

THE winning of this passage did greatly encourage the *Macedonians*, and brought such terror upon all those of the lesser *Asia*, as he obtained all the kingdoms thereof without a blow, some one or two towns excepted. For in all invasions, where the nations invaded have once been beaten upon a great advantage of the place, as in defence of rivers, streights and mountains, they will soon have persuaded themselves, that such an enemy, upon equal terms and even ground, can hardly be resisted. It was therefore *Machiavel's* counsel, that he, which resolveth to defend a passage, should with his ablest force oppose the assailant. And to say truth, few regions of any great circuit are so well fenced, that armies of such force as may be thought sufficient to conquer them can be debarred all entrance by the natural difficulty of the ways. One passage or other is commonly left unguarded; if all be defended, then must the forces of the country be distracted, and yet likely some one place will be found that is defended very weakly. How often have the *Alps* given way to armies breaking into *Italy*? Yea, where shall we find that ever they kept out an invader? Yet are they such, as (to speak briefly) afflict with all difficulties those that travel over them; but they give no security to those that lye behind them; for they are of too large extent. The towns of *Lombardy* persuaded themselves that they might enjoy their quiet, when the warlike nation of the *Switzers* had undertaken to hinder *Francis* the *French* king from descending

No. XXX.

into the duchy of *Milan*; but whilst these patrons of *Milan*, whom their own dwelling in those mountains had made fittest of all other for such a service, were busied in custody of the *Alps*, *Francis* appeared in *Lombardy*, to so much the greater terror of the inhabitants, by how much the less they had expected his arrival. What shall we say of those mountains, which lock up whole regions in such sort, as they leave but one gate open? The streights, or (as they were called) the gates of *Taurus* in *Cilicia*, and those of *Thermopylae*, have seldom been attempted, perhaps because they were thought impregnable; but how seldom (if ever) have they been attempted in vain? *Xerxes*, and, long after him the *Romans*, forced the entrance of *Thermopylae*, *Cyrus* the younger, and after him *Alexander*, found the gates of *Cilicia* wide open; how strongly soever they had been locked and barred, yet were those countries open enough to a fleet that should enter on the backside. The defence of rivers, how hard a thing it is, we find examples in all histories that bear good witness. The deepest have many fords; the swiftest and broadest may be passed by boats, in case it be found a matter of difficulty to make a bridge. He that hath men enough to defend all the length of his own bank, hath also enough to beat his enemy; and may therefore do better to let him come over, to his loss, than by striving in vain to hinder the passage, as a matter tending to his own disadvantage, fill the heads of his soldiers with an opinion that they are in an ill case, having their means of safeguard taken from them, by the skill or valour of such as are too good for them. Certainly if a river were sufficient defence against an army, the isle of *Mona*, now called *Anglesey*, which is divided from north-*Wales* by an arm of the sea, had been safe enough against the *Romans* invading it under conduct of *Julius Agricola*. But he wanting, and not meaning to spend the time in making vessels to transport his forces, did assay the fords; whereby he so amazed the enemies attending for ships and such like provision by sea, that surely believing nothing could be hard or invincible to men, which came so minded to war, they humbly intreated for peace, and yielded the island. Yet the *Britons* were men stout enough; the *Persians* very dastards.

It was therefore wisely done of *Alexander*, to pass the river of *Granick* in face of the enemy; not marching higher to seek an easier way, nor labouring to convey his men over it by some safer means. For having beaten them upon their own ground, he did thereby cut off no lets of their reputation than of their strength, leaving no hope of succour to the partakers and followers of such unable protectors.

Soon after this victory he recovered *Sardis*, *Ephesus*, the cities of the *Trallians* and *Magnesians*, which were render'd unto him. The inhabitants of which, with the people of the country, he received with great grace, suffering them to be governed by their own laws. For he observed it well; *Novum imperium inchoantibus utilis clementie fama*; It is commodious unto such as lay the foundation of a new sovereignty to have the fame of being merciful. He then by *Parmenio* won *Miletus*, and by force master'd *Halicarnassus*, which, because it resisted obstinately, he razed to the ground. From whence he enter'd into *Caria*, where *Ada* the queen, who had been cast out of all that she held (except the city of *Alinda*) by *Darius's* lieutenants, presented her self unto him, and adopted him her son and successor; which *Alexander* accepted

cepted in so gracious part, as he left the whole kingdom to her disposing. He then entered into *Lycia* and *Pamphylia*, and obtained all the sea-coasts, and subjecting unto him *Pisidia*, he directed himself towards *Darius* (who was said to be advanced towards him with a marvellous army) by the way of *Phrygia*: for all the province of *Asia* the less, bordering upon the sea, his first victory laid under his feet.

While he gave order for the government and settling of *Lycia*, and *Pamphylia*, they sent *Cleander* to raise some new companies in *Peloponnesus*, and marching towards the north, he enter'd *Celenas*, seated on the river *Meander*, which was abandoned unto him, the castle only holding out; which also after forty days was given up: for so long time he gave them to attend succour from *Darius*. From *Celenas* he pass'd on through *Phrygia* towards the *Euxine* sea, till he came to a city called *Gordium*, the regal seat, in former times, of king *Midas*. In this city it was that he found the *Gordian* knot, which when he knew not how to undo, he cut it asunder with his sword: for there was an ancient prophecy did promise to him that could untie it, the lordship of all *Asia*; whereupon *Alexander*, not respecting the manner how, so it were done, assumed to himself the fulfilling of the prophecy, by hewing it in pieces.

But before he turned from this part of *Asia* the less towards the east, he took care to clear the sea-coast on his back, and to thrust the *Persians* out of the islands of *Lesbos*, *Scio*, and *Coos*, the charge whereof he committed unto two of his captains, giving them such order as he thought to be most convenient for that service; and delivering unto them fifty talents to defray the charge; and withal, out of his first spoil gotten, he sent threescore talents more to *Antipater* his lieutenant in *Greece*, and *Macedon*. From *Celenas* he removed to *Ancyra*, now called *Anguri*, standing on the same river of *Sangarius*, which runneth through *Gordium*: there he muster'd his army, and then enter'd *Paphlagonia*, whose people submitted themselves unto him, and obtained freedom of tribute: where he left *Catus* governour, with one regiment of *Macedonians* lately arrived.

Here he understood of the death of *Memnon*, *Darius's* lieutenant, which heartned him greatly to pass on towards him, for of this only captain he had more respect than of all the multitude by *Darius* assembled, and of all the commanders he had besides. For so much hath the spirit of some one man excelled, as it hath undertaken and effected the alteration of the greatest states and commonwealths, the erection of monarchies, the conquest of kingdoms and empires, guided handfuls of men against multitudes of equal bodily strength, contriv'd victories beyond all hope and discourse of reason, converted the fearful passions of his own followers into magnanimity, and the valour of his enemies into cowardise; such spirits have been stirred up in sundry ages of the world, and in divers parts thereof, to erect and cast down again, to establish and to destroy, and to bring all things, persons and states to the same certain ends, which the infinite spirit of the universal, piercing, moving, and governing all things hath ordained. Certainly the things that this king did were marvellous, and would hardly have been undertaken by any man else: and though his father had determined to have invaded the lesser *Asia*, it is like enough that he would have contented himself with some part thereof, and not have discovered the river of *Indus*, as this man did. The swift course of victory, where-with he ran over so large a portion of the world, in

so short a space, may justly be imputed unto this, that he was never encounter'd by an equal spirit, concurring with equal power against him. Hereby it came to pass, that his actions, being limited by no greater opposition than desert places, and the mere length of tedious journeys could make, were like the *Colossus* of *Rhodes*, not so much to be admired for the workmanship, though therein also praise-worthy, as for the huge bulk. For certainly the things performed by *Xenophon*, discover as brave a spirit as *Alexander's*, and working no less exquisitely, though the effects were less material, as were also the forces and power of command, by which it wrought. But he that would find the exact pattern of a noble commander, must look upon such as *Epaminondas*, that encountering worthy captains, and those better followed than themselves, have by their singular virtue overtopped their valiant enemies, and still prevailed over those that would not have yielded one foot to any other. Such as these are do seldom live to obtain great empires; for it is a work of more labour and longer time, to master the equal forces of one hardy and well-ordered state, than to tread down and utterly subdue a multitude of servile nations, compounding the body of a gross unwieldy empire. Wherefore these *parvo potentes* men; that with little have done much upon enemies of like ability, are to be regarded as choice examples of worth; but great conquerors, to be rather admired for the substance of their actions, than the exquisite managing: exactness and greatness concurring so seldom, that I can find no instance of both in one, save only that brave *Roman Cesar*.

Having thus far digressed, it is now time that we return unto our eastern conqueror, who is traveling hastily towards *Cilicia*, with a desire to recover the streights thereof before *Darius* should arrive there. But first making a dispatch into *Greece*, he sent to those cities, in which he reposed most trust, some of the *Persian* targets which he had recovered in his first battel; upon which, by certain inscriptions, he made them partakers of his victory. Herein he well advised himself; for he that doth not as well impart of the honour which he gaineth in the wars, as he doth of the spoils, shall never be long followed by those of the better sort. For men which are either well born or well bred, and have more of wealth than of reputation, do as often satisfy themselves with the purchase of glory, as the weak in fortune, and strong in courage, do with the gain of gold and silver.

The governour of *Cilicia* hearing of *Alexander's* coming on, left some companies to keep the streights, which were indeed very defensible; and withal, as *Curtius* noteth, he began over-late to prize and put in execution the counsel of *Memnon*: who in the beginning of the wars advised him to waste all the provisions for men and horse, that could not be lodged in strong places, and always to give ground to the invader, till he found some such notable advantage as might assuredly promise him the obtaining of victory. For the fury of an invading army is best broken by delays, change of diet and want, eating sometimes too little and sometimes too much, sometimes reposing themselves in beds and oftener upon the cold ground. These and the like sudden alterations bring many diseases upon all nations out of their own countries. Therefore, if *Darius* had kept the *Macedonians* but a while from meat and sleep, and refusing to give or take battel had wearied them with his light horse, as the *Parthians* afterwards did the *Romans*, he might perchance have saved his own life and estate: for

for it was one of the greatest encouragements given by *Alexander* to the *Macedonians*, in the third and last fatal battel, that they were to fight with all the strength of *Persia* at once.

Xerxes, when he invaded *Greece*, and fought abroad, in being beaten, lost only his men; but *Darius* being invaded by the *Greeks*, and fighting at home, by being beaten, lost his kingdom; *Pericles*, though the *Lacedemonians* burnt all in *Attica* to the gates of *Athens*, yet could not be drawn to hazard a battel: for the invaded ought evermore to fight upon the advantage of time and place. Because we read histories to inform our understanding by the examples therein found, we will give some instances of those that have perished by adventuring in their own countries to charge an invading army. The *Romans*, by fighting with *Hannibal*, were brought to the brink of their destruction.

Pompey was well advised for a while, when he gave *Cesar* ground, but when by the importunity of his captains he adventured to fight at *Pharsalia*, he lost the battel, lost the freedom of *Rome*, and his own life.

Ferdinand, in the conquest of *Naples*, would needs fight a battel with the *French* to his confusion, tho' it was told him by a man of sound judgment, that those counsels which promise surety in all things are honourable enough.

The constable of *France* made frustrate the mighty preparation of *Charles V.* when he invaded *Provence*, by wasting the country, and forbearing the fight; so did the duke of *Alva* weary the *French* in *Naples*, and dissolve the boisterous army of the prince of *Orange* in the low countries.

The *Leigers*, contrary to the advice of their general, would needs fight a battel with the *Bourgonians*, invading their country, and could not be perswaded to linger the time, and stay their advantage; but they lost eight and twenty thousand upon the place. *Philip* of *Valois* set upon king *Edward* at *Cressy*, and king *John* (when the *English* were well near tired out, and would in short time by an orderly pursuit have been wasted to nothing) constrained the black prince with great fury, near *Poitiers* to join battel with him: But all men know what lamentable success these two *French* kings found. *Charles V.* of *France* made another kind of *Fabian* warfare; and though the *English* burnt and wasted many places, yet this king held his resolution to forbear blows, and followed his advice which told him, That the *English* could never get his inheritance by smoke; and it is reported by *Bellay* and *Herrault*, that king *Edward* was wont to say of *Charles*, that he won from him the duchy of *Guienne* without ever putting on his armour.

But where God hath a purpose to destroy, wise men grow short-lived, and the charge of things is committed unto such as either cannot see what is for their good, or know not how to put in execution any sound advice. The course which *Memnon* had propounded must, in all appearance of reason, have brought the *Macedonian* to a great perplexity, and made him stand still a while at the streights of *Cilicia*, doubting whether it were more shameful to return, or dangerous to proceed. For had *Cappadocia* and *Paphlagonia* been wasted whilst *Alexander* was far off, and the streights of *Cilicia* been defended by *Arfenes*, governour of that province, with the best of his forces; hunger would not have suffered the enemy to stay the trial of all means that might be thought upon of forcing that passage; or if the place could not have been maintain-

ed, yet might *Cilicia* at better leisure have been so thoroughly spoiled, that the heart of his army should have been broken, by seeking out miseries by painful travel.

But *Arfenes* leaving a small number to defend the streights, took the best of his army with him, to waste and spoil the country, or rather, as may seem, to find himself some work, by pretence of which he might honestly run further away from *Alexander*. He should rather have adventured his person in custody of the streights, whereby he might perhaps have saved the province; and in the mean time, all that was in the fields would have been conveyed into strong towns. So should his army, if it were driven from the place of advantage, have found good entertainment within walled cities, and himself with his horsemen have had the less work in destroying that little which was left abroad. Handling the matter as he did, he gave the *Cilicians* cause to wish for *Alexander's* coming, and as great cause to the keepers of the passage not to hinder it. For cowards are wise in apprehending all forms of danger. These guardians of the streights, hearing that *Arfenes* made all haste to join himself with *Darius*, burning down all as he went, like one despairing of the defence, began to grow circumspect, and to think that surely their general, who gave as lost the country behind their backs, had exposed themselves unto certain death, as men that were good for nothing else but to dull the *Macedonian* swords. Wherefore not affecting to die for their prince and country (which honour they saw that *Arfenes* himself could well forbear) they speedily followed the footsteps of their general, gleaning after his harvest. Thus *Alexander* without labour got both the entrance of *Cilicia*, abandoned by the cowardise of his enemies, and the whole province that had been alienated from the *Persian* side by their indiscretion.

SECT. IV.

Of the unwarlike army levied by Darius against Alexander. The unadvised courses which Darius took in this expedition. He is vanquished at Issus; where his mother, wife, and children are made prisoners. Of some things following the battel of Issus.

IN the mean season *Darius* approached, who (as *Curtius* reports) had compounded an army of more than two hundred and ninety thousand soldiers, out of divers nations: *Justin* multiplies them at three hundred thousand foot, and an hundred thousand horse; *Plutarch* at six hundred thousand.

The manner of his coming on, as *Curtius* describes it, was rather like a masker than a man of war; and like one that took more care to set out his glory and riches, than to provide for his own safety, perswading himself, as it seemed, to beat *Alexander* with pomp and sumptuous pageants. For before the army there was carried the holy fire which the *Persians* worshipped, attended by their priests, and after them three hundred and threescore and five young men, answering the number of the days of the year, covered with scarlet; then the chariot of *Jupiter*, drawn with white horses, with their riders clothed in the same colour, with rods of gold in their hands; and after it, the horse of the sun. Next after these followed ten sumptuous chariots, inlaid and garnish'd with silver and gold; and then the vanguard of their horse, compounded of twelve several nations, which the better to avoid confusion, did hardly understand each other's language, and these, marshalled in the head of the rest, being beaten, might serve very fitly to disorder all that

that followed them; in the tail of these horses the regiment of foot marched, with the *Persians* called immortal, because if any died, the number was presently supplied: and these were armed with chains of gold, and their coats with the same metal embroidered, whereof the sleeves were garnished with pearls, baits either to catch the hungry *Macedonians* withal, or to perswade them that it were great incivility to cut and to deface such glorious garments. But it was well said, *Sumptuose inductus miles, se virtute superiorem aliis non existimet, cum in præliis oporteat fortitudine animi, & non vestimentis muniri, quoniam hostes vestibus non debellantur*; Let no man think that he exceedeth those in valour, whom he exceedeth in gay garments; for it is by men armed with fortitude of mind, and not by the apparel they put on, that enemies are beaten. And it was perchance from the *Roman Papyrius* that this advice was borrowed, who, when he fought against the *Samnites* in that fatal battel, wherein they all swore either to prevail or die, thirty thousand of them having apparelled themselves in white garments, with high crests and great plumes of feathers, bad the *Roman* soldiers to lay aside all fear: ** Non enim cristas vulnera facere, & per picta atque aurata scuta transire Romanum pilum*; For these plumed crests would wound nobody, and the *Roman* pile would bore holes in painted and gilded shields.

To second this court-like company, fifteen thousand were appointed more rich and glittering than the former, but apparelled like women (belike to breed the more terror) and these were honoured with the title of the king's kinsmen. Then came *Darius* himself, the gentlemen of his guard-robe riding before his chariot, which was supported with the gods of his nation, cast and cut in pure gold; these the *Macedonians* did not serve, but they served their turns of these, by changing their massy bodies into thin portable and current coin. The head of his chariot was set with precious stones, with two little golden idols, covered with an open-winged eagle of the same metal: the hinder part being raised high whereon *Darius* sat, had a covering of inestimable value. This chariot of the king was followed with ten thousand horsemen, their lances plated with silver, and their heads gilt; which they meant not to embroe in the *Macedonian* blood, for fear of marring their beauty. He had for the proper guard of his own person two hundred of the blood royal, blood too royal and precious to be spilt by any valorous adventure (I am of opinion that two hundred sturdy fellows, like the *Switzers*, would have done him more service) and these were back'd with thirty thousand footmen, after whom again were led four hundred spare horses for the king, which if he had meant to have used, he would have marshalled somewhat nearer him.

Now followed the rearward, the same being led by *Sisygambis* the king's mother, and by his wife, drawn in glorious chariots, followed by a great train of ladies their attendants on horseback, with fifteen waggons of the king's children, and the wives of the nobility, waited on by two hundred and fifty concubines, and a world of nurses and eunuchs, most sumptuously apparelled: by which it should seem that *Darius* thought that the *Macedonians* had been comedians or tumblers; for this troop was far fitter to behold those sports than to be present at battels. Between these and a company of slight-armed slaves, with a world of valets, was the king's treasure, charged on six hundred mules,

and three hundred camels, brought, as it proved, to pay the *Macedonians*. In this sort came the may-game-king into the field, incumbered with a most unnecessary train of strumpets, attended with troops of divers nations, speaking divers languages, and for their numbers impossible to be marshalled; and for the most part so effeminate, and so rich in gold and in garments, as the same could not but have encouraged the nakedest nation of the world against them. We find it in daily experience, that all discourse of magnanimity, of national virtue, of religion, of liberty, and whatsoever else hath been wont to move and encourage virtuous men, hath no force at all with the common soldier, in comparison of spoil and riches. The rich ships are boarded upon all disadvantages, the rich towns are furiously assaulted, and the plentiful countries willingly invaded. Our *English* nation have attempted many places in the *Indies*, and run upon the *Spaniards* headlong, in hope of their royals of plate, and pistolets, which had they been put to it upon the like disadvantages in *Ireland*, or in any poor country, they would have turned their pieces and pikes against their commanders, contesting that they had been brought without reason to the butchery and slaughter. It is true, that the war is made willingly, and for the most part with good success, that is ordained against the richest nations; for as the needy are always adventurous, so plenty is wont to shun peril; and men that have well to live, do rather study how to live well, I mean wealthily, than care to die (as they call it) honourably. *Car on il n'y a rien à gagner que des coups volontiers, il n'y va pas*; No man makes haste to the market, where there is nothing to be bought but blows.

Now, if *Alexander* had beheld this preparation before his consultation with his soothsayers, he would have satisfy'd himself by the outsides of the *Persians*, and never have looked into the entrails of beasts for success. For leaving the description of this second battel (which is indeed no-where well described, neither for the confusion and hasty running away of the *Asians* could be) we have enough by the slaughter that was made of them, and by the few that fell of the *Macedonians*, to inform us what manner of resistance was made. For if it be true that threescore thousand *Persian* footmen were slain in this battel, with ten thousand of their horsemen: or (as *Curtius* saith) an hundred thousand footmen, with the same number of horsemen, and besides this slaughter, forty thousand taken prisoners, while of *Alexander's* army there miscarried but two hundred and fourscore of all sorts, of which numbers *Arianus* and other historians cut off almost the one half: I do verily believe that this small number rather died with the over-travel and pain-taking in killing their enemies, than by any strokes received from them. And surely, if the *Persian* nation (at this time degenerate, and the basest of the world) had had any favour remaining of the ancient valour of their forefathers, they would never have sold so good cheap, and at so vile a price, the mother, the wife, the daughters, and other the king's children, had their own honour been valued by them at nothing, and the king's safety and his estate at less. *Darius* by this time found it true what *Charidemus*, a banished *Grecian* of *Athens*, had told him, when he made a view of his army about *Babylon*, to wit, that the multitude which he had assembled of divers nations, richly attired, but poorly armed, would be found more terrible to the inhabitants of the country, whom in passing by

they would devour, than to the *Macedonians*, whom they meant to assail; who being all old and obedient soldiers, embattled in gross squadrons, which they call their *Phalanx*, well covered with armour for defence, and furnished with weapons for offence of great advantage, would make so little account of his delicate *Persians*, loving their ease and their palate, being withal ill armed and worse disciplined, as except it would please him to entertain (having so great abundance of treasure to do it withal) a sufficient number of the same *Grecians*, and so to encounter the *Macedonians* with men of equal courage, he would repent him over-late, as taught by the miserable success like to follow.

But this discourse was so displeasing to *Darius* (who had been accustomed to nothing so much as to his own praises, and to nothing so little as to hear truth;) as he commanded that this poor *Grecian* should be presently slain: who, while he was afundring in the tormentors hands, used this speech to the king, that *Alexander*, against whom he had given this good counsel, should assuredly revenge his death, and lay deserved punishment upon *Darius* for despising his advice.

It was the saying of a wise man: *Desperata ejus principis salus est, cujus aures ita formatae sunt, ut aspera quæ utilia, nec quicquam nisi jucundum accipiat*; That prince's safety is in a desperate case, whose ears judge all that is profitable to be too sharp, and will entertain nothing that is unpleasant.

For liberty in counsel is the life and essence of counsel; *Libertas consilii est ejus vita, & essentia, qua erepta consilium evanescit*.

Darius did likewise value at nothing the advice given him by the *Grecian* soldiers that served him, who intreated him not to fight in the straights: but had they been counsellors and directors in that war, as they were underlings and commanded by others, they had with the help of a good troop of horsemen been able to have opposed the fury of *Alexander*, without any assistance of the *Persian* footmen. For when *Darius* was overthrown with all his cowardly and confused rabble, those *Grecians*, under their captain *Amyntas*, held firm, and marched away in order, in despite of the vanquishers. Old soldiers are not easily dismay'd: we read in histories ancient and modern, what brave retreats have been made by them, tho' the rest of the army in which they have served, hath been broken.

At the battel of *Ravenna*, where the *Imperialists* were beaten by the *French*, a squadron of *Spaniards*, old soldiers, came off unbroken and undismay'd; whom when *Gaston de Foix*, duke of *Nemours*, and nephew to *Levis* the twelfth, charged, as holding the victory not entire by their escape, he was overturn'd and slain in the place. For it is truly said of those men, who, by being acquainted with dangers, fear them not: that, *Neglecto periculo imminentis mali opus ipsum quantumvis difficile aggrediuntur*; They go about the business it self, how hard soever it be, not standing to consider of the danger, which the mischief hanging over their heads may bring: and as truly of those that know the wars but by hearsay: *Quod valentes sunt & praevalentes ante pericula, in ipsis tamen periculis discedunt*; They have ability enough, and to spare, till dangers appear; but when peril indeed comes, they get them gone.

These *Grecians* also, that made the retreat, advised *Darius* to retire his army into the plain of *Mesopotamia*, to the end that *Alexander* being entered into those large fields, and great champions,

sides with his multitude; and withal they counselled him to divide that his huge army into parts, not committing the whole to one stroke of fortune, whereby he might have fought many battels, and have brought no greater numbers at once than might have been well marshalled and conducted. But this counsel was so contrary to the cowardly affections of the *Persians*, as they perswaded *Darius* to environ the *Grecians* which gave the advice, and to cut them in pieces as traytors. The infinite wisdom of God doth not work always by one and the same way, but very often in the alteration of kingdoms and estates, by taking understanding from the governors, so as they can neither give nor discern of counsels. For *Darius*, that would needs fight with *Alexander* upon a straightened piece of ground, near unto the city of *Iffus*, where he could bring no more hands to fight than *Alexander* could (who by the advice of *Parmenio* staid there, as in a place of best advantage) was utterly overthrown, his treasure lost, his wife, mother, and children (whom the *Grecians* his followers had perswaded him to leave in *Babylon*, or elsewhere) taken prisoners, and all their train of ladies spoiled of their rich garments, jewels, and honour. It is true, that both the queen, with her daughters, who had the good hap to be brought to *Alexander's* presence, were entertained with all respect due unto their birth, their honours preserved, and their jewels and rich garments restored unto them; and tho' *Darius's* wife was a most beautiful lady, and his daughters of excellent form, yet *Alexander* mastered his affections towards them all: only it is reported out of *Aristobulus* the historian, that he embraced the wife of the valiant *Memnon*, her husband lately dead, who was taken flying from *Damascus* by *Parmenio*, at which time the daughters of *Ochus*, who reigned before *Darius*, and the wives and children of all the nobility of *Persia* in effect, fell into captivity; at which time also *Darius's* treasure (not lost at *Iffus*) was seized, amounting to six thousand and two hundred talents of coin, and of bullion five hundred talents, with a world of riches besides.

Darius himself leaving his brother dead, with divers others of his chief captains (casting the crown from his head) hardly escaped.

After this overthrow given unto *Darius*, all *Phoenicia* (the city of *Tyre* excepted) was yielded to *Alexander*, of which *Parmenio* was made governour.

Aradus, *Zidon*, and *Biblos*, maritime cities of great importance, of which one *Strato* was king (but hated of the people) acknowledged *Alexander*. Good fortune followed him so fast that it trod on his heels; for *Antigonus*, *Alexander's* lieutenant in *Asia* the less, overthrew the *Cappadocians*, *Paphlagonians*, and others lately revolted; *Aristodemus*, *Darius's* admiral, had his fleet partly taken, and in part drowned by the *Macedonians* newly levied; the *Lacedemonians* that warred against *Antipater* were beaten; four thousand of those *Greeks* which made the retreat at the last battel, forsaking both the party of *Darius* and of *Alexander*, and led by *Amyntas* into *Egypt*, to hold it for themselves, were buried there; for the time was not yet come to divide kingdoms.

Alexander, to honour *Ephision*, whom he loved most, gave him power to dispose of the kingdom of *Zidon*. A man of a most poor estate, that laboured to sustain his life, being of the royal blood, was commended by the people unto him, who changed his spade into a scepter, so as he was beheld both a begger and a king in one and the same hour.

It was a good desire of this new king; when speaking to *Alexander*, he wish'd that he could bear his prosperity with the same moderation, and quietness of heart, that he had done his adversity; but ill done of *Alexander*, in that he would not perform in himself that which he commended in another man's desire; for it was a sign that he did but accompany, and could not govern, his felicity.

While he made some stay in those parts, he received a letter from *Darius*, importing the ransom of his wife, his mother, and his children, with some other conditions of peace; but such as rather became a conqueror, than one that had now been twice shamefully beaten, not vouchsafing, in his direction, to stile *Alexander* King. It is true, that the *Romans*, after that they had received an overthrow by *Pyrrhus*, returned him a more scornful answer upon the offer of peace, than they did before the trial of his force. But as their fortunes were then in the spring, so that of *Darius* had already cast leaf; the one resolved, well armed, and disciplined nation; the other cowardly and effeminate. *Alexander* disdain'd the offers of *Darius*, and sent him word, that he not only directed his letter to a king, but to the king of *Darius* himself.

S E C T. V.

How Alexander besieged and won the city of Tyre.

ALLEXANDER, coming near to the city of *Tyre*, received from them the present of a golden crown, with great store of victuals, and other presents, which he took very thankfully, returning them answer, that he desired to offer a sacrifice to *Hercules*, the protector of their city, from whom he was descended. But the *Tyrians* like not his company within their walls, but tell him, that the temple of *Hercules* was seated in the old city adjoining, now abandoned and desolate. To be short, *Alexander* resolved to enter it by force, and though it were a place in all mens opinion impregnable, because the island, whereon it was built, was eight hundred furlongs from the main; yet with the labour of many hands, having great store of stone from the old *Tyre*, and timber sufficient from *Libanus*, he filled the passage of the sea between the island and the main; which being more than once carried away by the strength of the sea upon a storm of wind, some time by the *Tyrians* fired, and some time torn asunder; yet with the help of his navy, which arrived (during the siege) from *Cyprus*, he overcame all difficulties, and prevailed, after he had spent seven months in that attempt. The *Tyrians*, in the beginning of the siege, had barbarously drowned the messengers sent by *Alexander*, persuading them to render the city, in respect whereof, and of the great loss of time and men, he put eight thousand to the sword, and caused two thousand of those that escaped the first fury, to be hanged on crosses on the sea-shore, and reserved for slaves (saith *Diodore*) thirteen thousand; ^a *Arianus* reckons them at thirty thousand. Many more had died, had not the *Zidonians*, that served ^b *Alexander*, conveyed great numbers away by shipping unto their own city.

Happy it was for *Apollo* that the town was taken; for one of the *Tyrians* having dreamt, that this god meant to forsake the city, they bound him fast with a golden chain to the idol of *Hercules*; but *Alexander*, like a gracious prince, loosened him again.

It is true, that it was a notable enterprize and difficult; but great things are made greater. For *Nabuchodonosor* had taken it before, and filled up the channel that lay between the island and the main.

The government of this territory he gave to *Philotas*, the son of *Parmenio*; *Cilicia* he committed to *Socrates* and *Andromachus*, lieutenant under *Parmenio*; *Ephesion* had the charge of the fleet, and was directed to find *Alexander* at *Gaza* towards *Egypt*.

S E C T. VI.

How Darius offered conditions of peace to Alexander. Alexander wins Gaza; and deals graciously with the Jews.

IN the mean while *Darius* sends again to *Alexander*, sets before him all the difficulties of passing on towards the east, and layeth the loss of the last battel to the straitness of the place: he hoped to terrify him, by threatening to encompass him in the plain countries; he bids him to consider, how impossible it was to pass the rivers of *Euphrates*, *Tigris*, *Araxes*, and the rest, with all such other fearful things: for he, that was now filled with nothing but fear, had arguments enough of that nature to present unto another. All the kingdoms between the river of *Alys* and the *Hellepont*, he offered him in dower with his beloved daughter. But *Alexander* answered, that he offered him nothing but his own, and that which victory and his own virtue had possess'd him of: that he was to give conditions, and not to receive any; and that he having passed the sea it self, disdain'd to think of resistance in transporting himself over rivers. It is said, that *Parmenio*, who was now old and full of honour and riches, told the king, that were he *Alexander*, he would accept of *Darius*'s offers; to which *Alexander* answered, that so would he if he were *Parmenio*.

But he goes on towards *Egypt*, and coming before *Gaza*, *Betis*, a faithful servant to *Darius*, shuts the gate against him, and defends the town with an obstinate resolution, at the siege whereof *Alexander* received a wound in his shoulder, which was dangerous, and a blow on his leg with a stone: He found better men in this place than he did at the former battels; for he left so many of his *Macedonians* buried in the sands of *Gaza*, that he was forc'd to send for a new supply into *Greece*. Here it was that *Alexander* first began to change condition, and to exercise cruelty. For after that he had enter'd *Gaza* by assault, and taken *Betis* (whom ^c *Josephus* calls *Babemesis*) that was weakened with many wounds, and who never gave ground to the assailants, he bored holes through his feet, and caused him to be drawn about the streets, whilst he was yet alive; who being as valiant a man as himself, disdain'd to ask him either life, or remission of his torments. And what had he to countenance this his tyranny, but the imitation of his ancestor *Achilles*, who did the like to *Heclor*? It is true, that cruelty hath always somewhat to cover her deformity.

From *Gaza* (saith ^d *Josephus*) he led his army towards *Jerusalem*, a city, for the antiquity and great fame thereof, well known unto him while he lay before *Tyre*: He had sent for some supply thither, which *Jaddus* the high priest, being subject and sworn to *Darius*, had refused him. The *Jews* therefore fearing his revenge, and unable to resist,

^a Arian. ^b Juil. l. 18. ^c Joseph. Ant. l. 11. c. 8. ^d l. 11. c. ult.

committed the care of their estates and safety to *Jaddus*, who, being taught by God, issued out of the city covered with his pontifical robes, to wit, an upper garment of purple, embroidered with gold, with his miter, and the plate of gold wherein the name of God was written, the priests and levites in their rich ornaments, and the people in white garments, in a manner so unusual, stately, and grave, as *Alexander* greatly admired it. *Josephus* reports it, that he fell to the ground before the high priest, as reverencing the name of God, and that *Parmenio* reprehended him for it: howsoever it was, I am of opinion, that he became so confident in his enterprise, and so assured of the success after the prophecy of *Daniel* had been read unto him, wherein he saw himself, and the conquest of *Persia*, so directly pointed at, as nothing thenceforth could discourage him or daunt him. He confessed to *Parmenio* (saith *Josephus*) that in *Dio*, a city of *Macedon*, when his mind laboured the conquest of *Asia*, he saw in his sleep such a person as *Jaddus*, and so appalled, professing one and the same God, by whom he was encouraged to pursue the purpose he had in hand, with assurance of victory. This apparition, formerly apprehended only by the light of his phantasy, he now beheld with his bodily eyes; wherewith he was so exceedingly pleased and emboldened, as contrary to the practice of the *Phenicians* (who hoped to have sack'd and destroyed *Jerusalem*) he gave the *Jews* all, and more than they desired, both of liberty and immunity, with permission to live under their own laws, and to exercise and enjoy their own religion.

S E C T. VII.

Alexander wins Egypt, and makes a journey to the temple of Hammon.

FROM *Jerusalem* *Alexander* turned again towards *Egypt*, and entered it, where *Darius's* lieutenant, *Assues*, received him, and delivered into his hand the city of *Memphis*, with eight hundred talents of treasure, and all other the king's riches. By this we see that the king of *Persia*, who had more of affection than of judgment, gave to the valiantest man he had but the command of one city, and to the veriest coward the government of all *Egypt*. When he had set things in order in *Egypt*, he began to travel after Godhead, towards *Jupiter Hammon*; so foolish had prosperity made him. He was to pass over the dangerous and dry sands, where, when the water which he brought on his camel's back was spent, he could not but have perished, had not a marvellous shower of rain fallen upon him, when his army was in extreme despair. All men that know *Egypt*, and have written thereof, affirm, that it never rains there; but the purposes of the mighty God are secret, and he bringeth to pass what it pleaseth him; for it is also said, that when he had lost his way in those vast deserts, that a flight of crows flew before the army; who making faster wing when they were followed, and fluttering slowly when the army was cast back, guided them over those pathless sands to *Jupiter's* temple.

* *Arianus*, from the report of *Ptolemy*, the son of *Lagus*, says, that he was led by two dragons, both which reports may be alike true; but many of those wonders and things prodigious, are feigned by those that have written the story of *Alexander*; as, that an eagle lay hovering directly over his head at the battel of *Iffus*; that a swallow flew about his head when he slept, and could not be affrighted from

him, till it had wakened him, at *Halicarnassus*, fore-shewing the treason of *Eropus*, practised by *Darius* to have slain him; that from the iron bars, of which the *Tyrians* made their defensive engines when *Alexander* besieged them, there fell drops of blood; and that the like drops were found in a loaf of bread, broken by a *Macedonian* soldier, at the same time; that a turf of earth fell on his shoulder, when he lay before *Gaza*, out of which there flew a bird into the air. The *Spaniards*, in the conquest of the *West-Indies*, have many such pretty tales; telling how they have been assisted in battel, by the presence of our lady, and by angels riding on white horses, with the like *Romish* miracles, which I think themselves do hardly believe. The strangest things that I have read of in this kind, being certainly true, was, that the night before the battel of *Novara*, all the dogs which followed the *French* army, ran from them to the *Switzers*, leaping and fawning upon them, as if they had been bred and fed by them all their lives; and in the morning following, *Trivulzi* and *Tremoville*, generals for *Lewis* the twelfth, were by these *Imperial Switzers* utterly broken and put to ruin.

The place of this idol of *Jupiter Hammon* is ill described by *Curtius*; for he bounds it by the *Arabian* troglodites on the south, between whom and the territory of *Hammon*, the region *Thebais*, or the superior *Egypt*, with the mountains of *Libya*, and the river of *Nilus*, are interjacent, and on the north he joins it to a nation, called *Nassamones*, who bordering the sea-shore, live (saith he) upon the spoils of shipwrack; whereas the temple or grove of this idol hath no sea near it by two hundred miles and more, being found on the south part of *Libya*; these *Nassamones* being due west from it, in the south part of *Marmarica*.

When *Alexander* came near the place, he sent some of his parasites before him to practise the priests attending the oracle, that their answer might be given in all things agreeable to his mad ambition, who affected the title of *Jupiter's* son. And so he was saluted *son of Jupiter*, by the devil's prophet, whether prepared before to flatter him, or rather (as some think) defective in the *Greek* tongue; for whereas he meant to say *O-pai-dion*, he said *O-pai-dios*; that is, *O son of Jupiter*, instead of, *O dear son*: For which grammatical error he was richly rewarded, and a rumour presently spread, that the great *Jupiter* had acknowledged *Alexander* for his own.

He had heard that *Perseus* and *Hercules* had formerly consulted with this oracle; the one, when he was employed against *Gorgon*; the other, against *Anteus* and *Busiris*; and seeing these men had derived themselves from the gods, why might not he? By this it seems, that he hoped to make his followers and the world fools, though indeed he made himself one, by thinking to cover from the world's knowledge his vanities and vices; and the better to confirm his followers in the belief of his deity, he had practised the priests to give answer to such as consulted with the oracle, that it should be pleasing to *Jupiter* to honour *Alexander* as his son.

Who this *Ammon* was, and how represented, either by a boss carried in a boat, or by a ram, or a ram's head, I see that many wise men have troubled themselves to find out; but, as *Arianus* speaks of *Dionysius*, or *Liber Pater* (who lived, saith *St. Augustine*, in *Moses's* time) *Ea quæ de diis veteres fabulis suis conscripserunt, non sunt nimium curiosè per-*

vestiganda ; We must not over-curiously search into the fables which the ancients have written of their gods.

But this is certain and notable, that after the gospel began to be preached in the world, the devil in this and in all other idols became speechless. For that this *Hammon* was neglected in the time of *Tiberius Cesar*, and in the time of *Trajan* altogether forgotten, *Strabo* and *Plutarch* witness.

There is found near this temple a fountain, called *Fons solis* (though *Ptolemy* in his third *African* table sets it farther off) that at midnight it is as hot as boiling water, and at noon as cold as any ice, to which I cannot but give credit, because I have heard of some other wells of like nature, and because it is reported by *St. Augustine*, by *Diodore*, *Herodotus*, *Pliny*, *Mela*, *Solinus*, *Arianus*, *Curtius*, and others ; and indeed our baths in *England* are much warmer in the night than in the day.

S E C T. VIII.

How Alexander marching against Darius, was opposed very unskilfully by the enemy.

FROM the temple of *Hammon* he returned to *Memphis*, where among many other learned men he heard the philosopher *Psammones*, who, be-like understanding that he affected the title of *Jupiter's* son, told him, that God was the father-king of all men in general ; and, refining the pride of this haughty king, brought him to say, that God was the Father of all mortal men, but that he acknowledged none for his children save good men.

He gave the charge of the several provinces of *Egypt* to several governours, following the rule of his master *Aristotle*, That a great dominion should not be continued in the hands of any one : whom therein the *Roman* emperors also followed, not daring to commit the government of *Egypt* to any of their senators, but to men of meaner rank and degree. He then gave order for the founding of *Alexandria* upon the westermost branch of *Nilus*. And having now settled (as he could) the estate of *Egypt*, with the kingdoms of the lesser *Asia*, *Phœnicia*, and *Syria* (which being but the pawns of *Darius's* ill fortune, one happy victory would readily have redeemed) he led his army towards *Euphrates*, which passage, though the same was committed to *Mazeus* to defend, yet was it abandoned, and *Alexander* without resistance passed it. From thence he marched towards *Tigris*, a river for the swiftness thereof called by the *Persians*, the arrow. Here, as *Curtius* and reason it self tells us, might *Darius* easily have repelled the invading *Macedonian* : for the violent course of the stream was such, as it drove before it many weighty stones, and those that moved not, but lay in the bottom, were so round and well polished by continual rolling, that no man was able to fight on so slippery a footing ; nor the *Macedonian* footmen to wade the river, otherwise than by joining their hands and interlacing their arms together, making one weighty and entire body to resist the swift passage and furious race of the stream. Besides this notable help, the channel was so deep towards the eastern shore, where *Darius* should have made head, as the foot-men were enforced to lift their bows and arrows and darts over their heads, to keep them from being moistened and made unserviceable by the waters. But it was truly and understandingly said of *Homer*,

*Talis est hominum tergestrium mens,
Qualem quotulis ducit pater vororumq; Decorumq;*

The minds of men are ever so affected,
As by God's will they daily are directed.

And it cannot be denied, that as all estates of the world by the surfeit of misgovernment have been subject to many grievous, and sometimes mortal diseases. So had the empire of *Persia* at this time brought it self into a burning and consuming fever, and thereby become frantick and without understanding, foreshewing manifestly the dissolution and death thereof.

But *Alexander* hath now recovered the eastern shores of *Tigris*, without any other difficulty than that of the nature of the place ; where *Mazeus* (who had charge to defend the passage both of *Euphrates* and it) presented himself to the *Macedonians*, followed with certain companies of horsemen, as if with uneven forces he durst have charged them on even ground, when as with a multitude far exceeding them he forsook the advantage, which no valour of his enemies could easily have overcome. But it is commonly seen, that fearful and cowardly men do ever follow those ways and counsels, whereof the opportunity is already lost.

It is true, that he set all provisions a fire where-with the *Macedonians* might serve themselves over *Tigris*, thinking thereby greatly to have distressed them ; but the execution of good counsel is fruitless when unseasonable. For now was *Alexander* so well furnished with carriages, as nothing was wanting to the competency of the army which he conducted. Those things also which he sought to waste, *Alexander* being now in sight, were by his horse-men saved and recovered. This *Mazeus* might have done some days before at good leisure ; or at this time with so great a strength of horsemen, as the *Macedonians* durst not have pursued them, leaving the strength of their foot out of sight, and far behind.

S E C T. IX.

The new provisions of Darius. Accidents foregoing the battel of Arbela.

DARIUS, upon *Alexander's* first return out of *Egypt*, had assembled all the forces, which those regions next him could furnish, and now also were the *Arians*, *Scythians*, *Indians*, and other nations arrived ; nations (saith *Curtius*) that rather served to make up the names of men, than to make resistance. *Arianus* hath numbered them with their leaders, and finds of foot-men of all sorts ten hundred thousand, and of horse four hundred thousand, besides armed chariots, and some few elephants. *Curtius*, who musters the army of *Darius* at two hundred thousand foot, and near fifty thousand horse, comes (I think) nearer to the true number ; and yet seeing that he had more confidence in the multitude than in the valour of his vassals, it is like enough that he had gathered together of all sorts some three or four hundred thousand, with which he hoped in those fair plains of *Assyria* to have overcome the few numbers of the invading army. But it is a rule in the philosophy of the war,

In omni praelio non tam multitudo, & virtus indocta, quam ars & exercitum solent prestare victoriam ; In every battel skill and practice do more towards the victory, than multitude and rude audacity.

While *Alexander* gave rest to his army after their passage over *Tigris*, there happened an eclipse of the moon, of which the *Macedonians*, not knowing the cause and reason, were greatly affrighted. All

^a And Pol. l. 5.

^b Curt. l. 4.

^c Veget.

that were ignorant (as the multitude always are) took it for a certain presage of their overthrow and destruction, insomuch as they began not only to murmur, but to speak it boldly, that for the ambition of one man, a man that disdained *Philip* for his father, and would needs be called the son of *Jupiter*, they should all perish; for he not only enforced them to make war against worlds of enemies, but against rivers, mountains, and the heavens themselves.

Hereupon *Alexander* being ready to march forward, made a halt; and, to quiet the minds of the multitude, he called before him the *Egyptian* astrologers, which followed him thence, that by them the soldiers might be assured that this defection of the moon was a certain presage of good success; for that it was natural they never imparted to the common people, but reserved the knowledge to themselves, so as a sorry almanack-maker had been no small fool in those days.

Of this kind of superstitious observation *Cesar* made good use, when he fought against *Ariovistus* and the *Germans*: for they being perswaded by the casting of lots, that if they fought before the change of the moon, they should certainly lose the battle, *Cesar* forced them to abide it, though they durst not give it; wherein having their minds already beaten by their own superstition, and being resolutely charged by the *Romans*, the whole army in effect perished.

These *Egyptians* gave no other reason than this, that the *Grecians* were under the aspect of the sun, the *Persians* of the moon; and therefore the moon failing and being darkened, the state of *Persia* was now in danger of falling, and their glory of being obscured. This judgment of the *Egyptian* priests being noised through all the army, all were satisfied, and their courage redoubled. It is a principle in the war, which, though devised since, was well observed then: *Exercitum terrore plenum dux ad pugnam non ducat*; Let not a captain lead his army to the fight, when it is possessed with matter of terror. It is truly observed by *Curtius*, that the people are led by nothing so much as by superstition; yea, we find it in all stories, and often in our own, that by such inventions, devised tales, dreams and prophecies, the people of this land have been carried head-long into many dangerous tumults and insurrections, and still to their own loss and ruin.

As *Alexander* drew near the *Persian* army, certain letters were surpris'd written by *Darius* to the *Grecians*, perswading them for great sums of money, either to kill or betray *Alexander*. But these, by the advice of *Parmenio*, he suppress'd.

At this time also *Darius's* fair wife, oppress'd with sorrow, and wearied with travel, died. Which accident *Alexander* seem'd no less to bewail than *Darius*, who upon the first bruit suspected that some dishonourable violence had been offered her; but being satisfied, by an eunuch of his own that attended her, of *Alexander's* kingly respect towards her, from the day of her being taken, he desired the immortal Gods, that if they had decreed to make a new master of the *Persian* empire, then it would please them to confer it on so just and continent an enemy as *Alexander*, to whom he once again, before the last trial of battle, offered these conditions of peace.

That with his daughter in marriage he would deliver up and resign all *Asia* the less, and with *Egypt*, all those kingdoms between the *Phenician* sea, and the river of *Euphrates*; that he would pay him for the ransom of his mother, and his other daughters, thirty thousand talents, and that for the perfor-

No. 30.

mance thereof, he would leave his son *Oechus* in hostage: to this they sought to perswade *Alexander* by such arguments as they had. *Alexander*, causing the ambassadors to be removed, advis'd with his council, but heard no man speak but *Parmenio*, the very right hand of his good fortune; who perswaded him to accept of these fair conditions. He told him, that the empire between *Euphrates* and *Hellefpont* was a fair addition to *Macedon*; that the retaining of the *Persian* prisoners was a great cumber, and the treasure offered for them of far better use than their persons, with divers other arguments; all which *Alexander* reject-ed. And yet it is probable, that if he had followed his advice, and bounded his ambition within those limits, he might have lived as famous for virtue as for fortune, and left himself a successor of able age to have enjoyed his estate, which afterward, indeed, he much enlarg'd, rather to the greatning of others than himself: who, to assure themselves of what they had usurped upon his issues, left not one of them to draw breath in the world within a few years after. The truth is, that *Alexander*, in going so far into the east, left behind him the reputation which he brought out of *Macedon*; the reputation of a just and prudent prince, a prince temperate, advis'd, and grateful: and, being taught new lessons by abundance of prosperity, became a lover of wine, of his own flattery, and of extreme cruelty. Yea, as *Seneca* hath observed, the taint of one unjust slaughter, amongst many, defaced and wither'd the flourishing beauty of all his great acts and glorious victories obtained. But the *Persian* ambassadors stay his answer, which was to this effect: that whatsoever he had bestow'd on the wife and children of *Darius*, proceeded from his own natural clemency and magnanimity, without all respect to their master; thanks to an enemy was improper; that he made no wars against adversity, but against those that resisted him; not against women and children, but against armed enemies: and although by the reiterated practice of *Darius* to corrupt his soldiers, and by great sums of money to perswade his friends to attempt upon his person, he had reason to doubt that the peace offered was rather pretended than meant; yet he could not (were it otherwise and faithful) resolve in haste to accept the same, seeing *Darius* had made the war against him, not as a king with royal and overforce, but as a traitor by secret and base practice: that for the territory offered him, it was already his own, and if *Darius* could beat him back again over *Euphrates*, which he had already pass'd he would then believe that he offered him somewhat in his own power: otherwise he propounded to himself for the reward of the war which he had made, all those kingdoms as yet in *Darius's* possession, wherein, whether he were abus'd by his own hopes or no, the battle which he meant to fight in the day following should determine. For in conclusion, he told them, that he came into *Asia* to give, and not to receive; that the heavens could not hold two suns: and therefore if *Darius* could be content to acknowledge *Alexander* for his superior, he might perchance be perswaded to give him conditions fit for a second person and his inferior.

SECT. X.

The battle of Arbela, and that it could not be so strongly fought as report hath made it.

WITH this answer the ambassadors return; *Darius* prepares to fight, and sends *Mazæus* to defend a passage, which he never yet dur'd to

much as to hazard. *Alexander* consults with his captains; *Parmenio* perfwades him to force *Darius's* camp by night, so that the multitude of enemies might not move terror in the *Macedonians*, being but few. *Alexander* disdains to steal the victory, and resolves to bring with him the day-light, to witness his valour. But it was the success that made good *Alexander's* resolution, tho' the counsel given by *Parmenio* was more sound: for it is a ground in war, *Si pauci necessario cum multitudine pugnare cogantur, consilium est noctis tempore belli fortunam tentare*. Notwithstanding, upon the view of the multitude at hand, he staggers and entrenches himself upon a ground of advantage, which the *Persian* had abandoned: and whereas *Darius*, for fear of surprize, had stood with his army in armour all the day, and forborn sleep all the night; *Alexander* gave his men rest and store of food, for reason had taught him this rule in the war: *In pugna milites validius resflunt, si cibo potuque refecti fuerint, nam fames intrinsecus magis pugnat, quam ferrum exterius*; Soldiers do the better stand to in fight, if they have their bellies full of meat and drink; for hunger within fights more eagerly than steel without.

The numbers which *Alexander* had, saith *Arianus*, were forty thousand foot, and seven thousand horse; these belike were of the *European* army; for he had besides both *Syrians*, *Indians*, *Egyptians*, and *Arabians*, that followed him out of those regions. He used but a short speech to his soldiers to encourage them, and I think that he needed little rhetoric; for by the two former battels upon the river of *Granick* and in *Cilicia*, the *Macedonians* were best taught with what men they were to encounter. And it is a true saying; *Victoria victoriam parat, animumque victoribus auget, & adversariis aufert*; One victory begets another, and puts courage into those that have already had the better, taking spirit away from such as have been beaten.

Arianus and *Curtius* make large descriptions of this battel, fought at *Gaugamela*; they tell us of many changes and re-changes; that the victory inclined sometimes to the *Persians*, sometimes to the *Macedonians*; that *Parmenio* was in danger of being overthrown, who led the left wing; that *Alexander's* rear-guard was broken, and his carriages lost; that for the first and valorous encounters on both sides, *Fortune* herself was long unresolved on whom to bestow the garland: and lastly, that *Alexander* in person wrought wonders, being charged in his retreat. But, in conclusion, *Curtius* delivers us in account but three hundred dead *Macedonians*, in all this terrible days work; saying, that *Epheslion*, *Perdiccas*, and others of name, were wounded. *Arianus* finds not a third part of this number slain; of the *Persians* there fell forty thousand (saith *Curtius*) thirty thousand, according to *Arianus*: ninety thousand, if we believe *Diodore*. But what can we judge of this great encounter, other than that, as in the two former battels, the *Persians* upon the first charge ran away, and that the *Macedonians* pursued? for if of these four or five hundred thousand *Asians* brought into the field by *Darius*, every man had cast but a dart, or a stone, the *Macedonians* could not have bought the empire of the east at so easy a rate, as six or seven hundred men in three notorious battels. Certainly, if *Darius* had fought with *Alexander* upon the banks of *Euphrates*, and had armed but fifty or threescore thousand of this great multitude, only with spades (for the most

of all he had were fit for no other weapon) it had been impossible for *Alexander* to have pass'd that river so easily, much less the river of *Tigris*. But, as a man whose empire God in his providence had determined, he abandoned all places of advantage, and suffered *Alexander* to enter so far into the bowels of his kingdom, as all hope and possibility of escape by retreat being taken from the *Macedonians*, they had presented unto them the choice, either of death or victory; to which election *Darius* could no way constrain his own, seeing they had many large regions to run into from those that invaded them.

S E C T. XI.

Of things following the battel of Arbela. The yielding of Babylon and Susa.

Darius, after the rout of his army, recovered *Arbela* the same night, better followed in his flight, than in the fight. He propounded unto them that ran after him his purpose of making a retreat into *Media*, perswading them that the *Macedonians*, greedy of spoil and riches, would rather attempt *Babylon*, *Susa*, and other cities, filled with treasure, than pursue the vanquished. This miserable resolution his nobility rather obeyed than approved.

Alexander, soon after *Darius's* departure, arrives at *Arbela*, which, with a great mass of treasure and princely ornaments, was rendered unto him: for the fear which conducted *Darius* took nothing with it but shame and dishonour. He, that had been twice beaten, should rather have sent his treasure into *Media*, than brought it to *Arbela*, so near the place where he did abide the coming of his enemies; if he had been victorious, he might have brought it after him at leisure; but being overcome, he knew it impossible to drive mules and camels laden with gold from the pursuing enemy, seeing himself, at the overthrow he had in *Cilicia*, cast the crown from his head to run away with the more speed. But errors are then best discerned, when most incurable; *Et præterita magis reprehendi possunt, quam corrigi*; It is easier to reprehend, than amend what is pass'd.

From *Arbela* *Alexander* took his way towards *Babylon*, where *Mazeus*, in whom *Darius* had most confidence, rendered himself, his children, and the city. Also the captain of the castle, who was keeper of the treasure, strewed the streets with flowers, burnt frankincense upon altars of silver as *Alexander* passed by, and delivered unto him whatsoever was committed to his trust. The *Magi* (the *Chaldean* astrologers) followed this captain in great solemnity to entertain their new king: after these came the *Babylonian* horsemen, infinite rich in attire, but exceeding poor in warlike furniture. Between these (though not greatly to be feared) and himself, *Alexander* caused his *Macedonian* footmen to march. When he entered the castle, he admired the glory thereof, and the abundance of treasure therein found, amounting to fifty thousand talents of silver uncoined. The city it self I have elsewhere described, with the walls, the towers, the gates, and the circuit, with the wonderful place of pleasure about two miles in circuit, surrounded with a wall of fourscore foot high, and on the top thereof (being under-borne with pillars) a grove of beautiful and fruitful trees, which it is said that one of the kings of *Babylon* caused to be built, that the queen and other princesses might walk privately therein. * In this city, rich in all things, but most of all in vo-

luptuous pleasures, the king rested himself and the whole army four and thirty days, consuming that time in banqueting, and in all sorts of effeminate exercise, which so much softened the minds of the *Macedonians*, not acquainted till now with the like delicacies, as the severe discipline of war, which taught them the sufferances of hunger and thirst, of painful travel, and hard lodging, began rather to be forgotten, than neglected.

Here it was that those bands of a thousand soldiers were erected, and commanders appointed over them, who thereupon were stiled *Chiliarchi*. This new order *Alexander* brought in, was to honour those captains which were found by certain selected judges to have deserved best in the late war. For before this time the *Macedonian* companies consisted but of five hundred. Certainly the drawing down of the footbands in this latter age hath been the cause (saith the marshal *Montauet*) that the title and charge of a captain hath been bestowed on every *Picque Bœuf* or spurn-cow; for when the captains of foot had a thousand soldiers under one ensign, and after that five hundred, as in the time of *Francis* the first, the title was honourable, and the kings were less charged, and far better served. King *Henry* the eighth of *England* never gave the commandment of any of his good ships, but to men of known valour, and of great estate; nay, sometimes he made two gentlemen of quality commanders in one ship: but all orders and degrees are fallen from the reputation they had.

While *Alexander* was yet in *Babylon*, there came to him a great supply out of *Europe*, for *Antipater* sent him six thousand foot, and five hundred horse; out of *Macedon*, of *Thracians* three thousand foot, and the like number of horse; and out of *Greece*, four thousand foot, and four hundred horse; by which his army was greatly strengthened: for those that were infected with the pleasures of *Babylon*, could hardly be brought again, *De quitter la plume pour dormir sur la dure*; To change from soft beds to hard boards.

He left the castle and city of *Babylon* with the territories about it in charge with three of his own captains, to wit, *Agathon*, *Minetus*, and *Appolidorus*; to supply all wants a thousand talents: but to grace *Mazeus*, who rendered the city unto him, he gave him the title of his lieutenant over all, and took with him *Bagissines* that gave up the castle, and having distributed to every soldier a part of the treasure, he left *Babylon*, and entered into the province *Satrapene*: from thence he went on towards *Susa* in *Persia*, the same which *Ptolemy*, *Herodotus*, and *Elianus* call *Memnonia*, situate on the river *Euleus*, a city sometime governed by *Daniel* the prophet. *Abulites* also, governour of this famous city, gave it up to the conqueror with fifty thousand talents of silver in bullion, and twelve elephants for the war, with all other the treasures of *Darius*. "In this sort did those vassals of fortune, lovers of the king's prosperity, not of his person (for so all ambitious men are) purchase their own peace and safety with the king's treasures. And herein was *Alexander* well advised, that whatsoever titles he gave to the *Persians*, yet he left all places of importance in trust with his own captains; to wit, *Babylon*, *Susa*, and *Persepolis*, with other cities and provinces by him conquered; for if *Darius* (as yet living) had beaten the *Macedonians* but in one battle, all the nobility of *Persia* would have returned to their natural lord. Those that are traitors to their own kings, are never to be used

alone in great enterprises by those princes that entertain them, nor ever to be trusted with the defences of any frontier town, or fortrefs of weight; by the rendering whereof they may redeem their liberty and estates lost. Hereof the *French* had experience, when *Don Pedro de Navarra*, being banished out of *Spain*, was trusted with *Fonterabe*; in the year 1523.

While *Alexander* spoiled *Arbela*, *Mazeus* might have furnished the king from *Babylon*, and while he staid four and thirty days at *Babylon*, *Abulites* might have holpen him from *Susa*: and while he feasted there, *Tiridates* from *Persepolis* might have reliev'd him, for the great mass of treasure was laid up in that city. But who hath sought out and friended fearful adversity? it is certain, that benefits bind not the ambitious, but the honest: for those that are but greedy of themselves, do in all changes of fortune only consult the conservation of their own greatness.

The government of *Susa*, with the castle and treasure, he committed to his own *Macedonians*, making *Abulites*, who rendered it unto him, his lieutenant, as he had done *Mazeus* and others, in giving them titles, but neither trust nor power; for he left three thousand old soldiers in garrison to assure the place, and *Darius's* mother and her children to repose themselves.

It is said, that *Charles* the fifth, having promised *Charles* of *Bourbon* the government of *Marseilles*, if he could have forc'd it, and whereof he made sure account, told some of his nearest counsellors, that he meant nothing less than the performance of that promise, because he should thereby have left the duke (revolted from his master) very well wherewithal to have recovered his favour.

S E C T. XII.

How Alexander came to Persepolis, and burnt it.

FROM *Susa* *Alexander* leadeth his army toward *Persepolis*, and when he sought to pass those mountains which sunder *Susiana* and *Persia*, he was soundly beaten by *Ariobarzanes*, who defended against him those streights, called *Pyle Persidis*, or *Susæide*; and after the loss of many companies of his *Macedonians*, he was forced to save himself by retreat, causing his foot to march close together, and to cover themselves with their targets from the stones tumbled on them from the mountain-top. Yet in the end he found out another path, which a *Lycian*, living in that country, discovered unto him, and came thereby suddenly in view of *Ariobarzanes*, who being inforc'd to fight upon even ground, was by *Alexander* broken, whereupon he fled to *Persepolis*, but (after that they of *Persepolis* had refused to receive him) he returned and gave a second charge upon the *Macedonians*, wherein he was slain. In like manner did king *Francis* the first, in the year 1515, find a way over the *Alps*, the *Switzers* undertaking to defend all the passages, who, if their footmanship had not saved them upon the king's descent on the other side, they had been ill paid for their hard lodging on those hills.

Four thousand *Greeks*, saith *Curtius* (*Justin* numbers them but at eight hundred) having been taken prisoners by the *Persians*, presented themselves to *Alexander* now in sight of *Persepolis*. These had the barbarous *Persians* so maimed and defaced, by cutting off their hands, noses, ears, and other members, as they could no way have been known to their countrymen, but by their voices;

to each of these *Alexander* gave three hundred crowns, with new garments, and such lands as they liked to live upon.

Tiridates, one of *Darius's* false-hearted grandees, hearing of *Alexander's* approach, made him know that *Persepolis* was ready to receive him, and prayed him to double his pace, because there was a determination in the people to spoil the king's treasure. This city was abandoned by many of her inhabitants upon *Alexander's* arrival, and they that staid, followed the worst counsel; for all was left to the liberty of the soldiers, to spoil and kill at their pleasure. There was no place in the world at that time, which, if it had been laid in the balance with *Persepolis*, would have weighed it down. *Babylon*, indeed, and *Susa*, were very rich; but in *Persepolis* lay the bulk and main store of the *Persians*. For after the spoil that had been made of money, curious plate, bullion, images of gold and silver, and other jewels, there remained to *Alexander* himself one hundred and twenty thousand talents. He left the same number of three thousand *Macedonians* in *Persepolis*, which he had done in *Susa*, and gave the same formal honour to the traitor *Tiridates*, that he had done to *Abulites*; but he that had the trust of the place was *Nicarides*, a creature of his own. The body of his army he left here for thirty days, of which the commanders were *Parmenio* and *Craterus*, and, with a thousand horse, and certain troops of chosen foot, he would needs view in the winter-time those parts of *Persia* which the snow had cover'd, a fruitless and foolish enterprise; but, as *Seneca* says, *Non ille ire vult, sed non potest stare*; He hath not a will to go, but he is unable to stand still. It is said and spoken in his praise, that when his soldiers cried out against him, because they could not endure the extreme frost, and make way, but with extreme difficulty, through the snow, that *Alexander* forsook his horse, and led them the way. But what can be more ridiculous than to bring other men into extremity, thereby to shew how well himself can endure it? His walking on foot did no otherwise take off their weariness that followed him, than his sometimes forbearing to drink did quench their thirst that could less endure it. For mine own little judgment, I shall rather commend that captain that makes careful provision for those that follow him, and that seeks wisely to prevent extreme necessity, than those witless arrogant fools, that make the vaunt of having endured equally with the common soldier, as if that were a matter of great glory and importance.

We find in all the wars that *Cesar* made, or the best of the *Roman* commanders, that the provision of victuals was their first care. For it was a true saying of *Coligni*, admiral of *France*, *That who so will shape that beast (meaning war) must begin with his belly*.

But *Alexander* is now returned to *Persepolis*, where those historians that were most amorous of his virtues, complain, that the opinion of his valour, of his liberality, of his clemency towards the vanquished, and all other his kingly conditions, were drowned in drink; * that he smothered in carousing cups all the reputation of his actions past; and that, by descending, as it were, from the reverend throne of the greatest king, into the company and familiarity of base harlots, he began to be despised both of his own and all other nations. For being persuaded, when he was inflamed with wine, by the infamous strumpet *Thais*, he caused the most sumptuous and goodly castle and city of *Persepolis* to be

consumed with fire, notwithstanding all the arguments of *Parmenio* to the contrary, who told him, that it was a dishonour to destroy those things by the persuasions of others, which by his proper virtue and force he had obtained; and that it would be a most strong persuasion to the *Asians*, to think hardly of him, and thereby alienate their hearts; For they might well believe that he, which demolished the goodliest ornaments they had, meant nothing less than (after such vastation) to hold their possession: ^b *Fere violentiam crudelitas sequitur*; Cruelty doth commonly follow drunkenness: For so it fell it out soon after, and often, in *Alexander*.

SECT. XIII.

The treason of Bessus against Darius. Darius's Death.

ABOUT this time he received a new supply of soldiers out of *Cilicia*, and goes on to find *Darius* in *Media*. *Darius* had there compounded his fourth and last army, which he meant to have increased in *Bactria*, had he not heard of *Alexander's* coming on, with whom (trusting to such companies as he had, which was numbred at thirty or forty thousand) he determined once again to try his fortune. He therefore calls together his captains and commanders, and propounds unto them his resolution, who being desperate of good success, used silence for a while. *Artabazus*, one of his eldest men of war, who had sometime lived with *Philip* of *Macedon*, brake the ice, and protesting that he could never be beaten by any adversity of the king's, from the faith which he had ever ow'd him, with firm confidence, that all the rest were of the same disposition (whereof they likewise assured *Darius* by the like protestation) he approved the king's resolution. Two only, and those the greatest, to wit, *Naburzanes* and *Bessus*, whereof the latter was governor of *Bactria*, had conspired against their master, and therefore advised the king to lay a new foundation for the war, and to pursue it by some such person for the present, against whom neither the gods nor fortune had in all things declar'd themselves to be an enemy: This preamble *Naburzanes* used, and in conclusion, advised the election of his fellow-traitor *Bessus*, with promise that, the wars ended, the empire should again be restored to *Darius*. The king, swollen with disdain, press'd towards *Naburzanes* to have slain him; but *Bessus*, and the *Bactrians*, whom he commanded, being more in number than the rest, with-held him. In the mean while, *Naburzanes* withdrew himself, and *Bessus* followed him, making their quarter apart from the rest of the army. *Artabazus*, the king's faithful servant, persuaded him to be advised, and serve the time, seeing *Alexander* was at hand; and that he would at least make shew of forgetting the offence made; which the king, being of a gentle disposition, willingly yielded unto. *Bessus* makes his submission, and attends the king, who removes his army. *Patron*, who commanded a regiment of four thousand *Greeks*, which had in all the former battels served *Darius* with great fidelity, and always made the retreat in spite of the *Macedonians*, offered himself to guard his person, protesting against the treason of *Bessus*; but it was not his destiny to follow their advice, who from the beginning of the war gave him faithful counsel; but he inclined still to *Bessus*, who told him, that the *Greeks*, with *Patron* their captain, were corrupted by *Alexander*, and practised the division of his faith-

ful servants. *Bessus* had drawn unto him thirty thousand of the army, promising them all those things, by which the lovers of the world and themselves are wont to be allured, to wit, riches, safety, and honour.

Now the day following *Darius* plainly discover'd the purposes of *Bessus*, and being overcome with passion, as thinking himself unable to make head against these ungrateful and unnatural traitors, he pray'd *Artabazus*, his faithful servant, to depart from him, and to provide for himself. In like sort, he discharged the rest of his attendants; all, save a few of his eunuchs; for his guards had voluntarily abandoned him. His *Persians* being most base cowards, durst not undertake his defence against the *Bactrians*, notwithstanding that they had four thousand *Greeks* to join with them, who had been able to have beaten both nations. But it is true, that him which forsakes himself, no man follows. It had been far more man-like and king-like, to have died at the head of those four thousand *Greeks*, which offered him the disposition of their lives, (to which *Artabazus* perswaded him) than to have lain bewailing himself on the ground, and suffering himself to be bound like a slave by those ambitious monsters that laid hands on him, whom neither the consideration of his former great estate, nor the honours he had given them, nor the trust reposed in them, nor the world of benefits bestow'd on them, could move to pity: no, nor his present adversity, which above all things should have moved them, could pierce their viperous and ungrateful hearts. Vain it was indeed to hope it, for infidelity hath no compassion.

Now *Darius*, thus forsaken, was bound and laid in a cart, covered with hides of beasts, to the end that by any other ornament he might not be discovered; and to add despight and derision to his adversity, they fastened him with chains of gold, and so drew him on among their ordinary carriages and carts. For *Bessus* and *Nabarzanes* perswaded themselves to redeem their lives and the provinces they held, either by delivering him a prisoner to *Alexander*, or if that hope failed, to make themselves kings by his slaughter, and then to defend themselves by force of arms. But they failed in both. For it was against the nature of God, who is most just, to pardon so strange villany, yea, though against a prince purely heathenish, and an idolater.

Alexander, having knowledge that *Darius* was retired towards *Bactria*, and durst not abide his coming, halted after him with a violent speed; and because he would not force his foot-men beyond their powers, he mounted on horseback certain selected companies of them, and best armed, and with six thousand other horse, rather ran than marched after *Darius*. Such as hated the treason of *Bessus*, and secretly forsook him, gave knowledge to *Alexander* of all that had happened, informing him of the way that *Bessus* took, and how near he was at hand; for many men of worth daily ran from him. Hereupon *Alexander* again doubled his pace, and his vanguard being discovered by *Bessus's* rear, *Bessus* brought a horse to the cart where *Darius* lay bound, perswading him to mount thereon, and to save himself. But the unfortunate king refusing to follow those that had betray'd him, they cast darts at him, wounded him to death, and wounded the beasts that drew him, and slew two poor servants that attended his person. This done, they all fled that could, leaving the rest to the mercy of the *Macedonian* swords.

No. 40.

Polystratus, a *Macedonian*, being by pursuit of the vanquished press'd with thirst, as he was refreshing himself with some water that he had discover'd, espying a cart with a team of wounded beasts breathing for life, and not able to move, searched the same, and therein found *Darius* bathing in his own blood. And by a *Persian* captive which followed this *Polystratus*, he understood that it was *Darius*, and was informed of this barbarous tragedy; *Darius* also seemed greatly comforted (if dying men, ignorant of the living God, can be comforted) that he cast not out his last sorrows unheard; but that by this *Macedonian*, *Alexander* might know, and take vengeance on those traitors, which had dealt no less unworthily than cruelly with him, recommending their revenge to *Alexander* by this messenger, which he besought him to pursue, not because *Darius* had desir'd it, but for his own honour, and the safety of all that did, or should after wear crowns. He also, having nothing else to present, rendered thanks to *Alexander* for the kingly grace us'd towards his wife, mother, and children, desiring the immortal gods to submit unto him the empire of the whole world. As he was thus speaking, impatient death pressing out his few remaining spirits, he desired water, which *Polystratus* presented him; after which he lived but to tell him, that of all the best things which the world had, which were lately in his power, he had nothing remaining but his last breath, wherewith to desire the gods to reward his compassion.

SECT. XIV.

How Alexander pursued Bessus, and took into his grace Darius's captains.

IT was now hoped by the *Macedonians*, that their travels were near an end, every man preparing for his return. When *Alexander* had knowledge thereof, he was greatly grieved; for the bounded earth sufficed not his boundless ambition. Many arguments he therefore us'd to draw on his army farther into the east; but that which had most strength was, that *Bessus*, a most cruel traitor to his master *Darius*, having at his devotion the *Hyrcanians* and *Bactrians*, would, in short time (if the *Macedonians* should return) make himself master of the *Persian* empire, and enjoy the fruits of all their former travels. In conclusion, he won their consent to go on; which done, leaving *Craterus* with certain regiments of foot, and *Amyntas* with six thousand horse, in *Parthenia*, he enters, not without some opposition, into *Hyrcania*; for the *Mardons*, and other barbarous nations, defended certain passages for a while. He pass'd the river of *Ziobheris*, which taking beginning in *Parthia*, dissolves it self in the *Caspian* sea: it runneth under the ledge of mountains which bound *Parthia* and *Hyrcania*, where, hiding it self under-ground for three hundred furlongs, it then riseth again, and followeth its former course. In *Zadracarta*, or *Zendracarta*, the same city which *Ptolemy* writes *Hyrcania*, the metropolis of that region, he rested seven days, banqueting and feasting therein.

Phataphernes, one of *Darius's* greatest commanders, with other of his best followers, submit themselves to *Alexander*, and were restored to their places and governments. But of all others, he graced *Artabazus* most highly, for his approved and constant faith to his master *Darius*. *Artabazus* brought with him ten thousand and five hundred *Greeks*, the remainder of all those that had served *Darius*: he treats with *Alexander* for their pardon,

before they were yet arrived ; but in the end they furrender themselves simply without promise or composition. He pardons all but the *Lacedemonians*, whom he imprifoned, their leader having flain himfelf: he was alfo wrought (though to his great difhonour) to receive *Nabarzanes*, that had joined with *Beffus* to murder *Darius*.

S E C T. XV.

Of *Thaleftris*, Queen of the *Amazons* ; where, by way of digreffion, it is fhewed, that fuch *Amazons* have been, and are.

HERE it is faid, that *Thaleftris*, or *Minothea*, a queen of the *Amazons*, came to vifit him, and her fuit was (which fhe eafily obtained) that fhe might accompany him till fhe were made with child by him ; which done (refufing to follow him into *India*) fhe returned into her own country.

Plutarch citeth many historians, reporting this meeting of *Thaleftris* with *Alexander*, and fome contradicting it. But, indeed, the letters of *Alexander* himfelf to *Antipater*, recounting all that befell him in thofe parts, and yet omitting to make mention of this *Amazonian* bufinefs, may juftly breed fufpicion of the whole matter as forged. Much more juftly may we fufpect it as a vain tale, becaufe an hiftorian of the fame time reading one of his books to *Lyfimachus* (then king of *Thrace*) who had followed *Alexander* in all his voyage, was laugh'd at by the king for inferting fuch news of the *Amazons*, as *Lyfimachus* himfelf had never heard of. One that accompanied *Alexander*, took upon him to write his acts ; which to amplify, he told how the king had fought fingle with an elephant, and flain it. The king hearing fuch ftuff, caught the book, and threw it into the river of *Indus*, faying, that it were well done to throw the writer after it, who, by inferting fuch fables, difparaged the truth of his great exploits. Yet, as we believe and know that there are elephants, though it were falfe that *Alexander* fought with one ; fo may we give credit unto writers, making mention of fuch *Amazons*, whether it were true or falfe that they met with *Alexander* ; as *Plutarch* leaves the matter undetermined. Therefore I will here take leave to make a digreffion, as well to fhew the opinions of the ancient hiftorians, cosmographers, and others, as alfo of fome modern difcoverers, touching thefe warlike women ; becaufe, not only *Strabo*, but many others of thefe our times, make doubt, whether or no there were any fuch kind of people. ^a *Julius Solinus* feats them in the north parts of *Afia* the lefs. *Pomp. Mela* finds two regions filled with them ; the one on the river *Thermodoon*, the other near the *Cafpian* fea ; ^b *Quas* (faith he) *Sauromatidas* appellant ; which the people call *Sauromatidas*. The former of thefe two had the *Cimerians* for their neighbours ; *Certum eft* (faith *Padianus*, who hath commented upon *Mela*) *illos proximos Amazonibus fuiſſe* ; it is certain that the *Cimerians* were the next nations to the *Amazons*. ^c *Ptolemy* ſets them farther into the land northwards, near the mountains *Hippaci*, not far from the pillars of *Alexander*. And that they had dominion in *Afia* it ſelf toward *India*, *Solinus* and *Pliny* tell us ; where they governed a people called the *Pandeans*, or *Padeans*, ſo called after *Pandea* the daughter of *Hercules*, from whom all the reſt derive themſelves. ^d *Claudian* affirms, that they com-

manded many nations: for he ſpeaks (largely perhaps as a poet) thus :

Medis levibusque Sabæis
Imperat hic ſextus: Reginarumque ſub armis,
Barbariæ pars magna jacet.

Over the *Medes*, and light *Sabeans*, reigns
This female ſex: and under arms of queen,
Great part of the *Barbarian* land remains.

^e *Diodorus Siculus* hath heard of them in *Libya*, who were more ancient (faith he) than thoſe which kept the banks of *Thermodoon*, a river falling into the *Euxine* ſea near *Heraclium*.

Herodotus doth alſo make report of theſe *Amazons*, whom he tells us that the *Scythians* call *Æorpatas*, which is as much as *Viricidas*, or men-killers. And that they made incurſion into *Aſia* the leſs, ſack'd *Ephesus*, and burnt the temple of *Diana*, *Mancthon* and *Aventinus* report, which they performed forty years after *Troy* was taken. At the ſiege of *Troy* it ſelf we read of ^f *Pentheſilea*, that ſhe came to the ſuccour of *Priamus*.

^g *Am. Marcellinus* gives the cauſe of their inhabiting upon the river of *Thermodoon*, ſpeaking confidently of the wars they made with divers nations, and of their overthrow.

Plutarch, in the life of *Theſeus*, out of *Philochorus*, *Hellanicus*, and other ancient hiftorians, reports the taking of *Antiopa*, queen of the *Amazons*, by *Hercules*, and by him given to *Theſeus*, though ſome affirm, that *Theſeus* himſelf got her by ſtealth when ſhe came to viſit him aboard his ſhip. But in ſubſtance there is little difference ; all confeſſing, that ſuch *Amazons* there were. The ſame author, in the life of *Pompey*, ſpeaks of certain companies of the *Amazons*, that came to aid the *Albanians* againſt the *Romans*, by whom, after the battel, many targets and buſkins of theirs were taken up: and he ſaith farther, that theſe women entertain the *Geles* and *Lelages* once a year, nations inhabiting between them and the *Albanians*.

But, to omit the many authors, making mention of *Amazons* that were in the old times, ^h *Fran. Lopez*, who hath written the navigation of *Orellana*, which he made down the river of *Amazons* from *Pern*, in the year 1542. (upon which river, for the divers turnings, he is ſaid to have ſailed fix thouſand miles) reports from the relation of the ſaid *Orellana*, to the council of the *Indies*, that he both ſaw thoſe women, and fought with them, where they fought to impeach his paſſage towards the eaſt ſea.

It is alſo reported by *Ulricus Schmidel*, that in the year 1542, when he ſailed up the rivers of *Paragna* and *Parabol*, that he came to a king of that country, called *Schernes*, inhabiting under the tropic of *Capricorn*, who gave his captain *Ernando Rieffere* a crown of ſilver, which he had gotten in ſight from a queen of the *Amazons* in thoſe parts.

ⁱ *Ed. Lopez*, in his deſcription of the kingdom of *Congo*, makes relation of ſuch *Amazons*, telling us, that (agreeable to the reports of elder times) they burn off their right breaſt, and live apart from men, ſave at one time of the year, when they feaſt and accompany them for one month. Theſe (faith he) poſſeſs a part of the kingdom of *Monomotapa* in *Africa*, nineteen degrees to the ſouthward of the line: and that theſe women are the

^a Solin. c. 27, & 65.

^b Theop. l. 1.

^c Ptol. l. 6. Afia Tab. 2. Plin. l. 6. c. 20.

^d Claud. de cap. Proſerpinae.

^e Diod. l. 2.

^f Aeneid. 1. l. 3.

^g Mar. l. 22. c. 7.

^h Hiſtor. Ind. part 1. c. 28.

strongest guards of this emperor, all the *East-Indian Portugals* know.

I have produced these authorities, in part, to justify mine own relation of these *Amazons*, because that which was delivered me for truth by an ancient *Casique* of *Guiana*, how upon the river of *Papamena* (since the *Spanish* discoveries called *Amazons*) that these women still live and govern, was held for a vain and unprofitable report.

S E C T. XVI.

How Alexander fell into the Persian luxury: and how he further pursued Bessus.

NOW, as *Alexander* had begun to change his conditions after the taking of *Persopolis*: so at this time his prosperity had so much over-wrought his virtue, as he accounted clemency to be but baseness, and the temperance which he had used all his life-time, but a poor and dejected humour, rather becoming the instructors of his youth, than the condition and state of so mighty a king, as the world could not equal. For he perswaded himself, that he now represented the greatness of the Gods; he was pleased that those that came before him, should fall to the ground and adore him; he wore the robes and garments of the *Persians*, and commanded that his nobility should do the like; he entertained in his court, and camp, the same shameless rabble of curtifans, and sodomitical eunuchs, that *Darius* had done, and imitated in all things the proud, voluptuous, and detested manners of the *Persians*, whom he had vanquished. So licentious is felicity, as notwithstanding that he was fully perswaded that the Gods, whom he served (detesting the vices of the invaded) assisted him in all attempts against them, he himself, contrary to the religion he professed (which how idolatrous soever it were, could not be but fearful unto him by neglecting it) became by imitation, and not by ignorance or education, a more foul and fearful monster than *Darius*, from whose tyranny he vaunted to have delivered so many nations. Yea those, that were dearest and nearest unto him, began to be ashamed of him, entertaining each other with this, and the like scornful discourse, that *Alexander* of *Macedon* was become one of *Darius's* licentious courtiers; that by his example the *Macedonians* were in the end of so many travels more impoverished in their virtues, than enriched by their victories; and that it was hard to judge whether the conquerors, or the conquered were the baser slaves. Neither were these opinions so reserved, but that the noise of them came to his ears. He therefore with great gifts sought to pacify the better sort, and those of whose judgments he was most jealous; and making it known to the army that *Bessus* had assumed the title of a king, and called himself *Artaxerxes*; and that he had compounded a great army of the *Bactrians*, and other nations, he had arguments enough to perswade them to go on, to the end that all already gotten might not with themselves (so far engaged) be cast away. And because they were pestered with the spoils of so many cities, as the whole army seemed but the guard of their carriages (not much unlike the warfare of the *French*) having commanded every man's fardels to be brought into the market-place, he, together with his own, caused all to be consumed with fire. Certainly, this could not but have proved most dangerous to him, seeing the common soldiers had more interest in these things, which they had bought with their painful travels, and with their blood, than in the king's ambition; had not (as *Seneca* often observed) his happy te-

merity overcome all things. As he was in his way news came to him that *Satibarzanes*, whom he had established in his former government over the *Arians*, was revolted; whereupon leaving the way of *Bactria*, he sought him out; but the rebel hearing of his coming, fled to *Bessus* with two thousand horse. He then went on towards *Bessus*, and by setting a great pile of wood on fire with the advantage of a strong wind, won the passage over a high and inaccessible rock, which was defended against him with thirteen thousand foot. For the extremity of the flame and smoke forced them from the place, otherwise invincible. I saw in the third civil war of *France* certain caves in *Languedoc*, which had but one entrance, and that very narrow, cut out in the mid-way of high rocks, which we knew not how to enter by any ladder or engine, till at last by certain bundles of straw let down by an iron chain, and a weighty stone in the midst, those that defended it were so smothered, as they render'd themselves with their plate, money, and other goods therein hidden. There were also, some three years before my arrival in *Guiana*, three hundred *Spaniards* well mounted, smothered to death, together with their horses, by the country people, who did set the long dry grass on fire to the eastward of them (the wind in those parts being always east) so as, notwithstanding their flying from the smoke, there was not any one that escaped. Sir *John Borowes* also, with an hundred *English*, was in great danger of being lost at *Margarita*, in the *West-Indies*, by having the grass fired behind him, but the smoke being timely discovered, he recovered the sea-shore with the loss of sixteen of his men. I remember these things, but to give caution to those that shall in times to come invade any part of those countries, that they always, before they pass into the land, burn down the grass and sedge to the east of them; they may otherwise, without any other enemy than a handful of straw set on fire, die the death of honey-bees, burnt out of the hive.

S E C T. XVII.

A conspiracy against Alexander. The death of Philotas and Parmenio.

ALEXANDER was, after he parted hence, no-where resisted, till he came into *Asia*, to the east of *Bactria*, where the chief city of that province, called *Artacoana*, was a while defended against him, by the revolt of *Satibarzanes*, but in the end he received the inhabitants to mercy. At this place his army was re-enforced with a new supply of five thousand and five hundred foot, and near five hundred horse, out of *Greece*, *Thessaly*, and other places. His journey out of *Persia* into these parts, is very confusedly described. For having (as all his historians tell us) a determination to find *Bessus* in *Bactria*, he leaves it at the very entrance, and takes the way of *Hyrcania*; from thence he wanders northward towards the obscure *Mardi*, upon the *Caspian* sea, and thence over the mountains *Coronus* into *Asia* and *Drangiana*.

At this time it was that the treason of *Dimnus* broke out, of which *Philotas* the son of *Parmenio* was accused, as accessory, if not principal. This *Dimnus*, having (I know not upon what ground) conspired with some others against the life of *Alexander*, went about to draw *Nicomachus*, a young man whom he loved, into the same treason. The youth, altho' he was first bound by oath to secrecy, when he heard so foul a matter uttered, began to protest against it so vehemently, that his friend was like

like to have slain him for security of his own life. So constrained by fear, he made shew as if he had been won by perswasion, and by seeming at length to like well of the business, he was told more at large what they were, that had undertaken it. There were nine or ten of them, all men of rank; whose names *Dimnus* (to countenance the enterprize) reckoned up to *Nicomachus*. *Nicomachus* had no sooner freed himself from the company of this traitor *Dimnus*, than he acquainted his own brother *Ceballinus* with the whole history: whereupon it was agreed between them, that *Ceballinus* (who might with least suspicion) should go to the court and utter all. *Ceballinus*, meeting with *Philotas*, told him the whole business, desiring him to acquaint the king therewith; which he promised to do, but did not. Two days passed, and *Philotas* never brake with the king about the matter; but still excused himself to *Ceballinus* by the king's want of leisure. This his coldness bred suspicion, and caused *Ceballinus* to address himself to another, one *Metron*, keeper of the king's armory, who forthwith brought him to *Alexander's* presence. *Alexander*, finding by examination what had passed between *Ceballinus* and *Philotas*, did fully perswade himself that his concealment of the treason, argued his hand to have been in the business. Therefore, when *Dimnus* was brought before him, he asked the traitor no other question than this: *Wherein have I so offended thee, that thou shouldest think Philotas more worthy to be king than I?* *Dimnus* perceiving, when he was apprehended, how the matter went, had so wounded himself, that he lived no longer than to give his last groan in the king's presence. Then was *Philotas* called, and charged with the suspicion which his silence might justly breed. His answer was, that when the practice was revealed unto him by *Nicomachus*, he judging it to be but frivolous, did forbear to acquaint *Alexander* therewithal, until he might have better information. This error of his (if it were only an error) altho' *Alexander*, for the notorious services of his father *Parmenio*, of his brother *Nicanor* lately dead, and of *Philotas* himself, had freely pardoned and given him his hand for assurance; yet by the instigation of *Craterus*, he again swallowed his princely promise, and made his enemies his judges: *Curtius* gives a note of *Craterus* in this business; how he perswaded himself, that he could never find a better occasion to oppress his private enemy, than by pretending piety and duty towards the king. Hereof a poet of our own hath given a note as much better, as it is more general in his *Philotas*.

See how these great men cloath their private hate,
In these fair colours of the publick good;
And to effect their ends, pretend the state,
As if the state by their affection stood;
And arm'd with power and princes jealousies,
Will put the least conceit of discontent
Into the greatest rank of treacheries,
That no one action shall seem innocent:
Yea, valour, honour, bounty, shall be made
As accessaries unto ends unjust;
And even the service of the state must lade
The needfullest undertaking with distrust:
So that base vileness, idle luxury,
Seem safer far, than to do worthily, &c.

Now, although it were so that the king, following the advice of *Craterus*, had resolved the next day to put *Philotas* to torment, yet in the very evening of the same night in which he was apprehended, he called him to a banquet, and dis-

coursed as familiarly with him as at any other time. But, when in the dead of the night *Philotas* was taken in his lodging, and that they which hated him began to bind him, he cried out upon the king in these words: *O Alexander, the malice of mine enemies hath surmounted thy mercy, and their hatred is far more constant than the word of a king.* Many circumstances were urged against him by *Alexander* himself (for the kings of *Macedon* did in person examine the accusations of treason) and this was not the least (not the least offence, indeed, against the king's humour, who desired to be glorified as a god) That when *Alexander* wrote unto him concerning the title given him by *Jupiter Hammon*; he answer'd, that he could not but rejoice that he was admitted into that sacred fellowship of the gods; and yet he could not but withal grieve for those that should live under such a one as would exceed the nature of man. This was (saith *Alexander*) a firm perswasion unto me, that his heart was changed, and that he held my glory in despight. See what a strange monster flattery is, that can perswade kings to kill those that do not praise, and allow those things in them, which are, of all others, most to be abhorred. *Philotas* was brought before the multitude to hear the king's oration against him: he was brought forth in vile garments, and bound like a thief; where he heard himself, and his absent father, the greatest captain of the world, accused, his two other brothers, *Hector* and *Nicanor*, having been lost in the present war. He was so greatly oppress'd with grief, that, for a while, he could utter nothing but tears; and sorrow had so wasted his spirits, that he sunk under those that led him. In the end, the king asked him in what language he would make his defence: he answered, in the same wherein it had pleased the king to accuse him, which he did, to the end that the *Persians*, as well as the *Macedonians*, might understand him. But hereof the king made his advantage, perswading the assembly, that he disclaimed the language of his own country; and so withdrawing himself, left him to his merciless enemies.

This proceeding of the king's, *Philotas* greatly lamented, seeing the king, who had so sharply inveighed against him, would not vouchsafe to hear his excuse. For, not his enemies only were emboldened thereby against him; but all the rest having discovered the king's disposition and resolution, contended among themselves which of them should exceed in hatred towards him. Among many other arguments which he used in his own defence, this was not the weakest, that when *Nicomachus* desired to know of *Dimnus* what men of mark and power were his partners in the conspiracy (as seeming unwilling to adventure himself with mean and base companions) *Dimnus* named unto him *Demetrius* of the king's chamber, *Nicanor*, *Amyntas*, and some others; but spake not a word of *Philotas*, who, by being commander of the horse, would greatly have valued the party, and have encouraged *Nicomachus*. Indeed, as *Philotas* said well for himself, it is likely that *Dimnus*, thereby the better to have heartned *Nicomachus*, would have named him, though he had never dealt with him in any such practice. And for more certain proof that he knew nothing of their intents that practised against the king, there was not any one of the conspirators, being many, enforce'd by torments, or otherwise, that could accuse him; and it is true, that adversity being seldom able to bear her own burden, is, for the most part, found so malicious, that she rather desires to draw others (nor always deserving it) into the same danger, than to spare any that it can accuse. Yet at

at the last, howsoever it were, to avoid the extremity of restless and unnatural torments, devised by his profess'd enemies, *Craterus*, *Genus*, *Epheslion*, and others, *Philotas* accused his own self; being perswaded that they would have slain him forthwith. But he failed even in that miserable hope, and suffering all that could be laid upon flesh and blood, he was forced to deliver, not what he knew, but what-soever best pleased their ears, that were far more merciless than death it self.

Of this kind of judicial proceeding St. *Augustin* greatly complaineth, as a matter to be bewailed, saith he, with fountains of tears. *Quid cum in sua causa quisque torquetur: Et cum queritur utrum sit nocens cruciatur: Et innocens luit pro incerto scelere certissimas penas: non quia illud commississe detegitur, sed quia non commississe nescitur; What shall we say to it, when one is put to torture in his own case; and tormented, whilst yet it is in question whether he be guilty; and being innocent, suffers assured punishment for a fault, of which there is no certainty; not because he is known to have committed the offence, but because others do not know that he hath not committed it.*

It had been enough for *Alexander's* safety, if *Philotas* had been put to death without torment, the rest would not much have grieved thereat, because he was greatly suspected. But *Hemolaus*, who afterwards conspired against him, made the king's cruelty and delight in blood the greatest motive of his own ill intent. Therefore *Seneca*, speaking of *Alexander*, saith thus, *Crudelitas minime humanum malum est, indignum tam mihi animo; ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere Et vulneribus, Et abjecto homine, in silvestre animal transire; Cruelty is not a human vice; it is unworthy of so mild a spirit. It is even a beastly rage to delight in blood and wounds, and casting away the nature of man, to become a savage monster.*

For the conclusion of this tragedy, *Curtius* makes a doubt, whether the confession that *Philotas* made, were to give end to the torments which he could no longer endure, or that the same was true indeed: For (saith he) in this case, they that speak truly, or they that deny falsely, come to one and the same end. Now while the king's hands were yet in blood, he commanded that *Lyncestes*, son-in-law to *Antipater*, who had been three years in prison, should be slain: The same dispatch had all those that *Nicomachus* had accused. Others there were that were suspected, because they had followed *Philotas*; but when they had answer'd for themselves, that they knew no way so direct to win the king's favour, as by loving those whom the king favoured, they were dismiss'd. But *Parmenio* was yet living; *Parmenio*, who had served with great fidelity, as well *Philip* of *Macedon*, the king's father, as himself; *Parmenio*, that first opened the way into *Asia*; that had depress'd *Attalus*, the king's enemy; that had always, and in all hazards, the leading of the king's vanguard, that was no less prudent in counsel, than fortunate in all attempts; a man beloved of the men of war, and, to say the truth, he that had made the purchase for the king of the empire of the east, and of all the glory and fame he had: That he might not therefore revenge the death of his son, though not upon the king (for it was unlikely that he would have dishonoured his fidelity in his eldest age, having now lived three score and ten years;) yet upon those, that, by the witchcraft of flattery, had possess'd themselves of his affection, it was resolved that he should be dispatch'd. *Polydamas*

was employ'd in this business; a man, whom, of all others, *Parmenio* trusted most, and loved best; who (to be short) finding him in *Media*, and having *Cleander* and other murderers with him, slew him walking in his garden, whilst he was reading the king's letters. *Hic exitus Parmenionis fuit, militiae domique clari viri; multa sine rege prosperè; rex sine illo nihil magnæ rei gesserat; This was the end of Parmenio (saith Curtius) who had performed many notable things without the king; but the king, without him, did never effect any thing worthy of praise.*

S E C T. XVIII.

How Alexander subdued the Bactrians, Sogdians, and other people. How Bessus was deliver'd into his hands. How he fought with the Scythians.

WHEN these things had an end, *Alexander* went on with his army, and brought under his obedience the *Arasprians*, or *Evergitans*; he made *Eumenides* (sometime *Darius's* secretary) their governor; then he subdued the *Arachosians*, and left *Menon* to command over them. Here the army, sometimes led by *Parmenio*, finds him, consisting of twelve thousand *Macedons* and *Greeks*, with whom he passed through some cold regions with difficulty enough. At length he came to the foot of the mountain *Taurus*, towards the east, where he built a city, which he honoured with his own name, and peopled it with seven thousand of his old *Macedons*, worn with age and with travels of the war. The *Arians*, who, since he left them, were revolted, he subdued again, by the industry and valour of *Caranus* and *Erigius*; and now he resolves to find out the new king *Bessus* in *Bactria*. *Bessus*, hearing of his coming, prepares to pass over the great river of *Oxus*, which divides *Bactria* from *Sogdiana*; *Artabazus* is made governor of *Bactria*, abandon'd by *Bessus*; the *Macedonian* army suffereth for want of water, inasmuch as when they came to the river of *Oxus*, there died more of them by drinking inordinately, than *Alexander* had lost in any one battle against the *Persians*. And it may well be; for (as *Clytus* did afterwards object unto him) he fought against women, not against men, and not against their persons, but their shadows. He found on the banks of this great river no manner of timber, or other materials, to make either boats, bridges, or raft; but was forced to sew together the hides that covered his carriages, and stuff them with straw, and on them in six days to pass over his army; which *Bessus* might easily have distress'd, if he had dared but to behold the *Macedonian* army afar off. He had formerly complained against *Darius*, for neglecting to defend the banks of *Tigris*, and other passages; and yet now, when this traitorous slave had siled himself king, he durst not perform any thing worthy of a slave. And therefore those, who were nearest unto him, and whom he most trusted, to wit, *Spitamenes*, *Dataphernes*, *Catanes*, and others, the commanders of his army, moved both by the care of their own safety, and by the memory of *Bessus's* treason and cruelty against *Darius*, bound him in the like manner that he had done his master; but with this difference, that he had the chain closed about his neck like a mastiff dog, and so was dragged along to be presented to his enemy.

In the mean while, *Alexander* was arrived at a certain town inhabited with *Greeks* of *Miletum*, brought thither by *Xerxes*, when long before he re-

^a Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 19. c. 6.

^b Sen. de. Clem. l. 1.

^c Lib. 7.

turned out of Greece, whose issues had well-near forgotten their country language. These most cruelly (after they had received him with great joy) he put to the sword, and destroyed their city. At this place he received *Bessus*, and, having rewarded *Spitamenes*, with the rest that delivered him, he gave the traitor into the hands of *Oxatres*, *Darius's* brother, to be tormented.

But while he now thought himself secure, some twenty thousand mountainers assaulted his camp; in repelling whom, he received a shot in the leg, the arrow-head sticking in the flesh; so that he was carried in a horse-litter, sometimes by the horsemen, sometimes by the foot.

Soon after he came unto *Maracanda*, which *Petrus Perondinus* takes to be *Samarchand*, the regal city of the great *Tamerlain*. It had in compass threescore and ten furlongs (*Curtius* saith.) Here he received the ambassadors of the *Scythians* (called *Avians*) who offered to serve him.

The *Bactrians* are shortly again, with the *Sogdians*, stirred to rebellion by the same *Spitamenes* and *Catanes*, who had lately delivered into his hands the traitor *Bessus*. Many cities were resolutely defended against him; all which, after victory, he defaced and rased, killing all therein. At one of these he received a blow on the neck, which struck him to the ground, and much disabled him for many days after. In the mean while, *Spitamenes* had recovered *Maracanda*, against whom he employed *Menedemus*, with three thousand foot and eight hundred horse.

In the heat of these tumults, *Alexander* marched on (if we may believe *Curtius* and others) till he came to the river of *Tanais*; upon whose bank he built another *Alexandria*, threescore furlongs in compass, which he beautified with houses within seventeen days after the walls were built. The building of this city is said to have been the occasion of a war between him and the *Scythians*; the *Scythian* king perswading himself, that this new town was fortified on purpose to keep him under. I do not well understand why the *Scythians*, offering war in such terrible manner, that *Alexander* was judged by his own soldiers to counterfeit sickness for very fear, should nevertheless make suit for peace: neither find I the reason why *Alexander* (not intending the conquest of those northern desarts, but only the defence of his own bank) should refuse to let them alone, with whom he could not meddle further than they should agree to suffer him. Yet hereof is made a great matter, and a victory described; in pursuit of which, the *Macedons* ran beyond the bounds and monuments of *Bacchus's* expedition.

The truth is, that *Curtius* and *Trogus* have greatly mistaken this river, which they call *Tanais*; for it was the river of *Iaxartes*, that runs between *Sogdiana* and *Scythia*, which *Alexander* pass'd over, while *Menedemus* was employed in the recovery of *Samarchand*: But *Tanais*, which divides *Asia* from *Europe*, is near two thousand miles distant from any part of *Bactria* or *Sogdiana*, and the way desert and unknown. So that *Alexander* had (besides *Iaxartes*) the great river of *Volga*, and many others, to swim over, ere he could recover *Tanais*, which (from the place where he was) he could hardly have discover'd with the army that followed him, if he had employ'd all the time that he lived in *Asia* in that travel.

Wherefore it is enough to believe, that the *Asiatic Scythians*, making some offer to disturb the erection of this new city, which was like to give some hindrance to their excursions, were driven away by the *Macedonians*; and being naked of defensive arms, easily chased some ten or twelve

miles, which is the substance of *Curtius's* report. As for the limits of *Bacchus's* journey; like enough it is, that *Bacchus* (if in his life-time he were as sober a man, as after his death he was held a drunken god) went not very far into that waste country, where he could find nothing but trees and stones, nor other business than to set up a monument.

Threescore of the *Macedons* are said to have been slain, and one thousand one hundred hurt in this fight, which might easily be, in passing a great river, defended against them by good archers. Of *Scythian* horses one thousand eight hundred were brought into the camp, and many prisoners. It is forbidden by some historians, and indeed it is hardly possible to set down the numbers of such as perish in battel; yet *Cesar* commonly did it. And where the diligence of the victors hath been so inquisitive into the greatness of their own success, that writers have been able to deliver such particulars by credible report; I hold it not unlawful to set down what we find; especially when it serves to give light to the business in hand. The small number which the *Macedonians* lost; the omission of the number which they slew (a thing not usual in *Curtius*, who forbears nothing that may set out the greatness of *Alexander*) and the little booty that was gotten, do make it probable, that this war was no better than the repulsion of a few roving *Tartars* (the like being yearly performed by the *Muscovite*, without any boast) and therefore better omitted by some historians, than so highly extolled as a great exploit by others.

While *Alexander* was assuring himself of those *Scythians* bordering upon *Iaxartes*, he received the ill news that *Menedemus* was slain by *Spitamenes*, the army (by him led) broken, and the greatest numbers slain, to wit, two thousand foot, and three hundred horse. He therefore, to appease the rebellion, and to take revenge of *Spitamenes*, makes all the haste he can; but *Spitamenes* flies into *Bactria*. *Alexander* kills, burns, and lays waste all before him; not sparing the innocent children, and so departs, leaving a new governour in that province.

To repair this loss, he received a great supply of nineteen thousand soldiers out of Greece, *Lycia*, and *Syria*; with all which and the old army, he returns towards the south, and passeth the river of *Oxus*; on the south side whereof he built six towns near each other for mutual succour. But he finds a new start-up-rebel, called *Arinxazes* (a *Sogdian*) followed with thirty thousand soldiers that defended against him a strong piece of ground on the top of a high hill; whom, when *Alexander* had sought in vain to win by fair words, he made choice of three hundred young men, and promised ten talents to the first, nine to the second, and so in proportion to the rest, that could find a way to creep up to the top thereof. This they performed with the loss of some two and thirty of their men, and then made a sign to *Alexander*, that they had performed his commandment. Hereupon he sent one *Cophes* to perswade *Arinxazes* to yield the place; who, being shewed by *Cophes* that the army of *Macedon* was already mounted up, yielded simply to *Alexander's* mercy, and was (with all his kindred) scourged and crucified to death; which punishment they well deserved for neglecting to keep good watch in so dangerous a time. For the place, as seems by the description, might easily have been defended against all the armies of the world. But what strength cannot do, man's wit, being the most forcible engine, hath often effected;

of which I will give you an example in a place of our own.

The island of *Sarke*, joining to *Guernsey*, and of that government, was in queen *Mary's* time surprized by the *French*, and could never have been recovered again by force, having cattel and corn enough upon the place to feed so many men as will serve to defend it; and being every way so inaccessible, that it might be held against the great *Turk*. Yet by a stratagem of a gentleman of the *Netherlands*, it was in this sort regained. He anchored in the road with one ship of small burden, and pretending the death of his merchant, besought the *French*, being some thirty in number, that they might bury their merchant in hallowed ground, and in the chapel of that isle, offering a present to the *French* of such commodities as they had on board; whereto (on condition that they should not come ashore with any weapon, no, not so much as with a knife) the *Frenchmen* yielded. Then did the *Flemings* put a coffin into their boat, not filled with a dead carcass, but with swords, targets, and harquebusses. The *French* received them at their landing, and searching all of them so narrowly, that they could not hide a penknife, gave them leave to draw their coffin up the rocks with great difficulty; some part of the *French* took the *Flemish* boat and rowed aboard their ship, to fetch the commodities promised, and what else they pleased; but being entered, they were taken and bound. The *Flemings* on the land, when they had carried their coffin into the chapel, shut the door to them; and taking their weapons out of the coffin, set upon the *French*: they run to the cliff, and cry to their company aboard the *Flemings* to come to their succour; but finding the boat charged with *Flemings*, yielded themselves and the place. Thus a fox-tail doth sometimes help well to piece out the lion's skin, that else would be too short.

SECT. XIX.

How Alexander slew his own friends.

AFTER these *Sogdian* and *Scythian* wars, we read of *Alexander's* killing of a lion, and other frivolous matters, and that he committed the government of *Maracanda*, and the country about it, to *Clytus*; and how he slew him soon after, for valuing the virtue of *Philip* the father, before that of *Alexander* the son; or rather, because he objected to the king the death of *Parmenio*, and derided the oracle of *Jammon*; for therein he touch'd him to the quick, the same being delivered in publick, and at a drunken banquet. *Clytus*, indeed, had deserved as much at the king's hands as any man living had done, and had, in particular, saved his life, which the king well remember'd, when he came to himself, and when it was too late. Yet, to say the truth, *Clytus's* insolency was intolerable. As he, in his cups, forgot whom he offended; so the king in his (for neither of them were themselves) forgot whom he went about to slay; for the grief whereof, he tore his own face, and lamented so inordinately; that, but for the persuasions of *Calisthenes*, it is thought he would have slain himself.

Wine beget fury, fury matter of repentance; but preceding mischiefs are not amended by succeeding bewailings. *Omne vitium ebrietas & incendit, & detegit; obstantem malis conatibus verecundiam removet; ubi possedit animum nimia vis vini, quicquid mali latebat, emergit: non facit ebrietas vitia, sed protrahit.* Drunkenness both kindles and lays open every vice; it removes out of the way that

shame which gives impediment unto bad attempts; where wine gets the mastery, all the ill that before lay hidden breaks out: drunkenness, indeed, rather discovers vices, than makes them.

Soon after this, *Spitamenes*, who slew *Bessus*, and had lately revolted from *Alexander*, was murdered by his wife, and his head presented to *Alexander*. *Spitamenes* being taken away, the *Dabans* also seized upon his fellow-conspirator *Dataphernes*, and delivered him up. So *Alexander*, being now freed from all these petty rebels, disposed of the provinces which he passed over, and went on with his army into *Gabaz*, where it suffered so much hunger, cold, lightning, thunder, and storm, that he lost, in one tempest, a thousand of his train. From hence he invaded the *Satans*, and destroyed their country. Then came he into the territory of *Cobortanes*, who submitted himself unto him, feasted him greatly, and presented him with thirty beautiful virgins, among whom *Roxane*, afterwards his wife, was one; which, although all the *Macedonians* disdained, yet none of them durst use any freedom of speech after *Clytus's* death. From hence he directed his course towards *India*, having so increased his numbers, that they amounted to an hundred and twenty thousand armed men.

In the mean while he would needs be honoured as a god; whereto, that he might allure the *Macedonians*, he employed two pernicious parasites, *Hagis* and *Cleo*, whom *Calisthenes* opposed: For, among many other honest arguments used to the assembly, he told *Cleo*, that he thought that *Alexander* would disdain the gift of godhead from his vassals; that the opinion of sanctity, though it did sometimes follow the death of those, who, in their life-time, had done the greatest things; yet it never accompanied any one, as yet, living in the world. He further told him, that neither *Hercules* nor *Bacchus* were deified at a banquet, and upon drink (for this matter was propounded by *Cleo* at a carousing feast;) but that, for the more than manly acts by them performed while they lived, they were in future and succeeding ages numbered among the gods. *Alexander* stood behind a partition, and heard all that was spoken, waiting but an opportunity to be revenged on *Calisthenes*, who, being a man of free speech, honest, learned, and a lover of the king's honour, was yet soon after tormented to death; not for that he had betrayed the king to others, but because he never would condescend to betray the king to himself, as all his detestable flatterers did. For in a conspiracy against the king, made by one *Hermolaus*, and others (which they confessed) he caused *Calisthenes*, without confession, accusation, or trial, to be torn asunder upon the rack: This deed, unworthy of a king, *Seneca* thus censureth. *Hec est Alexandri crimen eternum, quod nulla virtus, nulla bellorum felicitas redimet. Nam quoties quis dixerit, occidit Persarum multa millia; opponitur, & Calisthenem: quoties dictum erit, occidit Dariam; opponitur, & Calisthenem. Quoties dictum erit, omnia oceano tenuis vicit, ipsum quoque tentavit novis classibus, & imperium ex angulo Thracie usque ad orientis terminos protulit, dicetur, sed Calisthenem occidit. Omnia licet antiqua ducum regumque exempla transferit, ex his quae fecit nihil tam magnum erit quam scelus Calisthenes:* This is the eternal crime of *Alexander*, which no virtue nor felicity of his in war shall ever be able to redeem. For as often as any man shall say, he slew many thousand *Persians*; it shall be replied, he did so, and he slew *Calisthenes*. When it shall be said, he slew *Darius*; it shall be replied, and *Calisthenes*. When it shall be said, he won as far as to the very ocean, thereon also he adventured with unusual navies, and extended his empire

pire from a corner of *Thrace* to the utmost bounds of the orient; it shall be said withal, but he killed *Calisthenes*. Let him have outgone all the ancient examples of captains and kings, none of all his acts makes so much to his glory, as *Calisthenes* to his reproach.

S E C T. XX.

Of Alexander's journey into India. The battel between him and Porus.

WITH the army before remember'd, of one hundred and twenty thousand foot and horse, *Alexander* did enter the borders of *India*, where such of the princes as submitted themselves unto him he entertained lovingly, the rest he constrained; killing man, woman, and child, where they resisted. He then came before *Nisa*, built by *Bacchus*, which after a few days was render'd unto him. From thence he removed to a hill at hand, which on the top had goodly gardens filled with delicate fruits and vines, dedicated to *Bacchus*, to whom he made feasts for ten days together. Now, when he had drunk his fill, he went on towards *De-dala*, and from thence to *Acadera*, countries spoiled and abandoned by the inhabitants, by reason whereof, victuals failing, he divides his army: *Ptolemy* led one part, *Cenon* another, and himself the rest. They take many towns, whereof that of greatest fame was *Mazage*, which had in it three hundred thousand men; but after some resistance, it was yielded unto him by *Cleopbe* the queen, to whom again he restored it; at the siege of this city he received a wound in the leg. After this *Nora* was taken by *Polyperchon*, and a rock of great strength by himself: he won also a passage upon one *Eryx*, who was slain by his company, and his head presented to *Alexander*. This is the sum of *Alexander's* doings in those parts, before such time as he arrived at the river *Indus*. Coming to *Indus*, he found there *Ephestion*, who (being sent before) had prepared boats for the transportation of his army, and ere *Alexander's* arrival had perswaded *Omphis*, king of that part of the country, to submit himself to this great conqueror. Therefore, soon upon *Alexander's* coming, *Omphis* presented himself with all the strength of his country, and six and fifty elephants unto him, offering him his service and assistance. He made *Alexander* know that he was an enemy to the next two great kings of that part of *India*, named *Abisares* and *Porus*, wherewith *Alexander* was not a little pleased, hoping by this disunion to make his own victory by far the more easy. He presented *Alexander* with a crown of gold, so did he the rest of his commanders, and withal fourscore talents of silver coin, which *Alexander* not only refused, but, to shew that he was covetous of glory, not of gold, he gave *Omphis* a thousand talents of his own treasure, besides other *Persian* rarities. *Abisares* having heard that *Alexander* had received his enemy *Omphis* into his protection, resolved to make his own peace also: for knowing that his own strength did but equal that of *Omphis*, and that there was no other difference between them, than that which the change of war gave, he thought it an ill match when *Alexander*, who had already beaten under foot all the greatest princes of *Asia*, should make himself a party and head of the quarrel. So had *Alexander* none now to stand in his way but *Porus*, to whom he sent a commandment, that he should attend him at the border of his kingdom, there to do him homage. But from *Porus* he received this manly answer, that he would satisfy him in his first de-

mand, which was to attend him on his borders, and that well accompanied; but for any other acknowledgment he was resolved to take counsel of his sword. To be short, *Alexander* resolves to pass over the river *Hydaspes*, and to find *Porus* at his own home. *Porus* attends him on the farther bank with thirty thousand foot, fourscore and ten elephants, three hundred armed chariots, and a great troop of horse. If *Darius* had done the like on *Tigris*, *Alexander* had surely staid somewhat longer ere he had seen *India*. The river was four furlongs broad, which makes half a mile, and withal deep and swift. It had in it many islands, among which there was one well shadowed with wood, and of good capacity. *Alexander* sent *Ptolemy* up the river with a great part of the army, shrowding the rest from the view of *Porus*, who by this device being drawn from his first incamping, sets himself down opposite to *Ptolemy*, supposing that the whole army of *Macedon* meant to force their passage there. In the mean while *Alexander* recovers the farther shore without resistance. He orders his troops, and advanceth towards *Porus*, who at first rather believes that *Abisares* his confederate (but now the confederate of fortune) had been come over *Hydaspes* to his aid than that *Alexander* had pass'd it. But he finds it otherwise, and sends his brother *Hagis* with four thousand horse, and a hundred armed waggons to entertain him. Each waggon had in it four to fight, and two to guide it; but they were at this time of little use: for there had fallen so much rain, and thereby the fields were so moisten'd, as the horses could hardly trot. The *Scythians* and *Dahans* had the vant-guard, who so galled these *Indians*, as they broke their reins, and other furniture, overturning the waggons and those in them. *Perdiccas* also gave up the *Indian* horse-men, and the one and the other were forced to recoil. *Porus* moves forward with the gross of his army, that those of his vant-guard scattered might recover his rear: *Alexander*, being followed with *Ephestion*, *Ptolemy*, and *Perdiccas*, took on him to charge the *Indian* horse-men on the left wing, commanding *Cenon* or *Cenon* to invade the right; *Antigonus* and *Leonatus*, he directed to break upon *Porus's* battel of foot, strengthened with elephants, *Porus* himself being carried upon one of them of the greatest stature. By these beasts the *Macedonian* foot were most offended; but the archers and darters, being well guarded with the long and strong pikes of the *Macedonians*, so galled them, as being enraged, they turned head, and ran over the foot that followed them. In the end, and after a long and doubtful fight, by the advantage of weapon, and by the courage and skillfulness of the *Macedonian* captains, the victory fell to *Alexander*, who also far exceeded *Porus* in number: for, beside the *Macedonians*, and other eastern and northern nations, *Porus* was assailed by his own confederate and country people. Yet for his own person he never gave ground otherwise than with his sword towards his enemies, till being weakened with many wounds, and abandoned by his army, he became a prisoner to the conqueror, from whom again he received his estate with a great enlargement.

S E C T. XXI.

How Alexander finished his expedition, and returned out of India.

I Forbear to trouble my self and others with a frivolous discourse of serpents, apes, and peacocks, which the *Macedonians* found in these their travels: or of those petty wars which *Alexander* made

made between the overthrow of *Porus*; and his falling down the river of *Indus*. The descriptions of places about the head and branches thereof are better known unto us in this age, by means of our late navigations into those parts, than they were in any former times. The magnificence and riches of those kings we could in no sort be perswaded to believe, till our own experience had taught us, that there were many stranger things in the world, than are to be seen between *London* and *Stanes*.

Our great traveller *Mandevile*, who died in the year 1372, and had seen so much of the world, and of the *East-Indies*, we account the greatest fabler of the world; yet had he another reputation among other nations, as well able to judge as we; witness the monument made of him in the convent of the friers *Guillimins* in *Liege*, where the religious of that place keep some things of his, *Comme pour honorable memoire de son excellence; for an honourable memory of his excellency*, saith *Guichardine*.

The countries towards the springs of *Indus*, and where those many rivers of *Hydaspes*, *Zaradris*, *Acesines*, and the rest, fall into the main stream, are now possess'd by the great *Mogor*, the ninth from *Tamberlain*, who commands all that tract between *Persia* and *Indus* towards the west, as also a great extent of country towards *Ganges*. In the mouth of *Indus*, the *Ascension*, a ship of *London*, suffered shipwrack in the year 1609, and some of the company travelled over land till they came to *Agra*, the same great city (as I take it) which our later cosmographers call *Nagra*, being named of old *Dionysopolis*.

Philostratus, in the life of *Apollonius Tyanæus*, speaking of the expedition of *Bacchus* and *Hercules* into the *East-Indies*, tells us, that those two great captains (whom *Alexander* fought by all means to out-fame) when they endeavoured to subject unto them the *Oxydracæ*, a people inhabiting between the rivers of *Hyphasis* and *Ganges*, they were beaten from the assault of their cities with thunder and lightnings. This may well be understood by the great ordnance that those people had then in use. For it is now certainly known, that the great kings of the uttermost east, have had the use of the cannon, many hundreds of years since, and even since their first civility and greatness, which was long before *Alexander's* time. But *Alexander* pierc'd not so far into the east. It sufficed, that having already over-wearied his army, he discovered the rest of *India* by fame. The *Indian* kings whom he had subdued, informed him, that a prince called *Aggramenes*, who commanded many nations beyond the river of *Ganges*, was the powerfullest king of all those regions, and that he was able to bring into the field two hundred thousand foot, three thousand elephants, twenty thousand horse, and two thousand armed chariots. With this report, though *Alexander* were more inflamed than ever to proceed in this discovery and conquest, yet all the art he had could not perswade the soldiers to wander over those great desarts beyond *Indus* and *Ganges*, more terrible unto them than the greatest army that the east could gather. Yet at the last contented they were, after many perswasive orations, to follow him towards the south, to discover such part of the ocean sea, as was nearer at hand, whereunto the river of *Indus* was their infallible guide. *Alexander*, seeing that it would be no otherwise, devised a pretty trick, wherewith he hoped to beguile posterity, and make himself seem greater

than he was. He enlarged his camp, made greater trenches, greater cabins for the soldiers, greater horse-stalls, and higher mangers than his horses could feed in. He caused all furniture of men and horses to be made larger than would serve for use; and scattered these armours and bridles about his camp to be kept as reliques, and wonder'd at by the savages. Proportionable to these, he raised up twelve great altars to be the monument of his journey's end. This was a ready way to increase the fame of his bigness; to his greatness it could add nothing, save a suspicion that it was less than is thought, seeing he strove so earnestly to make it thought more than it was.

This done, he returned again to the bank of *Acesines*, and there determined to set up his fleet where *Acesines* and *Hydaspis* encounter, where, to testify by a surer monument how far he had past towards the east, he built by those rivers two cities; the one he called *Nicea*, and the other *Bucephalon*, after the name of his beloved horse *Bucephalus*. Here again he received a fourth Supply of six thousand *Thracian* horsemen, seven thousand foot; and from his lieutenant at *Babylon* five and twenty thousand armors, garnished with silver and gold, which he distributed amongst his soldiers. About these rivers he won many towns, and committed great slaughter on those that resisted: It is then written of him, that assaulting a city of the *Oxydracans*, he leapt from the top of the wall into it, and fought, I know not how long, against all the inhabitants; tales like those of *Bevis of Southampton*, frivolous and incredible. Finally, he past down the river with his fleet, at which time also the news came unto him of a rebellion in *Bactria*, and then of the arrival of an hundred embassadors from a king of *India*, who submitted himself unto him. He feasted these embassadors upon a hundred beds of gold, with all the sumptuousity that could be devised, who soon after their dispatch returned again with a present of three hundred horse, one hundred and thirty waggons, and to each four horses, a thousand targets, with many other things rare and rich.

Their entertainments ended, he sailed towards the south, passed through many obscure nations, which did all yield unto him either quietly, or compelled by force: among these he built another *Alexandria*. Of many places which he took in this passage, *Samus* was one, the inhabitants whereof fought against him with poisoned swords, with one of which *Ptolemy* (afterwards King of *Egypt*) was wounded, and cured by an herb which *Alexander* dreamt that he had seen in the mouth of a serpent.

When he came near the out-let of *Indus* (being ignorant of the tides of the sea) his gallies, as they were on a sudden shuffled one upon another by the flood, so on the ebb they were left on the dry ground and on the sandy banks of the river, wherewith the *Macedonians* were much amazed; but after he had a few days observed well the course of the sea, he pass'd out of the river's mouth some few miles, and, after sacrifices offered to *Nep-tune*, returned: and, the better to inform himself, he sent *Nearchus* and *Onesicritus*, to discover the coast towards the mouth of *Euphrates*. *Arianus*, in the beginning of his sixth book, hath written this passage down the river *Indus* at length, with the manner of the vessels, in which he transported his army, the commanders that were used therein, and other the marvellous provisions made.

Near the out-lets of this river he spent some part of the winter, and in eighteen days march from thence recovered *Gedrosia*, in which passage his army suffered such misery for want of food, that of a hundred and twenty thousand foot, and twelve thousand horse, which he carried into *India*, not the fourth part returned alive.

S E C T. XXII.

Of Alexander's riot, cruelty, and death.

FROM *Gedrosia* *Alexander* led his army into *Carmania*, and so drawing near to *Persia*, he gave himself wholly to feasting and drinking, imitating the triumphs of *Bacchus*. And though this swinish vice being hateful enough in itself, yet it always inflamed this king to cruelty. For (saith *Curtius*) the hangman followed the feast, for *Aspastes*, one of his provincial governors, he commanded to be slain; so as neither did the excess of voluptuousness qualify his cruelty, nor his cruelty hinder in ought his voluptuousness.

While he refreshed his army in these parts, a new supply of five thousand foot, and a thousand horse was brought him by *Cleander* and his fellows, that had been employed in the killing of *Parmenio*. Against these murderers great complaint was made by the deputies of the provinces in which they had commanded; and their offences were so outrageous, as *Alexander* was perswaded, that, had they not altogether despaired of his return out of *India*, they durst not have committed them. All men were glad of the occasion, remembering the virtue of him whom they had slaughtered. The end was, that *Cleander* and the other chief, with six hundred soldiers by them employed, were delivered over to the hangman: every one rejoicing that the ire of the king was at last executed on the ministers of his ire.

Nearchus and *Onesicritus* were now returned from the coast, and made report of an island rich in gold, and of other strange things; whereupon they were commanded to make some farther discovery: which done, that they should enter the mouth of *Euphrates*, and find the king at *Babylon*.

As he drew near to *Babylon*, he visited the sepulchre * of *Cyrus* in *Pasargada*, now called *Chel-quera*: where he was presented with many rich gifts by *Orsines*, one of the princes of *Persia*, of the race of *Cyrus*. But because *Bagoas*, an *Eunuch*, in especial favour with the king, was neglected, he not only practised certain loose fellows to witness against *Orsines*, that he had robbed *Cyrus's* tomb, for which he was condemned to die; but he assisted the hangman with his own hands in tormenting him. At which time also *Alexander* caused *Phradites* to be slain, suspecting his greatness. *Cæperrat* (saith *Curtius*) esse præcepta ad representanda supplicia, item ad deteriora credenda; he began headlongly to shed blood, and to believe false reports. It is true, that he took a way to make all men weary of his government, seeing cruelty is more fearful than all the adventures that can be made against it.

At this time it is said that *Calanus* the philosopher burnt himself, when he had lived threescore and thirteen years. Whether herein he followed the custom of his country, being an *Indian*, or sought to prevent the grief and incommodity of elder age, it is uncertain; but in this the historians agree, that foreseeing and foreshewing *Alexander's*

death, he promised to meet him shortly after at *Babylon*.

From *Pasargada* he came to *Susa*, where he married *Statira*, *Darius's* eldest daughter, giving her youngest sister to his beloved *Ephestion*, and fourscore other *Persian* ladies to his captains. There were six thousand guests invited to the feast, to each of which he gave a cup of gold. Here there came unto him three thousand young soldiers out of his conquered provinces, whereat the *Macedonians* greatly murmured. *Harpalus*, his treasurer in *Babylon*, having lavishly consumed the monies in his keeping, got him going with five thousand talents, and six thousand hired soldiers, but he was rejected in *Greece*, and there slain. *Alexander* greatly rejoiced at the fidelity of the *Greeks*, whom *Harpalus* with these forces and treasures could not stir: yet he sent commandment that they should again receive their banished men, whereunto (fearful of his indignation) all submitted themselves (except the *Athenians*) though they resolved that it was a manifest preparation towards their bondage. After this, there followed a marvellous discontentment in his army, because he had resolved to send into *Macedon* all those old soldiers which could no longer endure the travel of war, and to keep the rest in *Asia*. He used many orations to satisfy them, but it was in vain during the tempest of their fury. But afterwards, as whales are drawn to the land with a twine thread, when they have tumbled a while, so are the inconsiderate multitude easily conducted when their first passions are evaporate. With such as were licensed to depart, he sent *Craterus*, to whom he gave the lieutenantship of *Macedon*, *Thessaly*, and *Thrace*, which *Antipater* had held from his first departure out of *Europe*, who had beaten the rebellious *Greeks* in his absence, discharged the trust committed unto him with great fidelity, and sent him so many strong supplies into *Asia* from time to time. Certainly, if *Alexander* had not taken counsel of his cups, he would have cast some better colour on this alteration, and given *Antipater* a stronger reason for his remove, than to have employed him in the conduction of a new supply to be brought him to *Babylon*, the war being now at an end. For *Antipater* saw nothing in this remove, but the king's disposition to send him after *Parmenio* and the rest. With this *Antipater*, the king, notwithstanding his great courage, had no great appetite to grapple: princes, tho' jealous, do not stand in doubt of every man ill-affected, tho' valiant; but there is a kind of kingly courage, compounded of hardiness and understanding, which is many times so fearful unto them, as they take leave both of law and religion, to free themselves thereof.

After he had sent for *Antipater*, he made a journey into *Media* to settle things there; where *Ephestion*, whom he favoured most of all men, dies. The king, according to the greatness of his love, laments his loss, hangs his physician, and bestows upon his monument twelve thousand talents; after which he returns to *Babylon*. Thither *Antipater* came not, but sent; and not to excuse himself, but to free himself. For if we believe *Curtius* (whom *Plutarch* and others gainsay) *Antipater*, by his sons, *Cassander*, *Philip*, and *Lolla*, who waited on *Alexander's* cup, gave him poison, *Thessalus* (who was of the conspiracy) having invited him to a drinking feast of purpose. For after he had taken a carouse in *Hercules's* cup, a draught of drink stronger than *Hercules* himself, he quitted the world within a few days.

* *Calanus* hath a far different description of *Cyrus's* tomb.

Certainly the princes of the world have seldom found good by making their ministers over-great, and thereby suspicious to themselves. For he that doth not acknowledge fidelity to be a debt, but is perswaded that kings ought to purchase it from their vassals, will never please himself with the price given. The only restorative, indeed, that strengthens it, is the goodness and virtue of the prince, and his liberality makes it more diligent; so as proportion and distance be observed. It may be, that *Antipater*, having commanded two or three kingdoms ten or twelve years, knew not how to play any other part; no more than *Cesar* did, after he had so long a time governed the *Gauls*, where he utterly forgot the art of obedience. A most cruel and ungrateful traitor *Antipater* was, if *Curtius* do not belie him: for though he feared some ill measure upon his remove (the tragedies of *Parmenio*, *Clytus*, and *Callisthenes*, having been so lately acted;) yet he knew nothing to the contrary, but that the king had resolved to have given him some other great government in *Asia*: the old soldiers thence returned, having perchance desired to be governed by *Craterus*, whom they had followed in all the former war.

SECT. XXIII.

Of Alexander's person and qualities.

Howsoever it were, *Alexander's* former cruelties cannot be excused, no more than his vanity to be esteemed the son of *Jupiter*, with his excessive delight in drink and drunkenness, which others make the cause of his fever and death. In that he lamented his want of enterprizing, and grieved to consider what he should do when he had conquered the world, *Augustus Cesar* found just cause to deride him, as if the well-governing of so many nations and kingdoms, as he had already conquered, could not have offer'd him matter more than abundant, to busy his brains withal. That he was both learned, and a lover of learning, it cannot be doubted. Sir *Francis Bacon*, in his first book of the advancement of learning, hath proved it sufficiently. His liberality I know not how to praise, because it exceeded proportion. It is said, that when he gave a whole city to one of his servants, he, to whom it was given, did, out of modesty, refuse it, as disproportionable to his fortune: to whom *Alexander* replied, that he did not enquire what became him to accept, but the king to give: of which *Seneca*;
Animosa vox videtur & regia, cum sit stultissima:

nihil enim per se quonquam decet. Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi, &c. sine quibus facti ratio non constabit; habeatur personarum & dignitatum proportio, & cum sit ubique virtutis modus, aequè peccat quod excedit, quàm quod deficit; It seems a brave and royal speech, whereas indeed it is very foolish; for nothing, simply consider'd by it self, becomes a man. We must regard what, to whom, when, why, where; and the like; without which considerations; no act can be approved. Let honours be proportion'd unto the persons; for whereas virtue is ever limited by measure, the excess is as faulty as the defect.

For his person, it is very apparent, that he was as valiant as any man; a disposition, taken by it self; not much to be admired; for I am confident, that he had ten thousand in his army as daring as himself. Surely, if adventurous natures were to be commended simply, we should confound that virtue with the hardness of thieves, ruffians, and mastiff dogs. For certainly, it is no ways praise-worthy but in doing good things, and in the performance of those lawful enterprizes, in which we are employed for the service of our kings and common-weals.

If we compare this great conqueror with other troubles of the world, who have bought their glory with so great destruction, and effusion of blood, I think him far inferior to *Cesar*, and many others that lived after him, seeing he never undertook any warlike nation, the naked *Scythians* excepted, nor was ever encountered with any army, of which he had not a most mastering advantage, both of weapons and of commanders, every one of his father's old captains, by far, exceeding the best of his enemies. But it seemeth, fortune and destinies (if we may use those terms) had found out and prepared for him, without any care of his own, both heaps of men, that willingly offered their necks to the yoke, and kingdoms that invited and called in their own conquerors. For conclusion, we will agree with *Seneca*; who, speaking of *Philip* the father, and *Alexander* the son, gives this judgment of them. ^b *Quod non minores fuere pestes mortalium quàm inundatio, qua planum omne perfusum est, quàm conflagratio qua magna pars animantium exaruit;* That they were no less plagues to mankind, than an overflow of waters drowning all the level; or some burning drought, whereby a great part of living creatures is scorched up.

^a L. 2. de Ben. c. 1.

^b Natural. Quest. 1. 3. q. 1.

C H A P. III.

The Reign of A R I D Æ U S.

SECT. I.

Of the question about succession to Alexander.

THE death of *Alexander* left his army (as *Demades*, the *Athenian*, then compared it) in such case, as was that monstrous giant *Polyphe-mus*, having lost his only eye. For, that which is reported in fables of that great *Cyclops*, might well be verified of the *Macedonians*: their force was intolerable, but for want of good guidance, ineffectual, and harmful chiefly to themselves. The

causes whereof (under the divine ordinance) were, partly the uncertainty of title to succession in the kingdom of *Macedon*, partly the stubborn pride of *Alexander* himself, who, thinking none worthy to be his heir, did refuse to establish the right in any one, leaving every one to his own fortune; but especially the great ambition of his followers, who all had learned of their master to suffer no equals; a lesson soon taught unto spirits reflecting upon their own worth, when the reverence of a greater object faileth.

It hath formerly been shewed, that *Philip* (the father of *Alexander*) governing in *Macedon* as protector, assumed unto himself the kingdom, not rendering it unto *Amyntas* (the son of his elder brother *Perdiccas*) when he grew to man's estate; but only bestowing upon him in marriage a daughter of his own: by which bond, and much more by his own proper strength, he assured the crown unto himself: *Amyntas* never attempting ought against *Philip*, tho' (with price of his life) he did against *Alexander* in the beginning of his reign. Wherefore *Eurydice*, the sole issue of his marriage, ought in reason to have been acknowledged queen after *Alexander*; as having better title thereto, than either he or *Philip* had, when they lived, unless, peradventure, some law of that nation forbade the reign of women. But the excellent virtue of these two princes had utterly defaced the right of all pretenders, not claiming from their own bodies; and so great were their conquests, that *Macedon* itself was (in regard of them) a very small appendix, and no way deserving to be laid in balance against the demand of their posterity, had they left any able to make challenge of the royal seat.

Alexander, having taken many wives, had issue by none of the principal of them. *Barsine*, the daughter of *Artabazus* a *Persian*, had born unto him a young son: and *Roxane*, the daughter of *Oxyartes* (whom he had more solemnly married) was left by him great with child. But the baseness of the mothers, and contempt of the conquered nations, was generally alledged in bar of the plea made for them, by some that would (perhaps) have wrought out their own ends, under the name of *Alexander's* children.

Cleopatra, a sister of *Alexander*, widow to the king of *Epirus*, and *Arideus* his base brother (son to *Philip* by a concubine of no account) who had married the lady *Eurydice* before mentioned, were next in course. Of *Cleopatra* there was no speech, which may give suspicion, that either law or custom had made that sex incapable of the sovereignty; *Arideus* (besides his bastardy) was neither for person nor quality fit to rule as king; yet upon him the election fell, but slowly, and (as happeneth often) for lack of a better: when the counsellors having over-laboured their disagreeing wits in devising what was best, were content for very weariness to take what came next to hand.

Ptolemy (soon after king of *Egypt*) concurring with them who rejected all mention of the half-*Persian* brood, king *Alexander's* children, was of opinion, that the rule of all should be given to the captains, that going for law which by the greater part of them should be decreed: so far was he from acknowledging any one as true heir to the crown.

This *Ptolemy* was called the son of *Lagus*, but reputed of *Philip*: who having used the company of *Asinoe*, *Ptolemy's* mother, delivered her in marriage to *Lagus*, being great with child. Therefore, whether it were so, that he hoped well to work his own fortune out of those dissensions, which are incident unto the consultations of many ambitious men, equal in place, forcing them at length to redeem their quiet with subjection to one, deserving regard by his blood, and trust for his even carriage; or whether he desired only to get a share to himself, which could not have come to pass had all been given to one: plain enough it is, that he thought not on preferring *Arideus* before himself; and therefore gave such counsel as fitted his own and other men's purposes. Yea, this device of his took place indeed, tho' not in form as he had propound-

ed it: For, it was in effect all one, to have assembled at *Alexander's* empty chair, as *Ptolemy* had conceived the form of their consultations, or to set in the chair such a king as *Arideus*, no wiser than the chair it self. Also the controversies arising were determined by the greater part of the captains; by the greater part, if not in number, yet in puissance.

But as these counterfeit shews of dissembling aspirers, do often take check by the plain dealing of them, who dare to go more directly to work: so was it like to have fared with *Ptolemy* and the rest, when *Aristonous*, another of the captains, interpreted the very words of *Alexander*; saying, that he left his kingdom to the worthiest, as designing *Perdiccas*, to whom (lying at the point of death) he delivered his ring. It seemeth good in reason, that *Alexander* should be disposer of his own purchases; and those tokens of *Alexander's* purpose appeared plain enough, so long as no man would interpose another's construction: every one being uncertain how the secret affections of the rest might be inclined. Many therefore, either out of their love, or because they would not be of the latest, urged *Perdiccas* to take upon him the estate royal. He was no stranger to the royal blood; yet his birth gave him not such reputation, as the great favour of his dead king, with whom he had been very inward, and that especially since the death of *Ephestion* (a powerful minion) into whose place he was chosen. For his own worth he might well be commended, as a good man of war, and one that had given much proof of his private valour. But very furly he was: which quality (joined with good fortune) carried a shew of majesty: being check'd with misadventure, it was called by a true name *Pride*; and rewarded with death.

In the present business a foolish over-weening did him as great harm, as it had been great happiness to have succeeded *Alexander*. For not content to have the acclamation of the soldiers approving the sentence of *Aristonous*, he would needs counterfeit modesty; thinking that every one of the princes would have entreated him to take the weighty burden of an empire, which would be the less envious, the more solemnity he used in the acceptance. It is truly said, he that feigneth himself a sheep, may chance to be eaten by a wolf. *Meleager* (a man by nature envious, and bearing a particular hatred to *Perdiccas*) took advantage of his irresolute behaviour, and very bitterly inveighed against him. In conclusion he pronounced, that whosoever was heir to the crown, the soldiers ought to be heirs to the treasure; and therefore he invited them, who were nothing slow, to share it. This disturbed all the consultation. The captains were left alone, far enough from agreeing, and not able to have brought any conclusion to good effect without consent of the soldiers, who greedy of spoil thronged about *Meleager*.

S E C T. II.

The election of Arideus, with the troubles thereabout arising; the first division of the empire.

DURING this uproar, mention was made of *Arideus* by some one, and entertained with good liking of many, until at last it grew to the voice of the army. *Meleager*, having withdrawn himself tumultuously from the company of the lords, was glad of so fair an occasion to make himself great: therefore he produced *Arideus*, commended him to the soldiers, who called him by his father's name *Philip*, and brought him into the palace, invested him

him in *Alexander's* robes, and proclaiming him king. Many of the nobles withstood this election, but in vain; for they could not resolve what course to follow, rejecting this. Only *Python*, a hot-headed man, took upon him to proclaim the son of *Alexander* by *Roxana*, according to the counsel which *Perdiccas* at first had given, appointing *Perdiccas* and *Leonatus* his protectors: but this child was not yet born, which made that attempt of *Python* vain. Finally, *Perdiccas*, with six hundred men, and *Ptolemy*, with the king's pages, took upon them to defend the place where *Alexander's* body lay: but the army, conducted by *Meleager*, who carried the new king about whither he listed, easily brake in upon them, and enforced them to accept *Arideus* for their sovereign lord. Then, by the intercession of the ancient captains, a reconciliation was propounded and admitted, but on neither side faithfully meant.

Leonatus, who was of royal blood, a goodly gentleman, and valiant, issued out of *Babylon*, being followed by all the horse, which consisted (for the most part) of the nobility. *Perdiccas* abode in the city (but standing upon his guard) that he might be ready to take the opportunity of any commotion that should happen among the infantry. The king (who was governed by *Meleager*) commanded, or gave leave to have *Perdiccas* made away; which attempt succeeded ill, being neither secretly carried, nor committed to sure executioners. Their coming was not unexpected, and they were by *Perdiccas* rebuked with such gravity, that they departed honestlier than they came; being sorry for their bad enterprize. Upon the news of this attempt, the camp was in an uproar, which the king seeking to pacify, wanted authority, as having newly gotten the crown by them, and holding it by their courtesy. The matter it self afforded no good excuses, and his indiscretion made them worse. He said, that no harm was done, for *Perdiccas* was alive: but their exclamations were against the tyrannous enterprize, which he imputed to *Meleager*; abandoning the surest of his friends to the rage of the multitude, who were not appeased, until the king, by offering to resign his estate unto them, renewed, out of their pity, that favourable affection, which had moved them to set him up at the first.

Perdiccas, having now joined himself with *Leonatus*, kept the fields, intending to cut off all provision of victuals from the city. But, after sundry embassies passing between the king and the nobles (they requiring to have the authors of sedition given up into their hands; the king, that *Meleager* might be joined with *Leonatus* and *Perdiccas*, as a third in government of the army) things were compounded according to the king's desire. *Meleager* should have done well to consider, that such men as had one day demanded his head, were not like, the day following, to give him a principal place among them, without any new occasion offered, had not some purpose of treachery lurked under their great facility. General peace was renewed, and much love protested, where little was intended. The face of the court was the same which it had been in *Alexander's* time: but no longer now did the same heart give it life; and windy spirits they were which moved in the arteries. False reports were given out by appointment of *Perdiccas*, tending to his own disgrace; but in such terms, as might seem to have proceeded from *Meleager*, who, finding part of the drift, but not all, took it as an injury done to himself; and (as desirous of a true friendship)

desired of *Perdiccas*, that such authors of discord might be punished. *Perdiccas* (as a lover of peace) did well approve the motion; and therefore agreed, that a general muster should be made, at which time the disturbers of the common quiet should receive their punishment (as was the manner for soldiers offending) in presence of the army. The plot was mischievously laid: Had *Meleager* given way to seditious rumours, he must needs have incurred the general hatred of all, as a sower of dissension; and thereby, with publick approbation, might have been cut off, as having often offended in that kind; his prince being too weak a patron. Now, seeking redress of these disorders, he hastened his own ruin, by a less formal, but more speedy way. This kind of muster was very solemn, and practised with many ceremonies, as for cleansing of the army. The horsemen, the elephants, the *Macedonian* foot, the mercenaries, were each, according to their quality, set in array, apart from others, as if they had been of sundry sorts, met at adventure; which done, the manner was to skirmish (as by way of exercise) according to direction of their several captains. But at that time the great battel of *Macedonian* pikes, which they called the *Phalanx*, led by *Meleager*, was on purpose bestowed in a ground of disadvantage; and the countenance of the horse and elephants beginning to give charge upon them, was such, as discovered no jutting pastime nor good intent. Kings were always wont to fight among the horsemen; of which custom *Perdiccas* made great use that day, to the utter confusion of his enemies: for *Arideus* was always governed by him, which, for the present, had him in possession. Two or three days before, he had sought the death of *Perdiccas*, at the instigation of *Meleager*; now he rides with *Perdiccas* up and down about the footmen, commanding them to deliver unto the death all such as *Perdiccas* required. Three hundred they were who were cast unto the elephants, and by them slain, in the presence of the king, who should have defended them, and their affrighted companions. But these three hundred were not the men whose punishment *Meleager* had expected; they were such as had followed him, when he disturbed the first consultation that was held about the election of a new king, and some of them his especial friends. Having therefore kept himself quiet a while, as unwilling to give offence to them who had the advantage; when he saw their proceedings tend very manifestly to his destruction, he fled away into a temple, which he found no sanctuary; for thither they sent, and slew him.

The army being thus corrected, was led into the city, where a new council of the princes was held, who, finding what manner of man their king was, divided all the provinces of the empire among themselves; leaving to *Arideus* the office of a visitor, and yet making *Perdiccas* his protector, and commander of the forces remaining with him. Then were the funerals of *Alexander* thought upon, whose body, having been seven days neglected, was opened and embalmed by the *Egyptians*; no sign of poison appearing, how great soever the suspicion might be. The charge of his burial was committed to *Arideus*; one of the captains, who was two years preparing of a great and costly shew, making a stately chariot, in which the corps was laid; many coaches of his friends being laid in the ground, before that of *Alexander* was bestowed in *Alexandria*, a city of his own building in *Egypt*.

S E C T. III.

The beginning of the Lamian war.

WHILST these things were in doing, or presently after, *Antipater* and *Craterus*, two principal noblemen, and inferior to none of *Alexander's* followers, if not greater than any of the rest, were busied in *Greece* with a war, which the *Athenians* more bravely than wisely had begun in *Alexander's* life, but now did prosecute more boldly than before, upon the courage which they had taken by his death. *Alexander*, not long before he died, had commanded, that all the banished *Greeks* (few excepted) should be restored unto their former places. He knew the factious quality of the *Grecian* estates, and therefore thought so to provide, that in every city he would have a sure party. But it fell out otherwise; for he lost the hearts of many more than he won, by this proud injunction: his pleasure, indeed, was fulfilled; yet not without great murmuring of the whole nation, as being against all order of law, and a beginning of open tyranny. The *Athenians*, greatly decayed in estate, but retaining more than was needful, of their ancient spirits, forbade the execution of this decree in their dominions; so did also the *Etolians*, who were valiant men, and inhabited a region well fortified by nature; yet neither of them took arms, but seemed to bear themselves, as men that had done no more than they might well justify by reason: nevertheless, to prevent the worst, the *Athenians* gave secret instructions to *Leosthenes*, a captain of theirs, willing him to levy an army, but in his own name, and to keep it in a readiness for their use. This was no hard thing for *Leosthenes* to do, great numbers of *Greek* soldiers being lately returned from the *Asian* war in poor estate, as defrauded of their pay by the captains. Of these he gathered up eight thousand, when the certain news were brought of *Alexander's* death; at which the city of *Athens* declared it self, and more honourably than wisely, proclaimed open war against the *Macedonians*, for the liberty of *Greece*. Hereupon *Leosthenes* drew in the *Etolians*, and some other estates; gave battel to the *Boeotians*, who sided with *Antipater*, and overthrew them; growing so fast in reputation, and so strong in adherents, that *Antipater* (arming in all haste, yet suspecting his own strength) was forced to send into *Asia* to *Craterus* for succour.

Nothing is more vain than the fears and hopes of men, shunning or pursuing their destinies afar off, which deceive all mortal wisdom, even when they seem near at hand. One month was scarcely passed, since nothing so heavily burthened the thoughts of *Antipater*, as the return of *Craterus* into *Macedon*; which he then feared as death, but now desired, as the most likely assurance of his life. *Craterus*, whom *Alexander* held, as of all men, the most assured unto him, was sent into *Macedon*, to convey home the old soldiers (that was the pretence) and to succeed *Antipater* in the government of *Macedon* and *Greece*. The suspicions were strong, that he had a privy charge to put *Antipater* to death; neither did that which was commonly published, sound much better; which was, that *Antipater* should be sent unto the king, as captain of the young soldiers, newly to be levied in *Europe*. For *Alexander* was much incensed against him by his mother *Olympias*; and would sometimes give out speeches, testifying his own jealousy and hatred of him; but yet he strove to smother it, which in a cruel prince betokeneth little good. Few of *Alexander's* lieutenants had escaped with life; most of them, indeed, were mean persons in regard of those who followed him in his

Indian expedition, and were therefore (perhaps) removed, to make place for their betters. But if the king's rigor was such, as could find rebellious purposes (for so he interpreted even lewd government) in base persons; little might *Antipater* hope for, who, having sat viceroy ten years in the strongest part of the empire, was called away to the presence of so fell a master, and the envy of a court, wherein they had been his inferiors, which would now repine to see him their equal. Therefore, whether his fear drew him to prevention, working first the king's death by poison, given by his son *Iolaus*, *Alexander's* cup-bearer; or whether it brake not forth until opportunity had changed it into the passion of revenge, which was cruelly performed by his son *Cassander*; great cause of much fear he had, which I note in this place, as the ground of effects to be produced in very few years.

At the present *Craterus* was sent for, and all the captains of companies lying near solicited to make haste. Not without cause; for in *Macedon*, there could not, at that time, be raised more than thirteen thousand foot, and six hundred horse; which muster was of raw soldiers, all the force of the country being emptied into *Asia*. The *Thessalians*, indeed, who had long stood firm for *Philip* and *Alexander*, who also were the best horsemen of *Greece*, furnished him with very brave troops, that might have done great service, had their faith held out, which they changed for the liberty of *Greece*. With these forces did *Antipater*, in *Theffely*, try the fortune of a battel with *Leosthenes*; rather (as may seem) fearing the increase of his enemies power, and rebellion of the *Greeks* (were they not check'd at the first) than presuming on his own strength. For *Leosthenes* had of *Athenians*, *Etolians*, and mercenaries, two and twenty thousand foot, besides the assistance of many petty signories, and of some *Illyrians*, and *Thracians*: of horse he brought into the field about two thousand and five hundred; but over-strong he was that way also, when once the *Theffalians* had revolted unto him. So *Antipater* lost the day; and his loss was such, that he neither was able to keep the field, nor to make a safe retreat into his own country: therefore he fled into the town of *Lamia*, which was well fortified, and well provided of all things necessary to bear out a siege. Thither did *Leosthenes* follow him, present him battel again, and upon refusal close up the town with earth-works, and a wall. There will we leave him for a while, travelling in the last honourable enterprize that ever was undertaken by that great city of *Athens*.

S E C T. IV.

How Perdiccas employed his Army,

KING *Aridens* living under the rule of *Perdiccas*, when all the princes were gone each to his own province, kept a naked court; all his greatness consisting in a bare title, supported by the strength of his protector, who cared not for him, otherwise than to make use of him. *Perdiccas* had no province of his own peculiar, neither was he like to be welcome to any whom he should visit in his government. A stronger army than any of the rest he had, which he might easily hope, in that unsettled condition of things, to make better worth to him than many provinces could have been. The better to accomplish his desires, he closely sought the marriage of *Cleopatra*, the sister of *Alexander*; yet about the same time, he either married *Nicea*, the daughter of *Antipater*, or made such love to her as blinded their eyes, who did not somewhat narrowly search into his doings.

Ariarathes,

Ariarathes the *Cappadocian*, the second of that name, and tenth king of that country, had continued faithful to the *Persian* empire as long as it stood, following the example of his forefathers; even from *Pharnaces* I. that reigned in *Cappadocia*, who married *Atossa*, sister to the great *Cyrus*. Some of his ancestors had (indeed) been oppressed by the *Persians*, but what fortune took from them at one time, virtue restored at another, and their faithful princes had much increased all. But now in the fatal period of so great an empire, with much wisdom, and (*Darius* being slain) with sufficient honour, he might have acknowledged the *Macedonian* in the *Persian's* room. This he did not, neither did *Alexander* call him to account, being occupied with greater cares. But *Perdiccas*, who had no greater business wherein to entertain his army, found it expedient both for the honour of the empire, to take in that inland kingdom, surrounded with provinces of the *Macedonian* conquest, and for his own particular to have one opportune place of sure retreat, under the government of a steadfast friend. Therefore he enter'd *Cappadocia*, fought with *Ariarathes*, who drew into the field thirty thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse (a strong army, had it not encounter'd a stronger, and better trained) won the victory, and thereby the whole kingdom. But with much cruelty did he use the victory: for having taken *Ariarathes* prisoner with many others, he crucified him, and as many of his kindred as he could light upon: and so delivered that province to *Eumenes*, whom of all men living he trusted most.

Another part of his forces he had committed to *Python*, rather as to the most honourable of such as remained about him, than as to the most assured. *Python* was to subdue the *Greeks*, rebelling in the high countries of *Asia*. About twenty thousand foot, and three thousand horse they were (all old soldiers) who, planted in colonies by *Alexander*, to bridle the barbarous nations, were soon weary of their unpleasant habitations, and the rude people among whom they lived: and therefore took advantage of the present troubles to seek unto themselves a better fortune. Against these *Python* went, more desirous to make them his own, than to destroy them: which intent of his *Perdiccas* discovering, did both give him in charge to put all those rebels to the sword, giving the spoils of them to his soldiers, and further enjoined it unto *Python's* captains (his own creatures) that they should see this command executed. These directions for use of the victory might have proved needless; so uncertain was the victory itself. A captain of the rebels commanding over three thousand, corrupted by *Python*, did in the heat of the fight (which was very doubtful) retire without necessity to a hill not far off. This dismayed the rest, and gave the day to *Python*, who being far enough from *Perdiccas*, offered composition to the vanquished, granting unto them their lives and liberty, under condition of laying down their arms; and hereupon he gave them his faith. Being master of these companies, he might well have a good opinion of his own power: all power being then valued by strength in followers, when as none could vaunt himself as free lord of any territory. He had thirteen thousand foot, and eight thousand eight hundred horse, besides these new companions, whom needless fear without great loss had caused to leave the field: but in true estimation, all the greatness whereof *Python* might think himself assured, was (and soon appeared to be) inherent in *Perdiccas*. For by his command were ten thousand foot, and eight thou-

sand horse; of those which followed *Python*, levied; the rulers of the provinces carefully obeying the letters of *Perdiccas*, by which they were enjoined to give assistance to that business: and by virtue of the precept given unto them by *Perdiccas*, did the *Macedonians* cut in pieces all those poor men who had yielded themselves, leaving *Python* as naked as he came forth to return unto his great master.

Now was *Perdiccas* mighty above the mighty, and had fair leisure to pursue his hopes of marriage with *Cleopatra*, and thereby to make himself lord of all: but this must be secretly carried for fear of opposition. How it succeeded will appear when the *Lamian* war taketh ending.

S E C T. V.

The process of the Lamian war.

WE left *Antipater* hardly besieged, wanting means to free himself without succours from his friends in *Asia*. Those helps not appearing so soon as he expected, he came to parley with *Leosthenes*, and would have yielded unto any terms of reason, wherewith men possessed with hope of victory do seldom limit their desires. *Leosthenes* willed him without further circumstance to submit himself to discretion. This was too much for him that had once commanded over them, who now required of him such a dishonourable composition. Wherefore, knowing that the extremities, from which as yet he was far enough, could bring no worse with it, *Antipater* prepared for the defence, and the other for winning the town, which felt great want of victuals. In this lingering war, the *Etolians* (whether weary of sitting still at a siege, or having business which they pretended at home) took their leave, and returned into their own country. Their departure left the trenches so thinly manned, that *Antipater* found means to sally out upon his enemies to their great loss: for many were slain, and *Leosthenes* himself among them, ere he could be repulsed into the town. Yet hereby the *Macedonians* were nothing relieved; their victuals wasted, and they were not strong enough to deal with the *Greeks* in open fight. *Craterus* was long in coming. *Lyfimachus*, who was nearest at hand in *Thrace*, had too much work of his own, leading no more than four thousand foot, and two thousand horse, against *Scutbas* their king, who brought into the field above four times that number; and though *Lyfimachus*, not without loss, had gotten one victory, yet the enemy, abounding in multitude, felt not the blow so much as might abate his courage. Therefore *Leonatus* was earnestly solicited by *Antipater's* friends, to make all haste to the rescue. He had the government of *Phrygia* the less, and was able to raise an army of more than twenty thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse, whether levied out of his province, or appointed unto him out of the main army, it is uncertain. Certain it is, that he was more willing to take in hand the journey into *Greece*, than *Antipater* was to have him come. For *Cleopatra* had written unto him, desiring his presence at *Pella*, the chief city of *Macedon*, and very kindly offering herself to be his wife; which letters he kept not so close as had been requisite, and therefore brought himself into great suspicion, that soon ended with his life. *Antiphibus*, chosen general by the *Athenians*, in place of *Leosthenes*, hearing of this, forsook the siege of *Lamia*, and took the ready way to these great conquerors of *Asia*, with purpose to give them an evil welcome home, before:

before *Antipater* and they should join in one. He had (notwithstanding the departure of the *Etolians*) the advantage of *Leonatus* in horse, by the odds of two thousand *Theffalians*; in other things he was equal to him; in cause he thought himself superior; in the fortune of that day he proved so: for he won a great victory (chiefly by virtue of the *Theffalians*) which appeared the greater by the end of *Leonatus* himself; who fighting valiantly, was driven into a piece of marish ground, where he found his death, which he desperately had fought among the *Indians*, but it waited for him at home, not far from the place of his nativity. He was the first of *Alexander's* captains which died in battel, but all, or most of the rest shall follow him the same way. After this day the *Athenians* did never any thing suitable to their ancient glory. The vanquished *Macedonians* were too weak to renew the fight, and too proud to fly. They betook themselves to high grounds, unfit for service on horseback, and so abode in the sight of the enemy that day; the day following, *Antipater* with his men came into their camp, and took the charge of all. The *Athenians* perceiving their strength to be at the greatest, and fearing lest that of the enemies should increase, did earnestly seek to determine the matter quickly by another battel. But still *Antipater* kept himself on ground of advantage: which gave more than reasonable confidence to the *Greeks*, many of whom departed to their homes, accounting the enemy to be vanquished. This wretchedness (incorrigible in an army of voluntiers) was very inexcusable; seeing that the victories by land were very much defaced by losses at sea, where the *Athenians*, labouring to have made themselves once again masters, were put to the worst.

But now the fatal captivity of *Greece* came on, of which she never could be delivered unto this day. *Craterus*, with a strong army, having made great marches from *Cilicia*, passed over into *Europe*, and coming into *Theffaly*, joined himself with *Antipater*. The forces of *Leonatus*, *Antipater*, and *Craterus*, being joined in one, contained forty thousand weightily armed, three thousand light-armed men, and five thousand horse, of which numbers the *Greeks* wanted a thousand and five hundred in horse, in foot eighteen thousand. Carefully therefore did *Antipater* labour to avoid the necessity of a battel, until such time as the towns confederate should return unto the camp those bands which had straggled from it. But those companies were so slow in coming, and *Antipater* so urgent upon the *Greeks*, that compelled they were to put the matter in hazard without further attendance. Like enough it is, that with a little more help they had carried away the victory; for the *Theffalians* had the upper hand, and held it, until such time as they perceived their battels (overlaid with multitude) retire unto the higher ground, which caused them also to fall back. So the *Macedonians* became lords of the field, having little else to boast of, considering, that with the loss of an hundred and thirty men, they had purchased only the death of some five hundred enemies. Yet hereof was great use made. For the *Greeks*, as not subject unto the full command of one general, and being every one desirous to preserve his own estate and city, concluded to make a treaty of peace with *Antipater*; who being a subtle artificer, and well understanding their apuncts to division, refused to hearken to any general composition, but willed every city to deal apart for itself. The intent of his device was so apparent, that it was rejected; the *Greeks* chusing rather to abide the coming of their assistants,

whose unreasonable carelessness betrayed the cause *Antipater* and *Craterus* besieging and winning some towns in *Theffaly*, which the army of the confederates wanted means and courage to relieve, wearied that nation from attending any longer upon other mens unlikely hopes, with their own assured and present calamity.

SECT. VI.

Of the peace granted to Athens by *Antipater*. Of *Demosthenes's* death.

THE *Theffalians* falling off, all the rest soon followed severally, and sued for peace; the gentle conditions given to the most forward, inviting such as were slack. Only the *Athenians* and *Etolians* held out. Little favour could they hope for, having been authors of this tumult; and their fear was not great; the seat of the war being far from them. But the celerity of *Antipater* confounded all their imaginations, who sat still at *Athens*, devising upon courses of prosecuting the war to come, which came to their doors before their consultation could find issue. He was ready to enter upon their frontiers; they had no ability to resist, and were as heartless as friendless. All that remained was to send ambassadors desiring peace upon some good terms: necessity enforcing them to have accepted even the very worst. *Phocion*, with *Demades* the Orator, and *Xenocrates* the philosopher, were chief of this embassy; *Phocion* as the most honourable, *Demades* as a strong perswader (both of them well respected by *Antipater*) and *Xenocrates* as one admired for wisdom, gravity of manners, and virtue; but all these ornaments consisting in speculation, and therefore of less regard, when their admiration was to cost much in real effects.

Antipater calling to mind the pride of *Leosthenes*, required of the *Athenians* that they should wholly submit themselves to his pleasure; which being (perforce) granted, he commanded them to defray the charges of the war past, to pay a fine, and entertain a garrison. Further, he abrogated the popular estate, committing the government of the city to those of most wealth, depriving of the right of suffrage all such as wanted a convenient proportion of riches.

About nine thousand they were, all men of good substance, to whom the administration of the common-wealth was given, a number sufficient to retain the name and form of a *Democracy*. But the rascal multitude of beggarly persons, accustomed to get their livings out of the common troubles, being now debarred from bearing offices and giving their voices, cry'd out that this was a meer *Oligarchy*, the violent usurpation of a few incroaching upon the publick right. These turbulent fellows (of whom king *Philip* had been wont to say, that war to them was peace, and peace war) *Antipater* planted in *Thrace*, and gave them lands to manure, leaving as few of them as he could to molest the quiet of *Athens*.

To the same end (yet withal for satisfying his own suspicions and hatred) he caused *Demosthenes* and *Hyperides*, famous orators, with some others to be slain. Had the death of these two, especially of *Demosthenes*, been forborn, the rest of his proceedings in this action might well have passed for very mild: whereas now all such, as either delighted with the orations of *Demosthenes*, or have surrender'd their judgments to authors justly admiring him, as the most eloquent of all that ever did speak and write, condemn him utterly, calling

ling him a bloody tyrant. Such grace and reputation do the learned arts find in all civil nations, that the evil done to a man, famous in one of them, is able to blemish any action, how good soever otherwise it be, or honourably carried.

Demosthenes had taken sanctuary in the temple of *Neptune*, in the isle of *Calauria*; there did *Archias* (sent with soldiers by *Antipater* for the purpose) find him, and gently perswade him to leave the place, but not so prevailing, he threatened violence. Then *Demosthenes*, entreating a little respite, as it had been to write something, secretly took poison, which he had kept for such a necessity, and so died, rather chusing to do the last execution upon himself, than to fall into the hands of such as hated him. Only this act of his (commendable, perhaps, in a heathen man) argued some valour in him, who was otherwise too much a coward in battel, howsoever valiant in perswading to enterprizes, wherein the way to very honourable ends was to be made through passages exceedingly dangerous. He loved money well, and had great sums given him by the *Persian*, to encourage him in finding work for the *Macedonians* at home. Neither did he ill (methinks) in taking from the *Persians* which loved not his country, great rewards, for speaking such things as tended to his country's good; which he did not cease to procure, when the *Persians* were no longer able to give him recompence. Such as in tender contemplation of his death can endure no honourable, though true mention of *Antipater*, may (if they can) believe *Lucian*, who tells us, that it was *Antipater's* purpose to have done him great honour. Sure it is, that he was a stedfast enemy to the *Macedonians*; therefore discretion required that he should be cut off.

The matters of *Athens* being thus ordered, the chief command was left in the hand of *Phocion*, a virtuous man, and lover of his country, yet applying himself to the necessity of the times, by which commendations he had both at other times done the city much good, and now procured this peace, which (though grievous to freemen, yet favourable to the vanquished) he endeavoured carefully to preserve.

S E C T. VII.

How Craterus and Antipater were drawn from their Etolian wars into Asia. The grounds of the first civil war between the Macedonian lords.

SO *Antipater* with *Craterus* returned into *Macedonia*, where they strengthened their friendship with a new alliance, *Craterus* taking *Phila*, the daughter of *Antipater*, to wife.

Shortly after they went against the *Etolians*, whose poverty was not so easily daunted, as the luxurious wealth of the more powerful state of *Athens* had been. Their country was rough and mountainous, having many places of great fastness, into which they conveyed such of their goods as they most esteemed, and of their people as were least fit for war, with the rest they fortified the strongest of their cities, and so abode the coming of the *Macedonians*, whom they manfully resisted. With great obstinacy did the *Macedonians* contend against the difficulties of the places, which the *Etolians* made good as long as their victuals held out. But when *Craterus* had shut up all passages, and utterly debarred them of relief, then were they put to a miserable choice, either to descend from their strong holds and fight upon equal ground with unequal numbers, or to endure the miseries of hun-

ger and cold; against which they could make no long resistance, or to yield themselves to the *Macedonians*; who, incensed by the loss of many good soldiers, were not like to leave so stubborn enemies in places which might give confidence to rebellion. In cases of extremity, much fineness of wit apprehending all circumstances of danger commonly doth more hurt, than a blunt consideration of that only, which at the present is in hand. These *Etolians* did not as yet want meat, but their enemies daily molested them, wherefore as yet they thought upon nothing but fighting. Fortune was gracious to their courage. For such news came out of *Asia* into the *Macedonian* camp, as made *Antipater* and *Craterus* think every hour a month till they had rid their hands of these *Etolians*, giving them whatsoever conditions they would ask, yet with purpose to call them to severe account; yea, to root them out of *Greece* by death, or by captivity, when once they should have settled the affairs of *Asia*, as they hoped and desired. But of mens purposes God is the disposer: in whose high counsel it was ordained, that this poor nation should continue a troublesome bar to the proceedings of *Macedon* and *Greece*, and (when time had ripened the next monarchy) an open gate to let the *Roman* conquerors into those and other provinces. Likewise concerning the matters of *Asia*, the reformation intended by *Antipater* and *Craterus* was so far from taking effect, that it served merely as an introduction to all the civil wars ensuing.

The grounds of the *Asiatic* expedition, which did set the world in an uproar, were these. *Antipater* and *Craterus* were of *Alexander's* captains the mightiest in reputation: the one, in regard of his ancient precedency, and the present rule which he bare in the parts of *Europe*; the other, as of all men the best beloved, and most respected, both of *Alexander* and of the whole army. Next unto these had *Perdiccas* been, whom the advantage of his presence at the king's death did make equal, or superior to either of these, if not to both together. The first intents of *Perdiccas* were to have consorted with these two, and to have been with them a third partner in the government of all: to which purpose he entertained the discourse of marriage with one of *Antipater's* daughters. But feeling in short space the strength of that gale of wind which bore him up, he began to take wind, and soar quite another way. *Arideus* was a very simple man, yet served well enough to wear the title of that majesty, whereof *Perdiccas* being administrator, and hoping to become proprietary, the practice was more severe than had been in the days of *Alexander*: the desire to seem terrible being very familiar with weak princes and their ambitious officers, who know no other means of preserving themselves from contempt, and of giving such a fiery lustre to their actions, as may dazzle the eyes of the beholders. How cruelly the poor *Greeks* in the higher *Asia* were all put to the sword, and how tyrannously the king and princes of *Cappadocia* were crucified, hath already been shewed. The *Pisidians* were the next who felt the wrath of these counter-feit *Alexanders*. One city of theirs was utterly razed, the children sold for slaves, and all the rest massacred. The *Isaurians*, by this example grown desperate, when after two or three days trial they found themselves unable to continue the defence, lock'd themselves into their houses, and set the town on fire, into the flame whereof the young men did throw themselves, after that they had a while repelled the *Macedonians* from the walls.

These exploits being performed, the army had no other work than to lift the ashes of the burnt city for gold and silver; but *Perdiccas* had business of greater importance troubling his brains. Nothing was more contrary to his ends, than to sit still without employment, letting his soldiers grow idle about him, whilst others grew great, and took deep root in their several provinces. He purposed therefore to transport his forces into *Europe*, under pretence of bringing the king into *Macedonia*, the seat of his ancestors, and head of the empire. The king's presence would make the offices of his viceroys (during the time) actually void; *Antipater* with *Craterus* being once in case of private men, and only *Perdiccas* holding authority, the match with *Cleopatra* might easily be made. So should greatness meet with a good title, and what more could be wished? Some impediment the power of *Ptolemy* might give, who held *Egypt* well fortified with men, but much better with love of the people; yet, if the business prospered in *Macedonia*, like enough it was that either *Ptolemy* would follow of himself, or be driven to come to reason. *Antigonus* likewise then governing in *Phrygia*, a bulky-headed man, and ill affected to the side, was to be looked into and made away, for fear of further trouble. So thought *Perdiccas*, and was deceived in so thinking. *Antigonus* was as good a man of war, of as deep a judgment, as high a spirit, and as great underraking, as any of *Alexander's* captains. His employments had been less than some of theirs, which made him also the less respected; but his thoughts were as proud as theirs; for he valued himself by his own worth, not by the opinions of other men; with careful attention had he watched *Perdiccas*, and founded the depth of his purposes, which it was now high time to discover. For *Perdiccas*, having with a jealous eye pryed into the demeanour of *Antigonus*, and finding him no way fit for his turn, caused him to be charged with such accusations as might suffice to take away his life, especially by a judge that sought his death. This device *Antigonus* would not seem to perceive, but prepared himself in shew to make answer, indeed to make escape, which easily he did, putting himself and his son *Demetrius* aboard of some *Albanian* galleys that carried him to *Antipater*, laden with such tidings as finished the *Etolian* war before mentioned.

As the coming of *Antigonus* made *Craterus* and *Antipater* manifestly perceive their own danger: so his flight gave *Perdiccas* to understand that his intentions were laid open, and must now be justified by the sword. Therefore he prepared as fast as he could, not only for defence, but (as having on his side the king's name) to meet with them at home, who were nothing slack in providing to encounter him. *Ptolemy* being advertised of these proceedings, and considering how nearly they concerned him, sided with *Antipater*. To his government of *Egypt* he had annexed the dominion of *Cyrene*, not without consent of the chief citizens; and now in the midst of these garboils he celebrated the funeral of *Alexander* with great solemnity, purchasing thereby to himself much good will and many partakers, notwithstanding the terrible report of the king's army coming against him.

SECT. VIII.

Perdiccas's voyage into Egypt, and his death.

PERDICCAS, uncertain which way to bend his main power, at length resolved to set upon *Ptolemy*; leaving *Eumenes* to keep to his use,

against *Craterus* and *Antipater*; the parts of *Asia* bordering upon *Europe*.

It may seem strange, that he did not rather make head against those who were to come out of *Greece* with a great number, and of more able men than *Ptolemy* could bring. Perhaps he thought to make a quick end with *Ptolemy*; or believed that *Craterus* would not be ready for him soon enough. Sure it is that he took a bad course, and made it worse with ill handling.

Ptolemy by his sweet behaviour allured many to his party, without help of any bad arts. *Perdiccas* contrariwise was full of insolency, which never failed to be rewarded with hatred; that is truly defined, An affectation founded upon opinion of an unjust contempt. The whole story of his proceedings in *Egypt* is not worth relating: for he did nothing of importance; but (as a wilful man) tired his followers, and wasted them in hard enterprises without success. His most forcible attempt was upon a little town called the *Camels Wall*: thither he marched by night, with more haste than good speed; for *Ptolemy* preventing him, did put himself into the place, where behaving himself not only as a good commander, but as a stout soldier, he gave the foil to *Perdiccas*, causing him to retire with loss, after a vehement, but vain assault continued one whole day. The night following, *Perdiccas* made another journey (which was his last) and came to the divisions of *Nilus*, over against *Memphis*. There with much difficulty he began to pass over his army into an island where he meant to encamp. The current was strong, the water deep, and hardly fordable. Wherefore he placed his elephants above the passage, to break the violence of the stream, and his horsemen beneath it, to take up such as were carried away by swiftness of the water. A great part of his army being arrived on the further bank, the channel began to wax deep; so that whereas the former companies had waded up to the chin, they who should have followed could find no footing. Whether this came by rising of the water, or flitting away of the ground (the earthen being broken with the feet of so many men, horse, and elephants) no remedy there was, but such as had pass'd must re-pass again, as well as they might: for they were too weak for the enemy, and could not be relieved by their fellows. With great confusion therefore they committed themselves to the river, wherein above two thousand of them perished, a thousand were devoured by crocodiles; a miserable spectacle even to such as were out of danger; such as were strong and could swim recovered the camp, many were carried down the stream, and driven to the contrary bank, where they fell into the hands of their enemies.

This misfortune exasperated the soldiers against their general, giving liberty to their tongues, which long time had concealed the evil thoughts of their hearts. While they were thus murmuring, news came from *Ptolemy*, which did set them in an uproar. *Ptolemy* had not only shewed much compassion on those who fell into his hands alive, but performed all rights of funeral to the dead carcases, which the river had cast upon his side; and finally, sent their bones and ashes to be interred by their kinsmen or friends. This did not only move the common soldiers, but made the captains fall to mutiny, thinking it unreasonable to make war upon so virtuous and honourable a person, to fulfil the pleasure of a lonely ambitious man, using them like slaves. The sedition growing strong, wanted only a head, which

which is quickly found. *Python* was there, who inwardly hated *Perdiccas*, for the disgrace which he had suffered by his procurement after the victory upon the rebellious *Greeks*. *Python* had lived in honourable place about *Alexander*; he was in the division of the provinces made governour of *Media*; he had followed *Perdiccas*, and being in all things (the protectorship excepted) equal to him, had nevertheless been scornfully used by him, which now he requited. Drawing together a hundred of the captains, and a good part of the horse, which consisted of the gentry (the footmen having declared themselves before) he entered the tent of *Perdiccas*, where, without further circumstance, they all ran upon him, and slew him. Such end had the proud misgoverning authority of *Perdiccas*. He might have lived as great as any, could he have suffered any as great as himself; yea, peradventure, master of all, had he not been too masterly over those which were already his.

The next day *Ptolemy* came into the camp, where he was joyfully received; he excused himself of things past, as not having been author, or given cause of the war, and was easily believed: the favour of the army being such towards him, that needs they would have made him protector in the room of *Perdiccas*. But this he refused. It was an office fit for one, that would seek to increase his greatness with his trouble. *Ptolemy* was well enough already; wherefore for his own quiet he forbore to accept it, and for their well-deserving of him, he procured that honourable charge to *Python*, and to *Arideus* the captain, who having had some companies of soldiers to furnish with their attendance the solemnities of *Alexander's* funerals, did with them adhere to him against *Perdiccas*.

In the midst of these businesses came news of two great victories obtained by *Eumenes*; which news, had they arrived two or three days sooner, had been entertained with joyful acclamations; and would have given such reputation to *Perdiccas*, as had caused both his private maligners to continue his open flatterers, and his open enemies to have accepted any tolerable composition. But these good tidings coming in ill time, when death had stopped the ears which would have given them welcome, found bad acceptance, as shall be shewed hereafter.

SECT. IX.

Victories of Eumenes in the lower Asia.

BEfore we proceed in the relation of things, happening about the person of the king, it is meet that we speak of those businesses in the lower *Asia*, which were handled by *Eumenes* with notable dexterity, whilst *Perdiccas* was occupied in the *Egyptian* wars. *Alcetas*, the brother of *Perdiccas*, and *Neoptolemus*, had received command from *Perdiccas* to be assistant to *Eumenes*, and to follow his directions. But *Alcetas* made flat answer, that he would not; alledging the backwardness of his men to bear arms against so great a person as *Antipater*, and a man so much honoured as *Craterus*. *Neoptolemus* was content to make fair shew, but inwardly he repined at the precedency given to *Eumenes*, as thinking himself the better man. *Eumenes* discovering, through the counterfeited looks of *Neoptolemus*, the mischief lurking in his heart, wisely dissembled with him, in hope to win him by gentle behaviour and sweet language, that commonly are lost, when bestowed upon arrogant creatures. Yet, the better to fortify himself, that he might stand upon his own strength, he raised

out of the countries under his jurisdiction; about six thousand horse, giving many privileges to such as were serviceable, and training them well up. Not without great need: for when upon advertisement of the great preparations made by *Craterus* and *Antipater* (who had newly passed the *Hellepont*) for the invasion of his provinces, he willed *Neoptolemus* to come to him with all his power; *Neoptolemus* did indeed advance, but in hostile manner; tho' unprovoked, presented him battel. *Neoptolemus* had secretly covenanted with *Antipater* to lay open the way for him to the conquest of *Asia*, which now intending to perform, he was shamefully disappointed. For tho' his footmen, being all *Macedonians*, had much the better, and prevailed far upon *Eumenes's* battels; yet were his horse driven out of the field, and himself compelled, with a few of them, to run away, leaving naked the backs of his *Macedonian* footmen, to be charged by *Eumenes*, who forced them in such wise, that casting down their pikes, they cry'd for mercy, and gladly took their oath to do him faithful service. *Antipater* and *Craterus* endeavoured with many goodly promises to draw *Eumenes* into their society, who contrariwise offered himself, as a means of reconciliation, between *Perdiccas* and *Craterus*, whom he dearly loved; professing withal his hatred to *Antipater*, and constant faith to the cause which he had undertaken to maintain.

Whilst these negotiations were on foot, *Neoptolemus* came with his broken crew to *Antipater* and his associates, vilifying *Eumenes*, and calling him a *Scribe* (at which foolish railing they laugh'd) but extolling the virtue of *Craterus*, as well he might, with high commendations; assuring them, that if *Craterus* did but once appear, or that his voice were but heard by any *Macedonian* in *Eumenes's* camp, the victory was won, for they would all forthwith revolt unto him. Earnestly therefore he desired them to give him aid against *Eumenes*, and especially requested that *Craterus* might have the leading of the army to be sent. Their own affections did easily lead them to condescend to his motion; and good hope there was, that the reputation of *Craterus* might prevail as much, as the force which he drew along. For he had in the midst of *Alexander's* vanities, when others (imitating their king) betook themselves to the *Persian* fashions of garments and customs, retained the ancient *Macedonian* form of behaviour and apparel; whereby he became very gracious with the common soldiers, who beheld these new tricks of *Asia* with discontented eyes, as reproachful and derogatory to the manners of their native country. So *Antipater* took the way towards *Cilicia*, to hold *Perdiccas* at bay, and to join with *Ptolemy*. *Craterus* used great celerity, to have taken *Eumenes* revelling (as he hoped) according to the common fashion of captains after a great victory. But he had a wary and well-advised enemy to encounter, who kept good espial upon him, and with much wisdom foresaw all that was to be feared, and the means of prevention, which his courage did not fail to execute.

Eumenes was not ignorant, that *Craterus* was able to defeat him without battel, yea, without stroke; him therefore he feared more than the army following him (yet the army following him was such as much exceeded his own in footmen, but was inferior in horsemen) and thought it more uneasy to keep the *Macedonians* from revolting to him, than from knowing him. Hereupon he took in hand a strange piece of work, which desperation (of all courtesies) taught him, and wise managing, prosperously accomplished. He gave out reports, that *Neoptolemus*

lemus was returned with such company as he could gather together, and had gotten *Pigres* (a captain of no great estimation, who lay not far off) to join with him. Having animated his men against *Neoptolemus*, whom he knew to be despised and hated among them (as having been vanquished by some of them, and forsaken by others in plain field, whilst they valiantly fought in his quarrel) he took great care to keep them from receiving any intelligence of the enemies matters. Peremptorily he commanded, that no messenger nor trumpeter should be admitted; and not herewith satisfied, he placed against *Craterus* no one *Macedonian*, nor any other that much would have regarded him had he been known: but *Thracians*, *Cappadocians*, and *Persians*, under the leading of such, as thought more highly of none, than of *Perdiccas* and himself. To these also he gave in charge, that without speaking or hearkening to any word, they should run upon the enemy, and give him no leisure to say or do any thing, but fight. The directions which he gave to others, he did not fail to execute in his own person: but placing himself in the right wing of his battel, opposite to *Neoptolemus*, who (as he understood conducted the left wing on the contrary side, he held the *Macedonians* arranged in good order, and ready to charge the enemy as soon as the distance would give leave. A rising piece of ground lay between them, which having ascended, the armies discovered each other: but that of *Eumenes* every way prepared for the fight, the other wearied with long journies, which over-hastily they had made, seeking the deceitful issue of frivolous hopes. Then was it high time for *Craterus* (having failed in surprizing them as enemies) to discover himself to his old friends and fellow-soldiers, of whom he could see none. *Phœux*, a *Tenidian*, and *Artabazus*, a *Persian*, had the leading of that side, who mindful of their instructions, began to give upon him with such countenance, as told him his error; which to redeem, he bad his men fight and win the day, and take the spoil to themselves. But the bear whose skin he sells, is not yet caught. The ground whereon the battel was fought gave most advantage to the horse, who encountered very roughly on all parts; especially about *Eumenes* and *Neoptolemus*, who as soon as they had discovered one another, could not contain themselves, but with great rage met body to body, and letting loose their bristles, grappled so violently together, that their horses ran from under them, leaving both of them tumbling on the ground. *Neoptolemus* rose first up, but *Eumenes* had his sword first drawn, wherewith he houghed the other, causing him to fall down and light upon one knee. In this conflict they received many wounds, but *Neoptolemus* giving slight ones, took such as were deadly, by which he died in the place, and was there (being half-dead, half-alive) stripped by his mortal enemy, whose revilings he requited, lying even at the last gasp, with one wound in the groin, dangerous, had it not wanted force. The death of *Neoptolemus* caused his followers to run away upon the spur, and seek shelter behind the battels of their foot. They were nothing hotly pursued: for *Eumenes* pained himself to carry succour to his left wing, which he suspected much to be distressed, but found accompanied with the same fortune, that had assisted him when he fought in person. *Craterus* had gallantly borne himself a while, and sustained the impression of *Artabazus* and *Phœux*, with more courage than force; holding it nothing agreeable with his honour to retire and protract the fight, when he was charged by men of little esti-

mation or note. Otherwise it is not unlikely, that he might have either carried the day, or preserved himself to a better adventure by giving ground, as the rest (when he and *Neoptolemus* were slain) did. But whilst he sought to preserve his reputation, he lost his life by the fall of his horse, or his falling from his horse, through force of a wound received; upon which accident he was trampled under foot by many that knew him not, and so perished unknown, till it was too late to know it. *Eumenes*, coming to the place where he lay, made great lamentation, as having always loved and honoured *Craterus*, of whose death he was now become the instrument. The vanquished army entertained a treaty of peace with *Eumenes*, making shew of willingness to become his followers; but their intent was only to refresh themselves, which (by his permission) having done, they stole away by night, and fled towards *Antipater*.

This battel fought within ten days of the former, won to *Eumenes* more reputation than good will: for his own soldiers took the death of *Craterus* heavily; and the armies lying further off were enraged with the news. But other matters there were which incensed men against him, besides the death of *Craterus*, whereof it manifestly appeared, that he was as sorry as any that pretended greater heaviness. His army wanted pay. This was a great fault; which he wisely amended, by giving to them the spoil of such towns as were ill-affected to him. So he redeemed the love of his own men, who of their mere motion appointed unto him a guard for defence of his person. Others were not so easy to be reconciled. They, who had been traytors to *Perdiccas*, hated him for his faithfulness, as greatly as they thought that he would hate them for their fallhood; neither found they any fairer way of excusing their late revolt, than by accusing and condemning the side which they had forsaken. Wherefore they proclaimed *Eumenes* a traytor, and condemned him to die: but it was an easier matter to give that sentence, than to put it in execution.

S E C T. X.

Quarrels between Eurydice the queen, and Python the protector. Python resigns his office, into which Antipater is chosen.

PYTHON and *Arideus* being chosen protectors of king *Arideus*, and the children of *Alexander*, took the way to *Asia* the less, conducting the army through *Syria*. Of these two *Python* was the greater in reputation, yet far too weak to sustain so important a charge. For *Eurydice*, wife to king *Arideus*, was come to her husband, a lady of a masculine spirit, well understanding what she was or should be, and thinking her self able to support the weight which fortune had laid upon her foolish husband, being due to her own title. Her mother *Cyna*, sister to *Alexander* by her father, king *Philip*, was married (as hath been shewed) to *Amynas*, who was right heir to the kingdom of *Macedon*, being the only son of king *Perdiccas*, *Philip's* elder brother.

This *Cyna* was a warlike woman; she had led armies, and (as a true sister of *Alexander*) fighting hand to hand with *Ceria* queen of the *Phrygians*, a virago like unto her self, had slain her. She brought up this *Eurydice* in the same unwomanly art of war, who now among the soldiers began to put in practice the rudiments of her education, to the small contentment of *Python*, that could not brook her too curious intermeddling in his charge.

charge. Whether it were so that *Python* had some purpose to advance the son of *Alexander* by *Roxana*, to the kingdom (as once he had fought to do;) or whether the queen did suspect him of some such intent; or whether only desire of rule caused her to quarrel with him, quarrel she did, which disturbed the proceeding against *Eumenes*. The army having shaken off such a rank-rider as *Perdiccas*, would not afterwards be reined with a twined thread. *Python*, bearing himself upon his office, took upon him to give directions in the king's name, which the queen did oftentimes controul, using the same name, with more authority, and better liking of the soldiers. *Python*, seeing this, would needs resign his office, whether upon weariness of the contentions daily growing, or on purpose to bring the queen into envy, it is uncertain. Perhaps he thought, that now being the far worthiest man in the camp, he should be intreated to retain the place, and have his authority confirmed, or (as might be) increased, were it but for want of a fit successor. *Eurydice* was nothing sorry at this course; for now she thought to manage the affairs of the empire at her own will, being freed from the troublesome assistance of a protector. But the soldiers disappointed both her and *Python* of their contrary expectations; choosing *Antipater*, the only powerful man of *Alexander's* captains then living, into the room of *Python*. Hereat the queen fretted exceedingly, and began to deal earnestly with the *Macedonians*, that they should acknowledge no lord save only the king their sovereign. Yet she failed of her purpose, being hinder'd (as may seem) by three things: the apparent weakness of her husband, the growth of *Alexander's* children, who (though born of outlandish women) were bred in the *Macedonian* camp; and the mightiness of *Antipater*, who commanding a great army near at hand arrived in few days at the camp, and enforced *Eurydice* to hold her self content. *Antipater* was of such power, that he needed not to work by any close devices, as *Perdiccas* had done; he had no concurrents, all the governours of provinces that remained alive acknowledged him their better; yea, many of them he displaced out of hand, putting others in their room. This done, he took the king, queen, and princes along with him into *Macedonia*, leaving *Antigonus* general of the royal army: to whom for his good services done, and to be done against *Eumenes*, he gave the rule of *Susiana*, besides his former provinces, and committed into his hands the government of *Asia* during that war.

S E C T. XI.

Antigonus lieutenant of *Asia*, wins a battel of *Eumenes*, and besiegeth him in *Nora*: he vanquisheth other followers of *Perdiccas*.

HERE begins the greatness of *Antigonus*, whose power in few years over-growing the rest, wanted little of spreading it self over the whole monarchy. He was to make war upon *Eumenes*, *Alcetus* the brother, and *Attalus* the brother-in-law, to *Perdiccas*: work enough to keep his army employed in the publick service, till such time as he might find occasion to make use of it in his own business. The first of these which he undertook was *Eumenes*, with whom *Alcetus* and *Attalus* refused to join, having unseasonably contended with him in time of common danger about the chief place. *Eumenes* had an army strong in number, courage, and all needful provisions; but obedient only at discretion. Therefore *Antigonus* tryed all ways of corrupting his soldiers, tempting first the whole army

with letters; which practice failing by the cunning of *Eumenes* (who made shew as if he himself had scattered abroad those letters to try the faith of his men) he dealt apart with such captains, as he thought most easie to be won. Of these captains one rebelled, breaking out too hastily before any help was near him, yet looking so carelessly to himself, that he and his were surpris'd, when he thought his enemies far off. Another follower of *Eumenes* (or rather of good fortune, which he thought now to be in company with *Antigonus*) kept his treachery secret, reserving it for the time of execution. Upon confidence of the treason, which this false man *Apollonides* had undertaken, *Antigonus* presented battel to *Eumenes*; in the heat whereof, *Apollonides*, general of the horse to *Eumenes*, fled over to the contrary side with such as he could get to follow him: but was closely followed by some, whose company he desired not. *Eumenes*, perceiving the irrecoverable mischief which this traiterous practice brought upon him, pursued the villain, and cut him off before he could thrust himself into the troops of *Antigonus*, and boast of his treachery. This was some comfort to *Eumenes* in the loss of that battel, which disabled him utterly to keep the field, and left it very hard for him to make a safe retreat. Yet one thing he did, which much amazed his enemies, and (though a matter of small importance) caused *Antigonus* himself to admire his high resolution. It was held no small part of the victory to get possession of the dead bodies. *Eumenes*, whilst *Antigonus* held him in chace, turned out of the way, and fetching a compass returned to the place where the battel had been fought; there he burned (according to the manner of the time) the bodies of his own men, and interred the bones and ashes of the captains and common soldiers apart, raising up heaps of earth as mountains over them, and so went his way. As this bold adventure bred in the *Macedonians* (returned to their camp) great admiration of his brave spirit; so the news which *Menander* (who was set to look unto their carriages) brought and published among them, enticed them to love him as their honourable friend. He had found *Menander* in an open plain, careless, as after an assured victory, and loaded with the spoils of many nations, the rewards of their long service, all which he might have taken: but fearing lest such a purchase should prove a heavy burthen to him, whose chief hope consisted in swift expedition, he gave secret warning to *Menander* to flie to the mountains, whilst he detained his men (whom authority could not have restrained) by this sleight, setting them to bait their horses. The *Macedonians* extolled him for this courtesie, as a noble gentleman, that had forborn when it lay in his power to strip them out of all their wealth, and make their children slaves, and to ravish their wives: but *Antigonus* told them, that he had not forborn to do this out of any good will to them; but out of mere subtilty had avoided those precious setters, which would have hinder'd his speedy flight. He told them true: for *Eumenes* did not only think all carriages to be over-burdenfome, but the number of his men to be more troublesome than available, in his intended courfe. Wherefore he sent them from him as fast as he could, wishing them to shift for themselves; and retaining only five hundred horse, and two hundred foot. When he had wearied *Antigonus* a while in following him up and down, he came to *Nora*; where again, keeping no more about him, than necessity required to make good the place, he rovingly dismissed all the rest. *Nora* was a little fortress in the borders of *Lycania* and

Cappadocia, so strongly situated, that it seemed impregnable, and so well victualled and stored with all necessaries, that it might hold out for many years. Thither did *Antigonus* follow him, with more desire to make him his friend, than to vanquish him in war. To this purpose he entertained parley with him, but in vain. For whereas *Antigonus* offered him pardon, and his love; *Eumenes* required restitution of his provinces, which could not be granted without *Antipater's* consent. Then was *Nora* closed up; where *Antigonus* leaving sufficient strength for continuance of the siege, took his journey into *Pisidia*, against *Alcetus* and *Attalus*, with whom he made short work. He came upon them unexpected, and seized on passages, which wanted not men, but such a captain as *Eumenes*, to have defended them. *Alcetus* and *Attalus*, as they had been too secure before his coming, so were they too adventurous in fighting at the first sight, upon all disadvantages; and their folly was attended with suitable event. *Attalus*, with many principal captains, was taken; *Alcetus* fled to the city of *Termessus*, where the love of the younger sort toward him was so vehement, that, stopping their ears against all persuasions of the ancient men, they needs would hazard their lives and their country in his defence. Yet this availed him nothing; for the governors of the town, having secretly compounded with *Antigonus*, caused the young men to sally out; and using the time of advantage, they with their servants did set upon *Alcetus*, who unable to resist, slew himself. His dead body was conveyed to *Antigonus*, and by him barbarously torn, was cast forth without burial. When *Antigonus* was gone, the young men interred the carcase with solemn funerals, having once been minded to set on fire their own town, in revenge of his death. Such favour had he purchased with courteous liberality; but to make an able general, one virtue, how great soever, is insufficient.

S E C T. XII.

Ptolemy wins Syria and Phenicia. The death of Antipater.

WHILST these things were in doing, the rest of the princes lay idle, rather seeking to enjoy their governments for the present, than to confirm or enlarge them. Only *Ptolemy* looking abroad, won all *Syria* and *Phenicia*: an action of great importance, but not remarkable for any circumstance in the managing. He sent a lieutenant thither with an army, who quickly took *Laomedon* prisoner, that ruled there by appointment of *Antipater*, and formerly of *Perdiccas*, but (as may seem) without any great strength of soldiers, far from assistants, and vainly relying upon the authority which had given him that province, and was now occupied with greater cares, than with seeking to maintain him in his office.

Antipater was old and sickly, desirous of rest, and therefore contented to let *Antigonus* pursue the dispatch of those businesses in *Asia*. He had with him *Polyperchon*, one of the most ancient of *Alexander's* captains, that had lately suppressed a dangerous insurrection of the *Etolians*, which nation had stirred in the quarrel of *Perdiccas*, prevailing far at the first, but soon losing all that they had gained, whilst *Antipater* was abroad in his *Cilician* expedition. In this *Polyperchon* *Antipater* did repose great confidence; so far forth, that (suspecting the youth of his own son *Cassander* of insufficiency in so great a charge) he bequeathed unto him on his death-bed the government of *Macedon*

and *Greece*, together with his office of protectorship. So *Antipater* died, being fourscore years old, having always travelled in the great affairs of mighty princes, with such reputation, that *Alexander* in all his greatness was jealous of him, and the successors of *Alexander* did either quietly give place unto him, or were unfortunate in making oppositions. In his private qualities he was a subtle man, temperate, frugal, and of a philosophical behaviour; not unlearned, as having been scholar to *Aristotle*, and written some histories. He had been much molested by *Olympias*, *Alexander's* mother, whom after the death of her son he compelled to abstain from coming into *Macedonia*, or intermeddling in matters of estate; yea, at his own death he gave especial direction, that no woman should be permitted to deal in the administration of the empire. But this precept was soon forgotten; and yet, ere long, by sorrowful experience approved to have been sound and good.

S E C T. XIII.

Of Polyperchon, who succeeded unto Antipater in the protectorship. The insurrection of Cassander against him.

Polyperchon was very skilful in the art of war, having long time been apprentice in that occupation; other qualities, requisite in so high an office as he underwent, either nature had not given to him, or time had robbed him of them. He managed his business more formally than wisely, as a man of a second wit, fitter to assist than to command in chief. At the first entrance upon the stage, he called to council all his friends, wherein, for weighty considerations (as they who weighed not the contrary reasons held them) the queen *Olympias* was revoked out of *Epirus* into *Macedon*, that the presence of *Alexander's* mother might countenance and strengthen their proceedings. For the condition of the times requiring, that the governors of provinces abroad should keep greater armies than were needful or easy to be retained about the person of the king in *Macedonia*, it seemed expedient, that the face of the court should be filled with all majesty, that might give authority to the injunctions from thence proceeding, and by an awful regard contain within the bounds of duty such as could not by force have been kept in order, being strong, and lying too far off.

Such care was taken for prevention of imaginary dangers and out of sight, whilst present mischief lay unregarded in their bosoms. *Cassander*, the son of *Antipater*, was not able to discover that sufficiency in *Polyperchon*, for which his father had reposed in him so much confidence: neither could he discern such odds in the quality of himself and *Polyperchon*, as was in their fortune. He was left captain of one thousand, which office, by practice of those times, was of more importance than the title now seems to imply. He should thereby have been as camp-master, or lieutenant-general to the other, a place no way satisfying his ambition, that thought himself the better man. Therefore he began to examine his own power, and compare with the forces likely to oppose. All that had relied on his father were his own assured, especially such as commanded the garrisons bestowed in the principal cities of *Greece*. The like hope was of the magistrates, and others of principal authority in those Common weals, whose forms had been corrected by *Antipater*, that they would follow the side, and draw in many partakers: it concerned these men in their own particular, to adhere unto the cap-
tains

tains by whom their faction was upheld, and by whom the rascal multitude, covetous of regaining the tyrannous power which they had formerly exercised over the principal citizens, were kept in order, obeying their betters perforce. Besides these helps, *Cassander* had the secret love of queen *Eurydice*, who had in private render'd him such courtesy, as was due only to her husband. But neither the queen's favour, nor all his other possibilities, gave him confidence to break out into open rebellion, because he saw *Polyperchon* much revered among the *Macedonians*, and strong enough to suppress him before he could have made head. Therefore he made shew of following his pleasures in the country, and calling many of his friends about him, under pretence of hunting, advised with them upon the safest course, and most free from all suspicion. The necessity was apparent of raising an army, before the business was set on foot; and to do this, opportunity presented him with fair means. *Ptolemy* had by fine force, without any commission, annexed *Syria* to his government of *Egypt* and *Cyrene*: this was too much either for the king to trust him with, or for him to part with. *Antigonus*, upon the first news of *Antipater's* death, began to lay hold upon all he could get, in such sort, that he manifestly discovered his intent of making himself lord of all *Asia*. These two therefore stood in no need of a civil war; which *Cassander* well noted, and presumed withal, that the friendship which had passed between his father and them, would avail him somewhat. Whereupon he secretly dispatched messengers to them both, and within a little while conveyed himself on a sudden over the *Hellepont*, that he might in person advance the business with greater speed. Much perswasion is needless in winning a man to what he desireth. *Antigonus* coveted nothing more than to find *Polyperchon* work by raising some commotions in *Greece*. Yet (as formalities must not be neglected) *Cassander* did very earnestly press him, by the memory of his father, and all requisite conjurations, to assist him in this enterprize; telling him, that *Ptolemy* was ready to declare for them, and urging him to a speedy dispatch. *Antigonus*, on the other side, repayed him with the same coin; saying, that for his own sake, and his dead father's, whom he had very dearly loved, he would not fail to give him all manner of succour. Having thus scalded one another with words, they were nothing slack in preparing the common means leading to their several ends.

S E C T. XIV.

The unworthy courses held by Polyperchon for the keeping down of Cassander.

GREAT necessity there was of timely provision. For *Polyperchon* needed no other instructions to inform him of *Cassander's* drift, than the news of his departure. He was not ignorant of the ready disposition which might be found in *Antigonus* and *Ptolemy* to the strengthening of rebellion; and well he knew that one principal hope of *Cassander* was reposed in the confidence of such as ruled in the *Grecian* estate. Therefore (loving to work circumspectly) he called another council, wherein it was concluded, that the popular form of government should be erected in all the cities of *Greece*, the garrisons withdrawn, and that all magistrates and principal men, into whose hands *Antipater* had committed the supreme authority, should forthwith be either slain or banished. This was a

sure way to diminish the number of *Cassander's* friends, and to raise up many enemies to him in all quarters. Yet hereby was disclosed both an unthankful nature in *Polyperchon*, and a factious malice in his adherents. For how could he be excused of extreme ingratitude, that for hatred of the son went about to dishonour the father's actions, whose only bounty had enabled him to do it? or what could be said in their defence, who sought to destroy many worthy men, friends to the state, by whom the *Greeks* were held restrained from stirring against the *Macedonians*; and in opposition to their private enemy, gave the rule of things to base companions, and such as naturally maligned the empire? But as in man's body, through sinews newly issuing from one branch, a finger is more vexed by inflammation of his next neighbour, than by any distemper in the contrary hand: so in bodies politic, the humours of men, subdivided in faction, are more enraged by the disagreeable qualities of such as curb them in their nearest purposes, than they are exasperated by the general opposition of such as are divided from them in the main trunk. Hereby it comes to pass, that contrary religions are invited to help against neighbour princes; bordering enemies drawn in to take part in civil wars, and ancient hatred called to counsel against injurious friends. Of this fault nature is not guilty; she hath taught the arm to offer itself unto manifest loss in defence of the head: they are depraved affections, which render men sensible of their own particular, and forgetful of the more general good, for which they were created.

The decree, whereby the *Greeks* were presented with a vain shew of liberty, ran under the king's name; but so, as one might easily discern, that *Polyperchon* had guided his pen. For the main point was, that they should follow such directions as *Polyperchon* gave, and treat with him about all difficulties. In the rest it contained such a deal of kindness, as proceeding on a sudden from those who had kept them in hard subjection, might well appear to have some other root than the pretended good will, and was of itself too base and unfit for a king to use toward his conquered subjects, and often subdued rebels.

S E C T. XV.

Of the great commotions raised in Athens by Polyperchon's decree. The death of Phocion.

N Evertheless the *Athenians*, with immoderate joy, entertained this happy seeming proclamation, and sought how to put it in execution without further delay. But *Nicanor*, captain of the garrison, which kept one of their havens, called *Munychia*, in the lower part of the town, would needs take longer time of deliberation, than was pleasing to their hasty desires.

Nicanor, as a trusty follower of *Cassander*, was by him shifted into the place, and *Menillus* (that was captain there before) discharged, when *Antipater* was newly dead. His coming to *Athens* was no way grateful to the citizens, who soon after hearing the news of *Antipater's* death, cry'd out upon *Phocion*, saying, that he had sufficient intelligence of that accident, and might by advertising them in due time, have put into their hands a fair opportunity of thrusting out the *Macedonians*. But these exclamations argued no more than a desire to shake off the *Macedonian* yoke. Far more grievously would they have been offended, had they known the instructions which *Cassander* had given

given to *Nicanor*, and his resolution to follow them. It was concluded, that he should not only retain *Munychia*, any injunction to the contrary notwithstanding; but that he should find means to thrust some companies into *Pireus*, and fortify that also, which was the principal haven, against the high-town. How to accomplish this, he rather wanted some reasonable pretence, than good ability. But the *Athenians* were not long in giving him sufficient cause to do that, which he would have done without any cause given. They desired him to come unto their council, assembled in the *Pireus*, there to consider of the king's proclamation; whither upon *Phocion's* word and safe conduct he came, and earnestly pressed them to hold with *Cassander* in the war which was ready to break forth. Contrariwise they urged him first of all, to make them masters of their own, which how to use they might consult afterwards. Each of them refusing to condescend unto the other's demand; the *Athenians* (who did always measure justice by profit, yet seldom thrived by that course) practised with *Dercylus*, a captain following *Polyperchon*, and then lying near at hand, that he should enter into the town, and take *Nicanor* prisoner. But *Phocion*, who then governed in *Athens*, a man very unlike to the rest of the citizens, being nothing pleased with such a trick of politic dishonesty, did quietly suffer him to depart and save himself.

Nicanor hereupon began to devise upon taking *Pireus*; not as following now the project of *Cassander*, but prosecuting his own just revenge. He levied as many soldiers as he could, and drew them closely into *Munychia*; which done, he issued into *Pireus*, took it, and intrenched himself therein: to the exceeding discomfort of the *Athenians*, who, lately impatient of his keeping the one haven, saw him now master of both. *Alexander*, the son of *Polyperchon*, came thither shortly after, with an army. Then were the citizens in great hope of recovering all, and addressed themselves unto him; who made fair shews, intending mere mischief, which they perceived not, being blinded with the vain epistles of his father, and of *Olympias* the old queen. *Olympias*, taking upon her to command, before she durst well adventure to return into *Macedon*, had peremptorily charged *Nicanor* to restore to the *Athenians* the places which he held: but he would first consider more of the matter. *Polyperchon* had further ordained, that the isle of *Samos* should be rendered unto them: a goodly offer, had it accorded with his power and meaning. He was (indeed) so far from purposing to let them have *Samos*, that as yet he did not thoroughly intend to let them have themselves. The commodity of their havens was such, as he would rather get into his own hands, than leave in theirs; yet rather wished in theirs, than in *Cassander's*. His son *Alexander*, not ignorant of this, made fair shew to the *Athenians*, and spent much labour in communing with *Nicanor*, but suffered not them, for whom he seemed to labour, to intermeddle with the business. Hereupon the citizens grew jealous, and the displeasure they conceived against him they poured out upon *Phocion*, depriving him of his office. This was done with much tumult: banished men and strangers, thrusting themselves into the assembly of the citizens, who distracted with sundry passions, growing out of their present misfortunes, thought every one that best could inveigh against things past, a most likely man to find some remedy for the evil threatening them. In this hurlyburly was *Alexander* devising how he might come to some good point of composition with *Nicanor*, and held

much privy conference with him; which he could not so secretly carry, but that his negotiation was discovered, whereby the uproar in the town was so far increased, that *Phocion* with many of his friends were accused, and driven to seek safeguard of their lives by flight. So they came to *Alexander*, who entertained them gently, and gave them his letters of commendation to his father, desiring him to take them into his protection.

Polyperchon was in the country of *Phocis*, ready to enter with an army into *Attica*. Thither came *Phocion* with his companions, hoping well that the letters which they brought, and their own deserts (having always been friends to the *Macedonians*, as far as the good of their country gave leave) should be enough to get patronage to their innocency. Besides all this, *Dinarchus* a *Corinthian*, *Polyperchon's* familiar friend, went along with them (in an evil hour) who promised to himself and them great favour by means of his acquaintance. But *Polyperchon* was an unstable man, very earnest in what he took in hand; yet, either for want of judgment in following them, or of honesty in holding the best of them, easily changing his intended courses, and doing things by the halts, which made him commonly fail of good success. For fear of *Cassander*, he had offered wonderful kindness to the *Athenians*; this had caused them to love him: out of their love he gathered hope of deceiving them, which made him to change his mind, and seek how to get into his own hands those keys, with which *Cassander* held them fast locked up: finding himself disappointed of this purpose, and suspected as a false dishonourable man, he stood wavering between the contrary allurements of profit and reputation. To keep the *Athenians* perforce at his devotion, would indeed have done well: but the effecting of this began to grow desperate; and many towns of importance in *Greece* began to cast their eyes upon his proceeding in that action. Wherefore he thought it the wisest way to redeem their good opinion, by giving all contentment unto the popular faction, which was then grown to be master of that city. And in good time for this purpose were the *Athenian* ambassadors come, treading (as one may say) upon *Phocion's* heels, whom they were sent to accuse. These had solemn audience given to them in the king's presence, who was attended by many great lords, and for ostentation's sake was glorified with all exterior shews of majesty; yet all too little to change *Arideus* into *Alexander*: for he did nothing there, but either laugh or chafe, as he saw others do. For beginning of the business, *Polyperchon* commanded that *Dinarchus* should be tortured and slain: this was enough to testify his hearty affection to the commonalty of *Athens*, in that he spared not his old acquaintance for their sake; whose ambassadors he then bad to speak. When their errand was done, and answer to it made by the accused, who had no indifferent hearing, *Phocion* and the rest were pronounced guilty of treason; but to give sentence, and do the execution upon them, was (for honour's sake) referred unto the city of *Athens*, because they were burgesses. Then were they sent away to *Athens*, where the rascal multitude, not suffering them to speak for themselves, condemned them to die. So they perished being innocent. But the death of *Phocion*, a man very conspicuous, made the fortune of the rest to be of the less regard. Five and forty times had he been chosen governor of the city, never suing for the place, but sent for when he was absent: so well was his integrity known, and so highly valued, even of such as were no pretenders to the same virtue. He was

a good commander in war, wherein tho' his actions were not very great, yet were they of good importance, and never unfortunate. Never did the city repent of having followed his counsel: nor any private man of having trusted his word. *Philip of Macedon* highly esteemed him so; and much more did *Alexander*, who (besides other signs of his love) sent him two hundred talents of silver, and offered to bestow upon him of four cities in *Asia* any one which he would choose. But *Phocion* refused these and other gifts, howsoever importunately thrust upon him; resting well contented with his honest poverty: wherein he lived above fourscore years, and then was compelled by the unjust judgment of wicked men to drink that poison, which by just judgment of the righteous God so infected the city of *Athens*, as from that day forwards it never brought forth any worthy man resembling the virtue of their ancestors.

S E C T. XVI.

Of Polyperchon's vain expedition against Cassander.

NOT long after these things were done, *Cassander* with such forces as *Antigonus* lent him, entered into *Pireus*; which news drew *Polyperchon* head-long into *Attica*, with a great army, but so ill victualled, that he was fain to depart without any thing done. Only he had given some impediment to the enemy; who not contented with defending what he held, began to look out, and make new purchases abroad. Finding therefore himself unable to drive *Cassander* out of *Athens*, he left his son *Alexander*, with such number of men, as exceeded not the proportion of victuals, to withstand his further incroaching. The greatest part of his army he carried into *Peloponnesus*, to make the country sure to himself, wherein *Cassander* had many friends.

His doings in *Peloponnesus* were such, as they had been in other parts of *Greece*. First, he began to fight with edicts, restoring the *Democracy*, or popular form of government. He commanded that the principal citizens, that had by *Antipater* been made rulers, should be either slain or driven into exile. This decree took immediate effect in most places: the vulgar sort being very ready to seal the charter of their freedom and authority with the blood of those who had kept them in subjection. Yet many cities there were which delighted in the rule of the chief citizens, and many which wished well to *Cassander*; especially they of *Megalopolis*, on whom *Polyperchon* meant to inflict an exemplary punishment of disobedience to him, which he termed rebellion. *Megalopolis* had in it fifteen thousand serviceable men, well furnished with necessities, and resolved to endure the worst. And need there was of such resolution. For *Polyperchon* coming thither with all his power did so much, that he overthrew, by a mine, three of their bulwarks, and all the space of wall between them. But the defendants manfully repelled the *Macedonians* which came up to the breach; and at the same time, with great labour, they raised up an inner wall, to bear out the next assault. The assailants having failed to carry the town at the first attempt, took much pains to clear the ground, and make fair way for their elephants, whose violence was likely to overthrow all that came in their way. But the townsmen perceiving their drift, prepared boards driven through with long nails, which they used as gall-throgs, bestowing them slightly, covered with the points upwards, in the

No. 32.

way by which the beasts were to pass. Neither did they set any to encounter them in front, but appointed certain light-armed men to beat upon their sides with arrows and darts, as they were instructed by some that had learned the manner of that fight in the *Asian* wars. Of these provisions they made happy use in the next assault. For by them were the elephants (wherein the enemy chiefly trusted) either sorely hurt, or driven back upon the *Macedonians*, whom they trampled under feet. *Polyperchon* came as ill furnish'd for long abode to *Megalopolis*, as before to *Athens*. Therefore being neither able to dispatch the business quickly, nor to take such leisure as was requisite, he forsook the siege, with some loss, and much dishonour, leaving some part of his army to lie before the town for his credit.

After this, he sent *Clitus* his admiral to sea, to join with *Arideus* that was come out of *Phrygia*, and to cut off all succour which might come to the enemy out of *Asia*. *Cassander* also sent his whole fleet under *Nicanor*, who taking along with him some ships of *Antigonus*, came to the *Propontis*, where he fought with *Clitus* and was beaten. But *Antigonus* hearing of the overthrow, gathered together the ships that were escaped, and manning them very well, sent out *Nicanor* again, assuring him of the victory, as well he might. For he sent out sufficient numbers of light-armed men, whom he caused to be wafted over the straits in small vessels by night; these before day-light setting upon *Clitus*, drove his men, that lay securely on the land, headlong into their ships; in which tumult, *Nicanor* arriving, did assail them so lustily, that few or none escaped him.

This loss at sea, together with his bad success by land, brought *Polyperchon* into great contempt. He had a good facility in penning bloody decrees; but when the execution was referred to his own sword, he could find the matter more difficult. Wherefore the *Athenians* perceiving that he had left them to shift for themselves, and was not able to give them protection against the enemy which lay in their bosoms, came to agreement with *Cassander*, accepting a governour of his appointment; and restoring all things to the same state wherein *Antipater* had left them. The like inclination to the party of *Cassander*, was found in very many cities of *Greece*, which daily and willingly revolted unto him; as to an industrious man, and likely to prevail in the end. Thus was the whole country set in a combustion, uneasy to be quenched; which presented unto *Antigonus* an opportunity that he neglected not, of making himself lord of *Asia*.

S E C T. XVII.

Antigonus seeks to make himself an absolute lord: and thereupon treats with Eumenes, who disappointeth him. Phrygia and Lydia won by Antigonus.

ANTIGONUS had in *Antipater's* life time a firm resolution, to make unto himself the utmost benefit that he might of the army committed to his charge. And in fair season for advancement of his purposes came the news of *Antipater's* death; even then, when all the business in *Pisidia* was dispatched, and no more employment for the army remaining, save only the continuance of the siege of *Nora*; a small thing of it self, but as hard as a greater matter; and requiring few men, but much time; when time of all things was most precious. *Eumenes* lay in that fort of *Nora*,

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able to make the place good, and hoping that the mutability, to which the present state was manifestly subject, would in continuance of some years (which he might abide) work more for him, than his enemies in that space could work against him. His most fear was, that for want of exercise in that narrow castle, his men and horses might grow sickly and unserviceable: which made him to practise many devices of keeping them in health and lusty. But when he had continued shut up in this manner about a year, his hopes came to good pass, and he was eased of his cares by *Antigonus* himself, whose forces held him besieged.

Antigonus knowing the great sufficiency of *Eumenes*, and considering his fidelity shewed unto *Perdiccas*, thought that he could not find in all the world a fitter man than him, to employ in managing those high designs, wherein he doubted not that he should be withstood by the mightiest princes of the empire. He sent therefore to *Eumenes* by one that was friend to them both, acquainting him with some part of his intent, and promising to make him a greater lord than ever he had been, and the next man to himself, if things fell out as he desired, in regard whereof he required only his friendship, and thereupon sent him an oath to take; which done, he might at his good pleasure issue safely out of *Nora*, and enjoy his perfect liberty. *Eumenes* perusing the form of the oath, perceived the meaning of *Antigonus*, which was rather to make him his follower than his fellow. For whereas, in a few words, it mentioned the king and princes of the blood, rather to keep the *Decorum*, than upon any loyal intent; the binding words and sum of all the rest were such as tied him fast only to *Antigonus*, omitting all reservation of duty to the king or any other. This he liked not, holding it unseemly to become a sworn man to him, with whom he had fought for the mastery; and being assured that his voluntary assistance, which way soever he gave, would be more acceptable, and far more honourable than the course propounded. Yet would he not therefore break off the negotiation, and wait for some better occasion of enlargement, which might perhaps be long in coming; but seeming to be well agreed with *Antigonus*, he prepared to give up his hold and depart. As for the oath itself, when he came to take it, he made shew of dislike, in that it was not solemn enough for such personages as they were, who could not be too ceremonious in testifying their allegiance. The *Macedonians* which lay encamped before *Nora*, liked his words, and gave him leave to put in *Olympias*, and the children of *Alexander*, binding himself to them and their adherents, as well as to *Antigonus*, and so he departed.

Antigonus had taken upon him, as soon as he came down to the sea-side, to remove some of the governors of the provinces, behaving himself according to the authority which he had received of *Antipater*, to exercise in the time of war. Neither did he want sufficient pretence whereby to justify his proceedings. For, if *Polyperchon* might lawfully hold the protectorship, which the old man dying on his death-bed bequeathed unto him as a legacy, without consent of the princes or soldiers, why might not he himself as well retain the lieutenantship of *Asia*, that was granted unto him for the general good of the state, in presence of the whole army, by the king, and by *Antipater*, who had power to ordain what should seem convenient whilst he lived, not to dispose of things that should happen after his death? To give a fair colour to his ambition, this was enough: if any were not herewith satisfied, he had three-

score thousand footmen, ten thousand horse, and thirty elephants in a readiness to answer them.

The first that perceived his drift, and provided to resist him, was *Arideus*, governor of *Phrygia*, who fortified the towns of his own province, and sought to have won *Cyzicus*, a fair haven town, and seated very conveniently for him, but was fain to go away without it. Hereupon *Antigonus* took occasion to command him out of the country. *Arideus* was so far from obeying him, that he sent forces to relieve *Eumenes*. Nevertheless, finding that he was unable of himself to make long resistance, he took such companies as he could draw along with him, and so passed over into *Europe*, to complain at the court. The like fortune had *Clitus*, who ruled in *Lydia*, and sought the like remedy of his fortune, with some hope at the first (for both of them were entertained with very good words) which quickly vanished, and grew desperate, when they were beaten at sea, as hath already been declared.

SECT. XVIII.

Antigonus pursues Eumenes. Eumenes having authority from the court, raiseth great war against Antigonus, in defence of the royal house.

Antigonus having thus gotten into his hands all, or most of *Asia* the less, was able to have enter'd *Macedon*, and seized upon the court; which that he forbore to do, it proceeded (as may seem) for some of these reasons. It would have bred as much jealousy in *Cassander*, as fear in *Polyperchon*, which might have brought them to terms of reconciliation; it would ask more time than he could spare; and the envy which followed the protectorship was such, as he that had power enough without the office, ought rather to shun than to pursue. Besides all this, it was manifest that *Eumenes* would not only refuse to take his part, but would make war upon him in defence of the royal house, to which it was found that *Antigonus* did not stand well affected. Against him therefore he bent his course, and with an army of twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, made great haste toward *Cilicia*, hoping to suppress him before he should be able to make head.

Eumenes was one of those few that continued faithful to their dead master, which being well known in the court, he had commission sent unto him from thence to raise an army, and make war upon *Antigonus*, taking of the king's treasure as much as he should need. Other letters also there were directed to all the governors of provinces, requiring them to give assistance to *Eumenes*, and be ordered by his direction: especially to the captains of the old soldiers, called the *Agryaspides*, or silver shielded bands, commandment was given to be at his appointment. He had of his own followers gathered together two thousand foot, and five hundred horse, before his authority was given him; but now he purposed with all the strength that he could make, to fight with *Antigonus* in defence of the royal blood. *Olympias* had written to him, desiring him to bring help to her and to her nephew the son of *Alexander*, and in the mean time to give her his advice in that which *Polyperchon* required of her, for she was desirous to return into *Macedon*, but suspected his ambition, as not contained within lawful bounds. *Eumenes* therefore counselled her to remain in *Epirus*, till such time as he could bring the war to a good issue; which done, he promised that his faith and care should not be wanting to the seed of *Alexander*.

Strange it is to consider, that in all the empire, scarce any one could be found among the noblemen, in whom *Alexander's* mother, wives and children, might repose firm confidence, saving only this *Eumenes*, a stranger to the *Macedonian* blood, born at *Cardia*, a city of *Thrace*. His reputation was no more than his own virtue had made it; his followers obeyed at their own discretion, and compelled he was to travel as far as *Persia*, to gather together an army sufficient to resist the enemies that pursued his heels.

S E C T. XIX.

How the princes of Macedon stood affected mutually. Olympias takes Arideus and Eurydice, whom she cruelly puts to death.

NOW, forasmuch as in this present war, all the rulers of the provinces did intermeddle; and great alterations happened, not only in the parts of *Asia*, but *Macedon* itself, which brought a new face unto the state, by the extirpation of the royal house of *Philip* and *Alexander*: I hold it convenient in this place, before we enter into the particulars of the war itself, to shew briefly how the great ones did mutually stand affected, and by what passions they were drawn into those courses which overthrew most of them, and out of their ruins built the greatness of a few: as likewise to what extremity the faction brake out in *Macedon* itself, about the main controversy of the title to the crown, whereupon all other quarrels were or should have been depending.

Arideus the king, being simple and fearful, did only what he was bidden.

Polyperchon, desirous to continue long in office, had a purpose to advance the son of *Alexander* by *Roxana* to the kingdom, and become governor to a king of his own making.

Eurydice the queen discovering plainly this intent, and meaning nothing less than to let her husband serve as a stale, keeping the throne warm, till another were grown old enough to sit in it, grew acquainted with *Cassander*, who hated the memory of *Alexander*, and was therefore the fitter for her turn.

Cassander held fresh in mind the danger wherein his family had been through *Alexander's* malice, together with the indignity offered to himself by *Alexander*, who knocked his head against a wall, for deriding one that adored him after the *Persian* manner. The displeasure hereof, and the pleasure which he took in the amorous queen, made him resolve both to suppress the lineage which he hated, and to maintain his beloved mistress, either by supporting her weak husband, or by taking her to be his own wife.

The rest of the lords held it a thing indifferent who reigned over all, so as they might reign in their several countries, and establish their authority in such wise, that it might not be taken from them.

Among these, *Ptolemy* and *Antigonus* were well enough already, if their ambition would have suffered them to see it.

Pytho and *Selenus* lying far off, and being strong, had some good hope to encroach upon their neighbours. Against these, *Peucestos* and some others with much ado hardly made resistance, until such time as *Eumenes* came to them, who propounded to himself great matters, which he lived not to accomplish.

Olympias, the old queen (as it is common with step-daughters) hated the children of her husband by his other wives. It was thought that she had gi-

ven poison to *Arideus*; which, failing to take away his life, had much impaired both his body and wits. Now she, considering that *Eumenes* was too full of business, to come home so soon as she wished that he should, and that *Cassander* daily prevailed in *Greece*; thought it the best way to join with *Polyperchon*; and set up, as king, her nephew *Alexander*, the son of *Roxana*, removing *Arideus*, before *Cassander* were able to defend him. To this intent, she procured men among her kindred in *Epirus*, and so took her way towards *Polyperchon*; who, joining with her, enter'd into *Macedon*.

Eurydice, hearing this news, wrote very earnestly to *Cassander*, praying him to set aside all other business, and come to succour her. She her self, by entreaty, gifts and promises, drew to her party as many of the *Macedonians* as she could, until she thought her own side strong enough; and then, taking her husband with her, went boldly forth against *Olympias*, and the traitor *Polyperchon*.

These two queens met armed, as if the matter should have been determined by their own hands, which ended without any stroke stricken, by the revolt of those who followed *Eurydice*. For as soon as the *Macedonians* beheld *Olympias*; calling to mind her former estate, and the victorious reigns of her husband and son, they refused to lift any weapon against her. *Eurydice*, finding her self thus forsaken, fled towards *Amphipolis*; but was intercepted, and made prisoner with her husband.

Olympias, having obtained this victory without blood, thought that all things would succeed as easily, and that upon the same considerations for which they had refused to bear arms against her, the *Macedonians* would not stick to maintain her, whatsoever her proceedings were. Having therefore shut up *Arideus* and his wife in a close room, where they could scarce turn round, she fed them through a little hole; till, after a while, it came in her head (for fear lest the people should have commiseration of him, that had reigned almost six years and a half) to put them to death. So she delivered *Arideus* to some barbarous *Thracians*, who took away his life by cruel torments: to *Eurydice* she sent a sword, a halter, and a cup of poison, willing her to chuse the instrument of her own death, who, praying that the like presents might one day be sent to *Olympias*, yielded her neck to the halter, having spent her last curses not in vain. *Nicanor*, the brother of *Cassander*, and a hundred the chief of his friends, did *Olympias* then chuse out, all whom she commanded to be slain. His brother *Iolaus*, that was already dead and buried, she accused of poison given to *Alexander*; and thereupon caused his tomb to be thrown down, and his bones to be scattered abroad. The *Macedonians*, wondering at this fury, began to condemn themselves, and the folly of *Polyperchon*, who had, quite contrary to *Antipater's* charge given on his death-bed, called this outrageous woman to the government of the empire.

S E C T. XX.

How Cassander was revenged upon Olympias.

I.

The great expedition of Cassander. Olympias shuts her self into Pydna, where Cassander besieged her. Facides, king of Epirus, coming to succour Olympias, is forsaken, and banished by his own subjects.

CASSANDER, at that time, lay before *Tigæa*, in *Peloponnesus*; whither, when all these ill tidings were brought to him, he never staid to take

take the city, nor to give order for the state of things in that country, though *Alexander*, the son of *Polyperchon*, were there with an army; but compounding with them of *Tegea*, he willed his associates to look to themselves as well as they could, till his return; and so in all haste he took his journey towards *Macedon*, carried headlong with the greedy desire of just revenge. The *Etolians* had taken the streights of *Thermopylae*, in favour of the queen and *Polyperchon*, to hinder his passage; but he, not willing to mispend any time in dealing with them, got together as many ships as he could, great and small, with which he transported his army into *Thesaly*. There he divided his companies, appointing some under *Callas*, a subtil captain, to hold *Polyperchon* busied, who then lay encamped near to *Perbebia*; with the rest he marched directly against *Olympias*. She, having once prevailed by the respect given to her dignity, took more care now to appear majestic, to make her self strong. To this end, she made a solemn progress to *Pydna*, a sea-town, and well fenced, having in her company all the flower of the court, especially the great ladies, among whom was *Roxana*, and her young son *Alexander*, heir to the great *Alexander* by his grandmother's designment; who, during his minority, kept the sovereign power in her own hands. But all this pomp served to little use, against the violence of the enemy, that soon presented himself before the walls; only it fed the besieged with a vain hope of succour, that would, from all parts, arrive, to rescue persons of their quality. And hereof there soon appeared fair likelihood, which as soon vanished, and went away in smoke.

For *Eacides*, king of *Epirus*, made great haste to bring succour to *Olympias*, his cousin, with whom *Deodamia*, his daughter was also shut up. Nevertheless, his subjects were nothing forward in this expedition; but finding certain passages taken in the way by *Cassander's* men, they called upon him to retire, and quit the enterprize. The king's importunity, urging them to proceed, and the obstinate refusal of the army, brake out at length into such terms, that when he had raged in vain against the multitude, his authority, with which he thought to have prevailed upon them, was, by them, taken from him, and he compelled to forsake his kingdom, and to wander up and down in foreign countries, a banished man; his people joining with the enemy, against whom he had led them forth to war.

Pydna, in the mean time, was closed up streightly both by sea and land; so that neither any could issue out of the city, nor any relief be conveyed into it; but it held out as long as any food was left, no memorable service being done there, whilst great actions were managed abroad.

†. II.

A continuation of Olympias's story. Polyperchon defeated. Extreme famine in Pydna. Olympias yields to Cassander.

NOW, though order of time require it, that we should rehearse the doings of *Eumenes* and *Antigonus* in this place, leaving *Olympias* yet a while to the hour of her destiny, which grows the satter upon her, because she may discern it coming; yet that we may not be compelled to interrupt the course of our narration, by inserting her tragedy in the midst of things, not manifestly coherent with it, we will here (as elsewhere we have done, and elsewhere must) continue to end one history, that we may not be therewith distracted, when we shall come

to the relation of another. All the hope of the besieged, remaining in *Polyperchon*, was in like manner disappointed, as their former trust had been, which was reposed in the succours of the *Epirot*. For *Callas*, who was sent against him, found the means so corrupt the greatest part of his army with money, leaving him within a little while so slenderly accompanied, that he was fit for no other business of war, than a swift retreat. When famine had so far prevailed in the city, that the horses were killed as a precious food, many men feeding on the dead carcases of their fellows, and saw-dust being given to the elephants for provender; some of the soldiers obtaining the queen's leave (who could not deny it;) others, without asking leave, yielded themselves to the enemy, and were by him gently relieved, and sent abroad into the country. The news of the queen's affairs, dispersed by these men, did so affright her well-willers, that such as had reserved themselves to the event, came in apace, and submitted them to *Cassander*. At length, when the mortality was so great in the town, that the living were even poisoned with the noisome scent of the dead, *Olympias* bethought her self of stealing away by sea in a galley that she had; wherein her success was as bad as in the rest. For God had appointed this town, by her chosen as a place of refuge, to be unto her as a house of torment, and a goal, out of which she should not be delivered, but unto an evil death. Being therefore utterly broken with miseries, which daily afflicted her, and the other ladies, unaccustomed to so wretched a kind of life, she offered composition; and, with much labour, hardly obtained of *Cassander* (who, having fetch'd her galley out of the haven, accounted himself as good as master of her body) a grant of her own life. Immediately, upon her apprehension, *Pella*, the chief city of the kingdom, was yielded to *Cassander*. *Amphipolis* did stand out; for *Aristonous*, to whom *Olympias* had given charge of such forces as were left abroad in the country, taking courage from the success of some petty services wherein he had prevailed, began to promise himself great unlikelihoods. But *Olympias*, to win *Cassander's* favour, very earnestly required him, upon his faith to her, that he should give it up. He did so, and presently after was killed by his private enemies, that were set on by *Cassander*, who partly hated him upon old respects, partly doubted him as a man likely to seek innovation.

†. III.

The death of Olympias, and her conditions.

WHEN *Olympias* had now heard sorrowful tidings of all her friends, she her self was called into question, and accused in an assembly of the *Macedonians*, for the murders (they were so stiled in her affliction, which in time of prosperity she called justice) by her committed. There was she (being not heard, nor called to speak) condemned to die. The suit was commenced and prosecuted against her, by the kindred of those whom she had slain; but it was at *Cassander's* instigation, who (to hasten the execution) sent her word, that he would furnish her with a ship, and other necessities, to save her self by flight; which when she refused, saying, that she would plead for her self, and tell her own tale, he dissembled no longer, but sent unto her such men as hated her most, who took away her miserable life. She was daughter and sister unto two kings of *Epirus*, wife and mother unto two the mightiest kings of that or many other ages, a stout lady, and of unreprieveable chastity; but her

her ambition was boundless, her hatred unappeasable, and her fury, in revenge, most unwomanly. Her perverse conditions, made her husband seek other wives and concubines, which caused her to hate both him and them. She was thought privy to her husband's death; after which, very cruelly, she slew his late wife *Cleopatra*, having first murdered one of her two children in her arms, and, with a beastly fury, broiled the other alive in fire, in a copper basin. For these things, her son *Alexander* (otherwise loving her well) forbade her to meddle in the government of *Macedon*. But God, more severe unto cruel tyrants, than only to hinder them of their wills, permitted her to live and fulfill the rest of her wickedness (which was his justice upon the adulteries of *Philip*, and the oppression done by him and others;) after all which, he rewarded her malice, by returning it upon her own head.

†. IV.

Cassander celebrates the funeral of Arideus and Eurydice; and seeks to make himself king of Macedon.

AFTER her death, *Cassander* gave honourable burial to *Arideus* and *Eurydice*, among

their progenitors, kings of *Macedon*. And looking further into his own possibilities of greatness, he married the lady *Thessalonica*, whom he had taken at *Pydna*, being the daughter of king *Philip*, by another of his wives, that by her he might have some title to the crown. For the same end, he committed *Roxana* and her young son to close prison, removing thereby some part of his impediment. And, the better to increase his fame, and purchase love, he built a city, called by his own name, *Cassandria*, that soon grew to be very great and powerful. He re-edified likewise *Thebes* in *Greece*, and restored it unto the old inhabitants, after it had lain twenty years waste, being utterly rased by *Alexander*. By these means, especially by the restoration of *Thebes*, whereunto all *Greece* voluntarily contributed, he grew so strong, that few remained enemies unto him; and they, with much labour, hardly could resist him. Leaving him therefore daily prevailing in *Greece*, we will return to them who contended in *Asia* for less titles, but larger provinces, with greater forces.

C H A P. IV.

Of the great lordship which ANTIGONUS got in Asia.

SECT. I.

The Journey of Eumenes into Persia. His wife dealing with those that joined with him.

EUMENES, having joined unto his company the *Argyraspides*, made haste into the eastern parts, to take possession of those countries, according to his commission, and strengthen himself against *Antigonus*. He took his journey through *Celofyria* and *Phenicia*, hoping to reclaim those provinces, usurped with the rest of *Syria* (as hath been shewed) by *Ptolemy*, to the king's obedience. But to effect this, his haste of passing forward was too great, his army too little, and the readiness of the people to return to their due obedience, none at all. Besides all which impediments, one inconvenience troubled him in all his proceedings, making them the less effectual. The captains of the *Argyraspides* were so froward, that they scorned to repair to him, and take his directions; and their fidelity was so unsteady, that he might have more easily dealt with open traitors. It was not expedient, that he, being general, should weaken his authority, by courting them; neither lay it in his power to keep them in order by compulsion. Therefore he feigned, that *Alexander* had appointed unto him, in a dream, a place for their meeting; namely, in a rich pavilion, wherein an empty throne was placed, as if *Alexander* himself had been present at their consultations. Thus he freed himself from their vain pride; but of their faith he could have no assurance. Yet when *Ptolemy* requested them, and *Antigonus* bribed them to forsake him, they continued (though not without considering of the matter) to take his part. So he marched on, sending before him the king's warrant, which *Pytho* and *Seleucus* refused to obey; not as rejecting the king's authority, but excepting against the person of *Eumenes*, as a man condemned to die by the *Macedonian* army, for the

No. 32.

death of *Craterus*. *Eumenes*, knowing well that he was not to rely upon their assistance, who stood otherwise affected than his affairs required, and were not to be dealt with by perswasion, sought passage by strong hand through the country of *Babylon*, in such wise, that *Seleucus*, having in vain assayed to hinder him, by opening the sluices of *Euphrates*, was glad at length to grant him friendly way, as desirous to be rid of him. Thus he came to *Peucestes*, and the rest of the eastern lords, who were glad of his company, because of the differences between *Pytho*, *Seleucus*, and themselves. Yet the contention about superiority grew very hot among them; every one finding matter enough to feed his own humour of self-worthiness. But the former device of assembling in one pavilion, made all quiet; the conclusion ever being sure to follow that which *Eumenes* propounded, who was both wisest in giving advice, and best able to reward, by means of the authority given him, to take what he pleased of the king's treasures. By these means he won to himself many of those who had most power to do good or hurt.

SECT. II.

How Antigonus, coming to set upon Eumenes, was driven off with loss.

ANTIGONUS, hearing that *Eumenes* lay in the province of *Susa*, had an earnest desire to follow him, and drive him further from the king's treasures, which were kept there. To which end, as soon as he had made himself strong enough, he removed out of *Mesopotamia*, where he had wintered; and taking to him *Pytho* and *Seleucus*, with their men, he marched directly against the enemies, with intent to give them battel. *Eumenes* had fortified the castle of *Susa*, and was retired back toward *Persia*, keeping the river of *Tigris* between

tween him and his pursuers. The passages of the river were well guarded, and good espial kept upon *Antigonus*, to observe which way he took. Before he came to *Tigris* itself, he was to pass over *Coprates*, a great river, and not fordable, which he sought to do by small vessels, whereof he had no great store. A great part of his army had gotten over, when *Eumenes*, who kept a bridge upon *Tigris*, came with a thousand horse, and four thousand foot, to see their demeanor; and finding them out of order, charged them, broke them, and drove them headlong back into *Coprates*, wherein most of them were drowned; very few escaping with life, except four thousand that yielded themselves prisoners, in sight of *Antigonus*, that was not able to relieve them. This loss made *Antigonus* glad to fall off; and the heat of that country in the dog-days breeding diseases in the army, by which many perished, caused him to remove as far as into *Media*. So he took *Python* with him (leaving *Seleucus* to besiege the castle of *Susa*) and seeking to go the nearest way, passed through savage nations, that continually vexing him with skirmishes, slew great numbers of his men before he could arrive in *Media*, with his troops that were quite heart-broken.

S E C T. III.

Of Eumenes's cunning. A battel between him and Antigonus.

AFTER his departure, *Eumenes* with his associates fell into consultation about the remainder of their business. Fain he would have had them to enter upon those provinces, which *Antigonus* had left behind him; to which also the captains of the *Argyraspides* or *Silver-shields* were very inclinable, as desiring to draw nearer to *Greece*. But *Peucestes* and the rest, whose dominions lay in the high-countries, had more care of their own particular estates, and would needs march eastward. These carried it, for the army was not strong enough to divide itself into parts.

When they came into *Persia*, *Peucestes* ruling there, feasted them royally, and sought by all means to win the soldiers love to himself. *Eumenes*, perceiving whereunto those doings tended, suffered him a while to keep good cheer, till the time of war drew near. Then did he feign an epistle, directed as from *Orontes*, governor of *Armenia*, to *Peucestes* himself: the purport whereof was, that *Olympias* had vanquished *Cassander*, and sent over a great army under *Polyperchon*, to join with *Eumenes*. These news, as they filled the camp with vain joy, so they wrought in all mens minds a great willingness to obey *Eumenes*, by whom was the likeliest appearance of their preferment, wherein they dealt wisely, he being far the most sufficient commander, as they found soon after. For when *Antigonus*, coming out of *Media*, drew near unto them, *Eumenes* by some mischance was fallen sick, and fain to be carried in a litter; the army marched in very bad array, and was likely to have been forced to take battel in that disorder. But *Eumenes*, when the rest of the captains were amazed, was carried about the army in his litter, and upon the sudden did cast his men into so good form, that *Antigonus*, perceiving him afar off, could not refrain from giving him deserved commendations. Yet he did not cease to promise great rewards to the captains, and all sorts of men, if they would forsake *Eumenes*: which hopes deceiving him, he came to the trial of a battel. *Eumenes* had more elephants than *Antigonus*, otherwise he was inferior

in number both of horse and foot by a third part. The battel was fought with variable success, and great loss on both sides, continuing a great part of the day, and of the night following, yet the victory was uncertain. For *Eumenes* could not force his men to lie far from their carriages, by which means *Antigonus* (who had a more absolute command over his) incamping on the ground whereon they fought, had in his power the dead bodies, which was accounted the sign of victory; for he buried his own, and gave leave to his enemies, craving it, to do the like; but a greater sign of victory had *Eumenes*, for he abode still in the same place, and not only buried his men very honourably at great leisure, but held the country round about, whereas *Antigonus* was glad (having tarried but one day) to steal away by night, and return into *Media*, from whence he came.

S E C T. IV.

Of divers stratagems practised by Antigonus and Eumenes, one against the other.

THUS did the war continue doubtful, and was protracted to a greater length, each part having stout soldiers, and skilful generals; but the side which had hitherto prevailed, being hindered by the equal authority of many, from pursuing all advantages to the best. *Antigonus* grew daily weaker in men and reputation; so that to repair himself, he could find no way safer, than to put all to adventure. He knew that his enemies lay in their wintering places, quartered far asunder; so that if he could suddenly come among them, he was likely to put them in great distress. Between him and them the way was not long, being only nine days journey; but very bad, through a rough dry wilderness, hardly passable. Another way fairer, and leading through a country well peopled, but requiring twenty five days journey, he forsook, partly for the length, partly and chiefly, because he would come undiscovered. So therefore taking his journey in the dead of winter, he forbade unto his men the use of fire by night, because he would not have them descried afar off. This commandment had been well observed four or five days, when continuance of time (as commonly) breeding negligence, and the cold weather pinching them, they were bold to cherish themselves, being near to their way's end. The light of these fires gave notice of their coming, which being reported to *Peucestes*, and other captains, they were so astonished with the sudden danger, that in all haste they betook themselves to flight. But *Eumenes*, meeting with the news, began to hearten his affrighted companions, promising to make *Antigonus* march leisurely, and willing them to abide and draw up their men together. They could scarce believe him, yet they were content to be ruled, and did as he appointed, who failed not in making his word good. He took with him some companies of the readiest men, wherewith he occupied certain tops of mountains, looking toward the camp of *Antigonus*: there he chose a convenient ground to incamp upon, and made great store of fires in sundry places, as if the whole army had been present. This was a sorrowful spectacle to *Antigonus*, who thought himself prevented of his purpose, and began to fear lest he should be compelled to fight, whilst his men were tired with a long and painful journey. Therefore he resolv'd to turn aside, and take the way to such places as might better serve to refresh his army. This he did with great care and circumspection at the first, as knowing how ready *Eumenes* would

would be upon all advantages. But after a while, considering that no enemy stirred about him, he began to pause and think in himself, that somewhat or other was not fallen out according to his opinion. To be the better informed in the matter, he caused some inhabitants of that desert to be taken, and brought before him; of whom he learned, that they had seen no other army than his thereabouts, but only a few men that kept fires on the hill-tops. It vexed him exceedingly to find that he had been so deluded, therefore he went against these troops with great fury, meaning to take sharp vengeance on them for having so deceived him. But by this time sufficient strength was arrived there, which could not be forced without much business and long time. All the army was come, save only *Eudamus*, captain of the elephants, who, besides those beasts, had no more than four hundred horsemen in his company. *Antigonus* hearing of this supply coming to his enemies, sent above two thousand horse, and all his light-armed footmen to cut it off by the way. *Eudamus* being fallen into this danger, was fain to place his elephants round about his carriages, and so to defend himself as well as he could; for his horsemen, overlaid with multitudes, were quickly broken, and driven to run away upon the spur. Neither knew they, who sat upon the elephants, which way to turn them; for on all sides they received wounds, and were not able to requite them with the like. In this extremity there appeared brave troops of horse and foot, that came unexpected to the rescue, and charging the assailants upon the back, drove them to seek their own safety by speedy flight. These were sent by *Eumenes*, who, though he knew not what his adversary meant to do, yet he knew very well what was fittest for him to do; and therefore playing both games himself, provided the remedy.

SECT. V.

The conspiracy of Peucestes and others against Eumenes's life.

BY these means *Eumenes* won great honour, and was by the whole army acknowledged a most expert general, and well worthy of the chief command. But *Peucestes* and the other captains, conscious of their own insufficiency, were so transported with envy, that they could no longer contain their vile thoughts, but held communication, as upon a necessary point, how they might find means to murder him.

Surely it is great injustice to impute the mischief contrived against worthy men to their own proud carriage, or some other ill deserving: for, though it often happen, that small vices do serve to counterpoise great virtues (the sense of evil being more quick and lasting than of good) yet he shall bewray a very foolish malice, that, wanting other testimony, will think it a part of wisdom to find good reason of the evils done to virtuous men, which oftentimes have no other cause than virtue itself. *Eumenes*, among many excellent qualities, was noted to be of singular courtesy, of a very sweet conversation among his friends, and careful by all gentle means to win their love that seemed to bear him any secret ill affection. It was his mere virtue that overthrew him, which even they that sought his life acknowledged. For they concluded that he should not be slain before the battle were fought with *Antigonus*, wherein they confessed that it stood best with their safety to be governed by his direction. Of this treason he was quickly ad-

vertised by *Eudamus*, to whom he had done many pleasures, and by some others of whom he used to borrow money when he needed not, to the end that they should be careful of his good for fear of losing their own. Considering therefore, and discouraging with himself of the villainy intended against him, he made his last will, and burnt all his writings that contained any matter of secret; which done, he revolved many things in his mind, being doubtful what course were best to follow. All the nobles of the empire stood ill-affected to the royal blood, excepting those which were with him, that were more in number than in worth. How things at that time stood in *Macedon* and *Greece*, either he knew not, or knowing the truth, knew nothing that might encourage him to seek their help that needed his. To make his own peace with *Antigonus*, had been against his faith to *Olympias* and the princes that had committed this great power into his hands. For which cause also it may be thought, that he forbore either to lose the battle willingly, or to fly into *Cappadocia*, and make shift for himself among his old friends. At length he resolved to do his best against the common enemy, and afterwards to look to himself as well as he might.

SECT. VI.

The last battle between Antigonus and Eumenes.

THE foldiers, especially those old bands of the *silver-shields*, finding *Eumenes* perplexed, and not knowing the cause, entreated him not to doubt of the victory, but only to bring them into the field, and set them in array; for the rest, they alone would take sufficient order. The like alacrity was generally found in the common soldiers faces; but the chief commanders were so mischievously bent against him, that they could not endure to think upon being beholden to him for the victory; yet he ordered the battle so well, that, without their own great fault, they could hardly fail of getting the upper hand.

Before the armies came to joining, a horse-man from the side of *Eumenes*, proclaimed with a loud voice to the followers of *Antigonus*, that their wickedness in fighting against their own fathers, would now be punished as it well deserved. This was not spoken in vain, for the *silver-shields* were men of threescore or seventy years old, and strengthened more by continual exercise than decayed by age, and excelling in courage, as having passed through greater dangers than any like to be presented in that fight. Therefore *Antigonus's* men (who had often been beaten by them, and were now to try their last hope with these resolute warriors, the most ancient and best regarded of all *Alexander's* soldiers) grew very pensive, and advanced heavily, suspecting their own cause, and fearing that the threatnings uttered would prove true.

Antigonus was now again far the stronger in horse, which gave him cause of great hope; the ground on which they were to fight, being a plain levelled field. Placing therefore himself and his son *Demetrius* in the right wing, and committing the left wing to *Pythos*, he did set forward courageously against the enemies, that were ready to give him a sharp entertainment.

Eumenes took unto him *Peucestes*, with the rest of the lords, and stood in the left wing of his battle, in the face of *Antigonus*, meaning both to prevent the traitors, his companions, of all means to make head against him on the sudden, and (withal) to give proof of his own valour, which per-

haps

haps he should no more do, in the face of all his enemies. In the right wing, opposite unto *Python*, he bestowed the weakest of his horse and elephants, under one *Philip*, an honest man; and (which was enough at such a time) obedient; commanding him to protract the fight, and make a leisureable retreat, expecting the event of the other side.

So they joined very fiercely; *Antigonus* labouring to make himself master of all; *Eumenes*, to die an honourable death, or to win such a victory upon his open enemies, as might give him leisure and opportunity to deal with his false friends.

The foot-men of *Antigonus* being, even in their own opinions, far inferior to those whom they must encounter, were, at the first brunt, presently defeated by the *silver-shields*, who slew above five thousand of them, losing, of their own, not one man. But in horse, *Eumenes* was so over-matched, that he could not repel *Antigonus*, who pressed him very hard; but was fain to stand wholly upon defence. Yet his courage wrought so well by example among his followers, that the enemy could not win one foot of ground upon him, until such time as *Peucestes*, with one thousand five hundred horse withdrew himself out of the battel, leaving his companions fighting to defend his back.

Then did *Eumenes* desperately rush amongst his enemies, labouring to break open the way unto *Antigonus* himself. And though he failed of his purpose; yet, with great slaughter, he did so beat upon them which came in his way, that the victory hung a long time in suspense, uncertain which way to incline.

The ground, whereon they fought, being of a slight sandy mould, through the trampling of horses, men, and elephants, did cast up such a cloud of dust, as hindered the prospect; so that no man could see what was done a little from him. *Antigonus*, finding this advantage, dispatched away some companies of horse, that passed, undiscovered, beyond *Eumenes*'s battels, and came to his carriages, which lay about half a mile from the place of fight, slenderly guarded (for that the whole body of the army lay between them and danger) and therefore easily taken. Had *Peucestes* retired himself no further than unto the carriages, he might not only have defended them; but, peradventure, have surprized those which came to surprize them; and so have done as good a piece of service as a better man. But he was gotten somewhat further, to a place, where, out of danger, he might expect the event; and *Eumenes* was so over-laboured both in body and mind, that he could not possibly give an eye to every place, being not well able to continue where he was.

It happened so, that the elephants meeting together, those of *Antigonus* had the better hand; whereupon *Eumenes*, finding himself every way over-charged, began to give back, and withdrew himself and his companies, in good order, to the other side of the battel, where *Philip* (as he was directed) had, by fighting and retiring together, kept that wing from loss. The *Antigonians* had felt so much of *Eumenes* that day, that they were well contented to let him depart quietly, and wished not to see him come again; as fain he would have done.

The loss of the carriages was reported unto him, as soon as he had any leisure to hear how things went; whereupon he presently ordered his men for a fresh charge, and sent for *Peucestes*, that was not far off, requesting him to bring in his men, and renew the fight; whereby he trusted, not only to recover their own goods, but to enrich themselves with the spoils of the enemies. *Peucestes* not only

refused to join with him, but immediately withdrew himself into a safer place, where he might be further from such dangerous temptations.

By this, the night grew on; and both armies, wearied with fighting, were desirous to return into their camps. Yet *Antigonus* conceived hope of doing somewhat more; and therefore, taking half his horse-men, he waited upon *Eumenes* a part of his way homewards, but found no opportunity to offend him: the other half he committed to *Python*, willing him to set upon the *silver-shields* in their retreat; which yet he forbore to do, because it appeared too full of danger. So the battel ended, wherein *Antigonus* had not so much the better in horse, as the worse in foot; but the spoil which he got, by surprizing his enemies carriages, made amends for all his other losses.

SECT. VII.

How Eumenes was betrayed to Antigonus, and slain.

EUMENES, coming into his camp, and finding the *silver-shields* extremely discontented with their misfortune, began to cheer them up, and put them in hope of recovering all with advantage; for their brave demeanor that day had so crushed the enemy, that he had no power left wherewith to abide them in open field, and was much less able to draw their carts after him, through that great wilderness, over the high mountains.

But these persuasions availed nothing. *Peucestes* was gone; the other captains would needs return into the high countries; and the soldiers had no desire either to fly or to fight, but only to recover their goods. Wherefore *Teutamus*, one of the two captains of the *silver-shields* (who had in former times readily consented unto traitorous motions, in hope of gain; but was letted by his partner, *Antigenes*) finding, as he thought, a fit occasion of making himself great, and winning the love of those bands, dealt secretly with *Antigonus*, requesting him to restore unto those old soldiers their goods, which he had taken, being the only reward of their services in the wars of *Philip* and *Alexander*.

Antigonus, as a subtil man, knew very well, that they which requested more than they had reason to expect, would also, with a little entreaty, perform a great deal more than they promised; and therefore he lovingly entertained the messengers, filling them with hopes of greater matters than they desired, if they would put *Eumenes* into his hands, by whom they were seduced to make war against him. This answer pleased them so well, that they forthwith devised how to deliver him alive. Wherefore coming about him, as at other times, to do their duty; and, pretending more joy of their victory, than sorrow of their loss, which they said they would redeem by another fight; in the midst of this goodly talk, they leaped upon him, caught hold of his sword, and bound him fast. So they hauled him away, and, stopping their ears against all persuasions, would not yield so far as to loosen one of his hands, and let him kill himself; but brought him alive (that was their own general, under whom they had obtained many victories) as it had been in triumph, into the camp of their enemies.

The press of men, running out of the camp to see him, was so great, that *Antigonus* was forced to send a guard of horse-men and elephants, to keep him from being smothered, whom he could not suddenly resolve either to kill or save. Very few they were that sued for his life; but of these, *Demetrius*, the son of *Antigonus*, was one; the rest

were

were desirous to be rid of him quickly; thinking, belike, that if he were saved, he would soon be the chief in reputation, for his great ability. So, after long deliberation, *Antigonus* concluded, that it was the safest way to put him to death; which intending to have done by famine (perhaps, because he would keep it a-while in his own power to reverse this sentence, as desiring (if it might be) to have him live his friend) haste of other business made him do it by the sword.

To this end came all the travels of that worthy general, *Eumenes*, who had, with great wisdom, fidelity, and patience, laboured in vain, to uphold the family, which God had purposed to cast down. He is reckoned among the notable examples of fortune's mutability; but more notable was his government of himself in all her changes. Adversity never lessened his courage, nor prosperity his circumspection. But all his virtue, industry, and wit, were cast away, in leading an army, without full power to keep it in due obedience. Therefore it was not ill answer'd by *Gaspar de Colligny*, admiral of *France*, in our days, to one that foretold his death, which ensued soon after, in the massacre of *Paris*; *That rather than to lead an army of volunteers, he would die a thousand times.*

Antigonus himself gave to the body of *Eumenes* honourable funeral; and rewarded the treason wrought against him with deserved vengeance. One chief captain of the *silver-shields* he burnt alive; many of the other captains he slew; and to the whole multitude of the *silver-shields*, that had betrayed so worthy a commander, he appointed a leader, that should carry them into far countries, under pretence of wars; but with a privy charge, to consume them all, as perjured wretches, letting none of them return alive unto his friends and kindred, or so much as once behold the seas that beat upon the shoars of *Greece* and *Macedon*.

S E C T. VIII.

How Antigonus slew Python, and occupied Media. How he removed governors of provinces, and made himself lord of Persia, carrying away Peucestes.

THE two armies being joined thus in one, were carried into *Media*, where they spent the rest of the winter; the common soldier idly; the principal men intently bent unto the business ensuing. *Python* began to consider his own deservings; for that the whole war had been chiefly maintained by the strength and riches of his province. Besides, he thought himself as good a man as *Antigonus*, unless it were in the soldiers opinion, which he judged easy to be purchased with gifts; and therefore spared not to assuage them with great liberality. But, in following this course, he was driven by necessity to trust many, of whom he stumbled upon some, that were unsecret; and others, bearing him no sincere affection. Thus was his purpose discovered to *Antigonus*, who (nothing like to *Python*) dissembled his indignation, and rebuked the informers, as breeders of dissension between him and his honourable friend, unto whom he meant to commit the government of all those countries; his own business calling him into the lower *Asia*. These reports, coming daily to his ears, did finely delude *Python*. By his greatness with *Alexander*; his authority in that province where they lay, whereof he was governor; and the love of the soldiers, which he had bought with money, he was strong enough to maintain, even an offensive war. But, what need had he to use the sword, when he was likely, without contention, to obtain more than his own asking?

No. 32.

therefore he came, as soon as he was sent for; to take his farewell of *Antigonus*, and to divide the provinces with him; that meant nothing less than to yield to any such division. As soon as he came, he was taken, and accused, condemned to die, and slain out of hand. For *Antigonus*, having begun with *Eumenes*, his ancient friend, was not afterwards restrained by any consideration of old acquaintance, from cutting down indifferently all that stood in his way; but swam carelessly through the blood, wherein at the first he doubtfully waded.

When this business was ended, he appointed a new governor in *Media*, to order the province; and a captain, to suppress all commotions; thinking, belike, that the power and authority, so divided, would hardly agree in one against him, from whom both were derived.

After this, he marched into *Persia*, where he was entertained, as absolute lord of *Asia*: there began he to shew how well he understood his own mightiness. For he placed and displaced, at his pleasure, governors in all provinces; leaving none in office, that were not his own creatures, except such as lay too far off to be dislodged easily.

Peucestes, who ruled in *Persia*, thought with good cheer to redeem old offences; but was deceived, having to do with one that could not be taken with such baits: he was carried away, and feasted with goodly words of promise, that never took effect. Thus he, that envied the virtue of his friend, was driven to flatter (in vain) the fortune of his enemy; after which, he lived a most contemptible life, till he died obscurely, a man forgotten.

S E C T. IX.

How Seleucus was chased out of Babylon, by Antigonus. The great riches of Antigonus.

SELEUCUS was the next in this visitation; one that had, from time to time, continued in the same tenor of good-will to *Antigonus*, and now gave proof of his hearty affection towards him, by making the captain of the castle of *Susa* to meet him on the way, rendering unto him that strong piece, and all the treasures therein bestowed. This offer was so great, that *Antigonus* (though having in his hands the keeper of the place) could hardly believe it; but used him with excessive kindness, for fear so good a mood should change. In that castle he found all the treasures of *Alexander*, with the jewels of the *Persian* kings; which, added to his former store of money, made up twenty-five thousand talents. Having all this, he might well account himself a happy man, if riches were sufficient to happiness. But large dominion was the mark at which he aimed; therefore he proceeded, with intent to leave no country behind his back, that should not acknowledge him for sovereign lord. Coming to *Babylon*, he was entertained by *Seleucus* with all possible demonstration of love, and honour'd with presents, befitting the majesty of a king. All this he accepted with great gravity, as being due to him, and began to require an account of the revenues of that province. This demand *Seleucus* held unreasonable, saying, that it was not needful for him to render unto any man an account of that province, which was given unto him, in respect of his many good services to the state. But whether he spake reason or no, it sufficed, that *Antigonus* was powerful; who urged him daily to come to a reckoning. Manifest it was, that neither want of money, nor any other necessity, moved *Antigonus* to press him thus; but only the desire to pick matter of quarrel against him, whereof it was likely that he should

should find such issue as *Python* and *Peucestes* had done. Therefore, taking with him only fifty horse, he conveyed himself away, and fled into *Ptolemy's* dominions, desiring him to protect him from the violence of such a man, as went about to oppress all that in former times had been his betters, or at least his equals. *Antigonus* was glad of his flight; for now all those countries were yielded unto him without battel, whereas to fight with *Seleucus* for them he wanted all pretence, and to kill him it was not his desire, having received many benefits of him, and those not intermixed, as commonly it happens, with any injuries. Yet it is reported, that the *Chaldeans* brought a strange prophecy to *Antigonus*, bidding

him to look well to himself, and know, that if *Seleucus* did escape his hands, he should recover *Babylon*, yea, win all *Asia*, and kill *Antigonus* in battel. Easy believers may give credit to this tale. Had it been true, methinks, *Antigonus* rather should have hanged those *Chaldeans*, for giving him no warning till it was too late, than sent pursuers (as they say that he did) after him, whom the destinies preserved for so great purposes. When he had settled things at *Babylon*, he took his journey into *Cilicia*, where he winter'd. There he took up ten thousand talents more of the king's treasures, and casting his accounts, found his yearly income to amount unto eleven thousand talents.

C H A P. V.

Of the great civil war between Alexander's captains: and how they assumed the name and state of kings.

S E C T. I.

The combination of Ptolemy, Cassander, and others, against Antigonus. Their demands, and his answer.

THESE great riches, and the rest of his power, made *Antigonus* dreaded, envied, and suspected, whereby he quickly was embarked in a new war. *Ptolemy*, *Cassander*, and *Lyfimachus* had privily combined themselves together, intending to hinder his further growth, and bring him to more reason, than of his own accord he seemed like to yield unto. Of their practices he had some notice; the good entertainment given unto *Seleucus*, giving him sufficient cause of mistrust. Therefore he sent ambassadors to them severally, entreating them to continue firm in their love towards him, that would be ready to requite them with the like. The cold answers which they made occasioned his hasty preparation against the most forward of them, which was *Ptolemy*, it being likely that a good army should prevail more than a fair message. Therefore, as soon as the season of the year would permit, he took the way towards *Syria*, and was encountered by embassy from them all. These told him, that their lords did much rejoice at his victory obtained against *Eumenes* their common enemy, and the honour that he had thereby gotten. In which war, forasmuch as they being his confederates, must have endured great loss, with hazard of their whole estates, if the contrary faction had prevailed, they held it very just, that all should be partakers in the fruits of that voyage, wherein they had been all adventurers. Wherefore they desired him, that making between them all an equal division of the treasures that were in his hands (a thing easy to be done) he would also take some convenient order for enlarging their dominions, according to the rate of his new purchases. This might best be to every one's liking, if he would make over *Cappadocia*, with *Lycia*, to *Cassander*; and *Phrygia*, bordering upon the *Hellefpont*, to *Lyfimachus*; for whereas his own dominions were so much extended eastward by his late victory, he might well spare some of those western provinces, to those that were seated in the west. As for *Ptolemy*, he would not crave any new adliti-

on, but rest contented within his own territories. Provided always, that *Seleucus* their common friend, and partner in the late war, might be restored to his own, out of which he had been driven so injuriously, that all of them were forced to take it deeply to heart; requiring amends, with his friendly consent unto their demands, which otherwise they must labour to obtain with armed hands.

Antigonus knew, that after many losses received, he should yet be able to redeem peace whensoever he listed, with these, or perhaps with easier conditions. Neither was he so weak, to give away quietly any part of his strength into the hands of such bad friends, for fear only lest it should be taken from him perforce. Rather he hoped that he should be able to find them work, more than enough to defend their own. Therefore, he roundly answered the ambassadors, that it was no part of his meaning to communicate with other men the profit of that victory, which he alone, without other mens help, had obtained. Tho' indeed they had already sufficiently gained by him, if they could see it, having by his means kept their governments, whereof they were like to be dispossessed by *Polyperchon*, and the council of estate in *Macedon*. But what marvel was it, if they considered not how he had saved them, seeing one of them had forgotten the time, when coming to him as a fugitive and begging succour, he was by his mere bounty relieved, and enabled to get all that he now held? *Cassander* did not (said he) in those days command me to surrender provinces, and give him his equal share of my treasures; but (for his father's sake) desired me to pity him, and help him against his enemies; which I did, by lending him an army and fleet, on confidence whereof he now presumes to threaten me. As for *Seleucus*, how can he complain of wrong, that durst not stay to plead his right? I did use him well; but his conscience told him that he had deserved ill; else he would not have fled. Let them that so curiously search into my doings, consider well their own, which some of them can hardly justify. I am now in the way to *Syria*, meaning to examine *Ptolemy's* proceedings; and, after him, to deal with others, if they continue to provoke me.

SECT. II.

The preparation and beginnings of the wars.

WHEN the ambassadors were dismissed with this answer, nothing was thought upon but war. *Antigonus*, perceiving that he should be invaded from *Europe*, as soon as he were entered into *Syria*, left his nephew *Ptolemy* to guard the sea-coasts, and hinder *Cassander* from landing in *Asia*: giving him also in charge, to drive out of *Cappadocia* some that were already sent over to molest him. Likewise he dispatched messengers into *Greece* and *Cyprus*, not unfurnished of money, to draw friends to his side, and raise up troubles to his enemies. Especially he laboured to make himself the strongest by sea; to which purpose, he rather hastened than foreflowed his journey into *Syria*, that he might get possession of mount *Libanus*, which afforded many excellent commodities for building of a navy. Therefore, having erected beacons, and laid post-horses throughout all *Asia* to give swift advertisement of all occurrences, he invaded *Syria*, that was not held against him by any power sufficient to maintain the field.

Ptolemy lay in *Egypt*, the strength and heart of his dominion, where he was beloved and honoured of all the people as their natural lord; his other provinces he kept with a few garrisons, better serving to contain the people within obedience than to confront a foreign enemy. So *Antigonus* took many cities and places of that country, and began to set great numbers of artificers on work in making ships, which was one of his most earnest cares. In these businesses he consumed a year and three months, not idly; for he took *Joppe* and *Gaza*, which were yielded unto his discretion, and well used. The strong city of *Tyris* held out long, but was compelled in the end, by famine, to render itself upon composition that *Ptolemy's* soldiers might depart with their arms, which was permitted.

Ptolemy was not asleep while these things were in doing, though he kept himself within the bounds of *Egypt*, as indeed it behoved him to do. His forces were not able to stand against *Antigonus* in plain field, but likely they were to increase, which made him willing to protract the time. Nevertheless by sea (where his enemy was as yet unready) he sent his fleet into all quarters, whereof *Seleucus* had the chief command.

Seleucus passed with an hundred sail along the coast of *Syria*, in the full view of *Antigonus* and his army, to their no little discomfort. He landed in *Cyprus*, which was then governed by many petty lords, of whom the greatest adhered to *Ptolemy*; the rest were, by the factors of *Antigonus*, bought for him with gold, but now redeemed by the *Egyptian* with sharp steel.

The same commodity of aid by sea encouraged the president of *Caria* (called also *Cassander*, but not the son of *Antipater*, howsoever by the painful and learned writer *Reimerus Reineccius*, he is by some over-sight counted for the same) to declare for *Ptolemy* and his confederates, and busily employ in their quarrel all his forces, which he had hitherto kept in good neutrality, and thereby enjoyed rest; but now he threw himself into dangerous war, choosing rather to undergo trouble at hand, than to fall under certain ruin, though somewhat further distant, which would have overwhelmed him, if *Antigonus* had beaten all the rest.

SECT. III.

How each party sought to win the assistance of Greece. Antigonus's declaration against Cassander. Alexander, the son of Polyperchon, revolteth from Antigonus, who had set him up.

IN the mean season all possible care was taken on both sides, to assure unto them the people of *Greece*, whose aid, which way soever it inclined, was of great importance. Herein, at the first, *Antigonus* sped so well by large effusion of his treasure, that he drew to him the *Lacedemonians*, and other *Peloponnesians*, of whom he waged eight thousand, and caused *Polyperchon* (who had a good while made hard shifts) to rouse himself again, and taking upon him the title of captain of *Peloponnesus*, to make head against *Cassander*.

These hopeful beginnings encouraged him to proceed further in the same kind. Wherefore, to make *Cassander* the more odious, he called together both his own soldiers, and all the *Greeks* and *Macedonians* that were to be found thereabouts. To these he declared, that *Cassander* had very cruelly slain *Olympias*, mother to the great *Alexander*; and not herewith contented, had shut up in close prison the poor lady *Roxana*, *Alexander's* wife, and his son begotten on her body. That all this proceeded from a desire to make himself king over the *Macedonians*; which well appeared, by his enforcing the lady *Theffalonica*, daughter to king *Philip*, a match unfit for a man of no greater parentage than he, to join with him in marriage. That in mere despite of those dead princes, *Philip* and *Alexander*, he had planted the *Olynthians*, rooted out by *Philip*, in a new city by him built, and called by his own name *Cassandria*; and had re-edified the city of *Thebes*, which for the great treason of the inhabitants, was levelled with the ground by the victorious hand of *Alexander*. For these reasons he required them to make a decree, that *Cassander* should restore to absolute liberty the lady *Roxana* and her son, and should yield obedience to the lord lieutenant-general of the empire (by which name *Antigonus* himself was understood) or else should be reputed a traitor and open enemy to the state. Furthermore, he propounded, that all the cities of *Greece* should be restored into freedom; this he did, not because he was careful of their good, but for the need which he had of their assistance.

These things being decreed, *Antigonus* was persuaded, that not only the *Greeks* would adhere unto him, as to their loving parron, and fall off from *Cassander*; but that the rulers of provinces, who had hitherto suspected him as a man regardful of nothing but his own benefit, would correct their opinion, and think him the most faithful of all others to the royal blood. But concerning his loyalty to the young prince, the world was too wise to be deceived with vain shews. His undertaking for the liberty of the *Greeks* was more effectual, and got easy belief, in regard of his present hatred to *Cassander*. Yet herein also *Ptolemy* strove to be as earnest as he, making the like decree, in hope to win to himself that valiant nation, which afforded men far more servicable in war than were to be found in any province of the empire.

And this indeed was the point at which both sides aimed. Wherein *Antigonus*, thinking to make all sure, deceived himself, not without great cost. For he gave to *Alexander*, the son of *Polyperchon*, five hundred talents, willing him to set the war on foot in *Peloponnesus*, whereby it might appear, that

on his side was meant nothing else than what was openly pretended.

In *Peloponnesus*, *Cassander's* men had, with much bloodshed, grievously afflicted the contrary faction; and he himself perceiving, that they were more easily spoiled as enemies, than retained as friends, thought it the best way to make what use he could of them, that were not long like to continue his. Finally, perceiving that *Alexander* came furnished with plenty of gold, wherewith he was able, not only to win the doubtful, but to corrupt such as might seem best assured: he thought it a good part of wisdom to surrender upon fair conditions that which he could not assure himself to hold any long time by force. Therefore he sent one to deal with *Alexander*, about the matters in controversy; letting him know, that *Antigonus* was very skilful in setting men together by the ears, not caring who prevailed, but only desiring to have them weary themselves whilst he was busy elsewhere, that so at length he might find opportunity to set upon the stronger. If therefore *Alexander* were so wise, as to keep in his purse the five hundred talents which he had, and without stroke stricken, to receive the whole lordship of *Peloponnesus*, it should be freely put into his hands by *Cassander*: provided, that he should from thenceforth renounce all confederacy made with *Antigonus*, and enter into a sure and faithful league with *Ptolemy*, *Cassander*, and the rest of the confederates; otherwise, he might well persuade himself, that the country which his father could not keep, when he was indeed the lieutenant of the empire, should not in haste be won by him, that was only the factor of a proud injurious man, so styling himself, but not acknowledged by others.

Alexander had lived a while with *Antigonus* since the beginning of these wars, among whose followers it was not hard to discover the intent (which he did not carry very secret) of making himself absolute lord of all: Therefore he was soon entreated to accept so good an offer, and did not stick to enter into that league, whereby he was to become a free lord, and subject unto no man's controul.

Howbeit, this his honour continued not long ere he lost both it and his life together, by treason of the *Sicyonians*; who thinking thereby to have made themselves free, were soon after vanquished in battle by *Cratesipolis*, *Alexander's* wife, a discreet and valiant lady. She, in revenge of her husband's death, crucified thirty of the citizens taken in flight; and having by severity taught them obedience, did afterwards continue her army in good order, and governed those places that she held with the love and commendation of her subjects and neighbours.

SECT. IV.

The Etolians rise against Cassander in favour of Antigonus, and are beaten. A fleet and land-army of Antigonus utterly defeated by Ptolemy's lieutenant. In what term the war stood at this time. Antigonus draws near to Greece.

A *Antigonus*, when he found that with so much money he had only bought an enemy, began to raise troubles to *Cassander* and his other adversaries in *Greece*, by stirring up the *Etolians* against them; likewise he laboured to win to his party the islands in the *Greek* seas, by whose assistance he might be the better able to deal with *Ptolemy*, that greatly prevailed by reason of his strong fleet. But neither of these attempts had the

success which he expected. The *Etolians*, a factious nation, and always envying the greatness of their neighbours, were often in commotion, but so, that commonly their gains equalled not their losses. *Cassander* won some of their own countries, fortified the *Acarnerians* against them, and compelled *Glaucias*, king of the *Illyrians*, whom he vanquished in battle, to forsake their side, and bind himself to bear no arms against *Cassander's* friends.

On the other side, as many petty islands were drawn to join with *Antigonus*; so the fleet of the *Rhodians* under *Theodatus*, who was admiral to *Antigonus*, passing along the coast of *Asia* toward *Cyprus*, with an army under conduct of *Perilaus*, marching on the shore for mutual assistance, was quite overthrown by *Ptolemy's* navy. *Polychytus*, who in *Ptolemy's* behalf had been sent into *Peloponnesus* against *Alexander*, finding no need of his service in that country, because *Alexander* was come over to their side, returned homewards, and by the way heard of the course which these *Antigonians* held, whom he very cunningly surprized. He rode with his fleet behind a cape, which the enemies were to double; his land-forces he placed in ambush, whereinto *Perilaus* falling, was taken prisoner with many of his men, and many were slain, making little resistance. *Theodatus*, the admiral, perceiving this, made all haste to help his fellows that were on land; but whilst he, with all his fleet, were intentive only to that business, *Polychytus* appeared at their backs, who, as soon as he perceived their disorder, hastened about the cape, and charging them behind, suffered not one of them to escape him. These ill tidings caused *Antigonus* to deal with *Ptolemy* about some composition. First, he sent ambassadors; afterwards they met in person. But *Antigonus* would not yield unto the demands of *Ptolemy*, so the parly was vain.

Hitherto each party seemed to have indifferently sped in the war, and thereby to have equal cause of hope and fear. This late victory, with the good success of his affairs in *Cyprus*, did seem to make amends to *Ptolemy* for his losses in *Syria*. Likewise the revolt of *Alexander* from *Antigonus* did equal the confederacy made between the *Etolians* and him; as also those petty skirmishes that had been in *Asia* the less, to *Antigonus's* advantage, were sufficiently recompensed by others of like regard, but adverse to him, and by the troubles brought upon his states in those parts by the two *Cassanders*.

Contrariwise, *Antigonus* valued the loss of his men, money, and ships, no otherwise than as the paring of his nails that were left long enough, and would easily grow again; but the enlargement of his territory, by addition of *Syria*, he prized at a higher rate, as if thereby he had fed upon a limb of *Ptolemy's* enemy, and strengthened the body of his own empire. Concerning other accidents, whereof the good were hitherto sufficient to counterpoise the bad, he meant to proceed as occasion should direct, which commonly is not long wanting to them that want no money.

That which most molested him, was the attempts of his enemies upon *Asia* the less; wherein, though as yet they had gotten little, yet had he cause to fear, lest the people, being tied unto him by no bond of allegiance, might upon small occasion revolt from him, to men of as honourable reputation as he himself. To prevent this, and to be nearer to *Greece*, he held it expedient for him to be there in person, where his affairs did seem to prosper the worse, by reason of his absence. Therefore,

fore he left part of his army in *Syria*, under his son *Demetrius*, to whom, being then but two and twenty years old, he appointed many ancient captains as assistants, or rather as directors; the rest he carried with him into *Phrygia*, where he meant to winter.

SECT. V.

How Lyfimachus and Cassander vanquished some enemies, raised against them by Antigonus. The good success of Antigonus in Asia and Greece: with the rebellion of many cities against Cassander.

THE coming of *Antigonus* into those parts wrought a great alteration in the process of his business thereabouts. For his enemies had short leisure to think upon molesting him in *Asia*: they themselves were held over-hardly to their own work on *Europe* side. *Seuthes*, a king of the *Thracians*, joining with some towns that rebelled against *Lyfimachus*, brought also the bordering *Scythians* into the quarrel. All these relied upon *Antigonus*, who was to help them with money and other aid. The *Etolians* likewise took courage, and rose against *Cassander*, having *Eacides*, lately restored to the kingdom of *Epirus*, their assistant. But *Lyfimachus* gave unto his rebels no time to confirm themselves. He suddenly presented himself before two of the cities that had rebelled, and compelled them, by fear, to return to their former duty. He fought a battle with the *Scythians* and wild *Thracians*, and drove them out of the country. Finally, he overcame *Seuthes*; and, following the heat of his victory, slew *Pausanias* in battle, whom *Antigonus* had sent over with an army; and all his men he did either put to ransom, or fill up with them his own bands. The like success had *Philip*, *Cassander's* lieutenant, against the *Etolians*. For he wasted their country; fought with the *Epirotes* that came to help them; and, after the victory, fought again with their forces joined in one, overthrowing them, and killing *Eacides*, that unfortunate king. Finally, he drove the *Etolians* out of most of their country, and forced them to seek their safety among the wild mountains. Of the *Epirotes*, he sent as prisoners to *Cassander*, the principal authors of the king's restitution, and of the present war.

Yet these actions required some time, and wearied *Antigonus's* adversaries with painful travel; after which, they remained only savers. *Antigonus* himself, at fair leisure, won all *Caria* the whilst, and sent armies into *Peloponnesus*, and other parts of *Greece*, bestowing liberty upon all the cities he took out of *Cassander's* hands. The whole country of *Peloponnesus* (excepting *Sicyon* and *Corinth*) with the isle of *Eubœa*, and many places of the firm land, were by those means won to be his in true and vehement affection, ready to do or suffer any thing for him that had made so evident a demonstration of his readiness to give them the liberty in deed, which others had promised in idle words. Many states, desirous of the same benefit, would fain have shewed their goodwill; but they were kept in by *Cassander's* garrisons, who was too wise to trust them loose. Therefore *Antigonus* made shew as if he would pass over into *Macedon*; by which terror, he forced *Cassander* to repair thither in all haste, with the best of his strength, leaving many good towns of *Greece* so weakly guarded, that well they might take courage to help themselves, if any foreign succour appeared. The aid which they desired, was not long wanting. The lieutenants of *Antigonus*, taking the advantage of *Cassander's* departure, entered the

country; drove his garrisons out of divers cities; forced the governor of *Athens* to enter into league with their lord; won the citadel of *Thebes*, and set the people at liberty. This last action was somewhat remarkable; for *Thebes* had not long before been raised out of her old ruins, by the mere power of *Cassander*; of which act he was accused by *Antigonus*, as if it had been some heinous crime. Yet now the same *Antigonus* winneth the city, and the love of the inhabitants, only by expelling him that was their founder. So much are men readier to thank the increaser, than the author of their good; and rather to look forward upon those hopes, which vainly they extend beyond all measure, than backward upon their miserable nullity, that held them incapable of being any thing.

SECT. VI.

Victories of Ptolemy by sea. A great battle at Gaza, which Ptolemy and Seleucus won, against Demetrius, the son of Antigonus.

AS the presence or nearness of *Antigonus* gave life to his affairs in the lower *Asia*, and *Greece*; so the designs of his enemies, taking the advantage of his absence, ruined the very foundations of those great works in the eastern parts, wherewith in the year preceding he had overtopped them. The isle of *Cyprus*, whose princes wavered between contrary affections, inclining one while to *Antigonus*, another while faintly regarding their covenant with *Ptolemy*, was visited by an *Egyptian* fleet, wherewith *Ptolemy*, in his own person, easily reduced them to a more settled order, putting some to death, carrying others away prisoners, and leaving a lieutenant, of his own appointment, governor of the whole country. With the same fleet he ran along the sea-coasts, wasting a great part of *Caria* and *Cilicia*, with the spoils of which he enriched his followers, and returned laden to *Cyprus*. *Demetrius*, the son of *Antigonus*, hearing frequent reports of the miseries wherewith his father's subjects were oppressed, made all haste out of *Syria* to the rescue, taking only his horse and light-armed foot with him, because the business required expedition. But in vain did he tire himself, and his followers, in hasty seeking of one, that, by launching out into the deep, could, in a few minutes, delude the labour of so many days, if need had so required. Answerable to the vanity of this expedition, was the success. For *Ptolemy* was gone, before *Demetrius* came into *Cilicia*. Neither was it certain, whether having lightened his ships of their burthen in *Cyprus*, he would return upon those maritime countries; or make towards *Syria*, where his coming was expected. He was indeed gone into *Egypt*, and there, with *Seleucus*, was describing a royal army, which he levied with all convenient speed, for the recovery of *Syria*. This was more than *Demetrius* knew. Therefore he was fain to chuse, out of uncertainties, the most likelihood, and return the way that he came, with all his companies, which were fitter for service in the open field, than to be bestowed in garrisons among the *Cilicians*. He had scarce refreshed his men and horses in *Syria*, when the news arrived of *Ptolemy's* coming with a puissant army to give him battle. Hereupon, he called to counsel his principal friends, who advised him to give way to the time, and expect some better opportunity in the future; being a young man, and weakly furnished with means to resist such ancient and famous generals, as *Ptolemy* and *Seleucus*. This counsel seemed rather to proceed from the cold temper of those aged men than

gave it, than from any necessity growing out of the present business. For *Demetrius*, considering himself to be the son of *Antigonus*, and now general of his father's army, thought his own title weighty enough to be laid in ballance against the bare names of those two great commanders. Neither found he much reason that should move him to distrust his forces, as insufficient. His men were better exercised than the enemies, and promised as much as could be required. Therefore, perswading himself, that such odds of number, and of great fame, would rather serve to adorn his victory, than hinder him in obtaining it, he resolved to put the matter to trial, without expecting the advantage of more help. So, animating his soldiers with hope of spoil and rewards, he abode the coming of the enemies at *Gaza*, with purpose to encounter them, as soon as they had finished their wearisome journey over the deserts of *Arabia*.

Ptolemy and *Seleucus*, issuing out of so rich a province as *Egypt*, came so well provided of all necessities, that their army felt not any great grievance of the evil way, when battel was presented them, which confidently they undertook. In all things else they had the odds of *Demetrius*; of elephants they were utterly unprovided: but how to deal with those beasts they were not ignorant. They had prepared a kind of pallisado, fastened strongly together with chains, and sharpened in such a manner, that the elephants could not seek to break upon it, without receiving much hurt. The rest of their forces, which (besides that they had advantage in multitude) were heartened with many fortunate services, by them performed that year, whilst the enemies had wearied themselves, either with vain journeys, or long and dulling expectation, they disposed in such order, as best answered to the form, wherein *Demetrius* was embattelled. The fight began, and was maintained with equal courage for a long time, each party striving more to win honour, than to satisfy any other passion, as having little cause of hatred or revenge. But after some continuance, the greater number holding better out, the error of *Demetrius*, who, upon no necessity, would needs fight a battel at disadvantage, began to appear by his losses. He had committed himself to fortune, having more to lose by her than he could get: but in this fight she was idle, and left all to be decided by strong hands; unless it may be said, that the terror brought upon his men, by the loss of his elephants, was bad luck. Those beasts were in that kind of war hardly to be resisted on plain ground; and therefore, at the first, they made great spoil amongst *Ptolemy's* men. Afterwards, seeking to break through the pallisado, they were sorely hurt, and every one of them taken. This disaster caused the horsemen of *Demetrius* to faint: they had laboured hard, and prevailed little; till now, perceiving that all must lye upon their hands, who were ill able to make their own places good, they began to shrink, and many of them to provide for their safety by timely flight; which example the rest quickly follow'd. When *Demetrius* had stroven so long in vain to make his men abide, that he himself was likely to be lost, he was fain to give place to the stronger, making a violent retreat as far as to *Azotus*, which was about thirty miles from the place of battel. A great part of his carriages was in *Gaza*, whither some of his company turned aside, hoping to save such goods, as, in haste, they could pack up. This foolish covetousness was their destruction, and the loss of the town: for whilst they, forgetful of the danger, had filled the streets with sumpter horses, and flopped up the gates, thronging, some to get in and fetch, others

to carry out, what they had already loaden, *Ptolemy's* army brake in without resistance, taking them with their goods and the city altogether.

This victory restored unto *Ptolemy* the best part of *Syria*; a province, more easy in those times to get, than to keep; and opened the way to all the greatness of *Seleucus*: for between *Gaza* and *Phenicia*, no place offered resistance. In *Celofyria* and *Phenicia*, some towps held out a while; but were soon taken in by *Ptolemy*. Among these, were the great cities of *Tyrus* and *Sidon*; of which *Sidon* was given up by the inhabitants; *Tyrus* by the garrison, falling to mutiny against their captain; who, trusting to the strength of it, had made great vaunts; but was pardoned by *Ptolemy*, and honourably entertained, in respect of his fidelity.

S E C T. VII.

How Seleucus recovered Babylon, and made himself lord of many countries in the higher Asia. The Æra of the kingdom of the Greeks, which began with the dominion of Seleucus.

WHILE *Ptolemy* followed his business with such prosperity, *Seleucus* took leave of him, and went up to *Babylon*, to try his own fortune; which he found so favourable, that, recovering first his own province, he became at length master of the better part of *Alexander's* purchases.

This expedition of *Seleucus* was very strange, and full of unlikelihoods. His train consisted of no more than eight hundred foot, and two hundred horse; a number too small to have been placed as garrison in some one of those main great cities, against which he carried it into the higher *Asia*. But little force is needful, to make way into strong places, for him that already stands possessed of their hearts which dwell within the walls. The name of *Seleucus* was enough, whom the *Babylonians* had found so good a governor, that none of them would find courage to resist him; but left that work to *Antigonus's* own men, wishing them ill to speed. Some of the *Macedonians*, that were in those countries, had the like affection; others made a countenance of war, which, by easy compulsion, they left off, and followed new ensigns. This added courage to the people, who came in apace, and submitted themselves joyfully to *Seleucus*. In a defection so general, it was not a safe course for the *Antigonians*, to thrust themselves into the towns of most importance; for every man of them should have been troubled with daily enemies in his own lodging. It remained, that they should issue forth into the field, and try the matter by fight; but the treason of one principal man, who revolted to the enemy with more than a thousand soldiers following him, so dismayed the rest, that they did no more than seek to make good one strong place, wherein were kept the hostages and prisoners that *Antigonus* held for his security in those quarters. This castle, belike, they had not fortified in times of leisure, against dangers, that were not then apparent. *Seleucus* quickly took it, and so got the entire possession of *Mesopotamia* and *Babylon*.

Antigonus had bestowed in *Media* and *Persia*, forces convenient for the defence of those provinces, that were the utmost of his dominion. In the countries about *Euphrates*, he had not done the like; for his own great army lay between them and all enemies. Therefore, when the victory at *Gaza* had opened unto *Seleucus* the way into those parts, he found little impediment in the rest of his business. Having now gotten what he sought, it behoved him to seek how he might keep his gettings; for his own

forces

forces were too small, and his friends were ill able to lend him any more. That which his friends could not do for him, his enemies did. *Nicanor*, to whom *Antigonus* had committed his army in *Media*, joining unto himself, out of *Persia*, and other countries, all needful help, came with ten thousand foot, and seven thousand horse, either to save all from being lost, or to drive *Seleucus* out of that which he had won.

Against this power, *Seleucus* had only four hundred horse, and somewhat above three thousand foot, wherewith to oppose himself; his large conquest of unwarlike nations having yielded him many loving subjects, but few soldiers. Therefore, when his enemies were near to the river of *Tigris*, he withdrew himself from the place, where his resistance was expected, into certain marshes not far off, where he lay secretly, waiting for some advantage. *Nicanor* thought that he had been fled, and was the less careful in fortifying his camp. In recompence of this vain security, his camp was taken by surprise, the first night of his arrival; the *satraps*, or lieutenant of *Persia*, together with sundry of the captains, were slain; he himself was driven to flee for his life into the deserts, and the whole army yielded unto *Seleucus*; whose gentle demeanor, after the victory, drew all *Media*, *Susiana*, and the neighbouring provinces, to acknowledge him their lord, without any further stroke stricken.

This victory of *Seleucus* gave beginning unto the new stile of *The kingdom of the Greeks*, an account much used by the *Jews*, *Chaldeans*, *Syrians*, and other nations in those parts. I will not make any long disputation about the first year of this *Æra*. The authority of that great astrologer ^a *Ptolemy*, from which there is no appeal, makes it plain, that the five hundred and nineteenth year of *Nabonassar*, was the eighty-second year of this account. Other inference hereupon is needless, than that note of the learned ^b *Gauricus*, that the first of these years was reckoned compleat at *Babylon*, together with the end of four hundred and thirty-eight years after *Nabonassar*. With the observation of the *Saturn*, recorded by *Ptolemy*, agrees (as it ought) the calculation of *Buning*; finding the same planet to have been so placed in the sign of *Virgo*, as the *Chaldeans* had observed it, in the same year; which was, from *Nabonassar*, the five hundred and nineteenth; from *Seleucus* the eighty-second year; and the last of the hundred and thirty and seventh *Olympiad*. These observations of the celestial bodies, are the surest marks of time; from which he, that willfully varies, is inexcusable. As for such occurrences in history, and the years of succeeding princes (that are not seldom ambiguous, by reason of unremembered fractions) if they seem to be here-against, it is not greatly material; yet thus much is worthy of note, that these years of the *Greeks* were not reckoned in all countries from one beginning; as plainly appears in the difference of one year, that is found between actions, related by the several authors of the two books of the *Maccabees*, who follow divers accounts. He that shall adhere to the time defined by *Ptolemy*, may apply the other supputations therunto, as being no farther from it, than a year's distance.

S E C T. VIII.

Now *Ptolemy* lost all that he had won in *Syria*. What the causes were of the quiet obedience, performed unto the *Macedonians*, by those that had been subject unto the *Persian* empire. Of divers

petty enterprizes, taken in hand by *Antigonus* and *Demetrius*, with ill success.

IN a happy hour did *Seleucus* adventure, to go up to *Babylon*, with so few men as his friend could then well spare; for had he stayed longer, upon hope of getting more soldiers, *Ptolemy* could have spared him none at all, *Demetrius*, the son of *Antigonus*, having lost the battel at *Gaza*, received from *Ptolemy* all his own goods, his pages, and servants, in free gift; and therewithal a courteous message, to this effect: that no personal hatred was the ground of this war, which he and his confederates held with *Antigonus*; but only terms of honour, wherein they would seek to right themselves after such manner, that other friendly offices, without reference to the quarrel, should not be forgotten.

This noble dealing of *Ptolemy*, did kindle in *Demetrius*, an earnest desire of requiting him with some as brave liberality. Which to effect, he gathered together the remainder of his broken troops; drew as many as could be spared out of the garrisons in *Cilicia*, or other provinces thereabouts; and, advertising his father of his misfortune, besought him to send a new supply, wherewith he might redeem his honour lost. *Antigonus*, upon the first news of this overthrow, had said, that the victory, which *Ptolemy* won upon a beardless boy, should be taken from him by bearded men: yet upon desire that his son, whom he tenderly loved, should amend his own reputation, he was content to make a stand in *Phrygia*. *Ptolemy*, hearing of *Demetrius*'s preparations, did nevertheless follow his own business in *Celasyria*; thinking it enough to send part of his army under *Cilles*, his lieutenant, against the remnant of those, that had been already vanquished, when their forces were entire. This, peradventure, would have been sufficient, had not *Cilles* too much undervalued the power of such an enemy. He thought this young gallant, having lately saved his life by flight, would now be more careful of having a fair way at his back, than adventurous in setting further forward, than urgent reason should provoke him. In this confidence, he passed on without all fear; as one that were already master of the field, and should meet with none that would issue out of their places of strength, to make resistance. When *Demetrius* was informed of this careless march, he took the lightest of his army, and made his journey with such diligence, one whole night, that, early in the morning, he came upon *Cilles* unexpected; and was, on a sudden, without any battel, master of his camp; taking him alive, with his soldiers, and their carriages, all at once.

This exploit served not only to repair the credit of *Demetrius*, which his loss at *Gaza* had almost ruined; but, further, it enabled him to recompense the bounty of *Ptolemy*, with equal favour, in restoring to him *Cilles*, with many other of his friends, accompanied with rich presents. But neither was *Ptolemy* so weakened by this loss, nor *Demetrius* so emboldened by his victory, that any matter of consequence thereupon ensued. For *Demetrius* feared the coming of *Ptolemy*, and therefore he fortified himself in places of advantage: *Ptolemy*, on the other side, was loth to engage himself in an enterprize, wherein he might perceive, that if the coming of *Antigonus* found him entangled, he should either be driven to make a shameful retreat, or a dangerous adventure of his whole estate, in hope of not much more than already he possessed.

^a Ptol. Almag. l. 11. c. 7, 8.

^b L. Gauric. in annotat. ad locum citatum.

Antigonus, indeed, was nothing slow in his way towards *Syria*; whither he made all haste, not so much to relieve his son, as to embrace him: for he rejoiced exceedingly, that the young man had so well acquitted himself, and being left to his own advice, performed the office of a good commander. Wherefore, to increase the reputation of this late victory, he brought such forces, as might serve to recover all *Syria*; meaning, that the honour of all, should be referred unto the good foundation laid by his son, whom, from this time forwards, he employed in matters of greatest importance.

Ptolemy had now less reason to encounter with *Antigonus*, than before his coming to have assailed the camp of *Demetrius*; yet he made it a matter of consultation, as if he had dared more than he meant. But all his captains advised him to retire into *Egypt*, alledging many good arguments to that purpose; which they might well perceive to be agreeable to his own intent, by his propounding that course; not without remembrance of the good success against *Perdiccas*, in the like defensive war. So he departed out of *Syria*, preserving his honour; as being rather led by mature deliberation, than any sudden passion of fear: and he departed at fair leisure, not only carrying his treasures along with him, but staying to dismantle some principal cities, that he thought most likely to trouble him for the future. All the country, that he left at his back, fell presently to *Antigonus*, without putting him to the trouble of winning it by pieces; so easy was it in those times, for the captain of a strong army, to make himself lord of a great province.

We may justly wonder, that these kingdoms of *Syria*, *Media*, *Babylon*, and many other nations (which the victory of *Alexander* had over-run, with so hasty a course, as gave him not leisure to take any good view of them) were so easily held, not only by himself, but by the captains of his army after him. The hot contentions for superiority between the king of *Israel*, and those of *Damascus*; between *Egypt* and *Babylon*; *Babylon* and *Nineveh*; the *Persians*, and many countries; argue a more manly temper, to have once been in those people; which are now so patient of a foreign yoke, that, like sheep or oxen, they suffer themselves to be distributed, fought for, won, lost, and again recovered, by contentious masters; as if they had no title to their own heads, but were born to follow the fortune of the *Macedonians*. This will appear the more strange, if we shall consider, how the several states of *Greece* (many of which had never possessed so large dominion, as might cause their spirits to swell beyond their ability) did greedily embrace all occasions of liberty: and how these proud conquerors were glad to offer it, desiring to have them rather friends, than servants, for fear of further inconvenience.

It must therefore be noted, that most of these countries, had always been subject unto the rule of kings, or petty lords, whom the *Babylonians* and *Persians* long since had rooted out; and held them in such bondage, that few of them knew any other law, than the command of foreign masters. This had utterly taken from them all remembrance of home-born princes, and incorporated them into the great body of the *Persian* empire; so that wanting within themselves all sovereign power, or high authority (the life and spirit of every estate) they lay as dead, and were bereaved of motion, when that kingdom fell, whereof they lately had been members.

Why the *Persian satraps*, or princes of that empire, did not, when *Darius* was taken from them,

as the *Macedonian* captains after the death of *Alexander*, strive to lay hold upon those provinces, which had been many ages subject unto them, and scarce four years in quiet possession of their enemies; or why, at least, they contended not (when the terrible name of that great conqueror did cease to affright them) to get their shares among his followers, if not wholly to dispossess them of their new purchases; it is a question, wherein who is not satisfied may find no less reason to suspect the history, than authority to confirm it. For we seldom read, that any small kingdom, prevailing against a far greater, hath made so entire a conquest, in the compass of ten years, as left unto the vanquished no hope of recovery, nor means to rebel; especially when such disorders, or rather utter confusion, hath ensued, by the fury of civil war among the victors.

The cause why the *Macedonians* held so quietly the *Persian* empire, is well set down by *Machiavel*; and concerns all other kingdoms, that are subject unto the like form of government: the sum whereof is this. Wheresoever the prince doth hold all his subjects under the condition of slaves, there is the conquest easy, and soon assured. Where ancient nobility is had in due regard, there is it hard to win all, and harder to keep that which is won. Examples of this, are the *Turkish* empire, and the kingdom of *France*. If any invader should prevail so far upon *Turky*, that the great sultan and his children (for brethren he useth not to suffer alive) were taken or slain; the whole empire would quickly be won, and easily kept, without any danger of rebellion. For the *bassa's*, how great soever they may seem, are mere slaves; neither is there in all that large dominion, any one man, whose personal regard could get the people to follow him in such an attempt, where, in hope of private gain, should not countervail all apparent matter of fear. Contrariwise, in *France*, it were not enough for him that would make a conquest, to get into his hands the king and his children; though he further got the better part of the country, and were, by far, the strongest in the field. For, besides the princes of the royal blood, there are in that kingdom store of great men, who are mighty in their several countries; and having certain royalties and principalities of their own, are able to raise war in all quarters of the realm; whereunto the remembrance of their own ancient families, and long continued nobility, will always stir up and inflame them; so that until every one piece were won, and every one (an endless work) of the chief nobility brought under or destroyed, the victory were not complete, nor well assured. It is true, that such power of the nobility doth oftentimes make way for an invader, to whom the discontentments of a few can easily make a fair entrance. But such assistants are not so easily kept, as they are gotten; for they look to be satisfied at full, in all their demands; and, having what they would, they soon return to their old allegiance, upon condition to keep what they have, unless they be daily hired with new rewards; wherein it is hard to please one man, without offending another as good as himself. The *Turk*, on the other side, needs not to fear any peril, that might arise from the discontented spirits of his principal men. The greatest mischief that any of them could work against him, were the betraying of some frontier town, or the wilful loss of a battel; which done, the traitor hath spent his sling, and must either fly to the enemy, whereby he loseth all that he formerly did hold; or else, in hopes of doing some further harm, he must adventure to excuse himself unto his master, who seldom forgives the captain, that hath not striven,

striven, by desperate valour, against misfortune. As for making head, or arming their followers against the great sultan, and so joining themselves unto any invader, it is a matter not to be doubted; for none of them have any followers or dependants at all, other than such as are subject unto them, by virtue of their offices and commissions. Now, as this base condition of the principal men, doth leave unto them no means, whereby to oppose themselves against the flourishing estate of their prince; so would it weaken both their power and their courage in giving him assistance, if adversity should make him stand in need of them. For there is scarce any one among the *Turkish* bassa's, or provincial governors, that knows either from whence he was brought, or from whom descended; nor any one among them, that by the loss and utter ruin of the *Turkish* empire, can lose any foot of his proper inheritance; and it is the proper inheritance of the subject, which is also a kingdom unto him, which makes him fight with an armed heart against the conqueror, who hath no other device painted on his ensign, than the picture of slavery.

As is the *Turkish* empire, so was the *Persian*, void of liberty in the subjects, and utterly destitute of other nobility, than such as depended upon the mere favour of the prince. Some, indeed, there were of the royal blood, and others, descended from the princes that joined with *Darius*, the son of *Hystaspes*, in oppressing the *Magi*: these were men of reputation in *Persia*; but their reputation consisted only in their pedigree, and their safety in not meddling with affairs of state, which made them little esteemed. In what small account these *Persian* princes were held, it may appear by this, that the king's uncles, cousin-germans, and brethren, were called by the kings, *their slaves*; and so did stile themselves, in speaking unto these great monarchs. That upon every light occasion of displeasure, they were handled as slaves, it is easy to be discerned, in that example of cruelty practised by *Xerxes* upon his own brother *Masistes*, which hath been formerly noted in a place more convenient. As for the *satrapæ*, or governors of the provinces, it is needless to cite examples, proving them to have been mere slaves: it may suffice, that their heads are taken from them at the king's will; that is, at the will of those women and eunuchs by whom the king was governed.

To this want of nobility in *Persia*, may be added the general want of liberty convenient among the people; a matter no less available, in making easy and sure the conquest of a nation, than is the cause assigned by *Machiavel*. For, as *Æsop's* ass did not care to run from the enemies, because it was not possible that they should load him with heavier burthens, than his master caused him daily to bear; so the nations that endure the worst under their own princes, are not greatly fearful of a foreign yoke; nor will be hasty to shake it off, if by experience they find it more light, than was that whereunto they had been long accustomed. This was it that made the *Gaſcoigns* bear such faithful affection to the kings of *England*; for that they governed more mildly than the *French*: this enlarged the *Venetian* jurisdiction in *Lombardy*; for the towns that they won, they won out of the hands of tyrannous oppressors: and this did cause the *Macedonians*, with other nations, that had been subject unto the posterity of *Alexander's* followers, to serve the *Romans* patiently, if not willingly; for that by them they were eased of many burthens, which had been imposed upon them by their own kings.

So that of this tameness, which we find in those that had been subjects of the *Persian* kings, the

reasons are apparent. Yet some of these there were, that could not so easily be contained in good order by the *Macedonians*; for they had not indeed been absolutely conquered by the *Persians*. Such were the *Sogdians*, *Bactrians*, and other nations about the *Caspian* sea. Such also were the *Arabians* bordering upon *Syria*, against whom *Antigonus* sent part of his army, thinking therewith to bring them under; or rather, to get a rich booty. The captains that he sent, fell upon the *Nabatheans* at such time as they were busied in a great mart, wherein they traded with the more remote *Arabians*, for myrrh, frankincense, and other such commodities. All, or most of these rich wares, together with five hundred talents of silver, and many prisoners, the *Macedonians* laid hold upon; for their coming was sudden, and unexpected. But ere they could recover *Syria*, the *Nabatheans* overtook them, and finding them weary with long marches, made such a slaughter, that of four thousand foot and six hundred horse, only fifty horse escaped. To revenge this loss, *Demetrius* was set out with a greater power, yet all in vain; for he was not resisted by any army, but by the natural defence of a vast wilderness, lack of water, and of all things necessary. Therefore he was glad to make peace with them, wherein he lost not much honour; for they craved it, and gave him presents. Returning from the *Nabatheans*, he viewed the lake *Asphaltites*, whence he conceived hope of great profit that might be raised, by gathering the sulphur. With this good husbandry of his son, *Antigonus* was well pleased, and appointed men to the work; but they were slain by the *Arabians*, and so that hope vanished.

These petty enterprizes, with the ill success accompanying them, had much impaired the good advantage against *Ptolemy*; when the news of *Seleucus's* victories in the high countries, marred all together. For neither was the loss of those great and wealthy provinces, a matter to be neglected; neither was it safe to transport the war into the parts beyond *Euphrates*, whereby *Syria* and the lower *Asia* should have been exposed to the danger of ill affected neighbours. A middle course was thought the best, and *Demetrius*, with fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, was sent against *Seleucus*. These forces being sent away, *Antigonus* did nothing, and his son did less. For *Seleucus* was then in *Media*; his lieutenants about *Babylon* withdrew themselves from necessity of fight; some places they fortified and kept; *Demetrius* could hold nothing that he got, without setting in garrison more men than he could spare; neither did he get much, and therefore was fain to set out the bravery of his expedition, by burning and spoiling the country; which he did thereby the more alienate, and, as it were, acknowledge to belong unto his enemy, who thenceforth held it as his own assured.

Antigonus had laid upon his son a peremptory commandment, to return unto him at a time prefixed; reasonably thinking (as may seem) that in such an unsettled state of things, either the war might be ended, by the fury of the first brunt; or else it would be vain to strive against all difficulties likely to arise, where want of necessaries should frustrate the valour, that by length of time was like to become less terrible to the enemy. *Demetrius* therefore leaving behind him five thousand foot and a thousand horse, rather to make shew of continuing the war, than to effect much, where himself, with greater forces, could do little more than nothing, forsook the enterprize, and went back to his father.

SECT. IX.

A general peace made and broken. How all the house of Alexander was destroyed.

THESE ambitious heads, having thus wearied themselves with ineffectual travel, in seeking to get more than any one of them could hold, were contented at length to come to an agreement; wherein it was concluded, that each of them should hold quietly, that which at the present he had in possession. As no private hatred, but mere desire of empire had moved them to enter into the war, so was it no friendly reconciliation, but only a dulness growing upon the slow advancement of their several hopes, that made them willing to breathe a while, till occasion might better serve to fight again.

Besides that main point, *Of retaining the provinces which every man held*, there were two articles of the peace, that gave a fair, but a false colour to the business: *That the son of Alexander by Roxana, should be made king, when he came to full age; and, That all the estates of Greece should be set at liberty.* The advancement of young *Alexander* to his father's kingdom, seems to have been a matter forcibly extorted from *Antigonus*; in whom was discovered a purpose to make himself lord of all. But this, indeed, more nearly touched *Cassander*. For in his custody was the young prince and his mother; neither did he keep them in sort answerable to their degree, but as close prisoners, taken in that war, wherein they had seen the old queen *Olympias* taken and murdered, that sought to have put them in possession of the empire. The mutual hatred and fear between them, rooted in these grounds, of injuries done, and revenge expected, upon this conclusion of peace, grew up faster than any time before, in the heart of *Cassander*, who saw the *Macedonians* turn their favourable expectation towards the son of their late renowned king.

All this, either little concerned *Antigonus*, or tended greatly to his good. The young prince must first have possession of *Macedon*; whereby *Cassander* should be reduced to his poor office, of captain over a thousand men, if not left in worse case. As for them that held provinces abroad, they might either do as they had done under *Arideus*; or better, as being better acquainted with their own strength. He in the mean time, by his readiness to acknowledge the true heir, had freed himself from that ill-favoured imputation, of seeking to make himself lord of all that *Alexander* had gotten.

The like advantage had he in that article, of restoring the Greeks to their liberty. This liberty had hitherto been the subject of much idle discourse; but it never took effect. *Antigonus* held scarce any town of theirs; *Cassander* occupied most of the country; which if he should let free, he must be a poor prince; if not, there was matter enough of quarrel against him, as against a disturber of the common peace.

In the mean season, the countries lying between *Euphrates* and the *Greek* seas, together with a great army, and money enough to entertain a greater, might serve to hold up the credit of *Antigonus*, and to raise his hopes as high as ever they had been.

With much disadvantage do many men contend against one that is equal to them all in puissance, *Cassander's* friends had left him in an ill case; but he could not do with all: for where every one man's help is necessary to the war, there may any one make his own peace; but no one can stand out alone, when all the rest are weary. The best

was that he knew all their affections, which tended to no such end as the becoming subjects unto any man; much less to the son of an *Asiatick* woman, of whom they had long since refused to hear mention. Therefore he took a short course, and caused both the child and his mother to be slain: freeing thereby himself in a trice, from the dangerous necessity of yielding up his government, which he must have done when the child had come to age. *Roxana* was a lady of singular beauty, which was perhaps the cause, why *Perdiccas* desired to have her son, being as yet unborn, proclaimed heir to the great *Alexander*. Immediately upon the death of *Alexander*, she had used the favour (if it were not love) of *Perdiccas*, to the satisfying of her own bloody malice, upon *Statira*, the daughter of king *Darius*, whom *Alexander* had likewise married, according to the custom of those countries, wherein plurality of wives is held no crime. For having by a counterfeit letter, in *Alexander's* name, gotten this poor lady into her hands, she did, by assistance of *Perdiccas*, murder her and her sister, and threw their bodies into a well, causing it to be filled up with earth. But now, by God's just vengeance, were she and her son made away, in the like secret fashion; even at such time, as the near approaching hope of a great empire had made her life, after a wearisome imprisonment, grow dearer unto her than it was before.

The fact of *Cassander*, was not so much detested in outward shew, as inwardly it was pleasing unto all the rest of the princes. For now they held themselves free lords of all that they had under them; fearing none other change of their estates, than such as might arise by chance of war; wherein every one persuaded himself of success, rather better than worse. Hereupon all of them (except *Lyfimachus* and *Seleucus*, that had work enough at home) began to rouse themselves; as if now the time were come, for each man to improve his own stock. *Antigonus's* lieutenants were busy in *Peloponnesus*, and about *Hellepont*, while their master was careful in following other, and some greater matters that were more secretly to be handled. He pretended the liberty of *Greece*; yet did the same argument minister unto *Ptolemy's* matter of quarrel, against both him and *Cassander*. *Ptolemy* complaining (as if he had taken the matter deeply to heart) that *Antigonus* had put garrisons into some towns, which ought, in fair dealing, to be set at liberty. Under colour of redressing this enormity, he sent an army into *Cilicia*, where he won four towns, and soon after lost them, without much labour of his own or his enemies.

After this, putting to sea with a strong fleet, he ran along the coast of *Asia*, winning many places: and in that voyage allured unto him a nephew of *Antigonus* (a good commander, but discontented with the ill requital of his services) whom finding shortly as false to himself, as he had been to his own uncle, he was fain to put to death. But in doing these things, his desire to set the *Greeks* at liberty, appeared not so plain, as he wished that it should: for their case was no way bettered, by his molesting *Antigonus* in *Asia*. Therefore to get the love of that valiant nation, he made at the last an expedition into *Greece* it self; where having set free some little islands, and landed in *Peloponnesus*, he raised so great an expectation of finishing the long desired work, that *Cratesipolis*, the widow of *Alexander*, *Polyperchon's* son, gave up into his hands the towns of *Sicyon* and *Corinth*.

Ptolemy had conceived a vain belief, that the *Greeks*, emboldened by his countenance and assistance,

ance, would all of them take heart, and rise up in arms, whereby, with little labour, their liberty might be gotten, and he be acknowledged as author of this immortal benefit. But long servitude had well-near extinguished the ancient valour of that nation: and their ill fortune, in many likely attempts to recover freedom, had so tired their spirits, that they would no more stir in pursuit thereof; but sat idly still, as wishing it to fall into their mouths.

The *Lacedemonians*, about these times, began to fortify their town with walls; trusting no longer in their virtue (for both it, and the discipline that upheld it, were too much impaired) that had been a wall to their town and territory.

The *Athenians* were become as humble servants, as they had been, in times past, insolent masters; erecting as many statues in honour of *Demetrius Phalereus*, as there were days in the year. This *Demetrius* was now their governour, and he governed them with much moderation; but in spite of their hearts, as being set over them by *Cassander*. By this base temper of the principal cities, it is easy to gather, how the rest of the country stood affected. *Ptolemy* could not get them to set their helping hands to their own good; and to furnish him with the promised supplies, of money and victuals. Credible it is, that he had a true meaning to deliver them from thralldom; as judging the commodity that would arise by annexing them to his party, a matter of more weight, than the loss that *Cassander* should receive thereby, who could hardly retain them, if once *Antigonus* took the work in hand. But when he found such difficulty in the business, he changed his purpose; and renewing his former friendship with *Cassander*, he retained *Sicyon* and *Corinth* in his own possession.

Before the coming of *Ptolemy* into *Greece*, *Cassander* had been held occupied with very much work. For (besides his pains taken in wars among barbarous princes) he found means to allure unto himself the lieutenants of *Antigonus*, that were in *Peloponnesus*, and about *Hellepont*; making his own advantage of their discontentments. By the like skilful practice, he freed himself from a greater danger; and made those murders which he had committed seem the less odious, by teaching his enemies to do the like. Old *Polysperchon*, that had made so great a stir in the reign of *Arideus*, did after the death of *Roxana* and her child, enter again upon the stage, leading in his hand another son of the great *Alexander*, and meaning to place him in his father's throne.

The name of this young prince was *Hercules*: he was begotten on *Barsine*, the daughter of *Artabazus*, a *Persian*; but had been less esteemed than the son of *Roxana*, either for that his mother was held no better than a concubine, or else perhaps, in regard of the favour which *Perdiccas*, and after him *Olympias*, did bear unto *Roxana*. At this time, the death of his brother, had moved such compassion, and regard of his being *Alexander's* only living child, had procured unto him such good will, that the demand which *Polysperchon* made in his behalf, was deemed very just and honourable. There were indeed more hearts than hands, that joined with this young prince; yet wanted he not sufficient strength of hands, if the heart of him, that least ought, had not been most false. *Cassander* had raised an army to withstand his entry into *Macedon*: but little trust could he repose in that army, whose wishes he perceived to be with *Hercules*. Therefore he assailed *Polysperchon* himself with gifts and promises; wherewith at length he prevailed so

far, that the old villain was contented to murder his pupil, choosing rather, with many curses and foul dishonour, to take the offered lordship of *Peloponnesus*, and commander of an army, than to purchase a noble fame with dangerous travel, in maintaining his faith unto both his dead and living sovereigns.

Antigonus had not all this while been asleep, tho' his losses were hitherto the chief witnesses of his having been a stirrer in these commotions. He thought it enough for him at the present, to retain his own; and therefore took order for the recovery of those places, which *Ptolemy* had taken pains to win. As for the rest, it no way grieved him, to see *Cassander* incur the general hatred of men, by committing those murders, of which the profit was like to redound unto him, that was the most powerful: or to see *Polysperchon* and *Ptolemy* sweat in a busy war against *Cassander*. If they would have continued their quarrels, he could well have afforded them leisure, and have thought the time well spent in beholding their contentions. For he was thoroughly periwaded, that when the rest had wearied themselves in vain with long strife, his armies and treasures, wherein he exceeded them all, would bring all under. According to these haughty conceits, he demeaned himself among his followers; looking big upon them, and like a king before his time. This was it that caused so many of them to revolt from him: but it was no great loss to be forsaken by those that looked with envious eyes upon that fortune, whereon their own should have depended. Against this envy of his own men, and the malice of others, *Antigonus* busily sought a remedy, such as was like to give him a goodly title to the whole empire.

Cleopatra, sister unto the great *Alexander*, lay for the most part in *Sardes*, whom he had a great desire to take to wife. This his desire was not without good hope: for howsoever she discovered much unwillingness thereunto, yet was she in his power, and might therefore be entreated, were it only for fear of being enforced. But it was not his purpose to get her by compulsive means; either because his fancy, being an old man, was not over-violent; or rather because his ambition, whereunto all his affections had reference, could have made small use of her, by doing such apparent wrong. She had been married unto *Alexander*, king of *Epirus*, after whose death, she came to her brother in *Asia*; hoping, belike, to find a new husband in his camp. But neither any of those brave captains, that were, in times following, so hot in love with her, durst then aspire unto her marriage: nor did her brother, full of other cares, trouble himself with providing her of an husband. She therefore, being a lusty widow, suffered her blood so far to prevail against her honour, that she supplied the want of an husband by entertainment of paramours. *Alexander* hearing of this, turned it to a jest; saying, that she was his sister, and must be allowed this liberty, as her portion of the empire. When by his death, the empire lay, in a manner, void, and the portion due to her therein, grew, in mens opinion, greater than it had been; then did many seek to obtain her, while she herself desired only a proper man, with whom she might lead a merry life. To this purpose she did invite *Leonatus* unto her; who made great haste, but was cut off by death, ere he came to her presence. Now at the last, after long tarrying, she had her choice of all the great commanders: *Antigonus*, *Ptolemy*, *Lyfimachus*, and *Cassander*, being all her earnest wooers. All these (*Antigonus* excepted) had wives already; *Ptolemy* had many wives, and many concubines,

cubines, whom he respected as much as his wives, being noted of too much dotage in that kind. This hindred not his suit, peradventure it advanced it, by giving to *Cleopatra* some hope of mutual toleration. To him therefore she bequeathed herself, and was taking her journey from *Sardes* towards him, when *Antigonus's* deputy in that city made her to stay, until his master's further pleasure should be known. *Antigonus* had now a wolf by the ears; he neither could well hold her, nor durst let her go. She would not be his wife; he had none honest pretence to force her; and to keep her prisoner, had been the way, by which he might have incurred a general hatred, lasting perhaps beyond her life, as the course taken by *Cassander* against *Roxana* (a lady less respected than *Alexander's* own sister) did well testify; therefore he thought it the wisest way to procure her death; for to let any other enjoy the commodity of so fair a title to the kingdom, it was no part of his meaning. To this purpose he sent instructions to the governor of *Sardes*, willing him in any case to do it secretly. So the fact was committed, and certain women about her put in trust with the murder; which women afterwards were put to death, as mischievous conspirers against the life of that good lady. So was *Antigonus* freed from blame, at the least, in his own opinion; but the world was less foolish than to be so deluded. How the murder was detected we need not ask; for seldom is that bloody crime unrevealed, and never so ill smothered, as when great persons are the authors.

Thus was the whole race of *Philip* and *Alexander* the great extinguished, and it was extinguished by the hands of such as thought upon nothing less than the execution of God's justice, due unto the cruelty of these powerful, but merciless princes. Wherefore the ambitious frames, erected by these tyrants, upon so wicked foundations of innocent blood, were soon after cast down, over-whelming themselves or their children with the ruins, as the sequel will declare.

S E C T. X.

How Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, gave liberty to Athens, expelling the garrisons of Cassander out of those parts. The immoderate honours decreed by the Athenians to Antigonus and Demetrius.

NONE being left alive that had any title to the kingdom, it stood with good reason, that they which were lords of the provinces, acknowledging no superior, should freely profess themselves kings in name, as they were already in substance. Yet had this name ill becomed the weaker, while the strongest of all did forbear it; neither seemed it convenient, in the judgment of *Antigonus*, to crown his last action with such a title, as if he had attained unto greatness by that foul murder, the infamy whereof he was careful how to discharge from his own head. He purposed therefore to undertake a plausible enterprize, even the liberty of *Greece*; whereby it was apparent, that he might get such honour as would not only drown all bad reports, but make him be thought equal to any name of royalty, whereof in seeming modesty he was not covetous. To this purpose he delivered a strong army, with a navy of two hundred and fifty sail, and five thousand talents of silver, unto *Demetrius* his son, willing him to begin at *Athens*, and thence to proceed, in setting all the country free.

Demetrius came to *Athens* before he was expected, so that without resistance he entered the haven,

it being thought that a fleet of *Ptolemy*, *Cassander's* good friend, had been arrived. But when it was known, both who he was, and what was the cause of his coming, the joy of the citizens brake out into loud acclamations. *Demetrius Phalereus* forsook the town, and withdrew himself to *Thebes*, under safe-conduct; only the garrison in *Munychia* strove to make good that piece, which after a while was won upon them by force. During the siege of *Munychia*, *Demetrius* went to *Megara*, whence he expelled the garrison of *Cassander*, and so restored the city to liberty.

I think it not impertinent sometimes to relate such accidents as may seem no better than mere trifles; for even by trifles are the qualities of great persons as well disclosed, as by their great actions; because in matters of importance, they commonly strain themselves to the observance of general commended rules; in lesser things they follow the current of their own natures. The lady *Crateispolis* lay in *Patras*, and had a great desire to see *Demetrius*, hoping, belike, that she might by his means better her estate, and recover her towns in *Sycion* and *Corinth*, detained by *Ptolemy* (to whose lieutenant, in those places, *Demetrius*, before his departure out of *Greece*, offered money for the surrender of them) yet the only business pretended was love. He being advertised hereof, left his forces in the country of *Megara*, and taking a company of his lightest armed for guard of his person, made a long journey to meet with her. This troop also he caused to lodge a great way from his tent, that none might see her when she came. As closely as the business was carried, some of his enemies had gotten knowledge of it, whereby they conceived good hope, that the diligence of a very few men might overthrow all the great preparations of *Antigonus*, and bring him to any terms of reason, by taking his dear son prisoner. Their project fell but a little short of the effect, for they came so suddenly upon him, that he had no better shift than to muffle himself in an old cloak, and creep away disguised, leaving them to ransack his tent. There was in this prince a strange medley of conditions; especially an extream dissoluteness in wanton pleasures, and a painful industry in matter of war. He was of a most amiable countenance, a gentle nature, and a good wit; excellent in devising engines of war, and curious in working them with his own hands. He knew better how to reform his bad fortune, than how to rule his good. For adversity made his valour more active, prosperity puffed him with an over-weening, wherein he thought that he might do what he listed. His fortune was as changeable, as were his qualities: turning often round, like the picture of her wheel, till she had wound up the thread of his life, in such manner as followeth to be shewed.

Returning to his camp, and finishing his business at *Megara*; he resolved no longer to attend the issue of a siege, but to assail *Munychia* by force, that so he might accomplish the liberty of *Athens*; which, until it was fully wrought out, he refused to enter into the city. *Munychia* was strongly fortified; yet by the continuance of the assault, the multitude without, through help of their engines that scoured the walls, prevailed upon the resolution of those that lay within it, and won the place in two days. The walls and all the defences of that piece against the city, were levelled with the ground, and so was it freely put into the citizens hands, to whom withal was given their liberty, with promise to aid them in maintaining it.

The fame of this action was louder than of any other victory gotten by *Demetrius* with greater skill and industry. For the *Athenians* having forgotten how to employ their hands, laboured to make up that defect with their tongues; converting to base flattery that eloquence of theirs, which the virtues of their ancestors had suited unto more manly arguments.

They decreed unto *Antigonus* and *Demetrius* the name of kings; they consecrated the place in which *Demetrius* leaped from his chariot, when he entered their city, and built there an altar, calling it by the name of *Demetrius the Aligher*; they called them by the names of the *Gods their Saviours*, ordaining that every year there should be chosen a priest of these gods; and further, that such as were employed by their state, in dealing with either of these two princes, should not be called ambassadors, but *Theori*, or *Consulters with the Gods*, like as were they whom they sent unto the oracle of *Jupiter* or *Apollo*.

It were a frivolous diligence to rehearse all their flatteries, these being so gross. Hereby they not only corrupted the young prince, but made that acclamation, which best would have pleased the old man, to be of no use. For he could not handsomely take upon him the name of king as imposed by the *Athenians*, unless he would seem to approve their vanity, in loading him with more than human honours. Yet was he so tickled with this their fine handling him, that when their *Theori*, or *Consulters* came shortly after, desiring him to relieve them with corn, and timber to build ships, he gave them almost a hundred thousand quarters of wheat, and matter sufficient to make a hundred gallies. So gracious was his first oracle, or rather, so weak is great power in resisting the assaults of flattery.

S E C T. XI.

The great victory of Demetrius against Ptolemy in Cyprus. How Antigonus and Demetrius took upo them the stile of kings, wherein others followed their example.

FROM this glorious work, *Antigonus* called away *Demetrius* unto a business of greater difficulty; meaning to employ his service against *Ptolemy* in *Cyprus*. Before his departure out of *Greece*, he was willed to establish a general council that should treat of matters concerning the common good of the country. About the same time *Antigonus* withdrew his own garrison out of *Imbros*, committing their liberty entire into the people's hands; whereby it might appear, that as he would not permit any other to oppress the *Greeks*, so would he be far from doing it himself. This was enough to hold his reputation high among these new purchased friends: it followed, that he should convert his forces to the winning of ground upon his enemies.

A pitiful tragedy had lately happened in *Cyprus*, through the indiscretion of *Menelaus*, *Ptolemy's* brother, and his lieutenant in that isle. *Nicoles*, king of *Paphos*, was entred into some practice with *Antigonus*; yet, not so far, that he thought himself past excuse; by which confidence, he was, perhaps, the more easily detected. To cut off this negotiation, and the false-hearted king of *Paphos* at one blow, *Menelaus* was sent thither, who surrounding *Nicoles's* house with soldiers, required in *Ptolemy's* name, to have him yielded to the death. *Nicoles* offered to clear himself; but *Menelaus* told him, that die he must, and bade him come forth quietly. This desperate necessity caused the un-

happy king to rid himself of life; and his death struck such an impression into his wife; that she not only slew herself, but perswaded the wives of her husband's brethren to do the like; also those brethren of *Nicoles*, unto whom *Ptolemy* had intended no ill, being amazed with the suddenness of this calamity, did shut up the palace; and, setting it on fire, consumed it, with all that was in it, and themselves together.

Whatsoever the crime objected was, *Nicoles* perished as a man innocent, because he was not suffered to make his answer. Of this sad accident; though *Menelaus* deserved the blame for his rigorous proceeding, yet is it to be thought that much dislike fell also upon *Ptolemy*; as men that are grieved, cast an ill affection, even upon those that gave the farthest removed occasion.

Not long after this, *Demetrius* came into *Cyprus*, with a power sufficient against any opposition that *Ptolemy* was like to make. The *Cypriots* did little or nothing against him, either because they had small strength, or for that they held it a matter indifferent, whom they acknowledged as their lord, being sure that they should not themselves have the rule of their own country. *Menelaus* therefore, out of his garrisons, drew forth an army, and fought with *Demetrius*. But he was beaten, and driven to save himself within the walls of *Salamis*; where he was so hardly besieged, that, without strong succour, he had no likelihood to make good the place, much less to retain possession of the whole island. His greatest help, at the present, was the fidelity of his soldiers, whom no rewards could win from him, nor good usage (when any of them were taken prisoners, and enrolled in the enemies bands) keep from returning to him, with the first opportunity. Most of them were mercenaries; but all their goods were in *Egypt*, which was enough to keep them faithful. Yet could not this their resolution have stood long against the odds of number, which *Demetrius* had of men as resolute, and against his terrible engines of battery, if *Ptolemy* had not hastened to the rescue.

Ptolemy brought with him a hundred and forty gallies, besides two hundred ships of burden, for transporting his army and carriages. This fleet made a terrible shew, when it was descried afar, though more than half of it was unfit for service in fight at sea. Wherefore, to make the opinion of his forces the more dreadful, *Ptolemy* sent unto *Demetrius* a threatening message, willing him to be gone, unless he would be overwhelmed with multitudes, and trampled to death in a throng. But this young gallant repayed him with words of as much bravery, promising to let him escape, upon condition that he should withdraw his garrisons out of *Sicyon* and *Corinth*.

Demetrius had no more than one hundred and eighteen gallies; but they were, for the most part, greater than those of *Ptolemy*; better stored with weapons fit for that service, and very well furnished with engines in the prows to beat upon the enemy. Nevertheless, he stood in great doubt of threescore gallies that lay in the haven of *Salamis*, lest *Menelaus*, with them, should set upon his back; in which case, it was very likely that all should go very ill with him. Against this mischief, he bellowed ten of his own gallies in the mouth of that haven, to keep *Menelaus* from issuing forth, and setting his horse-men on the shore, to give what assistance they could, he, with the rest of his fleet, puts to sea against *Ptolemy*.

The fight began early in the morning, and continued long with doubtful success. The generals were not ranged opposite one to the other; but held each of them the left wing of his own fleet. Each of them prevailed against the squadron where-with he encountered; but the success of *Demetrius* was to better purpose: for his victory in one part was such, as caused others to fall out of order; and, finally, drove all to betake themselves unto speedy flight. As for *Ptolemy*, he was fain to leave his advantage upon the enemy in one part of the fight, that he might relieve and animate those of his own, which needed him in another; wherein he found his loss over-great, to be repaired, by contending any longer against the fortune of that day; and therefore he laboured only to save himself, in hopes of better event that might follow some other time.

There fell out in this battel no unusual accident; yet was the victory greater than could have been expected. The occasions whereof were, partly the great skill in sea services, which the *Greeks* and *Phenicians*, that were with *Demetrius*, had, above those which followed *Ptolemy*; partly the good furniture of the ships, wherein consisted no less, than in the quality of those with whom they were manned. Further, we may reasonably judge, that the two hundred ships of burthen, carrying the strength of *Ptolemy's* army, did not more encourage his own men, and terrify his enemies the day before the fight, than breed in each part the contrary affections; when, in the beginning of the fight, they fell off, and stood aloof. For though it were fitting that they should do so, yet a multitude, prepossessed with vain conceits, will commonly apprehend very slight occasions, to think themselves abandoned. Besides all this, the expectation, that *Menelaus* issuing with his fleet out of *Salamis*, should charge the enemies in stern, was utterly frustrate. He was kept in perforce, by the ten ships appointed to bar up the mouth of the haven; which they manfully performed, as great necessity required.

Such disappointment of expectation, doth much abate the courage of men in fight, especially of the assailants; whereas, on the contrary, they that find some part of their fears vain, do easily gather hopeful spirits, and conceive an opinion of their own ability, to do more than they had thought upon, out of their not suffering the harm that they had imagined.

Whatsoever the causes of this victory were, the fruit was very great. For *Ptolemy* had no more than eight gallies that accompanied him in his flight; all the rest of his fleet was either taken or sunk. Neither did *Menelaus* any longer strive against the violence of fortune; but yielded up all that he held in *Cyprus*, together with his army, consisting of twelve thousand foot, and a thousand and two hundred horse, and those gallies in the haven of *Salamis*. The same dejection of spirit was found in the common soldier, as well that was taken at sea, as that had served the *Egyptian* by land; none of them reposing any more confidence in *Ptolemy*, but willingly becoming followers of a new lord, whose army they now increased.

It was generally believed, that much more depended on the event of this fight, than the issue of *Cyprus*, for which they contended. Wherefore the common expectation was great; especially *Antigonus*, whom it most concerned, was deeply perplexed with cares, thinking every day a year, till he were advertised of the issue. In this mood *Aristodemus* found him, a notable flatterer, whom *Demetrius* had honoured with the message of these good news. *Aristodemus* had bethought himself of a trick, whereby to double the welcome of his joyful errand: he caused his ships to ride at anchor a good distance from the shore; he himself landed in a cock-boat, which he sent immediately back to the ship; and so all alone, he went forward, looking very sadly, that no part of his tidings might appear in his countenance. Report of his arrival (for it was not known where he had been) came presently to *Antigonus*, who sent messenger after messenger to meet him on the way, and bring speedy word how all went: but neither any answer, nor so much of a look as might intimate the purport of his errand, could be won from this demure gentleman. Thus marched he fair and softly forward, with a great throng at his heels (that served well to set out his pageant) until he came in sight of *Antigonus*, who could not contain himself, but went down to meet him at the gate, and hear the news. Then did *Aristodemus*, upon the sudden, with a high voice, salute *Antigonus*, by the name of king; uttering the greatness of the victory (with as much pomp, as before he had covered it with silence) in the hearing of all the people; who, with loud acclamations, gave that name of king both to *Antigonus*, and to his son *Demetrius*. *Antigonus*, in requital of the long suspense, wherein *Aristodemus* had held him, said, that it should also be long ere he received his reward. But the title of king, together with the diadem, which his friends did set on his head, he could not wish a fairer occasion to assume; wherefore he readily accepted them, and sent the like to his son.

When it was once noised abroad that *Antigonus* and *Demetrius* called themselves kings, it was not long ere their fellows were ready to follow the good example. *Ptolemy's* friends would by no means endure that their lord should be thought a man dejected for the loss of a fleet; therefore they saluted him also king. *Lyfmachus*, in *Thrace*, had boldness enough to put the diadem about his own head. *S Seleucus* had, before this time, among the barbarous people, taken upon him as king; but now he used the stile indifferently, as well among the *Greeks* and *Macedonians*, as in dealing with others. Only *Cassander* held himself contented with his own name; whereby, howsoever he might shadow his pride, he no way lessened the fame of his cruelty against his master's house. But the name which he forbore, his sons after him were bold to usurp, though with ill success, as will appear, when they shall enter upon the stage; whereon these old tragedians, under new habits, as no longer now the same persons, begin to play their parts, with bigger looks, and more boisterous actions, not with greater grace and judgment, than in the scenes already past.

C H A P. VI.

Of the wars between the kings of Egypt, Asia, Macedon, Thrace, and others, until all Alexander's princes were consumed.

S E C T. I.

The expedition of Antigonus against Egypt, with ill success.

ALL the rest of these kings had taken that name upon them, in imitation of *Antigonus* himself, as befitting his greatness; which was such, as gave him hope to swallow them up, together with their new titles. Being not ignorant of his own strength, he resolved to single out *Ptolemy*, and make him an example to others; who should hardly be able to stand, when the greatest of them was fallen. To this purpose, he prepared an army of eighteen thousand foot and eight thousand horse, with fourscore and three elephants; as likewise a fleet of a hundred and fifty gallies, and a hundred ships of burthen: the land-forces he commanded in person; of the navy *Demetrius* was Admiral.

When all was ready for the journey, the sea-men advised him to stay yet eight days longer, and expect the setting of the *Pleiades*. But his hasty desire to prevent all preparations for resistance that *Ptolemy* should make, rejected this counsel, imputing it rather to their fear than skill. Wherefore he departed from *Antigonia* (a town which he had built in *Syria*, and called after his own name, that was soon changed into *Seleucia*, by his mortal enemy) and came to *Gaza*, where he met with his fleet. The nearer that he drew to *Egypt*, the more haste he made; thinking by celerity to prevail more than by his great power. He caused his soldiers to carry ten days provision of victuals, and had many camels loaden with all necessaries for passing the deserts, over which he marched with no small toil, though he met with no resistance. At *Mount Casius*, which is near adjoining to *Nilus*, he saw his fleet riding at anchor, not far from the shore, in ill case, and many ships wanting. It had been sorely beaten with foul weather, wherein some were lost, others driven back to *Gaza*, or scattered elsewhere into such creeks as they could recover: *Demetrius* himself, with the best and strongest vessels, did so long beat it up against the wind, that all his fresh water was spent; in which extremity he and all his must have perished, had not the tempest ceased when it did, and *Antigonus* appeared in sight, from whom these over-wearied, thirsty, and sea-beaten soldiers received relief. After these painful travels, there followed a war, no less painful than to little purpose; for *Ptolemy* had so fortified all the passages upon the river of *Nilus*, as he assured himself either to end the war there, or, if his guards should happen to be forced, yet could it not be done; but so much to the weakening of the assailants, as he should afterwards, with a second army (which he held entire) entertain the invader upon advantage enough. All that *Antigonus* sought, was to come to blows speedily; *Ptolemy*, on the contrary, to beat *Antigonus* by the belly. It is true, that *Nilus* gave him water enough, but wood he had none to warm it; and while *Antigonus* assaulted the ramparts, raised upon the river in vain, *Ptolemy* assayed the faith of his soldiers with good success; for with great gifts, and greater promises, he ferried them over so fast, as had not *Antigonus* thrust some af-

fured regiments upon the passages next the enemy, and in the mean while taken a resolution to return, *Ptolemy* had turned him out of *Egypt* ill attended.

Some of them, indeed, he laid hands on, in the way of their escape, and those he put to death with extreme torments; but, in all likelihood, with the same ill success that *Perdiccas* had formerly done, when he invaded *Egypt*, had he not readily removed his army further off from the noise of their entertainment, that had already been won from him.

To prevent, therefore, as well the present danger of his stay, as the shame following a forced retreat, he secretly practised the advice of his council, upon whom the burden must be laid of his entrance, and leaving *Egypt*.

It is, indeed, less prejudicial in such like cases, that errors, dishonours, and losses, be laid on counsellors and captains, than on kings; on the directed, than on the director; for the honour and reputation of a prince is far more precious than that of a vassal. *Charles V.*, as many other princes have done, laid the loss and dishonour he received in the invasion of *France*, by the way of *Provence*, to *Antony de Leua*; whether justly or no, I know not: but howsoever, all the historians of that time agree, that the sorrow thereof cost that brave captain his life. Certainly, to give any violent advice in doubtful enterprizes, is rather a testimony of love, than of wisdom, in the giver; for the ill success is always cast upon the counsel; the good never wants a father, though a false one, to acknowledge it. Yet I have sometimes known it, that great commanders, who are for the present in place of kings, have not only been dissuaded, but held in a kind by strong hand, from hazarding their own persons; and yet have those kind of mutineers never been called to a marshal's court.

S E C T. II.

How the city of Rhodes was besieged by Demetrius.

THIS departure of *Antigonus* left behind it many dead carcases, and a great deal of joy in *Egypt*. *Ptolemy* held a solemn feast, and sent messengers abroad, loaden with glad news, to *Seleucus*, *Lyfimachus*, and *Cassander*, his confederates; strongly encouraging all that side with the report of this his late felicity, though it appeared but in a defensive war. *Antigonus*, on the contrary, flattered himself with another interpretation, calling the joys of his enemies for witnesses of his own greatness, seeing they arose but from so little things; his enemies being but bare saviors by the last bargain; and himself, as he supposed, having lost but a little time, and no part of his honour in the late retreat. Howsoever it were, yet he meant to follow his affairs henceforth in another fashion, for that which he could not cleave asunder by great blows, he purposed by little and little to pare off, by cutting off the branches first, to fell the tree it self with the more facility. To effect which he resolved (leaving the great ones to grow a while) to root up the dependants of his enemies: dependants, whom the forenamed confederates should be forced, either to relieve, or to lose;

lose; and hereby he doubted not to draw them into the field, where the advantage of power, and of all other warlike provisions, promised him victory.

At this time the city of *Rhodes* was very mighty, being well governed, and having long held it self in good neutrality, it drew the better part of all the trade of those parts, and thereby a great deal of riches to it self, to maintain which, and to increase it, it furnished and kept on the seas a fleet of well armed ships, by which it not only beat off all pirates and petty thieves, but the reputation of their strength was thereby so much increased, as all the neighbour princes sought their alliance and confederacy.

In this so dangerous a time (in which they must either refuse all that sought them, and so stand friendless and apart, or join themselves to some one; and thereby forego the peace, by which their greatness had grown) their affections carried them to the *Egyptian*, both because the greatest part of their trade lay that way, as also for that *Antigonus's* disposition, greatness, and neighbourhood was fearful unto them. This affection of theirs, with some other passages more apparent, gave argument of quarrel to *Antigonus*, who began to declare himself against them by petty injuries, of taking some of their ships, with such other grievances, while he made a more weighty preparation to pursue the war against them openly and strongly. All things soon after ordered according to the greatness of the enterprise, he imploy'd his son *Demetrius* against them in their own island, who brought such terror upon the citizens, that laying aside all respect of friendship and honour, they offered him their assistance and service against whomsoever. *Demetrius*, who knew from whence this change came, and that the alteration was perswaded by fear, and not by love, raised his demands to an intolerable height, requiring an hundred hostages to be delivered him, and liberty to lodge in their port as many ships of war as himself pleased: these conditions, more properly to be imposed upon a state already conquered, than on those who as yet had heard of nothing but a constrained assistance, restored unto the *Rhodians* their lost courage, and made them resolve to defend their liberty to the last man: this taught them to intransigent all their able bond-men, and wisely rather to make them their fellow citizens, than to make themselves fellow slaves with them.

Demetrius, having refused the fair conditions offered, as the *Rhodians* the fearful ones propounded to them, makes preparation for a long siege, and finding no appearance to carry the place in fury, he set in hand with his engines of battery; in the invention and use of which, he never shewed himself a greater *Artisan*, than in this war. But in conclusion, after the citizens had sustained all the assaults given them for a whole year, after many brave sallies out of the town, and the famine which they endured within the town, which had proved far more extreme, if *Ptolemy* had not with many hazards relieved them, *Demetrius* by mediation of the *Grecian* ambassadors, gave over the siege, a hundred hostages they gave him for performance of the peace made, but with exception of all the magistrates and officers of the city.

Hereunto *Demetrius* was brought by the usual policy of war and state: for while, with the flower of all his father's forces, he lay before *Rhodes*, *Cassander* recovered many of those places in *Greece*, which *Demetrius* had formerly taken from him; neither did *Cassander* make the war as in former times, by practice and surprise, but by a strong and

well compounded army, which he himself led as far as into *Attica*, and therewith greatly distressed and endangered *Athens* it self. On the other side (tho' with less success) did *Polysperchon* invade *Peloponnesus*. These dangerous undertakings upon *Greece*, advised the *Athenians* and *Etolians* to dispatch their ambassadors towards *Demetrius*, and advised *Demetrius* rather to abandon the enterprise of *Rhodes*, than to abandon the great honour which he had formerly gotten, by setting all *Greece* at liberty.

Demetrius was no sooner out of the island, than that the *Rhodians* erected statues in honour of *Lyfimachus* and *Cassander*, but for *Ptolemy*, whom they most affected, and from whom they received their most relief, they consulted the oracle of *Jupiter*, whether it were not lawful to call him a God. The priests which attended in the temple of *Hammon*, gave the same fair answer for *Ptolemy*, which they had formerly done for *Alexander's* master; for as *Alexander* consulted the oracle with an army at his heels, so was *Ptolemy* at this time lord of the soil: and yet was this a far more cleanly creation than that done by the *Athenians*, who deified *Antigonus* and *Demetrius* by decree of the people. A mad age it was, when so many of *Alexander's* captains could not content themselves with the stile of kings, but that they would needs be called gods.

SECT. III.

How Demetrius prevailed in Greece, Cassander desires peace of Antigonus, and cannot obtain it. Great preparations of war against Antigonus.

Demetrius coming with a strong fleet and army into *Greece*, quickly drove *Cassander* out of *Attica*; and pursuing his fortune, chased him beyond the straits of *Thermopyle*. Herein his reputation did much avail him, which was so great, that six thousand of his enemies soldiers revolted unto him. So partly by the greatness of his name, partly by force, he recover'd in short space all that *Cassander* held in those straits, and giving liberty unto the people, he bestowed upon the *Athenians* those pieces which had been fortified against them, to block them up. Then went he into *Peloponnesus*, where he found the like, or more easy success: for he suddenly took *Argos*, *Corinth*, *Sicyon*, and the most of the country, bestowing liberty upon such as needed it. The town of *Sicyon* he translated by consent of the citizens, from the old seat into another place: and called it after his own name *Demetrius*. This done, he betook himself to his pleasure: at the *Isthmian* games he caused himself to be proclaimed captain general of *Greece*, as *Philip* and *Alexander* had been in former times: whereupon (as if he were now become as great as *Alexander*) he despised all others, making it a matter of jest, that any, save himself or his father, should usurp the name of king. But in his behaviour, he was so far unlike to a king, that in all the time of his leisure, he deserved none other name than of a drunken *palliard*. Yet were the *Athenians* as ready as ever to devise new honours for him, among which they made one decree, that whatsoever king *Demetrius* should command, ought to be held sacred with the gods, and just with men.

All *Greece* being now at the disposition of *Antigonus*, *Cassander* stood in great fear, lest the wars should fall heavily upon him in *Macedon*; which, to avoid, he knew no better way than to make peace with his enemies betimes. And to that purpose he sent Embassadors, but had no better answer from *Antigonus*, than that he should submit his whole estate

SECT. IV.

estate to his discretion. This proud demand made him look about him, and labour hard in soliciting his friends both to assist him, and take heed to themselves; neither found he them slow in apprehending the common danger, for *Lyfimachus* knew, that if once *Cassander* had lost *Macedon*, *Demetrius* would soon be master of *Thrace*. Neither were *Ptolemy* and *Seleucus* ignorant of that which was like to befall them, if *Antigonus* were suffered to put himself in quiet possession of those provinces in *Europe*. Wherefore it was agreed, that with joint forces they should all together set upon the common enemy.

Hereof *Antigonus* had notice, but scorned all their preparations, saying, that he would as easily scatter them, as a flock of birds are driven away with a stone. With these conceits he pleased himself, and no way hindered the proceedings of his enemies. He lay at that time in his town of *Antigonia* (a name that it must shortly lose) where he was carefully providing to set out some stately game and pageants, in ostentation of his glory. But thither was brought unto him the tumultuous news of *Lyfimachus*'s victories about *Hellepont*. For *Cassander* had committed unto *Lyfimachus* part of his forces, wherewith to pass over into *Asia*, while he himself with the rest should oppose *Demetrius* on *Europe* side. So *Lyfimachus* passing the *Hellepont*, began to make hot war upon the subjects of *Antigonus*; getting some of the cities in those parts to join with him by fair means, winning others by force, and waisting the country round about.

To repress this unexpected boldness, *Antigonus* made hasty journeys, and came soon enough to recover his losses, but not strong enough to drive *Lyfimachus* home, or compel him to come to battle. *Lyfimachus* waited for the coming of *Seleucus*, keeping himself the whilst from necessity of fighting. But *Babylon* was far off, and *Seleucus*'s preparations were too great to be soon in readiness. The winter also did hinder his journey, which enforced them on both sides to rest in some quiet, without performing any matter of importance. This delay of debating the quarrel in open field, held all those nations in a great suspense, and bred much expectation. Yet might all have come to nothing, had not *Antigonus* been so forward, that he refused to yield unto any peaceable conditions. At length *Seleucus* drew near with a mighty army of his own (for he had gathered strength in that long time of leisure which *Antigonus* had given him) and with great aid from *Ptolemy*, that was joined with his forces.

To help in this needful case, *Demetrius* was called over into *Asia* by his father's letters, which he readily obeyed. Before his departure out of *Greece*, he made peace with *Cassander* upon reasonable terms, to the end he might not be driven to leave any part of his army for defence of the country; and that his journey might be without any such blemish of reputation, as if he had abandoned his dependants: for one article of the peace was, that all the cities of *Greece* should be at liberty. *Cassander* was glad to be so rid of an enemy, that was too strong for him. Yet would this league have done him little good, if things had fallen out contrariwise than they did in *Asia*; seeing the ratification thereof was referred unto *Antigonus*. It sufficed, that for the present every one found means to clear himself of all incumbrances elsewhere, to the end that each of them might freely apply himself to the trial of the main controversy in *Asia*.

How *Antigonus* was slain in a great battle at *Ipsus*, near unto *Ephesus*, wherein his whole estate was lost.

SELEUCUS, with his son *Antiochus*, joining with *Lyfimachus*, compounded a great army, which was (all considered) not inferior to that of the enemy. In greatness of name (that helpeth much in all wars, but especially in the civil) they were rather unanswerable, than unequal to their adversaries; for *Antigonus* had of long time kept them under with a mastering spirit, and had been reputed a king indeed, when the rest were held but usurpers of the title. Likewise *Demetrius* was generally acknowledged a brave commander, having given proof of his worth in many great services of all kinds, and enriched the art of war with many inventions, which even his enemies, and particularly *Lyfimachus*, did much admire. *Seleucus*, who had sometimes flattered *Antigonus*, and fearfully stolen away from him to save his life, with young *Antiochus*, a prince not heard of before this journey, and *Lyfimachus*, that had lived long in a corner, hardly keeping his own from the wild *Thracians*, wanted much in reputation, of that which was yielded to their opposites; yet so, that as ancient captains under *Philip* and *Alexander*, two of them were held worthy enough to receive any benefit that fortune might give; and the third a prince of great hope, whereof he now came to make experience.

The soldiers, on both sides, were for the most part hardy and well exercised; many of them having served under *Alexander*, though of those old companies the long space of two and twenty years had consumed the greatest number. But concerning their affections; the followers of *Seleucus* were easily perswaded, that in this battle they must either get the upper hand, or put in extreme danger all that belonged unto the confederate princes; whereas *Antigonus*'s men could discern no other necessity of fighting, than the obstinate quality of their lord, that needs would be master of all. *Antigonus* had about three-score and ten thousand foot, ten thousand horse, and seventy-five elephants. His enemies were six thousand short of him in number of their foot; in horse they had the odds of five hundred; of elephants they had four hundred, and a hundred and twenty armed chariots of war; which helps, though they little had availed the *Persians*, yet were they not to be despised, in the hands of a good captain.

Antigonus himself, either troubled with the unexpected greatness of his enemies forces, or presaging little good like to ensue, grew very pensive, communing much in private with his son, whom he commended to the army as his successor; whereas in former times he had never been so jocund, as towards the hour of battle, nor had been accustomed to make his son, or any other, privy to his counsel, before it required execution. Other tokens of bad luck, either foregoing the fight, or afterwards devised, I hold it needless to recount. *Diana* of *Ephesus* dwelt near to the place of battle, a busy goddess in many great fights, and therefore likely to have been thrust into the tale, if any matter, nearly resembling a miracle, had chanced.

It is easy to believe that these two so gallant armies, containing well near all the strength of *Alexander*'s whole empire, performed a notable fight, being led by such worthy commanders, and whom the issue thereof did highly concern. Yet are few of the particulars recorded; an easy lots

in regard of the much variety wherewith every story aboundeth in this kind. The most memorable things in the battel, were these. *Demetrius*, with his best force of horse, charged valiantly upon young *Antiochus*; whom when he had broken, and put to flight, he was so transported with the heat of his good success, that he never gave over his pursuit, but left his father naked, and lost thereby both him and the victory. For when *Seleucus* perceived this advantage, he interposed his elephants between *Demetrius* and the phalanx of *Antigonus*; and with many troops of horse offering to break upon the enemies battel, wheresoever it lay most open, he did so terrify the *Antigonians*, that a great part of them rather chose to revolt from their lord, whilst they were fairly invited, than to sustain the fury of so dangerous an impression. This cowardice, or rather treason of some, discouraged others; and, finally, cast them all into flight, exposing their general to the last end of his destinies. *Antigonus* was then fourscore years old, very fat and unweildy, so that he was unapt for fight, if his high spirit could have entertained any thought thereof. He had about him some of his most trusty followers, and as many others as he could hold together. When one, that perceived a great troop making towards him, told him, *Sir king, yonder company means to charge you*; he answered, *Well may they, for who defends me? but anon Demetrius will relieve us*. Thus expecting, to the very last, that his son should come to the rescue, he received so many darts into his body, as took away his lately ambitious, but then fearful hopes, together with his troublesome life.

His great ability in matter of arms, together with his insatiable desire of empire, have sufficiently appeared in the whole volume of his actions. He was more feared by his enemies, than loved by his friends; as one that could not moderate his fortune, but used insolence towards all alike, as if it had been some virtue nearest representing a kingly majesty. This was the cause that so many of his followers revolted to his enemies; and finally, that a great part of his army forsook him in his last necessity. For those kings and princes that call all the careful endeavours of their vassals, only duty and debt; and are more apt to punish the least offences, than to reward the greatest services, shall find themselves, upon the first change of fortune (seeing it is love only that stays by adversity) not only the most friendless, but even the most contemptible and despised of all others. This *Antigonus* found true in part, while he lived; in part he left it to be verified upon his son.

SECT. V.

How Demetrius forsaken by the Athenians, after his overthrow, was reconciled to Seleucus and Ptolemy, beginning a new fortune, and shortly entering into quarrels.

FOR *Demetrius*, at his return, from the idle pursuit of young *Antiochus*, finding all quite lost, was glad to save himself, with four thousand horse and five thousand foot, by a speedy retreat unto *Ephesus*; whence he made great haste unto *Athens*, as to the place that for his sake would suffer any extremity. But whilst he was in the midst of his course thither, the *Athenian* ambassadors met him with a decree of the people; which was, that none of the kings should be admitted into their city. These were ambassadors, not *theori*, or consultants with the oracle. It was a shameless ingratitude in the *Athenians*, to reward their benefactor, in his

misery, with such a decree; neither did any part of his calamity more afflict the unfortunate prince, than to see his adversity despised by those whom he had thought his surest friends. Yet he was fain to give good words; for he had left many of his ships in their haven, of which he now stood in great need, and therefore was fain to speak them fair, that sometimes had grossly flattered him: but he shall live to teach them their old language, and speak unto them in another tune. When he had gotten his ships, he sailed to the *Isthmus*, where he found nothing but matter of discomfort. His garrisons were every where broken up, the soldiers having betaken themselves to his enemies pay; so that he was king only of a small army and fleet, without money or means wherewith to sustain him and his followers any long time. All the rest, or the greatest part of his father's large dominion, was now dividing among the conquerors; and those few places, which as yet held for him (having not, perchance, heard the worst of what had happened) he no way knew how to relieve. For, to put himself into the field, on the side of *Asia*, he had no power; and to inclose himself in any town, how strong soever, were but to imprison his fortune, and his hopes, or therein, indeed, to bury himself and his estate. He therefore creeping thorough those bushes, that had fewest briars, fell upon a corner of *Lyfimachus's* kingdom, whereof he gave all the spoil that was gotten to his soldiers; his own losses having been too great, to be repayed again by small prizes.

In the mean while, the confederate princes had wherewithal to busy themselves in the partition of those provinces, of which their late victory had made them lords; wherein *Seleucus* had a notable advantage, by being present, and master of the field. For neither *Ptolemy* nor *Cassander* were at the overthrow given, having only sent certain troops to reinforce the army which *Seleucus* led, who took hold of a part of *Asia* the less, and all *Syria*, being no otherwise divided from his own territory than by the river of *Euphrates*. For there had not any order been taken by the confederates for the division of all those lands, because they did not expect so prosperous an issue of that war, which they made only in their common defence. It was therefore lawful for *Seleucus* to make the best benefit that he could of the victory; at which, nevertheless, others did repine; and though they neither could, nor durst, accuse him of ill dealing for the present; yet, seeing the over-greatness of *Seleucus* brought no less danger to the rest of the new kings, than that of *Antigonus* had done, they consulted upon the same reason of state as before, how to oppose it in time. Neither was *Seleucus* ignorant of what they had determined; for he read it in the law universal of kingdoms and states, needing no other intelligence. Hereupon they forget friendship on all sides, and cure themselves of all unprofitable passion; the hatred of each to other, and their loves, being laid on the one side, against their profits on the other, were found so far too light, as *Seleucus*, who had to day slain *Antigonus*, the father, and driven *Demetrius* the son, out of *Asia*, sought to-morrow, how to match himself with *Stratonica*, *Demetrius's* daughter; and so by *Demetrius*, to serve his turn against *Lyfimachus*.

The story of this *Stratonica*, with whom young *Antiochus*, the son of *Seleucus*, fell so passionately in love, and so distempered, as *Seleucus's* father, to save his son's life, gave her (though she were his wife) unto him; and how his passion was discovered by his pulse, is generally noted by all writers. But neither did this alliance between *Seleucus* and *Demetrius*, between *Ptolemy* and *Lyfimachus*,

chus, between *Demetrius* and *Cassander*, between *Demetrius* and *Ptolemy*, though for the present it brought them again into the rank of kings, otherwise tie any of them to each other, than the marriages between christian kings have done in latter times: namely between the *Austrians*, the *Arragonians*, the *French*, and other princes; neither have the leagues of those elder times been found more faithful, than those of the same later times have been; as in the stories of *Charles VIII.* of *France*, and of *Charles* the emperor, of *Francis I.* and of the kings of *Naples*, dukes of *Milan*, and others, the reader may observe: between whom, from the year of our lord one thousand four hundred ninety and five, when *Charles VIII.* undertook the conquest of *Naples*, to the year one thousand five hundred fifty and eight, when *Henry II.* died, the histories of those times tell us, that all the bonds, either by the bed or by the book, either by weddings or sacramental oaths, had neither faithful purpose nor performance. Yet did *Demetrius* reap this profit, by giving his daughter to his enemy *Seleucus*, that he recovered *Cilicia* from *Plistarchus*, the brother of *Cassander*, who had gotten it as his share in the division of *Antigonus's* possessions: for the intruder was not strong enough to hold it by his proper forces from him, that entered upon it as a lawful heir: neither would *Seleucus* lend him any help, as by the rule of confederacy he should have done against the common enemy. So *Plistarchus*, with very angry complaint, as well against *Seleucus* as *Demetrius*, went unto *Cassander*, whither *Phila*, their sister, followed him shortly, to pacify them both, and keep all quiet, being sent for that purpose by *Demetrius* her husband, that was not strong enough to deal with *Cassander*, and therefore glad to make use of that bond of alliance betwixt them, whereof in his own prosperity he never took notice to the others good. About the same time he took to wife a daughter of *Ptolemy's* (plurality of wives being familiar with these *Macedonians*, that had learned it in their eastern conquests) and so was he by two marriages rather freed from two enemies than strengthened with two friends; for neither of them wished him any good, otherwise than might seem to advance their own ambitious desires.

Seleucus and *Ptolemy* could both of them have been contented better, that *Demetrius*, with help of their countenance, should seek his fortune somewhat farther off, than settle his estate under their noses: Particularly *Seleucus* thought that *Cilicia* lay very fitly for himself, and *Ptolemy* had a great appetite (which yet he concealed a while) to the isle of *Cyprus*. Now whether it were so that *Seleucus* would him have set his new father-in-law upon the neck of *Lyfimachus*, or whether he were indeed greedy of the bargain, he offered to buy of *Demetrius* for ready money, his late purchase of *Cilicia*. Hereunto *Demetrius* would not hearken, but meant to keep as much land as he could, having already found in *Cilicia* twelve thousand talents of his father's treasure, that would serve him to make sport a while. This refusal so displeased *Seleucus*, that in angry terms he demanded the cities of *Tyre* and *Sidon* to be surrendered unto him, which were the only places in *Syria* that had not followed the fortune of the late great battle. Instead of giving them up, *Demetrius* took present order to have them better manned, and spake it stoutly, that were he overcome a thousand times, yet would he not hire *Seleucus* to become his son-in-law. In this quarrel *Seleucus* was generally reprehended as one of a malignant disposition, that would break friend-

ship with his father-in-law for two towns, from whom he had already taken more than well he knew how to govern. But the fire consumed itself in words, which had it fastened upon arms, like it is that the weaker should have found friends, out of envy to the stronger.

S E C T. VI.

How Demetrius won the city of Athens, and prevailed in Greece, but lost in Asia. Of troubles in Macedon following the death of Cassander.

IN the mean while, the *Athenians* not knowing how to use the liberty which *Demetrius* had bestowed on them, were fallen by sedition under the tyranny of *Lachares*. Through which alteration their distempered city was so weakned, that it seemed ill able to keep off the punishment due to their late ingratitude. This advantage hastned him, whom they had once called their *God and Saviour*, to present himself unto them in the habit of a revenging fury. He brought against them all the force that he could well spare from other employments, which were at that time perhaps the more, because his doubtful eastern friends were unwilling to give impediment to any business that might entangle him in *Greece*. His first enterprize in *Athens* had ill success, a great part of his fleet perishing in a tempest, but he soon repaired the loss; and (after some victories in *Peloponnesus*, where he won divers towns that had fallen from him) returning to the enterprize, wasted the country of *Attica*, and cut off all relief from the city both by land and sea.

Athens was not able to feed the great multitude within it any long time; for it stood in a barren soil, and wanted now the command of those islands and places abroad from whence it was wont to be stored with victuals; being also destitute of means to keep such a navy as might bring in supply, or dare to do any thing at sea against that of *Demetrius*. Yet was there some hope of succour from *Ptolemy*, who (trusting thereby to win the love of *Greece*) had laden a hundred and fifty ships with corn, and sent them to relieve the hungry city. But these hundred and fifty were unable to deal with three hundred good fighting ships which *Demetrius* had; rather they feared to become a prey to him, and therefore halted away betimes, as having done enough in adventuring to come so near, that they might be deserv'd. This broke the heart of the people, among whom the famine was so extreme, that a father and his son did fight for a dead mouse, which dropped down between them from the house top: Wherefore they sent ambassadors to yield up the town and crave pardon, having so far offended, that out of desperation they made it a capital offence to propose any motion of peace: yet were they fain to abolish this decree, rather because they knew not what else to do than because they hoped to be forgiven.

Demetrius, contented with the honour of the victory, did not only forbear to take away the lives of these unthankful men, which they had submitted unto his mercy, but out of his liberality gave them food, and placed in office amongst them such as were most acceptable to the people. Nevertheless, he was grown wiser than to trust them so far as he had done in times past. And therefore, when (among other flattering acclamations) they bade him take their havens, and dispose of them at his pleasure; he was ready to lay hold upon the word, and leave a sure garrison within their walls to keep them honest perforce. After this he went into *Peloponnesus*, vanquished the *Lacedemonians* in two battles,

battels, and was in very fair possibility to take their city; when the dangerous news called him in all haste, of *Lyfimachus* and *Ptolemy*, that prevailed faster upon him elsewhere than himself did upon his enemies in *Greece*. *Lyfimachus* had won many towns in *Asia*; *Ptolemy* had gotten all the isle of *Cyprus* except the city of *Salamis*, wherein *Demetrius* had left his children and mother, that were straitly besieged. Whilst he was bethinking himself which way to turn his face, a notable piece of business offered itself, which thrust all other cares out of his head.

Cassander was lately dead in *Macedon*, and soon after him *Philip* his eldest son, whose two younger brethren, *Antipater* and *Alexander*, fought for the kingdom. In this quarrel, *Thessalonica*, the daughter of king *Philip*, whom *Cassander* had married, seemed better affected to *Alexander* than to her elder son; who thereupon grew so enraged, that most barbarously he slew his own mother. The odiousness of this fact gave a fair lustre to *Alexander's* cause, drawing the generality of the *Macedons* to take his part, as in revenge of the queen's death, upon that wicked parricide *Antipater*. But *Antipater* was so strongly backed by *Lyfimachus*, whose daughter he had married, that *Alexander* could not hope to make his party good without some foreign aid. For which cause he called in both *Pyrrius* and *Demetrius*, who how they dealt with him it will soon appear in the following tragedy of him and his brother. Their father *Cassander* had been one that shifted well for himself, at such time as every man sought how to get somewhat, in the ill ordered division of the empire. He was cunning in practice, and a good soldier; one of more open dealing than were his companions, but withal more impudent, rudely killing those whom others would more wisely have made away. He deeply hated the memory of *Alexander*, that had knocked his head against a wall, upon some opinion of contempt. With *Olympias* he had an hereditary quarrel, derived from his father, whom she could not abide. Her feminine malice did so exasperate him by cruelty, that she used against his friends both alive and dead, as it made him adventure upon shedding the royal blood; wherewith when once he had stained his hands, he did not care how far he proceeded in that course of murder. His carefulness to destroy those women and children, whose lives hindered his purpose, argues him to have been rather skillful in matters of arms than a valiant man: such cruelty being a true mark of cowardice, which fears afar off the dangers that may quietly pass away, and seeks to avoid them by base and wicked means, as never thinking itself safe enough until there be nothing left that carries likelihood of danger. Of *Olympias* and *Roxana* it may be said, that they had well deserved the bloody end which overtook them, yet ill befitted it *Cassander* to do the office of a hangman. But *Alexander's* children had by no law of men deserved to die for the tyranny of their father. Wherefore, though *Cassander* died in his bed, yet the divine justice brought swords upon his wife and children, that well revenged the cruelty of this bloody man, by destroying his whole house, as he had done his master's.

SECT. VII.

Of *Pyrrius* and his doings in *Macedon*. The death of *Cassander's* children. *Demetrius* gets the kingdom of *Macedon*; prevails in war against the Greeks; loses reputation in his war against *Pyrrius*, and in his civil government, and pre-

pares to win *Asia*. How all conspire against *Demetrius*. *Pyrrius* and *Lyfimachus* invade him; his army yields to *Pyrrius*, who shares the kingdom of *Macedon* with *Lyfimachus*.

Pyrrius, the son of that unfortunate prince *Æacides*, which perished in war against *Cassander*, was hardly preserved, being a suckling infant, from the fury of his father's enemies. When his fosterers had conveyed him to *Glaucias*, king of *Illyria*, the deadly hatred of *Cassander* would have bought his life with the price of two hundred talents; but no man can kill him that shall be his heir. *Glaucias* was so far from betraying *Pyrrius*, that he restored him by force to his father's kingdom, when he was but twelve years of age. Within the compass of six years, either the indiscretions of his youth, or the rebellious temper of his subjects, drove him out of his kingdom, and left him to try the world anew. Then went he to *Demetrius*, (who married his sister) became his page, followed him awhile in his wars, was with him in the great battel of *Ipsus*, whence he fled with him to *Ephesus*, and was content to be hostage for him, in his reconciliation with *Ptolemy*. In *Egypt* he so behaved himself, that he got the favour of *Berenice*, *Ptolemy's* principal wife, so that he married her daughter, and was thereupon sent home with men and money into *Epirus*, more beholden now to *Ptolemy* than to *Demetrius*. When he had fully recovered the kingdom of *Epirus*, and was settled in it, then fell out that business between the children of *Cassander*, which drew both him and *Demetrius* into *Macedon*.

Antipater, the elder of *Cassander's* sons, was so far too weak for *Pyrrius*, that he had no desire to attend the coming of *Demetrius*, but made an hasty agreement, and divided the kingdom with his younger brother *Alexander*; who likewise felt the aid of *Pyrrius* so troublesome, that he was more willing to send him away, than to call in such another helper. For *Pyrrius* had the audacity to request, or take as granted, by strong hand, *Ambracia*, *Acarnania*, and much more of the country, as the reward of his pains; leaving the two brethren to agree as well as they could about the rest. Necessity enforced the brethren to composition; but their composition would not satisfy *Demetrius*, who took the matter heinously, that he was sent for, and made a fool, to come so far with an army, and find no work for it. This was a frivolous complaint; whereby it appeared, that *Demetrius* had a purpose to do as *Pyrrius* had done, and so much more, by how much he was stronger. Hereupon it seemed to *Alexander* a wise course, to remove this over-diligent friend, by murdering him upon some advantage. Thus *Demetrius* reported the story, and it might be true; tho' the greatest part, and perhaps the wisest, believed it not. But the issue was, that *Alexander* himself was teased and slain by *Demetrius*, who took his part of the kingdom as a reward of the murder; excusing the fact so well, by telling his own danger, and what a naughty man *Cassander* had been, that all the *Macedonians* grew glad enough to acknowledge him their king. It fell out happily, that about the same time *Lyfimachus* was busied in war with a king of the wild *Thracians*; for thereby he was compelled to seek peace of *Demetrius*, which to obtain, he caused the remainder of *Macedon* to be given up; that is, the part belonging to *Antipater* his son-in-law. At this ill bargain *Antipater* grievously stormed, though he knew not how to amend it; yet still he stormed, until his father-in-law, to save the labour of making

king many excuses, took away his troublesome life. Thus in haste, with a kind of neglect, and as it were to avoid molestation, were slain the children of *Cassander*; of *Cassander* that had slain his own master's children in a wise course of policy, with careful meditation (so much the more wicked as the more long) studying how to erect his own house, that fell down upon his grave, ere the earth on it was thoroughly settled.

It might be thought, that such an access of dominion added much to the greatness of *Demetrius*; but indeed it shewed his infirmity, and thereby made him neglected by many, and at length hated by all. For he had no art of civil government, but thought (or shewed by his actions that he thought) the use and fruit of a kingdom to be none other than to do what a king listed. He gave himself over to women and wine, laughing openly at those that offered to trouble him with supplications, and the tedious discourse of doing justice. He had more skill in getting a kingdom than in ruling it; war being his recreation, and luxury his nature. By long rest (as six years reign is long to him, that knows not how to reign one year) he discovered so much of his worst conditions, as made both the people weary of his idleness, and the soldiers of his vanity. He was freed from care of matters in *Asia*, by hearing that all was lost, though more especially, by hearing that *Ptolemy* had with great honour entertained and dismissed his mother and children. This afforded him the better leisure of making war in *Greece*, where he vanquished the *Thebans*, and won their city twice in short space, but used his victory with mercy. Against *Lyfimachus* he would fain have done somewhat (the peace between them notwithstanding) at such time as he was taken by the *Thracians*; but *Lyfimachus* was freely dismissed, and in good case to make resistance ere *Demetrius* came, so as this journey purchased nothing but enmity. Another expedition he took in hand against *Pyrrhus*, with no better, or rather with worse event. *Pyrrhus* held somewhat belonging to *Macedon*, which he had indeed as honestly gotten as *Demetrius* the whole kingdom; he had also made excursions into *Thessaly*. But there needed not any handsome pretence of quarrel, seeing *Demetrius* thought himself strong enough to over-run his enemies country with two great armies. It is a common fault in men, to despise the virtue of those whom they have known raw novices in that faculty, wherein themselves are noted as extraordinary. *Pyrrhus* was a captain, whom later ages, and particularly the great *Hannibal*, placed higher in the rank of generals, than either *Demetrius*, or any of *Alexander's* followers. At this time he missed that part of the army which *Demetrius* led, and fell upon the other half, which he overthrew, not with more commendations of his good conduct, than of his private valour, shewed in single combat against *Pantanchus*, *Demetrius's* lieutenant; who being a strong man of body, challenged this young prince to fight hand to hand, and was utterly beaten. The loss of this battle did not so much offend the *Macedonians*, as the gallant behaviour of *Pyrrhus* delighted them. For in him they seemed to behold the lively figure of *Alexander* in his best quality. Other kings did imitate, in a counterfeit manner, some of *Alexander's* places, and had good skill in wearing princely vestures; but (said they) none, save *Pyrrhus*, is like him in deed, in performing the office of a captain.

These rumours were not more nourished by the virtue of the *Epirat*, than by dislike of their own king, whom they began to disesteem, not so much

in regard of his unprofitable journey into *Epirus* (for he had wasted much of the country, and brought home his army in good case) as of his insolence, that grew daily more and more intolerable. His apparel seemed, in the eyes of the *Macedons*, not only too sumptuous and new-fangled, but very unmanly, and serving chiefly to be a daily witness how much he contemned them and their good opinion. Of his soldiers lives he was reckless, and suffered unwisely this unprincely sentence to escape out of his mouth; that *the more of them died, the fewer he was to pay*. He made a mockery of justice; and (as it were to publish unto all his subjects, how little he esteemed it or them) having by a shew of popularity invited petitioners, and with a gracious countenance entertained their supplications, he led the poor suitors after him in great hope, till coming to a bridge, he threw all their writings into the river, pleasing himself in that he could so easily and so boldly delude the cares of other men. By these courses he grew so odious, that *Pyrrhus* gathered audacity, and invading *Macedon*, had almost won it all with little resistance. *Demetrius* lay then sick in his bed; who recovering health, and taking the field, had such great odds of strength, as made *Pyrrhus* glad to forsake his winnings and be gone.

At length he began to have some feeling of the general hate, which to redress he did not (for he could not) alter his own conditions; but purposed to alter their idle discourses of him, by setting them on work in such an action; wherein his best qualities might appear, that is, in a great war. His intent was to invade *Asia* with a royal army, wherein the fortune of one battle might give him as much, as the fortune of another had taken from him. To this end, he first made peace with *Pyrrhus*, that so he might leave all safe and quiet at home. Then did he compose a mighty army, of almost a hundred thousand foot, and twelve thousand horse, with a navy of five hundred sail, wherein were many ships, far exceeding the greatness of any that had been seen before, yet so swift and useful withal, that the greatness was least part of their commendation.

The terrible fame of these preparations made *Seleucus* and *Ptolemy* suspect their own forces, and labour hard with *Lyfimachus* and *Pyrrhus*, to join against this ambitious son of *Antigonus*, that was like to prove more dangerous to them all than ever was his father. It was easily discerned, that if *Demetrius* once prevailed in *Asia*, there could be no security for his friends in *Europe*, what league soever were of old concluded. Therefore they resolved to begin with him betimes, and each to invade that quarter of *Macedon* that lay next his own kingdom. *Lyfimachus* came first, and against him went *Demetrius* with a great part of his army; but whilst he was yet on the way, news were brought into his camp that *Pyrrhus* had won *Berthea*. The matter was not over-great, were it not, that minds prepared with long discontent, are ready to lay hold upon small occasions of dislike. All the camp was in uproar; some wept, others raged, few or none did forbear to utter seditious words, and many desired leave of *Demetrius* to go to their own houses, meaning indeed to have gone to *Lyfimachus*.

When *Demetrius* perceived the bad affliction of his army, he thought it the wisest way to lead the *Macedonians* further off from *Lyfimachus*, their own countryman, against *Pyrrhus*, that was a stranger, hoping by victory against the *Epirat*, to recover the love of his followers, in such sort, that he might afterwards at leisure deal with the other.

But herein his wisdom beguiled him, for the soldiers were as hasty as he to meet with *Pyrrhus*; not intending to hurt him, but longing to see that noble prince, of whom they daily heard the honourable fame. Some spake of his valour, some enquired, others answered, of his person, his armour, and other tokens whereby he might be known; as particularly, by a pair of goat's horns that he wore on his crest. It was not likely that these men should hurt him. Divers of them stole away and ran over into *Pyrrhus's* camp; where the news that they brought were better welcome than their persons. For they said, and it was true, that if the *Macedonians* might once get sight of *Pyrrhus*, they would all salute him king. To try this, *Pyrrhus* rode forth, and presented himself bare-headed in view of the camp, whither some were sent before to prepare his welcome. The news of his arrival found a general applause, and every one began to look out, with desire to set eye on him. His face was not so well known as his helmet, therefore he was admonished to put it on, which done, all came about him and proffered their service; neither were there any that spake for *Demetrius*, only some (and they the most moderate of tongue) bade him begone betimes and shift for himself. So *Demetrius* threw aside his maskers habit, and attiring himself poorly, did fearfully steal away out of his own camp, deserving well this calamity, whether it were so that he would not hearken to the good counsel of his friends, or whether his behaviour deprived him of such friends as would dare to let him hear the unpleasant sound of necessary truth.

Whilst *Pyrrhus* was making this triumphant entry into the kingdom of *Macedon*, *Lyfimachus* came upon him very unseasonably, and would needs have half, saying, that he had done as much as *Pyrrhus* in the war, and therefore had reason to challenge his part of the gains. The bargain was quickly made, and the division agreed upon, each of them being rather desirous to take his part quietly than to fight for the whole, as hoping each of them to work his fellow quite out of all upon better opportunity.

S E C T. VIII.

How Demetrius gathering forces, enterprized many things with ill success in Greece and Asia. How he was driven upon Seleucus, and compelled to yield himself. His imprisonment and death.

THE *Athenians* were as unthankful to *Demetrius* in this his adversity, as they had been in former times; for they presently forsook his friendship, and called *Pyrrhus* out of *Macedon* to be their patron. *Demetrius*, when he went against *Lyfimachus*, had left a great part of his forces in *Greece*, under his son *Antigonus*: Therefore it is like that he had soon gotten an army, though *Phila* his wife (who is highly commended for a wife and virtuous lady) did poison herself, upon desperate grief for his misfortune. The first upon whom he attempted to shew his anger were the *Athenians*, that had well deserved it. He began to lay siege to their town, but was pacified by *Crates* the philosopher, whom they had made their spokesman, and taking fair words instead of satisfaction, passed over into *Asia* with eleven thousand soldiers, meaning to try his fortune against *Lyfimachus*, for the provinces of *Lydia* and *Garia*.

At his first coming into those parts, fortune seemed to smile upon him. For many good towns, willingly, or by compulsion, yielded to his obe-

dience. There were also some captains that fell from *Lyfimachus* to him with their companies and treasures. But it was not long, ere *Agathocles*, the son of *Lyfimachus*, came upon him with an army so strong, that it was not for *Demetrius's* good, to hazard his last stock against it. Wherefore, he resolved to pass through *Phrygia* and *Armenia*, into *Media*, and the provinces of the higher *Asia*, trusting to find a kingdom somewhere in those remote quarters. The execution of this counsel was grievously impeached by *Agathocles*, who pursued him close, and cut off all his provisions, driving him to take which ways he could, without following his intended course. In many skirmishes, *Demetrius* vanquished this troublesome enemy: nevertheless, he could not be shaken off, but continued afflicting the poor titular king with extreme famine. At length, in passing the river *Lycus*, so many of *Demetrius's* men were lost, that the rest could no longer make resistance; but were driven to travel with such speed, as might well be called a plain flight: so that with famine, pestilent diseases following famine, and other accidents of war, eight thousand of them were consumed; the rest, with their captain, escaped into *Cilicia*. *Seleucus* had gotten possession of *Cilicia*, whilst *Demetrius* was occupied in *Greece*; yet was it no part of *Demetrius's* errand, to lay claim to the country; but with vehement and humble letters he besought his son-in-law to call to mind their alliance, and to pity him in his great misery. These letters, at the first, wrought well with *Seleucus*, and he condescended to the request; yet considering further how *Demetrius* had carried himself, when he recovered strength after the battle at *Ipsum*, he changed his purpose, and went against him with an army.

Many treaties were held between them, of which none took effect, through the jealousy of *Seleucus*. Therefore, mere desperation enforced *Demetrius* to fight like a mad man; and his fury got him some victories, though of small importance. At length, sickness took and held him forty days, in which time a great number of his few men ran to the enemy. This notwithstanding, he still held out, and once had like to have taken *Seleucus* in his bed, had not his coming been discover'd by fugitives that gave the alarm. Finally, when all his army had forsaken him, and left him, with a few of his friends, to shift for himself; he was compelled, by the last of those adherents (for even some of those few forsook him) to yield unto *Seleucus*.

Seleucus, hearing this, was exceeding glad, and sent him very comfortable messages; but the approbation of his own humanity, by his followers, was such, as renew his jealous thoughts, and hindered him from admitting *Demetrius* to his presence; though otherwise he used him with as much favour, as any prisoner could wish. He was kept under sure guard in a demi-island, wherein were goodly walks, orchards, and parks, for hunting. He had all that he asked royally, and friends allowed to visit him at his, and their pleasure; only his liberty was reserved unto the coming of young *Antiochus* and *Stratonica*, out of the high countries. In this sort he spent three years, living merrily all the while (as one that now enjoyed the happiness, which, with so much travel and blood-shed, he had sought in vain) and then died, leaving to his son *Antigonus*, the same which his father had left unto himself; that is, friends and hope. His ashes were honourably buried in *Corinth*; his qualities have appeared in his actions; and the fortune of his house will shew it self hereafter, in times and places convenient.

SECT. IX.

The death of Ptolemy, of Lyfimachus, and of Seleucus, that was last of Alexander's captains: with other occurrences.

ABOUT the same time that *Demetrius* died, did also *Ptolemy* king of *Egypt*; a virtuous prince, warlike, gentle, bountiful, and (which in those times was a rare commendation) regardful of his word. He had, by many wives and concubines, many children; out of whom he selected *Ptolemy Philadelphus*, and caused him to reign, together with himself, two or three years before he died, that so he might confirm him in the inheritance of the kingdom. At this, *Ptolemy Ceraunus* (for all of that house assumed the name of *Ptolemy*) was grievously incensed; but no man cared for his anger. Therefore he went to *Seleucus*, who gave him loving entertainment. There were now only two of *Alexander's* captains left, *Seleucus* and *Lyfimachus*. These two needs would fight for it, who should be the longest liver of that brave company. The true ground of their quarrel was, their near equality of strength, and want of one to part them. The pretence was, the murders which *Lyfimachus* had committed upon many of his nobles, together with his poisoning *Agathocles*, his eldest son, whose wife and children fled unto *Seleucus* for aid.

The *Macedons*, after seven months pause, having spent their first heat of admiration, began to hearken so well to *Lyfimachus*, their natural countryman, that they forsook *Pyrrhus* upon none other ground, than because he was an alien. This they had known well enough before; but they did him no great wrong in taking lightly from him, what they lightly gave him. *Lyfimachus* had reigned about five

years alone, when the city of *Lyfimachia* (built by him, and called after his name) falling by an earthquake, appeared, by events, to have fore-shewed the fall of his house. His own jealousy, and the instigation of a mother-in-law, caused him to poison his son *Agathocles*, which drew upon him that war, wherein (after the loss of all his fifteen children, that were taken away by divers accidents) he perished himself.

Seleucus was encountered by *Lyfimachus* on *Asia* side, where one battel concluded the war with *Lyfimachus's* death. It pleased *Seleucus* more than the victory, that he was the last of all the great heroes which had followed *Alexander*; for now he seemed to himself, as lord and heir of all the conquered world. So he passed over into *Macedon*, to take possession of *Europe*, where there was none to withstand him. But there he ended his days, and within seven months followed *Lyfimachus*, and others of his fellows, by a bloody death; being treacherously slain by *Ptolemy Ceraunus*, whose friend and patron he had been. Seventy-seven years old he was, when he fought with *Lyfimachus*, and *Lyfimachus* was seventy-four. With them ended the generation of old captains, that had seen the days, as it were, of another world under the *Persian*; yet was there left one equal to any of them in the art of war, even *Pyrrhus*, the *Epirot*, of whom we spake before, that is now ready to enter into a war with the *Romans*, a more warlike people than *Alexander* himself did ever encounter. Of which war, and of which people, it is needful that we here make mention, as of a story more important, than any likely to ensue in *Greece*, or in the great kingdoms that were held by *Alexander's* successors, with less (and still decreasing) virtue, than was that by which they were first purchased.

C H A P. VII.

The growth of Rome, and settling of the eastern kingdoms.

SECT. I.

How the Romans enlarged their dominion in Italy, from the death of Tullus Hostilius, unto such time as they were assailed by Pyrrhus.

HOW *Rome* was founded by *Romulus*, settled in good order by *Numa Pompilius*; and by many, though small victories, it gathered strength, until such time as it became the head of *Latium*, by the conquest of *Alba*, in the reign of *Tullus Hostilius*, it hath been already noted in due order of time. But whereas now the *Roman* greatness beginneth to encounter the power of *Greece*, and, extending it self out of *Italy*, to overwhelm the dominions of other states and princes; I hold it convenient (as in like cases I have done) briefly to set down the growth of this mighty city, in a compendious relation of those many actions, which could not have been delivered in the ages wherein they were severally performed, without much interruption of the history, that was then occupied in matter more important.

After the death of *Tullus Hostilius* (who, when he had reigned two and thirty years, was burnt together with his house by lightning) *Ancus Martius*, grand-child to *Numa Pompilius*, by his daughter,

and not much unlike him in disposition, succeeded in the kingdom of *Rome*. He walled the city about, enlarged it with the hill *Aventine*, which he inclosed; built a bridge over *Tybris*, and the city of *Ostia*, upon the sea, sixteen miles distant from *Rome*. Finally, having reigned twenty-four years, he died; and by his last will, he left his children in charge with one *Lucumon*, the son of *Damaratus* a *Corinthian*, who, avoiding *Cypselus* king of *Corinth's* tyranny, had fled into *Umbria*, and dwelt in *Tarquinius*, by the name of which town he was afterwards called *Tarquinius*. From that city in *Umbria* coming to *Rome*, and encouraged by some ominous occurrences, together with his wife *Tanaquil's* prophecy, he grew a favourite of *Ancus Martius*, by his *Grecian* wit, humouring the factions of the *Roman* court; insomuch, that after his decease he became not only protector to the children, but governor to the city. He doubled the number of senators, and enlarged the centuries of horse-men: neither was he less eminent in war than in peace; for he prevailed often against the *Tuscans*, and from his victories, the chiefest ornaments of triumph took their original. When this *Lucius Tarquinius* had reigned eight and thirty years, he was slain by the sons of *Ancus Martius*, to whom he had been left guardian.

But

But *Tanaquil* his wife, perceiving what was done, informed the people from out of an high turret, that her husband was wounded, and sick, but not dangerously: and withal signified unto them, that in the *interim* of his sickness, one *Servius Tullius*, whom from his birth she always prophesied to be born to great hopes (the son of *P. Corniculani* and *Ocrisia*, a well descended, but captive woman) brought up in her house, and husband unto her daughter, should supply her husband's place, in governing the state until his recovery: which government, being thus at first obtained by cunning, he afterwards usurped as his right. He first ordained ratements, subsidies, and valuations of the people's wealth; among whom, at that time, four-score thousand were mustered, of which number consisted their whole corporation; and by distinction of dignities, ages, trades, and offices, he managed the kingdom in as good sort, as if it had been a private household. At length, having two daughters of different natures, the one mild and gentle, the other fierce and outrageous: and finding also, that the two sons of *Tarquinius Priscus*, *Sextus* and *Aruns*, which had been committed to his tuition, were of different dispositions, proportionably answering to his daughters; he (willing to add water, not oyl, to fire) gave the mild daughter to *Sextus*, the hot-headed son; and the violent, to *Aruns*, the gentle, in marriage. But whether by intended courses, or by accident, it happened; the two mild ones being made away, the furious natures were readily joined in marriage: who soon after concurring, and calling the senate together, began to lay claim to the kingdom. Upon this tumult, *Servius Tullius* hastening to the senate (where he thought by authority to have bridled insolency) was thrown down the stairs, and going home sore bruised, was slain by the way, when he had reigned forty and four years. Then *Tullia* his daughter, first proclaiming her husband *Tarquinius Superbus* king, returning home, enforced her coach-man to drive his chariot over her father's corps; whereupon the street had the denomination of *wicked-street*. This *Tarquin*, exercising cruelty without justice, and tyranny without mercy, upon the people and senators; having tired himself and them at home, used the same rage and treachery upon his borders. He took *Ocrinum*, *Suessa*, *Pometia*, and the *Gabii*. The issue of besieging *Ardea*, a town eighteen miles distant from *Rome*, was of bad success. In the heat of which war, his son *Sextus Tarquinius* violently ravished that chaste lady *Lucretia*, his kinsman *Collatine's* wife: who, in way of expiation for so unchaste a deed, thought good to wash out those spots of infamy with her own blood; so (having first bequeathed the revenge unto her father *Sp. Lucretius Tricipitinus*, her husband *Collatine*, and *Junius Brutus*) she killed herself; whereupon (chiefly by *Junius Brutus's* resolution) *Tarquinius Superbus*, with his wife and children, was deposed and banished; and fled to *Porfenna* king of *Hebruria* for succour, in the five and twentieth year of his reign, and the two hundred forty and fourth from the building of their city; in which space *Rome* had scarce gotten full possession of fifteen miles round about her.

Junius Brutus, by the help of *Collatine*, having expelled *Tarquin*, and freed his country from that heavy yolk of bondage, enforced the people, by solemn oath, never to admit any government by kings amongst them: whereupon they ransacked their kings goods, consecrated their fields to *Mars*, and conferred the government of the state upon *Brutus* and *Collatine*. But because the name of

king was odious in their ears, they changed the manner of their government, from perpetual to annual and from a single governor to a double; lest perpetual or sole dominion might be some motive to usurpation: and instead of kings they called them *Consuls*, signifying, as it may be interpreted, *Providers*; that their titles might remember them of their place, which was to be always mindful of their citizens welfare. And yet was it so hard settling of troubled waters, that the people, after this innovation of state, scarce daring to assure themselves of their own security, enforced *Tarquinius Collatine* to resign up his authority, fearing that tyranny would be hereditary, and supposing that the very name and affinity with the house of *Tarquin*, favoured already of their condition. In his room was substituted *Valerius Publicola*, who, that he might (as his name importeth) be gracious in the people's eyes, gave liberty, in matters of controversy, to appeal from the consuls to the people: and that he might, as well in goods as in person, avoid occasion of suspicion, caused his own house to be pulled down, because it was built in a place defensible, as if it had been a citadel. Neither was *Brutus* any ways deficient in matter of greater moment, which concerned as well the people's safety, as their favour: for having got intelligence, that some greener wits, and in the first rank his own sons, were itching after innovations, hoping to restore the banished kings; he caused them, publickly in the market-place to be whipt, and then to be brought all impartially to the block.

Hitherto the *Romans*, having by the unblemished integrity of *Brutus*, well appeased all inbred quarrels at home, now hereafter employ their military designments against foreigners; first, for their liberty; secondly, for enlarging their possessions; and lastly, for defending their confederate provinces, and extending their empire. For *Rome*, situated as it were in the mid-way between *Latians* and the *Tuscans*, having as yet but narrow bounds, being in her minority, could not but give occasion of offence to her neighbours; until by main opposition, having prevailed against her borderers, she used them as instruments, whereby to obtain the rest.

Their first war, in the first year of *Consuls*, was against *Porfenna* king of *Hebruria*; who being overpersuaded by *Tarquin's* lamentation, came to *Rome*, together with the banished king, and with great forces, to seat him again in his kingdom.

In the first conflict, *Horatius Cocles*, having long time borne the main brunt of his enemies, on the bridge over *Tybris*; at length, feeling himself too faint to stand against so many, caused the bridge behind him to be broken down, and, with his armour, leaping into the river like a hunted stag, refreshed his hot spirits, and returned safe to his fellows, with the like resolution to sustain a new charge. *Porfenna*, although by this he had well-nigh won the hill *Janiculus*, which is the very entrance into the city, and found the victory, in a manner, assuredly his own; yet admiring their valour, and terrified by the constant resolution of *Mutius Scaevola* (who having by error slain *Porfenna's* his secretary, instead of the king himself, did, in scorn of torments threatened, burn off his own hand) he thought it not a whit prejudicial, either to his safety, or credit, to enter league with them at the worst hand. And yet the edge of *Tarquinius's* spleen was not quite abated, though *Aruns* his son, and *Brutus* his enemy, in single combat, had slain each other. And here the *Romans*, although they lost *Brutus*, got the field; and their ladies, whole

champion

champion he was, for their chastity, not for beauty, mourned the loss of him one whole year. In to his place, for the residue of his year, was subrogated *Sp. Lucretius Tricipitinus*, father to *Lucretia*: and in his room (deceasing naturally before the year expired) *Horatius Pulvillus*.

Tarquine, upon his overthrow, feeling the fates disastrous, thought it no boot to strive against the stream; and spent the residue of his time, which was about fourteen years, privately at *Tusculum*. Yet his son-in-law, *Mamilius Tusculanus*, stomach- ing afresh at those old repulses, because *Porfenna* had made peace with the *Romans*, and denied further succour unto the *Tarquines*, mustered up his *Latins*, and gave battle to the *Romans* at the lake *Regillum*; where the conflict was fierce, and the issue uncertain, until *Aulus Posthumus*, the *Roman Dictator* (for they had created this magistracy greater than *Consuls*, purposely for this war, when first it was expected) to exasperate his soldiers courage, threw their own ensigns amidst the enemies; and *Cossus*, or *Spurius Cassius* (master of the horse- men, an assistant officer to the *Dictator*) command- ed to take off their bridles, that they might run with free violence, to recover again their ensigns. This fight was so well performed, that a report went current, of *Castor* and *Pollux*, two *Gods*, who came on milk-white steeds, to be eye-witnesses of their valour, and fellow-helpers of their victory; for the general consecrated a temple to them, as a stipend for their pains. After this, the *Romans* fierce spirits, having no object of valour abroad, reflected upon themselves at home; and the six- teenth year after the kings expulsion, upon instiga- tion of some desperate bankrupts, thinking them- selves wrongfully oppressed by the senate and con- suls, they made an uproar in the holy mount; un- til by *Mevenius Agrippa*, his discreet allusion, of the inconvenience in the head and bellies discord, to that present occasion, they were reconciled to the senate: with condition, that they might have some new magistrates created, to whom they might appeal in cases of variance, and make them sollici- tors in all their controversies, the consuls authority notwithstanding. This was enacted; and they were called the tribunes of the people. After this at- tonement amongst themselves, they had continual war with the *Latines*, concerning their bounds and limits, and with other neighbouring states. A- mongst these the *Volsci* and *Aequi* held them longest; who made war, of themselves, upon the *Romans*; whereby they lost the best city in their whole ju- risdiction, *Corioli*.

In this conquest, *T. Martius* got the surname of *Coriolanus*: a name honourable then, as derived from a great victory; although by reason of the poverty of the town, a *Roman* general, in after times, would have been ashamed of that title. But yet these graces had been no occasion of dis- paragement, had he not afterwards, in a great of dearth, advised to sell corn, which they pro- cured from *Sicily*, at too high a rate, to the people: whereupon, *Decius Mus*, their tribune, in their behalf, accused him, and after judgment, banished him. *Coriolanus* flying to the *Volsci*, whom lately before he had vanquished, incensed them to renew their forces again, which being committed unto him, and to *Attius Tullus*, he prevailed in field so far forth, that he was come within four or five miles of the city. Encamping there, he made so sharp war, and was at such defiance with his country, that he would not relent, by any supplication of ambassadors, until his mother *Veturia*, and *Volumnia* his wife, with a pitiful tune of deprecation,

shewing themselves better subjects to their country, than friends to their son and husband, were more available to *Rome*; than was any force of Arms: Hereupon *Coriolanus* dismissing his army, was after put to death among the *Volsci*, as a Traytor, for neglecting such opportunity: or (as others surmise) living with them until old age, he died naturally.

Not long after this, the *Veii* in *Ettruria* pro- voked the *Romans*; against whom the *Fabii*, three hundred and six in number, all of one family, en- treated and obtained, that they only might be em- ployed, as it had been in a private quarrel. These *Fabii*, after some good services, lying encamped at *Cremora*, were circumvented, and all slain; one only of that whole house, had been left, by reason of infancy, at home; from whom afterward sprang *Fabius Maximus*, who vanquished *Hannibal*.

In process of time, the *Romans* were also troubled with the *Volsci*, at the hill of *Algidum*, two miles from *Rome*; where *Lucius Minucius* their consul, with his whole army, had been discomfited, had not *L. Quintius Cincinnatus*, chosen *Dictator*, and taken from the plough to the highest honour in *Rome*, which success answerable to his expedition, dispersed his enemies, and freed his country in the space of six- teen days. In the continuance of this *Volcian* war it was, that *Appius Claudius*, one of the ten men, whom they had two years before chosen governours of the state, and enactors of *Solon's* Laws amongst them, procured from *Athens* (abrogating in the mean while the consuls, and all other magistrates) would have ravished *Virginia*, the daughter of *T. Virgini- us*, captain of a company, and lying then in camp at *Algidum*. Hereupon the people, in an uproar, took the hill *Aventine*, and after much variance, enforced the ten men to resign up their authority again to new consuls.

After this, either new quarrels, or desire to re- venge old losses, drew the *Romans* into a new war against the *Veientes*, and their adherents, upon whom having tried their forces, with diversity of captains, and variety of event, they vanquished the *Falisci*, and the *Fidenates*, and utterly subdued the *Veientes*. In conquering the *Falisci*, *Camillus* shewed no less integrity than fortitude. For when a school-master, by training forth into the *Roman* camp, many children of the principal citi- zens, thought to betray the town, yielding them all up as hostages: *Camillus* delivered this traitor bound unto his scholars, willing them to whip him back into the city; which forth-with yielded unto him in reverence of his justice. The siege of *Veii* was ten years, and so troublesome, that the *Ro- mans* were there first enforced to winter abroad un- der beasts skins (to which they were the more easily induced, because then first they received pay) and to make vows never to return without victory.

At length, winning the city by a mine, they got so large spoils, that they consecrated their tents to *Apollo Pythius*; and the whole people in general, were called to the ransacking of the city. But they were no less unthankful to *Camillus* for his service, than before they had been to *Coriolanus*; for they banish'd him the city, upon some occasion of inequality in dividing the spoils: yet he requited their unkindness with a new piece of service, a- gainst the fury of the *Gauls*; who being a popu- lous country, and very healthful, the fathers (as sometimes now) lived so long, that the sons, desti- tute of means, were enforced to rove abroad, seek- ing some place, where to set up their rest: and withal being a nation vast in body, rude by nature, and barbarous in conditions, wandred as rovers over many countries. Some of them lighting on *Italy*,

set upon *Clusium*, a town in *Hetruria*; whereof *Rome* having information (and being careful of her confederate towns) sent ambassadors, warning them to desist from such injurious enterprises. But the barbarous people, not regarding the message, upon some injury offered by the *Roman* ambassadors, converted their forces from *Clusium* towards *Rome*; and giving a great overthrow unto the *Romans*, by the river *Allia*, upon the sixteenth day before the *Calends* of *August* (which day was after branded for unlucky, and called *Alliensis* in the *Roman Calendar*) they hastened towards the city. Then was *Rome* the true map of misery and desolation. For some leaving the city, some creeping into holes, priests hiding their reliques, and every one shifting for himself; ere the enemy came, *Rome* was abandoned, as indefensible. The vestal virgins, in this tumult, were safely conveyed away; the ancients of the city, gathering boldness out of desperate fear, did put on their robes, and taking their leave of the world, did seat themselves in thrones, in their several houses, hourly expecting the messengers of death, and meaning to die, as they had lived, in state. The younger sort, with *M. Manlius* their captain, took upon them to make good the capitol.

By this, the *Gauls* were entred the city, who seeing all quiet, at first suspected some ambush; after finding all secure, they fell to the spoil, committing all to the fire and sword. As for the old senators, they sat in their majesty, with a grave resolution: having first revered them as *Gods*, anon they tried whether they would die like Men. When the city was thoroughly rifled, they attempted the capitol; which held them work for the space of seven months. Once they were like to have surprized it by night, but being descried by the galling of geese, *M. Manlius* did awaken, and kept them from entrance. At length a composition was agreed upon: the *Gauls* being weary, and the *Romans* hungry. The bargain was, that the *Gauls* should take a thousand pound weight in gold, to desist from their siege. Whilst the gold was in weighing, the *Gauls*, with open insolency, made their weights too heavy: *Brennus*, their captain, casting his sword into the balance, and, with a proud exprobration, saying, that the vanquished must be patient *per force*. But in the midst of this cavilling, came *Furins Camillus* with an army from *Ardea*, (where he had lived in his banishment) and fell upon the *Gauls* with such violence, that he dispersed their troops, quenched the fire of the city with their blood, forcing them to restore the spoils with advantage, and forbear the gold, in accepting which, they had lately been so nice. Further, having rid the city of them, he so hotly pursued them through a great part of *Italy*, that the remainder of their army which escaped from him, was very small. Other armies of the *Gauls*, which followed this first, had the like ill success. They were often beaten by the *Romans*; especially the victories of *M. Torquatus*, and of *M. Valerius Corvinus* (each of which in single fight slew a champion of the *Gauls*) abated their presumption, and restored courage to the *Romans*. *Camillus*, for his notable service, was afterwards accounted a second *Romulus*.

The people, after this destruction of their city, were earnestly bent to go to the *Veii* to inhabit; but *Camillus* dissuaded them.

About the same time, somewhat before the siege of *Veii*, they changed their government from consuls to military tribunes. The government of these also, after some years, was by civil dissention in-

terrupted: so that one while consuls ruled; another while there was an anarchy: then the tribunes were restored and ruled again, till after many years expired, the consular authority was established; it being enacted, that one of the consuls should always be a *Plebeian*. This was after the building of the city, three hundred sixty five years. And now *Rome*, by suppression of her neighbour countries, creeping well forward out of her minority, dares set forth against the warlike *Samnites*, who dwelt almost one hundred and thirty miles off; situated between *Campania* and *Apulia*. These did so strongly invade the *Campanians* their neighbours, that they forced them to yield themselves subjects to *Rome*, and undergo any conditions of tribute, or whatsoever else, to obtain protection: which the *Romans*, although both countries had been their confederates, yet not willing that the greater, like fish, should devour the less, easily allowed of; aiming themselves at the good situation of *Campania*, the abundance of corn and wine, pleasant cities and towns, but especially *Capua* it self, the fairest city then in all *Italy*.

The Families of the *Papyrii* and *Fabii* were most employed in the managing of this war, which endured the space of fifty years. And in this season were the *Romans* often-times dangerously encountered by the *Samnites*; as when *T. Veturius*, and *Sp. Posthumius* were consuls; and discomfited by *Pontius* at *Caudium*, with no small ignominy; and when *Q. Fabius Gurgus* lost the field with three thousand men. But for these losses, many great victories made large amends: the greatest whereof were gotten by *L. Papyrius*, and by *Quintus Fabius Maximus*.

The *Samnites* drew the *Hetrurians* into their quarrel. But the force of the *Samnites* was well broken, ere the *Hetrurians* (the greater and richer, but less warlike nation) began to stir. So the one and the other of these two countries, became at length, tributary to *Rome*.

In the continuance of this long war it was, (though in time of truce between the *Romans* and the *Samnites*) that the *Latins* began to challenge equal freedom in the corporation of *Rome*, and right in bearing office, so that they required to have one of the consuls yearly chosen out of them.

This demand of the *Latins* was not unreasonable. For the *Romans* themselves were a *Latin* colony; besides all which, they made offer, to change their name, and to be all called *Romans*. But the *Romans* were too proud, to admit any such capitulation. So a great battle was fought between them; wherein the fortune of *Rome* prevailed, by the virtue of the consuls.

Manlius Torquatus, and the elder *Decius*, were then consuls, whom the sooth-sayers advertised, that the side should be victorious which lost the general in fight. Hereupon, *Decius* the consul, exposed his life to the enemy, and purchased victory (as was believed) by his death. In which kind of devoting himself for his army, the son of this *Decius*, being after consul, did imitate his father, in the *Hetrurian* war. But (as *Tully* well notes) it was rather the desperate resolution of these *Decii*, that purchased victory, by rushing into the midst of the enemies, wherein their soldiers followed them, than any great commendation of such a religion as required the lives of so worthy citizens to be sacrificed for their country. The discipline of *Manlius* was no less resolute than the valour of *Decius*. He forbade any one to forsake his place, and fight single with an enemy. For breach of which order, he caused his son to be put to death, who had slain

slain a captain of the *Latins*, being challenged in single fight.

When the *Latins*, the *Æqui*, *Volsi*, *Hernici*, *Campani*, *Samnites*, and *Hetrurians*, with some other people, were brought under obedience; it was a vain labour for any people of *Italy*, to contend against the *Romans*.

Yet the *Sabines* adventured to try their fortune; and found it bad; for *Curius Dentatus*, the *Roman* consul, wasting all their country with fire and sword, from the river *Nar* and *Velia*, to the *Adriatick* sea, brought them into quiet subjection.

The last of the *Italians* that made trial of the *Roman* arms, were the *Tarentines*, and their adherents. These had interposed themselves as Mediators between the *Romans* and *Samnites*; with a peremptory denunciation of war unto that party which should dare to refuse the peace by them tendered. These threats, which discovered their bad affection unto *Rome*, ended in words; but when the *Samnites* were utterly subdued, matter enough of quarrel was found to examine their ability of performance.

The *Romans* complained that certain ships of theirs were robbed, and sent ambassadors unto *Tarentum*, to require amends. Upon some wrong done to these ambassadors, was laid the foundation of that war, wherein the *Lucans*, *Messapians*, *Brutians*, and *Apulians*, joining with the *Tarentines*, procured the *Samnites*, and other subjects of *Rome*, to rebel and take their part. But some experience of the *Roman* strength, taught all these people to know their own weakness. Wherefore, they agreed to send for *Pyrrhus*, by whose aid being a *Grecian*, as the *Tarentines* also were) great hope was conceived, that the dominion of *Rome* should be confined unto more narrow bounds than all *Italy*, which already, in a manner, it did overspread.

SECT. II.

How Pyrrhus warred upon the Romans, and vanquished them in two battels.

PYRRHUS, forsaken by the *Macedonians*, and unable to deal with *Lyfimachus*, was compelled a while to live in rest; which he abhorred no less, than a wiser prince would have desired. He had a strong army, and a good fleet, which in that unsettled estate of things, was enough to purchase a kingdom; but the fall of *Demetrius* had so increased the power of *Lyfimachus*, that it was no point of wisdom to make an offensive war upon him, without far greater forces. *Antigonus*, the son of *Demetrius*, held *Corinth* at the same time, and some other towns, with the remainder of his father's army and treasures, left in his hand. Upon him it is like that *Pyrrhus* might have won; but it was better to let him alone, that he might serve to give some hindrance to *Lyfimachus*.

In this want of employment, and covetous desire of finding it, the *Tarentine* ambassadors came very sily to *Pyrrhus*; and they came with brave offers, as needing none other aid than his good conduct, which to obtain, they would cast themselves under his protection. They had in their company some of the *Samnites*, *Lucanians*, *Messapians*, and others; which promised, in behalf of their several nations, as much as could be desired. This encouraged *Pyrrhus*, and filled him with hopes of goodly conquests, that he might enlarge his empire to the west, as far as *Alexander* had gotten eastward; and still, by one victory, open the gate unto another. To which effect, it is said, that once he answered *Cyneas*, his

chief counsellor, asking what he meant to do after every of the victories which he hoped to get; that, having won *Rome*, he would soon be master of all *Italy*; that, after *Italy*, he would quickly get the isle of *Sicil*; that out of *Sicil* he would pass over into *Africk*, and win *Carthage*, with all the rest of the country; and being strengthened with the force of all these provinces, he would be too hard for any of those that were now so proud and troublesome. But *Cyneas* enquired yet further what they should do, when they were lords of all; whereunto *Pyrrhus* (finding his drift) answered pleasantly, that they would live merrily; a thing (as *Cyneas* then told him) that they presently might do without any trouble, if he could be contented with his own.

Nevertheless, this *Italian* expedition seemed unto *Pyrrhus* a matter of such consequence, as was not to be omitted, in regard of any scholastical disputation. Wherefore he prepared his army, of almost thirty thousand men, well sorted, and well trained soldiers; part of which he sent over before him unto *Cyneas*, with the rest he followed in person. At his coming, he found the *Tarentines* very prompt of tongue; cut in matter of execution, utterly careless to provide for the war. Wherefore he was fain to shut up their theater, and other places of pleasure and resort; enforcing them to take arms, and making such a strict muster, as was to them very unpleasant, though greatly behoving to their estate.

Whilst he was occupied with these cares, *Levinus* the *Roman* consul drew near, and began to waste *Lucania*, a province confederate with the *Tarentines* in this war.

The *Lucanians* were not ready to defend their own country; the *Samnites* were careless of the harm, that fell not (as yet) upon themselves; the *Tarentines* were better prepared than they would have been, but their valour was little; all of these had been accustomed to shrink, for fear of the *Roman* fortitude; and therefore it fell out happily, that *Pyrrhus* relied more upon his own forces, than the issue of their vaunting promises. He was now driven either to set forward with those that himself had brought into *Italy*, and the assistance of the *Tarentines*, wherein little was to be reposed; or else to weaken the reputation of his own sufficiency, which by all means he was careful to uphold. In good time, a great part of his forces that had been scattered by foul weather at sea, were safely come to him; with which he resolved to assay the valour of the *Romans*, against whom he proudly marched.

Levinus, the consul, was not affrighted with the terrible name of a great king; but came on confidently to meet him, and give him battle ere all his adherents should be ready to join with him. This boldness of the *Roman*, and the slackness of the *Messapians*, *Lucanians*, *Samnites*, and others, whom the danger most concerned, caused *Pyrrhus* to offer a treaty of peace; requiring to have the quarrel between the *Romans* and his *Italian* friends, referred to his arbitrement. Whether he did this to win time, that the *Samnites* and their fellows might arrive at his camp; or whether, considering better at near distance, the weight of the business which he had taken in hand, he were desirous to quit it with his honour; the short answer that was returned to his proposition, gave him no means of either the one or the other; for the *Romans* sent him this word, that *they had neither chosen him their judge, nor feared him their enemy*.

Hereupon both armies hastened their march unto the river of *Siris*: *Levinus* intending to fight before the arrival of the *Samnites*; *Pyrrhus*, to hinder him from passing that river, until his own army

my were full. Upon the first view of the *Roman* camp, it was readily conceived by *Pyrrhus*, that he had not now to do with barbarous people, but with men well trained in a brave discipline of war: which caused him to set a strong *Corps de garde* upon the passage of the river, that he might not be compelled to fight, until he saw his best advantage. But he quickly found that this new enemy was not only skilful in the art of war, but courageous in execution; for the *Roman* army entered the ford in face of his *corps de garde*; and their horse at the same time began to pass the river in sundry places, which caused the *Greeks* to forsake the defence of their bank, and speedily retired unto their camp.

This audacity forced *Pyrrhus* to battel, where-with he thought it best to present them ere their whole army had recovered firm footing, and were in order. So, directing his captains how to marshal his battels, himself with the horse charged upon the *Romans*, who stoutly received him, as men well exercised in sustaining furious impressions. In this fight, neither did his courage transport him beyond the duty of a careful general, nor his providence, in directing others, hinder the manifestation of his personal valour. It behoved him, indeed, to do his best; for he never met with better opposers. Once, and shortly after the fight began, his horse was slain under him; afterwards he changed armour with a friend, but that friend paid his life for the use of his king's armour, which was torn from his back. This accident had almost lost him the battel; but he perceiving it, discovered his face, and thereby restored courage to his men, and took from the *Romans* their vain joy. The fight was obstinate, and with the greater loss (at least of more eminent men) on *Pyrrhus's* side, as long as only spear and sword were used. But when the elephants were brought into the wings, whose unusual form and terrible aspect the horses of the *Romans* (unaccustomed to the like) were not able to sustain, then was the victory quickly gotten; for the *Roman* battles perceiving their horse put to rout, and driven out of the field, finding also themselves both charged in flank, and overborn by the force and huge bulk of those strange beasts, gave way to necessity, and saved themselves as well as they could by hasty flight: in which consternation, they were so forgetful of their discipline, that they tarried not to defend their camp, but ran quite beyond it, leaving both it, and the honour of the day, entirely to *Pyrrhus*.

The fame of this victory was soon spread over *Italy*; and the reputation was no less than the fame; for it was a matter very rare to be heard, that a *Roman* consul, with a select army, should lose in plain battel not only the field, but the camp it self, being so notably fortified as they always were. And this honour was the more bravely won by *Pyrrhus*, for that he had with him none of his *Italian* friends, save the unwarlike *Tarentines*. Neither could he well dissemble his content that he took, in having the glory of this action peculiarly his own, at such time as he blamed the *Lucans* and *Samnites* for coming (as we say) a day after the fair. Nevertheless, he wisely considered the strength of the *Romans*, which was such as would better endure many such losses, than he could endure many such victories. Therefore he thought it good to compound with them, whilst with his honour he might; and to that purpose, he sent unto them *Cyneas*, his ambassador, demanding only to have the *Tarentines* permitted to live at rest, and himself accepted as their especial friend. This did *Cyneas*, with all his cunning, and with liberal gifts, labour to effect: but neither

man nor woman could be found in *Rome*, that would take any bribe of him; neither did their desire of recovering their captives, or their danger, by the rising of many states in *Italy* against them, so incline them to peace, as the vehement exhortation of *Appius Claudius*, an old and blind senator, did stir them up to make good their honour by war. So they returned answer, that whilst *Pyrrhus* abode in *Italy*, they would come to no agreement with him.

Such was the report that *Cyneas* made at his return, of the *Roman* puissance and virtue, as kindled in *Pyrrhus* a great desire of confederacy with that gallant city. Hereupon many kind offices passed between them: but still when he urged his motion of peace, the answer was, *He must first depart out of Italy, and then treat of peace.*

In the mean season each part made provision for war; the *Romans* levying a more mighty army than the former; and *Pyrrhus* being strengthened with access unto his forces, of all the east parts of *Italy*. So they came to trial of a second battel, wherein (tho' after long and cruel fight) the boistrous violence of the elephants gave to *Pyrrhus* a second victory. But this was not altogether so joyful as the former had been: rather it gave him cause to say, that such another victory would be his utter undoing. For he had lost the flower of his army in this battel, and tho' he drove the *Romans* into their camp, yet he could not force them out of it, nor saw any likelihood of prevailing against them that were like to be relieved with daily supplies, whilst he should be driven to spend upon his old stock. Neither could he expect that his elephants should always stand him in stead. A little knowledge of their manner in fight, would soon teach the *Romans*, that were apt scholars in such learning, how to make them unserviceable. Wherefore he desired nothing more, than how to carry his honour safe out of *Italy*: which to do (seeing the *Romans* would not help him, by offering or accepting any fair conditions of peace or of truce) he took a slight occasion, presented by fortune, that followeth to be related.

SECT. III.

The great troubles in Macedon and Sicil. How Pyrrhus being invited into Sicil, forsook Italy; won the most of the isle, and lost it in short space. Pyrrhus returns into Italy; where he is beaten by the Romans, and so goes back to his own kingdom.

WHEN *Ptolemy Ceraunus* had traiterously murdered his benefactor and patron *Seleucus*, he presently seized upon all the dominions of *Lyfimachus* in *Europe*, as if they had been the due reward unto him, that had slain the conqueror. The houses of *Cassander* and *Lyfimachus* were then fallen to the ground: neither was there in *Macedon* any man of strength and reputation enough to advance himself against *Ceraunus*. The friends of *Lyfimachus* were rather pleased to have him their king, that had (as he professed) revenged their lord's death, than any way offended with the odiousness of his fact, by which they were freed from subjection, to one, against whom they had stood in opposition. Many there were, that upon remembrance of his father's great virtue, gathered hope of finding the like in *Ceraunus*: perswading themselves that his reign might prove good, tho' his entrance had been wicked. These afflictions of the *Macedonians* did serve to defeat *Antigonus* the son of *Demetrius*, that made an attempt upon the kingdom.

As for *Antigonus*, the son of *Silenus*, he was far off, and might be questioned about some part of *Asia*, ere he should be able to bring an army near unto *Europe*. Yet he made great shew of meaning to revenge his father's death: but being stronger in money than in arms, he was content, after a while, to take fair words, and make peace with the murtherer. While these three strove about the kingdom, *Pyrrhus*, who thought his claim as good as any of theirs, made use of their dissension: threatening war, or promising his assistance to every one of them. By these means he strengthened himself, and greatly advanced his *Italian* voyage, which he had then in hand: requesting money of *Antiochus*, ships of *Antigonus*, and soldiers of *Ptolemy*, who gave him his daughter in marriage, and lent him a strong power of *Macedonian* soldiers, and of elephants (covenanting to have them restored at two years end) more for fear than for love: that so he might free himself from trouble, and quietly enjoy his kingdom. Thus *Ptolemy* grew mighty on the sudden; and the power that by wicked means he had gotten, by means as wicked he increased.

All *Macedon* and *Thrace* being his, the strong city of *Cassandria* was held by *Arfinoe* his sister, the widow of *Lyfimachus*, who lay therein with her young children. Her he circumvented by making love to her, and (according to the fashion of those times, wherein princes regarded no degree of consanguinity) taking her to wife, with promise to adopt her children: a promise that he meant not to perform; for it was not long ere he slew them and drove her into exile.

In the pride of this good success which his villany found, vengeance came upon him from afar, by the fury of a nation that he had never heard of. *Belgius* a captain of the *Gauls*, having forced his passage thro' many countries, unto the confines of *Macedon*, sent a proud message to *Ceraunus*, commanding him to buy peace with money, or otherwise to look for all the miseries of war. These *Gauls* were the race of those that issued out of their country, to seek new seats in that expedition, wherein *Brennus* took and burnt the city of *Rome*. They had divided themselves at their setting forth, into two companies; of which the one fell upon *Italy*, the other passing through the countries that lie on the northern side of the *Adriatic* sea, made long abode in *Pannonia*, and the regions adjoining, where they forced all the neighbour princes to redeem peace with tribute, as now they would have compelled *Ceraunus* to do, upon whose borders they came, about an hundred and eight years after such time as their fellows had taken *Rome*.

When their ambassadors came to *Ptolemy*, asking what he would give: his answer was, that he would be contented to give them peace, but it must be with condition, that they should put into his hands their princes as hostages, and yield up their arms, for otherwise he would neither pardon their boldness, nor give any credit to their words. At this answer, when it was returned, the *Gauls* did laugh; saying, that they would soon confute with deeds the vanity of such proud words. It may seem strange, that he, who had given away part of his army unto *Pyrrhus* for very fear, should be so confident in undertaking more mighty enemies. The king of the *Dardanians* offered to lend him twenty thousand men against the *Gauls*, but he scorned the offer; saying, that he had the children of those, who, under the conduct of *Alexander*, had subdued all the east. Thus he issued forth against the barbarous people, with his famous *Macedonians*, as if

the victory must needs have followed the reputation of a great name. But he soon found his great error, when it was too late. For the enemies were not only equal in strength of body and fierceness of courage, but so far superior to the *Macedonians* in numbers, that few or none escaped their fury: *Ptolemy* himself grievously wounded, fell into their hands whilst the battel continued, and they presently struck off his head, which they shewed to his men on the top of a lance, to their utter astonishment.

The report of this great overthrow filled all *Macedon* with such desperation, that the people fled into walled towns, and abandoned the whole country as lost. Only *Sosthenes*, a valiant captain, animating as many as he could, gathered a small army, with which he many times got the upper hand, and hindered *Belgius* from using the victory at his whole pleasure. In regard of this his virtue, the soldiers would have made him king, which title he refused, and was content with the name of a general. But (as mischiefs do seldom come alone) the good success of *Belgius*, drew into *Macedon* *Brennus*, another captain of the *Gauls*, with an hundred and fifty thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse; against which mighty army, when *Sosthenes* with his weak troops made opposition, he was easily beaten, and the *Macedonians* again compelled to hide themselves within their walls, leaving all their country to the spoil of the *Barbarians*.

Thus were the *Macedonians* destitute of a king, and trodden down by a nation that they had not heard of in less than fifty years after the death of *Alexander*, who sought to discover and subdue unknown countries, as if all *Greece*, and the empire of *Persia* had been too little for a king of *Macedon*.

Very seasonably had these news been carried to *Pyrrhus* in *Italy*, who sought a fair pretext of relinquishing his war with the *Romans*, had not other tiding out of *Sicily* distracted him, and carried him away in pursuit of nearer hopes. For, after the death of *Agathocles*, who reigned over the whole island, the *Carthaginians* sent an army to conquer *Sicily*, out of which, by him, they had been expelled. This army did so fast prevail, that the *Sicilians* had no other hope to avoid slavery, than in submitting themselves to the rule of *Pyrrhus*; whom, being a *Grecian*, and a noble prince, they thought it more for their good to obey, than to live under the well known heavy yoke of *Carthage*. To him therefore the *Syracusians*, *Leontines*, and *Agraguntines*, principal estates of the isle, sent ambassadors, earnestly desiring him to take them into his protection.

It grieved *Pyrrhus* exceedingly, that two such notable occasions, of enlarging his dominions, should fall out so unluckily, both at one time. Yet, whether he thought the business of *Sicily* more important, or more full of likelihood; or whether perhaps he believed (as came after to pass) that his advantage, upon *Macedon*, would not so hastily pass away, but that he might find some occasion to lay hold on it, at better leisure, over into *Sicily* he transported his army, leaving the *Tarentines* to shift for themselves; yet not leaving them free as he found them, but with a garrison in their town, to hold them in subjection.

As his departure out of *Italy*, was rather grounded on headlong passion, than mature advice; so were his actions following, until his return unto *Epirus*, rather many and tumultuous, than well ordered or note-worthy. The army which he carried into that Isle, consisted of thirty thousand

foot, and two thousand five hundred horse: with which, soon after his descent in *Sicily*, he forc'd the *Carthaginians* out of all, in effect, that they held therein. He also won the strong City of *Eryx*; and having beaten the *Mamertines* in battel, he began to change condition, and turn tyrant. For he drove *Softratus* (to whom his cruelty was suspected) out of the island, and put *Thenon* of *Syracuse* to death, being jealous of his greatness; which two persons had faithfully served him, and delivered the great and rich city of *Syracuse* into his hands. After this, his fortunes declined so fast, as he served himself, and salv'd the dis-reputation of his leaving *Sicily*, by an embassage sent him from the *Tarentines*, and *Samnites*, imploring his present help against the *Romans*, who, since his leaving *Italy*, had well near dispossest them of all that they had.

Taking this fair occasion, he embarked for *Italy*; but was first beaten by the *Carthaginian* gallies, in his passage; and secondly assailed in *Italy* it self, by eighteen hundred *Mamertines*, that attended him in the straits of the country. Lastly, after he had recovered *Tarentum*, he fought a third battel with the *Romans*, led by *M. Curius*, who was victorious over him, and forced him out of *Italy*, into his own *Epirus*.

A prince he was far more valiant than constant, and had he been but a general of an army for some other great king or state, and had been directed to have conquered any one country or kingdom, it is to be thought, that he would have purchased no less honour, than any man of war, either preceding or succeeding him; for a greater captain, or a valiant man, hath been no where found. But he never staid upon any enterprize; which was indeed the disease he had, whereof not long after he died in *Argos*.

SECT. IV.

How Antigonus, the son of Demetrius, delivered Macedon from the Gauls. How Pyrrhus won the kingdom of Macedon from Antigonus.

THE virtue of *Softhenes* being too weak, to defend the kingdom of *Macedon*; and the fortune which had accompanied him against *Belgius*, failing him in his attempts against *Brennus*: the *Macedonians* were no less glad to submit themselves unto the government of *Antigonus*, than they had formerly been desirous to free themselves, from the impotent rule of his father *Demetrius*. His coming into the country, with an army, navy, and treasure, becomming a king, did rather breed good hope in the people, than fill them with much confidence: for he was driven to use against the *Barbarians*, only those forces which he brought with him, having none other than good wishes of the *Macedons* to take his part. *Brennus*, with the main strength of his army, was gone to spoil the temple of *Apollo* at *Delphos*, having left no more behind him, than he thought necessary to guard the borders of *Macedon*, and *Pannonia*; which were about fifteen thousand foot, and three thousand horse. These could not be idle, but thought to get somewhat for themselves, in the absence of their fellows: and therefore sent unto *Antigonus*, offering to sell him peace, if he would pay well for it; which, by the example of *Ceraunus*, he had learnt (as they thought) not to refuse. *Antigonus* was unwilling to weaken his reputation, by condescending to their proud demands: yet he judged it unfit to exasperate their furious choler, by uncourteous words or usage, as *Ceraunus* had overfondly done. Wherefore he entertained their ambaf-

sadors in very loving and sumptuous manner with a royal feast; wherein he exposed to their view such abundance of massy gold and silver, that they were not so much delighted with the meat, as with sight of the vessels wherein it was served. He thought hereby to make them understand how great a prince he was, and how able, if need required, to wage a mighty army.

To which end, he likewise did shew unto them his camp and navy, but especially his elephants. But all this bravery served only to kindle their greedy appetites; who, seeing his ships heavy loaden, his camp full of wealth and ill fortified, himself (as it seemed) secure, and his men, both in strength and courage, inferior unto the *Gauls*, thought all time lost, wherein they suffered the present possessors to spend the riches which they accounted assuredly their own. They returned therefore to their companions, with none other news in their mouths, than of spoil and purchase; which tale carried the *Gauls* headlong to *Antigonus's* camp, where they expected a greater booty, than the victory over *Ceraunus* had given to *Belgius*. Their coming was terrible and sudden; yet not so sudden, but that *Antigonus* had notice of it, who, distrusting the courage of his own men, dislodged somewhat before their arrival, conveyed himself, with his whole army and carriage, into certain woods adjoining, where he lay close.

The *Gauls*, finding his camp forsaken, were not hasty to pursue him, but fell to ransacking the empty cabbins of the soldiers, in hope of finding all that was either lost or hidden. At length, when they had searched every place in vain, angry at their lost labour, they marched with all speed toward the seaside, that they might fall upon him, whilst he was busy in getting his men and carriages a-ship-board. But the success was no way answerable to their expectation; for, being proud of the terror which they had brought upon *Antigonus*, they were so careless of the sea-men, that without all order, they fell to the spoil of what they found on the shore, and in such ships as lay on ground.

Part of the army had left *Antigonus*, where he lay in covert, and had saved it self by getting aboard the fleet; in which number were some well experienced men of war, who discovering the much advantage offered unto them, by the desperate presumption of their enemies, took courage, and encouraged others, to lay manly hold upon the opportunity. So the whole number both of soldiers and mariners, landing together, with great resolution, gave so brave a charge upon the disordered *Gauls*, that their contemptuous boldness was thereby changed into sudden fear; and they, after a great slaughter, driven to cast themselves into the service of *Antigonus*.

The fame of this victory caused all the barbarous nations in those quarters, to re-entertain their ancient belief of the *Macedon* valour; by which the terrible and resistless oppressors of so many countries were overthrown.

To speak more of the *Gauls*, in this place; and to shew how, about these times, three tribes of them passed over into *Asia* the less, with their wars and conquests there, I hold it needless: the victorious arms of the *Romans*, taming them hereafter in the countries which now they won, shall give better occasion to rehearse these matters briefly.

Howsoever the good success of *Antigonus* got him reputation among the barbarous people, yet his own soldiers, that without his leading had won this victory, could not thereupon be perswaded to think him a good man of war, knowing that he had no interest in the honour of the service, wherein his conduct was no better, than creeping into a wood.

This

S E C T. V.

How Pyrrhus sailed for Sparta without success: His enterprize upon Argos, and his death.

This (as presently will appear) was greatly helpful unto *Pyrrhus*; though, as yet, he knew not so much. For *Pyrrhus*, when his affairs in *Italy* stood upon hard terms, had sent unto *Antigonus* for help; not without threats, in case it were denied. So was he sure to get either a supply, wherewith to continue his war against the *Romans*, or some seeming honourable pretence to forsake *Italy*, under colour of making his word good, in seeking revenge. The threats which he had used in bravery, mere necessity forced him, at his return into *Epirus*, to put in practice.

He brought home with him eight thousand foot and five hundred horse; an army too little to be employed, by his restless nature, in any action of importance; yet greater than he had means to keep in pay. Therefore he fell upon *Macedon*, intending to take what spoil he could get, and make *Antigonus* compound with him, to be freed from trouble. At his first entrance into this business, two thousand of *Antigonus's* soldiers revolted unto *Pyrrhus*; and many cities, either willingly or perforce, received him. Such fair beginnings easily persuaded the courage of this daring prince to set upon *Antigonus* himself, and to hazard his fortune, in trial of a battle, for the whole kingdom of *Macedon*.

It appears, that *Antigonus* had no desire to fight with this hot warrior; but thought it the wisest way, by protracting of time, to weary him out of the country. For *Pyrrhus* overtook him in a strait passage, and charged him in the rear, wherein were the *Gauls* and the elephants, which were thought the best of his strength; a manifest proof that he was in retreat. The *Gauls* very bravely sustain'd *Pyrrhus's* impression, yet were broken at length (when most of them were slain) after a sharp fight; wherein, it seems, that *Antigonus*, keeping his *Macedon* phalanx within the streight, and not advancing to their succour, took away their courage, by deceiving their expectation. The captains of the elephants were taken soon after, who, finding themselves exposed to the same violence that had consumed so many of the *Gauls*, yielded themselves and the beasts. All this was done in full view of *Antigonus* and his *Macedonians*, to their great discomfort; which emboldened *Pyrrhus* to charge them where they lay in their strength. Where the phalanx could be charged only in a front, it was a matter of extreme difficulty (if not impossible) to force it. But the *Macedonians* had seen so much, that they had no desire to fight against *Pyrrhus*, who discovered so well their affections, that he adventured to draw near in person, and exhort them to yield. Neither the common soldier, nor any leader, refused to become his follower. All forsook *Antigonus*, a few horse-men excepted, that fled along with him to *Theffalonia*, where he had some small forces left, and money enough to entertain a greater power, had he known where to levy it. But whilst he was thinking how to allure a sufficient number of the *Gauls* into his service, whereby he might repair his loss, *Ptolemy* the son of *Pyrrhus* came upon him; and easily defeating his weak forces, drove him to fly from the parts about *Macedon*, to those towns afar off in *Peloponnesus*, in which he had formerly lurked, before such time as he looked abroad into the world, and made himself a king.

This good success revived the spirits of the *Epirus*, and caused him to forget all sorrow of his late misfortunes in the *Roman* war; so that he sent for his son *Heleus* (whom he had left with a garrison in the castle of *Tarentum*) willing him to come over into *Greece*, where was more matter of conquest, and at the *Italians* shift for themselves.

PYRRHUS had now conceived a great hope, that nothing should be able to withstand him; seeing that in open fight he had vanquished the *Gauls*, beaten *Antigonus*, and won the kingdom of *Macedon*. There was not in all *Greece*, nor indeed in all the lands that *Alexander* had won, any leader of such name and worth, as deserved to be set up against him; which filled him with the opinion that he might do what he pleased. He raised therefore an army, consisting of twenty-five thousand foot, two thousand horse, and twenty-four elephants; pretending war against *Antigonus*, and the giving liberty to those towns in *Peloponnesus*, which the same *Antigonus* held in subjection; though it was easily discovered, that such great preparations were made for accomplishment of some design more important, than war against a prince already vanquished, and almost utterly dejected; especially the *Lacedemonians* feared this expedition, as made against their state. For *Cleonymus*, one of their kings, being expelled out of his country, had betaken himself to *Pyrrhus*, who readily entertained him, and promised to restore him to his kingdom. This promise was made in secret, neither would *Pyrrhus* make shew of any displeasure that he bare unto *Sparta*; but contrariwise, professed that it was his intent to have two of his younger sons trained up in that city, as in a place of noble discipline. With such colours he deluded men, even till he entered upon *Laconia*, where presently he demeaned himself as an open enemy; excusing himself, and his former dissembling words, with a jest; *That he followed herein the Lacedemonian custom, of concealing what was truly purposed.* It had been indeed the manner of the *Lacedemonians*, to deal in like sort with others, whom, in the time of their greatness, they sought to oppress; but now they complained of that as falshood in *Pyrrhus*, which they always practised as wisdom, till it made them distrustful, forsaken, and almost contemptible. Nevertheless, they were not wanting to themselves in this dangerous extremity; for the old men and women laboured in fortifying the town, causing such as could bear arms to reserve themselves fresh against the assault, which *Pyrrhus* had unwisely deferred, upon assurance of prevailing.

Sparta was never fortified before this time, otherwise than with armed citizens. Soon after this (it being built upon uneven ground, and, for the most part, hard to approach) the lower and more accessible places were fenced with walls; at the present, only trenches were cast, and barricadoes made with carts, where the entrance seemed most easy. Three days together it was assailed by *Pyrrhus* exceeding fiercely, and no less stoutly defended. The desperate courage of the citizens preserved the town the first day, whereinto the violence of *Pyrrhus* had forced entrance the second day, but that his wounded horse threw him to the ground, which made his soldiers more mindful of saving the person of their king, than of breaking into the city, though already they had torn in under the barricadoes. Presently after this, one of *Antigonus's* captains got into *Sparta* with a good strength of men, and *Areus* the king returned out of *Crete* (where he had been helping his friends in war) with two thousand men, little knowing the danger in which his own country stood, until he was almost at home. These succours did not more animate the *Spartans*, than kindle in *Pyrrhus* a desire

a desire to prevail against all impediments. But the third day's work shewed, how great his error had been in forbearing to assault the town at his first coming; for he was so manfully repelled, that he saw no likelihood of getting the place, otherwise than by a long siege; in which tedious course he had no desire to spend his time.

Antigonus had now raised an army, though not strong enough to meet the enemy in plain field, yet able to hinder all his purposes. This made *Pyrrhus* doubtful what way to take, being diversly affected, by the difficulty of his enterprize in hand, and the shame of taking a repulse in his first attempt. Whilst he was thus perplexed, letters came from *Argos*, inviting him thither, with promise to deliver that city into his hands.

Civil dissention raging then hotly in *Argos*, caused the heads of several factions, to call in *Pyrrhus* and *Antigonus*; but the coming of these two princes taught the citizens wit, and made them desirous to rid their hands of such powerful assistants, as each of the two kings pretended himself to be. *Antigonus* told the *Argives*, that he came to save them from the tyranny of *Pyrrhus*; and that he would be gone, if they needed not his help. On the other side, *Pyrrhus* would needs persuade them, that he had none other errand, than to make them safe from *Antigonus*; offering in like manner to depart, if they so desired.

The *Argives* took small pleasure in hearing the fox and kite at strife, which of them should keep the chickens from the enemy; and therefore prayed them both to divert their powers some other way. Hereunto *Antigonus* readily condescended, and gave hostages to assure his word; for he was the weaker, and stood in need of good-will. But *Pyrrhus* thought it enough to promise; hostages he would give none to his inferiors, especially, meaning deceit. This made them suspect his purpose to be such, as indeed it was. Yet he less regarded their opinions, than to hold them worthy of assurance, by giving such a bond as he intended to break ere the next morning.

It was concluded, that a gate of the city should be opened by night unto *Pyrrhus*, by his complices within *Argos*; which was accordingly performed. So his army, without any tumult, entered the city; till the elephants, with towers on their backs, cloyed the way, being too high to pass the gate. The taking off and setting on again of those towers, with the trouble thereto belonging, did both give alarm to the city, and some leisure to take order for defence,

before so many were entered as could fully master it. *Argos* was full of ditches, which greatly hindered the *Gauls* (that had the vanguard) being ignorant of the ways in the dark night. The citizens, on the other side, had much advantage, by their knowledge of every by-passage; and setting upon the enemies on all sides, did put them to great loss, and more trouble.

Pyrrhus therefore understanding by the confused noise and unequal shoutings of his own men, that they were in distress, entered the city in person, to take order for their relief, and assurance of the place. But the darkness, the throng, and many other impediments, kept him from doing any thing of moment, until break of day. Then began he to make his passage by force, and so far prevailed, that he got into the market-place. It is said, that seeing in that place the image of a wolf and a bull, in such posture as if they had been combatant, he called to mind an oracle, which threatened him with death when he should behold a bull fighting with a wolf; and that hereupon he made retreat.

Indeed the coming of *Antigonus* to the rescue, the disorder and confusion of his own men, with divers ill accidents, gave him reasonable cause to have retired out of the city, though the wolf and bull had been away. The tumult was such, that no directions could be heard; but as some gave back, so did others thrust forward, and the *Argives*, pressing hard upon him, forced *Pyrrhus* to make good his retreat with his own sword. The tops of the houses were covered with women, that stood looking on the fight. Among these was one, that saw her own son in dangerous case, fighting with *Pyrrhus*. Wherefore, she took a tile-stone or slate, and threw it so violently down on the head of *Pyrrhus*, that he fell to the ground astonished with the blow; and lying in that case, had his head cut off.

Thus ended the restless ambition of *Pyrrhus*, together with his life; and thus returned the kingdom of *Macedon* to *Antigonus*, who forthwith possessed the army, the body, and the children of his enemy. The body of *Pyrrhus* had honourable funeral, and was given by *Antigonus* unto *Helenus*, his son, which young prince he graciously sent home into his father's kingdom of *Epirus*. From this time forwards, the race of *Antigonus* held the kingdom of *Macedon*; the posterity of *Seleucus* reigned over *Asia* and *Syria*; and the house of *Ptolemy* had quiet possession of *Egypt*, until such time as the city of *Rome*, swallowing all up, digested these, among other countries, into the body of her own empire.

The End of the Fourth Volume.



THE
HISTORY
OF THE
WORLD:

INTREATING of the

*Times from the settled Rule of ALEXANDER'S
Successors in the East, until the ROMANS,
prevailing over all, made Conquest of ASIA
and MACEDON.*

The FIFTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Of the First Punic War.

SECT. I.

A discussion of that problem of Livy; Whether the Romans could have resisted the great Alexander? That neither the Macedonian nor the Roman soldier, was of equal valour to the English.



HAT question handled by Livy; Whether the great Alexander could have prevailed against the Romans, if, after his eastern conquest, he had bent all his forces against them, hath been, and is, the subject of much dispute; which (as it seems to me) the arguments on both sides do not so well explain, as doth the experience that Pyrrhus hath given of the Roman power in his days. For, if he, a commander (in Hannibal's judgment) inferior to Alexander, tho' to none else, could with small strength of men, and little store of money, or of other needful helps in war, vanquish them in two battels, and endanger their estate, when it was well settled, and held the best part of Italy under a confirmed obedience: what would Alexander have done, that was abundantly provided of all which is needful to a conqueror, wanting only matter of employment, coming upon them before their dominion was half so well settled? It is easy to say, that Alexander had no more than thirty thousand foot, and four thousand horse (as indeed, at his first passage into Asia, he carried over not many more) and

that the rest of his followers were no better than base effeminate *Africans*. But he that considers the armies of *Perdiccas*, *Antipater*, *Craterus*, *Eumenes*, *Ptolemy*, *Antigonus*, and *Lyfmachus*, with the actions by them performed; every one of which (to omit others) commanded only some fragment of this dead emperor's power; shall easily find, that such a reckoning is far short of the truth.

It were needless to speak of treasure, horses, elephants, engines of battery, and the like: of all which the *Macedonian* had abundance; the *Roman* having nought, save men and arms. As for sea-forces; he that shall consider after what sort the *Romans*, in their first *Punic* war, were trained; in the rudiments of navigation, sitting upon the shoar, and beating the sand with poles, to practise the stroke of the oar, as not daring to lanch their ill-built vessels into the sea; will easily conceive, how far too weak they would have proved in such services.

Now for helpers in war; I do not see, why all *Greece* and *Macedon*, being absolutely commanded by *Alexander*, might not well deserve to be laid in balance against those parts of *Italy*, which the *Romans* held in ill-assured subjection. To omit therefore all benefit, that the eastern world, more wealthy indeed than valiant, could have afforded unto the *Macedonian*: let us only conjecture, how the states of *Sicily* and *Carthage*, nearest neighbours to such a quarrel (had it happened) would have stood affected. The *Sicilians* were, for the most part, *Grecians*; neither is it to be doubted, that they would readily have submitted themselves unto him, that ruled all *Greece* besides them. In what terms they commonly stood, and how ill they were able to defend themselves, it shall appear anon. Sure it is, that *Alexander's* coming into those parts, would have brought excessive joy to them that were fain to get the help of *Pyrrhus*, by offering to become his subjects. As for the *Carthaginians*; if *Agathocles*, the tyrant of *Syracuse*, hated of his people, and ill able to defend his own besieged city, could, by adventuring to sail into *Africa*, put their dominion, yea, and *Carthage* it self, in extream hazard; shall we think that they would have been able to withstand *Alexander*? But, why do I question their ability, seeing that they sent embassadors, with their submission, as far as *Babylon*, ere the war drew near them? wherefore it is manifest, that the *Romans* must, without other succour, than perhaps of some few *Italian* friends (of which yet there were none that forsook them not, at some time, both before and after this) have opposed their valour, and good military discipline, against the power of all countries, to them known, if they would have made resistance. How they could have sped well, in undertaking such a match, it is uneasy to find in discourse of human reason. It is true, that virtue and fortune work wonders; but it is against cowardly fools, and the unfortunate: for whosoever contends with one too mighty for him, either must excell in these, as much as his enemy goes beyond him in power; or else must look, both to be overcome, and to be cast down so much the lower, by how much the opinion of his fortune and virtue renders him suspected, as likely to make head another time against the vanquisher. Whether the *Roman*, or the *Macedonian*, were in those days the better soldier, I will not take upon me to determine: tho' I might, without partiality, deliver mine own opinion, and prefer that army, which followed not only *Philip* and *Alexander*, but also *Alexander's* princes after him, in the greatest dangers of all sorts of war; before any, that come either had, or in long time after, did send forth. Concerning fortune, who can give a rule that shall always hold? *Alexander* was victorious in every battle that he fought; and the *Romans* in the issue of every war. But forasmuch as *Livy* hath judged this a matter worthy of consideration; I think it a great part of *Rome's* good fortune, that *Alexander* came not into *Italy*: where, in three years after his death, the two *Roman* consuls, together with all the power of that state, were surpris'd by the *Samnites*, and enforced to yield up their arms. We may therefore permit *Livy* to admire his own *Romans*, and to compare with *Alexander* those captains of theirs, which were honoured sufficiently, in being thought equal to his followers: that the same conceit should blind our judgment, we cannot permit without much vanity.

Now in deciding such a controversy, methinks it were not amiss, for an *Englishman*, to give such a sentence between the *Macedonians* and *Romans*, as the *Romans* once did (being chosen arbitrators) between the *Ardeates* and *Aricini*, that strove about a piece of land; saying, that it belonged unto neither of them, but unto the *Romans* themselves.

If therefore it be demanded, whether the *Macedonian*, or the *Roman*, were the best warrior? I will answer, the *Englishman*. For it will soon appear, to any that shall examine the noble acts of our nation in war, that they were performed by no advantage of weapon; against no savage or unmanly people; the enemy being far superiour unto us in numbers, and all needful provisions; yea, as well trained as we, or commonly better, in the exercise of war.

In what sort *Philip* won his dominion in *Greece*, what manner of men the *Persians* and *Indians* were, whom *Alexander* vanquished; as likewise of what force the *Macedonian phalanx* was, and how well appointed, against such arms as it commonly encountered; any man, that hath taken pains to read the fore-going story of them, doth sufficiently understand. Yet was this *phalanx* never, or very seldom, able to stand against the *Roman* armies; which were embattelled in so excellent a form, as I know not, whether any nation beside them have used, either before or since. The *Roman* weapons likewise, both offensive and defensive, were of greater use, than those with which any other nation hath served, before the fiery instruments of gunpowder were known. As for the enemies, with which *Rome* had to do, we find, that they, which did over-match her in numbers, were as far over-matched by her, in weapons; and that they, of whom she had little advantage in arms, had as little advantage of her in multitude. This also (as *Plutarch* well observeth) was a part of her happiness; that she was never over-lay'd with too great wars at once.

Hereby it came to pass, that having at first increased her strength, by accession of the *Sabines*; having won the state of *Alba*, against which she adventured her own self, as it were in wager, upon the heads of three champions; and having thereby made herself princeess of *Latium*; she did afterwards, by long war, in many ages, extend her dominion over all *Italy*. The *Carthaginians* had well-near oppressed her, but their soldiers were mercenary; so that for want of proper strength, they were easily beaten at their own doors. The *Etolians*, and

with them, all, or the most of *Greece*, assisted her against *Philip* the *Macedonian*; he being beaten, did lend her his help to beat the same *Illyrians*. The wars against *Antiochus* and other *Asiatics*, were such, as gave to *Rome* small cause of boast, though much of joy: for those opposites were as base of courage, as the lands which they held were abundant of riches. *Sicily*, *Spain*, and all *Greece*, fell into her hands by using her aid, to protect them against the *Carthaginians* and *Macedonians*.

I shall not need to speak of her other conquests; it was easy to get more when she had gotten all this. It is not my purpose to disgrace the *Roman* valour (which was very noble) or to blemish the reputation of so many famous victories: I am not so idle. This I say; that among all their wars, I find not any wherein their valour hath appeared comparable to the *English*. If my judgment seem over-partial, our wars in *France* may help to make it good.

First therefore it is well known, that *Rome* (or perhaps all the world besides) had never any so brave a commander in war as *Julius Cesar*; and that no *Roman* army was comparable unto that which served under the same *Cesar*. Likewise it is apparent, that this gallant army, which had given fair proof of the *Roman* courage, in good performance of the *Helvetian* war when it first entered into *Gaul*, was nevertheless utterly disheartened when *Cesar* led it against the *Germans*. So that we may justly impute all that was extraordinary in the valour of *Cesar's* men, to their long exercise, under so good a leader, in so great a war. Now let us in general compare with the deeds done by these best of *Roman* soldiers, in their principal service, the things performed in the same country by our common *English* soldiers, levied in haste from following the cart, or sitting on the shop-stall; so shall we see the difference. Herein will we deal fairly, and believe *Cesar*, in relating the acts of the *Romans*, but will call the *French* historians to witness what actions were performed by the *English*. In *Cesar's* time *France* was inhabited by the *Gauls*, a stout people, but inferior to the *French*, by whom they were subdued; even when the *Romans* gave them assistance. The country of *Gaul* was rent in sunder (as *Cesar* witnesseth) into many lordships, some of which were governed by petty kings, others by the multitude; none ordered in such sort as might make it applicable to the nearest neighbour. The factions were many, and violent; not only in general through the whole country, but between the petty states; yea, in every city, and almost in every house. What greater advantage could a conqueror desire? Yet there was a greater. *Ariovistus*, with his *Germans*, had over-run the country, and held much part of it in a subjection, little different from mere slavery; yea, so often had the *Germans* prevailed in war upon the *Gauls*, that the *Gauls* (who had sometimes been the better soldiers) did hold themselves no way equal to those daily invaders. Had *France* been so prepared unto our *English* kings, *Rome* itself by this time, and long ere this time, would have been ours. But when king *Edward III.* began his war upon *France*, he found the whole country settled in obedience to one mighty king; a king, whose reputation abroad was no less than his puissance at home; under whose ensign the king of *Bohemia* did serve in person; at whose call the *Genoese* and other neigh-

bour states were ready to take arms: finally, a king, unto whom one prince gave away his dominion for love, another sold away a goodly city and territory for money. The country lying so open to the *Roman*, and being so well fenced against the *English*, it is not-worthy, not who prevailed most therein (for it were mere vanity to match the *English* purchases with the *Roman* conquest) but whether of the two gave the greater proof of military virtue therein. *Cesar* himself doth witness, that the *Gauls* complained of their own ignorance in the art of war, and that their own hardiness was over-mastered by the skill of their enemies. Poor men, they admired the *Roman* towers and engines of battery, raised and planted against their walls, as more than human works. What greater wonder is it that such a people was beaten by the *Roman*, than that the *Caribes*, a naked people, but valiant as any under the sky, are commonly put to the worle by small numbers of *Spaniards*? Besides all this, we are to have regard of the great difficulty that was found in drawing all the *Gauls*, or any great part of them, to one head, that with joint forces they might oppose their assailants; as also the much more difficulty of holding them long together. For hereby it came to pass, that they were never able to make use of opportunity, but sometimes compelled to stay for their fellows, and sometimes driven to give or take battel, upon extreme disadvantages, for fear lest their companies should fall asunder; as indeed, upon any little disaster, they were ready to break, and return every one to the defence of his own. All this, and (which was little less than all this) great odds in weapon, gave to the *Romans* the honour of many gallant victories. What such help, or what other worldly help, than the golden metal of their soldiers had our *English* kings against the *French*? Were not the *French* as well experienced in feats of war? yea, did they not think themselves therein our superiors? were they not in arms, in horse, and in all provision, exceedingly beyond us? let us hear what a *French* writer saith of the inequality that was between the *French* and *English*, when their king *John* was ready to give the onset upon the *Black Prince*, at the battel of *Poitiers*. *John had all advantages over Edward, both of number, force, shew, country, and conceit (the which is commonly a consideration of no small importance in worldly affairs) and withal, the choice of all his horsemen (esteemed then the best in Europe) with the greatest and wisest captains of his whole realm.* And what could he with more?

I think it would trouble a *Roman* antiquary to find the like example in their histories; the example, I say, of a king brought prisoner to *Rome* by an army of eight thousand, which he had surrounded with forty thousand, better appointed, and no less expert warriors. This I am sure of, that neither *Syphax* the *Numidian*, followed by a rabble of half scullions, as *Livy* rightly terms them, nor those cowardly kings *Perseus* and *Gentius*, are worthy patterns. All that have read of *Cressy* and *Agincourt* will bear me witness, that I do not alledge the battel of *Poitiers*, for lack of other, as good examples of the *English* virtue; the proof whereof hath left many a hundred better marks in all quarters of *France*, than ever did the valour of the *Romans*. If any man impute these

^a The Dauphin of Viennois.

^b The king of Majorca.

^c John de Serres.

^d Jean avoit tout l'avantage

par dessus Edouard, le nombre, la force, le lustre, le pays, le prejugé (qui n'est pas communément une consideration de peu d'importance aux affaires du monde) & avec toi l'élite de la Cavallerie, lors estimée la meilleure de tout ton royaume.

victories of ours to the long-bow, as carrying farther, piercing more strongly, and quicker of discharge than the *French* cross-bow: my answer is ready; that, in all these respects, it is also (being drawn with a strong arm) superior to the musket; yet is the musket a weapon of more use. The gun and the cross-bow are of like force, when discharged by a boy or a woman, as when by a strong man: weakness, or sickness, or a sore finger, makes the long bow unserviceable. More particularly, I say, that it was the custom of our ancestors to shoot, for the most part, *point-blank*: and so shall he perceive, that will note the circumstances of almost any one battel. This takes away all objection: for when two armies are within the distance of a butt's length, one flight of arrows, or two at the most, can be delivered before they close. Neither is it in general true, that the long-bow reacheth farther, or that it pierceth more strongly than the cross-bow; but this is the rare effect of an extraordinary arm, whereupon can be grounded no common rule. If any man shall ask, How then came it to pass that the *English* won so many great battels, having no advantage to help him? I may, with best commendation of modesty, refer him to the *French* historian; who, relating the victory of our men at *Crevant*, where they passed a bridge in the face of the enemy, useth these words; *"The English comes with a conquering bravery, as he that was accustomed to gain every where, without any stay: he forceth our guard placed upon the bridge to keep the passage."* Or I may cite another place of the same author, where he tells how the *Britons*, being invaded by *Charles VIII*, king of *France*, thought it good policy to apparel twelve hundred of their own men in *English* cassocks, hoping that the very sight of the *English* red cross would be enough to terrify the *French*. But I will not stand to borrow of the *French* historians (all which, excepting *De Serres*, and *Paulus Æmilius*, report wonders of our nation) the proposition which first I undertook to maintain; *That the military virtue of the English prevailing against all manner of difficulties, ought to be preferred before that of the Romans, which was assisted with all advantages that could be desired.* If it be demanded; Why then did not our kings finish the conquest, as *Cesar* had done? my answer may be (I hope without offence) that our kings were like the race of the *Æacidae*, of whom the old poet *Ennius* gave this note; *Bellipotentes sunt magis quam sapientipotentes*; They were more warlike than politic. Whoso notes their proceedings, may find, that none of them went to work like a conqueror, save only king *Henry V*, the course of whose victories it pleased God to interrupt by his death. But this question may easily be answered, if another be first made; Why did not the *Romans* attempt the conquest of *Gaul*, before the time of *Cesar*? why not after the *Macedonian* war? why not after the *Punic*, or after the *Numantian*? At all these times they had good leisure, and then especially had they both leisure, and fit opportunity, when, under the conduct of *Marinus*, they had newly vanquished the *Cimbri* and *Tentones*, by whom the country of *Gaul* had been piteously wasted. Surely the words of *Tully* were true; that with other nations the *Romans* fought for dominion, with the *Gauls* for preservation of their own safety.

Therefore they attempted not the conquest of *Gaul*, until they were lords of all other countries to them known. We, on the other side, held only the one half of our own island; the other half be-

ing inhabited by a nation (unless perhaps in wealth and numbers of men somewhat inferior) every way equal to our selves; a nation anciently and strongly allied to our enemies the *French*, and in that regard enemies to us. So that our danger lay both before and behind us; and the greater danger at our backs, where commonly we felt, always we feared, a stronger invasion by land, than we could make upon *France*, transporting our forces over-sea.

It is usual with men that have pleased themselves in admiring the matters which they find in ancient histories, to hold it a great injury done to their judgment, if any take upon him, by way of comparison, to extol the things of later ages. But I am well persuaded, that as the divided virtue of this our island, hath given more noble proof of it self; than under so worthy a leader, that *Roman* army could do, which afterwards could win *Rome*, and all her empire, making *Cesar* a monarch: so hereafter, by God's blessing, who hath converted our greatest hindrance into our greatest help, the enemy that shall dare try our forces, will find cause to wish that, avoiding us, he had rather encountered as great a puissance, as was that of the *Roman* empire. But it is now high time that, laying aside comparisons, we return to the rehearsal of deeds done; wherein we shall find how *Rome* began, after *Pyrrhus* had left *Italy*, to strive with *Carthage* for dominion, in the first *Punic* war.

SECT. II.

The estate of Carthage, before it entred into war with Rome.

THE city of *Carthage* had stood above six hundred years, when first it began to contend with *Rome* for the mastery of *Sicily*. It forewent *Rome* one hundred and fifty years in antiquity of foundation; but in the honour of great achievements, it excelled far beyond this advantage of time. For *Carthage* had extended her dominion in *Africa* it self, from the west part of *Cyrene*, to the streights of *Hercules*, about fifteen hundred miles in length, wherein stood three hundred cities. It had subjected all *Spain*, even to the *Pyrenean* mountains, together with all the islands in the *Mediterranean* sea, to the west of *Sicily*, and of *Sicily* the better part. It flourished about seven hundred and thirty years, before the destruction thereof by *Scipio*, who, besides other spoils, and all that the soldiers reserved, carried thence four hundred and seventy thousand weight of silver; which make of our money (if our pounds differ not) fourteen hundred and ten thousand pounds sterling. So as this glorious city ran the same fortune, which many other great ones have done both before and since. The ruin of the goodliest pieces of the world, fore-shews the dissolution of the whole.

About one hundred years after such time as it was cast down, the senate of *Rome* caused it to be rebuilt; and by *Gracchus* it was called *Junonia*: it was again and again abandoned and re-peopled, taken and retaken; by *Genfericus* the *Vandal*, by *Bellisarius*, under *Justinian*, by the *Persians*, by the *Egyptians*, and by the *Mahometans*. It is now nothing. The seat thereof was exceeding strong, and, while the *Carthaginians* commanded the sea, invincible. For the sea compassed it about, saving that it was tied to the main by a neck of land, which passage had two mile and more of breadth (*Appian* saith three mile and one furlong) by which we may be induced to believe the common report, that the city it self

was above twenty miles in compass; if not that of *Strabo*, affirming the circuit to have been twice as great.

It had three walls without the wall of the city, and between each of those three or four streets, with vaults under-ground of thirty foot deep, in which they had place for three hundred elephants and all their food. Over these they had stables for four thousand horse, and granaries for all their provender. They had also lodgings in these streets between these out-walls for four thousand horse-men and twenty thousand foot-men, which (according to the discipline used now by those of *China*) never pestered the city. It had, towards the south part, the castle of *Byrsa*, to which *Servius* gives twenty-two furlongs in compass, that make two miles and a half. This was the same piece of ground which *Dido* obtained of the *Libyans*, when she got leave to buy only so much land of them as she could compass with an ox-hide. On the west side it had also the salt sea, but in the nature of a standing pool; for a certain arm of land, fastned to the ground on which the city stood, stretched it self toward the west continent, and left but seventy foot open for the sea to enter. Over this standing sea was built a most sumptuous arsenal, having their ships and gallies riding under it.

The form of their commonwealth resembled that of *Sparta*; for they had titular kings, and the *Aristocratical* power of senators. But (as *Regius* well observeth) the people in latter times usurped too great authority in their councils. This confusion in government, together with the trust that they reposed in hired soldiers, were helping causes of their destruction in the end. Two other more forcible causes of their ruin, were their avarice and their cruelty. * Their avarice was shewed both in exacting from their vassals (besides ordinary tributes) the one ^b half of the fruits of the earth; and in conferring of great offices, not upon gentle and merciful persons, but upon those who could best tyrannize over the people, to augment their treasures. Their cruelty appeared in putting them to death without mercy, that had offended through ignorance. The one of these rendered them odious to their vassals, whom it made ready, upon all occasions, to revolt from them: the other did break the spirits of their generals, by presenting, in the heat of their actions abroad, the fear of a cruel death at home. Hereby it came to pass, that many good commanders of the *Carthaginian* forces, after some great loss received, have desperately cast themselves, with all that remained under their charge, into the throat of destruction; holding it necessary, either to repair their losses quickly, or to ruin all together; and few of them have dared to manage their own best projects after that good form wherein they first conceived them, for fear lest the manner of their proceeding should be misinterpreted: it being the *Carthaginian* rule to crucify not only the unhappy captain, but even him whose bad counsel had prosperous event. The faults wherewith in general they of *Carthage* are taxed by *Roman* historians, I find to be these; lust, cruelty, avarice, craft, unfaithfulness, and perjury. Whether the *Romans* themselves were free

from the same crimes, let the trial be referred unto their actions. The first league between *Carthage* and *Rome* was very ancient, having been made the year following the expulsion of *Tarquin*. In that league the *Carthaginians* had the superiority, as imposing upon the *Romans* the more strict conditions. For it was agreed, that the *Romans* should not so much as have trade in some part of *Afric*, nor suffer any ship of theirs to pass beyond the head-land, or cape, then called the *Fair Promontory*, unless it were by force of tempest; whereas on the other side, no haven in *Italy* was forbidden to the *Carthaginians*. A second league was made long after, which (howsoever it hath pleased ^c *Livy* to say, that the *Romans* granted it at the *Carthaginians* intreaty) was more strict than the former; prohibiting the *Romans* to have trade in any part of *Africa*, or in the island of *Sardinia*.

By these two treaties it may appear, that the *Carthaginians* had an intent not only to keep the *Romans* (as perhaps they did other people) from getting any knowledge of the state of *Afric*; but to countenance and uphold them in their troubling all *Italy*, whereby they themselves might have the better means to occupy all *Sicily*, whilst that island should be destitute of *Italian* succours. Hereupon we find good cause of the joy that was in *Carthage*, and of the crown of gold weighing twenty-five pounds, sent from thence to *Rome*, when the *Samnites* were overthrown. But the little state of *Rome* prevailed faster in *Italy*, than the great power of *Carthage* did in *Sicily*. ^d For that mighty army of three hundred thousand men, which *Hannibal* conducted out of *Afric* into *Sicily*, was consumed by pestilence; many great fleets were devoured by tempests; and howsoever the *Carthaginians* prevailed at one time, the *Sicilians*, either by their own valour, or by assistance of their good friends out of *Greece*, did at some other time repair their own losses, and take revenge upon these invaders. But never were the people of *Carthage* in better hope of getting all *Sicily*, than when the death of *Agathocles* the tyrant had left the whole island in combustion; the estate of *Greece* being such at that time, that it seemed impossible for any succour to be sent from thence. But whilst the *Carthaginians* were busy in making their advantage of this good opportunity, *Pyrrhus*, invited by the *Tarentines* and their fellows, came into *Italy*, where he made sharp war upon the *Romans*. These news were displeasing to the *Carthaginians*, who, being a subtil nation, easily foresaw that the same busy disposition which had brought this prince out of *Greece* into *Italy*, would as easily transport him over into *Sicily*, as soon as he could finish his *Roman* war. To prevent this danger, they sent *Mago* ambassador to *Rome*, who declared in their name, that they were sorry to hear what misadventure had befallen the *Romans*, their good friends, in this war with *Pyrrhus*; and that the people of *Carthage* were very willing to assist the state of *Rome*, by sending an army into *Italy*, if their help were thought needful against the *Epirots*.

It was indeed the main desire of the *Carthaginians*, to hold *Pyrrhus* so hardly to his work in *Italy*, that they might, at good leisure, pursue their

* In *Pol. Arist.* l. 2. c. 9.

^b The *Turks* at this day do also take the one half of the poor man's corn that labours the earth; yet, they take tribute both of the bodies and of the souls of the *Christians* their vassals, by bereaving them of their ablest children, and bringing them up in the *Mahometan* religion. The *Irish* take the fourth sheaf, and were wont to eat up with their horse men, foot-men, and dogs, what they pleased of the other three parts remaining. The husbandman and the yeoman of *England* are the freest of all the world; and reason good, for of them have the bodies of our victorious armies been compounded. And it is the freeman, and not the slave, that hath courage, and the sense of shame deserved by cowardise. How free the *English* yeomen have been in times not long since past, *Ponticus* hath shewed in his praise of our country's ladies. But I may say, that they are more free now than ever, and our nobility and gentry more servile; for since the excessive bravery, and vain expence of our grandees, hath taught them to raise their tents; since by in-
clapnet, and dismembering of manors, the court-baron, and the court-leet, the principality of the gentry of *England* have been dissolved, the tenants having paid unto their lords their rack-rent, owe them now no service at all, and (perchance) as little love. ^c *Liv.* Dec. 1. l. 7.

^d *Xenoph. Græc. Hist.* l. 2.

business in *Sicily*, which caused them to make such a goodly offer. But the *Romans* were too high-minded, and refused to accept any such aid of their friends, lest it should blemish their reputation, and make them seem unable to stand by their own strength. Yet the message was taken lovingly, as it ought, and the former league between *Rome* and *Carthage* renewed, with covenants added, concerning the present business; that if either of the two cities made peace with *Pyrrhus*, it should be with reservation of liberty to assist the other, in case that *Pyrrhus* should invade either of their dominions. All this notwithstanding, and notwithstanding that the same *Mago* went and treated with *Pyrrhus*, using all means to sound his intentions (a matter very difficult where one upon every new occasion changeth his own purposes;) yet *Pyrrhus* found leisure to make a step into *Sicily*, where, though in fine, he was neither getter nor saver, yet he clean defeated the purposes of *Carthage*, leaving them at his departure from thence, as far from any end, as when they first began.

So many disasters in an enterprize, that, from the first undertaking, had been so strongly pursued through the length of many generations, might well have induced the *Carthaginians* to believe, that an higher providence resisted their intendment. But their desire of winning that fruitful island was so inveterate, that, with unwearied patience, they still continued in hope of so much the greater harvest, by how much their cost and pains therein buried had been the more. Wherefore they re-continued their former courses; and, by force or practice, recovered in few years all their old possessions; making peace with *Syracuse*, the chief city of the island, that so they might the better enable themselves to deal with the rest.

Somewhat before this time a troop of *Campanian* soldiers, that had served under *Agathocles*, being entertained within *Messina* as friends, and finding themselves too strong for the citizens, took advantage of the power that they had to do wrong, and, with perfidious cruelty, slew those that trusted them; which done, they occupied the city, lands, goods, and wives of those whom they had murdered. These mercenaries called themselves *Mamertines*. Good soldiers they were, and like enough it is, that mere desperation of finding any that would approve their barbarous treachery, added rage unto their stoutness. Having therefore none other colour of their proceedings, than *the law of the stronger*, they overran all the country round about them.

In this course at first they sped so well, that they did not only defend *Messina* against the cities of *Sicily* confederate; to wit, against the *Syracusians*, and others; but they rather won upon them, yea, and upon the *Carthaginians*, exacting tribute from many neighbouring places. But it was not long ere fortune turning her back to these *Mamertines*, the *Syracusians* won salt upon them; and finally, confining them within the walls of *Messina*, they also with a powerful army besieged the city. It happened ill, that about the same time a contention began between the *Syracusan* soldiers then lying at *Megara*, and the citizens of *Syracuse*, and governors of the commonwealth; which proceeded so far, that the army elected two governors among themselves; to wit, *Antemidorus*, and *Hieron*, that was afterwards king. *Hieron* being, for his years, excellently adorned with many virtues, although it was contrary to the policy of that state to approve any election made by the soldiers; yet for the great clemency he used at his first entrance, was, by general consent,

established and made governor. This office he rather used as a scale, thereby to climb to some higher degree, than rested content with his present preferment.

In brief, there was somewhat wanting, whereby to strengthen himself within the city, and somewhat without it, that gave impediment to his obtaining and safe keeping of the place he sought; to wit, a powerful party within the town, and certain mutinous troops of soldiers without, often and easily moved to sedition and tumult. For the first, whereby to strengthen himself, he took to wife the daughter of *Leptines*, a man of the greatest estimation and authority among the *Syracusians*. For the second, leading out the army to besiege *Messina*, he quartered all those companies which he had suspected on the one side of the city, and leading the rest of his horse and foot unto the other side, as if he would have assaulted it in two several parts, he marched away under covert of the town walls, and left the mutineers to be cut in pieces by the besieged. So returning home, and levying an army of his own citizens, well trained and obedient, he hastened again towards *Messina*, and was by the *Mamertines* (grown proud by their former victory over the mutineers) encountered in the plains of *Myleum*, where he obtained a most signal victory; and leading with him their commander captive into *Syracuse*, himself, by common consent, was elected and saluted king. Hereupon the *Mamertines* finding themselves utterly enfeebled, some of them resolved to give themselves to the *Carthaginians*, others to crave assistance of the *Romans*; to each of whom the several factions dispatched ambassadors for the very same purpose.

The *Carthaginians* were soon ready to lay hold upon the good offer; so that a captain of theirs got into the castle of *Messina*, whereof they that had sent for him gave him possession. But within a little while, they that were more inclinable to the *Romans*, had brought their companions to so good agreement, that this captain, either by force or by cunning, was turned out of doors, and the town reserved for other masters.

These news did much offend the people of *Carthage*, who crucified their captain, as both a traitor and coward; and sent a fleet and army to besiege *Messina*, as a town that rebelled, having once been theirs. *Hieron*, the new made king of *Syracuse* (to gratify his people, incensed with the smart of injuries lately received) added his forces to the *Carthaginians*, with whom he entered into league for exterminating the *Mamertines* out of *Sicily*. So the *Mamertines* on all sides were closed up within *Messina*, the *Carthaginians* lying with a navy at sea, and with an army on the one side of the town, whilst *Hieron* with his *Syracusians* lay before it on the other side.

In this their great danger came *Appius Claudius*, the *Roman* consul, with an army to the straits of *Sicily*; which passing by night with notable audacity, he put himself into the town, and sending messengers to the *Carthaginians*, and to *Hieron*, required them to depart; signifying unto them, that the *Mamertines* were now become confederates with the people of *Rome*, and that therefore he was come to give them protection, even by force of war, if reason would not prevail.

This message was utterly neglected, and so began the war between *Rome* and *Carthage*; wherein it will then be time to shew, on which part was the justice of the quarrel, when some actions of the *Romans*, lately foregoing this, have been first considered.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the first Punic war. That it was unjustly undertaken by the Romans.

WHEN Pyrrhus began his wars in Italy, the city of Rhegium being well affected to Rome, and not only fearing to be taken by the Epirots, but much more distrusting the Carthaginians, as likely to seize upon it in that busy time, sought aid from the Romans, and obtained from them a legion, consisting of four thousand soldiers, under the conduct of Decius Campanus, a Roman Prefect, by whom they were defended and assured for the present. But after a while, this Roman garrison, considering at good leisure the fact of the Mamertines, committed in Messina (a city in Sicily, situate almost opposite to Rhegium, and no otherwise divided than by a narrow sea, which severeth it from Italy) and rather weighing the greatness of the booty, than the odiousness of the villany by which it was gotten, resolved finally to make the like purchase, by taking the like wicked course. Confederating therefore themselves with the Mamertines, they entertained their hosts of Rhegium after the same manner, dividing the spoil and all which that state had among themselves.

When complaint was made to the senate and people of Rome of this outrage, they finding their honour thereby greatly stained (for no nation in the world made a more severe profession of justice than they did, during all the time of their growing greatness) resolved, after a while, to take revenge upon the offenders; and this they performed shortly after, when they had quenched the fires kindled in Italy by Pyrrhus. For, notwithstanding that those Romans in Rhegium (as men for the foulness of their fact, hopeless of pardon) defended themselves with an absolute resolution, yet in the end the assailants forced them, and those, which escaped the present fury, were brought bound to Rome, where, after the usual torments by whipping inflicted, according to the custom of the country, they had their heads stricken from their shoulders, and the people of Rhegium were again restored to their former liberties and estates.

This execution of justice being newly performed, and the fame thereof sounding honourably through all quarters of Italy, messengers came to Rome from Messina, desiring help against the Carthaginians and Syracusians, that were in a readiness to inflict the like punishment upon the Mamertines for the like offence. A very impudent request it was which they made, who, having both given example of that villany to the Roman soldiers, and helped them with joint forces to make it good, intreat the judges to give them that assistance, which they were wont to receive from their fellow-thieves.

The Romans could not suddenly resolve whether the way of honesty or of profit were to be followed; they evermore pretended the one, but they many times walked in the other. They considered how contrary the course of succouring the Mamertines was to their former counsels and actions, seeing for the same offences they had lately put to torment and to the sword their own soldiers, and restored the oppressed to their liberty. Yet, when they beheld the description of the Carthaginian dominion, and that they were already lords of the best parts of Africa, of the Mediterranean islands, of a great part of Spain, and some part of Sicily itself, whilst also they feared, that Syracuse therein seated (a city in beauty and riches little at that time inferior to Carthage, and far superior to Rome it-

self) might become theirs; the safety of their own estate spake for these Mamertines, who, if they (driven to despair by the Romans) should deliver Messina, with those other holds that they had, into the hands of the Carthaginians, then would nothing stand between Carthage and the lordship of all Sicily; for Syracuse itself could not, for want of succour, any long time subsist, if once the Carthaginians, that were masters of the sea, did fasten upon that passage from the main land. It was further considered, that the opportunity of Messina was such, as would not only debar all succours out of the continent from arrival in Sicily, but would serve as a bridge, whereby the Carthaginians might have entrance into Italy at their own pleasure.

These considerations of profit at hand, and of preventing dangers that threatened from afar, did so prevail above all regard of honesty, that the Mamertines were admitted into confederacy with the Romans, and Ap. Claudius, the consul, presently dispatched away for Messina, into which he entred, and undertook the protection of it, as is shewed before. The besiegers were little troubled with his arrival, and less moved with his requiring them to desist from their attempt. For they did far exceed him in number of men; the whole island was ready to relieve them in their wants, and they were strong enough at sea to hinder any supply from getting into the town. All this Appian himself well understood, and against all this he thought the stiff metal of his Roman soldiers a sufficient remedy. Therefore he resolved to issue out into the field, and to let the enemies know, that his coming was to send them away from the town, not to be besieged by them within it.

In executing this determination, it was very beneficial to him, that the enemy lay encamped in such sort, as one quarter was not well able to relieve another in distress. Hieron was now exposed to the same danger, whereinto he had wilfully cast his own mutinous followers not long before; only he was strong enough (or thought so) to make good his own quarter without help of others. Against him Appian Claudius issued forth, and (not attempting by unexpected fall to surprize his trenches) arranged his men in order of battel, wherewith he presented him. The Syracusan wanted not courage to fight, but surely he wanted good advice; else would he not have hazarded all his power against an enemy of whom he had made no trial, when it had been easy, and as much as was required, to defend his own camp. It may be, that he sought to get honour wherewith to adorn the beginning of his reign, but he was well beaten, and driven to save himself within his trenches, by which loss he learned a point of wisdom that stood him and his kingdom in good stead all the days of his life. It was a foolish desire of revenge that had made the Syracusians so busy in helping those of Carthage against the Mamertines.

Had Messina been taken by the Carthaginians, Syracuse itself must have sought help from Rome, against those friends which it now so diligently assisted. Hieron had (in respect of those two mighty cities) but a small stock, which it behoved him to govern well; such another loss would have made him almost bankrupt, therefore he quietly brake up his camp and retired home, intending to let them stand to their adventures that had hope to be gainers by the bargain. The next day, Claudius perceiving the Sicilian army gone, did with great courage, and with much alacrity of his soldiers, give charge upon the Carthaginians, wherein he sped so well, that the enemy forsook both field and camp, leav-

ing all the country open to the *Romans*, who, having spoiled all round without resistance, intended to lay siege unto the great city of *Syracuse*.

These prosperous beginnings, howsoever they animated the *Romans*, and filled them with hopes of attaining to greater matters than at first they had expected, yet did they not imprint any form of terror in the city of *Carthage*, that had well enough repaired greater losses than this, in which no more was lost than what had been prepared against the *Mamertines* alone, without any suspicion of war from *Rome*.

Now in this place I hold it seasonable to consider of those grounds whereupon the *Romans* entred into this war, not how profitable they were, nor how agreeable to rules of honesty (for questionless the enterprize was much to their benefit, though as much to their shame;) but how allowable in strict terms of lawfulness, whereupon they built all their allegations in maintenance thereof. That the *Mamertines* did yield themselves and all that they had into the *Romans* hands (as the *Campanes*, distressed by the *Samnites*, had done) I cannot find, neither can I find how the messengers of those folk, whereof one part had already admitted the *Carthaginians*, could be enabled to make any such surrendry in the publick name of all.

If therefore the *Mamertines*, by no lawful surrendry of themselves and their possessions, were become subject unto *Rome*, by what better title could the *Romans* assist the *Mamertines* against their most ancient friends the *Carthaginians*, than they might have aided the *Campanes* against the *Samnites*, without the same condition? which was (as they themselves confessed) by none at all. But let it be supposed, that some point serving to clear this doubt is lost in all histories. Doubtless it is, that no company of pirates, thieves, outlaws, murderers, or such other malefactors, can, by any good success of their villany, obtain the privilege of civil societies, to make league or truce, yea, or to require fair war; but are by all means, as most pernicious vermin, to be rooted out of the world. I will not take upon me to maintain that opinion of some *Civilians*, that a prince is not bound to hold his faith with one of these; it were a position of ill consequence: This I hold, that no one prince or state can give protection to such as these as long as any other is using the sword of vengeance against them, without becoming accessory to their crimes. Wherefore we may esteem this action of the *Romans* so far from being justifiable, by any pretence of confederacy made with them, as that contrariwise, by admitting this nest of murderers and thieves into their protection, they justly deserved to be warred upon themselves by the people of *Sicily*; yea, although *Messina* had been taken, and the *Mamertines* all slain, ere news of this confederacy had been brought unto the besiegers. The great *Alexander* was so far perswaded herein, that he did put to the sword all the *Branchiades* (a people in *Sogdiana*) and rased their city, notwithstanding that they joyfully entertained him as their lord and king, because they were descended from a company of *Malefians*, who, to gratify king *Xerxes* had robbed a temple, and were by him rewarded with the town and country, which these of their posterity enjoyed. Nevertheless, in course of human justice, long and peaceable possession gives *jus acquiritum*, a kind of right by prescription, unto that which was at first obtained by wicked means, and doth free the descendants from the crime of their

ancestors, whose villanies they do not exercise. But that the same generation of thieves, which by a detestable fact hath purchased a rich town, should be acknowledged a lawful company of citizens, there is no shew of right. For even the conqueror, that by open war obtaineth a kingdom, doth not confirm his title by those victories which gave him first possession, but length of time is requisite to establish him, unless by some alliance with the ancient inheritors he can better the violence of his claim, as did our king *Henry I.* by his marriage with *Maud*, that was daughter of *Malcolm*, king of the *Scots*, by *Margaret*, the niece of *Edmund Ironside*. Wherefore I conclude, that the *Romans* had no better ground (if they had so good) of justice in this quarrel, than had the *Goths*, *Huns*, *Vandals*, and other nations, of the wars that they made upon the *Roman* empire, wherein *Rome* herself, in the time of her visitation, was burnt to the ground.

S E C T. IV.

Of the island of Sicily.

†. I.

The quality of the island, and the first inhabitants thereof.

THE defence of the *Mamertines*, or the possession of *Messina*, being now no longer, since the first victories of *Appius Claudius*, the objects of the *Roman* hopes; but the dominion of all *Sicily* being the prize for which *Rome* and *Carthage* are about to contend: it will be agreeable unto the order, which in the like cases we have observed, to make a brief collection of things concerning that noble island, which hath been the stage of many great acts, performed as well before and after, as in this present war.


That *Sicily* was sometime a *Peninsula* or *Demy Isle* adjoining to *Italy*, as a part of *Brutium* in *Calabria* near unto *Rhegium*, and afterwards by violence of tempest severed from the same, it is a general opinion of all antiquity; but at what certain time this division happened, there is no memorial remaining in any ancient writer. *Strabo*,^a *Pliny*, and *Dionysius* affirm, that it was caused by an earthquake; ^b *Silius* and *Cassiodorus*, do think it to have been done by the rage and violence of the tide and surges of the sea. Either of these opinions may be true; for so was *Eubœa* severed from *Bœotia*, *Atalante* and *Macris* from *Eubœa*, *Scilly* here in *England* from the cape of *Cornwall*, and *Britain* itself (as may seem by *Verstegan's* arguments) from the opposite continent of *Gaul*; but for *Sicily*, they which lend their ears to fables, do attribute the cause of it to *Neptune* (as *Eusebius* witnesseth) who with his three forked mace, in favour of *Jocastus*, the son of *Æolus*, divided it from the main land, and so made it an island, which before was but a *Demy Isle*, that by that means he might the more safely inhabit and possess the same. ^c *Diodorus Siculus*, moved by the authority of *Hesiodus*, ascribeth the labour of sundring it from *Italy* to *Orion*; who, that he might be compared to *Hercules* (cutting through the rocks and mountains) first opened the *Sicilian* streights, as *Hercules* did those of *Gibraltar*.

They, which value the islands of the midland sea, according to their quantity and content, do make this the greatest, as *Eusebius* and *Strabo*, who affirm this, not only to excel the rest for big-

^a Plin. l. 2. c. 91.

^b Sil. l. 5.

^c Orion. l. 4. c. 14. Diocl. l. 6. Ovid. de Fast. 4.



THE
SEA
TYRRENUM

THE
AFRICAN
SEA

The manner of
fight, between Nicias
and the Siracusan
in their own Port

Vulcan's
Temple

Messana
or Zancle

Taurromenia
or Naxos

Aetna

Apollonia

Simethus F.

Gychoptum
or Scopuli

Catana

Trinitum

Leontium

Megara
or Myla

Thapsus

Trinacia

SYRACUSII

Anapus F.

Syracusa

Cyparis F.

Erineus

The overthrow
of Nicias

Callipolis

Notia

Pachynus P.

Camarina

Diana F.

Gela

Syracus F.

Heraclea or
Minoa Agrigentinum

SICANIARE G.

Lucania F.

Herbessus

Enna

Heraclea

Motya

Panormus

Elyma

Grinorus

Segesta

Terres
or Terres
or Terres

Acathus F.

Lilybaeum

Enella

Segetus F.

Mazara

Selinus

Thermus

Drepanum

Phorbantia

Hiera

Aegula

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ness, but also for goodness of soil. As concerning the form of this island, *Pomponius Mela* saith, it is like that capital letter of the *Greeks* which they call *Delta*, namely, that it hath the figure of a triangle, which is generally known to be true. That the whole island was consecrated to *Ceres* and *Proserpina*, all old writers with one consent affirm. To *Ceres* it was dedicated, because it first taught the rules of setting and sowing of corn; to *Proserpina*, not so much for that she was from hence violently taken by *Pluto*, as because (which *Plutarch* and *Diodorus* do report for truth) that *Pluto*, as soon as she, uncovering herself, first shewed herself to be seen of him, gave her the dominion thereof.

Of the fertility and riches of this country, there is a famous testimony writ by *Cicero*, in his second oration against *Verres*, where he saith, that *Marcus Cato* did call it the granary and store-house of the commonwealth, and the nurse of the vulgar sort. The same *Cicero* doth add in that place, that it was not only the store-house of the people of *Rome*, but also that it was accounted for a well furnished treasury. For without any cost or charge of ours (saith he) it hath usually cloathed, maintained, and furnished our greatest armies with leather, apparel and corn. ^a *Strabo* reporteth almost the same thing of it. Whatsoever *Sicily* doth yield (saith *Solinus*) whether by the sun and temperature of the air, or by the industry and labour of man, it is accounted next unto those things that are of best estimation; were it not, that such things as the earth first putteth forth are extremely overgrown with saffron. *Diodorus Siculus* saith, that in the fields near unto *Leontium*, and in divers other places of this island, wheat doth grow of itself, without any labour or looking to of the husbandman. *Martianus* sheweth, that there were in it six colonies, and sixty cities; there are that reckon more, whereof the names are found scatteringly in many good authors.

Now besides many famous acts done by the people of this island, as well in peace as war, there be many other things which have made it very renowned; as the birth of *Ceres*, the ravishing of *Proserpina*, the giant *Enceladus*, the mount *Ætna*, *Scylla* and *Charybdis*, with other antiquities and rarities; besides those learned men the noble mathematician *Archimedes*, the famous geometrician *Euclides*, the painful historian *Diodorus*, and *Empedocles* the deep philosopher.

That *Sicily* was at first possessed and inhabited by giants, *Læstrigones*, and *Cyclopes*, barbarous people and uncivil, all histories and fables do jointly with one consent aver. Yet *Thucydides* saith, that these savage people dwelt only in one part of the island. Afterwards the *Sicani*, a people of *Spain* possessed it. That these *Sicani* were not bred in the isle (although some do so think) *Thucydides* and *Diodorus* do constantly avouch.

Of these it was named *Sicania*. These *Sicani* were invaded by the *Siculi*; who, inhabiting that part of *Latium* whereon *Rome* was afterwards built, were driven by the *Pelasgi* from their own seats, and finding no place upon the continent which they were able to master and inhabit, passed over into this island, three hundred years before the *Greeks* sent any colonies thither: And (saith *Philistus*) eighty years before the fall of *Troy*. These *Siculi* gave the name of *Sicilia* to the island, and making war upon the *Sicani*, drove them from the east and northern part thereof into the west and south.

At their landing they first built the city *Zancle*, afterwards called *Messina*; and after that *Catana*, *Leontium*, and *Syracuse* itself, beating from thence the *Etolians*, who long before had set up a town in that place. As for the name of *Syracuse*, it was not known till such time as *Archias* of *Corinth* (long after) won that part of the island from the *Siculi*; neither did the *Siculi* at their first arrival dispossess the *Etolians* thereof, but some hundred years after their descent; and after such time as they had founded the cities before-named, with *Nææ*, *Hybla*, *Thrinacia*, and divers others.

After these *Siculi* came another nation out of *Italy*, called *Morgetes*, who were thence driven by the *Oenotrians*. These sat down in that part of *Sicily* where they afterwards raised the cities of *Morgentum* and *Leontium*. For at this time the *Siculi* were divided, and by a civil war greatly in-feeble. Among these ancient stories, we find the last voyage, and the death of *Minos*, king of *Crete*. *Thucydides*, an historian of unquestionable sincerity, reports of *Minos*, that he made conquest of many islands, and some such business, perhaps, drew him into *Sicily*. But the common report is, that he came thither in pursuit of *Dædalus*. The tale goes thus: *Dædalus* flying the revenge of *Minos*, came into *Sicily* to *Cocalus*, king of the *Sicani*, and during his abode there, he built a place of great strength near unto *Megara*, for *Cocalus* to lay up his treasure in, together with many notable works, for which he was greatly admired and honoured.

Among the rest, he cast a ram in gold, that was set up in the temple of *Venus Erycina*; which he did with so great art, as those that beheld it, thought it rather to be living than counterfeit.

Now *Minos*, hearing that *Cocalus* had entertained *Dædalus*, prepares to invade the territory of *Cocalus*; but when he was arrived, *Cocalus* doubting his own strength, promiseth to deliver *Dædalus*. This he performs not, but in the mean while kills *Minos* by treason, and perswades the *Cretans*, *Minos's* followers, to inhabit a part of *Sicily*; the better (as it seems) to strengthen himself against the *Siculi*. Hereunto the *Cretans* (their king being dead) gave their consent, and built for themselves the city of *Minoa*, after the name of their king *Minos*. After, they likewise built the town of *Engium*, now called *Gange*; and these were the first cities built by the *Greeks* in *Sicily*, about two ages before the war of *Troy*; for the grand-children of *Minos* served with the *Greeks* at the siege thereof.

But after such time as the *Cretans* understood, that their king had by treason been made away, they gathered together a great army to invade *Cocalus*; and landing near unto *Camicus*, they besieged the same five years, but in vain. In the end (being forced to return without any revenge taken) they were wrack'd on the coast of *Italy*; and having no means to repair their ships, nor the honour they had lost, they made good the place whereon they fell, and built *Hyria*, or *Hyrium*, between the two famous ports of *Brundisium* and *Tarentum*. Of these *Cretans* came those nations afterwards called *Iapyges* and *Messapii*.

After the taking of *Troy*, *Egeus* and *Elymus* brought with them certain troops into *Sicily*, and seated themselves among the *Sicani*, where they built the cities of *Egesta* and *Elyma*.

It is said that *Aeneas* visited these places in his passage into *Italy*, and that some of the *Trojans*, his followers, were left behind him in these towns of *Sicily*; whereof there want not good authors that make *Aeneas* himself the founder.

About the same time the *Phenicians* seized upon the promontories of *Pachinus* and *Lilybaeum*, and upon certain small isles adjoining to the main island; which they fortified, to secure the trades that they had with the *Sicilians*; like as the *Portugals* have done in the *East-Indies*, at *Goa*, *Ormuz*, *Mosambique*, and other places. But the *Phenicians* stay'd not there; for after they had once assured their descents, they built the goodly city of *Panormus*, now called *Palermo*.

These we find were the nations that inhabited the isle of *Sicily* before the war of *Troy*, and ere the *Greeks* in any numbers began to straggle in those parts.

It may perchance seem strange to the reader, that in all ancient story he finds one and the same beginning of nations after the flood; and that the first planters of all parts of the world were said to be mighty and giant-like men; and that as *Phenicia*, *Egypt*, *Libya* and *Greece*, had *Hercules*, *Orestes*, *Anteus*, *Typhon*, and the like; as *Denmark* had *Starbaterus*, remembered by ^a *Saxo Grammaticus*; as *Scythia*, *Britany*, and other regions had giants for their first inhabitants: so this isle of *Sicily* had her *Læstriogones* and *Cyclopes*. This discourse I could also reject for fained and fabulous, did not *Moses* make us know, that the *Zamzummins*, *Emims*, *Anakims*, and *Og* of *Bashan*, and others, which sometime inhabited the mountains and desarts of *Moab*, *Ammon*, and mount *Seir*, were men of exceeding strength and stature, and of the races of giants; and were it not that ^b *Tertullian*, *St. Augustine*, *Nicephorus*, *Procopius*, *Isidore*, *Pliny*, *Diodore*, *Herodotus*, *Solinus*, *Plutarch*, and many other authors, have confirmed the opinion. Yea, *Vesputius*, in his second navigation into *America*, hath reported, that himself hath seen the like men in those parts. Again, whereas the self-same is written of all nations that is written of any one, as touching their simplicity of life, their mean fare, their feeding on acorns and roots, their poor cottages, the covering of their bodies with the skins of beasts, their hunting, their arms and weapons, and their warfare, their first passages over great rivers and arms of the sea upon rafts of trees tied together; and afterwards, their making boats, first of twigs and leather, then of wood; first with oars, and then with sail; that they esteemed as gods the first finders out of arts; as of husbandry, of laws, and of policy; it is a matter that makes me neither to wonder at, nor to doubt of it. For they all lived in the same newness of time, which we call old-time, and had all the same want of his instruction, which (after the Creator of all things) hath by degrees taught all mankind. For other teaching had they none, that were removed far off from the *Hebrews*, who

inherited the knowledge of the first patriarchs, than that from variable effects they began by time and degrees to find out the causes: from whence came philosophy natural, as the moral did from disorder and confusion, and the law from cruelty and oppression.

But it is certain, that the age of time hath brought forth stranger and more incredible things than the infancy. For we have now greater giants for vice and injustice than the world had in those days for bodily strength; for cottages and houses of clay and timber we have raised palaces of stone; we carve them, we paint them, and adorn them with gold; insomuch, as men are rather known by their houses, than their houses by them; we are fallen from two dishes to two hundred; from water to wine and drunkenness; from the covering of our bodies with the skins of beasts, not only to silk and gold, but to the very skins of men. But to conclude this digression, time will also take revenge of the excess which it hath brought forth; *Quam longa dies peperit, longiorque auxilium, longissima subruet*; Long time brought forth, longer time increased it, and a time longer than the rest shall overthrow it.

†. II.

The plantation of the Greeks in Sicily.

WHEN the first inhabitants had contended long enough about the dominion of all *Sicily*, it happened that one *Theocles*, a *Greek*, being driven upon that coast by an easterly wind, and finding true the commendations thereof which had been thought fabulous, being delivered only by poets, gave information to the *Athenians* of this his discovery, and proposed unto them the benefit of this easy conquest, offering to become their guide. But *Theocles* was as little regarded by the *Athenians*, as *Columbus*, in our grand-fathers times, was by the *English*. Wherefore he took the same course that *Columbus* afterwards did. He over-laboured not himself in perswading the noble *Athenians* (who thought themselves to be well enough already, to their own profit, but went to the *Chalcidians*, that were needy and industrious, by whom his project was gladly entertained. By these was built the city of *Naxos*, and a colony planted of *Eubeans*.

But the rest of the *Greeks* were wiser than our western princes of *Europe*; for they had no pope that should forbid them to occupy the void places of the world. *Archias* of *Corinth* followed the *Eubeans*, and, landed in *Sicily*, near unto that city called afterward ^c *Syracuse*; of which that part only was then compassed with a wall, which the *Etolians* called *Homothermon*; the *Greeks* *Nafos*; the *Latins* *Insula*. He, with his *Corinthians*, having overcome the *Siculi*, drove them up into the country; and after a few years, their multitudes increasing, they added unto the city of the island that of *Acradina*, *Tycha*, and *Neapolis*. So as well by the commodity of the double port, capable of

^a Saxo G. in præfat. hist.

^b Tertul. de Resurr. Aug. de Civit. Dei, l. 15. c. 9. Et quell. in Gen. Niceph. l. 2.

^c 37. Procop. l. 2. de Bello Goth. Plin. l. 7. c. 2.

^c Syracuse, as Cicero relates, was the greatest and most woody city of all that the Greeks possess'd. For the situation is both strong and of an excellent prospect, from every entrance by land or sea. The port was (for the most part) environed with beautiful buildings; and that part which was without the city, was on both sides bank'd up, and sustained with beautiful walls of marble. The city itself was one of the greatest in the world: For it had in compass (as Strabo reporteth) without the treble wall thereof, 180 furlongs, which made of our miles about 18. It was compounded of four cities (Strabo saith of five) to wit, *Insula*, *Acradina*, *Tycha* and *Neapolis*; of which greatness the ruins and foundations of the walls do yet witness. After such time as the Dorians of Peloponnesus had driven out the *Sicilians*, this goodly city, for a long time, became the seat of tyrants. The first whereof was *Gelo*; the second, *Hiero*, the elder; the third, *Thrasybulus*; the fourth and fifth, *Dionysius* the elder and younger; the sixth, *Dion*; the seventh, *Agathocles*; the eighth, *Pyrrhus*; the ninth, *Hiero* the younger; the tenth and last, *Hieronimus*: who, being slain at *Leontium*, at length the Romans conquered it under the conduct of *Marcellus*.

as many ships as any haven of that part of *Europe*, as by the fertility of the soil; *Syracuse* grew up in great haste to be one of the goodliest towns of the world. In short time the *Greeks* did possess the better part of all the sea-coast, forcing the *Sicilians* to withdraw themselves into the fast and mountainous parts of the island, making their royal residence in *Trinacia*.

Some seven years after the arrival of *Archias*; the *Chalcidians*, encouraged by the success of the *Corinthians*, did assail and obtain the city of *Leontium*, built and possessed by the *Siculi*. In brief, the *Greeks* won from the *Siculi*, and their associates, the cities of *Catana* and *Hybla*, which, in honour of the *Megarians* that forced it, they called *Megara*.

About five and forty years after *Archias* had taken *Syracuse*; *Antiphemus* and *Entimus*, the one from *Rhodes*, the other from *Crete*, brought an army into *Sicily*, and built *Gela*; whose citizens, one hundred and eight years after, did erect that magnificent and renowned city of *Agrigentum*, governed according to the laws of the *Dorians*.

The *Syracusians* also, in the seventieth year after their plantation, did set up the city of *Acra*, in the mountains; and in the nineteenth year *Casmene*, in the plains adjoining; and again, in the hundred and thirtieth year of their dwelling in *Syracuse*, they built *Camerina*; and soon after that, *Enna*, in the very center of the island. So did the *Cumani*, about the same time, recover from the *Siculi* the city of *Zancle*, which they had founded in the streight between *Sicily* and *Italy*. They of *Zancle* had been the founders of *Himera*.

Not long after this, *Dorieus* the *Lacedemonian* built *Heraclia*; which the *Phenicians* and *Carthaginians*, fearing the neighbourhood of the *Spartans*, soon after invaded and ruined, tho' the same were again ere long re-edified.

Selirus also was built by a colony of *Megara*; and *Zancle* was taken by the *Messenians*; who having lost their own country, gave the name thereof unto this their new purchase. Such were the beginnings of the greatest cities in this island.

† III.

Of the government and affairs of Sicily, before Dionysius's tyranny.

THE most part of the cities in *Sicily*, were governed by the rule of the people, till such time as *Phalaris* began to usurp the state of *Agrigentum*, and to exercise all manner of tyranny therein.

This was that *Phalaris*, to whom *Perillus*, the cunning artificer of a detestable engine, gave an hollow bull of brass, wherein to inclose men, and scorch them to death: praising the device with this commendation; that the noise of one tormented therein, should be like the bellowing of a bull. The tyrant gave a due reward to the inventor, by causing the first trial to be made upon himself. He reigned one and thirty years, saith *Eusebius*; others give him but sixteen: howsoever it were, one *Tetramachus*, in the end, fell upon him with the whole multitude of *Agrigentum*, and stoned him to death; being thereto animated by *Zeno*, even whilst the tyrant was tormenting the same *Zeno* to make him confess some matter of conspiracy.

After the death of *Phalaris*, the citizens recovered their liberty, and enjoy'd it long, till *Thero*

usurped the government of the common-wealth; at which time also *Panetrius* made himself lord of *Leontium*; and *Cleander*, of *Gela*: but *Cleander*, having ruled seven years, was slain by one of the citizens. *Cleander* being dead, his brother *Hippocrates* succeeded in his room, and greatly afflicted the people of *Naxos*, of *Zancle* or *Messina*, and of *Leontium*; whom, with divers others of the ancient inhabitants, he forced to acknowledge him their lord. He also made war with the *Syracusians*, and in the end got from them, by composition, the city of *Camerina*. But when he had reigned seven years, he was slain in a battel against the *Siculi*, before *Hybla*.

At this time did the *Syracusians* change their form of government, from *Popular* to *Aristocrati- cal*; a preparation towards a principality, whereinto it was soon after changed. After the death of *Hippocrates*, *Gelon* (descended from the *Rhodians*, which together with the *Cretans* had long before, among other of the *Greeks*, seated themselves in *Sicily*) that had commanded the forces of *Hippocrates*, in the former war, with notable success, became lord of *Gela*. He, after his master's death, breaking the trust committed unto him by *Hippocrates* over his children, and being in possession of *Gela*, took the occasion and advantage of a contention in *Syracuse*, between the magistrates and the people. For coming with a strong army to the succour of the governours, driven out by the multitude, they elected him their prince, being the first, and (indeed) the most famous, that ever governed the *Syracusians*.^a This change happened in the second year of the three-score and twelfth *Olympiad*; wherein the better to establish himself, he took to wife the daughter of *Thero*, who had also usurped the state of *Agrigentum*.

Now this *Gelon*, the son of *Dinomenes*, had three brethren; *Hiero*, *Polyzelus*, and *Thrasylbulus*: to the first of which he gave up the city of *Gela*, when he had obtained the principality of *Syracuse*. For, after that time, all his thoughts travelled in the strengthening, beautifying, and amplifying of *Syracuse*. He defaced *Camerina*, that a little before was fallen from the obedience of the *Syracusians* who built it, and brought the citizens to *Syracuse*. The *Megarians*, that had moved a war against him, he overcame; the richer sort he brought to *Syracuse*; and the people he sold for slaves. In like manner dealt he with other places upon the like occasion. Not long after this, *Thero*, a prince of the *Agrigentines*, having dispossessed *Terillus* of his city *Himera*, the *Carthaginians* were drawn into the quarrel by *Anaxilus*, lord of *Messina*, father-in-law to *Terillus*; and *Gelon* also was solicited by his father-in-law, *Thero*. *Gelon* was content, and in fine, after divers conflicts, the *Carthaginians*, and other *Africans*, led by *Amilcar*, were overthrown by *Gelon*: and an hundred and fifty thousand of them left their bodies in *Sicily*.

This *Gelon* it was, to whom the *Athenians* and *Lacedemonians* sent for succour, when *Xerxes* with his huge army pass'd the *Hellepont*. He, for their relief, having armed thirty thousand soldiers, and two hundred ships, refused nevertheless to send them into *Greece*, because they refused him the commandment of one of their armies, either by sea or by land. So he used to their ambassadors only this saying, *That their spring was withered*; accounting the army, by him prepared, to be the very flower of the *Greek* nation.

^a Pausan. l. 6. ^b Herod. & Diod.

The *Carthaginians*, after this great loss received, fearing the invasion of their own country, sent to *Gelon* by their ambassadors, to desire peace; who grants it them on these conditions: That from thenceforth they should not sacrifice their children to *Saturn*: That they should pay him two thousand talents of silver; and present him with two armed ships, in sign of amity. These conditions the *Carthaginians* not only willingly accepted, but with the two thousand talents, and the ships for war, they sent unto *Demarata*, *Gelon's* wife, a crown, valued at an hundred talents of gold, with other presents. Whereby we see that some nations and some natures are much the better for being well beaten. The wars ended, and *Sicily* in peace, *Gelon* beautified the temples of the gods, and erected others in honour of them. So being exceedingly beloved and honoured of his subjects, he left the world, and left for his successor his brother *Hiero*. *Philistus* and *Pliny* report, that when his body was burnt, according to the custom of that age, a dog of his, which always waited on him, ran into the fire, and suffered himself to be burnt with him.

To *Gelon*, *Hiero* his brother succeeded; a man rude, cruel, covetous, and so suspicious of his brethren *Polyzelus* and *Thrasylbulus*, as he fought by all means to destroy them. Notwithstanding all this; by the conversation which he had with *Simonides*, he became of better condition, and greatly delighted with the study of good arts. Divers quarrels he had, as well with *Theron* of *Agrigentum*, as with other cities: all which he shortly after compounded, and gave a notable overthrow to the *Carthaginians*, whom *Xerxes* had incited to invade *Sicily*, fearing the succours which *Gelon* had prepared, to aid the *Grecians*, against him. He also overthrew in battel, *Thrasyldeus* the son of *Theron*, and thereby restored the *Agrigentines* to their former liberty. But in the end he lost the love of the *Syracusians*; and after he had reigned eleven years, he left the kingdom to his brother *Thrasylbulus*, who became a most unjust and bloody tyrant. *Thrasylbulus* enjoy'd his principality no longer than ten months. For notwithstanding the force of mercenary soldiers, which he entertained for his guards, he was beaten out of *Syracuse* by the citizens; to whom, being besieged in *Acradina*, he restored the government, and was banished the island. From thence he sailed into *Greece*, where he died a private man, among the *Locrians*.

And now had the *Syracusians* recovered again their former liberty, as all the rest of the cities did, after which they had never fought, had the successors of *Gelon* inherited his virtue, as they did the principality of *Syracuse*. For in all changes of estates, the preservation ought to answer the acquisition. Where a liberal, valiant, and advised prince, hath obtained any new signiory, and added it to that of his own, or exalted himself from being a private man, to the dignity of a prince; it becometh the successor to maintain it by the same way and art, by which it was gotten.

To conclude, *Syracuse* (tho' not without blows, ere she could cleanse her self of the creatures and lovers of *Gelon*) was now again become mistress of her self, and held her self free well near threescore years, to the time of *Dionysius*; tho' she were in the mean while greatly indangered by a citizen of her own, called *Tindario*.

Now, to prevent the greatness of any one among them, for the future, they devised a kind of banishment of such among them as were suspected; taking pattern from the *Athenian Ostracism*. They

called this their new devised judgment of exile, *Petalismus*, wherein every one wrote upon an olive leaf (as at *Athens* they wrote upon shells) the name of him, whom he would have expelled the city. He that had most suffrages against him, was banished for five years. Hereby, in a short time it came to pass; that those of judgment, and best able to govern the common-wealth, were by the worst able, either suppress'd or thrust out of the city. Yea, such as feared this law, tho' they had not yet felt it, withdrew themselves as secretly as they could; seeking some place of more security, wherein to maintain themselves. And good reason they had so to do; seeing there is nothing so terrible in any state, as a powerful and authorized ignorance. But this law lasted not long. For their necessity taught them to abolish it, and restore again the wiser sort to the government; from which, the nobility having practised to banish one another, the state became altogether popular. But after a while, being invaded by *Ducetius*, king of the *Sicilians*, that inhabited the inner part of the island (who had already taken *Enna*, and some other of the *Grecian* cities, and overthrown the army of the *Agrigentines*) the *Syracusians* sent forces against him, commanded by an unworthy citizen of theirs, called *Bolcon*. This their captain made nothing so much haste to find *Ducetius*, against whom he was employ'd, as he did to fly from the army he led, as soon as *Ducetius* presented him battel. So, for want of conduct, the greatest number of the *Syracusians* perished.

But making better choice among those whom they had banished, they levy other troops: by whom, in conclusion, *Ducetius* being beaten, submiteth himself, and is constrained to leave the island for a time. Yet it was not long ere he returned again, and built the city *Collatina* on the sea-side.

Ducetius being dead; all the *Greek* cities did in a sort acknowledge *Syracuse*: *Trinacia* excepted; which also by force of arms, in the fourscore and fifth *Olympiad*, they brought to reason.

But they do not long enjoy this their superintendency. For the citizens of *Leontium*, being oppress'd by them, seek aid from the *Athenians*, about the sixth year of the *Peloponnesian* war. In this suit they prevailed by the eloquence of *Gorgias* their orator; and got an hundred *Athenian* gallies to succour them, under the leading of *Laches*, and *Charoades*. To this fleet the *Leontines* and their partners added one hundred more; with which forces, and with some supplies brought by *Sophocles*, *Pythodorus*, *Eurymedon*, and other *Athenian* captains, they invaded the territories of the *Syracusians*, and their partisans; won and lost divers places; took *Messina*; and in the seventh year of the *Peloponnesian* war, lost it again. They also, at the same time, attempted *Himera*, but in vain. The fire of this quarrel took hold upon many cities, which invaded each other's territory with great violence. But when they had wearied themselves on all hands, and yet could see no issue of the war; the *Leontines*, without the advice of the *Athenians*, came to an accord with the *Syracusians*, and were admitted into their society with equal freedom. So the *Athenians*, who hoped to have greatened themselves in *Sicily*, by the division and civil war, were disappointed of their expectation, by the good agreement of the *Sicilians*, and tain to be gone with the broken remainder of their fleet. This they knew not how to amend; but (according to the custom of popular estates) by taking revenge upon their own commanders. So they banished

Pythodorus,

Pythodorus and *Sophocles*, and laid an heavy fine upon *Eurymedon*. Shortly after this, followed the most memorable war that ever was made by the Greeks in *Sicily*; which was that of the *Athenians* against the *Selinuntines* and *Syracusians*, in favour of the cities of *Egesta*, *Leontium*, and *Catana*. They of *Selinus* had oppressed the *Egestans*, and they of *Syracuse* the *Leontines*, and the *Catanians*; which was the ground of the war. For the *Athenians* undertook the protection of their old friends; and, in hatred of the *Athenians*, aid from *Lacedemon* was sent to the *Syracusians*. The *Lacedemonians* dealt plainly, having none other end than that which they pretended, namely, to help a people of their own tribe, that craved their succour, being in distress. The *Athenians* scarce knew what to pretend, for their preparations were so great, as discovered their intent to be none other than the conquest of the whole island; yet they, which had called them in, were so blinded with their own passions, that they would not believe their own eyes, which presented unto them a fleet and army far greater than the terrible report of fame had made it.

In this expedition the city of *Athens* had engaged all her power, as regarding not only the greatness of the enterprize, but the necessity of finishing it in a short space of time. For the *Lacedemonians* (as hath already been shewed in due place) stood at that time in such broken terms of peace with *Athens*, as differed not much from open war. Wherefore it was thought necessary either to spare no cost in this great expedition, or altogether to forbear it, which was likely to be hindered by wars at home, if their proceedings were slack abroad. And surely, had not the desire of the *Athenians* been overpassionate, the arguments of *Nicias* had caused them to abstain from so chargeable a business, and to reserve their forces for a more needful use. But young counsels prevailed against the authority of ancient men, that were more regardful of safety than of honour.

Of this business mention hath been already made, in that which we have written of the *Peloponnesian* war. But what was there delivered in general terms, as not concerning the affairs of *Greece*, otherwise than by consequence, doth in this place require a more perfect relation, as a matter wherein the whole state of *Sicily* was like to have felt a great conversion.

Though *Alcibiades* had prevailed against *Nicias*, in exhorting the people to this great voyage; yet *Nicias*, together with *Alcibiades* and *Lamachus*, was appointed to be one of the chief commanders therein.

These had commission and direction, as well to succour the *Egestans*, and to re-establish the *Leontines*, cast out of their places by the *Syracusians*, as also by force of arms to subvert the *Syracusians*, and all their adherents in *Sicily*, and compel them by tribute to acknowledge the *Athenians* for their supreme lords. To effect which, the fore-named captains were sent off with an hundred and thirty galleys, and five thousand one hundred soldiers, besides the thirty ships of burden, which transported their victuals, engines, and other munitions for the war; and these were *Athenians*, *Mantineans*, *Rhodians*, and *Candians*: there were, besides these, six thousand *Megarians* light armed, with thirty horsemen.

With these troops and fleets they arrive at *Rhegium*, where the *Rhegians* refuse to give them entry; but sell them victuals for their money. From

thence they sent to the *Egestans*, to know what treasure they would contribute towards the war, seeing, for their sakes, they had entered thereinto. But they found, by their answers, that these *Egestans* were poor, and that they had abused the *Athenian* ambassadors with false shews of gold, having in all but thirty talents. The *Athenians* further were discouraged, when they found that the *Rhegians*, their ancient friends, and allied unto the *Leontines*, refused to trust them within their walls. Hereupon *Nicias* adviseth to depart towards the *Selinuntines*, and to force them, or persuade them to an agreement with the *Egestans*; as likewise to see what disbursements the *Egestans* could make, and so return again into *Greece*, and not to waste *Athens* in a needless war. *Alcibiades*, on the other side, would solicit the cities of *Sicily* to confederacy against the *Syracusians*, and *Selinuntines*, whereby to force them unto restitution of all that they had taken from the *Leontines*. *Lamachus*, he persuades them to assail *Syracuse* it self, before it were prepared against them. But in the end (being excluded out of divers cities) they surprize *Catana*; and there they take new counsel how to proceed. Thence they employed *Nicias* to those of *Egesta*, who received from them thirty talents towards his charges, and one hundred and twenty talents more there were of the spoils they had gotten in the island. Thus, the summer being spent in idle consultations and vain attempts, the *Athenians* prepare to assail *Syracuse*. But *Alcibiades*, having been accused at home in his absence, was sent for back by the *Athenians*, to make his answer, and the army was left to the conduct of *Nicias* and *Lamachus*. These commanders obtain a landing-place very near unto *Syracuse*, by this device.

They employ to *Syracuse* an inhabitant of *Catana*, whom they trust; and instruct him to promise unto the *Syracusians*, that he would deliver into their hands all the *Athenians* within *Catana*. Hereupon the *Syracusians* draw thitherward with their best forces. But in the mean while, the *Athenians* setting sail from *Catana*, arrive at *Syracuse*, where they land at fair ease, and fortify themselves against the town. Shortly after this, they fight, and the *Syracusians* had the loss; but the *Athenians* wanting horse, could not pursue their victory to any great effect. They then retire themselves, with a resolution to refresh their army at *Catana*, for the winter-season. From thence they made an attempt upon *Messina*, hoping to have taken it by an intelligence, but in vain; for *Alcibiades* had discovered such as were traitors within the city to the *Messinians*. This he now did, in despite of his own citizens the *Athenians*, because they had recalled him from his command, with a purpose either to have put him to death, or to have banished him; whereof being assured by his friends, he took his way towards the *Lacedemonians*, and to them he gave mischievous counsel against his country. While this winter yet lasted, the *Syracusians* sent ambassadors to *Lacedemon* and *Corinth* for aid; as likewise the *Athenian* captains in *Sicily*, send to *Athens* for supplies; which both the one and the other obtained.

In the spring following (which was the beginning of the eighteenth year of the *Peloponnesian* war) the *Athenians* in *Sicily* sail from the port of *Catana* to *Megara*, forsaken of the inhabitants; from whence foraging the country, they obtain some small victories over the stragling *Syracusians*; and, at their return to *Catana*, they receive a supply of two hundred men at arms, but without horse, which they hoped to furnish in the island, from the *Egestans*,

and other their adherents: they were also strengthened with a company of archers, and with three hundred talents in money.

Hereupon they take courage, and encamp near *Syracuse*, upon the banks of the great port, repelling the *Syracusians* that sallied to impeach their intrenchments. They also received from their confederates four hundred horse-men, with two hundred other horse, to mount their men at arms. *Syracuse* was now in effect block'd up, so as hardly any succours could enter, but such as were able to force their passage: yet the *Athenians* receive divers losses; among which it was not the least, that *Lamachus*, one of their best commanders, was slain.

In the mean while, *Gylippus* and *Pylbon*, with the *Lacedemonian* and *Corinthian* forces, arrive, and take land at *Himera*. The citizens of *Himera*, and of *Gela*, together with the *Selinuntines*, join with them; so that with these, and his own troops, *Gylippus* ventured to march over-land towards *Syracuse*. The *Syracusians* send a part of their forces to meet him, and conduct him. The *Athenians* prepare to encounter them, expecting his arrival near unto the city, upon a place of advantage. At the first encounter they had the better of their enemies, by reason that the *Syracusan* horse-men could not come to fight in those streights; but soon after, *Gylippus*, charging them again, brake them, and constrained *Nicias* to fortify himself within his camp. Whereupon *Nicias* made the state of his affairs known by his letters to the *Athenians*; shewing, that without great supplies by sea and land, the enterprize would be lost, together with the small army remaining. These letters received, the *Athenians* appoint two other generals, *Eurymedon* and *Demosthenes*, to join with *Nicias*; the one they dispatch presently with some supply; the other they send after him in the spring following.

In the mean while *Gylippus*, at *Syracuse*, fights with the *Athenians* both by sea and land; sometimes with ill, sometimes with good success; but in conclusion, he took from them their fort near unto *Syracuse*, at the promontory called *Plymyrrium*, wherein the *Athenians* lost their treasure, and a great part of all their provisions. Notwithstanding which loss, and that the *Athenians* themselves in *Greece* were (in effect) besieged within *Athens*, by the *Lacedemonians*; yet were they most obstinate in prosecuting the war in *Sicily*, and dispatched away *Demosthenes* with new succours. *Demosthenes*, in his way towards *Sicily*, encountered with *Polyanthes* the *Corinthian* with his fleet, both the captains being bound for *Sicily*; the one to succour *Nicias*, the other *Gylippus*. The loss between them was in effect equal, and neither so broken, but that each of them prosecuted the enterprize they had in hand. But before the succours arrive to either, *Gylippus* and *Ariston* had assailed the *Athenians* in the great port of *Syracuse*, and in a sea-fight put them to the worst, to the great discouragement of the *Athenians*. On the neck of this, *Demosthenes* arrived with seventy-three gallies, charged with foot-men; and (blaming the sloth of *Nicias*) he invaded the *Syracusians* the same day that he arrived. But he made more haste than he had good speed, being shamefully beaten and repulsed with great loss. Hereupon *Demosthenes* and *Eurymedon* determine to rise up from before *Syracuse*, and return to the succour of *Athens*; but *Nicias* disputed to the contrary, pretending that he had good intelligence within *Syracuse*, whereby he learned that the town could not long hold out.

Whatsoever *Nicias's* intelligence was, upon the arrival of a new supply into the town, the *Athe-*

nians had all consented to depart, and to lodge at *Catana*, had not an eclipse of the moon, boding (as was thought) ill success, caused them to defer their departure. But this superstition cost them dear. For the *Syracusians*, *Lacedemonians*, and *Corinthians*, with seventy-seven sail of gallies, entered the great port of *Syracuse*, wherein the *Athenians* kept their fleet, and whereon they had fortified themselves. The *Athenians*, in the same port, encountered them with eighty-six gallies, commanded by *Eurymedon*; in which the *Athenian* fleet was beaten by the lesser number, and *Eurymedon* slain. Now, though it were so that the *Syracusians* received the more loss by land (for the fight was general;) yet when the *Athenians* were beaten by sea, in which kind they thought themselves invincible, they were wonderfully cast down. For it was well said of *Gylippus* to the *Syracusians*; *When any people do find themselves vanquished in that manner of fight, and with those weapons in which they persuade themselves that they exceed all others, they not only lose their reputation, but their courage.* The *Athenians*, besides the gallies sunk and wrack'd, had 17 taken and possessed by the enemy; and with great labour and loss they defended the rest from being fired, having drawn them within a pallisado, in one corner of the port, unadvisedly; for it is as contrary to a sea-war, to thrust ships into a straight room and corner, as it is to scatter foot in a plain field against horse; the one subsisting by being at large, the other by close embatteling.

The *Syracusians* having now weakened the *Athenian* fleet, resolve to imprison them within the port. And to that purpose they range all their gallies in the mouth of the haven, being about a mile over, and there they came to anchor; filling the out-let with all manner of vessels, which they man most strongly, because the *Athenians*, being now made desperate, should not with double ranks of gallies break through the *Syracusan* fleet, which lay but single, because they were forced to range themselves over all the out-let of the port. They therefore not only moored themselves strongly by their anchors, but chained the sides of their gallies together, and laid behind them again certain ships, which served in the former war for victuallers; to the end, that if any of their gallies were sunk, or the chain which joined them to their fellows broken, the *Athenians* might yet find themselves a second time entangled and arrested. To disorder also those *Athenian* gallies which came on in form of a wedge, to break through and force a passage, the *Syracusians* had left within these gallies and ships chained together a certain number of loose ones, to stop their course and fury; for where the way of any vessel using oar or sails is broken, and their speed fore-flowed, they cannot force with any weight and violence the resistance opposing.

On the other side, the *Athenians* knew that they were utterly lost, except, with an invincible resolution, they could make their way, and break down this great bridge of boats; or (at least) force a passage through them in some part or other; which they resolve to hazard with all their shipping (to the number of one hundred and ten of all sorts) and with all the strength of their land-army, in them embarked. But the gallies, which were within the bridge of boats, did so disorder the *Athenian* fleet, ere they came to force the bridge, as, albeit some few of them had broken through the chains; yet, being stopped by the ships without, and assailed by other loose gallies of the *Syracusians*, which were purposely left at large in the sea, they were either taken or sunk. Three great disadvantages the *Athenians* had; the first, that fighting within a haven, and

and (as it were) in a freight, they had no room to turn themselves, nor to free themselves one from another, being entangled; the second, that having over-pestered their galleys with soldiers, who used offensive arms of darts and slings, they had not place upon the decks to stretch their arms; the third was, the discomfortable end for which they fought, namely, to force a passage, by which they might save themselves by running away. To be short, the fight was no less terrible than the confusion, the slaughter great on all sides, and the noise and the cries so loud and lamentable, as that no direction could be heard. But in the end, the *Athenians*, as many as survived, were beaten back to the land, with the loss of sixty of their galleys, broken, sunk, or abandoned. The *Syracusians* did also lose twenty of theirs, with *Python*, the commander of the *Corinthians*. The rest of the *Athenian* galleys running themselves into the bottom of the port, saved themselves by the help and countenance of the land-army, there fortified. In this desperate estate, the *Athenian* commanders go to counsel. *Demosthenes* persuades them to furnish with fresh soldiers those few galleys which remained; and, while the *Syracusians* were triumphing, and made secure by their present victory, to set upon them, and forcing their way out of the port, to return to *Athens*. This was no ill counsel; for, as we have heard of many great captains (yea, the greatest number of all that have been victorious) that have neglected the speedy prosecution of a beaten enemy; so might we produce many examples of those, who, having slept securely in the bosom of good success, have been suddenly awakened by the rallied companies of a broken army, and have thereby lost again all the honour and advantage formerly gotten. But *Nicias* opposeth the advice of *Demosthenes*; others say, that the sea-men were against it. Whereupon abandoning their galleys, they all resolve to march over-land to the cities of their confederates, till some more favourable fortune should call them thence. On the other side, *Gylippus*, and other the *Lacedemonian* and *Corinthian* captains, with *Hermocrates*, exhort the *Syracusians* to put themselves presently into the field, and to stop all the passages leading to those cities of their enemies, to which the *Athenians* might make their retreat. But many were weary, and many were wounded, and many of them thought that they had done enough for the present. Which humour in some of our commanders at *Cadez*, lost us both the *Indian* fleet, and the spoils of many other neighbouring places. *Hermocrates* the *Syracusan*, finding it a lost labour to persuade his countrymen to any hasty prosecution, devised this good stratagem, thereby to gain time; not doubting, but that after a day or two, he should draw them willingly out. He sent two or three horse-men out of *Syracuse* by night, willing them to find *Nicias*, and (after they had assured him that they were of the *Athenians* faction) to give him advice not to march away over-hastily from the place wherein he was fortified; alledging, that the *Syracusians* had lodged their army, which could not long stay there upon the passages and places of advantage, leading towards the cities of their allies. These tidings *Nicias* easily believed, and put off his journey to the third day; for men newly beaten, are (for the most part) more fearful than wise, and to them every thistle in the field appears, by night, a man at arms.

The third day (leaving all their galleys, and all their baggage) they remove, being pierced and pursued with the lamentable out-cries of those that were sick and hurt, whom they abandon to the cure of

their enemy's swords. The rest march away, to the number of forty thousand, and make their first passage by force over the river of *Anapus*, notwithstanding the opposition of their enemies. But being every day charged in their marches, and by the *Syracusan* horse-men beaten in from foraging and provision of food, they grow weak and heartless. The *Syracusians* also possess the mountain *Lepas*, by which they were to pass towards *Camerina*, and thereby force them to fall back again towards the sea-coast, and to take what way they could, being unable to proceed in their journey intended. Many hard shifts they made in difficult passages, and blind marches by night, which they were fain to endure, as having none other means to escape from the enemy that pursued them, and held them waking with continual skirmishing. To keep all in order, *Nicias* undertook the leading of the vanguard, and *Demosthenes* conducted the rear. At the river *Esineus*, *Nicias* takes the start of a whole night's march, leaving *Demosthenes* to make the retreat, who being encompassed, and over-pressed with numbers, surrenders himself. The conditions he obtained, were far better than he could have hoped for; and the faith of his enemies far worse than he suspected; for he was afterwards, with *Nicias*, murdered in prison. The army of *Demosthenes* being dissolved, they pursue *Nicias* with the greater courage, who being utterly broken upon the passage of the river *Assinarus*, surrendered himself to *Gylippus* upon honest conditions. *Gylippus* sought to preserve him, and to have had the honour to have brought these two to *Sparta*; *Nicias*, as a noble enemy to the *Lacedemonians*, and who, at the overthrow which they received at *Pylus*, by the *Athenians*, had saved the lives of the vanquished; *Demosthenes*, as one that had done to *Lacedemon* the greatest hurt. *Hermocrates* also, the commander of the *Syracusan* army, dissuaded the rest, by all the art he had, from using any barbarous violence after so noble a victory. But the cruel and cowardly sort (cowardice and cruelty being inseparable passions) prevailed, and caused these brave captains to be miserably murdered; one part of their soldiers to be starved in loathsome prisons, and the rest sold for slaves. This was the success of the *Sicilian* war, which took end at the river *Assinarus*, the twenty-fourth day of May, in the ninety-first *Olympiad*.

The *Athenians* being beaten out of *Sicily*, the *Egeffans* (for whose defence against the *Selinuntines*, this late war had been taken in hand) fearing the victorious *Syracusians*, sought help from the *Carthaginians*, to whom they offered themselves and their city as their vassals. The *Carthaginians*, though ambitious enough of enlarging their dominion in *Sicily*, yet considering the prosperity of the *Syracusians*, and their late victories over the *Athenians*, they staid a while to dispute of the matter, whether they should refuse or accept the offer made unto them; for the *Selinuntines* were straightly allied to the *Syracusians*, as may appear by what is past. In the end, the senators of *Carthage* resolve upon the enterprize; and (by a trick of their *Punic* wit) to separate the *Syracusians* from the *Selinuntines*, they send ambassadors to *Syracuse*; praying that city, as in the behalf of the *Egeffans*, to compel the *Selinuntines* to take reason, and to rest content with so much of the lands in question, as they of *Syracuse* should think meet to allow them. The *Syracusians* approved the motion, for it tended to their own honour. But the *Selinuntines* would make no such appointment; rather they took it ill, that the *Syracusians*, with whom they had run one course of fortune in the *Athenian* war, should offer to trouble them by interposing

terposing as arbitrators, in a business that themselves could end by force. This was right as the *Carthaginians* would have it. For now could they of *Selinus* with an ill grace crave aid of *Syracuse*, and the *Syracusians* as ill grant it unto those that had refused to stand to the arbitrement, which the *Carthaginians* would have put into their hands. Hereupon an army of three hundred thousand men is set out from *Carthage*, under the conduct of *Hannibal*, nephew to that *Amilcar*, who (as you have heard before) was overthrown with the great *Carthaginian* army at *Himera* by *Gelon*. *Hannibal* was exceeding greedy of this employment, that he might take revenge, as well of his uncle's as of his father's death, the one of them having been slain by the *Himerans*, the other by those of *Selinus*. Both these cities *Hannibal*, in this war, won by force of arms, sack'd them and burnt them; and having taken three thousand of the *Himerans* prisoners, he caused them to be led unto the place where *Amilcar* was slain, and buried them there.

After this followed some trouble at *Syracuse*, occasioned by the banishment of *Hermocrates*, who had lately been general of the *Syracusan* forces against the *Athenians*. The malice of his enemies had so far prevailed with the ingrateful multitude, that he was condemned to exile for his mere virtue, at such time as he was aiding the *Lacedemonians* in their war against *Athens*, wherein he did great service. All the honest sort within *Syracuse* were sorry for the injury done unto him, and sought to have him repealed. *Hermocrates* himself returning into *Sicily*, gathered an army of six thousand, with which he began to repair *Selinus*, and by many noble actions, laboured to win the love of his citizens; but the faction that opposed him was the stronger. Wherefore he was advised to seize upon a gate of *Syracuse*, with some strength of men, whereby his friends within the town might have the better means to rise against the adverse party. This he did; but presently the multitude fell to arms, and set upon him, in which conflict he was slain. But his son-in-law, *Dionysius*, shall make them with *Hermocrates* alive again.

†. IV.

Of *Dionysius* the tyrant; and others, following him, in *Syracuse*.

THE *Syracusians* had enjoyed their liberty about threescore years, from the death of *Therasybulus*, to the death of *Hermocrates*; at which time *Dionysius* was raised up by God to take revenge, as well of their cruelty towards strangers, as of their ingratitude towards their own best citizens. For, before the time of *Dionysius*, they had made it their pallime to reward the virtue of their worthiest commanders with death or disgrace; which custom they must now be taught to amend.

Dionysius obtained the principality of *Syracuse*, by the same degrees that many others before him had made themselves masters of other cities, and of *Syracuse* itself. For, being made *Prætor*, and commanding their armies against the *Carthaginians* and other their enemies, he behaved himself so well, that he got a general love among the people and men of war. Then began he to follow the example of *Pisistratus*, that made himself Lord of *Athens*; obtaining a band of six hundred men to defend his person; under pretence, that his private enemies, being traiterously affected to the state of *Syracuse*, had laid plots how to murder him, because of his good services. He doubled the pay of the soldiers; alledging, that it would

encourage them to fight manfully; but intending thereby to assure them to himself. He persuaded the citizens to call home out of exile those that had been banished, which were the best men of *Syracuse*; and these were afterwards at his devotion, as obliged unto him by so great a benefit. His first favour among the *Syracusians*, grew from his accusation of the principal men. It is the delight of base people to reign over their betters; wherefore, gladly did he help them to break down, as fetters imprisoning their liberty, the bars that held it under safe custody. Long it was not, ere the chief citizens had found whereat he aimed. But what they saw, the people would not see; and some that were needy, and knew not how to get offices without his help, were willing to help him, though they knew his purposes to be such, as would make all the city to smart. He began early to hunt after the tyranny, being but twenty-five years of age when he obtained it: belike, it was his desire to reign long. His first work of making himself absolute lord in *Syracuse*, was the possession of the citadel; wherein was much good provision, and under it the gallies were moored. This he obtained by allowance of the people; and having done this, he cared for no more, but declared himself without all shame or fear: the army, the chief citizens restored by him from banishment, all the needy sort within *Syracuse*, that could not thrive by honest courses; and some neighbour-towns bound unto him, either for his help in war, or for establishing the faction reigning at that present, were wholly affected to his assistance. Having therefore gotten the citadel into his hands, he needed no more, save to assure what he had already. He strengthened himself by divers marriages; taking first to wife the daughter of *Hermocrates*, and after her, two at once; the one a *Locrian*, *Doris*, by whom he had *Dionysius*, his successor; the other *Aristomache*, the daughter of *Hipparinus*, and sister to *Dion*, honourable men in *Syracuse*, which bare unto him many children, that served to fortify him with new alliances.

Yet it was not long ere some of the *Syracusians* (envying his prosperity) incited the multitude, and took arms against him, even in the novelty of his rule. But their enterprize was more passionately than wisely governed. He had shamefully been beaten by the *Carthaginians* at *Gela*; which as it vexed the *Sicilian* men at arms, making them suspect that it was his purpose to let the *Carthaginians* walle all, that he might afterwards take possession of the desolate places; so it inflamed them with a desire to free themselves from his tyranny. They departed therefore from him, and marched hastily to *Syracuse*, where they found friends to help them: there they forced his palace, ransacked his treasures, and so shamefully abused his wife, that, for the grief thereof, she poisoned her self. But he follow'd their heels apace, and firing a gate of the city by night, entered soon enough to take revenge, by making a speedy rid-dance of them; for he spared none of his known, no, not of his suspected enemies. After that, he grew so doubtful of his life, as he never durst trust barber to trim him, nor any person, no, not so much as his brother, to enter into his chamber unstripped and searched. He was the greatest robber of the people that ever reigned in any state; and withal the most unrespectively cruel.

After this, he separated with fortification that part of the city called the island, from the rest; like as the *Spaniard* did the citadel of *Antwerp*; therein he lodged his treasures and his guards.

He then began to make war upon the free cities of *Sicily*; but while he lay before *Herbessa*, an inland town, the *Syracusians* rebelled against him; so as, with great difficulty, he recovered his citadel; from

from whence, having allured the old soldiers of the *Campanians*, who forced their passage through the city with twelve hundred horse, he again recovered the mastery over the *Syracusians*: and when a multitude of them were busied in gathering in their harvest, he disarmed all the townsmen remaining, and new strengthened the fort of the island with a double wall. He inclosed that part also called *Epipoles*; which, with three-score thousand labourers, he finished in three weeks, being two leagues in compass. He then built two hundred new gallies, and repaired one hundred and ten of the old; forged one hundred and forty thousand targets, with as many swords and head-pieces, with fourteen thousand corslets, and all other suitable arms. Which done, he sent word to the *Carthaginians* (greatly enfeebled by the plague) that except they would abandon the *Greek* towns which they held in *Sicily*, he would make war upon them; and, not staying for answer, he took the spoil of all the *Phenician* ships and merchandize within his ports; as king *Philip* the second did of our *English* before the war in our late queen's time. He then goes to the field with four-score thousand foot and three thousand horse, and sends his brother *Leptines* to sea with two hundred gallies and five hundred ships of burthen. Most of the towns which held for *Carthage*, yielded unto him, saving *Panormus*, *Segesta* or *Egesta*, *Ancyræ*, *Motya*, and *Entella*. Of these, he first won *Motya* by assault, and put all therein to the sword; but before *Egesta* he lost a great part of his army, by a fall of the citizens. In the mean while *Himilco* arrives, but ere he took land, he lost in a fight at sea with *Leptines* fifty ships of war, and five thousand soldiers, besides many ships of burthen. This notwithstanding, he recovered again *Motya* upon his first descent. From thence marching towards *Messina*, he took *Lypara*, and (soon after) *Messina*, and razed it to the ground. Now began *Dionysius* greatly to doubt his estate. He therefore fortified all the places he could in the territory of the *Leontines*, by which he supposed that *Himilco* would pass toward *Syracuse*, and he himself took the field again with 34000 foot and 1000 horse. Now, hearing that *Himilco* had divided his army into two parts, marching with the one half over-land, and sending *Mago* with the other by sea: he sent *Leptines* his brother to encounter *Mago*. But *Leptines* was utterly beaten by the *Carthaginians*; twenty thousand of his men were slain, and an hundred of his gallies lost. It is very strange, and hardly credible, which yet good authors tell us, that one city should be able to furnish five hundred sail of ships, and two hundred gallies (for so many did *Syracuse* arm in this war;) and more strange it is, that in a battel at sea, without any great artillery or musket-shot, twenty thousand should be slain in one fight. In all our fights against the *Turks*, of which that at *Lepanto* was the most notable, we hear of no such number lost; nor in any other fight by sea, that ever happened in our age, nor before us. When *Charles* the fifth went to besiege *Algier*, he had in all his fleet, transports and others, but two hundred and fifty sail of ships, and sixty-five gallies: for the furnishing of which fleet he sought help from all the cities and ports of *Spain*, *Naples*, and the rest of *Italy*. But in old times it was the manner to carry into the field, upon extremity, as many as were needful, of all that could bear arms, giving them little wages, or other allowance: in our days it is not so, neither indeed is it often requisite. Upon this overthrow, *Dionysius* posses away to *Syracuse*, to strengthen it: *Himilco* follows him, and besiegeth the town both by land and sea. But the tyrant having received aid

from the *Lacedemonians*, under the conduct of *Pharacidas*, puts himself to sea, to make provision for his citizens, who in his absence take twenty of the *Carthaginian* gallies, and sink four. Hereupon, finding their own success prosperous, and that of the tyrant exceeding ill, having also at the present weapons in their hands, they consult how to recover their liberty. And this they had done, had not *Pharacidas* the *Lacedemonian* resisted them. It also fell out, to his exceeding advantage, that the plague was so increased, and so violent among the *Carthaginians*, as it is said, that above 100000 of them died thereof. He therefore, with the power that he could gather together, sets upon them both by sea and land; and having slain great numbers of them, forceth *Himilco* to desire peace. This peace *Dionysius* sold him for a great sum of money, on condition that he should steal away with his *Carthaginians* only; which he basely accepted, betraying the rest of the *Africans* and *Spaniards*. Yet no faith was kept with him, for he was pursued, and left many of his *Carthaginians* behind him. The rest of the *Africans* fell under the swords of their enemies; only the *Spaniards*, after they had a while bravely defended themselves, were (after their submission) entertained, and served the conqueror.

Many such examples of perfidious dealing have I noted in other places, and can hardly forbear to deliver unto memory the like practices, when they meet with their matches: that which happened unto *Monsieur de Piles*, was very suitable to this treachery, wherewith *Dionysius* pursued *Himilco*. I was present when *De Piles* related the injury done unto him. He had surrendered *St. John de Angely* to the *French* king *Charles IX.* who besieged him therein. He surrendered it upon promise made by the faith of a king, that he should be suffered to depart in safety, with all his followers. Yet, in presence of the king himself, of the duke of *Anjou* his brother, general of his army, of the queen-mother, and of divers dukes and marshals of *France*, he was set upon and broken in his march, spoiled of all that he had, and forced to save his life by flight, leaving the most of his soldiers dead upon the place; the king's hand and faith, warranting him to march away with ensigns display'd, and with all his goods and provisions, no whit availing him. It needs not therefore seem strange, that an heathen tyrant should thus break his faith, since kings, professing christianity, are bold to do the like, or command their captains to do it for them.

Dionysius, after this great victory, took care to re-edify *Messina*. *Mago*, who staid in *Sicily*, to hold up the *Carthaginians* therein, is again beaten by *Dionysius*, who is also beaten by the *Tauromenians*. A new supply of four-score thousand soldiers is sent from *Carthage* to *Mago*; but these take eggs for their money, and make peace with *Dionysius*, leaving the *Sicilians* in *Tauromenium* to shift for themselves, whom *Dionysius*, after a long siege, overcame, and gave their city to his mercenary soldiers.

He then passed into *Italy*, obtained divers victories there, brought the *Rhegians* on their knees, forced them to pay him one hundred and four-score thousand crowns, to furnish him with three-score gallies, and to put in an hundred pledges, for assurance of their future observance of covenants. This he did, not with any purpose to perform unto them the peace that they had so dearly bought; but that having taken from them their gallies, he might besiege them, and ruin them utterly with the more ease. Now, to the end he might not, without some colour, falsify the faith that he had given to them; he pro-

tended

tended to want victuals for his army, at such time as he seemed ready to depart out of *Italy*, and sent to them to furnish him therewith, promising to return them the like quantity, at his coming home to *Syracuse*.

His resolution was, that if they refused to furnish him, he would then make their refusal the cause of his quarrel; if they yielded to aid him with the proportion which he desired, that then they should not be able, for want of food, to endure a siege any long time against him. For to ruin them he had fully determined, at what price soever. And great reason he had to take revenge of them, if he had done it fairly, and without breach of faith. For when, in the beginning of his reign, he desired them to bestow a daughter of some of their nobility upon him for a wife, they answered, that they had not any one fit for him, save the hangman's daughter. Princes do rather pardon ill deeds than villainous words. *Alexander* the great, forgave many sharp swords, but never any sharp tongues; no, though they told him but truly of his errors. And certainly, it belongs to those that have warrant from God, to reprehend princes, and to none else, especially in public.

It is said, that *Henry IV.* of *France* had his heart more inflamed against the Duke of *Biron*, for his over-bold and biting taunts that he used against him before *Amiens*, than for his conspiracy with the *Spaniard* or *Savoyan*; for he had pardoned ten thousand of such as had gone farther, and drawn their swords against him. The contemptuous words that Sir *John Parret* used of our late queen *Elizabeth* were his ruin, and not the counterfeit letter of the romish priest produced against him. So fared it with some other greater than he, that thereby ran the same and a worse fortune soon after.

To be short, he made them know new bread from old. He assaulted their town on all sides, which he continued to do eleven months, till he won it by force. He used his victory without mercy, especially against *Phyton*, who had commanded within it.

Some other wars he made with the *Carthaginians*, after the taking and raising of this city, and those with variable success. For as in one encounter he slew *Mago* with ten thousand *Africans*, so the son of *Mago* beat him, and slew his brother *Leptines*, with fourteen thousand of his soldiers. After which he bought his peace of the *Carthaginians*, as they had formerly done of him, following therein the advice of prosperity and adversity, as all kings and states do.

When he had reigned eight and thirty years he died; some say in his bed peaceably, which is the most likely, though others report it otherwise. A cruel man he was, and a faithless; a great poet, but a foolish one. He entertained *Plato* a while, but afterwards, for speaking against his tyranny, he gave order to have him slain or sold for a slave. For he could endure no man that flattered him not beyond measure. His parasites therefore stiled his cruelty, *The hate of evil men*; and his lawless slaughter, *The ornaments and effects of his justice*. True it is, that flatterers are a kind of vermin which poison all the princes of the world, and yet they prosper better than the worthiest and valiantest men do: And I wonder not at it; for it is a world; and as our *Saviour Christ* hath told us, *The world will love her own*.

To this *Dionysius's* son, of the same name, succeeded, and inherited both his kingdom and his vices. To win the love of the people, he pardoned and released out of prison a great number of persons, by his father lock'd up and condemned.

Withal, he remitted unto his citizens divers payments by his father imposed upon them. Which done, and thereby hoping that he had fastened unto himself the people's affections, he cast off the sheep's skin, and put on that of the wolf. For being jealous of his own brethren, as men of more virtue than himself, he caused them all to be slain, and all the kindred that they had by their mother's side. For *Dionysius* his father (as hath been said) had two wives; *Doris* of *Locris*, and *Aristomache* a *Syracusan*, the sister of *Dion*, which brother-in-law of his he greatly enriched.

By *Doris* he had this *Dionysius*, who succeeded unto him; and by *Aristomache* he had two sons and two daughters; of which the elder, called *Sophrosyne*, he gave in marriage to his eldest son, and her half brother *Dionysius*; the younger, called *Arete*, he bestowed on his brother *Theorides*; after whose death, *Dion* took her to wife, being his niece.

This *Dion*, a just and valiant man, finding that *Dionysius* had abandoned all exercise of virtue, and that he was wholly given over to sensuality, prevailed so much with *Plato*, whose disciple he had been, as he drew him into *Sicily* to instruct the young king. And having persuaded the king to entertain him, he wrought so well with him, as *Dionysius* began to change condition, to change tyranny into monarchy, and to hold the principality that he had, rather by the love of his people and the national laws, than by the violence of his guards and garrisons. But this goodness of his lasted not long. For *Philistus* the historian, and other his parasites that hated *Dionysius's* severity, wrought him out of the tyrant's favour, and caused him soon after to be banished out of *Sicily*, to the great grief of the whole nation. For whereas *Dion* had made offer to the king, either to compound the quarrels between him and the *Carthaginians*, of whom *Dionysius* stood in great fear, or (at least) if they refused it, to furnish him with fifty galleys at his own charge, during the war against them: his enemies found means, by sinister interpretation, to convert his good will into matter of treason. They told *Dionysius*, that all the great commendations given of *Plato*, had tended to none other end, than to soften his mind, and to make him neglect his own affairs by the study of philosophy; whilst *Dion*, in the mean time, having furnished fifty galleys, under colour of the king's service, had it in his own power, either to deliver to the *Syracusians* their former liberty, or to make himself lord and sovereign of their state.

It is likely, that the honest and liberal offer which he made to serve the king with so great a preparation at his own charge, begot him many enemies. For they that had served the king for none other end than to raise and enrich themselves, and had already been raised and enriched, thought themselves bound to make the same offer that *Dion* had made, if the king had had the grace to conceive it aright. But these covetous and ignorant cowards, that had neither the knowledge, nor the daring that *Dion* had, were bold to stifle his *Love* and *Liberality*, *Pride* and *Presumption*, and heartened the young king in his oppressing and eating up his own people, of whose spoils they themselves shared no small portion. I have heard it, that when *Charles V.* had the repulse at *Algier* in *Africa*, *Ferdinando Cortes*, one of the bravest men that ever *Spain* brought forth, offered unto the emperor to continue the siege at his own charge. But he had never good day after it. For they that envied his victories, and his conquest of *Mexico* in the *West-Indies*, persuaded

perswaded the emperor, that *Cortese* sought to value himself above him, and to have it said, that what the emperor could not, *Cortese* had effected, and was therefore more worthy of the empire than he that had it.

When *Dion* was newly banished, the tyrant was contented at first to send him the revenues of his lands, and permit him to dispose of his moveables at his own pleasure: not without giving hope to recall him in short time. Had he continued in this good mood, like enough it is, that *Dion* would have been well pleased to live well, as he did at *Athens*. But after some time, *Dionysius* made port-fail of this nobleman's goods, and thereby urged him to take another course, even to seek the restitution of his country to liberty. The virtues of *Dion*, especially his great liberality, had purchased much love in *Greece*. This love made him suspected and hated of the tyrant: but it stood him in good stead, when he sought to raise men, with whose help he might return into *Sicily*. Yet he got not above eight hundred (for he carried the matter closely) to follow him in this adventure. But many of them were men of quality, and fit to be leaders. Neither did he doubt of finding in *Syracuse*, as many as should be needful, that would readily assist him. Therefore he landed boldly in *Sicily*, marched to *Syracuse*, entered the city without resistance; armed the multitude, and won all, save the citadel.

Dionysius was then absent in *Italy*, but he quickly had advertisement of this dangerous accident. Wherefore he returned hastily to *Syracuse*: whence, after many vain treaties of peace, and some forceable attempts to recover the town, he was fain to depart; leaving yet the castle to the custody of *Apollocrates*, his eldest son. Yet ere he went, his minion *Philistus*, coming with a strength of men to assist him, was beaten, taken, and put to death by torment. But *Dion*, for the recovery of his country's liberty, had the same reward that all worthy men have had from popular estates. He was disgraced, assaulted, and forced to abandon the city. He retireth himself to the *Leontines*, who receive him with great joy. Soon after his departure from *Syracuse*, new troops enter the castle: they sally out, assail, spoil and burn a great part of the city. *Dion* is sent for, with humble request: yet, ere he could arrive, *Dionysius's* soldiers were retired; and the townsmen thinking themselves secure, shut the gates against *Dion*. But the next night, they of the castle sally again with greater fury than ever; they kill man, woman, and child, and set fire in all parts of the town. In this their extremity, *Dion* comes the second time to their succour; the love of his country surmounting all the injuries that he had received. He sets upon the garrison of the castle with the one part of his army; and quencheth the fire, every where kindled with the other part. In conclusion, after he had conquered both the fire and the sword, that had well near burnt to ashes and depopulated *Syracuse*, he recovered the castle, with the munition and furniture thereof, and sent *Apollocrates* after *Dionysius* his father into *Italy*. But their malice, of whom he had best deserved, and whom he had loved most, gave an untimely end to his days. For he was soon after this his victory, murdered by *Calippus*; who, after he had with ill success, a while governed *Syracuse*, was slain with the same dagger, with which he had murdered *Dion*.

Ten years after the death of *Dion*, *Dionysius*, with the assistance of his friends in *Italy*, recovers his estate, and returns to *Syracuse*, driving *Nysæus* thence, whom he found governour therein.

The better sort of the citizens, fearing, more than ever, his cruelty, fly to *Iceles*, a *Syracusan* born, and then ruling the *Leontines*. *Iceles* enters into confederacy with the *Carthaginians*, hoping by their assistance, not only to prevail against *Dionysius*, but by the hatred of the *Syracusians* towards *Dionysius*, to make him also lord of their city. The *Syracusians* being deservedly afflicted on all sides, send to the *Corinthians* for succour. *Iceles* also sends thither, and dissuades the *Corinthians*, as well as he can, from intermeddling in the business. He tells them by his messengers, that he had entered into league with the *Carthaginians*, who were so strong by sea, that it was not in the power of *Corinth* to land an army in *Sicily*. But the *Corinthians*, being by this treason of *Iceles*, more enraged than dissuaded, sent *Timoleon* with nineteen galleys to deliver *Syracuse* from tyranny. In the meanwhile, *Iceles* had entered *Syracuse*, and with the help of the *Carthaginians*, driven *Dionysius* into the castle, wherein he besieged him.

Iceles, being himself a tyrant in *Leontium*, rather sought how to enlarge his power, than how to deliver his country. Therefore, hearing that *Timoleon* was arrived at *Rhegium*, he sent to perswade him to return his fleet, for that all things were (in effect) established in *Sicily*. The *Carthaginian* galleys were also in the same port of *Rhegium*; whose captains advised *Timoleon* to get him gone in peace. They had far more galleys there than he had, and were like to compel him, if he would not be perswaded. *Timoleon* finding himself over-mastered, makes request to the *Carthaginian* captains, that they would be pleased to enter into *Rhegium*, and there, in an open assembly of the people, to deliver unto him those arguments for his return, which they had used to him in private; that he might, by public testimony, discharge himself to the senate of *Corinth*.

The *Carthaginians* perswading themselves, that a victory obtained by a few fair words, was without loss, and far more easy than that of many blows and wounds, yielded to *Timoleon's* desire. But while the orations were delivering, *Timoleon*, favoured by the *Rhegians*, stole out of the press; and having set sail before the gates were opened to the *Carthaginians*, he recovered the port of *Tauromenium*, where he was joyfully received by *Andromachus* the governour. From thence he marched towards *Adranum*, where surprising *Iceles's* army, he slew a part thereof, and put the rest to run. It is the nature of victory to beget friends. The *Adranitans* joined with him, and so did *Mamercus* the tyrant of *Catana*. *Dionysius* also sent to *Timoleon*, offering to surrender the castle of *Syracuse* into his hands: as thinking it better to yield up himself, and the places which he could not defend, unto the *Corinthians*, than either to *Iceles*, whom he disdained, or the *Carthaginians*, whom he hated. Now *Timoleon*, who within fifty days after his arrival, had recovered the castle of *Syracuse*, and sent *Dionysius* to *Corinth*, to live there a private man, was still invaded by the armies, and molested by the practices of *Iceles*. For he besieged the *Corinthians* within the castle of *Syracuse*, and attempted (but in vain) the murder of *Timoleon*.

The *Corinthians* send unto *Timoleon* a supply of two thousand foot, and two hundred horse, which are staid in *Italy* by foul weather. *Iceles* is strengthened with threescore thousand *Africans*, brought unto him by *Mago* (all which he lodgeth within *Syracuse*) and with an hundred and fifty galleys to keep the port. This was the first time that ever the *Carthaginians* had dominion within the walls

of that city. With this great army, *Icetes* assaulteth the castle. *Timoleon* sends them victuals and succour in small boats by night from *Catana*. *Mago* and *Icetes* do therefore resolve to besiege *Catana*; but they were no sooner on their way towards it, with part of their forces, than *Leon*, captain of the *Corinthians*, sallied out of the castle, and took that part of *Syracuse*, called *Acradina*, which he fortified.

In the mean while the two thousand *Corinthians* arrive: with whom, and two thousand other soldiers, *Timoleon* marched towards *Syracuse*. *Mago* abandoneth *Icetes*, being frightened out of *Sicily* (which he might easily have conquered) with an idle rumour of treason. This made him return to *Carthage*, where the general exclamation against his cowardize, did so much affright him, that for fear of farther punishment, he hanged himself. *Timoleon* enters the city, and beats down the castle (which he called *the nest of tyrants*) to the ground. But he found the city, when the strangers were fled, in effect desolate, so as their horses did feed on the grass growing in the market-place. Therefore he writes to *Corinth* for people to re-inhabit it. Ten thousand are sent out of *Greece*; many come from *Italy*, others from other parts of the island.

But a new storm ariseth. *Asdrubal* and *Amilcar*, *Carthaginians*, arrive about *Lilybeum*, with three-score and ten thousand soldiers transported (with all their provision) in a thousand ships of burthen, and two hundred galleys. *Timoleon* marcheth thither, and chargeth this great army upon the passage of a river.

A tempest of rain, hail, and lightning, with boistrous winds beating upon the faces of the *Carthaginians*, they were utterly broken: ten thousand slain, five thousand taken, with all their carriages and provisions: among which, there were found a thousand corslets, gilt and graven. After this, ^a *Timoleon* gave an overthrow to *Icetes*, and following his victory, took him, with his son *Eupolemus*, and the general of his horse, prisoners, whom he caused all to be slain: and afterwards (which was imputed to him for great cruelty) he suffered *Icetes's* wives and daughters to be put to death. But this was the revenge of God upon *Icetes*, who (after the murder of *Dion*) had caused *Arete*, *Dion's* wife, and a young child of his, with *Aristomache* his sister, to be cast into the sea.

He again prevailed against *Mamercus*, tyrant of *Catana*, and won *Catana* it self. *Mamercus* fled to *Hippon*, tyrant of *Messina*: but *Timoleon* pursuing him, won the town, delivering *Hippon* to his citizens, who tormented him to death. The same end had *Mamercus*, and all other, the tyrants in *Sicily*.

Finally, he made peace with the *Carthaginians*; on condition, that they should not pass the river of *Tyre*. After this, he lived in great honour among the *Syracusians*, till his death, and was solemnly buried by them in the market-place of their city: the day of his funerals being for ever ordained to be kept holy among them.

After such time as *Timoleon* had delivered *Syracuse* from the tyranny of *Dionysius*, and brought peace to the whole island, the inhabitants enjoyed their liberty in peace about twenty years. The cities and temples were repaired, the trade renewed, the merchant sailed in safety, and the labouring man enjoyed the fruits of the earth in quiet. But it was impossible that a nation, which neither knew how to govern, nor how to obey; which could neither en-

dure kings, nor men worthy to be kings to govern them, should any long time subsist.

Twenty years after the death of *Timoleon*, there started up one *Agathocles* among them, a man of base birth, and of baser condition, who, from a beggar to a common soldier, from a soldier to a captain, and so from degree to degree, rising to be a pretor; finally, became lord and sovereign of the *Syracusians*. Many fortunes he ran, and underwent as many dangers ere he obtained the principality. For he had more than once attempted it, and was therein both beaten and banished. A passing valiant man he was, and did notable service, as well for those by whom he was employ'd, as also for the *Syracusians*, and against them. For in their wars against those of *Enna* and the *Campanes*, he did them memorable service; and on the contrary, as memorable service for the *Murgantines*, against the *Syracusians*. For, being entertained by the people of *Murgantia*, and made general of their forces, he sack'd *Leontium*; and besieged *Syracuse* so streightly, that the citizens were driven to crave aid, even from their ancient and natural enemies, the *Carthaginians*. *Amilcar* was sent by the *Carthaginians* to relieve *Syracuse*. With him *Agathocles* wrought so well, that he got him to make peace between himself and the *Syracusians*, binding himself by promise and oath, to remain a friend and servant to the estate of *Carthage* for ever after. *Amilcar* entertained the business, and compounded the quarrels between *Agathocles* and the *Syracusians*. *Agathocles* is chosen pretor, he entertains five thousand *Africans*, and divers old soldiers of the *Murgantines*, under colour of a purpose to besiege *Herbita*. With these, and with the assistance of the poor and discontented *Syracusians* (the city being also divided into many factions) he assails the senators, kills all his enemies and opposites, divides the spoil of the rich among the poor, and gives liberty to his soldiers to rob, to ravish, and to murder, for two whole days and nights, without controulment: the third day, when they had blunted their barbarous appetites, and strewed the streets with ten thousand dead carcasses, besides those that had broken their necks over the walls, their fury had no further subject to work on.

Agathocles, in an assembly of the people (being an eloquent knave) perswaded them, that for the violent sickness, by which the common-wealth was utterly consumed, he found no better than the violent remedies which he had administred; and that he had affected no other thing, than the reducing of the state from an *Oligarchy*, or the rule of a few tyrannous magistrates, to the ancient and indifferent *Democracy*, by which it had been governed, from the first institution, with so great glory and prosperity. This he did, to have the crown clap'd on his head (as it were) perforce. For, as he knew that he had left none living within the city fit nor able to exercise the office of a magistrate; so knew he right well, that all they, which had assisted in the murder and spoil of their fellow citizens, had no other hope of defence, than the support of a lawless lord, who had been partaker with them in their villanies and cruelties committed. So as this rabble, his oration ended, proclaimed him king: again and again, saluting, and adoring him by that name, as if it had been given to him by some lawful election. Hence had our king *Richard* the third a piece of his pattern; but the one was of base, the other of kingly parents; the one took liberty from a common-wealth, the other sought only to succeed in a

monarchy; the one continued his cruelty to the end, the other, after he had obtained the crown, sought, by making good laws, to recover the love of his people.

The life of this tyrant is briefly written by *Justin*; more largely and particularly by *Diodorus Siculus*: the sum whereof is this. The same *Amilcar*, that had brought him into *Syracuse*, and that had lent him five thousand men to help in the massacre of the citizens, was also content to wink at many wrongs that he did unto the confederates of the *Carthaginians*. It was the purpose of *Amilcar*, to settle *Agathocles* in his tyranny, and to let him vex and waste the whole island, because it was thereby like to come to pass, that he should reduce all *Sicily* into such terms, as would make it become an easy prey to *Carthage*. But when the cities confederate with the *Carthaginians* sent their ambassadors with complaint of this ill dealing to *Carthage*; the *Punic* faith (so much taunted by the *Romans*, as no better than meer fallhood) shewed it self very honourable, in taking order for the redress. Ambassadors were sent to comfort the *Sicilians*, and to put *Agathocles* in mind of his covenants; *Amilcar* was recalled home into *Afric*, and a new captain appointed to succeed in his charge, with such forces, as might compel *Agathocles* to reason, if otherwise he would not hearken to it. All this tended to save their confederates from suffering such injuries in the future. For that which was past (since it could not be recalled) they took order to have it severely punished. *Amilcar* was accused secretly, and by way of scrutiny: the suffrages being given, but not calculated, and so reserved until he should return. This was not so closely handled, but that *Amilcar* had soon notice of it. In managing his business with *Agathocles*, it is likely that he had an eye to his own profit, as well as to the publick benefit of his country. For he had made such a composition with the *Syracusan*, as gave him not only means to weaken others, but to strengthen himself both in power and authority, even against the *Carthaginians*. Such is commonly the custom of those that hope to work their own ends by cunning practices; thinking to deal subtilly, and finally, they spin their threads so small, that they are broken with the very wind. *Amilcar* saw that his *Carthaginians* had a purpose to deal substantially, and that therefore it would be hard for him to make them follow his crooked devices: which if he could not do, it was to be expected, that their anger would break out into so much the greater extremity, by how much the more they had concealed it. Therefore he followed the example which some of his foregoers had taught him; and for fear of such a death as the judges might award him, he ended his own life in what sort he thought best. This desperation of *Amilcar* served to inform *Agathocles* of the *Carthaginians* intent. He saw they would not be deluded with words, and therefore resolved to get the start of them in action. He dissembled no longer; but, instead of spoil and robbery, made open war upon all their adherents. He had made the better part of *Sicily* his own ere the *Carthaginian* forces arrived: which thinking to have encountered an ill established tyrant, found him ready, as a king, to defend his own, and give them sharp entertainment. They were beaten by him, and their navy was so tempest-beaten, that they could neither do good by land nor sea, but were glad to leave their business undone, and return into *Afric*.

The *Carthaginians* prepare a new fleet: which being very gallantly manned and furnished, was

No. XXXVI.

broken by foul weather; and the best part of it cast away, even whilst it was yet within kenning of their city. But *Amilcar*, the son of *Gisco*, gathering together the remainders of this ship-wrack, was bold to pass over into *Sicily*, and landed not far from *Gela*: where *Agathocles* was soon ready to examine the cause of their coming. Many skirmishes passed between them, in which (commonly) the *Syracusan* had the better. But his good success begat presumption; whereby he lost a battle, more important than all the other fights. One adverse chance is enough to overthrow the state of a tyrant, if it be not upheld by great circumspection. The war was soon transferred to the walls of *Syracuse*, within which *Agathocles* was closed up, and driven to make his last defence. By their help, who may be judged to have loved him not very greatly. But the inhabitants of *Syracuse*, after that great massacre of the principal men, made in the beginning of this new tyranny, were (for the most part) such as had been either mercenary soldiers, enfranchised slaves, or base and needy people; helpers in establishing the present government, and executioners of the murders and spoil committed in that change. If there were any other (as some there were) they were so well observed, and withal so fearful, that they durst not stir. But it was not enough, that they all agreed in the common defence of themselves and their city; famine was likely to grow upon them, and enforce them to change their resolution. In this necessity *Agathocles* adventured upon a strange course, which the event commended as wise. He embarked as many as he thought meet in those vessels that rode in the haven; and committing the government of the city to his brother *Antander*, willed the people to be of good courage; for that (as he told them) he had be thought himself of a mean, both to raise the siege; and to repair all other losses. A *Carthaginian* fleet lay in the mouth of the haven, both to hinder the entrance of victuallers, and to keep the besieged from issuing forth.

Now at such time as *Agathocles* was ready to depart, advertisement came that many ships of burthen laden with corn and other provisions, were drawing near unto *Syracuse*. To intercept these, the *Carthaginians* hoise sail, and launch forth into the deep. They were not far gone when they might behold *Agathocles* issuing forth of the port, with purpose (as they thought) to give convoy unto his victuallers. Hereupon they wheel about, and make amain towards him, as thinking him the better booty. He neither abode their coming, nor fled back into the city, but made all speed towards *Afric*, and was pursued by the *Carthaginians*, as long as the day would give them light. In the mean season the victuallers were gotten into *Syracuse*, which was the more plentifully relieved by their coming, for that *Agathocles* had unburthened the place of no small number. When the *Carthaginian* admiral perceived; first, that by pursuing two fleets at once, he had missed of them both; and secondly, that *Agathocles* returned not again, but was gone to seek his fortune elsewhere; he thought it good to pursue those that were fled, and to attend so well upon them, that they should not have leisure to do mischief in some other part.

The *Carthaginian* navy followed *Agathocles* (whether by chance, or by relation of such as had met with him at sea) directly towards *Afric*, and overtook him after six days. He had (at the first) a great start of them, so that (belike) they rowed hard, and wearied themselves in seeking their own misfortune. For he fought with them, and beat them, and ha-

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ving sunk or taken many, drove the rest to fly; which way they could, laden with such strange tidings of his voyage.

When *Agathocles* had landed his men in *Afric*, then did he discover unto them his project; letting them understand, that there was no better way to divert the *Carthaginians*, not only from *Syracuse*, but from all the isle of *Sicily*, than by bringing the war to their own doors. For here (said he) they have many that hate them, and that will readily take arms against them, as soon as they perceive that there is an army on foot which dares to look upon their walls. Their towns are ill fortified, their people untrained and unexperienced in dangers; the mercenary forces, that they levy in these parts, will rather follow us than them, if we offer greater wages than they can give: which we may better promise and make good, by letting them have some share with us in all the wealth of the *Carthaginians*, than our enemies can do, by making some addition to their stipends. Thus he talked; as one already master of all the riches in *Afric*, and with many brave words encouraged his men so well, that they were contented to set fire on all their ships (reserving one or two to use as messengers) to the end that no hope should remain, save only in victory. In this heat of resolution, they win by force two cities, which, after they had thoroughly sacked, they burnt to the ground, as a mark of terror to all that should make resistance. The *Carthaginians* hearing this, are amazed, thinking that *Amilcar* is broken, and his whole army destroyed in *Sicily*. This impression so dismays them, that when they know the truth of all, by such as had escaped in the late sea-fight, yet still they fear, and know not what. They suspect *Amilcar's* faith, who had suffered *Agathocles* to land in *Afric*; they suspect their principal citizens at home of a meaning to betray *Carthage* unto the enemy; they raise a great army, and know not unto whose charge they may safely commit it.

There were at that time two famous captains in the city, *Hanno* and *Bomilcar*; great enemies, and therefore the more unlikely to conspire against the common-wealth. These are made generals of the army levied, which far exceeded the forces of *Agathocles*. But it seldom happens, that dissension between commanders produceth any fortunate event. Necessity drove *Agathocles* to fight, and the courage of his men, resolved to deal with the whole multitude of the *Carthaginians*, made easy the victory against the one half of them. For *Bomilcar* would not stir: but suffered *Hanno* to be cut in pieces.

The reputation of this great victory brought over a king of the *Africans*, from the *Carthaginian* society, to take part with *Agathocles*, who pursuing his victory, wins many towns, and sends word to *Syracuse* of his good success. The *Carthaginians* also send into *Sicily*, willing *Amilcar* their general to succour the state of *Afric*, which was in danger to be lost, whilst he was travelling in the conquest of *Sicily*. *Amilcar* sends them five thousand men: all his forces he thought it not needful to transport, as hoping rather to draw *Agathocles* back into *Sicily*, than to be drawn home by one that could scarce retain his own kingdom. But these good hopes had a bad issue. He spent some time in winning a few towns that adhered unto the *Syracusians*: and having brought his matters to some good order, he conceived a sudden hope of taking *Syracuse* by surprise. It was a pretty (though tragical) accident, if it were true, as *Tully* relates it. *Amilcar* had a dream, which told him

that he should sup the next day within *Syracuse*. His fancy begot this dream, and he verily believed it. He made more haste than good speed towards the city; and coming upon it on the sudden, had good hope to carry it. But his enemies were prepared for him, and had laid an ambush to intrap him, whereinto he fell. So he was carried prisoner into the city, in which it was likely that he had no great cheer to his supper; for they struck off his head, and sent it into *Afric* (a welcome present) to *Agathocles*.

This good success of things at home did put such courage into the *Sicilian* army, that *Agathocles* was bold to wear a crown, and stile himself King of *Afric*. He had allured *Ophellas*, king of the *Cyrenians*, to take his part, by promises to deliver the country into his hands; for that (as he said) it was sufficient unto himself to have diverted the *Carthaginians* from *Sicily*, wherein (after this war ended) he might reign quietly. *Ophellas* came with a great army, and was friendly entertained; but the traitorous *Sicilian* taking an advantage, did murder this his assistant; and afterwards, by good words and great promises, drew all the *Cyrenian* army to follow him in his wars. Thus his villany found good success, and he so prevailed in *Africa*, that he got leisure to make a step into *Sicily*. Many towns in *Sicily* had embraced a desire of recovering their liberty, thinking it high time to fight at length for their own freedom, after that they had so long been exposed (as a reward of victory) either unto aliens, or to tyrants of their own country. These had prevailed far, and gotten many to take their parts, as in a common cause; when the coming of *Agathocles* abated their high spirits, and his good success in many fights compelled them to obedience. Out of *Sicily* he returned into *Africa*, where his affairs stood in very bad terms. *Archagathus* his son had lost a battel, and (which was worse) had ill means to help himself, his army being in mutiny for lack of pay. But *Agathocles* pacified the tumult, by the accustomed promises of great booty and spoil. It had now been time for him to offer peace to the *Carthaginians*, which to obtain, they would (questionless) have given to him both money enough to pay his army, and all that they then held in *Sicily*. For their city had been distressed, not only by this his war, but by the treason of *Bomilcar*, who failed not much of making himself tyrant over them. But ambition is blind. *Agathocles* had all his thoughts fixed upon the conquest of *Carthage* itself; out of which dream he was awaked by the loss of a battel, not so memorable in regard of any accident therein, as of the strange events following it. The *Carthaginians*, after their great misfortunes in this war, had renewed their old sacrifices of children to *Saturn*, from which they had abstained ever since they made peace with *Gelon*. And now they made choice of some, the goodliest of their prisoners taken in the battel, to offer unto the said idol, in way of thankfulness for their victory. The fire, with which these unhappy men were consumed, caught hold upon the lodgings nearest unto the altar, and spreading itself farther through the camp, with the destruction of many men, caused such a tumult as is usual in the like cases. At the same time the like accident of fire burnt up the pavilion of *Agathocles*. Hereupon both the armies fled away, each of them believing that the noise in the adverse camp was a sign of the enemies coming to invade it. But the *Carthaginians* had a safe retreat: *Agathocles*, by a second error, fell into a new calamity. In the beginning of this his flight

in the dark, he met with his own *African* soldiers, and thinking them to be enemies (as indeed one half of them had revolted from him to the *Carthaginians*, in the last battle) he began to assail them, and was so stoutly resisted, that he lost in this blind fight above four thousand of his men. This did so discourage his proud heart, that being fallen from the near hope of taking the city of *Carthage*, unto some distrust of his own safety, he knew no more how to moderate his present weak fears, than lately he had known how to govern his ambition. Therefore he took the way that came next into his head; which was, to steal closely aboard his ships with his younger son (the elder he suspected of incest and ambition) and so to fly into *Sicily*, thinking it the best course to shift for himself, as wanting vessels wherein to transport his army. His elder son *Archagathus*, perceiving his drift, arrested him, and put him under custody; but by means of a sudden tumult he was let loose, escaped, and fled alone, leaving both his sons behind him. His flight being noised through the army, all was in uproar, and extremity of rage caused not only the common soldiers, but even such as had been friends to the tyrant, to lay hold upon his two sons and kill them. That this flight of *Agathocles* was extremely base, I need not use words to prove; that his fear was truly, as all fear is said to be, a passion, depriving him of the succours which reason offered, the sequel doth manifest. His forsaken soldiers being now a headless company, and no longer an army to be feared, obtained nevertheless a reasonable composition from the *Carthaginians*, to whom they sold those places whereof they had possession for nineteen talents. Likewise *Agathocles* himself, having lost his army, did nevertheless, by the reputation of this late war, make peace with *Carthage* upon equal terms.

After this, the tyrant, being delivered from foreign enemies, discovered his bloody nature in most abominable cruelties among the *Sicilians*. His wants and his fears urged him so violently, that he was not satisfied with the spoils of the rich, or the death of those whom he held suspected, but in a beastly rage depopulated whole cities. He devised new engines of torment; wherein, striving to exceed the bull of *Phalaris*, he made a frame of brass that should serve to scorch mens bodies, and withal give him leave to behold them in their misery. So devilish is the nature of man, when reason, that should be his guide, is become a slave to his brutish affections. In these mischiefs he was so outrageous, that he neither spared sex nor age; especially when he was informed of the slaughter of his children in *Africa*. But this was not the way to preserve his estate; it threw him into new dangers. They, whom he had chased out of their country, took arms against him, and drove him into such fear, that he was fain to seek the love at *Carthage*, which by ruling well he might have had in *Sicily*. He freely delivered into the *Carthaginians* hands all those towns of the *Phenicians* in *Sicily*, belonging unto them, which were in his possession. They requited him honourably with great store of corn, and with four hundred talents of gold and silver. So (though not without much trouble and hazard) he prevailed against the rebels, and settled his estate. Having no further business left in *Sicily*, he made a voyage into *Italy*. There he subdued the *Bruttians*, rather by terror of his name than by any force, for they yielded at his first coming. This done, he went to the isle of *Lipara*, and made the inhabitants buy peace with one hundred talents of gold. But when he had gotten this great sum, he

would needs exact a greater; and finding plainly that they had no more left, he was bold to spoil the temples of their gods. Herein (methinks) he did well enough. For how could he believe those to be gods that had continually given deaf ears to his horrible perjuries? Then he returned richly home, with eleven ships laden with gold; all which, and all the rest of his fleet were cast away by foul weather at sea, one galley excepted, in which he himself escaped, to suffer a more miserable end. A grievous sickness fell upon him that rotted his whole body, spreading itself through all his veins and sinews. Whilst he lay in this case, all desiring his end, save only *Theogenia* (a wife that he had taken out of *Egypt*) and her small children; his nephew, the son of *Archagathus* before-mentioned, and a younger son of his own, began to contend about the kingdom. Neither did they seek to end the controversy by the old tyrant's decision; they regarded him not so much. But each of them laid wait for the other's life, wherein the nephew sped so well, that he slew his uncle, and got his grandfather's kingdom without asking any leave. These tidings wounded the heart of *Agathocles* with fear and sorrow. He saw himself without help like to become a prey to his ungracious nephew, from whom he knew that no favour was to be expected, either by himself, or by those whom only he now held dear, which were *Theogenia* and her children. Therefore he advised her and them to fly before they were surprized; for that otherwise they could by no means avoid either death, or somewhat that would be worse. He gave them all his treasures and goods, wherewith he even compelled them (weeping to leave him desolate, in so wretched a case) to embark themselves hastily, and make speed into *Egypt*. After their departure, whether he threw himself into the fire, or whether his disease consumed him, there was none left that cared to attend him; but he ended his life as basely, as obscurely, and in as much want as he first began it.

After the death of *Agathocles* it was, that the *Mamertines* his soldiers traiterously occupied *Messina*, and infested a great part of the island. Then also did the *Carthaginians* begin to renew their attempts of conquering all *Sicily*. What the nephew of *Agathocles* did, I cannot find. Likely it is, that he quickly perished. For the *Sicilians* were driven to send for *Pyrrhus* to help them, who had married with a daughter of *Agathocles*. But *Pyrrhus* was soon weary of the country (as hath been shewed before) and therefore left it, prophesying, that it would become a goodly champion field, wherein *Rome* and *Carthage* should fight for superiority. In which business how these two great cities did speed, the order of our story will declare.

S E C T. V.

A re-continuation of the Roman war in Sicily. How Hieron, king of Syracuse, forsook the Carthaginians, and made his peace with Rome.

WHEN *Appius Claudius*, following the advantage of his victory gotten at *Messina*, brought the war unto the gates of *Syracuse*, and besieged that great city, *Hieron* found it high time for him to seek peace; knowing that the *Carthaginians* had neither any reason to be offended with him for helping himself by what means he could, when they were not in case to give him assistance; and foreseeing withal, that when once he had purchased his quiet from the *Romans*, it would be free for him to sit still without fear or molestation, whilst

Rome and *Carthage* were fighting for the mastery. In this good mood the new *Roman* consuls, *M. Valerius* and *C. Otacilius*, found him, and readily embraced the offer of his friendship. Yet they made use of their present advantage, and sold him peace for an hundred (some say two hundred) talents.

These consuls had brought a great army into *Sicily*, yet did they nothing else in effect than bring over *Hieron* to their side. If the *Syracusan* held them busied (which I find not, otherwise than by circumstances, as, by the sum of money imposed upon him, and by their performing none other piece of service) all the whole time of their abode in the island; then was his departure from the friendship of *Carthage* no less to his honour, than it was to his commodity. For by no reason could they require, that he should suffer his own kingdom to run into manifest peril of subversion for their sakes, that should have received all the profit of the victory; seeing they did expose him to the whole danger, without straining themselves to give him relief. But the *Carthaginians* had lately made good proof of the strength of *Syracuse* in the days of *Agathocles*, and therefore knew that it was able to bear a very strong siege. And hereupon it is like that they were the more slack in sending help; if (perhaps) it were not some part of their desire, that both *Rome* and *Syracuse* should weaken each one the other, whereby their own work might be the easier against them both. Yet indeed, the case of the besieged city was not the same when the *Romans* lay before it, as it had been when the *Carthaginians* attempted it. For there was great reason to try the uttermost hazard of war against the *Carthaginians*, who sought no other thing than to bring it into slavery; not so against the *Romans*, who thought it sufficient if they could withdraw it from the party of their enemies. Besides, it was not all one to be governed by *Agathocles* or by *Hieron*. The former of these cared not what the citizens endured, so long as he might preserve his own tyranny: the latter, as a just and good prince, had no greater desire than to win the love of his people, by seeking their commodity; but including his own felicity within the public, laboured to uphold both by honest and faithful dealing. Hereby it came to pass that he enjoyed a long and happy reign, living dear to his own subjects, beloved of the *Romans*, and not greatly molested by the *Carthaginians*; whom, either the consideration, that they had left him to himself ere he left their society, made unwilling to seek his ruin; or their more earnest business with the *Romans*, made unable to compass it.

SECT. VI.

How the Romans besiege and win Agrigentum. Their beginning to maintain a fleet. Their first loss and first victory by sea. Of sea-fight in general.

HIERON having sided himself with the *Romans*, aided them with victuals and other necessities; so that they presuming upon his assistance, recal some part of their forces. The *Carthaginians* find it high time to bestir them; they send to the *Ligurians*, and to the troops they had in *Spain*, to come to their aid; who being arrived, they made the city of *Agrigentum* the seat of war against the *Romans*, filling it with all manner of munition.

The *Roman* consuls having made peace with *Hieron* return into *Italy*, and in their places, *Lucius Posthumus* and *Quintus Mamilius* arrive. They go on towards *Agrigentum*, and finding no enemy in the field they besiege it, though it were stuffed with fifty thousand soldiers. After a while, the time of harvest being come, a part of the *Roman* army range the country to gather corn, and those at the siege grow negligent; the *Carthaginians* sally furiously, and endanger the *Roman* army, but are in the end repelled into the town with great loss; but by the smart felt on both sides the assailants redoubled their guards, and the besieged kept within their covert. Yet the *Romans*, the better to assure themselves, cut a deep trench between the walls of the city and their camp, and another on the outside thereof, that neither the *Carthaginians* might force any quarter suddenly by a sally, nor those of the country without break upon them unawares; which double defence kept the besieged also from the receiving any relief of victuals and munitions, whilst the *Syracusan* supplies the assailants with what they want. The besieged send for succour to *Carthage*, after they had been in this fort pent up five months. The *Carthaginians* embark an army with certain elephants, under the command of *Hanno*, who arrives with it at *Heraclea*, to the west of *Agrigentum*. *Hanno* puts himself into the field, and surpriseth *Erbesus*, a city wherein the *Romans* had bestowed all their provision. By means hereof, the famine without grew to be as great as it was within *Agrigentum*, and the *Roman* camp no less streightly assieged by *Hanno*, than the city was by the *Romans*; inasmuch, as if *Hieron* had not supply'd them, they had been forced to abandon the siege. But seeing that this distress was not enough to make them rise, *Hanno* determined to give them battel. To which end departing from *Heraclea*, he makes approach unto the *Roman* camp. The *Romans* resolve to sustain him, and put themselves in order. *Hanno* directs the *Numidian* horse-men to charge their vanguard, to the end to draw them further on; which done, he commands them to return as broken, till they came to the body of the army, that lay shadowed behind some rising ground. The *Numidians* perform it accordingly; and while the *Romans* pursued the *Numidians*, *Hanno* gives upon them, and having slaughtered many, beats the rest into their trenches.

^a *Agrigentum* was a goodly city built by the *Geloi*, under conduct of *Arillon* and *Pythilus*. The compass was ten miles about the walls; and it had sometimes in it eight hundred thousand inhabitants. This city, by reason of the fertility of the soil, and the neighbourhood of *Carthage*, grew in a short space from small beginnings to great glory and riches. The plenty and luxury thereof was great, as it caused *Empedocles* to say, that the *Agrigentines* built palaces of such sumptuousness, as if they meant to live for ever; and made such feasts, as if they meant to die the next day. But their greatest pomp and magnificence was in their goodly temples and theaters, water conduits and fish-ponds, the ruins whereof at this day are sufficient arguments, that *Rome* itself could never boast of the like. In the porch of the temple of *Jupiter Olympius* (by which we may judge of the temple itself) there was set out on one side the full proportion of the giants fighting with the gods, all cut out in polished marble of divers colours; a work, the most magnificent and rare that ever hath been seen: on the other side, the war of *Troy*, and the encounters which happened at that siege, with the personages of the heroes that were doers in that war, all of the like beautiful stone, and of equal stature to the bodies of those men in ancient times: in comparison of which, the latter works of that kind are but petty things and mere trifles. It would require a volume to express the magnificence of the temples of *Hercules*, *Aesculapius*, *Concord*, *Juno Lucina*, *Chastity*, *Proserpina*, *Castor* and *Pollux*: wherein the masterpieces of those exquisite painters and carvers, *Phidias*, *Zeuxis*, *Myron*, and *Polyclethus* were to be seen. But in process of time it ran the same fortune that all other great cities have done, and was ruined by calamities of war, whereof this war present brought unto it not the least.

After this encounter, the *Carthaginians* made no other attempt for two months, but lay strongly incamped, waiting until some opportunity should invite them. But *Hannibal*, that was besieged in *Agrigentum*, as well by signs as messengers, made *Hanno* know, how ill the extremity which he endured, was able to brook such dilatory courses. *Hanno* thereupon a second time provoked the consuls to fight. But his elephants being disordered by his own vanguard, which was broken by the *Romans*, he lost the day, and with such as escaped he recovered *Heraclea*. *Hannibal* perceiving this, and remaining hopeless of succour, resolved to make his own way. Finding therefore that the *Romans*, after this day's victory, wearied with labour, and secured by their good fortune, kept negligent watch in the night, he rush'd out of the town with all the remainder of his army, and pass'd by the *Roman* camp without resistance. The consuls pursue him in the morning, but in vain; sure they were, that he could not carry the city with him, which with little ado the *Romans* entered, and pitifully spoiled. The *Romans*, proud of this victory, purpose henceforth rather to follow the direction of their present good fortunes, than their first determinations. They had resolved in the beginning of this war, only to succour the *Mamertines*, and to keep the *Carthaginians* from their own coasts; but now they determine to make themselves lords of all *Sicily*; and from thence, being favoured with the wind of good success, to sail over into *Africa*. It is the disease of kings, of states, and also of private men, to covet the greatest things, but not to enjoy the least; the desire of that which we neither have nor need, taking from us the true use and fruition of what we have already. This curse upon mortal men was never taken from them, since the beginning of the world to this day.

To prosecute this war, *Lucius Valerius*, and *Titus Otacilius*, two new consuls, are sent into *Sicily*. Whereupon, the *Romans* being masters of the field, many inland towns gave themselves unto them. On the contrary, the *Carthaginians* keeping still the lordship of the sea, many maritime places became theirs. The *Romans* therefore, as well to secure their own coasts, often invaded by the *African* fleets, as also to equal themselves in every kind of warfare with their enemies, determine to make a fleet. And herein fortune favoured them with this accident, that being altogether ignorant in shipwrights craft, a storm of wind thrust one of the *Carthaginian* gallies of five banks to the shore.

Now had the *Romans* a pattern, and by it they began to set up an hundred *Quinqueremes*, which were gallies rowed by five on every bank, and twenty of three on a bank; and while these were in preparing, they exercised their men in the feat of rowing. This they did after a strange fashion. They placed upon the sea-sands many seats, in order of the banks in gallies, whereon they placed their watermen, and taught them to beat the sand with long poles, orderly, and as they were directed by the master, that so they might learn the stroke of the galley, and how to mount and draw their oars.

When their fleet was finished, some rigging and other implements excepted, *C. Cornelius*, one of the new consuls (for they changed every year) was made admiral; who being more in love with this new kind of warfare, than well advised, pass'd over to *Messina* with seventeen gallies, leaving the rest to follow him. There he stay'd not, but would needs row along the coast to *Lipara*, hoping to

do some piece of service. *Hannibal*, a *Carthaginian*, was at the same time governor in *Papirinus*, who being advertised of this new seaman's arrival, sent forth one *Boodes*, a senator of *Carthage*, with twenty gallies to entertain him. *Boodes*, falling upon the consul unawares, took both him and the fleet he commanded. When *Hannibal* received this good news, together with the *Roman* gallies and their consul, he grew no less fool-hardy than *Cornelius* had been. For he, fancying to himself to surprize the rest of the *Roman* fleet, on their own coast, ere they were yet in all points provided, sought them out with a fleet of fifty sail; where-with falling among them he was well beaten, and leaving the greater number of his own behind him, made an hard escape with the rest; for of one hundred and twenty gallies, the *Romans* under *Cornelius* had lost but seventeen, so as one hundred and three remained, which were not easily beaten by fifty.

The *Romans* being advertised of *Cornelius*'s overthrow, make haste to redeem him, but give the charge of their fleet to his colleague *Duilius*. *Duilius*, considering that the *Roman* vessels were heavy and slow, the *African* gallies having the speed of them, devised a certain engine in the prow of his gallies, whereby they might fasten or grapple themselves with their enemies, when they were (as we call it) board and board, that is, when they brought the gallies sides together. This done, the weightier ships had gotten the advantage, and the *Africans* lost it. For neither did their swiftness serve them, nor their mariners craft, the vessels wherein both nations fought being open; so that all was to be carried by the advantage of weapon, and valour of the men. Besides this, as the heavier gallies were accidentally likely to crush and crack the sides of the lighter and weaker, so were they, by reason of their breadth, more steady; and those that best kept their feet could also best use their hands. The example may be given between one of the long boats of his majesty's great ships, and a *London* barge.

Certainly, he that will happily perform a fight at sea, must be skilful in making choice of vessels to fight in; he must believe, that there is more belonging to a good man of war upon the waters than great during; and must know, that there is a great deal of difference between fighting loose or at large, and grappling. The guns of a slow ship pierce as well, and make as great holes as those in a swift. To clap ships together without consideration, belongs rather to a mad-man than to a man of war; for by such an ignorant bravery was *Peter Strossie* lost at the *Azores*, when he fought against the Marquis of *Santa Cruz*. In like sort had the lord *Charles Howard*, admiral of *England*, been lost in the year 1588, if he had not been better advised, than a great many malignant fools were, that found fault with his demeanor. The *Spaniards* had an army aboard them, and he had none; they had more ships than he had, and of higher building and charging, so that had he intangled himself with those great and powerful vessels, he had greatly endangered this kingdom of *England*. For twenty men upon the defences are equal to an hundred that board and enter; whereas then, contrariwise, the *Spaniards* had a hundred for twenty of ours, to defend themselves withal. But our admiral knew his advantage, and held it; which had he not done, he had not been worthy to have held his head. Here to speak in general of sea-fight (for particulars are fitter for private hands than for the press) I say, that a fleet of twen-

ty ships, all good sailors and good ships, have the advantage on the open sea of an hundred as good ships, and of slower sailing. For if the fleet of an hundred sail keep themselves near together in a gross squadron, the twenty ships charging them upon any angle shall force them to give ground, and to fall back upon their own next fellows; of which, so many as entangle, are made unserviceable or lost. Force them they may easily; because the twenty ships which give themselves scope, after they have given one broad side of artillery, by clapping into the wind, and staying, they may give them the other; and so the twenty ships batter them in pieces with a perpetual volley; whereas those that fight in a troop have no room to turn, and can always use but one and the same beaten side. If the fleet of an hundred sail give themselves any distance, then shall the lesser fleet prevail, either against those that are a-rear and hindmost, or against those, that, by advantage of over-sailing their fellows, keep the wind: and if upon a lee-shore, the ships next the wind be constrained to fall back into their own squadron, then it is all to nothing that the whole fleet must suffer shipwrack, or render itself. That such advantage may be taken upon a fleet of unequal speed, it hath been well enough conceived in old time; as by that oration of *Hermocrates* in *Thucydides*, which he made to the *Syracusians*, when the *Athenians* invaded them, it may easily be observed.

Of the art of war by sea, I had written a treatise for the lord *Henry*, prince of *Wales*; a subject, to my knowledge, never handled by any man, ancient or modern; but God hath spared me the labour of finishing it by his loss; by the loss of that brave prince; of which, like an eclipse of the sun, we shall find the effects hereafter. Impossible it is to equal words and forrows; I will therefore leave him in the hands of God that hath him. *Curae leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent.*

But it is now time to return to the beaten *Carthaginians*, who, by losing their advantage of swift boats, and boarding the *Romans*, have lost fifty sail of their gallies: as on the other side, their enemies, by commanding the seas, have gotten liberty to sail about the west part of *Sicily*, where they raised the siege laid unto *Segesta* by the *Carthaginians*, and won the town of *Macella*, with some other places.

S E C T. VII.

Drivers enterseits of war between the Romans and Carthaginians, with variable success. The Romans prepare to invade Afric, and obtain a great victory at sea.

THE victory of *Duilius*, as it was honoured at *Rome* with the first naval triumph that

was ever seen in that city, so gave it unto the *Romans* a great encouragement to proceed in their wars by sea; whereby they hoped, not only to get *Sicily*, but all the other isles between *Italy* and *Africa*, beginning with *Sardinia*, whither soon after they sent a fleet for that purpose. On the contrary side, *Amilcar* the *Carthaginian*, lying in *Panormus*, carefully waited for all occasions that might help to recompense the late misfortune; and, being advertised that some quarrel was grown between the *Roman* soldiers and their auxiliaries, being such as caused them to incamp apart, he sent forth *Hanno* to set upon them, who taking them unawares, buried four thousand of them in the place. Now during the continuance of the land-war in *Sicily*, *Hannibal*, who had lately been beaten by sea, but escaped unto *Carthage*, meaning to make amends for his former error, obtained the trust of a new fleet, wherewith he arrived at *Sardinia*: the conquest of which island the *Romans* had entertained for their next enterprize. Now it so fell out, that the *Romans* crossing the seas from *Sicily*, arrived in the port where *Hannibal* with his new fleet anchored. They set upon him unawares, and took the better part of the fleet which he conducted, himself hardly escaping the danger. But it little availed him to have escaped from the *Romans*. His good friends the *Carthaginians* were so ill pleased with this his second unfortunate voyage, that they hanged him up for his diligence; for (as it hath been said of old) *Non est bis in bello peccare*; In war it is too much to offend twice.

After this, it was long ere any thing of importance was done by the consuls, till *Panormus* was besieged; where, when the *Romans* had fought in vain to draw the *Carthaginians* into the field, being unable to force that great city, because of the strong garrison therein bestowed: they then departed from thence, and took certain inland towns, as *Mystratum*, *Enna*, *Camerina*, *Hippana*, and others, between *Panormus* and *Messina*. The year following, *C. Atilius* the consul, who commanded the *Roman* fleet, discovered a company of the *Carthaginian* gallies, ranging the coast; and, not staying for his whole number, pursued them with ten of his. But he was well beaten for the haste he made, and lost all, save the galley which transported him; wherein himself escaped with great labour. But ere all was done, the rest of *Atilius's* fleet was gotten up; who renewing the fight, recovered from the *Carthaginians* a double number of theirs; by which the victory remaining doubtful, both challenge it. Now to try at once which of these two nations should command the seas, they both prepare all they can. The *Romans* make a fleet of three hundred and thirty gallies, the *Carthaginians* of three hundred

^a If we may give credit to antiquities, which *Fazellus*, a diligent writer, hath left us in his history of *Sicily*; *Panormus*, now called *Palermo*, is one of the first cities that hath been built in all Europe. For whereas *Thucydides* seems to make it a colony of the *Phenicians*; *Ranzanus*, in libello de *Panormo*, lib. 6. affirms, that it was first and long before the time which *Thucydides* sets down, founded by the *Chaldeans*, and *Damascenes*. To prove which, he tells us of two inscriptions upon marble, in the Hebrew charactres, found at *Panormus* in the time of *William II.* king of *Sicily*, that were then beheld of all the citizens and other strangers, which being translated into Latin, say as followeth. *Vivente Isaac filio Abrae, & regnante in Idumaea, atque in valle Damascena, Isaac filio Isaac; ingens Hebræorum manus, quibus adjuncti sunt multi Damasceni, atque Phænices, protecti in hanc triangularem urbem, sedes perpetuas locaverunt in hoc amoenissimo loco, quem Panormum nominaverunt.* In the other marble are found these words. *Non est alius Deus præter unum Deum; non est alius Potens, præter eundem Deum, &c.* Hujus turris protectus est *Saphu* filius *Eliphaz* filii *Esau*, fratris *Jacob* filii *Isaac*, filii *Abrahami*: & turri quidem ipsi nomen est *Baych*; sed turri huic proxime nomen est *Pharah*. And this inscription (saith *Fazellus*) was found entire in the castle *Baych*, in the year 1534. Now whether these inscriptions were truly as ancient as these men believe they were, I leave every man to his own faith. But that the city was of aged times, it appears by *Thucydides*, who affirmeth, when the Greeks first into *Sicily*, that then the *Phenicians* inhabited *Panormus*; which certain it is they did in the first Punic war; to wit, the *Carthaginians*, who sent *Phenicians*, from whom the *Romans* (*A. Aquilius* and *C. Cornelius*) commanding this army, took it. And when *Marcellus* besieged *Syracuse*, it sent him in aid three thousand soldiers. But it was rather confederate than subject to the *Romans*. For *Cicero* against *Verres*, names it among the free cities of *Sicily*. After *Syracuse* destroyed, it became the first city and regal seat, as well of the *Goths* and *Saracens* in that island, as of the emperors of *Constantinople*; of the *Normans*, *French* and *Aragonians*; which honour it holds to this day, and is much frequented for the excellent wine which grows about it.

and fifty, ^a *Triremes*, *Quadrirèmes*, and *Quinqueremes*.

The *Romans* resolve to transport the war into *Africa*, the *Carthaginians* to arrest them on the coast of *Sicily*. The numbers with which each of them filled their fleet, was (perhaps) the greatest that ever fought on the waters. By *Polybius's* estimation, there were in the *Roman* galleys an hundred and forty thousand men; and in those of *Carthage*, an hundred and fifty thousand; reckoning one hundred and twenty soldiers, and three hundred rowers to every galley, one with the other. The *Roman* fleet was divided into four parts, of which the three first made the form of a wedge or triangle; the two first squadrons making the flanks, and the third squadron the base; the point thereof (wherein were the two consuls as admirals) looking toward the enemy, and the middle space lying empty. Their vessels of carriage were towed by the third squadron. After all, came up the fourth, in form of a *Crescent*, very well manned, but exceeding thin, so that the horns of it inclosed all the third squadron, together with the corners of the first and second. The order of the *Carthaginian* fleet I cannot conceive by relation; but by the manner of the fight afterwards, I conjecture that the front of their fleet was thin, and stretched in a great length, much like to that which the *French* call *Combat en bati*; a long front of horse, and thin: which form, since the pistol prevailed over the lance, they have changed. Behind this first out-stretched front their battalions were more solid. For *Amilcar*, admiral of the *Carthaginians*, had thus ordered them of purpose (his galleys having the speed of the *Romans*) that when the first fleet of the *Romans* hastened to break through the first galleys they should all turn tail, and the *Romans* pursuing them (as after a victory) disorder themselves, and for eagerness of taking the runaways, leave their own three squadrons far behind them. For so it must needs fall out, seeing that the third squadron towed their horse-boats and victuallers, and the fourth had the rearward of all. According to *Amilcar's* direction it succeeded. For when the *Romans* had charged and broken the thin front of the *Carthaginian* first fleet, which ran away, they forthwith gave after them with all speed possible, not so much as looking behind them for the second squadron. Hereby the *Romans* were drawn near unto the body of the *Carthaginian* fleet led by *Amilcar*, and by him (at the first) received a great loss, till their second squadron came up, which forced *Amilcar* to betake him to his oars. *Hanno* also, who commanded the right wing of the *Carthaginian* fleet, invaded the *Roman* rearward, and prevailed against them. But *Amilcar* being beaten off, *Marcus Atilius* fell back to their succour, and put the *Carthaginians* to their heels, as not able to sustain both squadrons. The rear being relieved, the consuls came to the aid of their third battalion, which towed the victuallers, which was also in great danger of being beaten by the *Africans*; but the consuls joining their squadrons to it, put the *Carthaginians* on that part also to running. This victory fell to the *Romans*, partly by the hardiness of their soldiers, but principally, for that *Amilcar* being first beaten, could never after join himself to any of his other squadrons, that remained as yet in a fair likelihood of prevailing, so long as they fought upon even terms,

and but squadron to squadron. But *Amilcar* forsaking the fight, thereby left a full fourth part of the *Roman* fleet unengaged, and ready to give succour to any of the other parts that were oppress'd. So as in conclusion, the *Romans* got the honour of the day; for they lost but four and twenty of theirs, whereas the *Africans* lost thirty that were sunk, and threescore and three that were taken.

Now, if *Amilcar*, who had more galleys than the *Romans*, had also divided his fleet into four squadrons (besides those that he ranged in the front to draw on the enemies, and to engage them) and that, while he himself fought with one squadron that charged him, all the rest of the enemies fleet had been at the same time entertained, he had prevailed; but the second squadron being free came to the rescue of the first, by which *Amilcar* was oppress'd; and *Amilcar* being oppress'd and scattered, the consuls had good leisure to relieve both their third and fourth squadron, and got the victory.

Charles V., among other his precepts to *Philip II.*, his son, where he adviseth him concerning war against the *Turks*, tells him, that in all battels between them and the *Christians*, he should never fail to charge the *Janisaries* in the beginning of the fight, and to engage them at once with the rest. For (saith he) the *Janisaries*, who are always reserved entire in the rear of the battel, and in whom the *Turk* reposeth his greatest confidence, come up in a gross body, when all the troops on both sides are disbanded and in confusion, whereby they carry the victory before them without resistance. By the same order of fight and reservation did the *Romans* also prevail against other nations. For they kept their *Triarii* in store (who were the choice of their army) for the upshot and last blow. A great and victorious advantage it hath ever been found, to keep some one or two good troops to look on, when all else are disbanded and engaged.

S E C T. VIII.

The Romans prevail in Afric. Atilius the consul propoundeth intolerable conditions of peace to the Carthaginians. He is utterly beaten, and made prisoner.

NOW the *Romans*, according to their former resolution, after they had repaired and re-victualled their fleet, set sail for *Africa*, and arrived at the promontory of *Hercules*, a great headland, somewhat to the east of the port of *Carthage*, and some forty leagues from *Heraclea* in *Sicily*, where *Amilcar* himself as yet staid. From this headland (leaving the entrance into *Carthage*) they coasted the east-side of the promontory, till they came to *Clypea*, a town about fifty *English* miles from it. There they disembarked, and prepared to besiege *Clypea*, which, to ease them of labour, was yielded unto them. Now, had they a port of their own on *Africa* side, without which all invasions are foolish. By this time were the *Africans* also arrived at their own *Carthage*, fearing that the *Roman* fleet and army had directed themselves thither; but being advertised that they had taken *Clypea*, they made provisions of all sorts both by sea and land for their defence. The *Romans* send to *Rome* for directions, and in the mean while waste all round about them. The order given from the senate, was, that one of the consuls should remain with the

^a The *Quinqueremes* are galleys, wherein every oar hath five men to draw it; the *Quadrirèmes* had four to an oar, and the *Triremes* three. Some have thought that the *Quinqueremes* had five ranks of oars one over another; and the other galleys (rateably) fewer. But had this been so, they must then have had five decks each over other, which hath seldom been seen in ships of a thousand tons; neither could the third, fourth and fifth ranks, have reached unto the water with their oars.

army, and that the other should return with the fleet into *Italy*. According to this direction, *Manlius* the consul is sent home to *Rome*, whither he carried with him twenty thousand *African* captives, with all the *Roman* fleet and army, except forty ships, fifteen thousand foot and five hundred horse that were left with *Atilius*.

With these forces, *Regulus* easily won some towns and places that were unwalled, and laid siege to others; but he performed no great matter before he came to *Adis*. Yet I hold it worthy of relation, that near unto the river of *Bagrada* he encountered with a serpent of one hundred and twenty foot long, which he slew, not without loss of many soldiers, being driven to use against it such engines of war as served properly for the assaulting of towns. At *Adis* he met with the *Carthaginian* army, whereof the captains were *Hanno* and *Bostar*, together with *Amilcar*, who had brought over out of *Sicily* five thousand foot and five hundred horse to succour his country. These (belike) had an intent rather to weary him out of *Africa*, by weary protraction of time, than to undergo the hazard of a main fight. They were careful to hold themselves free from necessity of coming to blows, yet had they a great desire to save the town of *Adis* out of his hands. Intending therefore to follow their general purpose, and yet to disturb him in the siege of *Adis*; they encamp near unto him, and strongly (as they think) on the top of an hill; but thereby they lose the services both of their elephants and of their horse-men. This disadvantage of theirs *Regulus* discovers, and makes use of it. He assails them in their strength, which they defend a while; but in fine, the *Romans* prevail, and force them from the place, taking the spoil of their camp. Following this their good fortune at the heels, they proceed to *Tunis*, a city within sixteen miles of *Carthage*, which they assault and take.

By the loss of this battel at *Adis*, and more especially by the loss of *Tunis*, the *Carthaginians* were greatly dismay'd. The *Numidians*, their next neighbours towards the west, insult upon their misfortunes, invade and spoil their territory, and force those that inhabit abroad to forsake their villages and fields, and to hide themselves within the walls of *Carthage*. By reason hereof a great famine at hand threatens the citizens. *Atilius* finds his own advantage, and assures himself that the city could not long hold out; yet he feared lest it might defend it self until his time of office, that was near expired, should be quite run out, whereby the new consuls were like to reap the honour of obtaining it. Ambition therefore, that hath no respect but to it self, persuades him to treat of peace with the *Carthaginians*. But he propounded unto them so unworthy and base conditions, as thereby their hearts, formerly possessed with fear, became now so courageous and disdainful, that they resolved either to defend their liberty, or to die to the last man. To strengthen this their resolution, there arrived at the same time a great troop of *Greeks*, whom they had formerly sent to entertain. Among these was a very expert soldier, named *Xantippus*, a *Spartan*; who being informed of what had passed, and of the overthrow which the *Carthaginians* received near unto *Adis*, gave it out publickly, that the same was occasioned by default of the commanders, and not of the nation. This

braut ran till it came to the senate; *Xantippus* is sent for, gives the reason of his opinion; and in conclusion, being made general of the *African* forces, he puts himself into the field. The army which he led consisted of no more than twelve thousand foot and four thousand horse, with an hundred elephants. No greater were the forces wherewith the *Carthaginians* fought for all that they had, liberty, lives, goods, wives, and children; which might well make it suspected that the armies by sea, before spoken of, were misnumbered; the one consisting of an hundred and forty thousand, the other of an hundred and fifty thousand; were it not commonly found that they, which use the service of mercenary soldiers, are stronger abroad than at their own doors.

Xantippus, taking the field with this army, marched directly towards the *Romans*; and ranging his troops upon fair and level ground, fittest both for his elephants and horse, presented them battel. The *Romans* wondered much whence this new courage of their enemies might grow; but confident they were that it should be soon abated. Their chief care was, how to resist the violence of the elephants. Against them they placed the *Velites*, or light-armed soldiers, as a forlorn hope; that these might, either with darts and other casting weapons, drive back the beasts upon the enemies, or at least break their violence, and hinder them from rushing freely upon the legions. To the same end they made their battels deeper in file than they had been accustomed to do. By which means, as they were the less subject unto the impression of the elephants; so were they so much the more exposed unto the violence of horse, wherein the enemy did far exceed them. The elephants were placed by *Xantippus*, all in one rank, before his army, which followed them at a reasonable distance: his horse-men, and some light-armed foot of the *Carthaginian* auxiliaries were in the wings. The first onset was given by the elephants, against which the *Velites* were so unable to make resistance, that they brake into the battalions following, and put them into some disorder. In this case, the depth of the *Roman* battel was helpful; for when the beasts had spent their force in piercing through a few of the first ranks, the squadrons nevertheless persisted in their order, without opening. But the *Carthaginian* horse, having at the first encounter, by reason of their advantage in number, driven those of *Atilius* out of the field, began to charge the *Roman* battalions in flank, and put them in great distress; who being forced to turn face every way, could neither pass forward, nor yet retire; but had much ado to make good the ground whereon they stood. In the mean while, such of the *Romans* as had escaped the fury of the elephants, and left them at their backs, fell upon the *Carthaginian* army, that met them in very good array. It was no even match; the one were a disordered company, wearied with labour, and hurt; the other fresh, and well prepared to have dealt with the enemy upon equal terms. Here was therefore a greater slaughter with little fight, the *Romans* hastily recoiling to the body of their army, which being surrounded with the enemy, and spent with travel, fell all to rout, upon the defeat of these troops, that open the way to a general overthrow. So the *Carthaginians* obtained a full victory, destroying the whole

* This city was taken from the Turks by Charles the fifth, in the year 1536, and was one of the three keys which he gave in charge to Philip the second his son, to keep safe: to wit, this *Tunis*, the key of *Africa*; *Flushing*, the key of the *Netherlands*; and *Cadix*, the key of *Spain*. But two of these Philip so lost, that he never found them again; the third, our English were bold, in the time of the renowned queen *Elizabeth*, to swing out of his hands; where we staid not to pick any lock, but broke open the doors, and having rifled all threw it into the fire.

Roman army, save two thousand; and taking five hundred prisoners, together with *Atilius* the consul. Of their own they lost no more than eight hundred mercenaries, which were slain when the fight began by two thousand of the *Romans*, that, wheeling about to avoid the elephants, bare down all before them, and made way even to the *Carthaginian* trenches. These were the two thousand that escaped, when the whole army behind them was routed. All the rest were either taken or slain. Hereby fortune made the *Romans* know, that they were no less her vassals, than were the *Carthaginians*; how insolent soever they had been in their proposition of peace, as if they had purchased from her the inheritance of their prosperity, which she never gave nor sold to any mortal man. With what joy these news were welcomed, when they came to *Carthage*; we may easily conjecture; and what great things the virtue of one man hath often brought to pass in the world, there are many examples to prove, no less than this of *Xantippus*; all of them confirming that sentence of *Eurypides*, *Mens una sapiens; plurimum vincit manus*; Many mens hands equal not one wise mind.

After this great service done to the *Carthaginians*, *Xantippus* returned into *Greece*; whether for that he was more injured than honoured, or for what other cause, it is unknown.

The death of *Atilius Regulus* the consul, was very memorable. He was sent from *Carthage* to *Rome*, about the exchange and ransom of prisoners on both sides; giving his faith to return, if the business were not effected. When he came to *Rome*, and plainly saw that his country should lose by the bargain, so far was he from urging the senate unto compassion of his own misery, that he earnestly perswaded to have the prisoners in *Africa* left to their ill destinies. This done, he returned to *Carthage*, where, for his pains taken, he was rewarded with an horrible death. For this his constancy and faith, all writers highly extol him; but the *Carthaginians* seem to have judged him an obstinate and malicious enemy, that neither in his prosperity would hearken to reason, nor yet in his calamity would have the natural care to preserve himself and others, by yielding to such an office of humanity, as is common in all wars (not grounded upon deadly hatred) only in regard of some small advantage. Whatsoever the *Carthaginians* thought of him, sure it is, that his faithful observance of his word given, cannot be too much commended. But that grave speech, which he made in the senate against the exchange of prisoners, appears in all reason to have proceeded from a vain-glorious forwardness, rather than from any necessity of state. For the exchange was made soon after his death, wherein the *Romans* had the worst bargain, by so much as *Regulus* himself was worth. As for the authority of all historians that magnify him in this point, we are to consider that they live under the *Roman* empire; *Philinus* the *Carthaginian*, perhaps, did censure it otherwise. Yet the death which he suffered with extreme torments, could not be more grievous to him, than it was dishonourable to *Carthage*. Neither do I think that the *Carthaginians* could excuse themselves herein, otherwise than by recrimination; saying, that the *Romans* deserved to be no better intreated, so much as it was their ordinary practice to use others in the like sort. Cruelty doth not become more warrantable, but rather more odious, by being customary. It was the *Roman* fashion to whip almost to death, and then to behead the captains of their enemies whom they took; yea, although they were such as had always made fair wars with them.

Wherefore it seems not meet, in reason, that they should cry out against the like tyrannical insolence in others; as if it were lawful only in themselves.

The consideration both of this misfortune, that rewarded the pride of *Atilius's* intolerable demands, and of the sudden valour whereinto the *Carthaginians* feat was changed by mere desperation, calls to remembrance the like insolency of others in prosperity; that hath bred the like resolution in those to whom all reasonable grace hath been denied. In such cases I never hold it impertinent to add unto one, more testimonies, approving the true rules from which our passions carry us away.

In the year 1378, the *Genoese* won so fast upon the *Venetians*, as they not only drove their galleys out of the sea, but they brought their own fleet within two miles of *Venice* it self. This bred such an amazement in the citizens of *Venice*, that they offered unto the *Genoese* (their state reserved) whatsoever they would demand. But *Peter Doria*, blown up with many former victories, would hearken to no composition, save the yielding of their city and state to his discretion. Hereupon the *Venetians* being filled with disdain, thrust out to sea with all their remaining power, and assailed *Doria* with such desperate fury, that they brake his fleet, kill *Doria* himself, take nineteen of his galleys, fourscore boats of *Padoua*, and four thousand prisoners; recover *Chiozza*, and all the places taken from them; and following their victory, enter the port of *Genoa*, enforcing the *Genoese* basely to beg peace, to their extreme dishonour and disadvantage, being beaten; which being victorious, they might have commanded, to their greatest honour and advantage. The like happened to the earl of *Flanders*, in the year 1380, when having taken a notable, and withal an over-cruel revenge upon the *Gantois*, he refused mercy to the rest, who in all humility submitting themselves to his obedience, offered their city, goods, and estates, to be disposed at his pleasure. This when he had unadvisedly refused, and was resolved to extinguish them utterly, they issue out of their city with five thousand chosen men, and armed with a desperate resolution, they charge the earl, break his army, enter *Bruges* (pell-mell) with his vanquished followers, and enforce him to hide himself under an heap of straw in a poor cottage, out of which, with great difficulty, he escaped, and saved himself. Such are the fruits of insolency.

S E C T. IX.

How the affairs of Carthage prospered after the victory against Atilius: How the Romans, having lost their fleet by tempest, resolve to forsake the seas: the great advantages of a good fleet in war, between nations divided by the sea.

BY the reputation of this late victory, all places that had been lost in *Africa*, return to the obedience of *Carthage*. Only *Clypea* stands out, before which the *Carthaginians* set down, and assailed it, but in vain: for the *Romans* hearing of the loss of *Atilius*, with their forces in *Africa*, and withal, that *Clypea* was besieged, make ready a gross army, and transport it in a fleet of three hundred and fifty galleys, commanded by *M. Aemilius* and *Ser. Fulvius* their consuls. At the promontory of *Mercury*, two hundred *Carthaginian* galleys set out on purpose, upon the bruit of their coming, encounter them, but greatly to their cost: for the *Romans* took by force an hundred and fourteen of their fleet, and drew them after them to *Clypea*, where they staid no longer than to take in their own men that had been besieged; and this done, they made amain towards *Sicily*, in hope

hope to recover all that the *Carthaginians* held therein. In this hasty voyage, they despise the advice of the pilots, who pray them to find harbour in time, for that the season threatened some violent storms, which ever happened between the rising of *Orion* and of the *Dog-star*. Now although the pilots of the *Roman* fleet had thus forewarned them of the weather at hand, and certified them withal, that the south coast of *Sicily* had no good ports, wherein to save themselves upon such an accident; yet this victorious nation was perswaded that the wind and seas feared them no less than did the *Africans*; and that they were able to conquer the elements themselves. So refusing to stay within some port, as they were advised, they would needs put out to sea; thinking it a matter much helping their reputation, after this victory against the *Carthaginian* fleet, to take a few worthless towns upon the coast. The merciless winds in the mean while overtake them, and near unto *Camerina*, overturn and thrust headlong on the rocks all but eighty, of three hundred and forty ships; so as their former great victory was devoured by the seas, before the same thereof recovered *Rome*.

The *Carthaginians* hearing what had happened, repair all their warlike vessels, hoping once again to command the seas: they are also as confident of their land-forces since the overthrow of *Atilius*. They send *Asdrubal* into *Sicily* with all their old soldiers, and an hundred and forty elephants, embarked in two hundred galleys. With this army and fleet he arrives at *Lilybeum*, where he begins to vex the partizans of *Rome*. But adversity doth not discourage the *Romans*: they build in three months (a matter of great note) one hundred and twenty ships, with which, and the remainder of their late shipwreck, they row to *Panormus*, or *Palermo*, the chief city of the *Africans* in *Sicily*, and surround it by land and water: after a while they take it, and, leaving a garrison therein, return to *Rome*.

Very desirous the *Romans* were to be doing in *Africa*: to which purpose they employed *C. Servilius* and *C. Sempronius* their consuls. But these wrought no wonders. Some spoil they made upon the coasts of *Africa*, but fortune robbed them of all their gettings. For in their return, they were first set upon the sands, and like to have perished near unto the lesser *Syrtes*, where they were fain to heave all over-board, that so they might get off: then, having with much ado doubled the cape of *Lilybeum*, in their passage from *Panormus* towards *Italy*, they lost an hundred and fifty of their ships by foul weather. A greater discouragement never nation had; the god of the wars favoured them no more, than the god of the waters afflicted them. Of all that *Mars* enriched them with upon the land, *Neptune* robbed them upon the seas: for they had now lost, besides what they lost in fight, four hundred and six ships and galleys, with all the munition and soldiers transported in them.

The exceeding damage hereby received, perswaded them to give over their navigation, and their fight by sea, and to send only a land-army into *Sicily*, under *L. Cæcilius* and *P. Furius* their consuls. These they transported in some sixty ordinary passage-boats, by the freights of *Messina*, that are not above a mile and a half broad from land to

land. In like sort the overthrow which *Atilius* received in *Africa*, occasioned chiefly by the elephants, made them less cholerick against the *Carthaginians* than before; so that for two years after they kept the high and woody grounds, not daring to fight in the fair and champion countries. But this late resolution of forsaking the seas lasted not long; for it was impossible for them to succour those places which they held in *Sicily*, without a navy; much less to maintain the war in *Africa*. For whereas the *Romans* were to send forces from *Messina* to *Egesta*, to *Lilybeum*, and to other places in the extreme west parts of *Sicily*, making sometimes a march of above one hundred and forty *English* miles by land, which could not be performed with an army, and the provisions that follow it, in less than fourteen days, the *Carthaginians* would pass it with their galleys in forty-eight hours.

An old example we have of that great advantage of transporting armies by water, between *Canutus* and *Edmund Ironside*. For *Canutus*, when he had entered the *Thames* with his navy and army, and could not prevail against *London*, suddenly embarked; and sailing to the west, landed in *Dorsetshire*, so drawing *Edmund* and his army thither. There finding ill entertainment, he again shipped his men, and entered the *Severn*, making *Edmund* to march after him to the succour of *Worcestershire*, by him greatly spoiled. But when he had *Edmund* there, he sailed back again to *London*, by means whereof he both wearied the king, and spoiled where he pleased, ere succour could arrive. And this was not the least help which the *Netherlands* have had against the *Spaniards*, in the defence of their liberty, that, being masters of the sea, they could pass their army from place to place unwearied and entire, with all the munition and artillery belonging unto it, in the tenth part of the time wherein their enemies have been able to do it. Of this, an instance or two. The count *Maurice* of *Nassau*, now living, one of the greatest captains, and of the worthiest princes, that either the present or preceding ages have brought forth, in the year 1590, carried his army by sea with forty cannons to *Breda*; making countenance either to besiege *Boisleduc* or *Gertrevidenbergh*; which the enemy (in prevention) filled with soldiers and victuals. But, as soon as the wind served, he suddenly set sail, and arriving in the mouth of the *Meuse*, turned up the *Rhine*, and thence to *Yffel*, and set down before *Zutphen*. So before the *Spaniards* could march over-land round about *Holland*, above eighty miles, and over many great rivers with their cannon and carriage, *Zutphen* was taken. Again, when the *Spanish* army had overcome this wearisome march, and were now far from home, the prince *Maurice* making countenance to sail up the *Rhine*, changed his course in the night; and sailing down the stream, he was set down before *Hulst* in *Brabant*, ere the *Spaniards* had knowledge what was become of him. So this town he also took, before the *Spanish* army could return. Lastly, the *Spanish* army was no sooner arrived in *Brabant*, than the prince *Maurice*, well attended by his good fleet, having fortified *Hulst*, set sail again, and presented himself before *Nimwegen* in *Gelders*, a city of notable importance, and mastered it.

a There is no part of the world, which hath not some certain times of outrageous weather, besides their accidental storms. We hear upon our coast a Michielmas storm, that seldom or never fails. In the West-Indies, in the months of August and September, there is a forcible wind which the Spaniards call the Norttes, or north winds, are very fearful: and therefore they that navigate in those parts, till harbour till these months take out. Charles the fifth, being as ill advised in passing the seas towards Algier in the winter-quarter, contrary to the counsel of A. Donna, as he was in like unreasonable times to continue his siege before Metz in Lorraine, lost 140 ships by tempest, and fifteen galleys, with all in effect in them of men, victuals, horses, and munition; a loss no less great, than his retreat both from before the one and the other, was extreme dishonourable.

And to say the truth, it is impossible for any maritime country, not having the coasts admirably fortified, to defend it self against a powerful Enemy that is master of the sea. Hereof I had rather, that *Spain* than *England* should be an example. Let it therefore be supposed, that King *Philip* the second, had fully resolved to hinder Sir *John Norris* in the year 1589, from presenting *Don Antonio*, king of *Portugal*, before the gates of *Lisbon*; and that he would have kept off the *English*, by power of his land-forces, as being too weak at sea, through the great overthrow of his mighty *Armada*, by the fleet of queen *Elizabeth*, in the year foregoing. Surely, it had not been hard for him to prepare an army, that should be able to resist our eleven thousand. But where should this his army have been bestowed? if about *Lisbon*, then would it have been easie unto the *English*, to take, ransack, and burn the town of *Groin*, and to waste the country round about it. For the great and threatening preparations of the earl of *Altemira*, the marquis of *Saralha*, and others, did not hinder them from performing all this. Neither did the hasty levy of eight thousand, under the earl of *Andrada*, serve to more effect, than the increase of honour to Sir *John Norris* and his associates: considering that the *English* charged these at *Puente de Burgos*, and passing the great bridge, behind which they lay, that was flanked with shot, and barricaded at the further end, routed them, took their camp; took their general's standard with the king's arms, and pursued them over all the country, which they fired. If a royal army, and not (as this was) a company of private adventurers, had thus begun the war in *Galicia*; I think it would have made the *Spaniards* to quit the guard of *Portugal*, and make haste to the defence of their *St. Jago*, whose temple was not far from the danger. But had they held their first resolution, as knowing that Sir *John Norris*'s main intent was to bring *Don Antonio* with an army into his kingdom, whither coming strong, he expected to be readily and joyfully welcomed, could they have hindered his landing in *Portugal*? did not he land at *Peniche*, and march over the country to *Lisbon*, six days journey? did not he (when all *Don Antonio*'s promises failed) pass along by the river of *Lisbon* to *Cascais*, and there, having won the fort, quietly embark his men, and depart? but these, though no more than an handful, yet were they *English*. Let us consider of the matter it self, what another nation might do, even against *England*, in landing an army, by advantage of a fleet, if we had none. This question, whether an invading army may be resisted at their landing upon the coast of *England*, were there no fleet of ours at the sea to impeach it; is already handled by a learned gentleman of our nation, in his observations upon *Cæsar's Commentaries*, that maintains the affirmative. This he holds only upon supposition; in absence of our shipping: and comparatively, as that it is a more safe and easy course to defend all the coast of *England*, than to suffer any enemy to land, and afterwards to fight with him. Surely I hold with him, that it is the best way to keep our enemy from treading upon our ground: wherein if we fail, then must we seek to make him wish that he had staid at his own home. In such a case, if it should happen, our judgments are to weigh many particular circumstances that belong not unto this discourse. But making the question general and positive, whether *England*, without help of her fleet, be able to debar an enemy from landing? I hold that it is unable so to do; and therefore I think it most

dangerous to make the adventure. For the encouragement of a first victory to an enemy, and the discouragement of being beaten to the invaded; may draw after it a most perilous consequence.

It is true, that the marshal *Monluc*, in his commentaries, doth greatly complain that by his wanting forces, wherewith to have kept the frontier of *Guienne*, they of the *Protestant* religion; after the battel of *Moncouter*, entered that country, and gathered great strength and relief thence; for if the king (saith he) would have given me but reasonable means, *j'euise bien garde a Monsieur l'admiral, de faire boire ses chevaux en la Garonne*; I would have kept the admiral from watering his horses in the river of *Garonne*. *Monsieur de Langey*, on the contrary side, prefers the not fighting upon a frontier with an invaded enemy, and commends the delay; which course the constable of *France* held against the emperor *Charles*, when he invaded *Provence*. Great difference I know there is, and a diverse consideration to be had, between such a country as *France* is, strengthened with many fortified places; and this of ours, where our ramparts are but of the bodies of men. And it was of invasions upon firm land, that these great captains spake, whose entrances cannot be uncertain. But our question is, of an army to be transported over-sea, and to be landed again in an enemy's country, and the place left to the choice of the invader. Hereunto I say, that such an army cannot be resisted on the coast of *England*, without a fleet to impeach it; no, nor on the coast of *France*, or any other country; except every creek, port, or sandy bay, had a powerful army in each of them to make opposition. For let his whole supposition be granted; that *Kent* is able to furnish twelve thousand foot; and that those twelve thousand be laid in the three best landing places within that country, to wit, three thousand at *Margate*, three thousand at the *Nesse*, and six thousand at *Foulkston*, that is somewhat equally distant from them both; as also that two of these troops (unless some other order be thought more fit) be directed to strengthen the third, when they shall see the enemies fleet to bend towards it: I say, that notwithstanding this provision, if the enemy, setting sail from the isle of *Wight*, in the first watch of the night, and towing their long boats at their sterns, shall arrive by dawn of day at the *Nesse*, and thrust their army on shore there; it will be hard for those three thousand that are at *Margate* (twenty and four long miles from thence) to come time enough to re-inforce their fellows at the *Nesse*. Nay, how shall they at *Foulkston* be able to do it, who are nearer by more than half the way? seeing that the enemy, at his first arrival, will either make his entrance by force, with three or four hundred shot of great artillery, and quickly put the first three thousand, that were intrenched at the *Nesse*, to run; or else give them so much to do, that they shall be glad to send for help to *Foulkston*, and perhaps to *Margate*: whereby those places will be left bare. Now let us suppose, that all the twelve thousand *Kentish* soldiers arrive at the *Nesse*, ere the enemy can be ready to disembark his army, so that he shall find it unsafe to land in the face of so many prepared to withstand him; yet must we believe that he will play the best of his own game; and (having liberty to go which way he list) under covert of the night, set sail towards the east, where what shall hinder him to take ground, either at *Margate*, the *Downs*, or elsewhere, before they at the *Nesse* can be well aware of his departure? certainly, there is nothing more easy than to do it. Yea, the like may be

be said of *Weymouth, Purbeck, Poole*, and of all landing places on the south coast. For there is no man ignorant, that ships, without putting themselves out of breath, will easily out-run the soldiers that coast them. *Les armées ne volent point en poste ; armées neither fly, nor run post*, saith a marshal of *France*. And I know it to be true, that a fleet of ships may be seen at sun-set, and after it, at the *Lizard*; yet by the next morning they may recover *Portland*; whereas an army of foot shall not be able to march it in six days. Again, when those troops lodged on the sea-shores, shall be forced to run from place to place in vain, after a fleet of ships, they will at length sit down in the mid-way, and leave all at adventure. But say it were otherwise; that the invading enemy will offer to land in some such place, where there shall be an army of ours ready to receive him: yet it cannot be doubted, but that when the choice of all our trained Bands, and the choice of our commanders and captains, shall be drawn together (as they were at *Tilbury*, in the year 1588.) to attend the person of the prince, and for the defence of the city of *London*: they that remain to guard the coast, can be of no such force, as to encounter an army like unto that, wherewith it was intended that the prince of *Parma* should have landed in *England*.

The Isle of *Tercera* hath taught us by experience, what to think in such a case. There are not many islands in the world, better fenced by nature, and strengthened by art: it being every-where hard of access; having no good harbour wherein to shelter a navy of friends; and upon every cove or watering place a fort erected, to forbid the approach of an enemy's boat. Yet when *Emanuel de Sylva*, and *Monsieur de Chattes*, that held it to the use of *Don Antonio*, with five or six thousand men, thought to have kept the marquis of *Santa Cruz*, from setting foot on ground therein; the marquis having shewed himself in the Road of *Angra*, did set sail ere any was aware of it, and arrived at the *Port des Moles*, far distant from thence, where he won a fort, and landed, ere *Monsieur de Chattes*, running thither in vain, could come to hinder him. The example of *Philip Strossie*, slain the year before, without all regard of his worth, and of three hundred *French* Prisoners murdered in cold blood, had instructed *de Chattes* and his followers, what they might expect at that marquis's hands: therefore it is not like that they were slow in carrying relief to *Port de Moles*. Whether our *English* would be persuaded to make such diligent haste from *Margate* to the *Nesse*, and back again, it may be doubted. Sure I am, that it were a greater march than all the length of *Tercera*; whereof the *Frenchmen* had not measured the one half, when they found themselves prevented by the more nimble ships of *Spain*.

This may suffice to prove, that a strong army, in a good fleet, which neither foot nor horse is able to follow, cannot be denied to land where it list, in *England*, *France*, or elsewhere, unless it be hindered, encountered, and shuffled together, by a fleet of equal or answerable strength.

The difficult landing of our *English* at *Fayal*, in the year 1597, is alledged against this: which example moves me no way to think that a large coast may be defended against a strong fleet. I landed those *English* in *Fayal* my self, and therefore ought to take notice of this instance. For whereas I find an action of mine cited, with omission of my name; I may, by a civil interpretation, think, that there was no purpose to defraud

me of any honour; but rather an opinion, that the enterprize was such, or so ill managed, as that no honour could be due unto it. There were indeed some which were in that voyage, who advised me not to undertake it: and I hearkned unto them somewhat longer than was requisite; especially, whilst they desired me to reserve the title of such an exploit (though it were not great) for a greater person. But when they began to tell me of difficulty, I gave them to understand the same which I now maintain, that it was more difficult to defend a coast, than to invade it. The truth is, that I could have landed my men with more ease than I did; yea, without finding any resistance, if I would have rowed to another place; yea, even there where I landed, if I would have taken more company to help me. But without fearing any imputation of rashness, I may say, that I had more regard of reputation, in that business, than of safety. For I thought it to belong unto the honour of our prince and nation, that a few islanders should not think any advantage great enough, against a fleet set forth by queen *Elizabeth*: and further, I was unwilling that some *Low-Country* captains, and others, not of mine own squadron, whose assistance I had refused, should please themselves with a sweet conceit (though it would have been short, when I had landed in some other place) *that for want of their help I was driven to turn tail*. Therefore I took with me none but men assured, commanders of mine own squadron, with some of their followers, and a few other gentlemen, voluntiers, whom I could not refuse; as *Sir William Brooke*, *Sir William Harvey*, *Sir Arthur Gorges*, *Sir John Scot*, *Sir Thomas Ridgeway*, *Sir Henry Thinne*, *Sir Charles Morgan*, *Sir Walter Chute*, *Marcellus Throckmorton*, captain *Laurence Kemis*, captain *William Morgan*, and others, such as well understood themselves and the enemy: by whose help, with God's favour, I made good the enterprize I undertook. As for the working of the sea, the steepness of the cliffs, and other troubles, that were not new to us, we overcame them well enough. And these (notwithstanding) made five or six companies of the enemies, who sought to impeach our landing, abandon the wall, whereon their musquetiers lay on the rest for us, and won the place of them without any great loss. This I could have done with less danger, so that it should not have served for example of a rule, that failed even in this example: but the reasons before alledged (together with other reasons well known to some of the gentlemen above named, though more private than to be here laid down) made me rather follow the way of bravery, and take the shorter course, having it still in mine own power to fall off when I should think it meet. It is easily said, that *the enemy was more than a coward* (which yet was more than we knew;) neither will I magnify such a small piece of service, by seeking to prove him better, whom had I thought equal to mine own followers, I would otherwise have dealt with. But for so much as concerns the Proposition in hand; he that beheld this, may well remember, that the same enemy troubled us more in our march towards *Fayal*, than in our taking the shore; that he sought how to stop us in place of his advantage; that many of our men were slain or hurt by him, among whom *Sir Arthur Gorges* was shot in that march; and that such, as (thinking all danger to be past, when we had won good footing) would needs follow us to the town, were driven by him, to forsake the pace of a man of war, and betake themselves to an hasty trot.

For end of this digression, I hope that this question shall never come to tryal; his majesty's many moveable forts will forbid the experience. And although the *English* will no less disdain, than any nation under heaven can do, to be beaten upon their own ground, or elsewhere, by a foreign enemy; yet to entertain those that shall assail us, with their own beef in their bellies, and before they eat of our *Kentish* Capons, I take it to be the wisest way. To do which, his majesty, after God, will employ his good ships on the sea, and not trust to any intrenchment upon the shore.

SECT. X.

How the Romans attempt again to get the mastery of the seas. The victory of Cæcilius the Roman consul at Panormus. The siege of Lilybæum. How a Rhodian gally entred Lilybæum at pleasure, in despite of the Roman fleet. That it is a matter of great difficulty to stop the passage of good ships. The Romans, by reason of grievous losses received under Claudius and Junius their consuls, abandon the seas again.

WHEN, without a strong navy, the *Romans* found it altogether impossible, either to keep what they had already gotten in *Sicily*, or to enlarge their dominions in *Africa*, or elsewhere: they resolved once again, notwithstanding their late misadventures, to strengthen their fleet and ships of war. So causing fifty new gallies to be built, and the old to be repaired, they gave them in charge (together with certain legions of soldiers) to the new consuls, *C. Atilius*, and *L. Manlius*. On the other side, *Asdrubal* perceiving that the *Romans*, partly by reason of the shipwreck which they had lately suffered, partly by reason of the overthrow which they received by *Xanthippus* in *Africa*, were less daring than they had been in the beginning of the war; and withal, that one of the consuls was returned into *Italy*, with the one half of the army; and that *Cæcilius*, with only the other half, remained at *Panormus*: he removed with the *Carthaginian* forces from *Lilybæum* towards it, hoping to provoke *Cæcilius* to fight: but the consul was better advised. For when *Asdrubal* had made his approaches somewhat near the Town, *Cæcilius* caused a deep trench to be cut a good distance without the ditch of the city: between which and his trench he left ground sufficient to embattle a legion of his soldiers. To these he gave order, that they should advance themselves, and pass over the new trench, till such time as the *African* elephants were thrust upon them. From those beasts he commanded them to retire, by slow degrees, till they had drawn on the elephants to the brink of the new trench, which they could by no means pass. This they performed accordingly; for when the elephants were at a stand, they were so gauled and beaten, both by those soldiers that were on the inside of the trench, and by those that lay in the trench it self, that being enraged by their many wounds, they brake back furiously upon their own footmen, and utterly disordered them. *Cæcilius* espying this advantage, sallied with all the force he had, and charging the other troops, that stood embattled, he utterly brake them, and put them to their heels, making a great slaughter of them, and taking all their elephants.

The report of this victory being brought to *Rome*, the whole state, filled with courage, prepared a new fleet of two hundred sail, which they sent into *Sicily*, to give end to that war, that had now lasted fourteen years. With this fleet and army the *Romans* resolve to attempt *Lilybæum*, the only place of im-

portance which the *Carthaginians* held in *Sicily*, and all (indeed) save *Drepanum*, that was near adjoining. They sit down before it, and possess themselves of all the places of advantage near unto it, especially of such as command the haven, which had a very difficult entrance. They also beat to the ground six towers of defence, and by forcible engines weaken so many other parts of the city, as the defendants begin to despair: yet *Himilco*, commander of the place, faileth not in all that belongs to a man of war: all that is broken, he repaireth with admirable diligence; he maketh many furious sallies, and giveth to the *Romans* all the affronts that possibly could be made: he hath in garrison (besides the citizens) ten thousand soldiers, among which there are certain lieutenants, and other petty officers, that conspire to render and betray the town. But the matter is revealed by an *Achean*, called *Alexon*, who had formerly, in danger of the like treason, saved *Agrirentum*. *Himilco* useth the help of *Alexon* to assure the hired soldiers, and employeth *Hannibal* to appease the troops of the *Gauls*, which did waver, and had sent their agents to the enemy. All promise constancy and truth; so that the traitors, being unable to perform what they had undertaken, are fain to live in the *Roman* camp as fugitives, that had wrought no good whereby to deserve their bread. In the mean while, a supply of ten thousand soldiers is sent from *Carthage* to their relief, having *Hannibal*, the son of *Amilcar*, for their conductor; who, in despite of all resistance, enter'd the port and city, to the incredible joy of the besieged. The old soldiers, together with the new companies (thereto perswaded by *Himilco* with hope of great reward) resolve to set upon the *Romans* in their trenches, and either force them to abandon the siege, or (at least) to take from them, or set on fire, their engines of battery. The attempt is presently made, and pursued to the uttermost, with great slaughter on both sides. But the *Romans* being more in number, and having the advantage of the ground, hold still their places, and with extream difficulty defend their engines.

They of *Carthage* desire greatly to understand the state of things at *Lilybæum*, but know not how to send into the town. A certain *Rhodian* undertakes the service, and having received his dispatch, sails with one gally to *Ægusa*, a little island near *Lilybæum*. Thence, taking his time, he steered directly with the port; and having a passing swift gally, he pass'd through the best of the channel, and recovered the water-gate, ere any of those, which the *Romans* had to guard the port, could thrust from the shores on either side.

The next day, neither attending the covert of the dark night, nor dreading to be boarded by the *Roman* gallies, who waited his return, he set sail, and shipping his oars (his gally being exceeding quick of steerage, and himself expert in all parts of the channel) recovered the haven's mouth, and the sea, in despite of all the pursuit made after him. Then finding himself out of danger of being encompassed by many, he turned again towards the mouth of the haven, challenging any one, if any one durst come forth, to undertake him. This enterprise, and the well performing of it, was very remarkable, and much wonder'd at in those days: and yet, where there was no great artillery, nor any other weapons of fire to kill afar off, the adventure which this *Rhodian* made, was not greatly hazardous: for in this age, a valiant and judicious man of war will not fear to pass by the best appointed fort of *Europe*, with the help of a good tide, and a leading gale of wind, no, though forty pieces

of great artillery open their mouths against him, and threaten to tear him in pieces.

In the beginning of our late queen's time, when *Denmark* and *Sweden* were at war, our *East-land* fleet, bound for *Leif-land*, was forbidden by the king of *Denmark* to trade with the subjects of his enemies, and he threatened to sink their ships if they came through the streights of *Elsenour*. Notwithstanding this, our merchants (having a ship of her majesty's, called the *Minion*, to defend them) made the adventure; and sustaining some volleys of shot, kept on their course. The king made all the provision he could to stop them or sink them at their return. But the *Minion*, commanded (as I take it) by *William Burrough*, leading the way, did not only pass out with little loss, but did beat down with artillery, a great part of the fort of *Elsenour*, which at that time was not so well rampard, as now perhaps it is: and the fleet of merchants that followed him, went through without any wound received. Neither was it long since, that the duke of *Parma*, besieging *Antwerp*, and finding no possibility to master it, otherwise than by famine, laid his cannon on the bank of the river, so well to purpose, and so even with the face of the water, that he thought it impossible for the least boat to pass by. Yet the *Hollanders* and *Zelanders*, not blown up by any wind of glory, but coming to find a good market for their butter and cheese, even the poor men, attending their profit when all things were extream dear in *Antwerp*, passed in boats of ten or twelve tun, by the mouth of the duke's cannon, in despite of it, when a strong westerly wind, and a tide of flood favoured them; as also with a contrary wind, and an ebbing water, they turned back again: so as he was forced, in the end, to build his *Stockado* overthwart the river, to his marvellous trouble and charge.

The fort *St. Philip* terrified not us in the year 1596, when we enter'd the port of *Calais*; neither did the fort at *Puntal*, when we were enter'd, beat us from our anchoring by it, though it play'd upon us with four demi-cannons within point-blank, from six in the morning till twelve at noon. The siege of *Ossend*, and of many other places, may be given for proof, how hard a matter it is to stop the passage of a good ship, without another as good to encounter it. Yet this is true, that where a fort is so set, as that of *Angra* in *Tercera*, that there is no passage along beside it, or that the ships are driven to turn upon a bow line towards it, wanting all help of wind and tide; there, and in such places, is it of great use, and fearful; otherwise not.

But to return to our adventurous *Rhodian*: He arrives in safety at *Carthage*, and makes them know the estate of *Lilybeum*. Others also, after this, take upon them to do the like, and perform it with the same success. The *Romans* therefore labour to choak the channel, and, for that purpose, fill many merchant ships with great stones, and sink them therein. The force of the tides clears it again in part: but they grounded so many of those great-bellied boats in the best of the entrance, as at last it made a manifest rising and heap, like a ragged island, in the passage. Hereby it came to pass, that a *Carthaginian* gally taking her course by night, and not suspecting any such impediment, ran her self aground thereon, and was taken. Now comes the brave *Rhodian*, thinking to enter as he had done before: but this *Carthaginian* gally, a little before taken, gave him chase, and gathered upon him; he finds what she is, both by her form, and by her swiftness: and being not able to run from her, resolved to fight with her: but she is too well manned for him, so that he is beaten and taken.

Lilybeum, after this, is greatly distressed; the soldiers being worn with labour and watching. But in this despair there rose so violent a tempest, as some of the *Romans* wooden towers, by which they overtopped the walls of *Lilybeum*, were over-turned. A *Greek* soldier undertakes to fire those that were fallen, and performs it: for the fire was no sooner kindled, but being blown unto by the bellows of a tempest, it increased so fast, as it became resistless, and in the end burned all to ashes, and melted the brazen heads of the battering Rams. Hereupon, despair and weariness hinder the *Romans* from repairing their engines; so that they resolve, by a long siege, to starve the defendants.

Upon relation of what had pass'd, a supply of ten thousand soldiers is sent from *Rome*, under *M. Claudius*, the consul. He arrives at *Messina*, and marcheth over land to *Lilybeum*; where having reinforced the army, and supplied the galleys with new rowers, he propounds the surprise of *Drepanum*, a city on the other side of the bay of *Lilybeum*. This service the captains and soldiers willingly embrace. So the consul imbarcs his troops, and arrives on the sudden in the mouth of the port. *Adherbal* is governor of the town, a valiant and prudent man of war, who being ignorant of the new supply arrived at *Lilybeum*, was at first amazed at their sudden approach; but having recovered his spirits, he persuades the soldiers, rather to fight abroad than to be inclosed. Herewithal he promisseth great rewards to such, as by their valour shall deserve them; offering to lead them himself, and to fight in the head of his fleet. Having sufficiently encouraged his men, he thrusts into the sea towards the *Romans*. The consul, deceived of his expectation, calls back the foremost galleys, that he might now marshal them for defence. Hereupon some row backward, some forward, in great confusion. *Adherbal* finds and follows his advantage, and forceth the consul into a bay at hand, wherein he rangeth himself, having the land on his back, hoping thereby to keep himself from being inclosed. But he was thereby, and for want of sea-room, so streightned, as he could not turn himself any way from his enemies, nor range himself in any order. Therefore, when he found no hope of resistance, keeping the shore on his left hand, he thrust out of the bay with thirty galleys besides his own, and so fled away: all the rest of his fleet, to the number of ninety and four ships, were taken or sunk by the *Carthaginians*. *Adherbal* for this service is greatly honoured at *Carthage*; and *Claudius*, for his indiscretion and flight, as much disgraced at *Rome*.

The *Romans*, notwithstanding this great loss, armed threescore galleys, with which they send away *L. Junius*, their consul, to take charge of their business in *Sicily*. *Junius* arrives at *Messina*, where he meets with the whole remainder of the *Roman* fleet, those excepted which rode in the port of *Lilybeum*. One hundred and twenty galleys he had; and, besides these, he had gotten together almost eight hundred ships of burthen, which were laden with all necessary provisions for the army. With this great fleet he arrives at *Syracuse*, where he stays a while, partly to take in corn, partly to wait for some that were too slow of sail, to keep company with him along from *Messina*. In the mean time, he dispatcheth away towards *Lilybeum*, his *Quæstors* or treasurers; to whom he commits the one half of his victuallers, with some galleys for their convoy.

Adherbal was not careless, after his late victory, but studied how to use it to the best advantage. The

The ships and prisoners that he had taken, he sent to Carthage. Of his own galleys he delivered thirty to Carthalo, who had threescore and ten more under his own charge, and sent him to try what good might be done against the Roman fleet, in the haven of Lilybæum. According to this direction, Carthalo suddenly enters the mouth of that haven, where he finds the Romans more attentive to the keeping in the besieged Carthaginians, than to the defence of their own against another fleet. So he chargeth them, boards and takes some, and fires the rest. The Roman camp takes alarm, and hastens to the rescue. But Himilco, governor of the town, is not behind-hand, who sallies out at the same time, and putting the Romans to great distress, gives Carthalo good leisure to go through with his enterprise.

After this exploit, Carthalo ran all along the south coast of Sicily, devising how to work mischief to the enemy, wherein fortune presented him with a fair occasion, which he wisely managed. He was advertised by his scouts, that they had descried near at hand, a great fleet, consisting of all manner of vessels. These were the victuallers, which the consul Junius, more hastily than providentially, had sent before him towards Lilybæum. Carthalo was glad to hear of their coming, for he and his men were full of courage, by reason of their late victories. Accounting therefore the great multitude of Roman hulks approaching, to be rather a prey, than a fleet likely to make a strong opposition, he hastens to encounter them. It fell out according to his expectation. The Romans had no mind to fight but were glad to seek shelter in an open road, full of rocks, under covert of a poor town, belonging to their party; that could help to save them only from the present danger, by lending them engines and other aid wherewith to beat off the Carthaginians that assailed them. Carthalo therefore having taken a few of them, lay waiting for the rest, that could not long ride under those rocks, but would be forced, by any great change of wind, either to put out into the deep, or to save their men how they could, by taking land, with the loss of all their shipping. Whilst he was busied in this care, the consul Junius drew near, and was discovered. Against him Carthalo makes out, and finds him altogether prepared to fight, as being wholly ignorant of that which had happened. The consul had neither means to fly, nor ability to fight: therefore he likewise ran into a very dangerous creek, thinking no danger so great as that of the enemy. The Carthaginian seeing this, betakes himself to a station between the two Roman fleets, where he watcheth to see which of them would stir first, with a resolution to assault that which should first dare to put it self into the sea. So as now all the three fleets were on the south coast of Sicily, between the promontory of Pachinus and Lilybæum; a tract exceeding dangerous, when the wind stormed at south. The Carthaginians, who knew the times of tempest, and their signs, finding belike some swelling billow (for so we do in the west of England, before a southerly storm) hastened to double the cape of Pachinus, thereby to cover themselves from the rage at hand. But the Romans, who knew better how to fight than how to navigate, and never found any foul weather in the entrails of their beasts, their sooth-sayers being all land-prophets, were suddenly overtaken with a boisterous south wind, and all their galleys forced against the rocks, and utterly wracked.

This Calamity so discouraged the Romans, that they resolved again to forsake the seas, and trust

only to the service of their legions upon firm ground. But such a resolution cannot long hold. Either they must be strong at sea, or else they must not make war in an island, against those that have a mightier fleet. Yet are they to be excused, in regard of the many great calamities which they had suffered through their want of skill. Here I cannot forbear to commend the patient virtue of the Spaniards. We seldom or never find that any nation hath endured so many misadventures and miseries as the Spaniards have done in their Indian discoveries. Yet persisting in their enterprises, with an invincible constancy, they have annexed to their kingdom so many goodly provinces, as bury the remembrance of all dangers past. Tempests and shipwracks, famine, overthrows, mutinies, heat and cold, pestilence, and all manner of diseases, both old and new, together with extream poverty, and want of all things needful, have been the enemies, wherewith every one of their most noble discoverers, at one time or other, hath encountered. Many years have passed over some of their heads, in the search of not so many leagues: yea, more than one or two, have spent their labour, their wealth, and their lives, in search of a golden kingdom, without getting further notice of it, than what they had at their first setting forth. All which notwithstanding, the third, fourth, and fifth undertakers have not been disheartened. Surely, they are worthily rewarded with those treasures, and paradises, which they enjoy; and well they deserve to hold them quietly, if they hinder not the like virtue in others, which (perhaps) will not be found.

S E C T. XI.

The city of Eryx is surprized by the Romans, and recovered by Amilcar; who stoutly holds war with them five years. The Romans having emptied their common treasury, build a new fleet, at the charges of private men. The great victory at sea of Lucatius the consul; whereby the Carthaginians are forced to crave peace. The conditions of the peace between Rome and Carthage.

THE Romans were careful, to supply with all industry, by land, the want of strength at sea. Therefore they continue the siege of Lilybæum, and seek to make sure to themselves all places, whither the enemies ships could not bring relief. The consul Junius, to cure the wound of dishonour, which he had received, bethought him what enterprises to undertake. In the end he resolved to attempt the mountain and city of Eryx, with the temple of Venus Erycina, which was the fairest and richest of all the island; and of these, by cunning or treason, he got possession. Eryx was commodiously seated between Drepanum and Panormus; so that it seemed a fit place for a garrison, that should restrain the Carthaginians from making roads into the country. Wherefore Junius fortified both the top of the mountain, and the first entrance of the passage from the bottom (both which places were very defensible) with a good strength of men. But shortly after, in the 18th year of this war, the Carthaginians sent forth Amilcar, surnamed Barca, father of the great Hannibal, with a fleet and army, who sailing to the coasts of Italy, did thoroughly repay the spoils which the Romans made in Africa. For he first of all walled and destroyed the territories of the Locrines, and of the Brutians, that were dependants of Rome. Then entered he into Sicily, and finding there no walled

walled city in the *Carthaginians* power, that served fitly to infect the *Romans*, he occupied a piece of ground of great advantage, and lodged his army thereon; to confront as well the *Romans*, that were in *Panormus*, as those that kept about *Eryx*, putting himself between both armies with admirable resolution.

The place that *Amilcar* had seized upon, was not only very strong by situation, but had the command of a port; whereby it gave him opportunity, to scour all the coast of *Italy* with his fleet, wafting all along as far as to *Cuma*. In the isle of *Sicily* he held the *Romans* to hard work, lying near unto *Panormus*, where, in three years abode, he did many notable acts, though not of much consequence, for that the enemy could never be drawn to hazard the main chance. Having wearied himself and the *Romans* long enough about *Panormus*, he undertook a strange piece of work at *Eryx*. The *Roman* garrisons, placed there by *Junius*, on the top and at the bottom of the mountain, were very strongly lodged. Nevertheless, *Amilcar* found a way, lying towards the sea-side, by which he conveyed his men into the city of *Eryx*, that was about the midst of the ascent, ere the enemy knew of it. By this it came to pass, that the *Romans*, which kept the top of the mountain, were straightly held (as it were) besieged. And no less was *Amilcar* himself restrained, by both of these garrisons, and such as came to relieve them. There he found them pastime about two years more; hoping still to weary out those that lay over his head, as they on the contrary did their best to thrust him out of those quarters.

At this time, all the care, both of the *Romans* and of the *Carthaginians*, was bent unto the prosecuting of this business at *Eryx*. Wherein it seems true (as *Hannibal*,^a in *Livy*, spake unto *Scipio*) that the affairs of *Carthage* never stood in better terms, since the beginning of the war, than now they did. For whereas the *Romans* had utterly forsaken the seas, partly by reason of their great losses, partly upon confidence of their land-forces, which they held resistless; *Amilcar*, with a small army, had so well acquitted himself, to the honour of his country, that by the trial of five years war, the *Carthaginian* soldier was judged equal, if not superior, to the *Roman*. Finally, when all, that might be, had been devised and done, for the dislodging of this obstinate warrior, no way seemed better to the senate of *Rome*, than once again to build a fleet; whereby, if the mastery of the sea could once be gotten, it was likely that *Amilcar*, for lack of supply, should not long be able to hold out. But in performing this, extream difficulty was found. The common treasury was exhausted, and the cost was not little, that was requisite unto such an enterprize. Wherefore there was no other way left, than to lay the burden upon private purses. Divers of the principal citizens undertook to build (each at his own charges) one *Quinquereme*; which example wrought so well, that they, whose ability would not serve to do the like, joined with some others, and laying their money together, concurred two or three of them, in building of another, with condition to be repaid, when the war was finished. By this voluntary contribution, they made and furnished 200 new *Quinqueremes*, taking for their pattern, that excellent swift-rowing galley which they had gotten from the *Rhodian*, in the port of *Lilybæum*, as was shewed before. The charge of this fleet was committed to *C. Lucretius*

Catulus, who passed with the same into *Sicily* the spring following, and entered the port of *Drepanum*, endeavouring by all means to have forced the city. But being advertised that the *Carthaginian* fleet was at hand, and being mindful of the late losses which his predecessors had received, he was careful to put himself in order, against their arrival.

Hanno was admiral of the *Carthaginian* fleet; a man (as his actions declare him) wise in picture, exceedingly formal, and skilful in the art of seeming reverend. How his reputation was first bred, I do not find, but it was upheld by a factious contradiction; of things undertaken by men more worthy than himself. This quality procured unto him (as it hath done to many others) both goodliking among the ancient sort, whose cold temper is averse from new enterprizes, and therewithal an opinion of great foresight, confirmed by every loss received. More particularly, he was gracious among the people, for that he was one of the most grievous oppressors of their subject provinces; whereby he procured unto the *Carthaginians* much wealth, but therewithal such hatred, as turned it all to their great loss. He had ere this been employed against the *Numidians*, and wild *Africans*, that were more like to rovers, than to soldiers, in making war. Of those fugitive Nations, he learned to neglect more manly enemies, to his own great dishonour, and to the great hurt of *Carthage*; which lost not more by his bad conduct, than by his malicious counsel; when, having shewed himself an unworthy captain, he betook himself to the long robe. Yet is he much commended in *Roman* histories, as a temperate man, and one that studied how to preserve the league between *Carthage* and *Rome*. In which regard, how well he deserved of his own country, it will appear hereafter: how beneficial he was to the *Romans*, it will appear, both hereafter, and in his present voyage; wherein he reduced the *Carthaginians* to a miserable necessity of accepting, upon hard conditions, that peace which he thenceforth commended.

Hanno had very well furnished his navy, with all needful provisions for the soldiers at *Eryx* (for dexterity in making preparation was the best of his qualities;) but he had neither been careful in training his mariners, to the practice of sea-fight, nor in manning his galleys with stout fellows. He thought, that the same of a *Carthaginian* fleet was enough to make the unexpert *Romans* give way: forgetting, that rather the resistless force of tempests, than any other strength of opposition, had made them to forsake the seas. Yet in one thing he had either conceived aright, or else was sent forth well instructed. It was his purpose, first of all, to sail to *Eryx*, and there to discharge his ships of their lading: and having thus lightened himself, he meant to take aboard some part of the land-army, together with *Amilcar* himself, by whose help he doubted not, but that he should be able to make his enemy repent of his new adventure to sea. This was a good course if it could have been performed. But *Catulus* used all possible diligence, to prevent the execution of this design: not because he was informed of the enemy's purpose, but for that he knew it to be the best for them, and for that he feared no danger so greatly, as to encounter with *Amilcar*. Wherefore, although the weather was very rough, and the seas went high, when the *Carthaginian* fleet was descried; yet he rather chose to fight with the enemy, that had the wind

^a Liv. Dec. 3. l. 10.

of him, than to suffer this convoy to pass along to *Eryx*, upon unlikely hope of better opportunity in the future. All that *Hanno* should have done, *Catulus* had performed. He had carefully exercised his men in rowing; he had lightened his galleys of all unnecessary burthens; and he had taken aboard the choice men of the *Roman* land-soldiers. The *Carthaginians* therefore, at the first encounter, were utterly broken and defeated, having 50 of their galleys stemmed and sunk, and 70 taken, wherein were few less than 10000 men, that were all made prisoners: the rest, by a sudden change of wind, escaping to the isle of *Hieronefus*.

The state of *Carthage*, utterly discouraged by this change of fortune, knew not whereon to resolve. Means to repair their fleet in any time there were none left; their best men of war by sea were consumed; and *Amilcar*, upon whose valour and judgment the honour and safety of the commonwealth rested, was now surrounded by his enemies in *Sicily*, where he could not be relieved. In this extremity, they make dispatch unto *Amilcar* himself, and authorize him to take what course should seem best unto his excellent wisdom; leaving all conclusions to his election and sole counsel.

Amilcar, whom no adversity, accompanied with the least hope or possibility of recovery, had ever vanquished, looking over every promise, true or false, that the present time could make him (for to attend any thing from the future he was not able) resolved to make tryal, whether his necessity might be compounded upon any reasonable terms. He therefore sent to *Lutatus* the consul an overture of peace: who considering it well, gathered so many arguments from the present poverty of the *Roman* state, waited beyond expectation in the former war, that he willingly hearkened unto it. So, in conclusion, an accord was made, but with provi-

sion, that it should hold none otherwise, than if the senate and people of *Rome* would ratify it with their allowance.

The conditions were: first, that the *Carthaginians* should clearly abandon the isle of *Sicily*. Secondly, that they should never undertake upon *Hieron* king of *Syracuse*, nor invade any part of his territories, nor the territories of any of his friends and allies. Thirdly, that they should set at liberty, and send back into *Italy*, all the *Romans*, whom they held prisoners, without ransom. Lastly, that they should pay unto the *Romans* two thousand and two hundred talents; which make, after 600 *French* Crowns to the talent, thirteen hundred and twenty thousand crowns: the same to be delivered within 20 years next following.

These articles were sent to *Rome*, where they were not thoroughly approved: but ten commissioners were sent into *Sicily*, to make perfect the agreement. These commissioners added a thousand talents to the former sum; and required a shorter time of payment. Further also, they took order, that the *Carthaginians* should not only depart out of *Sicily* it self, but should also withdraw their companies out of all the other islands between it and *Italy*, renouncing their whole interest therein.

Such was the end of the first *Punic war*, that had lasted about twenty-four years without intermission; in which time the *Romans* had lost, by fight or shipwreck, about seven hundred *Quinqueremes*, and the *Carthaginians*, about five hundred: the greatness of which losses, doth serve to prove the greatness both of these two cities, and of the war it self; wherein I hold good the judgment of *Polybius*, that the *Romans*, in general, did shew themselves the braver Nation; and *Amilcar*, the most worthy captain.

C H A P. II.

Of divers actions passing between the first and second Punic wars.

S E C T. I.

Of the cruel war begun between the *Carthaginians* and their own mercenaries.

THE *Romans*, having partly by force, and partly by composition, thrust the *Carthaginians* out of *Sicily*, and all the little islands thereunto adjacent, gave them rather means and leisure to help themselves in a following war, than cause to hold themselves contented with the present peace. It is an ancient and true rule, *Quod leges à victoribus dicuntur, accipiuntur à vinctis*; that laws are given by the conquerors, and received of the conquered. But the *Romans* had either forgotten the answer that was made unto them, by one of the *Priver-nates*; or else had forgotten to follow it, in this weighty business. For one of *Privernum*, after a rebellion, defending in the senate the cause of his city, was demanded by a senator, *what peace the Romans might hope for, or assure themselves of, if they quitted their present advantage over them*; he answered in these words, *si bonam dederitis, & si- dam & perpetuam; si malam, haud diuturnam*;

if the peace be good and faithful that you give us, it will be perpetual; if it be ill, then of little continuance. To this answer, the senate, at that time, gave such approbation, that it was said, *viri & liberi vocem auditam; an credi posset, nullum populum, aut hominem denique in ea conditione, cujus cum pœniteat, diutius quàm necesse sit mansurum? that it was the speech of a manly, and a free man; for who could believe, that any people, or indeed any one man, would continue longer in an over-burdened estate, than mere necessity did enforce?* Now, if the *Romans* themselves could make this judgment of those nations, who had little else, besides their manly resolution, to defend their liberty; surely, they grossly flattered themselves, in presuming, that the *Carthaginians*, who neither in power nor in pride, were any way inferior unto themselves, would sit down any longer by the loss and dishonour received, than until they could recover their legs, and the strength, which had a while failed them, to take revenge. But occasion, by whom (while well entertained) not only private men, but kings and publick states, have more prevailed, than by any proper prowess or virtue, withheld the tem-

pest from the *Romans* for a time, and turned it most fearfully upon *Africa*, and the *Carthaginians* themselves.

For after that the first *Punic* war was ended, *Amilcar*, leaving *Eryx*, went to *Lilybæum*, from whence most conveniently the army might be transported into *Afric*: the care of which business he committed unto *Gesco*, to whom, as to a man of approved sufficiency, he delivered over his charge. *Gesco* had an especial consideration of the great sums wherein *Carthage* was indebted unto these mercenaries; and, withal, of the great disability to make payment. Therefore he thought it the wisest way to send them over (as it were) by handfuls, a few at a time; that so the first might have their dispatch, and be gone ere the second or third companies arrived. Herein he dealt providently; for it had not been hard to persuade any small number, lodged within so great a city as *Carthage*, unto some such reasonable composition as the present emptiness of the common treasury did require: so that the first might have been friendly discharged, and a good precedent left unto the second and third, whilst their disjunction had made them unable to recover their whole due by force. But the *Carthaginians* were of a contrary opinion. They thought to find, in the whole army, some that would be contented to gratify the publick state, by remitting a great part of their own due; and hoped, by such an example, to draw all the multitude to the like agreement and capitulation. So they detained the first and second cohorts, telling them, that they would make an even reckoning with all together. Thus every day the number increased, and many disorders (a thing incident among soldiers) were committed; which much disquieted the city, not accustomed unto the like. In this regard, it was thought fit to remove them all to some other place, where they might be less troublesome. This must be done by some colourable words of persuasion; for their number was already so great, that it was not safe to offend them too far. Wherefore it is devised, that they should all attend to the coming of their fellows at *Sicca*, receiving every one a piece of gold to bear his charges in the mean while. This motion is accepted, and the soldiers began to dislodge, leaving behind them their wives, their children, and all their baggage, as meaning shortly to fetch away all, when they came back for their pay. But the *Carthaginians* have no fancy to their returning into the town, and therefore compel them to truss up their fardels, that they might have no occasion left to make any errands thither. So to *Sicca* they removed, with all their goods, and there lay waiting for news of their fellows arrival, and their own pay. Business they had none to do, and therefore might easily be drawn to mutiny; the whole argument of their discourse inclining them to nothing else. Their daily talk was, how rich they should be when all their money came in; how much would fall to every single share, and for how long time the city was behind-hand with them in reckoning. They were all grown arithmeticians; and he was thought a man of worth, that could find most reason to increase their demands to the very highest, even beyond their due. No part of their long service was forgotten, but the comfortable words and promises of their captains, leading them forth to any dangerous fight, were called to mind, as so many obligations not to be cancelled, without satisfying their expectation by some unordinary largess.

Thus the time passeth away, until, the whole army being arrived and lodged in *Sicca*, *Hanno* comes thither to clear the account. Now is the day come,

wherein they shall all be made rich, especially if they can hold together in maintaining stoutly the common cause. So think they all, and assemble themselves to hear what good news this messenger had brought; with a full resolution to help his memory, in case he should happen to forget any part of the many promises made unto them; all which were to be considered in their donative. *Hanno* begins a very formal oration; wherein he bewails the poverty of *Carthage*; tells them how great a sum of money is to be paid unto the *Romans*; reckons up the excessive charges whereat the commonwealth had been in the late war; and finally, desires them to hold themselves contented with part of their pay, and out of the love which they bare unto the city, to remit the rest. Few of them understood his discourse, for the *Carthaginian* army was composed of sundry nations; as *Greeks*, *Africans*, *Gauls*, *Ligurians*, *Spaniards*, and others, all of different languages. Yet they stared upon him, and were (as I think) little pleased with his very gesture. But when such as conceived the whole tenor of his speech, had informed the rest what cold comfort he brought, they were all enraged, and fared like mad-men; so that nothing would serve to appease them. *Hanno* would fain have asswaged their fury, but he knew not how; for he less understood their dissonant loud noises, than they did his oration. An army collected out of so many countries, that have no one language common to all, or to the greater part of them, is neither easily stirred up to mutiny, nor easily pacified, when once it is broken into outrage. The best that *Hanno* can do, is to use the help of interpreters and messengers. But these interpreters mistake his meaning, some for want of skill, others of set purpose, and such as deliver his errands in the worse sense, are best believed. Finally, they think themselves much abused by the *Carthaginians*, and resolve to demand their own in peremptory terms at a nearer distance. In this mood they leave *Sicca*, and march as far as *Tunis*, that is within a very little of *Carthage*, and there they encamp.

Now begin the *Carthaginians* to find their own error. It is a good rule:

*Curandum imprimis, ne magna injuria fiat
Fortibus & miseris:*

I have special care, that valiant poverty
Be not oppress'd with too great injury.

But this proud city having neglected the rule, hath also been careless in providing to secure her self against the inconvenience that might follow. She had suffered the whole multitude, whereunto she was like to give cause of discontent, to join it self into one body, when the several troops might easily have been dispersed: she hath turned out of her gates the wives, children, and goods, of these poor men, which had she retained in shew of kindness, she might have used them as hostages for her own safety; and by employing a miserable penny-father in her negotiation with men of war, she hath weakened the reputation of her bravest captains, that might best have served to free her from the threatening danger. Yet likely it is, that *Amilcar* had desire to be used as an instrument in defrauding his own soldiers of their wages, especially considering that as he best could bear witness of their merits, so was he not ignorant that means to content them were not wanting, if the citizens had been willing thereunto. Hereunto may be added a probable conjecture, that *Hanno*, with his accomplices, who at this very time was a bitter enemy to *Amil-*

car, had the boldness to impose the blame of his own wretched counsel, upon the liberal promises made by the captains. *Amilcar* therefore did wisely in suffering those that maligned him to have the managing of their own plot, and to deal the cards which themselves had shuffled. This they continued to do as foolishly as they had at first begun. They furnish a market at *Tunis* for the soldiers, whom they suffered to buy what they list, and at what price they list. They send ever and anon some of their senators into the camp, who promise to satisfy all demands, as far forth as it should be possible. And thus, by shifting from one extreme to another, they make the soldiers understand into what fear the city was driven; which cannot but add much insolency to the passions already stirred up.

This sudden change of weather, and the true cause of it, is quickly found by the army, which thereupon grows wise; and finding the season fit, labours to make a great harvest. Money must be had, and without any abatement. This is granted. Many have lost their horses in the publick service of the state. The state shall pay for them. They had lived some years, by making hard shift, without receiving their allowance of victuals from *Carthage*. If they had lived, they wanted not meat; therefore what was this to the *Carthaginians*? Was it not all one, whether the ships did bring in provision, or their captain direct them where to fetch it? But this would not serve. They said that they had been sometimes driven to buy, and that (since they could not remember how much, or at what rate they bought) they would be paid for their provision during the whole time, and according to the dearest price that wheat had borne whilst the war lasted. Such are now the demands of these mutineers, who might easily have been satisfied with far less charges, and far more honour, by receiving their due at the first. But now they make no end of craving: for whilst the *Carthaginians* were perplexed about this com-money, the soldiers have devised many more tricks, whereby to extort a greater sum of money, without all regard of shame. Since therefore no good end could be found of these controversies, which daily did multiply, it was thought convenient that one of the *Carthaginians*, which had commanded in *Sicily*, should be chosen by the soldiers, to reconcile all differences. Hereunto the army condescended, and made choice of *Gesco*; partly out of good liking to him, who had shewed himself at all times a friendly man to them, and careful of their good, especially when they were to be transported into *Afric*; partly out of a dislike which they had conceived of *Amilcar*, for that he had not visited them in all this busy time. So *Gesco* comes among them, and to please them the better, comes not without money, which might give better countenance to his proceedings, than barren eloquence had done to the negotiation of *Hanno*. He calls unto him first of all the captains, and then the several nations apart; rebuking them gently for that which had passed; advising them temperately concerning the present; and exhorting them to continue their love unto the state, which had long entertained them, and would needs always be mindful of their good services. After this he began to put hand to his purse, offering to give them their whole pay in hand, and then alter to consider of other reckonings at a more convenient time. This had been well accepted, and might have served to bring all to a quiet pass, if two seditious ring-leaders of the multitude had not stood against it.

There was in the camp one *Spendius*, a sturdy fellow, and audacious, but a slave; that in the late war had fled from a *Roman*, whom he served, and therefore stood in fear, lest he should be delivered back to his master; at whose hands he could expect no less than to be whipped and crucified. This wretch could find no better way to prolong his own life, than by raising such troubles as might serve to withdraw men from care of private matters, and make his own restitution impossible, were his master never so importunate. With *Spendius* there associated himself one *Matbo*, an hot headed man, that had been so forward in stirring up the tumult, as he could not chuse but fear, lest his own death should be made an example to deter others from the like seditious behaviour. This *Matbo* deals with his countrymen the *Africans*, telling them, that they were in far worse condition than either the *Gauls*, the *Greeks*, the *Spaniards*, or any other foreign mercenaries. For (saith he) *These our companions have no more to do than to receive their wages, and so get them gone; but we, that are to stay behind in Africa, shall be called to another manner of account when we are left alone; so that we shall have cause to wish that we had returned home beggars, rather than laden with the money, which (little though it be) shall break our backs. Ye are not ignorant how tyrannically those our haughty masters of Carthage do reign over us. They think it reasonable that our lives and goods should be at their disposition, which they have at other times been accustomed to take from us, even without apparent cause, as it were, to declare their sovereignty; what will they now do, seeing that we have demeaned our selves as free-men, and been bold to set a good face on the matter, demanding our own, as others have done? Ye all do know that it were a very shame for us, if having been as forward in every danger of war as any other men, we should now stand quaking like slaves, and not dare to open our mouths, when others take liberty to require their due. This notwithstanding ye may assure your selves, that we are like to be taught better manners as soon as our fellows are gone; in regard of whom, they are content to shadow their indignation with a good, but a forced countenance. Let us therefore be wise, and consider that they hate and fear us. Their hatred will shew it self, when their fear is once past; unless we now take our time, and, whilst we are the stronger, enfeeble them so greatly, that their hatred shall not be able to do us wrong. All their strength consisteth in money, wherewithal they have hired others against us, and us against others. At the present they have neither money nor friends. The best army that ever served them, whercof we are no small part, lies at their gates, ready to help us if we be men. A better opportunity cannot be expected, for were our swords once drawn, all *Afric* would rise on our side. As for the *Carthaginians*, whither can they send for help? The case it self is plain, but we must quickly resolve. Either we must prevent the diligence of *Gesco*, by incensing these *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, and procuring them to draw blood; or else it becometh us to please our good masters, by joining with them against our fellows, yea, by offering to forgive unto them all our wages, if so (peradventure) they may be won to forgive us, or not over-cruelly to punish our faults already committed. He is most worthily a wretched slave, that neither hath the care to win his master's love, nor the courage to attempt his own liberty.*

By such persuasions *Matbo* wins the *African* soldiers to his own purpose. They are not now so greedy of money, as of quarrel; which he that seeks, will not miss to find. When *Gesco* therefore offered

to pay them their whole stipend presently, but referred their other demands for horses and victuals, to some other more convenient time, they break into great outrage, and say, that they will have all, even all at once, and that out of hand. In this tumult, the whole army flock together about *Matbo* and *Spendius*, whose diligence is not wanting to add more fuel to the fire already blazing. *Matbo* and *Spendius* are the only men to whom the soldiers will hearken; if any other stand up to make a speech, a shower of stones flying about his ears, puts him to silence, that he shall never afterwards speak word more. Neither stay they to consider what it is that any man would say; enough hath been said already by those good spokesmen, so that no other word (though perhaps to the same purpose) can be heard, save only, *throw, throw*.

Now the rebellion begins to take form. *Matbo* and *Spendius* are chosen captains, who, followed by a desperate crew of ruffians, will suffer no man to make his own peace, but pursue their own ends, under fair pretence of the common cause. All which notwithstanding, *Gesco* is not wanting to the good of his country, but adventures himself upon their other fury. One while he deals with the captains, and principal men, taking them by the hand, and giving gentle words; another while he works with the several nations, putting them all in hope of their own hearts desire, if any reason would content them. None of them are so sullen as the *Africans*; indeed, none of them had so good cause. They require him peremptorily to give them their own, and not to feed them with words. The truth is, that they are not so covetous as they seem, but will be more glad of an ill answer, than of a good payment. This is more than *Gesco* knows; he seeth not that *Matbo* hath any more than bare words to bestow upon them: wherefore, as rebuking their inconsiderate heat, he tells them, that they may do well, if they stand in want of money, to seek it of their captain *Matbo*. This is enough. Shall he both defraud them and deride them? They stay no longer, but lay violent hands upon the treasure that he had brought; yea, upon him also, and all that are with him, as intending to take this in part of payment, and for the rest, to take another course. *Matbo* and *Spendius* are glad of this. It had little pleased them to see their fellows begin to grow calm by his fair language; wherefore they cast into bonds both him and all the *Carthaginians* that they can find, that so the army may be freed from danger of good admonition, which they call treason. After this follows open war. *Matbo* solicits all *Africa*, and his ambassadors are every-where well entertain'd. Neither is it necessary to use persuasion, the very fame of this rebellion sufficeth to draw the whole country into it. Now must the *Carthaginians* be plagued for those oppressions with which they have plagued others. It is true, that adversity hath never been untold of her errors; and as she is ever assured to hear her own, so commonly with her own she undergoes those of other men. The *Africans*, finding the *Carthaginians* hang under the wheel, tell them boldly, that their impositions were mercilefs; that they took from them the one half of their corn, that they doubled their tributes in all things else, and that they inflicted upon their vassals the greatest punishments for the least offences. These cruelties the *Carthaginians* themselves have forgotten; but the people, that have suffered so much, retain all in perfect memory. Wherefore not only such as can bear arms, are ready to do service in this great commotion; but the very women bring forth their jewels and other ornaments, offering all

to sail for the maintenance of so just a quarrel. By this great forwardness, and liberal contribution, *Matbo* and *Spendius* are supplied with a strong aid of three-score and ten thousand *Africans*: and are moreover furnished with money, not only to satisfy the present appetite of their men, but sufficient to continue the war begun, though it should be of long endurance.

S E C T. II.

Divers observations upon this war with the mercenaries.

†. I.

Of tyranny, and how tyrants are driven to use the help of mercenaries.

HERE let us rest a while, as in a convenient breathing-place; whence we may take a prospect of the subject, over which we travel. Behold a tyrannical city, persecuted by her own mercenaries with a deadly war. It is a common thing, as being almost necessary, that a tyranny should be upheld by mercenary forces: it is common that mercenaries should be false: and it is common that all war made against tyrants should be exceeding full of hate and cruelty. Yet we seldom hear that ever the ruin of a tyranny is procured or sought by those that were hired to maintain the power of it: and seldom or never do we read of any war that hath been prosecuted with such inexpiable hatred, as this that is now in hand.

That which we properly call tyranny, is a violent form of government, not respecting the good of the subject, but only the pleasure of the commander. I purposely forbear to say, that it is the unjust rule of one over many: for very truly doth *Cleon* in *Thucydides* tell the *Athenians*, that their dominion over their subjects was none other than a mere tyranny; though it were so, that they themselves were a great city, and a popular estate. Neither is it peradventure greatly needful, that I should call this form of commanding, violent; since it may well and easily be conceived, that no man willingly performs obedience to one regardless of his life and welfare, unless himself be either a mad-man, or (which is little better) wholly possessed with some extream passion of love. The practice of tyranny is not always of a like extremity; for some lords are more gentle than others to their very slaves; and he that is most cruel to some, is mild enough towards others, though it be but for his own advantage. Nevertheless, in large dominions, wherein the ruler's discretion cannot extend it self unto notice of the difference which might be found between the worth of several men, it is commonly seen, that the taste of sweetness, drawn out of oppression, hath so good a relish, as continually inflames the tyrant's appetite, and will not suffer it to be restrained with any limits of respect. Why should he seek out bounds to prescribe unto his desires, who cannot endure the face of one so honest as may put him in remembrance of any moderation? It is much that he hath gotten, by extorting from some few: by sparing none, he should have riches in goodly abundance. He hath taken a great deal from every one: but every one could have spared more. He hath wrung all their purses, and now he hath enough: but (as covetousness is never satisfied) he thinks that all this is too little for a stock, though it were indeed a good yearly income. Therefore he deviseth new tricks of robbery, and is not better pleased with the gains, than with the art of getting.

He is hated for this, and he knows it well: but he thinks by cruelty to change hatred into fear. So he makes it his exercise to torment and murder all whom he suspecteth: in which course, if he suspect none unjustly, he may be said to deal craftily: but if innocency be not safe, how can all this make any conspirator to stand in fear, since the traitor is no worse rewarded than the quiet man? Wherefore he can think upon none other security, than to disarm all his subjects; to fortify himself within some strong place; and, for defence of his person and state, to hire as many lusty soldiers as shall be thought sufficient. These must not be of his own country: for if not every one, yet some one or other might chance to have a feeling of the publick misery. This considered, he allures unto him a desperate rabble of strangers, the most dishonest that can be found; such as have neither wealth nor credit at home, and will therefore be careful to support him, by whose only favour they are maintained. Now, lest any of these, either by detestation of his wickedness, or (which in wicked men is most likely) by promise of greater reward than he doth give, should be drawn to turn his sword against the tyrant himself: they shall all be permitted to do as he doth; to rob, to ravish, to murder, and to satisfy their own appetites in most outrageous manner; being thought so much the more assured to their master, by how much the more he sees them grow hateful to all men else. Considering in what age, and in what language I write, I must be fain to say, that these are not dreams: tho' some *Englishmen* perhaps, that were unacquainted with history, lighting upon this leaf, might suppose this discourse to be little better. This is to shew, both how tyranny grows to stand in need of mercenary soldiers, and how those mercenaries are, by mutual obligation, firmly assured unto the tyrant.

†. II.

That the tyranny of a city over her subjects, is worse than the tyranny of one man: and that a tyrannical city must likewise use mercenary soldiers.

NOW concerning the tyranny, wherewith a city or state oppresseth her subjects; it may appear some ways to be more moderate than that of one man: but in many things it is more intolerable. A city is jealous of her dominion, but not (as is one man) fearful of her life: the less need hath she therefore to secure her self by cruelty. A city is not luxurious in consuming her treasures, and therefore needs the less to pluck from her subjects. If war, or any other great occasion, drive her to necessity of taking from her subjects more than ordinary sums of money, the same necessity makes either the contribution easy, or the taking, excusable. Indeed no wrongs are so grievous and hateful, as those that are insolent. Remember (saith *Caligula* the emperor to his grandmother *Antonia*) *that I may do what I list, and to whom I list.* These words were accounted horrible, though he did her no harm. And *Juvenal* reckons it as the complement of all torments, inflicted by a cruel *Roman* dame upon her slaves; that whilst she was whipping them, she painted her face, talked with her gossips, and used all signs of neglecting what those wretches felt. Now seeing that the greatest grievances wherewith a domineering state offendeth her subjects, are free from all sense of indignity; likely it is, that they will not extremely hate her, although desire of liberty make them weary of her empire. In these respects it is not needful, that she should keep a guard of licentious cut-throats, and maintain

them in all villany, as a *Dionysius* or *Agathocles* must do: her own citizens are able to terrify, and to hold perforce in obedience, all malecontents. These things, considered alone by themselves, may serve to prove, that a city is scarce able to deserve the name of a tyranness, in the proper signification.

All this notwithstanding, it shall appear, That the miseries, wherewith a tyrant loadeth his people; are not so heavy, as the burthens imposed by a cruel city. Not without some appearance of truth, it may be said, that lust, and many other private passions, are no way incident to a city or corporation. But to make this good, we shall have need to use the help of such distinctions as the argument in hand doth not require. Was not *Rome* lascivious, when *Cato* was fain to rise and leave the theater, to the end, that the reverend regard of his gravity might not hinder the people from calling for a shew of naked courtesans, that were to be brought upon the open stage? By common practice, and general approved custom, we are to censure the quality of a whole state; not by the private virtue or vice of any one man, nor by metaphysical abstraction of *the universal* from *the singular*; or of *the corporation*, from *those of whom it is compounded*. I say therefore (as I have said elsewhere) that it were better to live under one pernicious tyrant, than under many thousands. The reasons proving this, are too many to set down: but few may suffice. The desires of one man, how inordinate soever, if they cannot be satisfied, yet they may be wearied; he is not able to search all corners; his humour may be found, and soothed; age, or good advice, yea, or some unexpected accident, may reform him: all which failing, yet is there hope, that his successour may prove better. Many tyrants have been changed into worthy kings: and many have ill used their ill-gotten dominion, which, becoming hereditary to their posterity, hath grown into the most excellent form of government, even a lawful monarchy. But they, that live under a tyrannical city, have no such hope: their mistress is immortal, and will not slacken the reins until they be pulled out of her hands, and her own mouth receive the bridle of a more mighty charioteer. This is woful: yet their present sufferings make them less mindful of the future. New flies, and hungry ones, fall upon the same fore, out of which others had already sucked their fill. A new governor comes yearly among them, attended by all his poor kindred and friends, who mean not to return home empty to their hives, without a good lading of wax and honey. These fly into all quarters, and are quickly acquainted with every man's wealth, or whatsoever else, in all the province, is worthy to be desired. They know all a man's enemies, and all his fears, becoming themselves, within a little space, the enemies that he feareth most. To grow into acquaintance with these masterful guests, in hope to win their friendship, were an endless labour (yet it must be undergone) and such as every one hath not means to go about: but were this effected, what availeth it? The love of one governor is purchased with gifts: the successor of this man, he is more loving than could be wished, in respect of a fair wife or daughter: then comes the third, perhaps of the contrary faction at home, a bitter enemy to both his fore-goers, who seeks the ruin of all that have been inward with them. So the miseries of this tyranny are not simple, but interlaced (as it were) with the calamities of civil war. The *Romans* had a law *de repetundis*, or of *recovery*, against extorting magistrates: yet we find, that it served not wholly to restrain their provincial go-

vernors, who presuming on the favour of their own citizens, and of their kindred and friends at home, were bold in their provinces, to work all these enormities rehearsed, though somewhat the more sparingly, for fear of judgment. If the subjects of *Rome* groaned under such oppressions, what must we think of those that were vassals unto *Carthage*? The *Romans* imposed no burthensome tributes; they loved not to hear that their empire was grievous; they condemned many noble citizens, for having been ill governors. At *Carthage* all went quite contrary; the rapines newly devised by one magistrate, served as precedents to instruct another; every man resolved to do the like, when it should fall to his turn; and he was held a notable statesman, whose robberies had been such, as might afford a good share to the common treasure. Particular examples of this *Carthaginian* practice are not extant: the government of *Verres* the *Roman* in *Sicily*, that is lively set out by *Tully*, may serve to inform us, what was the demeanour of these *Punic* rulers, who stood in fear of no such condemnation as *Verres* underwent. By prosecuting this discourse, I might infer a more general proposition, That a city cannot govern her subject provinces so mildly as a king: but it is enough to have shewed, That the tyranny of a city is far more intolerable than that of any one most wicked man.

Suitable to the cruelty of such lords, is the hatred of their subjects: and again, suitable to the hatred of the subjects, is the jealousy of their lords. Hence it followed, that in wars abroad, the *Carthaginians* durst use the service of *African* soldiers; in *Africa* it self, they had rather be beholden to others that were farther fetch'd. For the same purpose did *Hannibal*, in the second *Punic* war, shift his mercenaries out of their own countries; ^a *Ut Afri in Hispania, Hispania in Africa, melior procul ab domo futurus uterque miles, velut mutuis pignoribus obligati stipendia facerent.* That the *Africans* might serve in *Spain*, the *Spaniards* in *Africa*, being each of them like to prove the better soldiers, the farther they were from home, as if they were obliged by mutual pledges. It is disputable, I confess, whether these *African* and *Spanish* hirelings, could properly be termed mercenaries: for they were subject unto *Carthage*, and carried into the field, not only by reward, but by duty. Yet seeing their duty was no better than enforced, and that it was not any love to the state, but mere desire of gain, that made them fight. I will not nicely stand upon propriety of a word, but hold them, as *Polybius* also doth, no better than mercenaries.

† III.

The dangers growing from the use of mercenary soldiers, and foreign auxiliaries.

THE extreme danger, growing from the employment of such soldiers, is well observed by *Machiavel*: who sheweth, that they are more terrible to those whom they serve, than to those against whom they serve. They are seditious, unfaithful, disobedient, devourers and destroyers of all places and countries, whereinto they are drawn, as being held by no other bond than their own Commodity. Yea, that which is most fearful among such hirelings, is, that they have often, and in time of greatest extremity, not only refused to fight, in their defence, who have entertained them; but revolted unto the contrary part, to the utter ruin of those princes and states that have trusted

them. These mercenaries (saith *Machiavel*) which filled all *Italy*, when *Charles* the eighth of *France* did pass the *Alps*, were the cause that the said *French* king won the realm of *Naples*, with his buckler without a sword. Notable was the example of *Sforza*, the father of *Francis Sforza*, duke of *Milan*; who being entertained by queen *Joan* of *Naples*, abandoned her service on the sudden; and forced her to put her self into the hands of the king of *Arragon*. Like unto his father was *Francis Sforza*, the first of that race, duke of *Milan*: who, being entertained by the *Milanese*, forced them to become his slaves; even with the same army which themselves had levied for their own defence. But *Lodovick Sforza*, the son of this *Francis*, by the just judgment of God, was made a memorable example unto posterity, in losing his whole estate by the treachery of such faithless mercenaries, as his own father had been. For, having waged an army of *Switzers*, and committed his duchy, together with his person, into their hands; he was by them delivered up unto his enemy the *French* king, by whom he was inclosed in the castle of *Loches* to his dying day.

The like inconvenience is found, in using the help of foreign auxiliaries. We see, that when the emperor of *Constantinople* had hired 10000 *Turks*, against his neighbour princes; he could never, either by perswasion or force, set them again over sea upon *Asia* side: which gave beginning to the *Christian* servitude, that soon after followed. *Alexander*, the son of *Cassander*, sought aid of the great *Demetrius*: but *Demetrius*, being entred into his kingdom, slew the same *Alexander* who had invited him, and made himself king of *Macedon*. *Syrael* the *Turk* was called into *Egypt* by *Sanar* the *Soldan*, against his opposite: but this *Turk* did settle himself so surely in *Egypt*, that *Saladine* his successor became lord thereof; and of all the holy land, soon after. What need we look about for examples of this kind; every kingdom, in effect, can furnish us. The *Britons* drew the *Saxons* into this our country; and *Mac Murrough* drew the *English* into *Ireland*: but the one and the other soon became lords of those two kingdoms.

Against all this may be alledged, the good success of the *United Provinces* of the *Netherlands*, using none other than such kind of soldiers, in their late war. Indeed these *Low-countries* have many goodly and strong cities, filled with inhabitants that are wealthy, industrious, and valiant in their kind. They are stout sea-men, and therein is their excellency; neither are they bad, at the defence of a place well fortified: but in open field they have seldom been able to stand against the *Spaniard*. Necessity therefore compelled them to seek help abroad: and the like necessity made them forbear to arm any great numbers of their own. For, with money raised by their trade, they maintained the war: and therefore could ill spare, unto the pike and musket, those hands, that were of more use in helping to fill the common purse. Yet what of this? they sped well. Surely they sped as ill as might be, whilst they had none other than mercenary soldiers. Many fruitless attempts, made by the prince of *Orange*, can witness it: and that brave commander, count *Lodowick* of *Nassau*, felt it to his grief, in his retreat from *Groeninghen*; when in the very instant, that required their service in fight, his mercenaries cried out aloud for money, and so ran away. This was not the only time, when the hired soldiers of the *States*, have

^a Liv. Dec. 3. l. 1.

either sought to hide their cowardice under a shew of greediness; or at least, by meer covetousness, have ruined in one hour the labour of many months. I will not stand to prove this by many examples; for they themselves will not deny it. Neither would I touch the honour of *Monsieur*, the duke of *Anjou*, brother to the *French* king; save that it is folly to conceal what all the world knows. He that would lay open the danger of foreign auxiliaries, needeth no better pattern. It is commonly found, that such aiders made themselves lords over those, to whom they lend their succour: but where shall we meet with such another as this *Monsieur*, who, for his protection promised, being rewarded with the lordship of the country, made it his first work, to thrust by violence a galling yoke upon the people's necks? well, he lived to repent it, with grief enough. Even whilst he was counterfeiting unto those about him, that were ignorant of his plot, an imaginary sorrow for the poor burghers of *Antwerp*, as verily believing the town to be surprized and won; the death of the count *St. Aignan*, who fell over the wall, and the cannon of the city, discharged against his own troops, informed him better what had happened; shewing that they were his own *French*, who stood in need of pity. Then was his feigned passion changed into a very bitter anguish of mind; wherein smiting his breast, and wringing his hands, he exclaimed, *Helas mon Dieu, que veux tu faire de moy; alas, my God, what wilt thou do with me?* So the affairs of the *Netherlands* will not serve to prove, that there is little danger in using mercenary soldiers, or the help of foreign auxiliaries. This notwithstanding, they were obedient unto necessity, and sought help of the *English*, *Scotch*, and *French*: wherein they did wisely, and prospered. For when there was in *France* a king partaker with them in the same danger; when the queen of *England* refused to accept the sovereignty of their country, when they offered, yet being provoked by the *Spaniard* their enemy, pursued him with continual war; when the heir of *England* reigned in *Scotland*, a king too just and wise (though not engaged in any quarrel) either to make profit of his neighbour's miseries, or to help those that had attempted the conquest of his own inheritance: then might the *Netherlanders* very safely repose confidence, in the forces of these their neighbour-countries. The soldiers that came unto them from hence, were (to omit many other commendations) not only regardful of the pay that they should receive; but well affected unto the cause that they took in hand: or if any were cold in his devotion, to the side whereon he fought; yet was he kept in order, by remembrance of his own home, where the *English* would have rewarded him with death, if his faith had been corrupted by the *Spaniard*. They were therefore trusted with the custody of cities; they were held as friends, and patrons; the necessity of the poorer sort was relieved, before the pay-day came, with *lendings*, and other helps, as well as the ability of the states could permit. When three such princes, reigning at one time, shall agree so well, to maintain against the power of a fourth, injurious (or at least so seeming) to them all, a neighbour-country, of the same religion, and to which they are all lovingly affected: then may such a country be secure of her auxiliaries, and quietly intend her trade, or other business, in hope of like success. But these circumstances meet so seldom, as it may well hold true in general, that mer-

cenary, and foreign auxiliary forces, are no less dangerous, than the enemy, against whom they are entertained.

†. IV.

That the moderate government of the Romans gave them assurance to use the service of their own subjects in their wars. That in man's nature there is an affection breeding tyranny, which hindereth the use and benefit of the like moderation.

HERE it may be demanded, whether also the *Romans* were not compelled to use service of other soldiers in their many great wars; but performed all by their own citizens? for if it were their manner to arm their own subjects; how happened it, that they feared no Rebellion? if strangers; how then could they avoid the inconveniencies above rehearsed? the answer is; that their armies were compounded usually of their own citizens, and of the *Latins*, in equal number: to which they added, as occasion required, some companies of the *Campanes*, *Hetrurians*, *Samnites*, or other of their subjects, as were either interested in the quarrel, or might best be trusted. They had, about these times (though seldom they did employ so many) ten *Roman* legions; a good strength, if all other help had been wanting: which served to keep in good order their subjects, that were always fewer in the army than themselves. As for the *Latins*, if consanguinity were not a sufficient obligation; yet many privileges and immunities, which they enjoyed, made them assured unto the state of *Rome*: under which they lived almost at liberty, as being bound to little else, than to serve it in war. It is true, that a yoke, how easy soever, seems troublesome to the neck that hath been accustomed to freedom. Therefore many people of *Italy* have taken occasion of several advantages, to deliver themselves from the *Roman* subjection. But still they have been reclaimed by war; the authors of rebellion have been sharply punished; and the people, by degrees, have obtained such liberty, as made them esteem none otherwise of *Rome*, than as the common city of all *Italy*. Yea, in process of time it was granted unto many cities, and those far off removed, even to *Tarsus* in *Cilicia*, where *St. Paul* was born, that all the burghesses should be free of *Rome* it self. This favour was conferred absolutely upon some; upon some, with restraint of giving voice in election of magistrates, or with other such limitation, as was thought fit. Hereunto may be added, that it was their manner, after a great conquest, to release unto their new subjects half of their tribute which they had been wont to pay unto their former lords, which was a ready way, to bring the multitude into good liking of their present condition; when the review of harder times past should rather teach them to fear a relapse, than to hope for better in the future, by seeking innovation. Neither would it be forgotten, as a special note of the *Romans* good government, that when some, for their well-deserving, have had the offer to be made citizens of *Rome*; they have refused it, and held themselves better contented with their own present estate. Wherefore it is no marvel, that *Petellia*, a city of the *Brutians* in *Italy*, chose rather to endure all extremity of war, than, upon any condition, to forsake the *Romans*; even when the *Romans* themselves had confessed, that they were unable to help these their subjects, and therefore willed them to look

^a Liv. Dec. 3. l. 3.

^b Liv. ibid.

to their own good, as having been faithful to the utmost. Such love purchased these mild governments, without impairing their majesty thereby. The sum of all is: they had, of their own, a strong army; they doubled it, by adjoining thereunto the *Latins*; and they further increased it, as need required, with other help of their own subjects: all, or the most of their followers, accounting the prosperity of *Rome* to be the common good.

The moderate use of sovereign power being so effectual, in assuring the people unto their lords, and consequently, in the establishment or enlargement of dominion: it may seem strange, that the practice of tyranny, whose effects are contrary, hath been so common in all ages. The like, I know, may be said, of all vice, and irregularity whatsoever. For it is less difficult (whosoever think otherwise) and more safe, to keep the way of justice and honesty, than to turn aside from it; yet commonly our passions do lead us into by-paths. But where lust, anger, fear, or any the like affection, seduceth our reason; the same unruly appetite either bringeth with it an excuse, or at least-wile taketh away all cause of wonder. In tyranny it is not so: forasmuch as we can hardly descry the passion, that is of force to insinuate it self into the whole tenour of a government. It must be confessed, that lawless desires have bred many tyrants: yet so, that these desires have seldom been hereditary or long-lasting; but have ended commonly with the tyrant's life, sometimes before his death; by which means the government hath been reduced to a better form. In such cases, the saying of *Aristotle* holds, *that tyrannies are of a short continuance*. But this doth not satisfy the question in hand. Why did not the *Carthaginians* exercise tyranny? why did the *Athenians*? why have many other cities done the like? If in respect of their general good; how could they be ignorant, that this was an ill course for the safety of the weal publick? If they were led hereunto by any affection; what was that affection, wherein so many thousand citizens, divided and subdivided within themselves by factions, did all concur, notwithstanding the much diversity of temper, and the vehemency of private hatred among them? Doubtless, we must be fain to say, that tyranny is, by it self, a vice distinct from others. A man, we know, is *animal politicum*, apt, even by nature, to command, or to obey; every one in his proper degree. Other desires of mankind, are common likewise unto brute beasts; and some of them, to bodies wanting sense: but the desire of rule belongeth unto the nobler part of reason; whereunto is also answerable an aptness to yield obedience. Now as hunger and thirst are given by nature, not only to man and beast, but unto all sorts of vegetables, for the sustentation of their life: as fear, anger, lust, and other affections are likewise natural, in convenient measure, both unto mankind, and to all creatures that have sense, for the shunning or repelling of harm, and seeking after that which is requisite: even so is this desire of ruling or obeying engrafted by nature in the race of man, and in man only as a reasonable creature, for the ordering of his life, in a civil form of justice. All these in-bred qualities are good and useful. Nevertheless, hunger and thirst are the parents of gluttony and drunkenness, which, in reproach, are called beastly, by an improper term: since they grow from appetites, found in less worthy creatures than beasts, and are yet not so common in beasts, as in men. The effects of anger,

and of such other passions as descend no lower than unto brute beasts, are held less vile; and perhaps not without good reason: yet are they more horrible, and punished more grievously, by sharper laws, as being in general more pernicious. But as no corruption is worse, than of that which is best; there is not any passion, that nourisheth a vice more hurtful unto mankind, than that which issueth from the most noble root, even the depraved affection of ruling. Hence arise those two great mischiefs, of which hath been an old question in dispute, whether be the worse; that all things, or that nothing, should be lawful. Of these, a dull spirit, and over-loaden by fortune, with power whereof it is not capable, occasioneth the one; the other proceedeth from a contrary distemper, whose vehemency the bounds of reason cannot limit. Under the extremity of either, no country is able to subsist: yet the defective dulness, that permitteth any thing, will also permit the execution of law, to which, mere necessity doth enforce the ordinary magistrate; whereas tyranny is more active, and pleaseth it self in the excess, with a false colour of justice. Examples of stupidity, and unaptness to rule, are not very frequent, tho' such natures are every-where to be found: for this quality troubles not it self in seeking empire; or if, by some error of fortune, it encounter therewithal (as when *Claudius*, hiding himself in a corner, found the empire of *Rome*) some friend, or else a wife, is not wanting to supply the defect, which also cruelty doth help to shadow. Therefore this vice, as a thing unknown, is without a name. Tyranny is more bold, and feareth not to be known, but would be reputed honourable: for it is *prosperum & felix scelus*, a fortunate mischief, as long as it can subsist. *There is no reward or honour* (saith *Peter Charron*) *assigned to those, that know how to increase, or to preserve human nature: all honours, greatness, riches, dignities, empires, triumphs, trophies, are appointed for those, that know how to afflict, trouble, or destroy it.* *Cesar*, and *Alexander*, have unmade and slain each of them, more than a million of men: but they made none, nor left none behind them. Such is the error of man's judgment, in valuing things according to the common opinion. But the true name of tyranny, when it grows to ripeness, is none other than *Ferity*: the same that *Aristotle* saith to be worse than any vice. It exceedeth indeed all other vices, issuing from the passions incident both to man and beast; no less than perjury, murder, treason, and the like horrible crimes, exceed in villany, the faults of gluttony and drunkenness, that grow from more ignoble appetites. Hereof *Sciron*, *Procrustes*, and *Pityocampes*, that used their bodily force to the destruction of mankind, are not better examples, than *Phalaris*, *Dionysius* and *Agathocles*, whose mischievous heads were assailed by the hands of detestable ruffians. The same barbarous desire of lordship, transported those old examples of *Ferity*, and these latter tyrants, beyond the bounds of reason: neither of them knew the use of rule, nor the difference between free-men and slaves.

The rule of the husband over the wife, and of parents over their children, is natural, and appointed by God himself; so that it is always, and simply, allowable and good. The former of these is, as the dominion of reason over appetite: the latter is the whole Authority, which one free-man can have over another. The rule of a king is no more, nor none other, than of a common father over his whole country: which he that

knows what the power of a father is, or ought to be, knows to be enough. But there is a greater, and more masterly rule, which God gave unto *Adam*, when he said; ^a *Have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth*: which also he confirmed unto *Noah*, and his children, saying, ^b *The fear of you, and the dread of you, shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hands are they delivered*. He, who gave this dominion to man, gave also an aptitude to use it. The execution of this power hath since extended it self over a very great part of mankind. There are indeed no small numbers of men, whose disability to govern themselves, proves them, according to *Aristotle's* doctrine, to be naturally slaves.

Yet find I not in scripture any warrant to oppress men with bondage, ^c unless the lawfulness thereof be sufficiently intimated, where it is said, that a man shall not be punished for the death of a servant, whom he hath slain by correction, if the servant live a day or two, because ^d *he is his money*; or else by captivity of the ^e *Midianitish* girls, which were made bond-slaves, and the sanctuary had a part of them for *the Lord's tribute*. Doubtless, the custom hath been very antient; ^f for *Noah* laid this curse upon *Canaan*, that he should be a servant of servants; and *Abraham* had of *Pharaoh*, among other gifts, *men-servants*, ^g and *maid-servants*, which were none other than slaves. Christian religion is said to have abrogated this old kind of servility; but surely they are deceived that think so. ^h *St. Paul* desired the liberty of *Onesimus*, whom he had won unto Christ; yet wrote he for this unto *Philemon*, by way of request, craving it as a benefit, not urging it as a duty. Agreeable hereto is the direction which the same *St. Paul* giveth unto servants; ⁱ *Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called: art thou called, being a servant? care not for it, but if thou mayst be made free, chuse it rather*. It is true, that christian religion hath procured liberty unto many, not only in regard of piety, but for that the christian masters stood in fear of being discovered by their slaves unto the persecutors of religion. *Mahomet* likewise, by giving liberty to his followers, drew many into his impiety; but whether he forbade it, as unlawful, unto his sectators to hold one another of them in bondage, I cannot tell; save that by the practice of the *Turks* and *Moors*, it seems he did not. In *England* we had many bond-servants, until the time of our last civil wars; and I think that the laws concerning villanage are still in force, of which the latest are the sharpest. And now, since slaves were made free, which were of great use and service, there are grown up a rabble of rogues, cut-purses, and other the like trades; slaves in nature, though not in law.

But whether this kind of dominion be lawful, or not, *Aristotle* hath well proved that it is natural. And certainly we find not such a latitude of difference in any creature, as in the nature of man; wherein (to omit the infinite distance in estate of the elect and reprobate) the wisest excel the most foolish by far greater degree, than the most foolish of men doth surpass the wisest of beasts. Therefore, when commiseration hath given way to reason, we shall find that nature is the ground even of masterly power, and of servile obedience, which is

thereto correspondent. But it may be truly said, that some countries have subsisted long without the use of any servility; as also it is true, that some countries have not the use of any tame cattel. Indeed, the affections which uphold civil rule are (though more noble) not so simply needful unto the sustentation either of our kind, as are lust, and the like; or of every one, as are hunger and thirst, which notwithstanding are the lowest in degree. But where most vile and servile dispositions have liberty to shew themselves begging in the streets, there may we more justly wonder how the dangerous toil of seafaring-men can find enough to undertake them, than how the swarm of idle vagabonds should increase, by access of those that are weary of their own more painful condition. This may suffice to prove, that in mankind there is found ingrafted, even by nature, a desire of absolute dominion, whereunto the general custom of nations doth subscribe; together with the pleasure which most men take in flatterers, that are the basest of slaves.

This being so, we find no cause to marvel how tyranny hath been so rife in all ages, and practised not only in the single rule of some vicious prince, but even by consent of whole cities and estates; since other vices have likewise gotten head, and born a general sway, notwithstanding that the way of virtue be more honourable and commodious. Few there are that have used well the inferior passions, how then can we expect that the most noble affections should not be disordered? In the government of wife and children, some are utterly careless, and corrupt all by their dull connivency; others, by masterly rigor, hold their own blood under condition of slavery. To be a good governor, is a rare commendation; and to prefer the weal-publick above all respects whatsoever, is the virtue justly termed heroical. Of this virtue, many ages afford not many examples. *Hector* is named by *Aristotle*, as one of them; and deservedly, if this praise be due to extraordinary height of fortitude, used in defence of a man's own country. But if we consider, that a love of the general good cannot be perfect, without reference to *the Fountain of all goodness*, we shall find that no moral virtue, how great soever, can, by it self, deserve the commendation of *more than virtue*, as the heroical doth. Wherefore we must search the scriptures for patterns hereof; such ^j *David*, *Josaphat*, and *Josias* were. Of christian kings, if there were many such, the world would soon be happy. It is not my purpose to wrong the worth of any, by denying the praise where it is due, or by preferring a less excellent. But he that can find a king religious and zealous in God's cause, without enforcement either of adversity, or of some regard of state; a procurer of the general peace and quiet, who not only useth his authority, but adds the travel of his eloquence, in admonishing his judges to do justice; by the vigorous influence of whose government, civility is infused, even into those places that have been the dens of savage robbers and cut-throats; one that hath quite abolished a slavish *Brehon* law, by which an whole nation of his subjects were held in bondage; and one, whose higher virtue and wisdom doth make the praise not only of nobility, and other ornaments, but of abstinence from the blood, the wives, and the goods of those that are under his power, together with a world of chief commendations belonging unto some good princes, to appear less regardable; he, I say, that can find such a king, findeth

^a Gen. i. 28.^b Gen. ix. 2.^c Aril. Pol. l. i. c. 4.^d Exod. xxi. 21.^e Num. xxvi. 9.^f Gen. ix. 25.^g Gen. xii. 16.^h Epist. to Philem. v. 14.ⁱ 1 Cor. vii. 20, 21.

^an example worthy to add unto virtue an honourable title, if it were formerly wanting. Under such a king, it is likely, by God's blessing, that a land shall flourish with increase of trade in countries before unknown; that civility and religion shall be propagated into barbarous and heathen countries; and that the happiness of his subjects, shall cause the nations far off removed, to wish him their sovereign. I need not add hereunto, that all the actions of such a king, even his bodily exercises, do partake of virtue; since all things tending to the preservation of his life and health, or to the mollifying of his cares (who, fixing his contemplation upon God, seeketh how to imitate the unspeakable goodness, rather than the inaccessible majesty, with both of which himself is endued, as far as human nature is capable) do also belong to the furtherance of that common good which he procureth. Lest any man should think me transported with admiration, or other affection, beyond the bounds of reason, I add hereunto, that such a king is nevertheless a man, must die, and may err; yet wisdom and fame shall set him free from error, and from death, both with and without the help of time. One thing I may not omit, as a singular benefit (though there be many others besides) redounding unto this king, as the fruit of his goodness. The people that live under a pleasant yoke, are not only loving to their sovereign lord, but free of courage, and no greater in muster of men, than of stout fighters, if need require; whereas on the contrary, he that ruleth as over slaves, shall be attended, in time of necessity, by slavish minds, neither loving his person, nor regarding his or their own honour. Cowards may be furious, and slaves outrageous, for a time; but among spirits that have once yielded unto slavery, universally it is found true, that ^a*Homer* saith, *God bereaveth a man of half his virtue, that day when he casteth him into bondage.*

Of these things, I might perhaps more seasonably have spoken, in the general discourse of government; but where so lively an example of the calamity following a tyrannical rule, and the use of mercenaries, thereupon depending, did offer it self, as is this present business of the *Carthaginians*, I thought that the note would be more effectual, than being barely delivered, as out of a common place.

SECT. III.

How the war against the mercenaries was diversly managed by Hanno and Amilcar, with variable success. The bloody counsels of the mercenaries, and their final destruction.

BEING now to return unto those mercenaries, from whom I have thus far digressed, I cannot readily find by what name henceforth I should call them. They are no longer in pay with the *Carthaginians*, neither care they to pretend that they seek their wages already due; so that they are neither mercenaries nor mutineers. Had they all been subject unto *Carthage*, then might they justly have been termed rebels: but *Spendius*, and others, that were the principal part of them, owed none allegiance to that state, which they endeavoured to subvert. Wherefore I will borrow the name of their late occupation, and still call them mercenaries, as *Polybius* also doth.

These using the advantage of their present strength, besieged ^b*Utica* and *Hippagreta*, cities of great importance, as being seated upon the western haven of *Carthage*, where it is divided by a neck of land; *Hippagreta* standing inwards upon the great lake, *Utica* farther out upon the sea. Neither was the camp at *Tunis* abandoned, which lay fitly to hinder the *Carthaginians* from passing up into the country; for *Matbo* and *Spendius* wanted not men to follow the war in all parts at once.

How the *Carthaginians* were amazed with this unexpected peril, any man may conceive. But the business it self awakes them hastily. They are hardly press'd on all sides, and therefore travelled their brains to the uttermost, how to shake off these furious dogs from their shoulders, who sometimes by night, sometimes by day, came unto the very walls of their city. In this exigence, *Hanno* was made their general, who failed not in his accustomed diligence of making all good preparation; but had gotten together whatsoever was needful, as well to relieve a town besieged, as to batter and assail any place defended against him. With these provisions, and with an hundred elephants, he came to *Utica* so suddenly, that the enemies, as men surprized, forsook their trenches, and retired themselves unto a rising piece of woody ground, where they might be safe against the violence of his beasts. *Hanno*, thinking that he had to do with *Numidians*, whose custom was, after any loss, to fly two or three days journey off, presently entered the town, to shew himself after this his victory. But these good fellows, against whom he was to war, had learned of *Amilcar* to retire and fight again, many times in one day, as need required. Therefore, as soon as they perceived that he knew not how to use a victory, they assailed their own camp, and with great slaughter, drove the *Carthaginians* out of it, forcing them to hide themselves within *Utica*, and got possession of all the store that *Hanno* had brought for the relief of the town. This bad beginning *Hanno* followed with suitable indiscretion, losing the benefit of many fair opportunities, and suffering the enemies to take possession of all the entrance from *Carthage* to the firm land.

The *Carthaginians* perceiving this, were exceedingly troubled, and did therefore let fall their sheet-anchor, sending to the field their great captain *Amilcar*, whom they furnished with ten thousand foot of supply, and seventy elephants. *Amilcar* had work enough to do before he should be able to meet with the enemy upon equal ground; for, besides other places of advantage that the mercenaries had occupied, *Hanno* had suffered them to win the only bridge, by which the river *Macra*, or *Bagradas*, was passable unto these that were to travel into the continent. This river had not many fords, nor those easy for a single man to get over; but upon them all was kept such guard, as gave to *Amilcar* little hope of prevailing in seeking way by force. As for the bridge it self, *Matbo* and his followers were there lodged, and had there built a town, wherein to lie commodiously, intente only to the custody thereof. But *Amilcar* had observed, that the very mouth of *Bagradas* used to be sometimes cloyed with sand and gravel, that was driven in by certain customary winds, and could not be driven out again by force of that slow river, till the wind falling, or changing, suffered the weight of the

^a Hom. Odyss. l. 17. ^b *Utica* is seated in the great bay that enters into *Carthage*, not far within the promontory of *Apollo*. At this time it is called *Porto Farina*, or *Biserta*; and by the Africans themselves *Garel Melba*. *Niger* saith, that the town it self is ruined, and the place whereon it stood, now called *Mazachares*. It was very ancient, and built before *Carthage*, saith *Silius*. As it flourished before *Carthage* was set up, so did it after *Carthage* was thrown down by the Romans in the third Punic war. Famous it was by the death of *Cato the younger*, who held it against *Cesar*. *Victor*, that worthy divine, was bishop thereof in the time of *Genesius* the *Arrian*, who lived all the time of that tyrant, and hath written the story of his cruelties.

waters to disburthen their channel. Hereof he made use, and taking his opportunity, passed the river, contrary to all expectation, either of the enemy, or of his own citizens.

There was no need to bid *Spendius* look about him, when once it was heard that *Amilcar* was come over into *Bagradas*; all the mercenaries were troubled with the news, knowing that they were no longer to deal with the improvident gravity of *Hanno*, but with an able spirit, even with their own master in the art of war, whom they admired, though they hated him. But this fear was soon changed into presumption; when more than fifteen thousand of their own society were come from *Utica*, and other ten thousand from the guard of the bridge. Their army was far greater than that of *Amilcar's*, and they were in their own judgment the better men; upon which confidence they resolved to charge him on all sides, and beat him down in despite of his worth and reputation. With this resolution they attended upon him, watching for some advantage, and still exhorting one another to play the men, and give the onset. Especially they that followed him in the rear had a mind to begin the fight; whereunto their promptness was such, as took from them their former circumspection. *Amilcar* held his way towards the bridge, keeping himself on plain grounds, that were fittest for the service of his elephants, which he placed in front of his army. Neither made he shew of any desire to fight, but suffered the rashness of his enemies to increase, till it should break into some disorder. At length, perceiving that with more boldness than good heed, they followed him so near, as would be little for their good, if he should turn upon them, he hastened his march, even to such a pace, as made a shew little differing from plain flight. The mercenaries presently fell upon his skirts; believing, that for fear of them he was ready to run away. But whilst they confusedly, as in sudden opinion of victory, were driving at the heels of those who had the rear, *Amilcar* wheeled about and met him in the face, charging them hotly, but in very good order; so that, amazed with the apprehension of unexpected danger, they fled without making any resistance. In this overthrow there were six thousand of the mercenaries slain, and about two thousand taken; the rest fled, some to the camp at *Utica*, others to the town at the bridge, whither *Amilcar* followed them so fast that he won the place easily; the enemies being thence also fled into *Timis*, as not having recollected their spirits to make it good.

The fame of this victory, together with the diligence of *Amilcar* in pursuing it, caused many towns revolted, partly by fear, partly by force, to return to their former obedience. Yet was not *Matbo* wanting to himself in this dangerous time. He sent about *Numidia* and *Africa* for new supplies, admonishing the people now or never to do their best, for the recovery of their freedom; he persuaded *Spendius* and *Autarius*, that was captain of the *Gauls*, to wait upon *Amilcar*, and always to keep the higher grounds, or at least the foot of some hill, where they might be safe from the elephants; and he himself continued to press the town of *Hippagreta* with an hard siege. It was necessary for *Amilcar*, in passing from place to place, as his business required, to take such ways as there were, for all the country lay not level. Therefore *Spendius*, who still coasted him, had once gotten a notable advantage of ground; the *Carthaginians* lying in a plain surrounded with hills,

that were occupied by the mercenaries, with their *Numidian* and *African* succours. In this difficulty the fame of *Amilcar's* personal worth did greatly benefit his country. For *Naravasus*, a young gentleman commanding over the *Numidians*, was glad of this occasion, serving to get the acquaintance and love of so brave a man, which he much desired: and therefore came unto *Amilcar*, signifying his good affection to him, with offer to do him all service. *Amilcar* joyfully entertained this friend, promising unto him his own daughter in marriage, and so won from the enemies two thousand horse, that following *Naravasus*, turned unto the *Carthaginians* side. With this help he gave battle unto *Spendius*, wherein the *Numidian* laboured to approve his own valour to his new friend. So the victory was great; for there were slain ten thousand of *Spendius's* fellows, and four thousand taken prisoners; but *Spendius* himself, with *Autarius* the *Gaul*, escaped to do more mischief. *Amilcar* dealt very gently with his prisoners, pardoning all offences past, and dismissing as many as were unwilling to become his followers; yet with condition, that they should never more bear arms against the *Carthaginians*, threatening to take sharp revenge upon all that should break this covenant.

This humanity was vehemently suspected by *Matbo*, *Spendius*, and *Autarius*, as tending to win from them the hearts of their soldiers. Wherefore they resolved to take such order, that not a man among them should dare to trust in the good nature of *Amilcar*, nor to hope for any safety whilst *Carthage* was able to do him hurt. They counterfeited letters of advertisement, wherein was contained, that some of their company, respective only of their private benefit, and careless of the general good, had a purpose to betray them all unto the *Carthaginians*, with whom they held intelligence; and that it was needful to look well unto *Gesco* and his companions, whom these traitors had a purpose to enlarge. Upon this theme *Spendius* makes an oration to the soldiers, exhorting them to fidelity; and shewing with many words, that the seeming humanity of *Amilcar* toward some, was none other than a bait wherewith to intrap them all at once together; as also telling them what a dangerous enemy *Gesco* would prove if he might escape their hands. While he is yet in the middle of his tale were letters come to the same purpose. Then steps forth *Autarius*, and speaks his mind plainly; saying, that it were the best, yea, the only way, for the common safety, to cut off all hope of reconciliation with *Carthage*; that if some were devising to make their own peace, it would go hard with those that had a care of the war; that it were better to make an end of *Gesco's* life, than to trouble themselves with looking to his custody; that by such a course every one should be engaged in the present action, as having none other hope left than in victory alone; finally, that such as would speak here-against, were worthy to be reputed traitors. This *Autarius* was in great credit with the soldiers, and could speak sundry languages, in such sort, that it was understood by all. According to his motion therefore it was agreed, that *Gesco* and all the other prisoners should forthwith be put to horrible death by torments. Nevertheless there were some, who, for love of *Gesco*, sought to alter this intended cruelty, but they were forthwith stoned to death, as a document unto others; and so the decree was put in execution. Neither were they there-withal contented; but further ordained, that all *Carthaginian* prisoners which they took should be served in like sort; and that the subjects or friends

friends of *Carthage* should lose their hands, and so be sent home; which rule they observed ever afterwards.

Of this cruelty I need say no more, than that it was most execrable ferity. As for the counsel of using it, it was like unto the counsel of *Achitophel*; *All Israel shall hear that thou art abhorred of thy father; then shall the hands of all that are with thee be strong.* Such are the fruits of desperation. He that is past all hope of pardon is afraid of his own fellows, if they be more innocent; and, to avoid the punishment of less offences, committeth greater. The cowardise of offenders, and the revengeful spirits of those that have been wronged, are breeders of this desperation: to which may be added some deficiency of laws, in distinguishing the punishments of malefactors according to the degree of their several crimes. A coward thinks all provision too little for his own security. *If Phocas be a coward (said the emperor Mauritijs) then is he murtherous.* To be stedfast and sure in taking revenge is thought a point of honour, and a defensative against new injuries. But wrongfully; for it is opposite to the rule of Christianity; and such a quality discovered, makes them deadly enemies, who otherwise would have repented, and sought to make amends for the wrong done in passion. This was it which wrought so much woe to the *Carthaginians*, teaching *Matbo* and his *Africans* to suspect even their gentleness, as the introduction to extreme rigour. Like unto the errors of princes and governors are the errors of laws. Where one and the same punishment is awarded unto the less offence, and unto the greater, he that hath adventured to rob a man, is easily tempted to kill him, for his own security.

Against these inconveniences, mercy and severity, used with due respect, are the best remedies. In neither of which *Amilcar* failed. For, as long as these his own soldiers were any way likely to be reclaimed by gentle courses, his humanity was ready to invite them; but when they were transported with beastly outrage, beyond all regard of honesty and shame, he rewarded their villainy with answerable vengeance, casting them unto wild beasts to be devoured.

Until this time, *Hanno*, with the army under his command, had kept himself apart from *Amilcar*, and done little, as may seem, for that nothing is remembered of him since his late losses. Neither was *Amilcar* sorry to want his help, as being able to do better without him. But when the war grew to such extremity as threatened utter ruin to one or the other side, then was *Hanno* sent for, and came to *Amilcar*, with whom he joined his forces. By this access of strength *Amilcar* was not enabled to do more than in former times; rather he could now perform nothing; such was the hatred between him and his unworthy colleague. The towns of *Utica* and *Hippagreta*, that had stood always firm on the *Carthaginian* party, did now revolt unto the enemy, murdering all the soldiers that they had in garrison, and casting their bodies forth, without suffering them to be buried. The provisions brought by sea for maintenance of the army, were lost in foul weather; and *Carthage* itself stood in danger of being besieged, about which *Matbo* and *Spendius* consulted, whilst one of the *Carthaginian* generals did (as it were) bind the others hands.

It hath in all ages been used as the safest course, to send forth in great expeditions, two generals of one army. This was the common practice of those two mighty cities *Athens* and *Rome*, which other states and princes have often imitated; persuading

themselves, that great armies are not so well conducted by one as by two; who, out of emulation to excel each other, will use the greater diligence. They have also joined two chief commanders in equal commission, upon this further consideration; the better to restrain the ambition of any one that should be trusted with so great a strength. For hereof all common-weals have been jealous, having been taught by their examples, that have made themselves tyrants over those cities and states that have employed them. In this point the *Venetians* have been so circumspect, as they have, for the most part, trusted strangers, and not their own, in all the wars that they have made. It is true, that the equal authority of two commanding in chief, serveth well to bridle the ambition of one or both, from turning upon the prince or state that hath given them trust; but in managing the war itself, it is commonly the cause of ill success. In wars made near unto *Rome* itself, when two good friends were consuls, or such two at least as concurred in one desire of triumph; which honour (the greatest of any that *Rome* could give) was to be obtained by that one year's service; it is no marvel, though each of the consuls did his best, and referred all his thoughts unto none other end than victory: Yet in all dangerous cases, when the consuls proceeded otherwise than was desired, one dictator was appointed, whose power was neither hindered by any partner, nor by any great limitation. Neither was it indeed the manner to send forth both the consuls to one war; but each went whither his lot called him, to his own province, unless one business seemed to require them both, and they also seemed fit to be joined in the administration. Now, although it was so that the *Romans* did many times prevail with their joint generals; yet was this never or seldom, without as much concord as any other virtue of the commanders. For their modesty hath often been such, that the less able captain, though of equal authority, hath willingly submitted himself to the other, and obeyed his directions. This notwithstanding, they have many times, by ordaining two commanders of one army, received great and most dangerous overthrows; whereof in the second *Punic* war we shall find examples. On the contrary side, in their wars most remote, that were always managed by one, they seldom failed to win exceeding honour, as hereafter shall appear. Now, of those ten generals which served the *Athenians* at the battel of *Marathon*, it may truly be said, that had not their temper been better than the judgment of the people that sent them forth, and had not they submitted themselves to the conduction of *Miltiades*, their affairs had found the same success which they found at other times, when they coupled *Nicias* and *Alcibiades* together in *Sicily*; the one being so over-wary, and the other so hasty, as all came to nought that they undertook; whereas *Cimon* alone, as also *Aristides* and others, having sole charge of all, did their country and common-weal most remarkable service. For it is hard to find two great captains of equal discretion and valour; but that the one hath more of fury than of judgment, and so the contrary, by which the best occasions are as often over-slip'd, as at other times many actions are unreasonably undertaken. I remember it well, that when the prince of *Condy* was slain after the battel of *Jarnac* (which prince, together with the admiral *Chastillon*, had the conduct of the *Protestant* army) the *Protestants* did greatly bewail the loss of the said prince, in respect of his religion, person and birth; yet comforting themselves, they thought it rather an advancement

vancement than an hindrance to their affairs. For so much did the valour of the one out-reach the advisedness of the other, as whatsoever the admiral intended to win by attending the advantage, the prince adventured to lose, by being over-confident in his own courage.

But we need no better example than of the *Carthaginians* in this present business; who, though they were still sick of their ill-grounded love to *Hanno*, and were unwilling to disgrace him; yet seeing that all ran towards ruin, through the discord of the generals, committed the decision of their controversies unto the army that served under them. The judgment of the army was, that *Hanno* should depart the camp; which he did; and *Hannibal* was sent in his stead, one that would be directed by *Amilcar*, and that was enough.

After this, the affairs of *Carthage* began to prosper somewhat better. *Matbo* and *Spendius* had brought their army near unto the city; and lay before it as in a siege. They might well be bold to hope and adventure much, having in their camp above fifty thousand, besides those that lay abroad in garrisons. Nevertheless, the city was too strong for them to win by assault, and the entrance of victuals they could not hinder, if any should be sent in by friends from abroad.

Hieron, king of *Syracuse*, though during the wars in *Sicily* he assisted the *Romans*, and still continued in their alliance, yet now sent succours to the *Carthaginians*, fearing their fall, and consequently his own; because, if no other state gave the *Romans* somewhat to trouble their digestion, the principality of *Syracuse* would soon be devoured by them. The *Romans* also gave them some slender assistance, and for the present, refused good offers made unto them by the mercenaries. This they did to shew a kind of noble disposition; which was indeed but counterfeit, as the sequel manifestly proved.

Whilst *Matbo* and his followers were busily pressing the city, *Amilcar* was as diligent in waiting at their backs and cutting off all that came to their supply; so that finding themselves more straitly besieged by him than *Carthage* was by them, they purposed to desist from their vain attempt, and try some other course. Hereupon they issue into the field; where *Spendius*, and one *Zarcas*, an *African* captain assisting the rebellion, take upon them to find *Amilcar* work, leaving *Matbo* in *Tunis*, to negotiate with their friends, and take a general care of the business. The elephants of *Carthage*, and horse of *Naravasus*, made *Spendius* fearful to descend into the plains. Wherefore he betook himself to his former method of war, keeping the mountains and rough grounds, or occupying the straitest passages, wherein the desperate courage of his men might shew itself with little disadvantage. But *Amilcar* had more skill in this art than could be matched by the labour of *Spendius*. He drew the enemy to many skirmishes; in all which the success was such, as added courage to his own men, and abated the strength and spirit of the rebels. Thus he continued provoking them night and day; still intrapping some of them, and sometimes giving them the overthrow in plain battle, until at length he got them into a straight, whence ere they should get out, he meant to take of them a good account. Their judgment was enough to perceive their own disadvantage; and therefore they had the less stomach to fight, but awaited for help from *Tunis*. *Amilcar* prudently foreseeing, that necessity might teach them to dare impossibilities, used the benefit of their present fear, and shut them close up with

trench and rampart. There they waited miserably for succour that came not; and having spent all their victuals, were so pinched with hunger, that they fed upon the bodies of their prisoners. This they suffered patiently, as knowing that they had not deserved any favour from *Carthage*, and hoping that their friends at *Tunis* would not be unmindful of them. But when they were driven to such extremity that they were fain to devour their own companions, and yet saw none appearance or likelihood of relief, their obstinacy was broken, and they threatened their captains with what they had deserved, unless they would go forth to *Amilcar*, and seek such peace as might be gotten. So *Spendius*, *Zarcas* and *Autarius*, fell to consultation, wherein it was resolved to obey the multitude, and yield themselves, if it were so required, unto the death, rather than to perish by the hands of their own companions. Hereupon they send to crave parley, which is granted; and these three come forth to talk with *Amilcar* in person. What they could say unto him it is hard to conjecture; yet, by the conditions which *Amilcar* granted, it seems that they took the blame upon themselves, and craved pardon for the multitude. The conditions were, that the *Carthaginians* should chuse out of the whole number of these enemies any ten whom they pleased, to remain at their discretion; and that the rest should all be dismissed, each in his shirt, or in one single coat. When the peace was thus concluded, *Amilcar* told these ringleaders, that he chose them presently as part of the ten, and so commanded to lay hands on them; the rest he forthwith went to fetch, with his whole army in order. The rebels, who knew not that peace was concluded upon so gentle articles, thought themselves betrayed; and therefore amazedly ran to arms. But they wanted captains to order them, and the same astonishment that made them break the covenants of peace, whereof they were ignorant, gave unto *Amilcar* both colour of justice in accomplishing revenge, and ease in doing the execution. They were all slain, being forty thousand or more in number.

This was a famous exploit, and the news thereof exceeding welcome to *Carthage*, and terrible to the revolted cities of *Africa*. Henceforward, *Amilcar*, with his *Naravasus* and *Hannibal*, carried the war from town to town, and found all places ready to yield: *Utica* and *Hippagreta* only standing out, upon fear of deserved vengeance; and *Tunis* being held by *Matbo*, with the remainder of his army. It was thought fit to begin with *Tunis*, wherein lay the chief strength of the enemy. Coming before this town they brought forth *Spendius*, with his fellows, in view of the defendants, and crucified them under the walls, to terrify those of his old companions that were still in arms. With this rigour the siege began, as if speedy victory had been assured. *Hannibal* quartered on that part of *Tunis* which lay towards *Carthage*, *Amilcar* on the opposite side; too far asunder to help one another in sudden accidents, and therefore it behoved each to be the more circumspect.

Matbo from the walls beheld his own destiny in the misery of his companion, and knew not how to avoid it otherwise, than by a cast at dice with fortune. So he broke out upon that part of the *Carthaginian* army that lay secure, as if all danger were past, under the command of *Hannibal*; and with so great and unexpected fury he sallied, that after an exceeding slaughter he took *Hannibal* prisoner; on whom, and thirty the most noble of the *Carthaginian* prisoners, he presently revenged the death of *Spendius* by the same torture. Of this

Amilcar knew nothing till it was too late; neither had he strength enough remaining, after this great loss, to continue the siege, but was fain to break it up, and remove unto the mouth of the river *Bagradas*, where he encamped.

The terror was no less within *Carthage* upon the fame of this loss, than had been the joy of the late great victory. All that could bear arms were sent into the field under *Hanno*, whom, it seems, they thought the most able of their captains surviving the late accidents of war. If there were any law among them forbidding the employment of one sole general near unto their city (for they are known to have trusted one man abroad) the time did not permit, in this hasty exigent, to devise about repealing it. But thirty principal men are chosen by the senate to bring *Hanno* to *Amilcar's* camp, and by all good persuasions to reconcile them. This could not be effected in one day. It nearly touched *Amilcar* in his honour, that the carelessness of *Hannibal* seemed to be imputed unto him, by sending his enemy to moderate his proceedings. Nevertheless, after many conferences, the authority of the senators prevailed; *Amilcar* and *Hanno* were made friends; and thenceforth, whilst this war lasted, *Hanno* took warning by *Hannibal's* calamities to follow good directions, though afterwards he returned to his old and deadly hatred.

In the mean season *Matbo* was come abroad; as meaning to use the reputation of his late success, whilst it gave some life unto his business. He had reason to do as he did, but he wanted skill to deal with *Amilcar*. The skirmishes and light exercises of war, wherein *Amilcar* trained his *Carthaginians*, did so far abate the strength, and withal diminish the credit of *Matbo*, that he resolved try the fortune of one battel; wherein either his own desire should be accomplished, or his cares ended. To this conclusion the *Carthaginians* were no less prone than *Matbo*, as being weary of these long troubles and insupportable expences; confident in the valour of their own men, which had approved itself in many trials, and well assured of *Amilcar's* great worth, whereunto the enemy had not what to oppose. According to this determination, each part was diligent in making provision, inviting their friends to help, and drawing forth into the field all that lay in garrison.

The issue of this battel might have been foretold without help of witchcraft. *Matbo* and his followers had nothing whereon to presume, save their daring spirits, which had been well cooled by the many late skirmishes, wherein they had learned how to run away. The *Carthaginians* had reason to dare, as having often been victorious, and in all points else they had the better of their enemies; especially (which is worth all the rest) they had such a commander, as was not easily to be matched in that age. Neither was it likely, that the desire of liberty should work so much, in men accustomed to servitude, as the honour of their state would, in citizens, whose future and present good lay all at once engaged in that adventure. So the *Carthaginians* won a great victory, wherein most of the *Africans* their enemies were slain; the rest fled into a town which was not to be defended, and therefore they all yielded, and *Matbo* himself was taken alive. Immediately upon this victory, all the *Africans* that had rebelled made submission to their old masters: *Utica* only and *Hippagrota* stood out, as knowing how little they deserved of favour. But they were soon forced to take what conditions best pleased the victors. *Matbo* and his

fellows were led to *Carthage* in triumph; where they suffered all torments that could be devised, in recompence of the mischiefs which they had wrought in this war. The war had lasted three years and about four months, when it came to this good end; which the *Carthaginians*, whose subjects did not love them, should with less expence, by contenting their mercenaries, have prevented in the beginning.

SECT. IV.

How the mercenaries of the Carthaginians, that were in Sardinia, rebelled: and were afterwards driven out by the islanders. The faithless dealing of the Romans with the Carthaginians, in taking from them Sardinia, contrary to the peace.

WHILST *Matbo* and *Spendius* were making terrible combustion in *Africa*, other mercenaries of the *Carthaginians* had kindled the like fire in *Sardinia*: where murdering *Bostar* the governor, and other *Carthaginians*, they were in hope to get, and hold that island to their own use. Against these one *Hanno* was sent with a small army (such as could be spared in that busy time) consisting likewise of mercenaries, levied on the sudden. But these companions that followed *Hanno*, finding it more for their safety, and present profit, to join themselves with those that were already revolted, than to endanger themselves by battel, for the good of that common-weal, of which they had no care, began to enter into practice with the *Sardinian* rebels; offering to run one course of fortune with them in their enterprize. This their offer was kindly taken; but their faith was suspected. Wherefore, to take away all jealousy and distrust, they resolved to hang up their commander *Hanno*, and performed it. A common practice it hath been in all ages, with those that have undertaken the quarrel of an unjust war, to enjoin the performance of some notorious and villanous act, to those that come into them as seconds, with offer to partake, and to assist the impious purposes which they have in hand. It is indeed the best pawn, that desperate men can deliver to each other, to perform some such actions, as are equally unpardonable to all.

By such a kind of cruelty did the ungrateful *Mantineans* murder a garrison of *Achaians*, sent unto them for their defence against the *Lacedemonians* by *Aratus*; who, when he had formerly possessed himself of their city, by right of war, did not only spare the sack and spoil thereof, but gave them equal freedom with the rest of the cities united. These *Revolts* are also common in our court-wars; where, in the conquests of new fortunes, and making of new parties, and factions, without the depression or destruction of old friends, we cannot be received and trusted by old enemies. *Ce sont les coups de vieille escrime. These* (say the *French*) *be the blows of the old art of fencing.*

These mercenaries in *Sardinia* were no whit less violent in their purposes, than were *Spendius* and his Associates: only they wanted a *Matbo* among them, to negotiate with the inhabitants of the province. The islanders were no less glad, than the soldiers, that the *Carthaginians* were expelled the country: but they could not agree about the profit of the victory. The *Sardinians* thought that it was enough, if they rewarded the soldiers for their pains taken. Contrariwise, the soldiers were of opinion, that the title of the *Carthaginians* to that isle, was devolved unto themselves, by right of conquest. The same quarrel would (in likelihood) have risen, between *Spendius* with his mercenaries, and their *African* friends, if the common desire of both

both had once taken effect: unless the riches of *Carthage*, had served to content them all. But in *Sardinia*, where there was none other valuable reward, than possession and rule of the country, the matter was not easily taken up. So they fell to blows; which, how they were dealt I know not; but finally, the mercenaries were driven out, and compelled to save themselves in *Italy*. Before their departure out of *Sardinia*, they had invited the *Romans* into it, with as good right, as the *Mamertines* had called them into *Sicily*. Yet this offer was refused, upon reasons that follow.

Some *Italian* merchants had relieved *Matbo* and *Spendius* with corn; of whom the *Carthaginians* took almost five hundred, and held them in prison. Hereof was made a great complaint: so that the *Romans* sent ambassadors to *Carthage*, requiring satisfaction. It was no time for the *Carthaginians* to dispute: they quietly yielded to release them all. This was so kindly taken, that they forbade all their merchants, to trade thenceforth with the rebels; admonishing them to carry all provisions to *Carthage*. And upon the same reason, did they forbear to meddle with *Sardinia*, or to accept the city of *Utica*, offering it self unto their subjection. This might have served, as a notable example of the *Roman* faith, to all posterity: had not the issue proved, that it was mere regard of greater profit; which kept them so temperate, no longer than the hope lasted of thriving better thereby, than they should have done by open breach of faith. The whole estate of *Carthage* depended, at that time, upon the virtue of *Amilcar*: who, had he been overthrown by *Spendius* or *Matbo*, in one main battle, that mighty city must either have fallen into the barbarous hands of merciless villains, or have humbled her self under protection of the *Romans*, with whom she had lately striven for superiority. That extream necessity, whereinto *Matbo* reduced the city, by the fortune of one fall made out of *Tunis*, is enough to prove, that *Carthage* was not far from such a miserable choice. Wherefore it was not unwisely done of the *Romans*, to make such demonstration of kindness, and honourable dealing, as might invite a rich, but sinking ship to run her self aground upon their shore. But when all was well ended in *Africa*, and the *Carthaginians* began to prepare for the recovery of *Sardinia*, then did ambition put off her goodly vizard. The *Romans* perceiving that *Carthage*, beyond their hope, had recovered her feet again, began to strike at her head. They entertained the proffer of those mercenaries, that were fled out of *Sardinia*; and they denounced war against this enfeebled and impoverished city, under a shameless pretence, that the preparations made for *Sardinia*, were made indeed against Rome it self. The *Carthaginians* knew themselves unable to resist; and therefore yielded to the *Romans* demand; renouncing unto them all their right in *Sardinia*. But this was not enough. They would have twelve hundred talents, in recompence belike (for I see not what reason they could alledge) of the great fear which they had endured, of an invasion from *Carthage*. It is indeed plain, that they impudently sought occasion of war. But necessity taught the *Carthaginians* patience; and the money was paid, how hardly soever it was raised. From this time forward, let not Rome complain of the *Punic* faith, in breach of covenants: she her self hath broken the peace already, which *Amilcar* purposeth to make her dearly repent; but

what *Amilcar* lives not to perform, shall be accomplished by *Hannibal* his renowned son.

S E C T. V.

How the affairs of Carthage went between the African rebellion, and the second Punic war.

THE injurious dealing of the *Romans*, expressing their desire to pick a quarrel, served to instruct the *Carthaginians* in a necessary lesson. That either they must make themselves the stronger, or else resolve to be obedient unto those that were more mighty. In a city long accustomed to rule, the braver determination easily took place: and the best means were thought upon, for the increase of puissance and empire. The strength, and the jealousy of the *Romans*, forbade all attempts upon the *Mediterranean* seas; but the riches of *Spain*, that lay upon the *Ocean*, were unknown to *Rome*: wherefore that province might serve, both to exercise the *Carthaginians* in war, and to repair their decayed forces, with all needful supplies. Of this *Spanish* expedition, the charge and sovereign trust was committed unto *Amilcar*: upon whom his country did wholly repose it self; in hope to recover strength by his means, that had saved it from ruin.

Hanno, with some other envious men, that were of his faction, took little pleasure in the general love and honour, which daily increased towards *Amilcar* and his friends. Yet could they not deny him to be the most worthy of command in all the city: only they commended peace and quietness; advising men to beware of provoking the *Romans*, in whose amity, they said, that the felicity of *Carthage* did consist. By such discourses, harsh to the ears of good citizens, who had feeling of the wrong done to their common-weal, they got none other reputation, than of singularity: which the ignorant sort suspected to be wisdom.

But the glory of *Amilcar* was continually upheld and enlarged, by many notable services that he did, to the singular benefit of his country. He passed the streights of *Hercules* (now called the streights of *Gibraltar*) and landed on the western coast of *Spain*; in which country, during nine years that he lived there, he subjected unto the state of *Carthage* the better part of all those provinces. But finally, in a battle that he fought with a nation in *Portugal*, called the *Vettones* (defending himself a long time with an admirable resolution) he was invironed and slain: carrying with him to the grave the same great honour and fame, by which, in many signal victories, he had acquired the name of a second *Mars*.

After the death of *Amilcar*, *Asdrubal* his son-in-law was made general of the *Carthaginian* forces in *Spain*. This was a good man of war; but far better in practice and cunning, than in deeds of arms. By his notable dexterity in matter of negotiation, he greatly enlarged the dominion of *Carthage*: adding so many subjects and confederates thereunto, that the *Romans* began to grow jealous again of this hasty increase. He built a goodly city, upon a commodious haven, in the kingdom of *Granada*, opposite to that of *Oran* in *Africa*, and gave it the name of *New Carthage*, which to this day it nearly retaineth, being called now *Carthagona*.^a With this success of the *Carthaginians* in *Spain*, the *Romans* were not a little troubled, but begin to cause their own negligence. For

^a The Spaniards have since built a city of the same name in the West-Indies: which being peopled by them in the year 1532, was

whereas they had formerly taken so much pains to beat them out of the isle of *Sicily*, as suspecting their neighbourhood there; they had now, by cumbering themselves in a war of far less importance (whereof I shall speak anon) given them leisure, without interruption, to recover upon their own continent, a dominion by far exceeding, both in the bodies of men and in revenue, that which the *Romans* had taken from them. But how to help this, at the present they knew not; for they daily expected to be invaded by the *Gauls*, their ancient enemies, and nearest neighbours to the west. But he needeth little help of force, that knoweth himself to be feared: it is enough if he request, since his request shall have the virtue of a command.

Yet were the *Romans* utterly destitute of all good colour, that might help them to intermeddle in *Spain*. The *Spaniards* were then unacquainted with *Rome*, whereof (in probability) they scarce had heard the name: so that there were no *Mamertines*, nor other such rebels, to call in *Roman* succours. But in the enterprize of *Sardinia*, the *Romans* had learned an impudent pretence, that might also serve their turn in *Spain*. For though it were apparent, that the *Spanish* affairs had no relation to the peace between these two cities; and though it were nothing likely, that *Asdrubal* had any purpose, to extend his victories unto the gates of *Rome*, or to any of the *Roman* frontiers: yet (as if some such matter had been suspected) they sent unto him, requiring that he should forbear to proceed any further, than to the river of *Iberus*. In addressing their messengers, rather to *Asdrubal*, than to the city of *Carthage*; they seem to have hoped, that howsoever the generality of the *Carthaginians* had sweetly swallowed many bitter pills, to avoid all occasion of war with *Rome*: yet the bravery of one man might prove more fastidious, and, resenting the injury, return such answer, as would entangle his whole country in the quarrel, that they so much desired; and might embrace at leisure, when once they had found apparent cause. But *Asdrubal* finely deluded their expectation. He pretended no manner of dislike at all: and whereas they would have this insolent covenant inserted into the articles of peace, he took upon him to do it, of his own power, with such appearance of conformity to their will, that they went their ways contented, and sought no further.

If it had been so, that the state of *Carthage*, thereunto pressed by the *Romans*, for fear of present war, had ratified this new composition made by *Asdrubal*, yet should it not have stood bound in honour, to observe the same carefully, unless an oath had also been extorted, to make all sure. But since all passed quietly, under the bare authority of *Asdrubal*, this capitulation was none other in effect, than a second breach of peace; whereof the *Romans* might be accused more justly, than they could accuse the *Carthaginians* of perjury, (as they after did) for refusing to stand to it.

By this treaty with *Asdrubal*, the *Romans* won some reputation in *Spain*. For when it was once conceived by the *Spaniards*, that the city which would needs be mistress over them, stood in fear her self, of receiving blows from a stouter dame, there were soon found some, that by offering themselves to the protection of *Rome*, became (as they thought) fellow-servants with *Carthage*. But the *Carthaginians* will shortly teach them another lesson. The *Saguntines*, a people on the south-side of *Iberus*, entered into confederacy with the *Romans*, and were gladly accepted. Surely it was lawful unto

the *Romans*, to admit the *Saguntines*, or any other people (neither subject, nor open enemy in war to the *Carthaginians*) into their society: and unlawful it was unto the *Carthaginians*, to use violence towards any that should thus once become confederate with *Rome*. Nevertheless, if we consider the late agreement made with *Asdrubal*, we shall find that the *Romans* could have none other honest colour of requiring it, than an implicit covenant of making the river *Iberus* a bound, over which they themselves would not pass, in any discovery or conquest by them intended to be made upon *Spain*: in which regard, they might have some honest pretence to require the like of the *Carthaginians*; though *Rome* as yet had no foot, on the one side of *Iberus*, whereas *Carthage*, on the other side of that river, held almost all the country. Howsoever it were, this indignity was not so easily digested, as former injuries had been. For it was a matter of ill consequence, that the nations which had heard of no greater power than the *Carthaginian*, should behold *Saguntum* resting securely among them, upon confidence of help from a more mighty city. Wherefore either in this respect; or for that the sense is most feeling of the latest injuries; or rather for that now the *Carthaginians* were of power to do themselves right, war against *Saguntum* was generally thought upon, let the *Romans* take it how they list. In such terms were the *Carthaginians*, when *Asdrubal* died, after he had commanded in *Spain* eight years: (being slain by a slave, whose master he had put to death) and the great *Hannibal*, son of the great *Amilcar*, was chosen general in his stead.

SECT. VI.

The estate of Greece from the death of Pyrrhus, to the reign of Philip the son of Demetrius in Macedon.

IN the long term of the first *Punic* war, and the vacation following, between it and the second, the estate of *Greece*, after the death of *Pyrrhus*, was grown somewhat like unto that, wherein *Philip* of *Macedon* had found it; though far weaker, as in an after-spring. The whole country had recovered, by degrees, a form of liberty: the petty tyrannies (bred of those inferior captains, which in the times of general combustion, had seized each upon such small towns as he could get) were, by force or accident, extirpated and reformed; and some states were risen to such greatness, as not only served to defend themselves, but to give protection to others. This conversion to the better, proceeded from the like dissensions and tumults in *Macedon*, as had been in *Greece*, when *Philip* first began to incroach upon it. For after many quarrels and great wars, about the kingdom of *Macedon*, between *Antigonus* the elder, *Cassander*, *Demetrius*, *Lyfmachus*, *Seleucus*, *Pyrrhus*, and the *Gauls*, *Antigonus*, the son of *Demetrius*, finally got and held it, reigning six and thirty years; yet so, that he was divers times thence expelled, not only by the *Gauls*, and by *Pyrrhus*, as hath been already shewed, but by *Alexander* the son of *Pyrrhus* the *Epirot*, from whose father he had hardly won it. This happened unto him by the revolt of his soldiers, even at such time, as having overthrown with great slaughter an army of the *Gauls*, he was converting his forces against the *Athenians*, whom he compelled to receive his garrisons. But his young son *Demetrius* raised an army, wherewith he chased *Alexander*, not only out of *Macedon*, but out of his own *Epirus*, and restored his father to the kingdom.

By the help of this young prince *Demetrius*, (though in another kind) *Antigonus* got into his possession the citadel of *Corinth*; which was justly termed *the fetter of Greece*. This citadel, called *Acrocorinthus*, stood upon a steep rocky hill on the north-side of the town; and was by nature and art so strong, that it seemed impregnable. It commanded the town; which was of much importance, as occupying the whole breadth of the *Isthmus*, that running between the *Egean* and *Ionian* seas, joineth *Peloponnesus* to the main of *Greece*. Wherefore he that held possession of this castle, was able to cut off all passage by land, from one half of *Greece* unto the other; besides the commodity of the two seas, upon both of which, this rich and goodly city had commodious havens. *Alexander*, the son of *Polyperchon*, and, after his death, *Cratesipolis's* wife, had gotten *Corinth* in the great shuffling of provinces and towns, that was made between *Alexander's* princes. Afterwards it passed from hand to hand, until it came, I know not how, to one *Alexander*; of whom I find nothing else, than that he was thought to be poisoned by this *Antigonus*, who deceived his wife *Nicea* thereof, and got it from her by a trick. The device was this: *Antigonus* sent his young son *Demetrius* to *Corinth*, willing him to court *Nicea*, and seek her in marriage. The foolish old widow perceived not how unfit a match she was for the young prince, but entertained the fancy of marriage; whereto the old king was even as ready to consent, as was his son to desire it, and came thither in person to solemnize it. Hereupon all *Corinth* was filled with sacrifices, feasts, plays, and all sorts of games: in the midst of which, *Antigonus* watched his time, and got into the castle, beguiling the poor lady, whose jealousy had been exceeding diligent in keeping it. Of this purchase he was so glad, that he could not contain himself within the gravity befitting his old age. But as he had stolen it, so was it again stolen from him: neither lived he to revenge the loss of it, being already spent with age.

Demetrius, the son of this *Antigonus*, succeeding unto his father, reigned ten years. He made greater proof of his virtue before he was king, than after. The *Dardanians*, *Etolians*, and *Achaians*, held him continually busied in war; wherein his fortune was variable, and for the more part ill. About these times the power of the *Macedonians* began to decay: and the *Grecians* to cast off their yoke.

Philip, the only son of *Demetrius*, was a young child when his father died; and therefore *Antigonus*, his uncle, had the charge of the kingdom, during the minority of the prince; but he assumed the name and power of a king, though he respected *Philip* as his own son, to whom he left the crown at his death. This *Antigonus* was called the *Tutor*, in regard of his protectorship; and was also called *Doson*, that is as much as *Willgive*, because he was flow in his liberality. He repressed the *Dardanians*, and *Thessalians*, which molested his kingdom, in the beginning of his reign. Upon confidence of this good service, he took state upon him, as one that rather were king in his own right, than only a protector. Hereupon the people fell to mutiny; but were soon appeased by fair words, and a seeming unwillingness of his to meddle any more with the government. The *Achaians* took from him the city of *Athens*, soon after *Demetrius's* death; and likely they were to have wrought him out of all or most that he held in *Greece*, if their own estate had not been endangered by a nearer enemy. But civil dissension, which had overthrown the power of *Greece*, when it flourished most, overthrew it easily

now again, when it had scarcely recovered strength after a long sickness; and gave to this *Antigonus* no less authority therein, than *Philip*, the father of *Alexander*, got by the like advantage.

These *Achaians*, from small beginnings, had increased in short time to great strength and fame: so that they grew the most redoubted nation of all the *Greeks*. By the equality of their laws, and by their clemency (notwithstanding that they were a long time held under by the *Macedonians* and *Spartans*) they did not only draw all others by their love and alliance; but induced, through their example, the rest of the cities of *Peloponnesus*, to be governed by one law, and to use one and the same sort of weights, measure, and money.

Aratus, the *Sicyonian*, was the first that united them again; and gave them courage, after that they had been by the *Macedonian* captains divided into many principalities. In elder times they were governed by kings, as most of the great cities of *Greece* were; to which kind of rule they first subjected themselves, after the descent of the *Heraclidae*, when *Tisamenus* the son of *Orestes* possess'd the territory of *Achaia*. In this estate they continued to the time of *Gyges*; after whom, when his sons sought to change the legal government of their predecessors into tyranny; they expelled them, and made their state popular; as seeming most equal. This form of common-weal had continuance, with some small changes according to the diversity of times, till the reign of *Philip* and *Alexander*, kings of *Macedon*: who tempest-like overturned all things in that part of the world. For those twelve cities, called *the cities of alliance*, whereof *Helice*, and *Bura* or *Olenus*, the sea had eaten up a little before the battel of *Leuctres*; were, by disturbance of the *Macedonians*, divided from each other, and trained into a war, no less foolish than cruel, among themselves. But in the one hundred and four and twentieth *Olympiad*, in which, or near it, *Ptolemy* the son of *Lagus*, *Lyfimachus*, *Seleucus*, and *Ptolemy Ceraunus*, left the world; two of the ten remaining cities and people, namely, the *Patrenses* and the *Dimeis*, united themselves, and laid the foundation of that general accord, and re-union, which after followed. For having been, some of them partisans with sundry *Macedonian* captains, and others having been governed by petty kings, they began to fasten themselves in a strong league of amity, partly in the *Olympiad* before spoken of, and partly at such a time as *Pyrrhus* made his first voyage into *Italy*. Now after the uniting of the *Patrenses* and *Dimeis*, to whom all the cities of *Tritea*, and *Phara*, joined themselves, *Egira* chased out her garrisons; and the *Burians*, killing their kings, entered with the *Ceraunians*, into the same confederacy. These cities, for twenty and five years, used the same form of government with the *Achaians*; who, by a senatory and two pretors, ordered all things in their common-weal; and soon after, by one pretor, or commander: of which *Marcus Caryneus* was the first, and *Aratus* the second.

This *Aratus* was a noble young gentleman of *Sicyon*, who living at *Argos* in exile, whilst his country was oppressed by tyrants, found means, through the help of other banished men, to enter their own city by night, with ladders; whence they chased the tyrant, and restored the people to liberty. This was in the time of *Antigonus Gonatus*, king of *Macedon*, a prince more busy in watching what to get among the *Greeks*, than wise in looking to his own. For fear of *Antigonus*, the *Sicyonians* entered into the *Achaian* league; which, though at that time it received more increase, by their accession, than it

added

added strength to them; yet the benefit of this conjunction served well enough against *Antigonus*, whose subtilty was somewhat greater than his valour. As the industry and counsel of *Aratus* delivered his country from bondage, and fortified it by the *Achaian* league; so further, by his great liberality, with the exceeding great cost of one hundred and fifty talents, he pacified the inexplicable controversies between the banished *Sicyonians*, which returned with him, and the other citizens that had possession of these mens lands; as also with the same money he drew many others to assist him in those enterprizes following, that redounded to the singular good of all *Achaia*. The money he obtained of *Ptolemy Euergetes*, king of *Egypt*, who partly had a desire to hold some strong and sure friendship in *Greece*, partly was delighted with the conversation of *Aratus* himself, that made a dangerous voyage to him into *Egypt*, and fed his pleasure in goodly pictures, with the gift of many curious pieces, wherein the workmen of *Sicyon* excelled.

The first of *Aratus's* great attempts, was the surprize of the *Acrocorinthus*, or citadel of *Corinth*, which he won by night, being thereinto guided by some thieves that he had hired for the purpose, who living in the place, had practised to rob *Antigonus's* treasury, passing in and out by a secret path among the rocks. Yet was he fain to fight for it, ere he could get it, though indeed *Antigonus's* soldiers were rather overcome by their own fear, than by any force of the assailants; as mistrusting lest the *Achaians* were more in number, than in truth they were, and having lost the advantages of the place already, upon which they had presumed, before they were aware of any enemy.

In these kind of night-services, ambushments, surprizes, and practices, *Aratus* was very cunning, adventurous, and valiant: in open field and plain battel he was as timorous. By this strange mixture of cowardice and courage, he ministred argument of disputation to philosophers and others; whether a valiant man (as he was esteemed, and in some cases approved) might look pale and tremble when he began battel; and whether the virtue of fortitude were diversified by the sundry natures of men, and in a manner confined unto several sorts of action. In resolving which doubts, it may be said, that all virtue is perfected in man by exercise, wherein they are trained by occasion, though a natural inclination standeth in need of little practice; whereas the defect hereof must be supplied with much instruction, use, good success, and other help; yet hardly shall grow absolute in general. Such was *Aratus* in matter of war. In sincere affection to his country he was unreprouceable, and so acknowledged, as his following actions will truly testify.

When *Acrocorinthus* was taken, and joined unto the commonwealth of *Achaia*, the *Megarians* revolted soon after from *Antigonus*, and entered into the same corporation. So did the *Trezenians*, and the *Epidaurians*, whereby this new-erected state grew so powerful, that it adventured to take *Athens* from the *Macedonians*; and *Argos*, and *Megalopolis* from tyrants that held them. The enterprize upon *Athens* was of none effect; for though *Aratus* wasted the isle of *Salamis*, to shew his strength, and sent home the *Athenian* prisoners without ransom, to allure the city by shew of love; yet the *Athenians* stirred neither against him, nor for him, as being now grown honest slaves to the *Macedonians*. Upon *Argos* the adventure was carried more strongly. The *Achaian* came sometimes to the gates of the city, but the people stirred not: once they entered into it, and might have won it, if the

citizens would have lent any help to the recovery of their own freedom; sundry times, and with diverse events, they fought with the tyrants (who rose up one after another in *Argos*) in open field, and slew one of them in battel; but all sufficed not, until at length *Aristomachus* the tyrant was so terrified, perswaded, and hired by *Aratus*, that he consented to resign his estate. The like did *Xenon* the tyrant of *Hermione*, and *Cleonymus*, that had oppressed the *Phliasians*. Whilst this business with the *Argives* was on foot, *Lyfiadas* the tyrant of *Megalopolis* was so well handled by *Aratus*, that, without compulsion, he gave liberty to his city, and annexed it to the council of *Achaia*; whereby he got such credit, that he was chosen general of their forces (which was a yearly office, and might not be held two years together by one man) every second year for a certain while, he and *Aratus* succeeding one another by turns. But those late tyrants and new citizens, *Lyfiadas* and *Aristomachus* were carried with private passion, from care of the general good; in which courses they opposed *Aratus*, to the great hurt of *Achaia*, as shall appear in due time.

The *Acheans* having obtained so much puissance and reputation, that *Ptolemy* king of *Egypt* was become patron of their alliance, and (in title of honour) general of their forces by sea and land, made open war upon *Demetrius* the son of *Antigonus Gonatas*, for the liberty of *Athens*. It is strange, and worthy of noting, that when *Aratus* in this quarrel had lost a battel, the *Athenians* wore garlands in sign of joy, to flatter their good lords the *Macedonians*, that had won the victory. Such were now the *Athenians* become, in whom the rule was verified, that holds true in general of the multitude, *Aut humiliter servit, aut superbe dominatur*; It is either base in service, or insolent in command. Nevertheless, when *Demetrius* was dead, *Aratus* performed that by money which he could not by force; and corrupting the captain of the *Macedonian* garrison, purchased liberty to the *Athenians*, who thenceforth held good correspondence with the *Acheans*, loving them, and speaking well of them, which was all that they could do; but into their corporation they entered not, scorning it, belike, in regard of their own out-worn glory.

Now as the commonwealth of *Achaia* daily increased within *Peloponnesus*, by justice and honesty; so did the *Etolians*, in the utter part of *Greece*; yea, and within *Peloponnesus* it self, wax very powerful, by sturdiness of body, and rude courage in fight, without the help of any other virtue. They had stoutly defended themselves against *Antipater* and *Craterus*; partly by daring to do and suffer much, partly by the natural strength and fastness of their country; but especially by the benefit of the time, which called away these famous captains to other business, as hath been related. They had molested *Cassander*, in favour of *Antigonus*; and were themselves as much plagued by him, and by the *Acarnanians*, a little, but stout nation, that took his part. Afterwards they had to do with *Demetrius* the son of the first *Antigonus*, and more or less, with all the kings of *Macedon* succeeding him. They likewise held often war with the *Acarnanians*, *Athamanians*, *Epirots*, and many cities in *Peloponnesus*; so that they were hardened with perpetual travel, seldom putting off their armour. But their hardiness ill deserved the name of valour, seeing they had no regard of honesty or friendship; measuring all things by their own insolent will, and thinking all people base-minded, that were not as fierce and outrageous as themselves.

These *Etolians* had lately made great spoils in *Peloponnesus*, and occupied a good part of the country. They had invaded the friends of the *Acheans*, taken and sacked *Pallene*; where, although they were soundly beaten by *Aratus*, yet their desire of gain made them greedy of a new voyage thither, as to a country wherein somewhat was to be gotten. But they were forced to look another way, by *Demetrius* the son of *Antigonus Gonatas*, who pressed them so hardly, that they were driven to seek help of the *Acheans*, which they obtained. The war, which the *Acheans* made upon *Demetrius*, without *Peloponnesus*, in *Attica*, though it tended to expelling the *Macedons* out of *Greece*; yet the benefit thereof redounded chiefly unto the *Etolians*, at whose instance it was set on foot, for thereby were the *Macedonian* forces diverted from them. Neither was this good turn unacknowledged; though very basely the *Etolians*, giving thanks in words, devised how to requite the benefit with some great mischief. They saw that the *Acheans* were desirous to bring all *Peloponnesus* into their alliance and corporation; of which intent the *Lacedemonians* were very jealous. Wherefore these *Etolians* laboured earnestly to set the *Lacedemonians* and *Acheans* together by the ears; hoping that if this might come to pass, they themselves should be called in to help (it skilled not on what side) and so get no small share both in booty and territory. Neither did they forbear to communicate this their device unto *Antigonus*, offering to make him partaker of their gain, whom they knew to be offended with the many losses that this kingdom had sustained by the *Acheans*. Of this plot *Aratus* was aware, who therefore determined to suffer many indignities, rather than to give the *Lacedemonians* cause to take arms. But this resolution was taken somewhat too late, and not altogether in his own power to hold. He had been meddling with the *Arcadians*, that were dependants of *Lacedemon*, and thereby had provoked the *Lacedemonians* to look about them; seeing that all *Peloponnesus*, excepting themselves, the *Eleans*, and a few *Arcadians* their friends (who also were attempted) was already become *Achean*.

The city of *Sparta* was in ill case about these times, and subject to the injuries of any stronger neighbour. *Pyrrhus* had greatly weakened it. The *Etolians*, entering *Laconia* with an army, had carried away fifty thousand slaves; and, which was worse, their discipline was corrupted, avarice and luxury reigned among them, the poor was oppressed by the rich; and the generosity of spirit, that had some time been their general virtue, was hardly now to be found among the best of them. There were left in *Sparta* no more than seven hundred natural citizens, of whom not above one hundred had lands, all the rest were needy people, and desirous of innovation. Hereupon followed intestine sedition, which endangered the city most of all. *Agis*, a good king, who sought to reform the disorders of the state, exhorted the people to a strict observation of *Lycurgus's* Laws. To which purpose he caused them to pass an Act for the abolishing of all debts, and equal division of lands. All the younger and poorer sort were glad of this; but the rich men opposed it. These had recourse to *Leonidas* the other king (for in *Sparta* were two kings) who took their part, being himself a dissolute man, as one trained up in the court of *Syria*, whence also he had his wife. In this contention *Leonidas* was expelled the city, and a new king chosen in his stead. But *Agis's* friends and counsellors in this enterprize, abused his good meaning to their own private commodity. They were hasty to take away all debts, and cancel all bonds, for they

themselves were deeply indebted; but the division of lands they afterwards hindered, because their own possessions were great. Hence arose a tumult in *Sparta*, which these men increased, by their foul oppression of the poorer citizens. So that in fine, *Leonidas* was brought home, and restored to his kingdom, and the two adverse kings driven to take sanctuary; out of which *Cleombrotus*, the late made king, was dismissed into exile: but *Agis* was trained forth, drawn into prison, and there by his enemies condemned and strangled, together with his mother, and his old grandmother. The like to this was never known in *Sparta*; and (which is the more odious) this cruelty proceeded from the *Ephori*, magistrates that should have given patronage to the laws, using their power, and more power than to them belonged, against a king that had proceeded orderly in reforming the city, as the law required.

The death of *Agis* was much lamented by all good citizens, and served to establish the impotent rule of a few tyrannical oppressors. In which case *Aratus* might well hope to adjoin *Lacedemon* to the *Achean* commonwealth, though it were great injustice to take such advantages, and attempt by force, that which would have redounded to the general good of *Peloponnesus*, and to the benefit of *Sparta* it self, if it could have been wrought by persuasion.

But the same man that redressed the disorders of *Sparta*, and revenged the death of *Agis*, did also requite the unjust attempts of the *Acheans*, even in their own kind; obtruding upon them by force, an union of all *Peloponnesus*, though little to their good liking, for that the *Lacedemonians* and their king should have been the principal; not they and their prætor. *Leonidas* having thus caused *Agis* to be slain, took his wife, that was very rich and beautiful, and gave her in marriage (perforce) to his own son *Cleomenes*. This young prince fell greatly enamoured on his wife, and sought to win her affection, as well as he had her person. He discoursed much with her about the purpose of her former husband *Agis*, and, by pitying his misfortune, began to entertain a desire of accomplishing that wherein *Agis* had failed. So coming himself to be king whilst he was very young, he gladly embraced all occasions of war; for that he hoped by strong hand to effect that, which *Agis*, by proceeding formally, in so corrupt an estate of the city, had attempted to his own ruin. Therefore, when the *Ephori* gave him in charge to take and fortify *Atheneum*, a temple on the marches of *Laconia*, to which both they and the *Megalopolitans* pretended title: he readily performed it. Hereof *Aratus* made no complaint, but sought to take by surprize *Tegea* and *Orchomenus*, cities then confederate with the *Lacedemonians*; wherein his intelligence failing, he lost the labour of a painful night's travel, and discovered his enmity to *Sparta*, of which *Cleomenes* was nothing sorry. By these degrees the war began. In the entrance whereunto *Aratus* had discovered the *Etolian* practice, and therefore would have staid the quarrel from proceeding too far. But *Lyfiadus* and *Aristomachus* would needs fight, and he could do no other than be ruled by them; especially seeing *Cleomenes* was so urgent. *Aristomachus* was at that time general of the *Acheans* (he and *Lyfiadus* being of great account, since they had abandoned their tyranny) who sent unto *Aratus*, lying then in *Athens*, and required his assistance in a journey to be made into *Laconia*. No dissuasions of *Aratus* would serve; therefore he came in person, and took part of a business little pleasing him in the present, and less in the future. When he met

met with *Cleomenes*, he durst not fight, but opposed himself against *Aristomachus*, who desired to give battel; yet had the *Acheans* twenty thousand foot and one thousand horse in their army; whereas *Cleomenes* had no more than five thousand in all. This gave reputation to the *Lacedemonian*, and raised an ill report upon *Aratus*; which *Lyfiadas* helped to make worse, by accusing his cowardise. Nevertheless, the *Acheans* would not fall out with *Aratus* their benefactor, but chose him their general the year following, against *Lyfiadas* his accuser, that sued for the place. Being general himself, it behoved him to confute with deeds the slanderous words of *Lyfiadas*. Therefore he purposed to set upon the *Eleans*; but was met withal on the way, near unto the mount *Lyceus*, by *Cleomenes*, who vanquished him in a great battel, and drove him to hide himself all night for fear; so that he was thought to have been slain. This misadventure *Aratus* recompensed by a trick of his own more natural occupation, performing with his broken army that which could hardly have been expected, had he been victorious; for, whilst there was no suspicion of any great matter that he could undertake, he suddenly wrought with some of the *Mantineans*, who did let him into their city. The *Mantineans* did once before join themselves with the *Achaians*; but shortly, upon fear, or some other passion, they gave themselves to the *Etolians*, and from the *Etolians*, presently after this victory, to *Cleomenes*, from whom immediately they were thus won. For this their levity they were not punished, but freely admitted now again into the *Achean* society. As this good success repaired the credit of *Aratus*, so another battel almost ruined it. *Cleomenes* and he encountered near unto *Megalopolis*, where the *Acheans* had somewhat of the better at the first, but their general durst not follow his advantage. Thereupon *Lyfiadas*, of whom we spake before, grew somewhat impatient with anger; and, taking with him all the horse, brake upon the *Lacedemonians*, whom he routed at the beginning, but pursuing them too far into places of hard passage, he was slain by them, and his followers driven back upon their own companions, in such sort, that finally, all the army was disordered, and put to flight. This was a great loss, and incensed the *Acheans* against *Aratus*; yet their indignation proceeded no further, than that they refused to make any longer contribution towards the pay of those mercenaries which he had waged. This *Aratus* took patiently, and followed the war nevertheless; wherein, though *Cleomenes* won some towns, and *Aratus* got the better in one small fight, yet little of importance was done, the *Acheans* being weary, and the *Spartan* king intente to another business.

Cleomenes, having led into the field all that were like to hinder his purpose, and tired them with painful journeys, forsook the *Achean* war on a sudden, and came unexpected home to *Sparta*, where he slew the *Ephori*, and restored by force the ancient discipline of *Lycurgus*. Then gave he an account of his doings, and shewing by what degrees the *Ephori* had inroached upon the power of kings, and many disorders had grown in the city, he justified his proceedings, and forthwith began to make equal division of the lands, reducing all to the first institution. He also supplied the defect of citizens, by chusing new out of such as were friends to the state, and valiant men; so that henceforth his country might not altogether stand in need of mercenary help, as it lately had done, to save it from the *Etolians*, *Illyrians*, and such other enemies. All this was dispatched in great haste; the *Spartans* well satis-

fied, and *Cleomenes* himself ready in the field, ere his enemies could take any advantage of this his domestic troubles.

The *Acheans*, hearing of this great alteration in *Sparta*, thought that it would be long ere *Cleomenes* durst issue forth of the city, for fear of some rebellion. But it was not long ere they heard that he had wasted all the country of *Megalopolis*; had ranged over all *Arcadia* at his pleasure; and was admitted into *Mantineia*, and ready to take other places, even of *Achaia*. These news displeased them not a little; but they must patiently endure to hear worse. For, when *Cleomenes* had shaken off the power of the *Ephori*, that curbed his authority, he proceeded more roundly in his work, being better obeyed, and by better men. His *Lacedemonians* resumed their ancient courage; and he himself had the heart to demand the principality of *Greece*. He did not therefore henceforth contend about the possession of a few towns, but adventured to win or lose all. The *Etolians*, in favour of his attempt, declared themselves on his side; and, whereas he had gotten *Mantineia*, *Tegea*, and other places, to which they had some title, they willingly renounced all their interest unto him.

Aratus did apprehend the danger of his country, and saw that *Antigonus* with the *Etolians*, or perhaps without them, would shortly make an end of that which *Cleomenes* had thus begun. Therefore he devised how to provide against the worst, and either to repair all, or (if it could not be) to save all from utter ruin. The office of general, when it was next put upon him, he refused; fearing to be so far press'd as to hazard in one battel all the force of his country, to which as he had never any affection, nor perchance courage, so was his manner of warfare otherwise. For he commonly attempted by surprize, and defended upon the advantage of place, after the manner of the *Irish*, and of all other nations, overcharged with numbers of men. Yet did he not forsake the care of the weal publick, though, in aiming at the general good, it seems that private passion drew him into an ill course. He saw that *Megalopolis* could not be defended without making a dangerous hazard of battel; that *Mantineia* had not only opened her gates unto *Cleomenes*, but slain the *Achean* garrison that lay therein; that other towns had yielded unto him without compulsion; and that *Aristomachus*, once tyrant of *Argos*, and since general of the *Acheans*, was now revolted unto the enemy, following the fortune of *Cleomenes*. *Ptolemy* was too far off to help, and the nearness of *Antigonus* was very dangerous; yet might be useful, if this king would (as *Polybius* saith) like others, be friend or enemy, as should best agree with his own profit. To make trial hereof, *Aratus* practised with some of *Megalopolis*, whom he found apt unto his purpose, and instructed them how to deal with both *Antigonus* and the *Acheans*.

The city of *Megalopolis* had been well affected to the *Macedonians* ever since the time of *Philip* the father of *Alexander*, who had obliged it unto him by some special benefits. At this time it lay nearest unto the danger; was very faithful, and therefore deserved succour, yet could not well be relieved by the *Acheans* with their own proper strength. Wherefore it was thought meet that ambassadors should be sent unto the general council of *Achaia*, requesting leave and good allowance to try the favour of *Antigonus* in their necessity. This was granted, for lack of what else to answer, and the same ambassadors dispatched away to *Antigonus*. They did their own errand briefly, tel-

ling him of the good will and respect which their city had of long time born unto him and his predecessors; of their present need, and how it would agree with his honour to give them aid. But when they delivered the more general matter, wherein *Aratus* had given them instructions, shewing how the ambition of *Cleomenes*, and violence of the *Etolians*, might redound to his own great loss or danger, if the one and the other were not in time prevented; how *Aratus* himself did stand affected; and what good likelihood there was of reducing the *Acheans* under the patronage of *Macedon*; then began *Antigonus* to lend a more attentive ear to their discourse. He embraced the motion; and, to give it the more life, he wrote unto the *Megalopolitans*, that his help should not be wanting, so far forth as it might stand with the *Acheans* good liking. Particularly he commended himself by these messengers to *Aratus*; assuring them, that he thought himself highly bound to this honourable man, whose former actions he now perceived, not to have been grounded upon any hatred to the *Macedonians*, but only upon a just and worthy love to his own nation. With this answer they return to *Megalopolis*; and are presently sent away to the council of *Achaia*, there to make some speedy conclusion, as the necessity of the time required.

The *Acheans* were glad to hear that *Antigonus* was so inclinable to their desire, and therefore were ready to entertain his favour with all good correspondence. Hereunto *Aratus* gave his consent, and praised the wisdom of his countrymen, that so well discerned the best and likeliest means of their common safety: adding nevertheless, that it was not amiss first of all to try their own ability; which if it failed, then should they do well to call in this gracious prince, and make him their patron and protector. Thus he shewed himself moderate, in that which himself of all others did most wish; to the end, that he might not afterwards sustain the common reprehension, if any thing fell out amiss, since it might appear, that he had not been author of this decree, but only followed, and that laudably, the general consent.

Nevertheless, in true estimation, this fineness of *Aratus* might have been used with his greater commendation, in a contrary course. For it had been more honourable to make an end of the war, by yielding unto *Cleomenes* that power which they gave unto *Antigonus*; since thereby he should both have freed his country from all further trouble; and what, should have restored unto the universal state of *Greece* that honourable condition whereof the *Macedonians* had bereft it. But it is commonly found (which is great pity) that virtue having risen to honour by degrees, and confirmed itself (as it were) in the seat of principality, by length of time, and success of many actions, can ill endure the hasty growth of any other's reputation, whereby it sees itself likely to be over-topped. Other cause to despise the *Lacedemonians* there was none, than that they lately had been in dangerous case; neither could any reason be found why *Aratus* should prefer *Antigonus* before *Cleomenes*, than that he had stood in doubt of the one, when he thought himself more mighty than the other. Wherefore he was justly plagued, when he saw his own honours reversed by the insolent *Macedonians*; and, instead of living as a companion with *Cleomenes*, that was descended of a long race of kings, the posterity of *Hercules*, was fain to do sacrifice unto *Antigonus* as unto a God; and was finally poisoned by *Philip*, whose nobility was but of five descents, and whom perhaps he might have seen his fellows, if

he had not made them his lords. By this inclination to the *Macedonians* the love of *Ptolemy* was lost; who forthwith took part with *Cleomenes*, though he did not supply him with such liberality as he had used to the *Acheans*; being warned, as may seem by their example, to be more wary, both in trusting and disbursing. *Cleomenes* himself, whilst this business with *Antigonus* was a foot, passed thro' *Arcadia* with an army, and laboured by all means to draw the *Acheans* to battel. At the city of *Dymes* in *Achaia* were assembled all the remaining forces of the nation; with which it was concluded to make trial, whether perhaps they might amend their estate without seeking help of the *Macedonian*. Thither went *Cleomenes*, and there fought with them; where he had so great a victory, that the enemy was no longer able to keep the open field. The calamity was such, that *Aratus* himself durst not take upon him to be their general, when his turn came in the next election. Wherefore the *Acheans* were compelled to sue for peace; which was granted upon this easy condition: That they should not arrogate unto themselves the command of *Peloponnesus*, but suffer the *Lacedemonians* (as in former ages) to be their leaders in war. Hereunto if they would condescend, he promised unto them, that he would presently restore all places taken from them, and all his prisoners ransom-free; also, that they should enjoy their own laws and liberties without molestation. This gentle offer of *Cleomenes* was very pleasing to the *Acheans*, who desired him to come to the city of *Lerna*, where a Parliament should be held for the conclusion of the war.

Now seemed the affairs of *Greece* likely to be settled in better order than they had ever been since the beginning of the *Peloponnesian* wars; yea, or since the *Persian* invasion, when God, who had otherwise disposed of these matters, hindred all with a draught of cold water, which *Cleomenes* drank in a great heat, and thereupon fell extreme sick, and so could not be present at *Lerna*, but caused the parliament to be deferred to another time. Nevertheless, he sent home the chief of his prisoners, to shew that he meant none other than good faith. By this fair dealing he confirmed the *Acheans* in their desire of his friendship, who assembled again at *Argos*, there to establish the league. But *Aratus* was violently bent against it, and fought by great words and terrible threats to make his countrymen afraid of resolving. When all would not serve turn, he betook himself to his cunning, and sent word to *Cleomenes*, that he should do well to leave his army behind him, and come alone into *Argos*, receiving hostages for safety of his person. *Cleomenes* was already far on his way when he met with this advertisement, and took it in ill part that he should be thus deluded. For it had been an easy matter to have told him so much at the first, and not to have made him come so far with an army, which afterwards he must dismiss. Yet that, which chiefly seemed to have troubled him, was the drift of his oppugners, who fought thereby, either to make him wait without the gates, and deal only with themselves and their messengers; or, if he would adventure himself into the city, then to deprive him of all royal shew that might breed respect of him in the multitude. This was that indeed which *Aratus* feared, and for which he sought to hinder his coming thither in person, lest the people, hearing the promises of *Cleomenes* ratified by his own mouth, should presently be won with his gentle words, and finish the bargain without more ado. Therefore *Cleomenes* wrote unto the

whole council, bitterly complaining against these juggling tricks; and *Aratus* was not far behind with him in as bitter an oration. So between fear of the one, and reverence of the other, the assembly knew not how to proceed, but abruptly broke up, leaving all, as it were, to fortune. *Cleomenes* took his advantage of their present weakness, and renewed the war. Many cities yielded unto him willingly, many he forced; and partly by force, partly by terror, he won *Argos*, which never king of *Sparta* before him could do. In this case *Aratus* sent his own son to *Antigonus*, entreating him to defer no time, but come presently to relieve the distressed *Acheans*. *Antigonus* gave as good words as could be wished; saying, that he utterly refused to do any thing, unless he might first have *Acrocorinthus* put into his hands. This demand was somewhat like unto that of the hunter, who promised to help the horse against his enemy the stag; but with condition, that the horse should suffer himself to be saddled and bridled. *Aratus* was herewithal contented, but wanted all honest colour to do it, seeing the *Corinthians* had no way deserved to be thus given away to the *Macedonians*. Yet at length an occasion was found; for that the *Corinthians* perceiving what he intended, were minded to arrest him. So he withdrew himself out of their city, and sent word to *Antigonus* that the castle should be ready to let him in. The *Corinthians* on the other side ran to *Cleomenes*, who lost no time, but made haste with them to *Corinth*, where he sought how to get possession of their castle, or at least to save it from *Antigonus*, by surrounding it with trenches, that none might issue nor enter without his leave. Whilst this was in doing, he took special order that *Aratus's* house and goods within the town should be safely kept for the owner, to whom he sent messenger after messenger, desiring him to come to an agreement, and not to bring in the barbarous *Macedonians* and *Illyrians* to *Peloponnesus*: promising, that if he would hearken to these persuasions, then would he give him double the same pension which he had been wont to receive of king *Ptolemy*. As for the castle of *Corinth*, which was the gate of *Peloponnesus*, and without which none could hold assured sovereignty of the country, he desired that it might not be committed unto his own disposition, but be jointly kept by the *Lacedemonians* and *Acheans*. All this entreaty served to no purpose; for *Aratus*, rejecting utterly the motion, sent his own son as an hostage to *Antigonus*, and laboured with the *Acheans* to put *Acrocorinthus* into his hands. Which when *Cleomenes* understood, he seized upon the goods of *Aratus* in *Corinth*, and wasted all the country of *Sicyon*, whereof this his adversary was native.

Antigonus, in the mean time, drew near to the *Isthmus*; having passed with his army through *Eubœa*, because the *Etolians* held the fireights of *Thermopylæ* against him. This they did, either in favour of *Cleomenes*, which they pretended; or in doubt of the greatness whereunto the *Macedonians* might attain by the good success of this journey. At his coming thither he found the *Lacedemonians* ready to forbid his entrance, and that with sufficient strength, yet with no purpose to hazard battle, but rather to weary him thence with hunger, against which he came not well provided. *Antigonus* therefore laboured hard to make his way by force, but he was not able so to do; he secretly got into the *Corinthian* haven, but was violently driven out again with great loss of men: finally, he resolved to turn aside and seek a passage over the

gulf of *Corinth* to *Sicyon*, or some other part of *Achaia*; but this required much time, and great preparation, which was not easily made.

In this perplexity, news from *Argos* came by sea that greatly comforted *Antigonus*, and no less troubled his enemies. The *Acheans* were gotten into that city, and the garrison, which *Cleomenes* had left therein, though it was not driven out of the citadel, yet was hardly distressed, and stood in need of present help. *Argos* had always been enemy to *Sparta*, and well affected to the kings of *Macedon*. When *Cleomenes* took it, he forbore to chase out those whom he most suspected; partly at the entreaty of friends, and partly for that they all made shew to be glad of his prosperity. They were glad indeed of *Cleomenes's* victory, both in *Argos* and elsewhere, as many as hoped that he would cause all debtors to be discharged from their creditors, as he had lately done in *Sparta*. But that which *Cleomenes* had done in *Sparta* was agreeable to the *Spartan* institution; in other places, where it would have been tyrannical, he did it not. Thereupon, such as were disappointed of their unjust hopes began to turn good commonwealth's-men, and called him tyrant for his doings at home, because he would not do the like abroad. So they took their time, invited the *Acheans*, assailed his garrison, cut in pieces the rescue that he sent, and compelled him at length to forsake the defence of *Corinth*, and look unto the enemies that were behind his back. For when he understood, by continual messages, that his men, which held the citadel at *Argos*, were almost lost, he began to fear, lest his labour in guarding the entry should grow frivolous, the *Acheans* in the mean while spoiling all that lay within. Therefore he forsook his custody of the *Isthmus*, and made all haste towards *Argos*; which if he could save, he meant to trust fortune with the rest. And so far he prevailed at his coming to *Argos*, that both *Argives* and *Acheans* were glad to house themselves, leaving him master of the streets; when the horsemen of *Antigonus* were discovered afar off, hastening to relieve the citizens, and *Antigonus* himself (to whom *Corinth* was yielded, as soon as the *Spartan* had turned his back) following apace with the body of his army. *Cleomenes* therefore had no more to do than to make a safe retreat. This he did, and got him home into *Laconia*, losing in short space all or most of that which he had been long in getting.

Antigonus having shewed himself at *Argos*, and commended the citizens, went into *Arcadia*, where he won such castles as were held for *Cleomenes*, and restored them to the old possessors. This done, he took his way to *Ægium*, where was held a parliament by the *Acheans*, to whom he declared the cause of his coming, and spoke brave words, that filled them with hope. The *Acheans* were not behind with him, but made him captain-general over them and their confederates; and further entered into covenant with him, that they should not deal with any prince or state, either by writing or by ambassador, without his consent. All this while, and somewhat longer, *Aratus* was the only man that seemed to rule the king's heart; carrying him to *Sicyon*, his own town (for winter was come on) where he not only feasted him as a great prince, but suffered more than human honours, as sacrifices and the like, to be done unto him. This example of *Aratus* and his *Sicyonians* was followed by the rest of *Achaia*, which had made (forsooth) a very wise bargain, if, instead of *Cleomenes* that would have been a king, it had obtained the protection

rection of a god. But this god was poor, and wanting wherewith to pay his *Macedonians*, imposed the burthen upon the *Acheans*. This was hardly taken, yet worse must be endured in hope of better. Neither was *Aratus* himself over-carefully respected, when the statues of those tyrants, which he had thrown down in *Argos*, were again erected by *Antigonus*; or when the statues which he had erected, of those that had taken *Acrocorinthus* with him, were all thrown down by the same king, and one only left unto himself at his earnest entreaty. It might therefore appear that this god was also spiteful. Nevertheless, in taken revenge upon those that offended him, *Aratus* did satisfy his own passion by the aid of these *Macedonians*. For with extreme torments he did put *Arifomachus* to death, who had been once tyrant of *Argos*, afterwards general of the *Acheans*, and, from them revolting unto *Cleomenes*, did fall at length into their hands. In like sort handled he (though not as yet) the *Mantineans*, for their ingratitude and cruelty shewed to the *Acheans*. For he slew all the principal citizens, and sold the rest, men, women and children, all for bond-slaves; dividing the spoil, two parts to the *Macedonians*, and the third to the *Acheans*. The town itself was given by *Antigonus* to the *Argives*, who peopled it with a colony of their own; and *Aratus*, having charge of this business, caused it to be new-named *Antigonia*. Surely of this cruelty there can be no better excuse, than even the flattery which *Aratus* was driven to use to *Antigonus*; forasmuch as it was a token of servility, whereinto they had urged and brought him; whom he, as in revenge thereof, did thus requite. But leaving to speak of this change, which the coming in of the *Macedonian* wrought, in the civil state of the *Acheans*, let us return unto his war against the *Lacedemonians*.

The next summer *Antigonus* won *Tegea*, *Mantineia*, *Orchomenus*, *Herea* and *Telphussa*. *Mantineia* he dispeopled, as was said before; in *Orchomenus* he placed a garrison of his *Macedonians*; the rest he restored to the *Acheans*, with whom he wintered at *Ægium*, where they held a parliament. Once only *Cleomenes* had met him this year, and that was on the borders of *Laconia*, where he lay ready to defend his own territory. The reason why he stirred no further, nor followed *Antigonus* to *Mantineia*, and to those other towns that he won, was this: He had few soldiers, and not money enough to wage more. *Ptolemy* the *Egyptian* promised much, but would perform nothing; unless he might have *Cleomenes's* own mother, and his children in pledge. These were sent into *Egypt*; yet the aid came not. For *Ptolemy* was slow, as dealing in the business of *Greece*, rather for his mind's sake, than upon any apprehension of necessity. *Cleomenes* therefore provided for himself, as well as his own ability would serve. He manumitted all the *Heilotæ*, which were the *Lacedemonian* slaves; taking money for their liberty, and arming two thousand of them after the *Macedonian* fashion. Having thus increased his forces, he came on the sudden to *Megalopolis* that lay secure, as having defended itself in more dangerous times, and having now *Antigonus* near at hand in *Ægium*. The town he won; but after he was entred, all that were fit to bear arms rose hastily against him; and though they could not drive him out, yet saved the multitude, to whom they gave a port free for their escape. He sent after the citizens, offering the goods to them again, if they would be of his party. But they bravely refused his offer; wherefore he sacked and ruined it, carrying with him to *Sparta*

a great booty that he found therein. These news astonished the *Acheans* at *Ægium*, who thereupon broke up their parliament. *Antigonus* sent hastily for his *Macedonians* out of their wintering quarters, but they were so long in coming, that *Cleomenes* was safely gone home. Therefore he returned them back to their lodgings, and went himself to *Argos*, there to pass the rest of this unlucky winter, somewhat further from the eyes of the grieved *Acheans*. When he had lain a while at *Argos*, *Cleomenes* was at the gates, with no great number of men, yet with more than *Antigonus* had then about him. The *Argives* perceiving that their country would be spoiled if *Antigonus* did not issue into the field, were very earnest with him to go forth and fight. But he was wiser than to be moved by their clamours, and suffered them to see their villages burnt, to bid him resign his office of protector unto some that were more valiant, and to satisfy their passions with foolish words, rather than he would be overcome in fight, and thereby lose more honour than could easily be repaired. By this *Cleomenes* had his desire in weakening the reputation of his enemy, though he thereby added neither followers nor other strength unto *Lacedemon*.

Afterwards, when the season was more fit for war, *Antigonus* gathered together all his troops, meaning to requite these bravado's of his enemy, with the conquest of *Sparta*. *Cleomenes* on the other side laboured to keep the war from his own gates, and therefore entred upon the country of *Argos*, where he made such havock as drew *Antigonus* thither, from his intended invasion of *Laconia*. Many great affronts the *Macedonian* was fain to endure in coasting the *Spartan* king; that ranging over the country of the *Argives*, *Phliasians* and *Orchomenians*, drove a garrison of his out of *Oligyris*; and did sacrifice, as it were before his face, in the suburbs of *Argos*, without the temple of *Juno*, that was shut up; sending unto him in scorn to borrow the keys. These were light things, yet served to dishearten the *Achean* side, and to fill the enemy with courage, which was no matter of light importance. Therefore he concluded to lay apart all other regard of things abroad, and to put all to hazard, by setting up his rest, without any more delay, upon *Sparta* itself. He had in his army eight and twenty thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse, collected out of sundry nations, as *Macedonians*, *Illyrians*, *Gauls*, *Epirots*, *Beotians*, *Acaruanians* and others, together with the *Acheans*, and their friends of *Peloponnesus*. *Cleomenes* had of all sorts twenty thousand, with which he lay at *Selasia*, fortifying slightly the other passages into *Laconia*, through which the *Macedonians* were not likely to seek entrance. *Antigonus* coming to *Selasia*, found the enemy so strongly incamped, upon and between the hills of *Eva* and *Olympus*, that he was constrained to spend much time there, before he could advance any one foot; neither lay it in his power to come hastily to blows, which he greatly desired, without the hazard of his whole army, in assailing of their well-defenced camp. But at length (as it happens, when men are weary both of their hopes and fears) both kings being resolved to make an end one way or other, *Antigonus* attempted with his *Illyrians* to force that part which lay on the hill *Eva*; but his *Illyrians* were so ill seconded by the *Achean* foot, that the *Spartan* horse and light-armed foot, incamped in the strait valley between those hills, issuing forth, fell upon their skirts, and not only disordered them, but were like to have endangered all the rest. If *Cleomenes* himself had stood in that part of the battle,

tel, he would have made great use of such a fair beginning. But *Euclidas*, his brother, a more valiant than skilful soldier, commanded in that wing: who neither followed this advantage, nor took such benefit as the ground afforded, whereon he lay. *Philopæmen* the *Arcadian* of *Megalopolis*, who afterwards proved a famous captain, served them on horse, as a private young man, among the *Acheans*. He seeing that all was like to go to rout, if their *Illyrians* were driven to fall back upon the army following them, perswaded the captains of the *Achean* horse, to break upon the *Spartan* mercenaries. But they would not: partly despising his youth and want of charge; partly, for that *Antigonus* had given order, that they should keep their places, until they received a sign from him, which was not as yet. *Philopæmen*, perceiving them to be more orderly, than well advised, entreated some of his own countrymen to follow him; gave a charge on the *Spartans*, and forced them, not only to leave the *Illyrians*, but seek how to save themselves. Being so far advanced, he found the place which the *Illyrians* had attempted, like enough to be won, through the skilfulness of him that held it. Wherefore he alighted, and perswaded the men at arms his companions to do the like: the folly of *Euclidas* being manifest, who kept the top of the hill, and stirred not to hinder those that ascended, but waited for them in a plain, where they might fight upon even terms. So he recovered the hill top; where, though he was sore hurt, yet he made good the place that he had gotten, until the whole army came up to him; by which the *Lacedemonians* were beaten from it, with great slaughter of them in their descent. This overthrow, and death of *Euclidas*, made *Cleomenes* lose the day: who fighting bravely on the other side, upon *Olympus*, against *Antigonus* himself, was like to have been surrounded and lost, if he had not withdrawn himself with an extraordinary speed. In this battel ended the glory of *Lacedemon*, which, as a light ready to go out, had with a great, but not long blaze, shined more brightly of late, than in many ages past.

Cleomenes fled unto *Sparta*, where he had no desire to stay, finding only two hundred left, of six thousand *Spartans* that had led unto this battel, and most of his hired soldiers dead, or gone away. So he perswaded his people to yield themselves unto *Antigonus*; and promising to do all that should at any time lie in his own power, for their good, he hastened away to the sea-side (where he had shipping long before provided against all that might happen) and embarked himself for *Egypt*. He was lovingly entertained by *Ptolemy Euergetes*, who undertook to restore him to his kingdom; and (perhaps) meant no less, as being much delighted with his gallant behaviour and qualities. In the mean season he had a pension allowed him, of four and twenty talents yearly. But this *Ptolemy* died; and his son *Ptolemy Philopater* succeeded him: a vicious young prince, wholly governed by lewd women and base men, unmindful of all virtue, and hating any in whom it was found. When therefore *Cleomenes* was desirous to return into *Greece*, whither the troubles in *Peloponnesus* did seem to unite him; *Ptolemy* and his minions, would neither give him aid; nor yet dared to dismiss him (as he desired) to try his own friends in *Greece*, because he was too well acquainted with the weakness of *Egypt*: nor well knew how to detain him against his will. At length they devised matter against him, and made

him prisoner. The last act of him was, that with thirty of his countrymen, he undertook a desperate enterprise: breaking out of the prison, and provoking the *Alexandrians* to rebel and seek their liberty. In which attempt he slew some enemies of his that he met; and having walked up and down the streets without resistance (no man offering to take his part, or, which is very strange, to fight against him on the king's behalf) he, and his companions, agreed together to be ministers of their own death. Upon his dead body *Ptolemy* was bold to shew his own indignation; and slew his mother and children, that had been sent thither as hostages, together with the wives of his adherents, as many as were there, attending upon the old queen. Such was the end of *Cleomenes*; a generous prince, but son of *Leonidas*, who had caused *Agis*, with his mother and grand-mother, to come to such a bloody end, as now befel his own wife, son and grandchildren.

After the victory at *Sallasia*, *Antigonus* without resistance entered *Sparta*: whereinto never the force of an enemy, before him, could make way. He kindly entreated the citizens, and left them to their own laws and government: tarrying there no longer than two or three days; after which he hastened out of *Peloponnesus*, and never returned. The cause of his speedy departure was, an advertisement that he received out of *Macedon*; how the *Illyrians* over-ran, and destroyed the country. Had these news come a little sooner, or had *Cleomenes* either deferred the fight a few days longer, or at leastwise tarried a few days after the fight in *Sparta*, the Kingdom of *Lacedemon* would have stood, and perhaps have extended it over all *Greece*. But God had otherwise determined.

Antigonus fought a great battel with the *Illyrians*, and overcame them. Yet therein he caught his bane; not by any wound, but by over-straining his voice; wherewith he brake a vein that bled inwardly, and in short space finished his life, who was troubled before with a consumption of the lungs. His kingdom descended unto *Philip*, the son of *Demetrius*, being then a boy; as also about the same time it was, that *Antiochus*, surnamed (I know not why) *the Great*; and *Ptolemy Philopater*, began to reign in *Asia*, and *Egypt*, boys all. Of these, *Ptolemy*, though old enough to love harlots when he first was king, yet continued a boy, all the seventeen years of his reign. The unripe age of *Philip* and *Antiochus* bred such intestine inconvenience to their kingdoms, as is usual in the minority of princes; but their elder years brought them acquainted with the *Romans*; upon which occasion, when it comes, we shall more seasonably speak of them, and of their kingdoms, more at large.

SECT. VII.

How the Illyrians infested the coast of Greece; and how they were subdued by the Romans.

WHILST things thus passed in *Greece*, and whilst the *Cartaginians* were busy in their conquest of *Spain*, the *Romans* had found themselves work among the *Sardinians* and *Corficans*, that were easily subdued at first, and easily vanquished again, when they rebelled. They made also war with the *Illyrians*, wherein they got much honour with little pain. With the *Gauls* they had much ado, that lasted not long; being rather, as *Livy* saith, a tumult than a war. So that by all these light exercises, their valour was hardly kept

from rust. How they got the islands in the *Mediterranean* sea, it hath been shewed before: of their dealings with *Illyrians* and *Gauls*, it is not mete to be utterly silent.

The *Illyrians* inhabited the country now called *Slavonia*: a troublesome nation, impatient of rest, and continually making war for gain, without either regard of friend or foe. They were invited by *Demetrius* king of *Macedon*, to help the *Mydionians*, his friends, that were besieged by the *Etolians*; for that they refused to be of their society. Before the *Illyrian* succours came, the *Mydionians* were so far spent, that the *Etolians* contended about the booty: the old pretor, or chief magistrate of their nation, who was going out of his office, claiming to have the honour of the victory, and the division of the spoil to be referred unto him; for that he had, in a manner, brought the siege to an end, and won the town: others, that were in hope to be chosen into the office, contradicting this, and desiring that old orders might be kept. It was a pretty strife, and somewhat like to that of the *French* in latter ages, who thought upon dividing the prey, before they had won the victories, which anon they lost, at *Poitiers* and *Agincourt*. The *Etolians* wisely compounded the difference, ordering it thus; that the old, and the new pretor, should be jointly intitled in the victory, and have equal authority in distribution of the gettings. But the *Illyrians* finished the strife much more elegantly, and after another fashion. They arrived, and landed, ere any was aware of them; they fell upon the *Etolians*; and though good resistance was made, yet got the victory, partly by force of their multitude, partly by the help of the *Mydionians*, that were not idle in their own business, but stoutly sallied out of the town. Many of the *Etolians* were slain, more were taken, their camp and all their baggage was lost: the *Illyrians* took the spoil, and went their way; the *Mydionians* erected a trophy, inscribing the names, both of their old and new magistrate (for they also chose new Officers at the same time) as the *Etolians* had directed them by example.

The success of this voyage, highly pleased *Agron* king of the *Illyrians*: not only in regard of the money, wherewith *Demetrius* had hired his assistance, or of the booty that was gotten; but for that having vanquished the stoutest of the *Greeks*, he found it not uneasy, to enrich himself by setting upon the less warlike. For joy of this he feasted, and drank so immoderately, that he fell into a *Pleureisy*, which in a few days ended his life. His kingdom, together with his great hopes, he left unto *Tenta*, his wife.

Tenta gave her people free liberty to rob all sorts at sea, making no difference between friend and foe; as if she had been sole mistress of the salt waters. She armed a fleet, and sent it to *Greece*: willing her captains, to make war where they found advantage, without any further respect. These fell with the western coast of *Peloponnesus*, where they invaded the *Eleans* and *Messenians*. Afterwards they returned along by *Epirus*, and stayed at the city of *Phenice*, to take in victuals and other necessities. There lay in *Phenice* eight hundred *Gauls*; that having been mercenaries of the *Carthaginians*, went about to betray, first *Argigentum*, then *Erys*, to the *Romans*; but failing to do either, they nevertheless revoked, and were their misdeeds disarmed, and sent to sea by the *Romans*, yet entertained by these *Epirots*, and trusted to lie in garrison within their town. The *Gauls* were soon grown acquainted with the *Illyrians*, to whom they betrayed *Phenice*; which deserved none other, in trusting

them. All *Epirus* was presently in arms, and hastened to drive out those unwelcome guests. But whilst the *Epirots* lay before the town, there came news into their camp, of another *Illyrian* army, that was marching thither by land, under one *Scerdilaïdas*, whom queen *Tenta* had sent to help his fellows. Upon this advertisement, a part of them is sent away towards *Antigonis*, to make good that town, and the freights adjoining, by which these new comers must enter into their country; another part of them remains at *Phenice*, to continue the siege. Neither the one, nor the other, sped well in their business. For *Scerdilaïdas* found means to join with his fellows, and they that were besieged within *Phenice*, sallied out of the town, and gave such an overthrow to the *Epirots*, as made them despair of saving their country, without great and speedy help from abroad. Wherefore ambassadors were sent to the *Acheans* and *Etolians*, craving their help, with very pitiful terms of entreaty. They obtained their suit; neither was it long, before an army, sent by these two nations, was ready in *Epirus*, to present battel unto *Scerdilaïdas*. But *Scerdilaïdas* was called home, by letters from *Tenta* the queen, that signified a rebellion of some *Illyrians* against her: so that he had no mind to put his forces to hazard, but offered composition, which was accepted. The agreement was, that the *Epirots* might ransom their town, and all their people that were prisoners; and that the *Illyrians* should quietly depart, with all their booty and slaves. Having made this profitable and honourable bargain, the *Illyrians* returned into their own country by land, sending their booty away by sea.

At their coming home, they found no such great trouble, as that which they brought, or had occasioned in this voyage. For in fulfilling the commandment of their queen, they had taken many *Italian* merchants, whilst they lay at *Phenice*; and made them good prize. Hereof the complaints, made unto the *Roman* senate, were so frequent, that ambassadors were sent to require of *Tenta*, that she should abstain from doing such injuries. These ambassadors found her very jolly; both for the riches which her fleet had brought in, and for that she had, in short space, tamed her rebels, and brought all to good order, save only the town *Issa*, which her forces held straightly besieged. Swelling with this prosperity, she could hardly afford a good look to the *Romans*, that found fault with her doings, and calling them by a true name, *Piracy*, required amends. Yet, when their speech was ended, she vouchsafed to tell them, that injury in publick she would do them none: as for private matters, no account was to be made of them; neither was it the manner of kings to forbid their subjects to get commodity, how they best could by sea. But (said the younger of the two ambassadors) we *Romans* have a manner, and a very valuable one, to take revenge in publick, of those private wrongs that are borne out by publick authority: therefore we shall teach you, God willing, to reform your kingly manners, and learn better of us. These words the queen took so impatiently, that no revenge could satisfy her, but the death of him that had spoken them. Wherefore, without all regard of the common law of nations, she caused him to be slain, as if that had been the way to set her heart at rest; which was indeed the means to disquiet and afflict it ever after.

The *Romans*, provoked by this outrage, prepare two great armies; the one by sea, consisting of two hundred sail, commanded by *C. Fulvius*; the

the other by land, led by *A. Posthumus*. They trouble not themselves any more with requiring satisfaction; for this injury is of such a nature, as must be requited with mortal war. It is indeed contrary to all human law, to use violence towards ambassadors: the reason and ground whereof seems to be this; that since, without mediation, there would never be an end of war and destruction, therefore it was equally received by all nations, as a lesson taught by nature, that ambassadors should pass freely, and in safety, between enemies. Nevertheless, as I take it, this general law is not without limitation. For, if any king or state lay hold upon ambassadors sent by their enemies, not unto themselves, but unto some third, whom they should draw into the quarrel; then it is as lawful to use violence to those ambassadors (thus employed, to make the war more terrible) as it is to kill the men of war, and subjects, of an enemy. And so might the *Athenians* have answered it, when they slew the *Lacedemonian* ambassadors, that were sent to *Xerxes*, to draw him into a war upon the *Athenians*. Neither are those ambassadors, which practise against the person of that prince, in whose countries they reside, warranted by any law whatsoever. For, whereas the true office of an ambassador residing, is the maintenance of amity; if it be not lawful for one prince, to practise against the life of another; much less may an ambassador do it without incurring justly the same danger of punishment, with other traitors; in which case, his place gives him no privilege at all. But we will leave this dispute to the *Civilians*, and go on with the revenge, taken by the *Romans*, for the slaughter of their ambassador *Coruncanius*.

The *Illyrian* queen was secure of the *Romans*, as if they would not dare to stir against her. She was indeed in an error; that hath undone many of all sorts, greater and less than she, both before and since; *having more regard unto fame, than unto the substance of things*. The *Greeks* were at that time more famous than the *Romans*; the *Etolians* and *Epirots* had the name of the most warlike people in *Greece*; these had she easily vanquished, and therefore thought, that with the *Romans* she should be little troubled. Had she considered, that her whole army, which wrought such wonders in *Greece*, was not much greater, than of ten thousand men; and that nevertheless it prevailed as much, by odds of number, as by valour or skill in arms; she would have continued to use her advantage, against those that were of more fame than strength, with such good caution, that she should not have needed to oppose her late gotten reputation, against those that were more mighty than her self. But she was a woman, and did what she listed. She sent forth a greater fleet than before, under *Demetrius* of *Pharos*; with the like ample commission to take all that could be gotten. This fleet divided it self, and one part of it fell with ^a *Dyrrachium*, the other with *Corcyra*. *Dyrrachium* was almost surprised by the *Illyrians*; yet was it rescued by the stout citizens. In ^b *Corcyra* the *Illyrians* landed, wasted the isle, and besieged the town. Hereupon the *Etolians* and *Acheans* were called in to help; who came, and were beaten in a fight at sea; losing, besides others of less note, *Marcus Cerynenfis*, the first pretor of *Achaia*, whom *Aratus* succeeded. The town of *Corcyra*, dismayed with this overthrow, opened the gates unto *De-*

metrius Pharius, who took possession of it with an *Illyrian* garrison, sending the rest of his forces to besiege *Dyrrachium*. In the mean season, *Tenta* was angry with her captain *Demetrius*: I know not why; but so, as he resolved to try any other course, rather than to trust her.

The *Romans* were even ready to put to sea, though uncertain which way to take, when advertisement was brought to *C. Fulvius* the consul, of *Demetrius's* fear and discontent. Likely it was, that such an occasion might greatly help to advance the business in hand; wherefore the consul failed thither, where he found the town of *Corcyra* so well prepared to his hand by *Demetrius*, that it not only received him willingly, but delivered into his power the *Illyrian* garrison, and submitted it self unto the *Roman* protection.

After this good beginning, the consul sailed along the coast to ^c *Apollonia*, accompanied with *Demetrius*, whom he used thenceforth as his counsellor and guide. To *Apollonia* came also *Posthumus* the other consul, with the land-army, numbered at twenty-thousand foot and two thousand horse. Thence they hasten towards *Dyrrachium*, which the *Illyrians* had besieged; but upon news of the *Roman* army, they disperse themselves. From thence the *Romans* enter *Illyria*, and take *Parthedia*; beat the *Illyrians* by sea, take twenty of their ships, and enforce the queen *Tenta* to forsake the coast, and to cover her self in *Rison*, far within the land. In the end, part of the *Romans* haste them homeward, and leave the best places of *Illyria* in the hands of *Demetrius*; another part stays behind, and prosecutes the war in such sort, that *Tenta* was forced to beg peace, which she obtained upon miserable conditions; to wit, that she should quit the better part of *Illyria*, and pay tribute for the rest; and from thenceforth never send any of her ships of war towards the coasts of *Greece*, beyond the island of *Lissa*, except it were some one or two vessels unarmed, and by way of trade.

After this *Illyrian* war, the *Romans* sent ambassadors into divers parts of *Greece*, signifying their love to the country, and how, for good-will thereunto, they had made war with good success upon *Tenta*, and her people. They hoped, belike, that some distressed cities would take this occasion to desire their patronage; which if it happened, they were wise enough to play their own games: but no such matter fell out. The ambassadors were only rewarded with thanks, and a decree made at *Corinth*, that the *Romans* thenceforth might be partakers of the *Isthmian* pastimes. This was an idle courtesy, but well meant by the vain *Greeks*, and therefore well taken by the *Romans*, who by this *Illyrian* expedition got nothing in *Greece*, save a little acquaintance, that shall be more hereafter.

S E C T. VIII.

Of the war between the Romans and Gauls, somewhat before the coming of Hannibal into Italy.

THE *Gauls*, that dwelt in *Lombardy*, were the next against whom the *Romans* took arms. These were a populous nation, and often molested *Rome*; sometimes with their own forces, and sometimes with the assistance of those that inhabited *France*. Once their fortune was good, when they took *Rome* and burnt it; though the issue of that war proved not answerable to the beginning, if we

^a *Dyrrachium*, sometime called *Epidamus*, and now *Durazzo*, seated upon the Adriatic Sea, between the islands of *Pharos* and *Corcyra*.
^b *Corcyra*, an island of the Adriatic Sea, not far from *Durazzo*, called now *Corfu*, and in the possession of the Venetians.
^c *Apollonia*, a city near *Dyrrachium*, or *Durazzo*, upon the sea-coast. *Ptolemy* calls it *Sissopolis*.

may give credit unto *Roman* historians. In following times their success was variable, and commonly bad. Many overthrows they received; and, if they got any victory, it yielded them no profit, but was soon extorted out of their hands: they were indeed more fierce, than well advised; lightly stirred up to war, and lightly giving over. At the first brunt, they were said to be more than men; but when that was past, less than women. The *Romans* were acquainted with their temper by long experience, and knew how to handle them; yet gave always careful heed to their approach, were it only bruited: for the danger of them was sudden and uncertain, by reason of their neighbourhood, and want of intelligence among them. Few of their attempts upon *Rome* were called wars, but *tumultus Gallici*, tumults of the *Gauls*; and rightly: for they gave many alarms to *Italy*, and used to rise with great armies; but after a few days march, and sometimes before their setting forth, any small occasion served to disperse them. Having received an overthrow, they would rest ten or twelve years, sometimes twenty or thirty, till they were stirred up again by younger heads, unacquainted with the danger. Whilst they rested, the state of *Rome*, that against these made only defensive war, had leisure to grow, by setting upon others. Herein God provided well for that monarchy, which he intended to raise; that the *Gauls* never fell upon *Italy* with a mighty power, in the time of any other great and dangerous war. Had they attempted to conquer it, whilst *Pyrrhus* was travelling in the same enterprize, or in either of the two former *Punic* wars; it may be doubted what would have become of this imperious city. But it seems that the *Gauls* had no better intelligence in the affairs of *Italy*, than strangers had in *Gaul*; at least, they knew not how to use their times, and were therefore like to smart, whensoever the enemies, whom they had much provoked, and little hurt, should find leisure to visit them at their own home; which was now after the first *Punic* war. Once before this, the *Romans* had been bold to set upon the *Gauls* in their own country, and that was three years before the coming of *Pyrrhus* into *Italy*. At that time the *Senones*, a tribe of the *Gauls*, invading *Umbria*, and besieging *Arretium*, had won a great battle, and slain *L. Cecilius*, with the most of his army. *Mannius Curius*, the new consul, sent ambassadors to them, to treat about ransom of prisoners; but these ambassadors they slew. Therefore, when fortune turned to the better, the *Romans* followed it so well, that they expelled these *Senones* out of their country, and sent a colony of their own to inhabit it. This caused the *Boij*, another people of *Gaul*, to fear the like measure, who thereupon took arms, and drew the *Umbrians* to their side: but the *Romans* overthrew them in two great battles, and thereby made them sue for peace, which lasted until this end of the *Illyrian* war.

It vexed the *Gauls* to see a *Roman* colony planted in their country, who had been accustomed to enlarge their bounds, by driving out their neighbours perforce; wherefore they laboured with the *Transalpinos* (so the *Romans* called those in *France*, as lying from them beyond the *Alps*, though to us they were nearer, like as they called *Cisalpinos*, or *By-bither the Alps*, those who dwelt between them and the mountains) to draw them to their party; reasonably presuming, that as their disjunction had caused their loss, so their union might recompense it with

large amends: but the business was so foolishly carried, that the *Cisalpinos* and *Transalpinos* fell together by the ears, putting the *Romans* only to a tumult, without further trouble of war. Soon after, they were urged by a greater indignity, to go more substantially to work; for *C. Flaminius*, a popular man in *Rome*, proposed a decree, which was ratified by the people; that besides one colony already planted in the territory of the *Senones*, as many more should be carried thither as would serve to people the whole country between *Ancona* and *Ariminum*, exterminating utterly those *Gauls*. Such an offer, were it made in *England*, concerning either *Virginia* or *Guinea* it self, would not over-joy the multitude; But the commonalty of *Rome* took this in so good part, notwithstanding all danger joined with the benefit, that *Flaminius* had ever after their goodwill.

This dreadful precedent extremely displeased the *Boij*, who being neighbours to *Ariminum*, feared the like displantation. And, because the rest of the *Gauls* had reason to resolve that themselves also should be rooted out by degrees, the great nation of the *Insubrians*, which inhabited the duchy of *Milan*, joined with the *Boij*, and upon a common purse entertained the *Gessates*, nations about *Rhodanus*, wageable as the *Switzers* in these times. The *Gessates* having received a great impress, come to the field under the conduct of their kings, *Concolitanus* and *Aneroestus*, who, with the *Boij* and *Insubrians*, compound an army of fifty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and those of the best men, and best appointed, that ever invaded the *Roman* territory; to whom the *Senogalli*, that had been beaten out of their possessions, gave a great increase of strength. On the contrary side, the *Venetians*, and the *Cenomanni*, adhered to the *Romans*, as better believing in their prosperity and rising fortune: for fear of whose incursions therefore, the *Gauls* were forced to leave a good part of their army on the frontier of *Milan*: with the rest of their forces they entered into *Tuscany*. The *Romans* hearing of this danger, send *Emilius* to *Rimini*, to stop their passage; and in the place of *C. Atilius*, their other consul, who then was in *Sardinia*, they employ one of their pretors for the defence of *Tuscany*.

Being at this time greatly troubled with the consideration of this powerful army which the *Gauls* had assembled, they caused a view to be taken as well of all their own forces, as of those of their allies, who were no less willing than themselves to oppose the incursions of the barbarous people; fearing, as they had cause, that their own destruction could not be prevented, otherwise than by the good fortune of *Rome*. The numbers found in this muster deserve to be recorded, because they set out the power of the *Romans* in those days. With the consuls they sent forth to the war four legions of their own, every legion consisting of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse, and of their allies thirty thousand foot and two hundred horse. There were also appointed for supplies (if any misadventure came to these) of the *Sabines* and *Umbrians* fifty thousand foot and four thousand horse; which army was to be lodged in the border of *Umbria*. Of the *Umbri* and *Sarminates*, which inhabited the *Apennines*, there were twenty thousand, and of the *Venetians* and *Cenomanni* other twenty thousand; which latter armies were directed to invade the *Boij*, that, forcing them to defend their own territories, the ge-

^a There were divers nations of the *Boij*; as in *Pannonia*, *Illyria*, *Germany*, in *Bombonois* in *France*, and in *Aquitane*; but these were none of the French race, and dwelt at this time about the mouth of the river of *Po*. ^b *Cenomanni*, are the people about *Uten*, on the north side of the river *Po* in *Italy*. There were also of these *Cenomanni* in *France*, and inhabited the country of *Main*.

neral army of the *Gauls* should be thereby greatly diminished. There were besides these, to be ready against all uncertain chances of war, thirty thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, garrisoned in *Rome* it self, of their own people; and of their allies thirty two thousand foot and two thousand horse. Over and above these great troops, in the roll of the *Latins*, that was sent unto the senate, there were numbered eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse; in that of the *Samnites* seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse; in that of the ^a *Iapyges*, and *Messapyges*, fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse; the *Lucans* sent a list of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; the ^b *Marfi*, ^c *Marracini*, ^d *Ferentani*, and the *Vestini*, of twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. The *Romans* had also two legions in *Sicily*, and about *Tarentum*, containing eight thousand four hundred foot and four hundred horse. So as of the *Romans* and *Campanians* jointly, reckoning men armed, and fit to bear arms, there were registered two hundred and fifty thousand foot and twenty-three thousand horse; of which, reckoning the *Romans* apart, there were an hundred and fifty thousand foot and about six thousand horse. Casting up the whole forces of all the provinces in *Italy*, both of the *Romans* and their confederates, it amounted to seven hundred thousand foot and seventy thousand horse; but the number is somewhat miscast by *Polybius*, not with a purpose to enrich himself by the dead pays; for where he reckons nine hundred horse too many, he falls short nine thousand two hundred of the foot.

How great soever this muster was, it seems to have been like unto that which *Lodowick Sforza* made, when *Lewis* the twelfth invaded *Milan*; at what time, the better to encourage himself, and his subjects, he took a roll of all persons able to bear arms within the dutchy, though indeed he were never able to bring a tenth part of them into the field. Certain it is, that the battels of *Trebia*, *Trasymene*, and *Canne*, did not consume any such proportion as was answerable to this large account; yet were the *Romans* slain to arm their slaves, even for want of other soldiers, after their overthrow at *Canne*. Wherefore the marvel is not great, that the *Carthaginians* and others were little terrified with report of such a multitude; for all heads are not fit for helmets, though the *Roman* citizens were, in general, as good fighting men as elsewhere might be found.

Notwithstanding all these counter-preparations, the *Gauls* keep on their way; and, entering into *Tuscany*, destroy, and put to fire and sword all that lay before them. From thence they march directly towards *Rome*, hoping to find the *Romans* rather in deliberation, than in the field: but their intelligence fails them. For the *Roman* army, sent into *Tuscany*, having taken some other way than they did, and, finding that it had missed of them, came again fast after them, to arrest them in their journey. Hereof when they heard the rumour, fearing to be charged on their backs, they turned head, and in the same evening discovered the *Roman* army, by whom they encamped. It was now a matter of apparent necessity, that fight they must; wherefore they helped themselves with a stratagem, that shewed no great fineness of wit, but such as well beseemed those that had none other occupation than war, and stood them in good stead at the present. In the dead of the night, they cause their foot to march away, but not far, leaving their horse in guard;

to whom they give order to come off at the first light of day, with such a speed, as might rather argue a running away, than a retreat, as if they had not dared to abide battel. The *Romans*, interpreting this their hasty departure, as the *Gauls* desired they should, follow them in disorder. The *Gauls* return, charge them, and kill six thousand upon the place; the rest take a piece of ground of advantage, and defend themselves, till *L. Æmilius*, being at *Ariminum*, comes to their succour. Upon the coming of the consul, the *Gauls* consult whether they should give the *Romans* battel, or forbear. In which dispute, *Aneroestus*, one of their kings, persuades them rather to return into their own countries; where, after they had disposed of the great spoils and riches which they had gotten, they should then renew the war, being without carriage, pester, or other impediment. This advice they all embrace; for seeing they that were mercenaries, had obtained what they came for, to wit, the spoils of their enemies, they thought it wisdom to hazard neither it nor themselves any further.

This indeed had been a good resolution, if they had taken it before the enemy had been in sight. But as well in the wars of these latter ages, as in former times, it hath ever been found extreme dangerous to make a retreat in the head of an enemy's army; for although they that retire, do often turn head, yet in always going on from the pursuing enemy, they find within a few miles either streight, hedge, ditch, or place of disadvantage, which they are enforced to pass in disorder. In such cases, the soldier knows it as well as the captain, that he, which forsakes the field, perceives and fears some advantage of the enemies. Fear, which is the betrayer of those succours that reason offereth, when it hath once possessed the heart of man, it casteth thence both courage and understanding: they that make the retreat, are always in fear to be abandoned; they that lead the way, fear to be engaged, and so the hindmost treads on his heels that is foremost; and consequently all disband, run, and perish, if those that favour the retreat be not held to it by men of great courage. The miserable overthrow that the *French* received in *Naples* in the year 1503, upon a retreat made by the marquis of *Sal*, doth testify no less; for although a great troop of *French* horse sustained the pursuing enemy a long time, and gave the foot leisure to trot away; yet being retarded by often turnings, the *Spanish* foot overtook, and defeated them utterly. During the wars between the *Imperialists* and the *French*, *Beisi* and *Mont* were lost at *Brignolles*, who in a bravery would needs see the enemy, before they left the field. So was *Strofi* overthrown by the marquis of *Marignan*, because he could not be persuaded to dislodge the night before the marquis's arrival. Therefore did the *French* king *Francis* the first wisely, when, without respect of point of honour, he dislodged from before *Landersey* by night, as many other the most advised captains (not finding themselves in case to give battel) have done. *Je ne trouve point* (saith the marshal *Montluc*) *au fait des armes chose si difficile, qu'une retraite*; I find nothing in the art of war so difficult, as to make a safe retreat. A sure rule it is, that there is less dishonour to dislodge in the dark, than to be beaten in the light. And hereof *M. de la Noue* gives this judgment of a day's retreat, made in *France* presently before the battel of *Moncontour*. For (saith he) staying upon our reputation in shew, *not to dis-*

^a *Iapyges* and *Messapyges* seem to be one nation, who are also called *Salentine*, *Peucecian*, *Apulians*, and *Calabrians*. The country is now *Apulia*, containing the northernmost head land of *Calabria*. ^b A people of the kingdom of *Naples*. ^c *Ptolemy* calls them a people of *Italy*. ^d A people of *Campania*, called to this day *Ferentines*, saith *Leander*.

ledge by night; we lost our reputation indeed, by dislodging by day; whereby we were forced to fight upon our disadvantage, and to our ruin. And yet did that worthy gentleman count Lodowick of Nassau, brother to the late famous prince of Orange, make the retreat at Moncountour with so great resolution, as he saved the one half of the protestant army, then broken and disbanded, of which my self was an eye-witness, and was one of them that had cause to thank him for it.

Now the Gauls, embracing the same advice (as they take it) of one of their kings, turn their backs to the enemy, and their faces homeward. *Æmilius* follows them as near as he can, without engaging himself, attending his advantage. In the mean while, *C. Atilius* the other consul, with the legions of *Sardinia*, lands at *Pisa*; so as the Gauls, inclosed between two armies, are forced to fight: they therefore equally strengthen their rear and front. To sustain *Æmilius*, they appoint the *Gessates* and the *Milanois*; in the front they range the *Piemontois*, and the rest of the Gauls inhabiting upon the river of *Po*. The manner of the fight *Polybius* describeth at large, which was well fought of all hands: but in the end the Gauls fell, and so did *Atilius* the consul, who died in the place, accompanied with the two kings of the Gauls *Concolitanus* and *Aneroeslus*, with forty thousand of their vassals.

After this fatal overthrow the Gauls lost courage, and, ere long, all that they held in *Italy*; for they were invaded the year following this overthrow, by the new consuls *Fulvius* and *Manlius*. The Romans knew well how to use their victory; they gave not ten, twenty, or thirty years time, to the Gauls, to repair their forces, as the Gauls had done to them.

These new consuls bear the Boij, but by reason of the great rains that fell, and the great pestilence that reigned, they were compelled for that present to surcease. In the second year, *Furius* and *Flaminius* invade the *Milanois*, and prevail very far, being strongly assisted by the *Cenomanni* and the *Veneti*. Nevertheless, these consuls were revoked out of their province by the senate of *Rome*, and compelled to resign their office; because the augures, or soothsayers, had found, that some token or other of the birds (in which, and all sorts of their divination, the Romans were extremely superstitious) had not only foreshewed little good when they were chosen, but had also nullified the election. *C. Flaminius*, receiving letters of this revocation from the senate, and being otherwise advertised of the contents, was not hasty to open them; but first gave battle unto the enemies, vanquished them, and spoiled their country; then perused the letters, and returning home, obtained a triumph, fore against the will of the senate, and not altogether with good liking of the people, who yet bare him out, for that he sided in faction with the commonalty, though a man of great nobility.

This was that *Flaminius*, who had propounded the decree for dividing the country of the *Senones* among the people of *Rome*. He was the first, or one of the first, that understanding the majesty of *Rome* to be indeed wholly in the people, and no otherwise in the senate, than by way of delegacy, or grand commission; did not stand highly upon his birth and degree, but courted the multitude, and taught them to know and use their power over himself, and his fellow senators, in reforming their disorders. For this, the commons highly esteemed him, and the senators as deeply hated him; but he had the surer side, and found imitators that rose by the same art, which in process of time, grew the only or chief way to preferment.

No. 38.

Flaminius and his colleague being deposed, *M. Claudius Marcellus*, and *Cn. Cornelius Scipio*, were chosen consuls for the rest of that year. The Gauls about this time desired peace, and were like to have obtained it, though the new consuls were against it, as fearing to want work. But when thirty thousand of the *Gessates*, following their king *Britomarus*, were come over the Alps, and joined with the *Insubrians*, all other discourse, than of present war, was at an end. So the consuls hasted into their province, where they besieged *Acerre*, a town not far from *Novaro* (so far had the Romans pierced already) in the dutchy of *Milan*. To divert them from this siege, *Britomarus* sat down before *Clastidium*, a town in the same tract, with great part of his forces, leaving the rest, with the *Insubrians*, to attend upon the consuls at *Acerre*, and to look to the defence of *Milan*: but this would not suffice to make the Romans break up their siege. *Marcellus*, taking with him the greatest part of the horse, and six hundred foot lightly armed, thought to deal well enough with those at *Clastidium*. *Britomarus* heard of the consul's coming, and met him upon the way so suddenly, that the Romans had no leisure to rest themselves after their journey, but were compelled instantly to fight: herein *Britomarus* had done well, if he had not forthwith, in a rash bravery, lost his game at a cast. He had advantage enough in number both of horse and foot; but he thought so well of his own personal valour, that he rode out single before his army, provoking any one to fight with him. *Marcellus* was no less daring than the barbarous king; whether more wise in this action, I will not dispute; he was more fortunate, and that sufficed to commend him. He slew and disarmed *Britomarus* in presence of both armies, whereby his own men took such courage, and his enemies were so dismayed, that without much trouble of fight, the Romans obtained a great victory.

This was the third and last time that ever any Roman general slew the general of the enemies with his own hand. To this kind of victory belonged a peculiar triumph, whereof only *Romulus*, *Cossius*, and this *Marcellus*, had the honour; yet I dare say, that the two *Scipio's*, and divers other Roman captains, especially *Cesar*, were better men of war than any of these three; though they never offered up to *Jupiter*, *Opima spolia*, The armour of a general slain by themselves, when they were generals, nor perhaps affected so to do.

After this victory, *Acerre* was yielded to the Romans, and *Milan* soon after, with all that belonged to the *Cisalpinæ* or Gauls that dwelt in *Lombardy*. Thus was that valiant and mighty nation, that had so many years vexed the state of *Rome*, and in former times taken the city itself, brought to nothing in a short time; their pleasant and fertile territory possessed by the Romans; and the remainder of their nation, inhabiting *Italy*, so many as would not subject their necks to the Roman yoke, either forced to abandon their countries, or to hide themselves in the cold and barren mountains, like out-laws and thieves. And thus did the Romans spend the twenty-three years following the peace made with *Carthage*. In part of which time, they were at such leisure, that they closed up the temple of *Janus*, which they never did before (it standing always open when they had any war) save once, in the reign of *Numa*; nor in long time after, until the reign of *Augustus*. But this their present happiness was not to last long; a dangerous war, and perhaps the greatest that ever had been, was to come unto their gates; which being well ended, they might boldly undertake to extend their monarchies as far as their ambition could reach.

C H A P. III.

Of the second Punic war.

S E C T. I.

The wars of Hannibal in Spain. Quarrels between the Romans and Carthaginians. Hannibal besiegeth and taketh Seguntum, whilst the Romans are busied with the Illyrians. War proclaimed between Rome and Carthage.

HANNIBAL the son of *Amilcar*, was about six and twenty years old when he was chosen general of the *Carthaginian* forces in *Spain*: he was elected by the army, as soon as *Asdrubal* was dead, and the election was ratified by the state of *Carthage*, wherewith *Hanno* and his complices were nothing pleased. This was now the third of the *Barchine* family (so called of *Amilcar*, whose surname was *Barcas*) that had command in chief over the men of war; which honour would, perhaps, have been less envied by these domestic enemies, if the allies and friends of the *Barchine* house had not also borne the whole sway in government, and been the only men regarded both by the senate and the people. This general good-will, as it was first purchased by the most worthy deserts of *Amilcar*, in saving his country from imminent ruin, enlarging the dominion thereof, and enriching it with treasures and great revenues; so was it retained by the same good arts among his friends and followers. *Hanno* therefore, and his partizans, being neither able to tax the virtue of their enemies; that was unproveable, nor to perform the like services unto the common-weal, had nothing left whereby to value themselves, excepting the general reprehension of war, and cautelous advice of not provoking the *Romans*. This they seasoned otherwhiles with detraction, saying, that the *Barchine* faction went about to oppress the liberty of the city. But their malicious words were unregarded, and, if it were factious to bear ill-will to *Rome*, then were all the citizens (very few excepted) no less *Barchine* than *Hannibal* himself: for it was long since apparent, that the oath of the *Romans* to the articles of peace, afforded no security to *Carthage*, were she never so quiet and officious, unless she would yield to become their subject. Since therefore the peace was like to hold no longer, than until the *Romans* could find some good advantage to renew the war, it was rather desired by the *Carthaginians*, that whilst their own state was in good case, the war should begin; than, that in some unhappy time of famine or pestilence, or after some great loss of army or fleet, they should be driven to yield unto the impudent demands of their enemies, and to give away basely their lands and treasures, as they had lately done; or miserably fight upon terms of disadvantage.

This disposition of his countrymen *Hannibal* well understood; neither was he ignorant (for his father and other friends had long time devised of this business) that, in making war with the *Romans*, it was no small advantage to get the start of them. If once he could bring an army into *Italy* without molestation, there was good hope that he should find friends and assistance, even of those people that helped to increase the *Roman* army in foreign wars.

But this could never be effected, if the matter were openly disputed at *Carthage*; for it was to be doubted, that the *Carthaginians*, how glad soever they would be to hear that he had set the war on foot, would nevertheless be slow and timorous, as commonly men are in the beginning of great enterprizes, if the matter were referred to their deliberation; which if it should happen, then were the *Romans* like to be made acquainted not only with the generalities of his purpose, but with such particulars as must be discoursed of in procuring allowance to his design. This might suffice to disorder the whole project; wherefore he resolved to lay siege unto *Saguntum*, which might seem not greatly to concern the *Romans*, and would highly please the *Carthaginians*, that had fresh in mind the indignity of that *Spanish* town's allegiance, with their half friends. So should he assay both the patience of his enemies, and the disposition of his own citizens.

Having thus concluded, he nevertheless went fair and orderly to work; and, beginning with those that lay next in his way, approaching unto *Saguntum* by degrees. This he did (saith *Livy*) to give some colour to his proceedings; as if he had not principally intended the war against *Saguntum*, but had been drawn thither by course of business: yet reason teacheth plainly, that without regard of such formalities, it was needful to finish the conquest of the rest, before he did any thing that should provoke the *Romans*. First therefore he entered upon the territory of the *Olcades*, and having besieged *Althea* (*Livy* calleth it *Carteia*) their chief city, he became in a few days master not only thereof, but of all the other towns of their country. This nation, which he first undertook, being subdued, and the winter at hand, he rested his army in *New Carthage*, or *Carthagena*, and imparted liberally to the soldiers the spoils he had gotten in his late conquest.

In the spring following he pursued the war against the *Vaccæi*, and without any great difficulty, won first *Salmantica*, now called *Salamanca*; and after it, *Arbucala*, by assault, though not without a long siege, and great difficulty. But in his return, he was put to the height both of his courage and of his martial judgment; for all such of the *Vaccæi* as were able to bear arms, being made desperate by the spoil of their country, with those of *Salamanca*, and of the *Olcades*, that had escaped in the late overthrow, joining themselves with the *Toletans*, compounded an army of an hundred thousand able men, and stayed *Hannibal* on the banks of the river *Tagus*, which runneth to the sea by *Lisbon* in *Portugal*. Those four nations having had experience of *Hannibal's* invincible courage, and that he never saw enemy upon whom he durst not give charge, were thoroughly resolved that his natural valour would at this time no less neglect the cold advice of discretion, than at other times it had seemed to do, when the like great occasion perswaded him to use it. But he that makes himself a body of crystal, that all men may look through him, and discern all the parts of his disposition, makes himself virtual an ass; and

^a A people (saith *Stephanus*) near the river of *Elbro*. But in the old description of *Spain*, in *Ortelius*, they are found near *Tagus* and by *Suidas*, not far from *New Carthage*. ^b A people of *Castile* the old. ^c *Arbucala*, or *Albrucala*, an inland city of the *Vaccæi* in *Arragon*.

thereby teacheth others, either how to ride or drive him. Wise men, though they have single hearts in all that is just and virtuous; yet they are like coffers with double bottoms; which when one looks into, being opened, they see not all they hold on the sudden, and at once. It is true, that this subtil *Carthaginian*, when he served under *Asdrubal*, was, of all the men of mark in the army, the most adventurous. But that which may beseem a captain or inferior commander, doth not always become a chief; though it hath sometime succeeded well with such great ones, as have been found more fortunate than wise. At this time, our great man of war knew as well how to dissemble his courage, as at other times to make it good. For he withdrew himself from the river side, as if fearful to ford it, thereby to draw over that great multitude from their banks of advantage. The *Spaniards*, apprehending this in such sort as *Hannibal* desired that they should, thrust themselves in fury and disorder into the swift stream, with a purpose to charge the *Carthaginians*, abandoning (as they thought for fear) the defences on the contrary side. But when *Hannibal* saw them in their way, and well near over, he turned back his elephants to entertain them at their landing, and thrust his horse-men both above and beneath them into the river. These carrying a kind of *Lance de gay*, sharp at both ends, which they held in the midst of the staff, had such an advantage over the foot that were in the river, under their strokes, clattered together, and unable to move or shift their bodies as on firm ground, that they flew all those (in a manner) without resistance, which were already entered into the water, and pursued the rest, that fled like men amazed, with so great a slaughter, as from that day forward there was not any *Spaniard* on that side the river of *Iberus* (the *Saguntines* excepted) that had the daring to lift up their hands against the *Carthaginians*.

The *Saguntines* perceiving the danger towards them, cried before they were hurt. They sent ambassadors to *Rome*, and bemoaned themselves, as likely to suffer that which afterwards they suffered indeed, only because of their alliance and friendship with this honourable city, which the *Carthaginians* hated. This tale moved the senate, but much more a report, that *Saguntum* was already besieged. Hereupon some cry out that war should be proclaimed by land and sea; as also, that the two consuls should be sent with armies, the one into *Spain*, the other into *Africa*. But others went more *Roman*-like to work, and carried it. So it was only concluded, that ambassadors should be sent into *Spain* to view the state of their confederates, which were indeed none other than the *Saguntines*. For if *Hannibal* intended war against *Rome*, it was likely that he would give them, ere it were long, a more plausible occasion to take arms against him: if he had no such purpose, yet would it be in their power to determine what they listed themselves, upon the report of these ambassadors; and this their gravity, in being not too rash at first, would serve to countenance their following decree. Of these ambassadors *Livy* reports, that they found *Hannibal* before *Saguntum*, but could not get audience of him, and therefore went to *Carthage*, where also they were not regarded nor heard. But *Polybius*, an historian of sincerity less questionable, tells, that they found him at *Carthage*, and had conference with him, though such as left them doubtful. This is more agreeable to the rest of *Hannibal's* whole course. And surely we might wonder, why the

Carthaginians should afterwards admit a more peremptory embassy (as *Livy* confesseth) and fall to disputation about the covenants of peace, if they had rejected that which was sent upon none other pretence than prevention of war.

Whilst the ambassadors passed to and fro, *Hannibal* prepared not only his forces, but some *Roman* pretences against *Saguntum*. He found but *Mamertines*, or people that should do as the *Mamertines* in *Sicily* had done for the *Romans*; and implore his help against the *Saguntines*. These were the *Turdetani*, a nation adjoining to *Saguntum*, and having many quarrels with them (as happens commonly among neighbours) of which *Hannibal* himself had hatched some. Finding therefore such an occasion, whatsoever it was, as made him able to say, that the *Saguntines* had first provoked him ere he meddled with them; he made no more ado but sat down with his whole power before their town. He was now more secure than he had formerly been of his own citizens; for that they had not entertained the *Roman* ambassadors with any trembling reverence, as of late years they had been wont. Nevertheless, he was glad of any handsome colour to shadow his actions; not only because the war, which he so much desired, was not proclaimed; but that he might not be checked in his course as an open enemy, before he could set foot in *Italy*. The *Romans* had the like, tho' contrary desire. They were glad of the quarrel; as hoping, that *Carthage*, with all thereto belonging, should thereby in short space become their own. Yet were they not hasty to threaten before they were ready to strike; but meant to temporize, until they had an army in readiness to be sent into *Spain*, where they thought to make *Saguntum* the seat of the war.

In the mean while, *Demetrius Pharius*, whom the *Romans* had made king over a great part of *Illyria*, rebelled against them; either for that he found himself over-straitly tied up by them with hard conditions, or rather because he was of an unthankful disposition. The commotion of the *Gauls*, and afterwards the same of the *Carthaginian* war, emboldened him to despise his benefactors and patrons, whom he ought to have defended and aided in all perils, even with the hazard of his whole estate, which he had received of their gift. But he was a traitor to his own queen, and therefore dealt according to his kind, with those that had rewarded him for being such. First, he built ships, and spoiled the isles of *Greece*, against the covenants to which he was bound. Then he adventured further, and seized upon some places that the *Romans* kept in their own hands. If he had begun sooner, or rather if he had stay'd somewhat longer, he might have sped better. For the business with the *Gauls* was ended; with *Hannibal* not thoroughly begun: when he declared himself, by his doings, an enemy, and was vanquished. The *Roman* consul, *Emilius*, was sent against him; who in seven days won the strong town of *Dimitium*, and thereby brought such terror upon the country round about, that ambassadors were sent from all places to yield themselves, without putting him to further pains: only the city of *Pharus*, in which *Demetrius* lay prepared to resist, which he might have done long, if the hot-headed rebel had not been too foolish. *Emilius* landed a great part of his army in the isle of *Pharus* by night, and bestowed them in covert, presenting himself the next morning with twenty ships before the town, and offering to force the haven. *Demetrius* with all his power issued out against the consul,

consul, and was soon intercluded from the town by those that lay in ambush. Wherefore he fled away through by-paths to a creek, where he had shipping ready for him, and embarked himself, leaving all his estate unto them of whose liberality he first had it.

This business, though it were soon dispatched, yet prevented it not the siege of *Saguntum*, before which *Hannibal* sat down, ere *Emilius* was landed in *Illyria*. In the beginning of the siege the *Carthaginians* were much discouraged, by reason of the brave sallies made by the *Saguntines*; in one of which their general received a dangerous wound in the thigh, that caused him to lie many days unable to move. Nevertheless he was not unmindful of his work in the mean while, but gave order to raise certain moveable towers, that might equal those which were built on the walls of the city, and to prepare to batter the curtains, and make a breach. These being finished and apply'd, had soon wrought their effect. A great and large breach was made by the fall of divers towers, and a great length of wall, wherein an hot assault was given; but it was so well sustained by the *Saguntines*, as the *Carthaginians* were not only beaten from the breach, and out of some ground within the town, which upon the first fury they had won; but they were pursued even to their own trenches and camp. Nevertheless the *Carthaginian* army, wherein were about an hundred and fifty thousand men, did so weary the townsmen with continual travail, that at length it got within the walls; and was only hindred from taking full possession of the city, by some counter-works of the *Saguntines*, that were also ready to be won. In this extremity there was one *Alcon* a *Saguntine*, that conveyed himself out of the town, to treat with *Hannibal* for some accord. But the conditions which the *Carthaginian* offered were so severe, and without all compass of honour, as *Alcon* durst not return to propound them to his countrymen. For *Hannibal* demanded all that they had, gold, silver, plate, and other riches within the city; yea, the city itself to be abandoned by the citizens; promising, that he would assign some other place for their habitation; not allowing them to carry out with them any other thing wherewith to sustain themselves, than the cloaths on their backs; or other arms to defend them, than their nails and teeth. Yet might they far better have submitted themselves unto this miserable appointment (seeing thereby they might have enjoyed their lives, and saved the honour of their wives and daughters) than to have rested at the discretion of the conqueror, as soon after they did; by whom their wives and daughters were deslowered before their own faces, and all put to sword that were above fourteen years of age. For it was a poor comfort, which a great number of them took, when not daring to fight, and sell their blood at the dearest rate, they shut themselves up like most wretched creatures in their own houses, and therein burnt themselves with all they had, so dying unrevenged. The treasures found in *Saguntum*, which were very great, *Hannibal* kept, therewith to pay his army: the slaves and other booty he divided among his soldiers, reserving some things of choice, wherewith to present his friends at *Carthage*, and to animate them unto the war.

These tidings exceedingly vexed the *Romans*, who had good cause to be angry at their own slowness, in forbearing to send help unto the *Saguntines*, that held out eight months, looking still for succour, but in vain. Wherefore they determined to repair

their honour by taking sharp revenge. To this end they sent ambassadors again to *Carthage*, demanding only, *Whether it were by general consent and allowance of the Carthaginians, that Hannibal had made war upon Saguntum*; which, if they granted (as it seemed they would) then to give them defiance. Hereunto answer was made in the senate of *Carthage*, to this effect. That this their second embassy, howsoever qualified with mild words, was indeed more insolent than the former. For in that they only required justice against *Hannibal*; but in this, the very state and commonwealth of *Carthage* was urged to plead guilty, or not guilty. But (said the *Carthaginian* speaker) whether the general of our army in *Spain*, in besieging *Saguntum*, have only followed his own counsel, or whether he did it by direction from us, it is not the question which the *Romans* ought to ask us. That which is indeed worthy examination or dispute, is; *Whether it were lawful or unlawful for Hannibal to do as he hath done*. For it belongs to us to call our own commanders in question, and to punish them according to their faults and errors; to you, to challenge us, if we have done any thing contrary to our late league and contract. It is true, that in our negotiation with *Lucretius* the consul, the allies of both nations were comprehended; but the *Saguntines* were not then of your allies, and therefore no parties to the peace then made; for of your allies in the future, or of ours, there was no dispute. As touching the last agreement between you and *Asdrubal*, wherein you will say, that the *Saguntines* were comprehended by name; it is you that have taught us how to answer that particular. For whatsoever you found in the treaty between us and *Lucretius*, to your own disadvantage, you cast it upon your consul's presumption, as promising those things for which he had no warrant from the senate and people of *Rome*. If then it be lawful for the *Romans* to disavow the actions of their consuls and commanders, concluding any thing without punctual and precise warrant, the same liberty may we also assume, and hold ourselves no way bound in honour to perform those bargains which *Asdrubal* hath made for us, without our commandment and consent.

This was an impertinent answer, and little better than a mere cavil. For *Lucretius* the consul, in his treaty of peace with the *Carthaginians*, had expressly referred the allowance thereof to the people of *Rome*. It had been therefore much better to have dealt plainly, and to have alledged, that after this league was made and confirmed on both parts, it was broken by the *Romans*, in robbing the *Carthaginians* of the isle of *Sardinia*, and withal of twelve hundred talents; which perjury the state of *Carthage*, being now grown able, would revenge with open war. As for the *Saguntines*, it little skilled that the *Romans* had admitted them into confederacy, and forthwith inserted their names into the treaty of peace with *Asdrubal*; seeing that the treaty with *Asdrubal*, and all other business between *Rome* and *Carthage*, following the violence and breach of peace, in taking away *Sardinia*, were no better than *Roman* injuries, as implying this commination; *Do whatsoever we require, else will we make war, without regard of our oath which we have already broken*.

But this the *Carthaginians* did not alledge, forgetting, in heat of contention (as *Polybius* takes it) the best of their plea. Yet since *Livy* himself doth remember and acknowledge, that the taking of *Sardinia* from the *Carthaginians*, did inflame the spirit of *Amilcar* with desire of revenge; we may

may reasonably think, that the mention of this injury was omitted, not so much upon forgetfulness, as for that it was not thought convenient, by ripping up such ancient matter of quarrel, to shew that the war, now towards, had long been thought upon, and like to be made with extraordinary force, in other manner than heretofore. In conclusion, the *Carthaginian* senate moved the *Roman* ambassadors to deliver unto them in plain terms the purposes of those that sent them, and the worst of that which they had long determined against them: as for the *Saguntines*, and the confining of their armies within *Iberus*, those were but their pretences. Whereupon *Q. Fabius* gathering up the skirt of his gown, as it somewhat had been laid in the hollow thereof, made this short reply: I have here (quoth he) in my gown-skirt both peace and war; make you (my masters of the senate) election of these two, which of them you like best, and purpose to embrace. Hereat all cried out at once; Even which of them you yourself have a fancy to offer us. Marry then (quoth *Fabius*) take the war, and share it among you. Which all the assembly willingly accepted.

This was plain dealing. To wrangle about pretences, when each part had resolved to make war, it was merely frivolous. For all these disputes of breach of peace have ever been maintained by the party unwilling, or unable to sustain the war. The rusty sword and the empty purse do always plead performance of covenants. There have been few kings or states in the world that have otherwise understood the obligation of a treaty, than with the condition of their own advantage; and commonly (seeing peace between ambitious princes and states, is but a kind of breathing) the best advised have rather begun with the sword than with the trumpet. So dealt the *Arragonois* with the *French* in *Naples*; *Henry II.* of *France*, with the *Imperialists*, when he wrote to *Brisac*, to surprize as many places as he could ere the war broke out; *Don John*, with the *Netherlands*, and *Philip II.* of *Spain*, with the *English*, when in the great imbargo he took all our ships and goods in his ports.

But *Hannibal*, besides the present strength of *Carthage*, and the common feeling of injuries received from these enemies, had another private and hereditary desire, that violently carried him against the *Romans*. His father *Amilcar*, at what time he did sacrifice, being ready to take his journey into *Spain*, had solemnly bound him by oath, to pursue them with immortal hatred, and to work them all possible mischief, as soon as he should be a man, and able. *Hannibal* was then about nine years old when his father caused him to lay his hand upon the altar and make this vow; so that it was no marvel, if the impression were strong in him.

That it is inhuman to bequeath hatred in this sort, as it were by legacy, it cannot be denied. Yet for mine own part, I do not much doubt, but that some of those kings with whom we are now in peace, have received the like charge from their predecessors, that as soon as their coffers shall be full, they shall declare themselves enemies to the people of *England*.

S E C T. II.

Hannibal takes order for the defence of Spain and Africa. His journey into Italy.

WAR being thus proclaimed, *Hannibal* resolved not to put up his sword which he

had drawn against the *Saguntines*, until he had therewith opened his passage unto the gates of *Rome*. So began the second *Punic* war; second to none that ever the senate and people of *Rome* sustained. *Hannibal* wintered at *Carthage*, where he licensed his *Spanish* soldiers to visit their friends, and refresh themselves against the spring. In the mean while, he gave instructions to his brother *Asdrubal* for the government of *Spain* in his absence. He also took order to send a great many troops of *Spaniards* into *Africa*, to equal the numbers of *Africans* formerly drawn into *Spain*; to the end, that so the one nation might remain as pledges and gages for the other. Of the *Spaniards*, he transported into *Africa* thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot, and twelve hundred horse; also eight hundred slingers of the *Baleares*. Besides these, he selected four thousand foot, all young men, and of quality, out of the best cities of *Spain*, which he appointed to be garrison'd in *Carthage* itself, not so much in regard of their forces, as that they might serve for hostages; for among those four thousand, the best of the *Spanish* citizens, and those that swayed most in their several states, had their sons or kinsmen. He also left with his brother, to guard the coasts and ports, fifty and seven gallies, whereof thirty seven were presently armed and appointed for the war. Of *Africans* and other nations strangers, he left with him above twelve thousand foot, and two thousand horse, besides one and twenty elephants.

Having in this sort taken order for the defence of *Spain* and *Africa*, he sent discoverers before him to view the passages of the *Pyrenean* mountains, and of the *Alps*. He also sent ambassadors to the mountaineers of the *Pyrenees*, and to the *Gauls*, to obtain a quiet passage, that he might bring his army entire into *Italy*, and not be compelled to diminish his forces by any war in the way, till he came to encounter the *Romans*. His ambassadors and discoverers being returned with good satisfaction; in the beginning of the spring he pass'd over the river of *Iberus*, with an army consisting of fourscore and ten thousand foot, and twelve thousand horse. All those parts of *Spain*, into which he had not entered before, he now subdued; and appointed *Hanno* (not that old enemy of his house, who sat still at *Carthage*) to govern *Spain* on the east-side of *Iberus*, to whom he left an army of ten thousand foot, and one thousand horse. Being arrived at the borders of *Spain*, some of his *Spanish* soldiers returned home, without asking leave; which that others might not also do or attempt, he courteously dismissed many more that seemed willing to be gone. Hereby it came to pass, that the journey seemed the less tedious unto those that accompanied him, as being not enforced by compulsion. With the rest of his army, consisting now but of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse, he pass'd the *Pyrenees*, and entered into *Gaul*. He found the *Gauls* that bordered upon *Spain* ready in arms to forbid his entrance into their country; but won them, with gentle speech, and rich presents that he bestowed upon their leaders, to favour his expedition. So without any molestation he came to the bank of *Rhodanus*; where dwelt, on each side of the river, a people called *Volca*. These were unacquainted with the cause of his coming, and therefore sought to keep him from passing over the water. But he was greatly assisted by some of those *Gauls* that in-

* Majorca and Minorca.

habited on the west-side of *Rhodanus*, to wit, by those of *Vivareiz* and *Lionnois*. For although many of them had transported themselves and their goods into the country of *Dauphine*, thinking to defend the further bank against him; yet such as remained, being very desirous to free their country of so many ill guests, were better pleased to have their countrymen well beaten, which had abandoned them, than to have their own store of corn and cattle wasted, by the long stay of so great an army as lay upon them. For which reason they helped him to make boats, informed him of another more easy passage higher up the river, and lent him guides. When the vessels for transportation of his army were in readiness, he sent *Hanno*, the son of *Bomilcar*, up the river; himself in the mean while making countenance to enter the ford below. The end of this labour was, that *Hanno*, charging the *Gauls* unawares upon their own side, and *Hannibal*, at the same time, passing the river in their faces, the further bank was won, though with some difficulty, and the enemies dispersed. Yet was he greatly troubled in conveying over his elephants, who marvellously feared the water. He was therefore driven to make rafts of trees, and cover them with earth and turf; whereof he fastened one to each bank, that might serve as a bridge, to and from another of the same sort, but loose, upon which the beasts were towed over.

Having past this first brunt, and overcome both the rage of the river, and of those that defended it, he was visited by the princes of the *Gauls Cisalpinæ*, that inhabited *Piedmont* and *Milan*, who lately had revolted from the *Romans*. These informed him of the passages of the *Alps*, that they were not so difficult as common report made them, and from these he received guides, with many other encouragements. All which notwithstanding; he found himself extremely incumbered by the *Savoyards*; and lost, both of his carriages and of his *Carthaginians*, more than willingly he would, or had formerly thought that he should. For he was twice mainly assailed by them before he could recover the plain countries on the other side. And whereas this journey over the mountains cost him fifteen days travel, he was every day, more or less, not only charged by those mountaineers, but withal extremely beaten with grievous weather and snow; it being the beginning of winter when he began and overcame this passage. But the fair and fertile plains, which were now ready to receive them, with the assistance and conduct of the *Cisalpine Gauls*, who by their proper forces had so often invaded the *Roman* territory, gave them great comfort and encouragement to go on; having nothing else of difficulty remaining, but that which from the beginning they made account to overcome by their proper valour and resolution; namely, the *Roman* armies and resistance.

SECT. III.

How the Romans in vain solicited the Spaniards and Gauls to take their part. The rebellion of the Cisalpine Gauls against the Romans.

THE countries of *Spain* and *Gaul*, through which the *Carthaginians* marched thus far, had been solicited before by the same *Roman* ambassadors, who had denounced the war at *Carthage*. These, as they were instructed by the senate, took *Spain* in their way homeward from *Carthage*, with a purpose to draw into the *Roman* alliance as many of the cities and princes as they could; at least to dissuade them from contracting any friendship

with the *Carthaginians*. The first which they attempted, were the *Volsians*, a people in *Spain*; from whom, in open assembly, they received by one that spake for the rest, this uncomfortable answer: With what faith (saith he) can ye *Romans* persuade us to value your alliance, or to prefer it before the friendship of the *Carthaginians*; seeing we are taught by the example of the *Saguntines*, to be more wise than so? For they, relying on your faith and promised assistance, have been utterly rooted out, and destroyed by the *Carthaginians*; whom they might else have held their assured friends, and good neighbours, as we, and other the people of *Spain*, have found them. Ye may therefore be gone, with this resolution from us, that for our parts (and, so I think, I may answer for the rest of our countrymen) the *Romans* henceforth are not to expect any kindness at our hands; who are resolved, never to make account of their protection, nor amity. From the *Volsians*, the ambassadors took their way towards the *Gauls*; using their best arguments to persuade them not to suffer the *Carthaginians* to pass into *Italy*, through their territory: and withal greatly glorifying themselves, their strength, and large dominion. But the *Gauls* laugh'd them to scorn, and had hardly the patience to hear them speak. For shall we (saith one of their princes) by resisting *Hannibal's* passage into *Italy*, entertain a war which is not meant to be made against us? Shall we hold the war among our selves, and in our own territory, by force, which marcheth with a speedy pace from us, towards our ancient enemies? Have the *Romans* deserved so well of us, and the *Carthaginians* so ill, that we should set fire on our own houses, to save theirs from burning? No, we know it well, that the *Romans* have already forced some nations of ours, out of their proper territory and inheritance; and constrained others, as free as themselves, to pay them tribute. We will not therefore make the *Carthaginians* our enemies, who have no ways yet offended us, nor we them.

With this displeasing answer the ambassadors returned home; carrying no good news, of friends likely to help them; but rather some assurance from the people of *Massilia*, which were confederates with *Rome*, that the *Gauls* were determined to take part with their enemy. Of this inclination, the *Cisalpine Gauls* gave hasty proof. For when the news was brought into *Italy*, that the *Carthaginians* had passed *Iberus*, and were on the way towards *Rome*; this alone sufficed to stir up the *Boii*, and *Insubrians*, against the *Romans*. These people were lately offended at the plantation of new *Roman* colonies, at *Cremona* and *Placentia*, within their territories. Relying therefore upon the *Carthaginian* succour, which they supposed to be now at hand, they laid aside all regard of those hostages, which they had given to the *Romans*, and fell upon the new colonies. The towns it seems that they could not win; for *Hannibal* shortly after failed to get them. But they forced the *Roman* commissioners (who belike were abroad in the country) to fly to *Modena*, where they besieged them. The siege of *Modena* had continued some small time; when the *Gauls*, having little skill in assaulting cities, waxed weary, and seemed desirous to have peace, and to come to some good accord with the *Romans*. This they did of purpose to draw on some meeting; that they might therein lay hand upon the *Roman* deputies, thereby to redeem their hostages, in way of exchange. And it fell out, in part, according to their wish. For the *Romans* sent out ambassadors to treat with them,

and to conclude a peace ; whom they detained. *Manlius* the pretor, who lay in these quarters with an army, hearing this outrage, marched in all haste to the relief of the besieged. But the *Gauls*, having laid a strong ambush in a wood joining to the way, fell upon the pretor so opportunely, as he was utterly overthrown, and all his followers left dead in the place ; a few excepted, that recovered, by fast running, a little village, but defensible, upon the river of *Po*. When this was heard at *Rome*, *C. Attilius*, another of the pretors, was hastily sent to relieve the besieged, with a legion, and five thousand of the *Roman* associates : which forces were taken out of the consul's army, and supplied by a new levy.

As the *Gauls* were too rash and hasty ; so were the *Romans* too slow, and indeed too ill-advised, in the beginning of this war. They were not persuaded, that *Carthage*, which had almost servilely endured so many indignities, in time of the late peace ; would be so brave and courageous on the sudden, as to attempt the conquest of *Italy* it self. Wherefore they appointed one of their consuls, to make war in *Spain*, the other in *Afric* : resting secure of all danger at home. *Titus Sempronius* took his way toward *Afric*, with an hundred and sixty *Quinqueremes*, or gallies, of five to an oar, which preparation may seem to threaten even the city of *Carthage*, to which it shall not come near. *P. Cornelius Scipio*, the other consul, made all possible haste, by way of *Genoa*, into *Provence* ; and used such diligence, having the wind also favourable, as in five days he recovered *Massilia*. There he was advertised, of *Hannibal's* having passed the river of *Rhodanus*, whom he thought to have found busy yet a while in *Spain*. *Hannibal* had also news of the consul's arrival ; whereof he was neither glad nor sorry, as not meaning to have to do with him. Each of them sent forth scouts, to discover the others number and doings : *Hannibal*, about five hundred *Numidians* ; *Scipio*, three hundred of his better appointed *Roman* horse. These met and fought, and the *Numidians* were beaten ; yet could not the *Romans* greatly brag, having slain only two hundred, and lost of their own, one hundred and forty. But when *Scipio* drew near, to have met with the *Carthaginians*, he found, they were gone three days before ; and that (as he then found assuredly true) with an intent to look upon the walls of *Rome*. This interrupted his intended voyage into *Spain*. Nevertheless he sent away thither his brother *Cn. Cornelius Scipio*, with the greatest part of the fleet and army, to try what might be done against *Hannibal* and the other *Carthaginian* lieutenants in that country. He himself, taking with him a few choice bands, returned by sea to *Pisa* ; and so passing through *Tuscany* to *Lombardy*, drew together the broken troops of *Manlius* and *Attilius*, that lately had been beaten by the *Gauls* : with which forces he made head against the enemy, thinking to find him over-laboured, with travel of his painful journey.

S E C T. IV.

Scipio the Roman consul overcome by Hannibal at Ticinum. Both of the Roman consuls beaten by Hannibal, in a great battel at Trebia.

FIVE months *Hannibal* had spent in his tedious journey from *Carthage* ; what great muller he could make, when he had passed the *Alps*, it is not easily found. Some reckon his foot at an

hundred thousand, and his horse at twenty thousand ; others report them to have been only twenty thousand foot, and six hundred horse. *Hannibal* himself, in his monument which he raised, in the temple of *Juno Lucina*, agreeth with the latter sum. Yet the *Gauls*, *Ligurians*, and others that joined with him, are likely to have mightily increased his army in short space. But when he marched eastward from the banks of *Rhodanus*, he had with him eight and thirty thousand foot, and eight thousand horse ; of which all, save those remembered by himself in the inscription of his altar in *Juno's* temple, are like to have perished, by diseases, enemies, rivers, and mountains ; which mischiefs had devoured, each, their several shares.

Having newly passed the *Alps*, and scarce refreshed his wearied army in the country of *Piedmont* ; he sought to win the friendship of the *Taurini*, who lay next in his way. But the *Taurini* held war at that time with the *Insubrians*, which were his good friends ; and refused (perhaps for the same cause) his amity. Wherefore he assaulted their town, and won it by force in three days. Their spoil served well to hearten his army ; and their calamity, to terrify the neighbour places. So the *Gauls*, without more ado, fell unto his side : many for fear (many also for good-will, according to their former inclination. This disposition ran through the whole country : which joined, or was all in a readiness to join with the *Carthaginians* ; when the news of *Scipio* the consul's arrival, made some to be more advised than the rest. The name of the *Romans* was terrible in those quarters ; what was in the *Carthaginians*, experience had not yet laid open. Since therefore the *Roman* consul was already gotten through the most defensible passages, ere any speech had been heard of his approach : many sat still for very fear, who else would fain have concluded a league with these new-come friends ; and some, for greater fear, offered their service against the *Carthaginians*, whom nevertheless they had wished well to speed.

This wavering affection of the province, whereinto they were entered, made the two generals hasten to the trial of a battel. Their meeting was at *Ticinum*, now called *Pavia* ; where each of them wondered at the other's expedition : *Hannibal* thinking it strange, that the consul whom he had left behind him on the other side of the *Alps*, could meet him in the face, before he had well warmed himself in the plains ; *Scipio* admiring the strange adventure of passing those mountains, and the great spirit of his enemy. Neither were the senate at *Rome* little amazed at *Hannibal's* success, and sudden arrival. Wherefore they dispatched a messenger in all haste unto *Sempronius*, the other consul, that was then in *Sicily*, giving him to understand hereof : and letting him further know, that whereas he had been directed to make the war in *Africa*, it was now their pleasure that he should forbear to prosecute any such attempt, but that he should return the army under his charge, with all possible speed, to save *Italy* it self. According to this order, *Sempronius* sent off his fleet from *Lilybæum*, with direction to land the army at *Ariminum*, a port town not far from *Ravenna* ; quite another way from *Carthage*, whither he was making haste. In the mean while, *Scipio* and *Hannibal* were come so near, that sight they must, ere they could part asunder. Hereupon, both of them prepared the minds of their soldiers, by the best arguments they had : unto which *Hannibal* added the rhetoric of

^a *Not far from Turin, a goodly city, now subject unto the duke of Savoy ; which from them took the name of Augusta Taurinorum.*

a present example, that he shewed upon certain prisoners of the *Savoyards*, which he brought along with him, fitted for the purpose, into *Italy*. For these, having been no less miserably fettered and chained, than sparingly fed; and withal so often scourged on their naked bodies, as nothing was more in their desire, than to be delivered from their miseries by any kind of present death, were brought into the middle of the army; where it was openly demanded, which of them would fight hand to hand with some other of his companions, till the one of them were slain, with condition, being the victor, to receive his liberty, and some small reward. This was no sooner propounded, than all of them together accepted the offer. Then did *Hannibal* cause his lots to be cast, which of them should enter the list, with such weapons, as the chieftains of the *Gauls* were wont to use in single combats. Every one of these unhappy men wished, that his own lot might speed; whereby it should at least be his good fortune, to end his miseries by death, if not to get a reward by victory. That couple, whose good hap it was to be chosen, fought resolutely: as rather desiring, than fearing death; and having none other hope, than in vanquishing. Thus were some few couples matched, it skilled not how equally: for all these poor creatures were willing, upon whatsoever uneven terms, to rid themselves out of slavery. The same affection that was in these combatants, and in their fellows which beheld them, wrought also upon the *Carthaginians*, for whom the spectacle was ordained. For they deemed happy, not only him, that by winning the victory had gotten his liberty, together with an horse and armour, but even him also, who being slain in fight, had escaped that miserable condition, unto which his companions were returned. Their general perceiving what impression this dumb shew had wrought in them, began to admonish them of their own condition, speaking to this effect: That he had laid before them an example of their own estates: seeing the time was at hand, wherein they were all to run the same fortune, that these slaves had done; all to live victorious and rich; or all to die, or (which these prisoners esteemed far more grievous) to live in a perpetual slavery: that none of them all, in whom was common sense, could promise to himself any hope of life by flight; since the mountains, the rivers, the great distance from their own countries, and the pursuit of merciless enemies, must needs retrench all such impotent imaginations. He therefore prayed them to remember, that they, who had even now praised the fortune both of the victor, and of the vanquished, would make it their own case; seeing that there was never any in the world, appointed with such a resolution, that had ever been broken, or beaten by their enemies. On the contrary, he told them, that the *Romans*, who were to fight upon their own soil, and in view of their own towns; who knew as many ways to save themselves by flight, as they had bodies of men to fight withal, could no way entertain such a resolution as theirs: seeing the same necessity (to which nothing seems impossible) did no way press them, or constrain them. In this sort did *Hannibal*, with one substantial argument, *that there was no mean between victory and death*, encourage his companions. For (saith a great captain of *France*) *la commodité de la retraite avance la fuite; the commodity of a retreat doth greatly advance a flat running away*.

Scipio, on the other side, after that he had given order for the laying of a bridge over the river of

Ticinus, did not neglect to use the best arguments and reasons he could to encourage the army he led; putting them in mind of the great conquests and victories of their ancestors; against how many nations they had prevailed, and over how many princes their enemies they had triumphed. As for this army commanded by *Hannibal*, although it were enough to tell them, that it was no better than of *Carthaginians*, whom in their late war they had so often beaten by land and sea; yet he prayed them withal to consider, that at this time it was not only so diminished in numbers, as it rather seemed a troop of brigants and thieves, than an army likely to encounter the *Romans*; but so weather-beaten, and starved, as neither the men nor horses had strength or courage to sustain the first charge that should be given upon them. Nay (saith he) ye yourselves may make judgment what daring they have now remaining, after so many travels and miseries; seeing when they were in their best strength, after they had passed the *Roan*, their horse-men were not only beaten by ours, and driven back to the very trenches of their camp, but *Hannibal* himself, fearing our approach, ran head-long towards the *Alps*; thinking it a less dishonour to die there by frost, famine, and precipitation, than by the sharp swords of the *Romans*, which had so often cut down his people both in *Africa*, and in *Sicily*. It was not long after this, ere the two generals met, each being far advanced before the gross of his army with his horse; and the *Roman* having also with him some light-armed foot, to view the ground, and the enemy's countenance. When they discovered the approach one of the other, *Scipio* sent before him his horsemen of the *Gauls* to begin the fight, and bestowing his darters in the void ground between their troops, to assist them; himself with his *Roman* men at arms followed softly in good order. The *Gauls* (whether desirous to try the metal of the *Carthaginians*, or hoping thereby to get favour of the *Romans*) behaved themselves courageously, and were courageously opposed; yet their foot, that should have aided them, shrank at the first brunt, or rather fled cowardly away, without casting a dart, for fear of being trodden down by the enemy's horse. This notwithstanding, the *Gauls* maintained the fight, and did more hurt than they received, as presuming that they were well back'd; neither was the consul unmindful to relieve them, their hardiness deserving his aid, and the hasty flight of those that should have stood by them, admonishing him that it was needful. Wherefore he adventured himself so far, that he received a dangerous wound, and had been left in the place, if his son (afterwards surnamed *Africanus*) had not brought him off; though others give the honour of this rescue to a *Ligurian* slave. Whilst the *Romans* were busied in helping their consul, an unexpected storm came driving at their backs, and made them look about how to help themselves. *Hannibal* had appointed his *Numidian* light-horse to give upon the *Romans* in flank, and to compass them about, whilst he with his men at arms sustained their charge, and met them in the face. The *Numidians* performed this very well; cutting in pieces the scattered foot, that ran away at the first encounter; and then falling on the backs of those, whose looks were fastened upon *Hannibal* and *Scipio*. By this impression the *Romans* were shuffled together, and routed; so that they all betook them to their speed, and left unto their enemies the honour of the day.

When *Scipio* saw his horse-men thus beaten, and the rest of his army thereby greatly discouraged, he thought it a point of wisdom, having lost so many of his fleet upon the first puff of the wind, to take post

port with the rest before the extremest of the tempest overtook him; for he saw by the lowring morning what manner of day it was like to prove: therefore his battel of foot being yet unbroken, he, in a manner, stole the retreat, and recovered the bridge over *Ticinus*, which he had formerly built. But notwithstanding all the haste that he made, he left six hundred of his rear behind him, who were the last that should have passed, and staid to break the bridge. Herein he followed this rule of a good man of war, *Si certamen quandoque dubium videatur, tacitam miles arripiat fugam: fuga enim aliquando laudanda*; which must be understood in this sort: *If a general of an army, by some unprosperous beginnings, doubt the success, or find his army fearful or wavering, it is more profitable to steal a safe retreat, than to abide the uncertain event of battel.*

It was two days after ere *Hannibal* could pass the river, *Scipio* the whilst refreshing his men, and easing himself of his wound in *Placentia*: but as soon as *Hannibal* presented his army before the town, offering battel to the *Romans*, who durst not accept it, nor issue forth of their camp, the *Gauls*, that hitherto had followed *Scipio* for fear, gathered, out of his fear, courage to forsake him. They thought that now the long-desired time was come, in which better chieftains and soldiers than *Aneroestus*, *Britomarus*, and *Gessates*, were come to help them, if they had the hearts to help themselves. Wherefore the same night they fell upon the *Roman* camp, wounded, and slew many; especially of those guards that kept watch at the gate, with whose heads in their hands they fled over to the *Carthaginians*, and presented their service. *Hannibal* received them exceeding courteously, and dismissed them to their own places, as men likely to be of more use to him, in perswading the rest of their nation to become his confederates, than in any other service at the present.

About the fourth watch of the night following, the consul stole a retreat, as he had done before; but not with the like ease and security. *Hannibal* had a good eye upon him, and ere he could get far, sent the *Numidians* after him, following himself with all his army. That night the *Romans* had received a great blow, if the *Numidians*, greedy of spoil, had not staid to ransack their camp, and thereby given time to all, save some few in rear, that were slain or taken, to pass the river of *Trebia*, and save themselves. *Scipio*, being both unable to travel by reason of his wound, and withal finding it expedient to attend the coming of his fellow-consul, encamps himself strongly upon the banks of *Trebia*. Necessity required that he should so do; yet this diminished his reputation, for every day more and more of the *Gauls* fell to the *Carthaginian* side; among whom came in the *Boij*, that brought with them the *Roman* commissioners, which they had taken in the late insurrection. They had hitherto kept them as pledges, to redeem their own hostages; but now they deliver them up to *Hannibal*, as tokens and pledges of their affections towards him, by whose help they conceived better hope of recovering their own men and lands. In the mean while *Hannibal*, being in great scarcity of victuals, attempted the taking of *Clasidium*, a town wherein the *Romans* had laid up all their store and munition: but there needed no force, a *Brundusian*, whom the *Romans* had trusted with keeping it, sold it for a little money.

The news of these disasters brought to *Rome*, filled the senate and people rather with a desire of hally revenge, than any great sorrow for their loss received; seeing that, in a manner, all their foot,

wherein their strength and hope consisted, were as yet entire. They therefore halted away *Sempronius*, that was newly arrived, towards *Ariminum*, where the army, by him sent out of *Sicily*, awaited his coming. He therefore halted hither, and from thence he marched speedily towards his colleague, who attended him upon the banks of *Trebia*. Both the armies being joined in one, the consuls devised about that which remained to be done: *Sempronius* receiving from *Scipio* the relation of what had passed since *Hannibal's* arrival, the fortune of the late fight, and by what error or misadventure the *Romans* were therein foiled, which *Scipio* chiefly laid on the revolt and treason of the *Gauls*.

Sempronius, having received from *Scipio* the state of the affairs in those parts, sought by all means to try his fortune with *Hannibal*, before *Scipio* were recovered of his wounds, that thereby he might purchase to himself the sole glory of the victory, which he had already, in his imagination, certainly obtained. He also feared the election of the new consuls, his own time being well near expired. But *Scipio* perswaded the contrary, objecting the unskillfulness of the new-come soldiers; and withal, gave him good reason to assure him, that the *Gauls*, naturally unconstant, were upon terms of abandoning the party of the *Carthaginians*; those of them inhabiting between the rivers of *Trebia* and *Po* being already revolted. *Sempronius* knew all this as well as *Scipio*; but being both guided and blinded by his ambition, he made haste to find out the dishonour which he might otherwise easily have avoided. This resolution of *Sempronius* was exceeding pleasing to *Hannibal*, who feared nothing so much as delay and loss of time; for the strength of his army, consisting in strangers, to wit, in *Spaniards* and *Gauls*, he no less feared the change of affection in the one, than the impatience of the other; who, being far from their own home, had many passions moving them to turn their faces towards it. To further the desire of *Sempronius*, it fell out so, that about the same time the *Gauls* inhabiting near unto *Trebia*, complained of injuries done by the *Carthaginians*. They did not supply *Hannibal* with necessities, as he supposed that they might have done; although he daily reprehended their negligence, telling them, that for their sakes, and to set them at liberty, he had undertaken this expedition. Seeing therefore how little they regarded his words, he was bold to be his own carver, and took from them by force as much as he needed of that which they had. Hereupon they fly to the *Romans* for help, and, to make their tale the better, say, that this wrong is done them, because they refused to join with *Hannibal*. *Scipio* cared not much for this; he suspected their falshood, and was assured of their mutability: but *Sempronius* affirmed, that it stood with the honour of *Rome* to preserve their confederates from suffering injury, and that thereby might be won the friendship of all the *Gauls*. Therefore he sent out a thousand horse, which coming unlooked for upon *Hannibal's* foragers, and finding them heavy laden, cut many of them in pieces, and chased the rest even into their own camp. This indignity made the *Carthaginians* sally out against them, who caused them to retire faster than they came. *Sempronius* was ready to back his own men, and repelled the enemies. *Hannibal* did the like. So that at length all the *Roman* army was drawn forth, and a battel ready to be fought, if the *Carthaginian* had not refused it.

This victory (for so the consul would have it called) made the *Romans* in general detrous to try the main chance in open field: all the perswasions

of *Scipio* to the contrary notwithstanding. Of this disposition *Hannibal* was advertised by the *Gauls*, his spies, that were in the *Roman* camp. Therefore he bethought himself how to help forward the victory, by adding some stratagem to his forces: he found in the hollow of a water-course, over-grown with high reeds, a fit trench to cover an ambush. Therein he cast his brother *Mago*, with a thousand choice horse, and as many foot. The rest of his army, after they had well warmed, and well fed themselves in their camp, he led into the field, and marched towards the consul. Early in the morning he had sent over *Trebia* some companies of *Numidian* light-horse to brave the enemy, and draw him forth to a bad dinner, ere he had broken his fast. *Sempronius* was ready to take any opportunity to fight; and therefore not only issued out of his camp, but forded the river of *Trebia*, in a most cold and miserable day, his foot being wet almost to the arm-holes; which, together with the want of food, did so enfeeble and cool their courages, as they wanted force to handle the arms they bare. Strong they were in foot, as well of their own nation, as of the *Latins*: having of the one, sixteen, of the other, twenty thousand. The mass of these they ranged in a gross battalion, guarded on the flanks with three thousand horse: thrusting their light-armed, and darters, in loose troops in the head of the rest, in the nature of a vanguard. The *Carthaginian* numbers of foot, were in a manner equal to their enemies; in horse, they had by far the better, both in number and goodness. When therefore the *Roman* horse, ranged on the flanks of their foot, were broken by the *Numidians*; when their foot were charged both in front and flank, by the *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, and elephants; when finally the whole army was unawares press'd in the rear, by *Mago* and his two thousand, that rose out of their place of ambush: then fell the *Romans*, by heaps, under the enemies swords; and being beaten down, as well fighting in disorder, as flying towards the river, by the horsemen that pursued them, there escaped no more of six and thirty thousand, than ten thousand of all sorts, horse and foot.

Three great errors *Sempronius* committed, of which every one deserved to be recompensed with the loss that followed. The first was, that he fought with *Hannibal* in a champain, being by far interior in horse, and withal thereby subject to the *African* elephants, which, in inclosed or uneven grounds and wood-lands, would have been of no use. His second error was, that he made no discovery of the place upon which he fought; whereby he was grossly over-reach'd, and insnared, by the ambush which *Hannibal* had laid for him. The third was, that he drench'd his footmen with empty stomachs, in the river of *Trebia*, even in a most cold and frosty day, whereby in effect they lost the use of their limbs. For, as one saith well; *There is nothing more inconvenient and perilous, than to present an army tired with travel, to an enemy fresh and fed; since where the strength of body faileth, the generosity of mind is but as an unprofitable vapour.*

The broken remainder of the *Roman* army, was collected by *Scipio*, who got therewith into *Placentia*; stealing away the same night, which was exceeding rainy, from the *Carthaginians*, who either perceived him not, because of the showers; or would not perceive him, because they were over-wearied. *Sempronius* escaped with extrem danger; flying through the country that was overrun by the enemies horse. He was attended by more, than were requisite in a secret flight; yet by

fewer, than could have made resistance, if the enemy had met with him. Nevertheless he got away, and came to *Rome*, where he did his office in choosing new consuls for the year following; and then returned into his province, with a fresh supply against *Hannibal*.

S E C T. V.

The departure of Hannibal from the Cisalpine Gauls into Hetruria. Flaminius the Roman consul slain; and his army destroyed by the Carthaginians, at the lake of Trasymene.

THE winter growing on apace, was very sharp, and unfit for service: to the great contentment of the *Romans*, who being not able to keep the field, lay warm in *Placentia*, and *Cremona*. Yet *Hannibal* did not suffer them to rest very quiet: but vexed them with continual alarms; assailing divers places; and taking some; beating the *Gauls* their adherents; and winning the *Ligurians* to his party, who presented him, in token of their faithful love, with two *Roman* questors or treasurers, two colonels and five gentlemen, the sons of senators, which they had intercepted. These, and in general all such prisoners as he had of the *Romans*, he held in streight places, loaden with irons, and miserably fed: those of their followers he not only well entreated, but sent them to their countries without ransom; with this protestation, That he therefore undertook the war in *Italy* to free them from the oppression of the *Romans*. By these means he hoped, and not in vain, to draw many of them to his party and assistance. But the *Gauls* were not capable of such persuasions. They stood in fear, lest he should make their country the seat of war, and perhaps take it from them. They were also more grieved than reason willed them, at his feeding upon them, and wasting their territory. Wherefore some of them conspired against his life; others admonished him of the danger: and these that gave him the advice, were ready soon after to practise against him; but were in like sort detected. He was therefore glad to use perriwigs of hair, and false beards of divers colours, to the end that he might not be descried, nor known, to those that should undertake to make him away. Fain he would have passed the *Apennines*, upon the first appearance of spring; but was compelled by the violence of weather, to tarry among the *Gauls*, till he had seen more swallows than one. At length, when the year was somewhat better opened, he resolved to take his leave of these giddy companions, and bring the war nearer to the gates of *Rome*. So away he went, having his army greatly increased with *Ligurians* and *Gauls*; more serviceable friends abroad, than in their own country. That the passage of the *Apennine* mountains was troublesome, I hold it needless to make any doubt. Yet since the *Roman* armies found no memorable impediment, in their marches that way: the great vexation which fell upon *Hannibal*, when he was travelling through and over them, ought in reason to be imputed rather to the extremity of winter, that makes all ways foul, than to any tolerable difficulty in that journey. Nevertheless, to avoid the length of way, together with the resistance and fortifications, which may not improbably be thought to have been erected upon the ordinary passages towards *Rome*: he chose at this time, though it were with much trouble, to travel through the fens and rotten grounds of *Tuscany*. In those marshes and bogs, he lost all his elephants, save one, together with the use of one of his eyes; by the

moistness of the air, and by lodging on the cold ground, and wading through deep mire and water. In brief, after he had with much ado recovered the firm and fertile plains; he lodged about *Arretium*: where he somewhat refreshed his wearied followers, and heard news of the *Roman* consuls.

C. Flaminius, and *Cn. Servilius* had of late been chosen consuls for this year: *Servilius*, a tractable man, and wholly governed by advice of the senate; *Flaminius*, an hot-headed popular orator, who having once been robbed (as he thought) of his consulship, by a device of the senators, was afraid to be served so again, unless he quickly finished the war. This jealous consul thought it not best for him to be at *Rome*, when he entered into his office; lest his adversaries, by feigning some religious impediment, should detain him within the city, or find other business for him at home, to disappoint him of the honour, that he hoped to get in the war. Wherefore he departed secretly out of the town, and meant to take possession of his office, when the day came, at *Ariminum*. The *Fathers* (so the senators were called) highly displeased with this, revoked him by ambassadors: but he neglected their injunction; and, hasting to meet with the *Carthaginians*, took his way to *Arretium*, where he shortly found them.

The fiery disposition of this consul, promised unto *Hannibal* great assurance of victory. Therefore he provoked, with many indignities, the vehement nature of the *Roman*; hoping thereby to draw him unto fight, ere *Servilius* came with the rest of the army. All the country between *Fesule* and *Arretium* he put to fire and sword, even under the consul's nose; which was enough to make him stir, that would not have sitten still, though *Hannibal* had been quiet. It is true, that a great captain of *France* hath said, *Pays gasté n'est pas perdu; a wasted country is not thereby lost*. But by this waste of the country, *Flaminius* thought his own honour to be much impaired, and therefore advanced towards the enemy. Many advised him (which had indeed been best) to have patience a while, and stay for his colleague. But of this he could not abide to hear: saying, that he came not to defend *Arretium*, whilst the *Carthaginians* went burning down all *Italy* before them, to the gates of *Rome*. Therefore he took horse, and commanded the army to march. It is reported as ominous, that one of their ensigns stuck so fast in the ground, as it could not be plucked up by the ensign-bearer. Of this tale, whether true or false, *Tully* makes a jest: saying, that the cowardly knave did faintly pull at it (as going now to fight) having hardly pitched it into the earth. Neither was the answer of *Flaminius* (if it were true) disagreeable hereto: for he commanded, that it should be digged up, if fear had made the hands too weak to lift it up; asking withal, whether letters were not come from the senate, to hinder his proceedings. Of this their jealousy, both he, and the senate that gave him cause, are likely to repent.

All the territory of *Cortona*, as far as to the lake of *Tbrasmene*, was on a light fire, which whilst the consul thought to quench with his enemies blood, he pursued *Hannibal* so unadvisedly, that he fell with his whole army, into an ambush cunningly laid for him, between the mountains of *Cortona*, and the lake. There was he charged unawares on all sides (save only where that lake of *Ponsa* permitted neither his enemies to come at him, nor him to flee from them) knowing not which way to turn, or make resistance. So was

he slain in the place, accompanied with fifteen thousand dead carcasses of his countrymen. About six thousand of his men, that had the vanguard, took courage, as for the most part it happens, out of desperation; and, breaking through the enemies, that stood in their way, recovered the tops of the mountains. If these had returned, and given charge upon the *Carthaginians* backs, it was thought that they might have greatly amended, if not wholly altered, the fortune of the day. But that violence of their fear, which, kindled by necessity, had wrought the effects of hardiness; was well asswaged, when they ceased to despair, of saving their lives by flight. They stood still, in a cold sweat, upon the hill-top; hearing under them a terrible noise, but not any ways discovering how things went, because of the great fog that held all that morning. When it grew toward noon, the air was cleared, and they might plainly discern the lamentable slaughter of their fellows. But they staid not to lament it: for it was high time, they thought, to be gone, ere they were descried, and attacked by the enemies horse. This they should have thought upon sooner, since they had no mind to return unto the fight. For descried they were, and *Maharbal* sent after them; who overtook them by night in a village, which he surrounded with his horse: and so they yielded the next day, rendering up their arms, upon his promise of their lives and liberties.

This accord *Hannibal* refused to confirm; saying, that it was made by *Maharbal*, without sufficient warrant, as wanting his authority to make it good. Herein he taught them (yet little to his own honour) what it was to keep no faith: and fitted them with a trick of their own. For, if it were lawful unto the *Romans* to alter covenants, or add unto them what they had listed; if the *Carthaginians* must be fain to pay certain hundreds, and yet more hundreds of talents, besides their first bargain; as also to renounce their interest in *Sardinia*, and be limited in their *Spanish* conquests, according to the good pleasure of the *Romans*, whose present advantage is more ample, than the conditions of the late concluded peace: then can *Hannibal* be as much a *Roman*, as themselves; and make them know, that perfidiousness gaineth no more in prosperity, than it loseth in the change of fortune. Fifteen thousand *Italian* prisoners, or thereabout, he had in his hands: of which, all that were not *Romans*, he set free without ransom; protesting, as he had done before, that it was for their sakes, and to free them and others from the *Roman* tyranny, that he had undertaken this war. But the *Romans* he kept in strait prison, and in fetters; making them learn to eat hard meat. This was a good way, to breed in the people of *Italy*, if not a love of *Carthage*, yet a contempt of *Rome*: as if this war had not concerned the general safety, but only the preserving of her own neck from the yoke of slavery, which her over-strong enemies would thrust upon her in revenge of her oppressions. But an ancient reputation, confirmed by success of many ages, is not lost in one or two battels. Wherefore more is to be done, ere the *Carthaginians* can get any *Italian* partisans.

Presently after the battel of *Tbrasmene*, *G. Centronius*, with four thousand *Roman* horse, drew near unto the camp of *Hannibal*. He was sent from *Ariminum*, by *Servilius* the other consul, to increase the strength of *Flaminius*; but coming too late, he increased only the misadventure. *Maharbal* was employed by *Hannibal*, to intercept this company, who finding them amazed with the report which

which they had newly heard of the great overthrow, charged them, and brake them: and killing almost half of them, drove the rest unto an high piece of ground, whence they came down, and simply yielded to mercy, the next day. *Servilius* himself was, in the mean time, skirmishing with the *Gauls*; against whom he had wrought no matter of importance, when the news was brought him of his colleague's overthrow and death in *Hetruria*, that made him hasten back to the defence of *Rome*.

In these passages, it is easy to discern the fruits of popular jealousy, which perswaded the *Romans* to the yearly change of their commanders in the wars, which greatly endangered, and retarded the growth of that empire. Certain it is, that all men are far better taught by their own errors, than by the examples of their fore-goers. *Flaminius* had heard, in what a trap *Sempronius* had been taken up but the year before, by this subtil *Carthaginian*; yet suffered he himself to be caught soon after in the same manner. He had also belike forgotten, how *Sempronius*, fearing to be prevented by a new consul, and ambitious of the sole honour of beating *Hannibal* in battel, without help of his companion *Scipio*, had been rewarded with shame and loss: else would he not, contrary to all good advice, have been so hasty to fight, before the arrival of *Servilius*. If *Sempronius* had been continued in his charge, it is probable that he would have taken his companion with him the second time, and have searched all suspected places, proper to have shadowed an ambush: both which this new consul *Flaminius* neglected. We may boldly avow it, that by being continued in his government of *France* ten years, *Cesar* brought that mighty nation, together with the *Helvetians*, and many of the *Germans*, under the *Roman* yoke; into which parts, had there been every year a new lieutenant sent, they would hardly, if ever, have been subdued. For it is more than the best wit in the world can do, to inform itself, within one year's compass, of the nature of a great nation, of the factions, of the places, rivers, and of all good helps, whereby to prosecute a war to the best effect. Our princes have commonly left their deputies in *Ireland* three years; whence, by reason of the shortness of that their time, many of them have returned as wise as they went out; others have profited more, and yet when they began but to know the first rudiments of war, and government, fitting the country, they have been called home, and new apprentices sent in their places, to the great prejudice both of this and that estate. But it hath ever been the course of the world, rather to follow old errors, than to examine them: and of princes and governours, to up-hold their slothful ignorance, by the old examples and policy of other ages and people; though neither likeness of time, of occasion, or of any other circumstance, have perswaded the imitation.

S E C T. VI.

How Q. Fabius, the Roman dictator, fought to consume the force of Hannibal, by lingering war. Minutius the master of the horse, honoured and advanced by the people for bold and successful attempting, adventures rashly upon Hannibal, and is like to perish with his army, but rescued by Fabius.

GR E A T L Y were the *Romans* amazed, at this their ill success, and at the danger appa-

rent; which threatened them in more terrible manner, than ever did war, since *Rome* it self was taken. They were good foldiers; and so little accustomed to receive an overthrow, that when *Pyrrhus* had beaten them, once and again, in open field, all *Italy* was strangely affected with his success, and held him in admiration, as one that could work wonders. But *Pyrrhus's* quarrel was not grounded upon hate: he only fought honour, and fought (as it were) upon a bravery: demeaning himself like a courteous enemy. This *Carthaginian* detested the whole *Roman* name; against which he burned with desire of revenge. *Ticinum*, *Trebia*, and *Thrasymene*, witnessed his purpose, and his ability. Which to withstand, they fled unto a remedy that had long been out of use, and created a dictator. The dictator's power was greater than the consuls, and scarcely subject unto controul of the whole city. Wherefore this officer was seldom chosen, but upon some extremity, and for no longer time than six months. He was to be named by one of the consuls, at the appointment of the senate: though it were so, that the consul (if he stood upon his prerogative) might name whom he pleased. At this time, the one consul being dead, and the other too far off, the people took upon them, as having supream authority, to give up the dignity, by their election, to *Q. Fabius Maximus*, the best reputed man of war in the city. *Novum factum, novum consilium expetit; contrary winds, contrary courses.* *Q. Fabius* chose *M. Minutius Rufus* master of the horse; which officer was customarily, as the dictator's lieutenant; though this *Minutius* grew afterwards famous, by taking more upon him.

The first act of *Fabius*, was the reformation of somewhat amiss in matter of religion: a good beginning, and commendable; had the religion been also good. But if it were true (as ^a *Livy* reports it) that the books of *Sibyl* were consulted, and gave direction in this business of devotion; then must we believe, that those books of *Sibyl*, preserved in *Rome*, were dictated by an evil spirit. For it was ordained, that some vow, made in the beginning of this war to *Mars*, should be made anew, and amplified; as having not been rightly made before: also that great plays should be vowed unto *Jupiter*, and a temple to *Venus*; with such other trumpery. This vehemency of superstition, proceeds always from vehemency of fear. And surely this was a time, when *Rome* was exceedingly dis-tempered with passion; whereof that memorable accident, of two women that suddenly died, when they saw their sons return alive from *Thrasymene*, may serve to bear witness; though it be more properly an example of motherly love. The walls and towers of the city were now repaired and fortified; the bridges upon rivers were broken down; and all care taken for defence of *Rome* it self. In this tumult, when the dictator was newly set forth against *Hannibal*; word was brought, that the *Carthaginian* fleet had intercepted all the supply that was going to *Cn. Scipio* in *Spain*. Against these *Carthaginians*, *Fabius* commanded *Servilius* the consul to put to sea; and, taking up all the ships about *Rome* and *Ostia*, to pursue them: whilst he, with the legions, attended upon *Hannibal*. Four legions he had levied in haste: and from *Ariminum* he received the army, which *Servilius* the consul had conducted thither.

With these forthwith he followed apace after *Hannibal*; not to fight, but to affront him. And

^a *Liv. l. 22.*

knowing well, what advantage the *Numidian* horse had over the *Romans*, he always lodged himself on high grounds, and of hard access. *Hannibal* in the mean while, pursuing his victory, had ranged over all the country, and used all manner of cruelty towards the inhabitants; especially to those of the *Roman* nation, of whom he did put to the sword all that were able to bear arms. Passing by *Spoletum* and *Ancona*, he encamped upon the *Adriatic* shores; refreshed his diseased, and overtravelled companies; armed his *Africans* after the manner of the *Romans*; and made his dispatches for *Carthage*, presenting his friends, which were in effect all the citizens, with part of the spoils he had gotten. Having refreshed his army, fed his horses, cured his wounded soldiers, and (as *Polybius* hath it) healed his horse heels of the scratches, by washing their pasterns in old wine; he followed the coast of the *Adriatic* sea towards *Apulia*, a northern province of the kingdom of *Naples*; spoiling the *Marrucini*, and all other nations lying in his way. In all this ground that he over-ran, he had not taken any one city; only he had assayed *Spoletum*, a colony of the *Romans*; and finding it well defended, presently gave it over.

The malice of a great army is broken, and the force of it spent, in a great siege. This the *Protestant* army found true at *Poitiers*; a little before the battel of *Moncouter*; and their victorious enemies, anon after, at *St. Jean de Angeley*. But *Hannibal* was more wise. He would not engage himself in any such enterprise, as should detain him, and give the *Romans* leave to take breath. All his care was to weaken them in force and reputation; knowing, that when once he was absolute master of the field, it would not be long ere the walled cities would open their gates, without expecting any engine of battery. To this end he presented *Fabius* with battel, as soon as he saw him; and provoked him with all manner of bravado's. But *Fabius* would not bite. He well knew the differences between soldiers bred up, ever since they were boys, in war and in blood, trained and hardened in *Spain*, made proud and adventurous by many victories there, and of late by some notable acts against the *Romans*; and such as had no oftner seen the enemy, than been vanquished by him. Therefore he attended the *Carthaginian* so near, as he kept him from stragling too far; and preserved the country from utter spoil. He inured his men by little and little, and made them acquainted with dangers by degrees; and he brought them first to look on the lion afar off, that in the end they might sit on his tail.

Now *Minutius* had a contrary disposition, and was as fiery as *Flaminius*; taxing *Fabius* with cowardice and fear. But all stirred not this well-advised commander. For wise men are no more moved with such noise, than with wind bruised out of a bladder. There is nothing of more indiscretion and danger, than to pursue misfortune: it wasteth it self sooner by sufferance, than by opposition. It is the invading army that desires battel: and this of *Hannibal*, was both the invading, and the victorious. *Fabius* therefore suffered *Hannibal* to cross the *Apennines*, and to fall upon the most rich and pleasant territory of *Campania*; neither could he by any arguments be persuaded, to adventure the *Roman* army in battel: but being far too weak in horse, he always kept the hills and fast grounds. When *Hannibal* saw he could by no means draw this wary dictator to fight; that the winter came on; and that the towns stood firm for the *Romans*, whose legion were in sight, though afar off;

he resolved to rest his army, that was laden with spoil, in some plentiful and assured place, till the following spring. But ere this can be done, he must pass along by the dictator's camp; that hung over his head on the hills of *Calicula* and *Cassinum*: for other way there was none, by which he might issue out of that goodly garden-country, which he had already wasted, into places more abundant of provision for his wintering. It was by mere error of his guide, that he first entred within these streights. For he would have been directed unto *Cassinum*, whence he might both assay the fair city of *Capua*, which had made him friendly promises under-hand, and hinder the *Romans* from coming near it to prevent him. But his guide misunderstood the *Carthaginian* pronunciation, and conducted him awry another way, from *Cassinum* to *Casilinum*, whence *Fabius* hoped that he should not easily escape. Now began the wisdom of *Fabius* to grow into credit; as if he had taken the *Carthaginians* in a trap, and won the victory without blows. But *Hannibal* reformed this opinion, and freed himself, by a slight invention, yet serving the turn as well as a better. In driving the country, he had gotten about two thousand kine; whose horns he dressed with dry faggots; and setting fire to them in a dark night, caused them to be driven up the hills. The spectacle was strange, and therefore terrible; especially to those that knew it to be the work of a terrible enemy. What it should mean, *Fabius* could not tell: but thought it a device to circumvent him; and therefore kept within his trenches. They that kept the hill-tops, were horribly afraid, when some of these fiery monsters were gotten beyond them; and ran therefore hastily away, thinking that the enemies were behind their backs; and fell among the light-armed *Carthaginians*, that were no less afraid of them. So *Hannibal*, with his whole army, recovered sure ground, without molestation: where he stayed till the next morning; and then brought off his light foot-men, with some slaughter of the *Romans*, that began to hold them in skirmish. After this, *Hannibal* made semblance of taking his journey towards *Rome*: and the dictator coasted him in the wonted manner, keeping still on high grounds, between him and the city, whilst the *Carthaginians* wasted all the plains. The *Carthaginian* took *Geryon*, an old ruinous town in *Apulia*, forsaken by the inhabitants, which he turned into barns, and store-houses for winter, and incamped under the broken walls. Other matter of importance he did none: but the time passed idly, till the dictator was called away to *Rome*, about some business of religion, and left the army in charge with *Minutius*, the master of the horse.

Minutius was glad of this good occasion to shew his own sufficiency. He was fully persuaded, that his *Romans*, in plain field, would be too hard for the *Africans* and *Spaniards*: by whom if they had been foiled already twice or thrice, it was not by open force, but by subtilty and ambush, which he thought himself wise enough to prevent. All the army was of his opinion; and that so earnestly, as he was preferred by judgment of the soldiers, in worthiness to command, before the cold and wary *Fabius*. In this jollity of conceit, he determined to fight. Yet had he been peremptorily forbidden so to do, by the dictator; the breach of whose command was extreme peril of death. But the honour of the victory, which he held undoubtedly his own; the love of the army, and the friends that he had at home bearing office in *Rome*, were enough to save him from the dictator's rods and

axes, took he the matter never so heinously. *Hannibal* on the other side was no less glad, that he should play with a more adventurous gamester. Therefore he drew near, and, to provoke the *Romans*, sent forth a third part of his army to waste the country. This was boldly done, seeing that *Minutius* encamped hard by him: but it seems, that he now despised those whom he had so often vanquished. There was a piece of high ground between the two camps, which because it would be commodious to him that could occupy it, the *Carthaginians* seized upon by night with two thousand of their light-armed. But *Minutius*, by plain force, won it from them the next day; and entrenching himself thereupon, became their nearer neighbour.

The main business of *Hannibal* at this time was, to provide abundantly, not only for his men, but for his horses, which he knew to be the chief of his strength, that he might keep them in good heart against the next summer: if, besides this, he could give the *Romans* another blow, it would increase his reputation, encourage his own men, terrify his enemies, and give him leave to forage the country at will. Since therefore *Minutius* did not in many days issue forth of his camp, the *Carthaginian* sent out (as before) a great number of his men to fetch in harvest. This advantage *Minutius* wisely espied and took. For he led forth his army, and setting it in order, presented battel to *Hannibal*, that was not in case to accept it, even at his own trenches. His horse, and all his light armature, divided into companies, he sent abroad against the foragers; who being dispersed over all the fields, and laden with booty, could make no resistance. This angered *Hannibal*, that was not able to help them; but worse did it anger him when the *Romans* took heart to assail his trenches. They perceived that it was mere weakness which held him within his camp, and therefore were bold to despise his great name, that could not resist their present strength. But in the heat of the business, *Asdrubal* came from *Geryon* with four thousand men, being informed of the danger by those that had escaped the *Roman* horse. This emboldened *Hannibal* to issue forth against the *Romans*, to whom nevertheless he did not such hurt as he had received.

For this piece of service *Minutius* was highly esteemed by the army, and more highly by the people at *Rome*, to whom he sent the news, with somewhat greater boast than truth. It seemed no small matter, that the *Roman* army had recovered spirit, so far forth that dared to set upon *Hannibal* in his own camp; and that in so doing it came off with the better. Every man therefore praised the master of the horse, that had wrought this great alteration; and consequently, they grew as far out of liking with *Fabius* and his timorous proceedings, thinking that he had not done any thing wisely in all his dictatorship, saving that he chose such a worthy lieutenant; whereas indeed in no other thing had he so greatly erred. But the dictator was not so joyful of a little good luck, as angry with the breach of discipline, and fearful of greater danger thereon likely to ensue. He said, that he knew his own place, and what was to be done; that he would teach the master of the horse to do so likewise, and make him give account of what he had done, if he were dictator; speaking it openly, that good success issuing from bad counsel was more to be feared than calamity; forasmuch as the one bred a foolish confidence, the other taught men to be wary. Against these sermons every one cried out, especially *Metellus*, a tribune of the peo-

ple; which office warranted him to speak, and do what he list without fear of the dictator. It is not enough (said he) that this our only man, chosen to be general, and lord of the town in our greatest necessity, hath done no manner of good, but suffered all *Italy* to be wasted before his eyes, to the utter shame of our state; unless he also hinders others from doing better than himself can, or dares? It were good to consider what he means by this. Into the place of *C. Flaminius* he hath not chosen any new consul all this while; *Servilius* is sent away to sea. I know not why; *Hannibal* and he, have, as it were, taken truce; *Hannibal* sparing the dictator's grounds (for *Hannibal* had indeed forbore to spoil some grounds of *Fabius*, that so he might bring him into envy and suspicion;) and the dictator giving him leave to spoil all others without impeachment. Surely his drift is even this: he would have the war to last long, that he himself might be long in office, and have the sole government both of our city and armies. But this must not be so. It were better that the commonalty of *Rome*, which gave him this authority, should again take it from him, and confer it upon one more worthy. But lest, in moving the people hereto, I should seem to do him injury, thus far forth I will regard his honour; I will only propound, that the master of the horse may be joined in equal authority with the dictator; a thing not more new, nor less necessary, than was the electing of this dictator by the people.

Though all men, even the senators, were ill perswaded of the course which *Fabius* had taken against *Hannibal*, as being neither plausible, nor seeming beneficial at the present; yet was there none so injurious as to think, that his general intent and care of the weal publick was less than very honourable. Whereas therefore it was the manner in passing of any act, that some man of credit and authority, besides the propounder, should stand up, and formally deliver his approbation; not one of the principal citizens was found so impudent as to offer that open disgrace, both unto a worthy personage, and (therewithal) unto that dignity, whose great power had freed the state at several times from the greatest dangers. Only *C. Terentius Varro*, who the year before had been pretor, was glad of such an opportunity to win the favour of the multitude. This fellow was the son of a butcher, afterwards became a shop-keeper; and, being of a contentious spirit, grew, by often brablings, to take upon him as a pleader, dealing in poor mens causes. Thus by little and little he got into office, and rose by degrees, being advanced by those, who in hatred of the nobility favoured his very baseness. And now he thought the time was come for him to give an hard push at the consulship; by doing that which none of the great men, fearing or favouring one another, either durst or would. So he made an hot invective, not only against *Fabius*, but against all the nobility; saying, that it grieved them to see the people do well, and take upon them what belonged unto them in matter of government; that they sought to humble the commons by poverty, and to impoverish them by war; especially by war at their own doors, which would soon consume every poor man's living, and find him other work to think upon than matter of state. Therefore he bad them to be wise; and since they had found one (this worthy master of the horse) that was better affected unto them and his country, to reward him according to his good deserts; and give him authority accordingly as was propounded by the tribune.

that so he might be encouraged and enabled to proceed as he had begun. So the act passed.

Before this busy day of contention, *Fabius* had dispatched the election of a new consul, which was *M. Atilius Regulus*, in the room of *C. Flaminius*; and, having finished all requisite business, went out of town, perceiving well that he should not be able to withstand the multitude, in hindering the decree. The news of *Minutius's* advancement was at the camp as soon as *Fabius*: so that his old lieutenant, and new colleague, began to treat with him as a companion; asking him at the first, in what sort he thought it best to divide their authority; whether that one one day, and the other the next, or each of them successively, for some longer time, should command in chief. *Fabius* briefly told him, that it was the pleasure of the citizens to make the master of the horse equal to the dictator, but that he should never be his superior: he would therefore divide the legions with him by lot, according to the custom. *Minutius* was not herewith greatly pleased; for that with half of the army he could not work such wonders as otherwise he hoped to accomplish. Nevertheless he meant to do his best, and so taking his part of the army, encamped about a mile and a half from the dictator. Needful it was (though *Livy* seems to tax him for it) that he should so do. For where two several commanders are not subordinate one unto another, nor joined in commission, but have each entire and absolute charge of his own followers, there are the forces (though belonging unto one prince or state) not one, but two distinct armies; in which regard one camp shall not hold them both without great inconvenience. *Polybius* neither finds fault with this division, nor yet reports that *Fabius* was unwilling to command in chief successively (as the two consuls used) with *Minutius*, by turns. He saith, that *Minutius* was very refractory, and so proud of his advancement, that continually he opposed the dictator: who thereupon referred it to his choice, either to divide the forces between them, as is said before, or else to have command over all by course. This is likely to be true. For natures impatient of subjection, when once they have broken loose from the rigour of authority, love nothing more than to contest with it; as if herein consisted the proof and assurance of their liberty.

It behoved the master of the horse to make good the opinion which had thus advanced him. Therefore he was no less careful of getting occasion to fight, then was *Fabius* of avoiding the necessity. That which *Minutius* and *Hannibal* equally desired could not long be wanting. The country lying between them was open and bare, yet as fit for ambush as could be wished: for that the sides of a naked valley adjoining, had many and spacious caves; able, some one of them, to hide two or three hundred men. In these lurking places *Hannibal* bestowed five hundred horse, and five thousand foot; thrusting them so close together, that they could not be discovered. But lest by any misadventure they should be found out, and buried in their holes, he made offer betimes in the morning to seize upon a piece of ground that lay on the other hand; whereby he drew the eyes and the thoughts of the *Romans* from their more needful care, to business little concerning them. Like unto this was the occasion, which, not long before, had provoked *Minutius* to adventure upon the *Carthaginians*. Hoping therefore to increase his honour, in like sort as he got it, he sent first his light armature, then his horse, and at length (seeing that *Hannibal* seconded his own troops with fresh com-

panies) he followed in person with the legions. He was soon caught, and so hotly charged on all sides, that he knew neither how to make resistance, nor any safe retreat. In this dangerous case, whilst the *Romans* defended themselves, losing many, and those of their best men, *Fabius* drew near in very good order to relieve them. For this old captain, perceiving afar off, into what extremity his new colleague had rashly thrown himself and his followers, did the office of a good citizen; and regarding more the benefit of his country, than the disgrace which he had wrongfully sustained, sought rather to approve himself by hastening to do good, than by suffering the enemy to feel the reward of his doing ill. Upon *Fabius's* approach *Hannibal* retired, fearing to be well wetted with a shower from the cloud (as he termed the dictator) that had hung so long on the hill-tops. *Minutius* forthwith submitted himself to *Fabius*, by whose benefit he confessed his life to have been saved. So from this time forwards the war proceeded coldly, as the dictator would have it; both whilst his office lasted, which was not long, and likewise afterwards, when he delivered up his charge unto the consuls, that followed his instructions.

Servilius the consul had pursued in vain a *Carthaginian* fleet, to which he came never within kenning. He ran along all the coast of *Italy*, took hostages of the *Sardinians* and *Corficans*, passed over into *Africa*, and there negligently falling to spoil the country, was shamefully beaten aboard his ships, with the loss of a thousand men. Weighing anchor therefore in all haste, he returned home by *Sicily*; and (being so required by the dictator's letters) repaired to the camp with his fellow-consul, where they took charge of the army.

SECT. VII.

The Roman people, desirous to finish the war quickly, chuse a rash and unworthy consul. Great forces levied against Hannibal. Hannibal taketh the Romans provisions in the castle of Cannæ. The new consuls set forth against Hannibal.

WITH little pleasure did they of the poorer sort in *Rome* hear the great commendations that were given to *Fabius* by the principal citizens. He had indeed preserved them from receiving a great overthrow; but he had neither finished the war, nor done any thing in appearance thereto tending. Rather it might seem, that the reputation of this his own worthy act, was likely to countenance the slow proceedings, or perhaps the cowardise (if it were no worse) of those that followed him, in protracting the work to a great length. Else, what meant the consuls to sit idle the whole winter, contrary to all former custom; since it was never heard before, that any *Roman* general had willingly suffered the time of his command to run away without any performance; as if it were honourable to do just nothing? Thus they suspected they knew not what; and were ready, every man, to discharge the grief and anger of his own private loss, upon the ill administration of the publick.

This affection of the people was very helpful to *C. Terentius Varro*, in his suit for the consulship. It behoved him to strike while the iron was hot; his own worth being little or none, and his credit over-weak, to make way into that high dignity. But the commonalty were then in such a mood, as abundantly supplied all his defects. Wherein to help he had a kinsman, *Bibius Herennius*, then tribune of the people; who spared not to use the liberty

liberty of his place, in saying what he listed, without all regard of truth or modesty. This bold orator stuck not to affirm, that *Hannibal* was drawn into *Italy*, and suffered therein to range at his pleasure, by the noblemen; that *Minutius*, indeed, with his two legions, was likely to have been overthrown, and was rescued by *Fabius* with the other two; but, had all been joined together, what they might have done, it was apparent, by the victory of *Minutius*, when he commanded over all as master of the horse; that without a *Plebeian* consul, the war would never be brought to an end; that such of the *Plebeians* as had long since been advanced to honour by the people, were grown as proud as the old nobility, and contemned the meaner sort, ever since themselves were freed from contempt of the more mighty; that therefore it was needful to chuse a consul, who should be altogether a *Plebeian*, a mere new man, one that could boast of nothing but the people's love, nor could wish more than to keep it, by well deserving of them. By such persuasions the multitude was won to be wholly for *Terentius*, to the great vexation of the nobles, who could not endure to see a man raised for none other virtue than his detracting from their honour, and therefore opposed him with all their might. To hinder the desire of the people, it fell out, or at least was alledged, that neither of the two present consuls could well be spared from attending upon *Hannibal*, to hold the election. Wherefore a dictator was named for that purpose, and he again deposed; either (as was pretended) for some religious impediment, or because the fathers desired an *Inter-regnum*, wherein they might better hope to prevail in choice of the new consuls. This *Inter-regnum* took name and being in *Rome* at the death of *Romulus*, and was in use at the death of other kings. The order of it was this: All the fathers or senators, who at the first were an hundred, parted themselves into tens or decuries, and governed successively by the space of five days, one decury after another in order; yet so, that the lictors or virgers, carrying the fasces or bundles of rods and axes, waited only upon the chief of them with these ensigns of power. This custom was retained in times of the consuls; and put in use, when by death or any casualty, there wanted ordinary magistrates of the old year, to substitute new for the year following. The advantage of the fathers herein was, that if the election were not like to go as they would have it, there needed no more than to slip five days, and then all to begin anew; by which interruption the heat of the multitude was commonly well asswaged. Upon such change of those that were presidents of the election, it was also lawful unto new petitioners to sue for the magistracies that lay void, which otherwise was not allowed; but a time limited, wherein they should publicly declare themselves to seek those offices. But no device would serve against the general favour born unto *Terentius*. One *Inter-regnum* passed over, and the malice of the fathers, against the virtue (as it was believed) of this mean, but worthy man, seemed so manifest, that when the people had urged the business to dispatch, only *Terentius* was chosen consul; in whose hand it was left to hold the election of his colleague. Hereupon all the former petitioners gave over. For whereas men of ordinary mark had stood for the place before, it was now thought meet, that both to supply the defect, and to bridle the violence of this unexpert and hot-headed man, one of great sufficiency and reputation, should be joined with him, as both companion and op-

posite. So *L. Æmilius Paulus*, he who few years since had overcome the *Illyrians*, and chased *Demetrius Pharius* out of his kingdom, was urged by the nobility to stand for the place; which he easily obtained, having no competitor. It was not the desire of this honourable man to trouble himself any more in such great business of the common-wealth. For, notwithstanding his late good service, he and *M. Livius*, that had been his companion in office, were afterwards injuriously vexed by the people, and called unto judgment; where in *Livius* was condemned, and *Æmilius* hardly escaped. But of this injustice they shall put the *Romans* well in mind each of them in his second consulship, wherein they shall honourably approve their worth; the one of them nobly dying in the most grievous loss, the other bravely winning in the most happy victory that ever befel that common-wealth.

These new consuls, *Varro* and *Paulus*, omitted no part of their diligence in preparing for the war; wherein though *Varro* made the greater noise, by telling what wonders he would work, and that he would ask no more than once to have a sight of *Hannibal*, whom he promised to vanquish the very first day, yet the providence and care of *Paulus* travelled more earnestly toward the accomplishment of that, whereof his fellow vainly boasted. He wrote unto the two old consuls *Servilius* and *Attilius*, desiring them to abstain from hazard of the main chance; but nevertheless to ply the *Carthaginians* with daily skirmish, and weaken them by degrees, that when he and his colleague should take the field, with the great army which they were now levying, they might find the four old legions well accustomed to the enemy, and the enemy well weakened to their hands. He was also very strict in his musters, wherein the whole senate assisted him so carefully, as if in this action they meant to refute the slanders with which *Terentius* and his adherents had burdened them. What number of men they raised it is uncertain. Fourscore thousand foot at the least, and six thousand horse; they were strong in the field when the day came, which *Varro* had so greatly desired of looking upon *Hannibal*.

Hiero, the old king of *Syracuse*, as he had relieved the *Carthaginians* when they were distressed by their own mercenaries, so did he now send help to *Rome*, a thousand archers and slingers, with great quantity of wheat, barley, and other provisions; fearing nothing more, than that one of these two mighty cities should destroy the other, whereby his own estate would fall to ruin, that stood upright by having them somewhat even-balanced. He gave them also counsel to send forces into *Africa*; if (perhaps) by that means they might divert the war from home. His gifts and good advice were lovingly accepted, and instructions were given to *Titus Oelacilius* the pretor, which was to go into *Sicily*, that he should accordingly pass over into *Africa*, if he found it expedient.

The great levies which the *Romans* made at this time, do much more serve to declare their puissance than any, though larger, account by poll, of such as were not easily drawn into the field, and fitted for service. For, besides these armies of the consuls, and that which went into *Sicily*, twenty five thousand with *L. Posthumus Albanus*, another of the pretors, went against the *Gauls* to reclaim that province, which the passage of *Hannibal* through it had taken from them. The contemplation of this their present strength might well embolden them to do as they did. They sent amb-

bassadors

ambassadors to *Philip* the son of *Demetrius*, king of *Macedon*, requiring him to deliver into their hands *Demetrius Pharius*; who having been their subject and rebel, was fled into his kingdom. They also sent to the *Illyrians* to demand their tribute, whereof the day of payment was already past. What answer they received it is not known; only this is known, that *Demetrius Pharius* was not sent unto them, and that *Philip* henceforth began to have an eye upon them, little to their good. As for the *Illyrian* money, by the shifts that they were driven soon after to make, it will appear, that the one half of it (how little soever) would have been welcome to *Rome*, and accepted without any cavil about forfeiture for non-payment of the whole.

Whilst the city was busied in these cares, the old consuls lay as near unto *Hannibal* as possibly they could, without incurring the necessity of a battle. Many skirmishes they had with him, wherein their success for the most part was rather good than great. Yet one mischance not only blemished the honour of their other services, but was indeed the occasion to draw on the misery following. *Hannibal*, for the most part of that time made his abode at *Geryon*, where lay all his store for the winter. The *Romans*, to be near him, lodged about *Cannusum*; and, that they might not be driven to turn aside for all necessities, to the loss of good opportunities, they bestowed much of their provisions in the castle of *Cannæ*; for the town was razed the year before. This place *Hannibal* won, and thereby not only furnished himself, but compelled his enemies to want many needful things, unless they would be troubled with far carriage. Besides this, and more to his advantage, he enabled himself to abide in that open country, fit for the service of his horse, longer than the *Romans*, having so many mouths to feed, could well endure to tarry, without offering battle, which he most desired. Of this mishap, when *Servilius* had informed the senate, letting them understand how this piece, taken by *Hannibal*, would serve him to command no small part of the country adjacent; it then seemed needful, even unto the fathers themselves, to adventure a battle with the *Carthaginian*, rather than suffer him thus to take root in the ground of *Italy*. Nevertheless, answer was returned unto *Servilius*, that he should have patience yet awhile, for that the consuls would shortly be there with a power sufficient to do as need required.

When all things were ready in the city, and the season of the year commodious to take the field, the two consuls, with their army, set forth against *Hannibal*. This was always done with great solemnity; especially, whensoever they went forth to war against any noble or redoubted enemy. For sacrifices and solemn vows were made unto *Jupiter*, and the rest of their gods, for good success and victory; which being performed, the generals, in warlike attire, with an honourable train of the principal men, not only such as were of their kindred and alliance, or followed them to the war as volunteers, for love; but a great number of others that meant to abide at home, were accompanied on their way, and dismissed with friendly leave-taking, and good wishes. At this time all the fathers and the whole nobility waited upon *Emilius Paulus*, as the only man whom they thought either worthy of this honour, or likely to do his country remarkable service. *Terentius*, his attendants were the whole multitude of the poorer citizens; a troop no less in greatness than the other was in dignity. At the parting, *Fabius*, the late dictator, is said to have exhorted the consul *Paulus*

with many grave words, to shew his magnanimity, not only in dealing with the *Carthaginians*, but (which he thought harder) in bridling the outrageous folly of his fellow-consul. The answer of *Paulus* was, that he meant not again to run into danger of condemnation by offending the multitude; that he would do his best for his country; but if he saw his best were likely to be ill taken, he would think it less rashness to adventure upon the enemies sword, than upon the malice of his own citizens.

S E C T. VIII.

Diffension between the two Roman consuls: Whether it be likely, that Hannibal was upon point of flying out of Italy, when the Romans pressed him to fight. The great battle of Cannæ.

THESE new generals arriving at the camp, dismissed *M. Atilius*, one of the last year's consuls, requesting it because of his age and weakness; *Servilius* they retained with them as their assistant. The first thing that *Emilius* thought necessary, was, to hearten his soldiers with good words; who, out of their bad success hitherto, had gathered more cause of fear than of courage. He willed them to consider, not only now, their victories in times past against the *Carthaginians*, and other more warlike nations than were the *Carthaginians*; but even their own great numbers, which were no less than all that *Rome* at the present was able to set forth. He told them in what danger their country stood; how the state and safety thereof rested upon their hands; using some such other common matter of persuasion. But the most effectual part of his oration was, that *Hannibal*, with this his terrible army, had not yet obtained one victory by plain force and valour; but that only by deceit and ambush he had stolen the honour which he had gotten at *Trebia* and *Thrasymene*. Herewithal he taxed the inconsiderate rashness of *Sempronius* and *Flaminius*; of whom the one saw not his enemies until he was surrounded by them, the other scarce saw them when they struck off his head, by reason of the thick mist, through the darkness whereof he went groping (as it were blindfold) into their snares. Finally, declaring what advantages they had against the enemy, and how destitute the enemy was of those helps by which he had hitherto prevailed against them; he exhorted them to play the men, and do their best. They were easily persuaded; for the contemplation of their own multitude, and confidence of the *Roman* virtue in matter of arms, gave them cause to think, that under a captain so well experienced, and every way sufficient, as *Emilius* was known to be, they should easily prevail against the *Carthaginians*, that came far short of them in all things else, save craft, which would not always thrive. But in one thing they mistook the meaning of their general. It was his desire that they should have heart to fight, not that they should use the patience of waiting a convenient season. But they, having pre-conceived a victory, thought all delays to be impediments, and thereby sought to rob themselves of their best help, which was good conduct. They remembered what talk they had heard at *Rome*, and were themselves affected with the vulgar desire of ending the war quickly, wherein since *Emilius* had acknowledged, that the advantage was theirs, why did he make them forbear to use it? Thus thought the common soldier, and thus also thought the consul *Terentius*, who was no less popular in the camp than he had been in the city. Expectation is always tedious, and never more, than when the event is of most importance

importance. All men longed, both at *Rome* and in the army, to be freed from the doubtful passions of hope and fear: therefore *Terentius*, who hastened their desire to effect, was likely to win more thanks than should his colleague, though greater in performance. Thus, while the *Romans* think themselves to have the better of their enemies, they fall into an inconvenience, than which few are more dangerous; dissension of their chief commanders. *Varro* would fight, *Æmilius* would so too; but said that it was not yet time: why? because the enemy must shortly dislodge, and remove hence into places less fit for his horse. But shall the *Romans* wait, till *Hannibal*, having eaten up his last year's provisions, return into *Campania* to gather a second harvest? This would (said *Varro*) favour too much of *Q. Fabius*: And your haste (said *Paulus*) doth favour no less of *C. Flaminius*. Their deeds were like their words; for they commanded by turns interchangeably every day. *Æmilius* lodged six miles from *Hannibal*, where the ground was somewhat uneven. Thither, if the *Carthaginians* would take pains to come, he doubted not to send them away in such haste, as they should not leave running till they were out of *Italy*. But they came not. *Terentius* therefore the next day descended into the plains; his colleague holding him, and beseeching him to stay. Nevertheless, he sat down close by *Hannibal*, who, as an unbidden guest gave him but a rude welcome and entertainment. The *Carthaginian* horse and light armature fell upon the *Roman* vant-courers, and put the whole army in tumult, whilst it was yet in march; but they were beaten off, not without loss, for that the *Romans* had, among their *Velites*, some troops weighily armed, whereas the *Carthaginians* had none. The day following, *Æmilius*, who could not handsomely withdraw the army out of that level ground, encamped upon the river *Aufidus*, sending a third part of his forces over the water, to lie upon the eastern bank, where they entrenched themselves. He never was more unwilling to fight than at this present, because the ground served wholly for the advantage of his enemy, with whom he meant to deal, when occasion should draw him to more equal terms. Therefore he stirred not out of his trenches, but fortified himself, expecting when *Hannibal* should dislodge, and remove towards *Geryon*, *Cannæ*, or some other place, where his store lay, for want of necessaries; whereof an army foraging the country was not likely to carry about with it sufficient quantity for any long time.

Here it would not be passed over with silence, that *Livy* disreth much in his relation from *Polybius*; telling many strange tales of the misery into which *Hannibal* had been driven, and of base courtes that he devised to take, if the *Romans* could have retained their patience a little longer. He had (saith *Livy*) but ten days provision of meat. He had not money to pay his soldiers. They were an unruly rabble, gathered out of several nations, so that he knew not how to keep them in order; but that from murmuring they fell to flat exclamations, first, about their pay and provant, and afterwards for very famine. Especially the *Spaniards* were ready to forsake him, and run over to the *Roman* side. Yea, *Hannibal* himself, was once upon the point to have stolen away into *Gaul* with all his horse, and left his foot unto their miserable destinies. At length, for lack of all other counsel, he resolved to get him as far as he could from the

Romans, into the southermost parts of *Apulia*; to the end, that both his unfaithful soldiers might find the more difficulty in running from him, and that his hunger might be relieved with the more early harvest. But whilst he was about to put this device in execution, the *Romans* pressed him so hard, that they even forced him unto that which he most desired, even to fight a battel upon open champaign ground, wherein he was victorious. It was not uncommendable in *Livy*, to speak the best of his own citizens; and, where they did ill, to say, that, without their own great folly, they had done passing well. Further also he may be excused; as writing only by report. For thus he saith; *Hannibal de fugâ in Galliam [dicitur] agitasse*; *Hannibal [is said] to have bethought himself of flying into Gaul*: where he makes it no more than a matter of hearsay; as perhaps was all the rest of this relation. As for the process itself, it is very incredible. For if *Hannibal*, coming out of *Gaul*, through the marishes and bogs of *Ættruria*, could find victuals enough, and all things needful unto his army, the summer foregoing: what should hinder him to do the like this year? especially seeing he had played the careful husband in making a great harvest; since he had long been master of the open field; and besides, had gotten, by surprise, no small part of the *Romans* provisions? Suitable hereunto is all the rest. If *Hannibal* had taken nothing but corn and cattel; his soldiers might perhaps have fallen into mutiny for pay. But he brought gold with him into *Italy*: and had so well increased his stock, since he came into that country, that he had armed his *African* soldiers, all *Roman-like*; and loaden his followers with spoil: having left wherewith to redeem as many of his own, as were taken by the enemy; when the *Romans* were not willing, as finding it not easy, to do the like. In this point therefore, we are to attend the general agreement of historians: who give it as a principal commendation unto *Hannibal*, that he always kept his army free from sedition, though it were composed of sundry nations; no less different in manners, religion, and almost in nature, than they were in languages: and well might he so do, having not only pronounced, that which of his men soever fought bravely with his enemy, was thereby a *Carthaginian*; but solemnly protested and swore (besides other rewards) to make as many of them, as should deserve and seek it, free citizens of *Carthage*. The running away into *Gaul* was a senseless device. *Hannibal*, being there with his whole army, took so little pleasure in the country and people, that he made all haste to get him out of it. And what should he now do there with his horse? or how could he be trusted, either there or elsewhere? yea, how could he desire to live; having betrayed all his army, and relinquished his miserable foot, to the butchery of their enemies? This tale therefore *Plutarch* omitteth; who, in writing the life of *Hannibal*, takes in a manner all his Directions from *Livy*. But of this and the like it is enough to say, that all historians love to extol their own countrymen; and where a loss cannot be dissembled, nor the honour of the victory taken from the enemy, and given unto blind fortune, there to lay all the blame on some strange misgovernment of their own forces: as if they might easily have won all, but lost all through such folly, as no enemy can hope to find in them another time.

Now let us return back to the two armies,

where they lie encamped on the river *Aufidus*. *Varro* was perswaded, that it concerned him in honour, to make good his word unto the people of *Rome*: and, since he had thus long waited in vain, to get the consent of *Paulus* now at length to use his own authority; and, without any more disputing of the matter, to fight when his own day came. When therefore it was his turn to command; at the first break of day he began to pass the river, without staying to bid his colleague good morrow. But *Paulus* came to him; and fought, as in former times, to have dissuaded him, from putting the estate of his country to a needless hazard. Against whose words and substantial arguments, *Tarentius* could alledge none other, than point of honour. *Hannibal* had presented them battel at their trenches: should they endure this bravado? He had sent his *Numidians* over the river but even the day before, who fell upon the *Romans* that were fetching water to the lesser camp; and drove them shamefully to run within their defences, which also they made offer to assail: must this also be suffered? He would not endure it: for it could not but weaken the spirit of the *Roman* soldier; which as yet was lively, and full of such courage, as promised assured victory. When *Æmilius* perceived, that he could not hinder the obstinate resolution of his companion; he took all care, that what he saw must be done, might be done well. Ten thousand *Roman* foot he caused to be left behind, in the greater camp, opposite unto the *Carthaginian*; to the intent, that either *Hannibal* might be compelled, to leave behind him some answerable number, for defence of his trenches (which out of his paucity he was less able to spare from the battel, than were the *Romans*;) or that these ten thousand, falling upon the *Carthaginian* camp, when the fight began, and taking it with all the wealth therein, might thereby (as commonly do such accidents) terrify and distract the enemies in the heat of fight. This done; the two consuls went over the water with their army to the lesser camp, whence also they drew forth their men, and ranged them in order of battel: the ground on the east part of the river, seeming perhaps more fit for marshalling of their army. *Hannibal* was glad of this, as he had great cause; and, without any delay, passed likewise over, somewhat higher up the stream, which ran from the south; leaving in his own camp so many, as he thought would serve to defend it, and no more. To encourage his men; he bad them look about them, and view the ground well, upon which they were to fight. They did so. And could you (said he) pray for any greater fortune, than to join battel with the *Romans* upon such a level ground, where the stronger in horse are sure to prevail? They all assented to him; and shewed by their countenances, that they were very glad of it. Well then (said he further) ye are first of all to thank the Gods, that have brought them hither; and then us, that have trained them along, and drawn them into necessity of playing for their lives, where they are sure to lose them. As for these *Romans*, I was fain to encourage you against them, when ye met them first: but now ye may even encourage your selves, by calling to mind that they are the men, whom ye have as often beaten as seen. Of one thing only I will put you in mind: That whereas hitherto you fought for other respects; as, to drive them before you out of *Gaul*; and to win the open country, and fields of *Italy*; both of which ye have obtained: now are ye to fight for the towns themselves, and all the riches within them, which this victory shall

make yours. Therefore play the stout soldiers; and, ere many hours pass, ye shall be lords of all that the *Romans* hold.

When he had said this; his brother *Mago* came to him, whom he had sent to view the countenance of the enemy. *Hannibal* asked him, what news; and what work they were likely to have with these *Romans*? Work enough (answered *Mago*) for they are an horrible many. As horrible a many as they are (thus *Hannibal* replied) I tell thee, brother, that among them all, search them never so diligently, thou shalt not find one man, whose name is *Mago*. With that he fell a laughing, and so did all that stood about him: which gladdened the soldiers, who thought their general would not be so merry, without great assurance. Whether it were so, that *Hannibal*, in the pride of his victories already gotten, valued one *Mago* above many thousand *Romans*; or whether he intimated, that the *Romans* were no less troubled with thinking upon *Mago* and his companions, than was *Mago* with beholding their huge multitude; or whether he meant only to correct the sad mood of his brother with a jest, and shew himself merry unto the soldiers: this his answer was more manly, than was the relation of his discoverer. But if *Hannibal* himself had been sent forth by *Mago*, to view the *Romans*; he could not have returned with a more gallant report in his mouth, than that which captain *Gam*, before the battel of *Agincourt*, made unto our king *Henry* the fifth: saying, that of the *Frenchmen*, there were enough to be killed; enough to be taken prisoners; and enough to run away. Even such words as these, or such pleasant jests as this of *Hannibal*, are not without their moment; but serve many times, when battel is at hand, to work upon such passions, as must govern more of the business: especially, where other needful care is not wanting; without which they are but vain boasts.

In this great day, the *Carthaginian* excelled himself; expressing no less perfection of his military skill, than was greatness in his spirit and undertakings. For, to omit the commodiousness of the place, into which he had long before conceived the means to draw his enemies to battel; he marshalled his army in such convenient order, that all hands were brought to fight, where every one might do best service. His darters, and slingers of the *Baleares*, he sent off before him, to encounter with the *Roman Velites*. These were loose troops, answerable in a manner to those, which we call now by a *French* Name *Enfans perdues*; but when we use our own terms, the *Forlorn Hope*. The gross of his army following them he ordered thus: His *Africans*, armed after the *Roman* manner, with the spoils which they had gotten at *Trebia*, *Thrasymene*, or elsewhere; and well trained in the use of those weapons, that were of more advantage, than those wherewith they had formerly served; made the two wings, very deep in file. Between these he ranged his *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, armed, each after their own country manner; their shields alike; but the *Gauls* using long broad swords, that were forcible in a downright stroke; the *Spaniards*, short and well-pointed blades, either to strike or thrust; the *Gauls*, naked from their navel upwards, as confident in their own fierceness; the *Spaniards* wearing white cassocks embroidered with purple. This medley of two nations, differing as well in habit and furniture, as in quality, made a gallant shew; and terrible, because strange. The *Gauls* were strong of body, and furious in giving charge; but soon wearied, as accustomed to spend their violence at the first brunt, which disposition all that come of them have inherited to this day. The

Spaniards

Spaniards were less eager, but more wary; neither ashamed to give ground, when they were overpressed; nor afraid to return, and renew the fight, upon any small encouragement. As the roughness of the one, and patience of the other, served mutually to reduce each of them to a good and firm temper; so the place which they held in this battle, added confidence jointly unto them both. For they saw themselves well and strongly flanked with *Carthaginians* and other *Africans*; whose name was grown terrible in *Spain*, by their conquests; and in *Gaul*, by this their present war. Since therefore it could not be feared, that any great calamity should fall upon them, whilst the wings on either side stood fast: these barbarians had no cause to shrink, or forbear to imploy the utmost of their hardiness, as knowing that the enemy could not press far upon them, without further engaging himself than discretion would allow. Hereunto may be added that great advantage, which the *Carthaginian* had in horse: by which he was able, if the worst had happened, to make a good retreat. The effect of contraries is many times alike. Desperation begetteth courage; but not greater, nor so lively, as doth assured confidence. *Hannibal* therefore caused these *Gauls* and *Spaniards* to advance; leaving void the place wherein they had stood, and into which they might fall back, when they should be over-hardly pressed. So, casting them into the form of a crescent, he made them as it were his vanguard: the two points of this great half moon, that looked toward the empty space from which he had drawn it, being narrow and thin, as serving only to guide it orderly back, when need should require; the foremost part of the ring, swelling out toward the enemies, being well strengthened and thickened against all impression. The circle hereof seemeth to have been so great, that it shadowed the *Africans*, who stood behind it: though such figures, cut in brass, as I have seen of this battle, present it more narrow; with little reason, as shall anon appear: as also in the same figures it is omitted, that any companies of *Africans*, or others, were left in the rear, to second the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, when they were driven to retreat; though it be manifest, that *Hannibal* in person stood between the last ranks of his long battalions, and in the head of his rear, doubtless well accompanied with the choice of his own nation. Between the left battalion and the river *Ausidus*, were the *Gauls* and *Spanish* horse, under the command of *Asdrubal*: On the right wing, toward the wide plains, was *Hanno* (*Livy* saith *Mabarbal*) with the *Numidian* light-horse. *Hannibal* himself, with his brother *Mago*, had the leading of the rear. The whole sum of *Hannibal's* army in the field this day, was ten thousand horse, and forty thousand foot; his enemies having two to one against him in foot; and he, five to three against them in horse.

The *Roman* army was marshalled in the usual form: but somewhat more narrow, and deep, than was accustomed; perhaps, because this had been found convenient against the *Carthaginians*, in the former war. It was indeed no bad way of resistance against elephants, to make the ranks thick and short, but the files long; as also to strengthen well the rear, that it might stand fast compacted as a wall, under shelter whereof the disordered troops might rally themselves. Thus much it seems, that *Terentius* had learned of some old soldiers; and therefore he now ordered his battles accordingly, as meaning to shew more skill, than was in his understanding. But the *Carthaginians* had here

no elephants with them in the field: their advantage was in horse; against which, this manner of embatteling was very unprofitable; forasmuch as their charge is better sustained in front, than upon a long flank. As for *Æmilius*; it was not his day of command: he was but an assistant; and in such cases it happens often, that wise men yield for very weariness unto the more contentious. Upon the right hand, and toward the river, were the *Roman* horse-men, under the consul *Paulus*: On the left wing was *C. Terentius Varro* the other consul, with the rest of the horse, which were of the *Latins*, and other associates: *Cn. Servilius* the former year's consul, had the leading of the battle. The sun was newly risen, and offended neither part; the *Carthaginians* having their faces northward; the *Romans* towards the south.

After some light skirmish between the *Roman Velites* and *Hannibal's* darters and slingers of the *Baleares*, *Asdrubal* brake upon the consul *Paulus*, and was roughly encountred; not after the manner of service on horse-back, used in those times, wheeling about *Alman-like*, but each giving on in a right line, pouldron to pouldron, as having the river on the one hand, and the shoulder of the foot on the other hand, so that there was no way left, but to pierce and break through. Wherefore they not only used their lances and swords, but rushing violently amongst the enemies, grasped one another: and so their horses running from under them, fell many to the ground; where, starting up again, they began to deal blows like footmen. In conclusion, the *Roman* horse were overborn, and driven by plain force to a staggering recoil. This the consul *Paulus* could not remedy. For *Asdrubal*, with his boisterous *Gauls* and *Spaniards*, was not to be resisted by these *Roman* gentlemen, unequal both in number and in horsemanship. When the battles came to joining, the *Roman* legionaries found work enough, and somewhat more than enough to break that great crescent, upon which they first fell: so strongly for the while, did the *Gauls* and *Spanish* foot make resistance. Wherefore the two points of their battle drew towards the midst; by whose aid, these opposites were forced to disband, and fly back to their first place. This they did in great haste and fear, and were with no less haste and folly pursued. Upon the *Africans*, that stood behind them, they needed not to fall foul, both for that there was void room enough, and forasmuch as the rear, or horns of this moon, pointed into the safe retreat, where *Hannibal* with his *Carthaginians* was ready to reinforce them, when time should require. In this hasty retreat, or flight of the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*; it happened, as was necessary, that they, who had stood in the limb or utter compass of the half moon, made the innermost or concave surface thereof (disordered and broken though it were) when it was forced to turn the inside outward, the horns or points thereof, as yet untouched, only turning round, and recoiling very little. So the *Romans*, in pursuing them, were inclosed in an half circle; which they should not have needed greatly to regard (for that the sides of it were exceeding thin and broken; and the bottom of it, none other than a throng of men routed, and seeming unable to make resistance) had all the enemies foot been cast into this one great body, that was in a manner dissolved. But whilst the legions, following their supposed victory, rushed on upon those that stood before them, and thereby unwittingly engaged themselves deeply within the principal strength of the enemies, hedging them in on both hands; the two *African* battalions

lions on either side advanced so far, that getting beyond the rear of them, they inclosed them, in a manner, behind: and forward they could not pass far, without removing *Hannibal* and *Mago*, which made that way the least easy. Hereby it is apparent, that the great crescent, before spoken of, was of such extent, as covered the *Africans*, who lay behind it undiscerned, until now. * For it is agreed, that the *Romans* were thus empaled *unawares*, and that they behaved themselves as men that thought upon no other work, than what was found them by the *Gauls*. Neither is it credible, that they would have been so mad, as to run headlong with the whole bulk of their army, into the throat of slaughter, had they seen those weapons bent against them at the first, which when they did see, they had little hope to escape. Much might be imputed to their heat of flight, and rashness of inferior captains: but since the consul *Paulus*, a man so expert in war, being vanquished in horse, had put himself among the legions; it cannot be supposed, that he and they did wilfully thus engage themselves. *Asdrubal* having broken the troops of *Roman* horse, that were led by the consul *Paulus*, followed upon them along the river side, beating down, and killing as many as he could (which were almost all of them) without regard of taking prisoners. The consul himself was either driven upon his own legions, or willingly did cast himself among them, as hoping by them to make good the day, notwithstanding the defeat of his horse. But he failed of this his expectation. Nevertheless he cheered up his men as well as he could, both with comfortable words, and with the example of his own stout behaviour: beating down, and killing many of the enemies with his own hand. The like did *Hannibal* among his *Carthaginians*, in the same part of the battel; and with better success. For the consul received a blow from a sling, that did him great hurt: and though a troop of *Roman* gentlemen, riding about him, did their best to save him from further harm, yet was he so hardly laid at, that he was compelled by wounds and weakness, to forsake his horse. Hereupon all his company alighted, thinking that the consul had given order so to do, as in many battels, the *Roman* men at arms had left their horses, to help their foot in distress. When *Hannibal* (for he was near at hand) perceived this, and understood that the consul had willed his horse-men to dismount, he was very glad of it, and pleasantly said, *I had rather he would have delivered them unto me bound hand and foot*: meaning, that he had them now almost as safe as if they were so bound. All this while *C. Terentius Varro*, with the horse of the associates, in the left wing, was marvellously troubled by *Hanno* (or *Maharbal*) and the *Numidians*: who beating up and down about that great sandy plain, raised a foul dust, which a strong south-wind, blowing there accustomarily, drove into the eyes and mouths of the *Romans*. These using their advantage both of number and of lightness, wearied the consul and his followers exceedingly, neither giving nor sustaining any charge, but continually making offers, and wheeling about. Yet at the first they seemed to promise him an happy day of it. For when the battels were even ready to join, five hundred of these *Numidians* came pricking away from their fellows, with their Shields cast behind their backs (as was the manner of those which yielded) and throwing down their arms, rendered themselves. This was good luck to begin

withal, if there had been good meaning. *Varro* had not leisure to examine them, but caused them; unweaponed as they were, to get them behind the army, where he had them rest quietly till all was done. These crafty adventurers did as he had them for a while, till they found an opportunity to put in execution the purpose for which they had just yielded. Under their jackets they had short swords and ponyards, besides which, they found other scattered weapons about the field, of such as were slain; and therewithal flew upon the hindmost of the *Romans*, whilst all eyes and thoughts were bent another way; so that they did great mischief, and raised yet a greater terror. Thus *Hannibal*, in a plain level ground, found means to lay an ambush at the back of his enemies. The last blow, that ended all fight and resistance, was given by the same hand which gave the first. *Asdrubal*, having in short space broken the *Roman* troops of horse, and cut in pieces all, save the company of *Æmilius*, that rushed into the grofs of his foot, and a very few besides, that recovered some narrow passage between the river and their own battalions, did not stay to charge upon the face of the legions, but fell back behind the rear of his own, and fetching about, came up to the *Numidians*, with whom he joined, and gave upon *Terentius*. This fearful cloud, as it was shewed at the first appearance what weather it had left behind it on the other side; so did it prognosticate a dismal storm unto those upon whom it was ready now to fall. Wherefore *Terentius's* followers, having wearied themselves much in doing little, and seeing more work toward than they could hope to sustain, thought it the best way to avoid the danger by present flight. The consul was no less wise than they, in apprehending the greatness of his own peril, nor more desperate in striving to work impossibilities; it being impossible, when so many shrank from him, to sustain the impression alone, which he could not have endured with their assistance. Now he found that it was one thing to talk of *Hannibal* at *Rome*, and another to encounter him. But of this, or ought else, excepting hasty flight, his present leisure would not serve him to consider. Close at the heels of him and his flying troops followed the *Numidians*, appointed by *Asdrubal* unto the pursuit, as fittest for that service. *Asdrubal* himself, with the *Gauls* and *Spanish* horse, compassing about, fell upon the backs of the *Romans*, that were, ere this, hardly distressed, and in a manner surrounded on all parts else. He brake them easily, who before made ill resistance, being inclosed and laid at on every side, not knowing which way to turn. Here began a pitiful slaughter, the vanquished multitude thronging up and down, they knew not whither, or which way, whilst every one sought to avoid those enemies whom he saw nearest. Some of the *Roman* gentlemen that were about *Æmilius*, got up to horse, and saved themselves; which though it is hardly understood how they could do, yet I will rather believe it, than suppose that *Livy* so reporteth, to grace thereby his history with this following tale. *Cn. Cornelius Lentulus*, galloping along by a place, where he saw the consul sitting all bloodied upon a stone, intreated him to rise and save himself, offering him his assistance and his horse. But *Paulus* refused it, willing *Lentulus* to shift for himself, and not to lose time; saying, that it was not his purpose to be brought again into judgment by the people, either as an accuser of his colleague, or as guilty himself of that day's loss. Further, he willed *Lentulus* to command him to the

* *Plut. in vit. Hannib.*

senate, and in particular to Fabius; willing them to fortify Rome as fast and as well as they could; and telling Fabius, that he lived and died mindful of his wholesome counsel. These words (peradventure) or some to like purpose, the consul uttered to *Lentulus*, either when against his will he was drawn to that battel, or when he beheld the first defeat of his horse, at what time he put himself in the head of his legions. For I doubt not but *Hannibal* knew what he said a good while before this, when he thought the consul and his troop in little better case than if they had been bound. The whole gross of the *Romans* was inclosed indeed as within a sack, whereof the *African* battalions made the sides, the *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, and *Hannibal* with his *Carthaginians*, the bottom, and *Asdrubal*, with his horse, closed up the mouth; in which part they first of all were shuffled together, and began the rout, wherein all the rest followed. *Æmilius* therefore, who could not sit his horse, whilst the battel yet lasted, and whilst the spaces were somewhat open, by which he might have withdrawn himself, was now (had he never so well been mounted) unable to fly, having in his way so close a throng of his own miserable followers, and so many heaps of bodies as fell apace in that great carnage. It sufficeth unto his honour, that in the battel he fought no less valiantly, than he had warily before both abstained himself, and dissuaded his fellow-consul from fighting at all. If, when the day was utterly lost, it had lain in his power to save his own life, unto the good of his country, never more needing it; I should think that he either too much disesteemed himself, or being too faintly minded, was weary of the world, and his unthankful citizens. But if such a resolution were praise-worthy in *Æmilius*, as proceeding out of *Roman* valour; then was the *English* virtue of the lord *John Talbot*, viscount *Lisle*, son to that famous earl of *Shrewsbury*, who died in the battel of *Chaftillon*, more highly to be honoured. For *Æmilius* was old, grievously, if not mortally wounded, and accountable for the overthrow received; *Talbot* was in the flower of his youth, unhurt, easily able to have escaped, and not answerable for that day's misfortune, when he refused to forsake his father; who foreseeing the loss of the battel, and not meaning to stain his actions past by flying in his old age, exhorted this his noble son to be gone and leave him.


In this terrible overthrow died all the *Roman* foot, save two or three thousand, who (as *Livy* saith) escaped into the lesser camp, whence, the same night, about six hundred of them brake forth, and joining with such of those in the greater camp as were willing to try their fortune, conveyed themselves away ere morning, about four thousand foot and two hundred horse, partly in whole troops, partly dispersed into *Cannussum*: the next day the *Roman* camps, both less and greater, were yielded unto *Hannibal* by those that remained in them. *Polybius* hath no mention of this escape; only he reports, that the ten thousand whom *Æmilius* had left on the west side of *Aufidus* (as was shewed before) to set upon the camp of *Hannibal*, did as they were appointed; but ere they could effect their desire, which they had well-near done, the battel was lost, and *Hannibal* coming over the water to them, drove them into their own camp, which they quickly yielded, having lost two thousand of their number. Like enough it is, that at the first sight of *Hannibal* coming upon them with his victorious army, a great number of these did fly, and thereby escaped,

whilst their fellows, making defence in vain, retired into their camp, and held the enemy busied. For about two legions they were (perhaps not half full, but made up by addition of others, whose fault or fortune was alike) that having served at *Cannæ*, were afterwards extremely disgraced by the state of *Rome*, for that they had abandoned their companions fighting. Of the *Roman* horse, what numbers escaped, it is uncertain; but very few they were that saved themselves in the first charge, by getting behind the river; *Terentius* the consul recovered *Venusia*, with threescore and ten at the most in his company. That he was so ill attended, it is no marvel; for *Venusia* lay many miles off to the southward; so that his nearest way thither had been through the midst of *Hannibal's* army, if the passage had been open. Therefore it must needs be, that when once he got out of sight, he turned up some by-way, so disappointing the *Numidians* that hunted *contre*. Of such as could not hold pace with the consul, but took other ways, and were scattered over the fields, two thousand, or thereabouts, were gathered up by the *Numidians*, and made prisoners: the rest were slain, all save three hundred, who dispersed themselves in flight, as chance led them, and got into sundry towns. There died in this great battel of *Cannæ*, besides *L. Æmilius Paulus* the consul, two of the *Roman* questors or treasurers, and twenty-one colonels or tribunes of the soldiers, fourscore senators, or such as had borne office, out of which they were to be chosen into the senate. Many of these were of especial mark, as having been *Ædiles*, pretors, or consuls; among whom was *Cn. Servilius*, the last year's consul, and *Minutius*, late master of the horse. The number of prisoners taken in this battel, *Livy* makes no greater than three thousand foot and three hundred horse; too few to have defended, for the space of one half hour, both the *Roman* camps; which yet the same *Livy* saith to have been over-cowardly yielded up. We may therefore do better to give credit unto one of the prisoners, whom the same historian shortly after introduceth speaking in the senate, and saying, that they were no less than eight thousand. It may therefore be, that these three thousand were only such as the enemy spared, when the fury of execution was past; but to these must be added about five thousand more, who yielded in the greater camp, when their company were either slain or fled. So the reckoning falls out right; which the *Romans*, especially the consul *Varro*, had before cast up (as we say) without their host; nothing so chargeable, as now they find it. On the side of *Hannibal* there died some four thousand *Gauls*, fifteen hundred *Spaniards* and *Africans*, and two hundred horse, or thereabouts; a loss not sensible, in the joy of so great a victory; which if he pursued, as *Mabarbal* advised him, and forthwith marched away towards *Rome*, it is little doubted but that the war had presently been at an end. But he believed not so far in his own prosperity, and was therefore told, That he knew how to get, not how to use a victory.

S E C T. IX.

Of things following the battel at *Cannæ*.

NOT without good cause doth *Polybius* reprehend those two historians, *Fabius* the *Roman*, and *Philinus* the *Carthaginian*; who regarding more the pleasure of them, unto whose honour they consecrated their travels, than the truth of things, and information of posterity, magnified indifferently



The greater Camp of the Romans

The lesser Camp of the Romans

The Roman Camp beyond y River

L. Aemilius Paulus

The Roman Velites

C. Terentius Varro

Scipio

Hannibal

The Balearics

Afri-

Afri-

Hanno or Maharbal

The Camp of Hannibal

camp

camp

Hannibal

& Mago

whether good or bad, all actions and proceedings; the one of his *Carthaginians*; the other of his *Roman Quirites*, and *Fathers* conscript. No man of sound judgment will condemn this liberty of censure which *Polybius* hath used. For, to recompense his juniority (such as it was) he produceth substantial arguments to justify his own relation, and confuteth the vanity of those former authors, out of their own writings, by conference of places ill cohering; which pains, it is to be suspected, that he would not have taken, had he been born in either of those two cities, but have spared some part of his diligence, and been contented to have all men think better and more honourably than it deserved of his own country. The like disease, it is to be feared, that we shall hereafter find in others, and shall have cause to wish that either they were somewhat less *Roman*, or else that some works of their opposite writers were extant, that so we might at least hear both sides speak, being henceforth destitute of *Polybius's* help, that was a man indifferent. But since this cannot be, we must be sometimes bold to observe the coherence of things, and believe so much only to be true, as dependeth upon good reason, or (at least) fair probability. This attentive circumspection is needful even at the present, such is the repugnancy or forgetfulness which we find in the best narration of things following the battel of *Cannæ*. For it is said, that four thousand foot and horse gathered together about the consul *Terentius* at *Venusia*; that others, to the number of ten thousand, got into *Cannusum*, chusing for their captains young *P. Scipio*, and *Ap. Claudius*; yet that the consul *Terentius Varro*, joining his company unto those of *Scipio* at *Cannusum*, wrote unto the senate, that he had now well near ten thousand men about him; that these letters of the consul were brought to *Rome* when the senate was newly risen, that had been taking order for pacifying those tumults in the city, which grew upon the first bruit of the overthrow; and yet, that ambassadors from *Capua* (after some consultation whether it were meet to send any, or, without further circumstance, to side with *Hannibal*) were sent unto *Terentius*, and found him at *Venusia*, a pretty while before he wrote those letters, which overtook (in a manner) at *Rome* the first news of the overthrow. Among such incoherences, I hold it the best way to omit so much as hath not some particular connexion with matter ensuing; mutual dependency in things of this nature, being no small argument of truth.

When *Hannibal* had sacked the *Roman* camp, and trussed up the spoils, forthwith he dislodged, and marched away into *Samnium*, finding a disposition in the *Hirpines*, and many other people thereabout, to forsake the *Roman* party, and make alliance with *Carthage*. The first town that opened the gates unto him, was *Cossa*, where he laid up his baggage; and leaving his brother *Mago* to take in other places, he hasted into *Campania*. The general affection of the multitude, in all the cities of *Italy*, was inclinable unto him; not only in regard of their grievous losses sustained abroad in the fields, which the *Romans* themselves, who could not hinder him from spoiling the country, especially the poorer sort of them, did hardly endure; but in a loving respect unto that great courtesy (as it seemed) which he used unto such of them as became his prisoners. For as at other times, so now also, after his great victory at *Cannæ*, he had lovingly dismissed as many of the *Italian* confederates of *Rome* as fell into his hands: rebuking them gently for being so obstinate against him that had sought to deliver them

from bondage. Neither spared he to win their love with gifts; pretending to admire their valour; but seeking indeed, by all ways and means, to make them his, whilst all other motives were concurrent. At this time also he began to deal kindly (though against his nature) with his *Roman* prisoners: telling them, that he bore no mortal hatred unto their estate; but being provoked by injuries, sought to right himself and his country; and fought with them, to try which of the two cities, *Rome* or *Carthage*, should bear sovereign rule, not which of them should be destroyed. So he gave them leave to choose ten of their number, that should be sent home to treat with the *Fathers* about their ransom: and together with these, he sent *Carthalo* a nobleman of *Carthage*, and general of his horse, to feed the disposition of the senate; whether it were bowed as yet by so much adversity, and could stoop unto desire of peace. But with the *Romans* these arts prevailed not, as shall be shewed in due place. The people of *Italy*, all, or most of them, save the *Roman* colonies, or the *Latins*, were not only weary of their losses past, but entertained a deceivable hope, of changing their old society for a better. Wherefore not only the *Samnites*, *Lucans*, *Brutians*, and *Apulians*, ancient enemies of *Rome*, and not until the former generation utterly subdued, began to reassume their wonted spirits: but the *Campanians*, a nation of all other in *Italy* most bound unto the state of *Rome*, and by many mutual affinities therewith as streightly conjoined, as were any save the *Latins*, changed on a sudden their love into hatred, without any other cause found, than change of fortune.


Campania is the most goodly and fruitful province of *Italy*, if not (as some then thought) of all the earth: and the city of *Capua*, answerable unto the country whereof it was head, so great, fair, and wealthy, that it seemed no less convenient a seat of the empire, than was either *Rome* or *Carthage*. But of all qualities, bravery is the least requisite unto sovereign command. The *Campanians* were luxurious, idle and proud: and valuing themselves like jays by their feathers, despised the unfortunate virtue of the *Romans* their patrons and benefactors. Yet were there some of the principal among them, as in other cities, that bore special regard unto the majesty of *Rome*, and could not endure to hear of innovation. But the *Plebeian* faction had lately so prevailed with *Capua*, that all was governed by the pleasure of the multitude, which wholly followed the direction of *Pacuvius Calavius*, an ambitious nobleman, whose credit grew, and was upheld by furthering all popular desires: whereof the conjunction with *Hannibal* was not the least. Some of the *Capuans* had offered this city to the *Carthaginian*, shortly after the battel of *Thrasymene*: whereupon chiefly it was, that *Hannibal* made his journey into *Campania*; the dictator *Fabius* waiting upon him. At that time, either the nearness of the *Roman* army, or some other fear of the *Capuans*, hindered them from breaking into actual rebellion. They had indeed no leisure to treat about any articles of new confederacy: or had leisure served, yet were the multitude (whose constant love *Hannibal* had won from the *Romans*, by gentle usage, and free dismissing of some prisoners, in good account among them) unable to hold any such negotiation, without advice of the senate, which mainly impugned it. So they that had promised to yield up their town to *Hannibal*, and to meet him on the way with some of their nobility, that should assure him of all faithful meaning; were driven

driven to fit still in a great perplexity: as having failed to let in this their new friend, yet sufficiently discovered themselves, to draw upon them the hatred of the *Romans*. In this case were no small number of the citizens: who thereupon grew the more incensed against their senate; on whom they cast all the blame, easily pardoning their own cowardice. The people holding so tender a regard of liberty, that even the lawful government of magistrates grieved them, with an imaginary oppression, had now good cause to fear, lest the senators should become their lords indeed, and, by help of the *Romans*, bring them under a more streight subjection than ever they had endured. This fear, being ready to break into some outrage, *Pacuvius* made use of to serve his own ambition. He discoursed unto the senate, as they sat in council, about these motions troubling the city: and said, that he himself had both married a *Roman* lady, and given his daughter in marriage to a *Roman*; but, that the danger of forsaking the *Roman* party was not now the greatest: for that the people were violently bent even to murder all the senate, and afterwards to join themselves with *Hannibal*, who should countenance the fact, and save them harmless. This he spake as a man well known to be beloved himself by the people, and privy unto their designs. Having thoroughly terrified the senate, by laying open the danger hanging over them: he promised nevertheless to deliver them all, and to set things at quiet, if they would freely put themselves into his hands, offering his oath, or any other assurance that they should demand, for his faithful meaning. They all agreed. Then shutting up the court, and placing a guard of his own followers about it, that none might enter nor issue forth without his leave; he called the people to assembly, and speaking as much ill of the senate as he knew they would be glad to hear, he told them that these wicked governours were surpris'd by his policy, and all fast, ready to abide what sentence they would lay upon them. Only thus much he advis'd them, as a thing which necessity required, that they should choose a new senate, before they satisfied their anger upon the old. So rehearsing unto them the names of one or two senators, he asked what their judgment was of those. All cried out, that they were worthy of death: choose then (said he) first of all some new ones into their places. Hereat the multitude, unprovided for such an election, was silent; until at last, some one or other adventured to name whom he thought fit. The men so nominated, were utterly disliked by the whole assembly; either for some known fault, baseness, and insufficiency; or else, even because they were unknown, and therefore held unworthy. This difficulty in the new election appearing more and more, whilst more were to be chosen (the fittest men to be substituted, having been named among the first, and not thought fit enough) *Pacuvius* entreated, and easily prevailed with the people, that the present senate might for this time be spared, in hope of amends hereafter; which (doubtless) they would make, having thus obtained pardon of all offences past. Henceforth, not only the people, as in former times, honoured *Pacuvius*, and esteemed him their patron; but the senators also were governed by him, to whom they acknowledged themselves indebted, for saving all their lives. Neither did the senate fail after this, by all obsequiousness, to court the people, giving their reins unto their lawless will, who else were likely to cast them down: All the city being thus of one mind; only fear of

the *Romans* kept them from opening the gates to *Hannibal*. But after the battle at *Cannæ*, this impediment was removed, and few there were that would open their mouths to speak against the rebellion. Yet forasmuch as three hundred principal gentlemen of the *Campans*, did then serve the *Romans* in the isle of *Sicily*: the parents and kinsmen of these prevailed so far, that ambassadors were sent unto *Terentius* the consul; to see his present case, and what it could minister of hope or fear. These, wheresoever they found him, found him weakly attended, and as weak in spirit as in followers. Yet they offered him formally the service of their state; and desired to know what he would command them. But he most basely lamented unto them, the greatness of the *Roman* misfortune: saying, that all was lost, and that the *Campans* must now, not help the *Romans*, who had nothing left wherewith to help themselves, but make war in their defence against the *Carthaginians*; as the *Romans* had sometimes done for the *Campans* against the *Samnites*. Hereunto he is said to have added a foolish invective, against *Hannibal* and his *Carthaginians*: telling, how he had taught them to make bridges of slaughtered carcases, and to feed upon man's flesh; with such other stuff, as only bewrayed his own fear. As for the *Campans* themselves, he put them in mind of their present strength: they having thirty thousand foot, and four thousand horse; with money, and all provisions, in abundance. Thus he dismissed them, prouder than they came: and filled them with conceit of getting a great lordship; whereas before they were somewhat timorous in adventuring to seek their own liberty. Having reported this at *Capua*: the same ambassadors were dispatched away to *Hannibal*, with whom they easily made alliance, upon these conditions: that the *Campans* should be absolutely free, and ruled by their own laws; that no citizen of theirs should be subject unto any *Carthaginian* magistrate, in what case soever, whether in war, or peace; and, that *Hannibal* should deliver unto the *Campans* three hundred *Roman* prisoners, such as they themselves would choose, whom they might exchange for their gentlemen which were in *Sicily*.

Against all this negotiation, *Decius Magius*, an honourable citizen opposed himself earnestly: using, in vain, many persuasions, to the wilful and headstrong multitude; whom he put in mind of *Pyrrhus* and the *Tarentines*, wishing them not to change old friends for new acquaintance. This did he, when they were sending ambassadors to *Hannibal*: and this also did he when the new alliance was concluded; but most earnestly, when a *Carthaginian* garrison was entering the town: at which time he gave advice, either to keep it out, or to fall upon it, and cut it in pieces, that, by such a notable piece of service, they might make amends unto the *Romans*, whom they had forsaken.

Advertisement hereof was given to *Hannibal*: who lying about *Naples*, not far off, sent for *Magius* to come speak with him in the camp. This *Magius* refused: alledging, that he was, by the late concluded articles, free from subjection unto any *Carthaginian*; and therefore would not come. *Hannibal* thereupon hasted himself towards *Capua*: forbearing to attempt any further upon *Naples*; which he thought to have taken in his way by *Scalado*, but found the walls too high, and was not well provided, to lay siege unto it. At *Capua* he was entertained with great solemnity and pomp: all the people issuing forth of the town, to behold that great commander, which had won so many noble



noble victories. Having taken his pleasure in the sight of that goodly city, and passed over his first entertainments, he came into their senate: where he commended their resolution, in shaking off the Roman yoke; promising, that ere long all *Italy*, and *Rome* it self, should be driven to acknowledge *Capua* as chief, and receive law from thence. As for *Decius Magius*, who openly took part with the Romans their enemies; he prayed them, that they would not think him a *Campan*, but a traitor to the state: and use him accordingly, giving sentence out of hand upon him, as he deserved. This was granted: and *Magius* delivered unto *Hannibal*; who, unwilling to offend the *Capuans*, at his first coming, by putting so great a man to death; yet fearing that they might sue for his liberty; if he kept him alive, thought it best to send him away to *Carthage*. Thus *Hannibal* settled his friendship with the *Campan*s: among whom, only this *Decius Magius* had openly dared to speak against him; being assisted by *Perolla*, the son of *Pacuvius*. This *Perolla* would have murdered *Hannibal*, whilst he was at supper, the first night of his coming, had not his father's authority kept him from making any such attempt. All the town (besides) were so earnest in the love of their new society, that they are said to have murdered all the *Romans*, upon whom at the present they could lay hand; or (which is all one) to have smothered them to death in an hot bath.

The same course of fortune, with those of *Capua*, ran some other towns thereabouts, which depended on this, as their mother-city. *Nola*, *Nuceria*, *Naples*, *Casiline*, and *Acerre*, were the cities next adjoining, that stood out for the *Romans*. Against these *Hannibal* went, thinking to find them weakly manned; as they were indeed, though stoutly defended.

The *Romans* at this time were not in case to put garrisons into all their walled towns; but were fain to leave all places, except a few of the most suspected, unto the faith and courage of the inhabitants. *Rome* it self was in extreme fear of *Hannibal*'s coming, at the first report of the overthrow at *Cannæ*: and the grief of that loss was so general, and immoderate, that it much disturbed the provision against apparent danger. It was hard to judge, whether the loss already received, or the fear of destruction presently threatening, were the more terrible. All the senators found work enough, to stint the noise and lamentable bewailings, whereof the streets were full. Couriers were sent forth, to bring assured tidings how all went; whereof, when letters from the consul *Varro* had thoroughly informed them, they were so amazed, that they ran into barbarous superstition; and taking direction (as was said) from their fatal books, buried alive two men and women, *Gauls* and *Greeks*, in their ox-market. If the books of *Sibyl* gave them such instructions, we may justly think, that *Sibyl* her self was instructed by the devil. Yet is it not improbable, that extremity of fear caused them to hearken to wicked soothsayers; whose detestable counsels they afterwards, for their own honour (as ashamed of such authors) imputed to the books of *Sibyl*. An ambassador was sent to *Delphi*, to consult the oracle of *Apollo*; and enquire, with what prayers and supplications they might pacify the Gods, and obtain an end of these calamities. This is enough to discover the greatness of their fear; though not serving to give remedy. At the same time came letters out of *Sicily*,

from the pretor *Ostacilius*, whom the senate had appointed, if he found it meet, to pass over into *Afric*. In these were contained news of one *Carthaginian* fleet, that wasted the kingdom of *Hieron*, their good friend and confederate; and of another fleet, riding among the isles *Ægateis*, which was in readiness to set upon *Lilybæum*; and the rest of the *Roman* province, if the pretor stirred aside to the rescue of *Hieron*.

In the midst of these extremities, it was thought needful to call home *Terentius* the consul, that he might name a dictator to take sovereign charge of the weal-publick, with absolute power, as necessity required. It must needs seem strange, that all sorts of people went forth to meet the consul, and bid him welcome home, giving him thanks for that he had not despaired of the weal-publick. But this was done (as may seem) by order from the senate; which therein (doubtless) provided wisely for upholding the general reputation. If his coming into the city had renewed the lamentations and out-cries of the people, what else would have followed, than a contempt of their wretchedness, among those that were subject unto their dominion? Now in finding this occasion (though indeed he gave it not) of bestowing upon him their welcome and thanks; they noised abroad a fame, which came perhaps unto the ears of *Hannibal*, of their magnanimity and confidence, that might seem grounded on their remaining strength. This therefore was wisely done; but whereas *Livy* would have us think that it was done generously, and out of great spirit, let me be pardoned, if I believe him not. It was done fearfully, and to cover their grief; had they dared to shew their indignation, they would have struck off his head, as in few years after, *Cn. Fulvius* had his life brought into question, and was banished by them, being less blame-worthy, for a smaller offence. *M. Junius*, by appointment of the senate, was nominated dictator, and *T. Sempronius* master of the horse. These fell presently to mustering of soldiers, of whom they raised ^b four new legions and a thousand horse, though with much difficulty, as being fain to take up some that were very boys. These four legions are elsewhere forgotten in account of the forces levied by this dictator, and ^c two legions only set down, that had been enrolled in the beginning of the year for custody of the city. Wherefore it may be, that these two legions being drawn into the field, four new ones of *Prætestati*, or striplings, were left in their places. In such raw soldiers, and so few, little confidence was to be reposed; for which reason they increased their number, by adding unto them eight thousand sturdy slaves, that were put in hope of liberty, if they should deserve it by manful service. This not sufficing, the dictator proclaimed, that whosoever owed money, and could not pay it, or had committed any capital offence, should forthwith be discharged of his debt, or punishment, if he would serve in the war. To arm these companies, they were fain to take down out of their temples and porches the spoils of their enemies, that had been there set up; among which were six thousand armours of the *Gauls*, that had been carried in the triumph of *C. Flaminius*, a little before the beginning of this war. To such mockery had God brought the pride of the *Romans*, as a due reward of their insolent oppressions, that they were fain to issue forth of their own gates, in the habit of strangers, when *Hannibal* was ready to encounter them with his *Africans*, armed *Roman*-like.

^a Liv. l. 26.

^b Liv. l. 22.

^c Liv. l. 23.

About the same time it was, that *Carthalo*, with the agents of the prisoners taken at *Canne*, came to *Rome*. *Carthalo* was not admitted into the city, but commanded, whilst he was on the way, to be gone ere night out of the *Roman* territory. To the messengers of the captives, audience was given by the senate. They made earnest petition to be ransomed at the publick charge, not only the tears and lamentation of their poor kinsfolk, but the great need wherein the city then stood of able soldiers, commending their suit, which yet they obtained not. Besides the general custom of the *Romans* (held by long tradition, and strengthened by a notable precedent, when *Regulus* was overthrown, and taken prisoner in the former war) not to be too tender of such as had yielded to the enemy, much was alledged against these who now craved ransom; but the special point was, that they were wilfully lost, since they might have saved themselves, as others did. It sufficed not unto these poor men to say, that their offence was no greater than the consuls: they were told, that this was great presumption. The truth was, the state wanted money, and therefore could not want excuses, whereby to avoid the disbursement: whether it were so, or not, that any such plea was held about this matter of redemption, as we find recorded. Neither must we regard it, that the slaves which were armed for the war, are said to have cost more than the sum did amount unto, that would have ransomed these prisoners. For this is but a tale, devised to countenance the *Roman* proceedings, as if they had been severe; when as indeed they were suitable to the present fortune, poor, and somewhat beggarly. Hereof it is no little proof, that *Hannibal* valued those *Roman* slaves, whom he had taken in the camp among their masters, at no more than every one the third part of a common soldier's ransom; and likely it is, that he offered them at the price whereat he thought them current. But if we should suppose, that by trading with *Hannibal*, a better bargain for slaves might have been made, than was by the state at home, in dealing with private men; yet must we withal consider, that these private men did only lend these slaves for a while unto the commonwealth, and were afterwards contented ^a to forbear the price of them (when by order from the senate they were enfranchised) until the war should be ended. If *Hannibal* would have given such long day of payment, it is likely that the *Romans* would have been his chapmen; but seeing he dealt only for ready money, they chose rather to say, we will not give, than, we cannot. The like austeritv, upon the same reason, but contrary pretence, was used toward the soldiers that escaped from that great battel. These were charged for having fled, as the prisoners were for not flying, when they might have done so. True it is, that in such cases (if ever) that which they call *raggione del Stato*, may serve for an excuse; when the commonwealth, being driven to a miserable exigent, is fain to help it self, by doing injuries to private men. And so dealt the *Romans* now, condemning all those that had served at *Canne*, to be transported into *Sicily*; and there to serve, not as others did, until they had fulfilled twenty years in the wars, or else were fifty years of age; but until this war should be ended, how long soever it lasted, and that without reward. The same thrifty censure was afterwards laid upon others for their misbehaviour; but never upon any man of quality, save only (a good while after this, at better leisure) upon *Cæcilius Metellus*, and a few other hare-brain'd fools, his companions,

who being frighted out of their wits with the terror of so great a loss, were devising, after the battel, which way to run out of *Italy*, when *Hannibal* as yet had scarce one town within it. The inequality of this rigour grew shortly distasteful to the commonalty, and was openly blamed by ^b a tribune of the people; nevertheless it was quietly digested, the excuse being no less apparent than the fault.

M. Junius, the dictator, having dispatched all needful business within the city, took the field with twenty-five thousand men. What he did with this army, I cannot find, nor more of him than this, that he spent the time about *Campania*; where (as may be presumed) he was not idle. To him therefore perhaps it may be ascribed, that *Hannibal* did no greater evil; for of any evil done to *Hannibal* by the *Romans* in this their weak estate, only *Marcellus* had the honour. *Marcellus* being then one of the pretors, lay at *Ofstia* with a fleet, ready to set sail for *Sicily*, having one legion aboard his ships, and fifteen hundred other soldiers newly taken up; with which forces he was to defend that island, and do what harm he could in *Afric*. But hearing of the overthrow at *Canne*, he sent these of his new levy to *Rome*, for defence of the city, and marched hastily with his legion toward *Cannusium*, delivering the fleet, empty of soldiers, to *P. Furius*, his colleague. Thence was he called by the magistrates, and chief citizens of *Nola*, to help them, who were like to be forced by the multitude (affected, as were the rest of the *Campanians*) to let in the *Carthaginian*; and knew not how to avoid this otherwise, than by seeming to deliberate about the articles of this new confederacy. Wherefore he made great journies thitherward, and arrived even time enough to prevent the enemy. Many idle walks *Hannibal* made betwixt *Nola* and *Naples*, assaying by fair words and terrible threats the one and the other city. *Naples* was strong, and not infected with any the least touch of disloyalty: it had also a sure haven, whereby it stood in the less fear of sustaining much inconvenience, by spoil of the lands and villages abroad in the country. But at *Nola* it was thought a valuable consideration, that *Hannibal* was master of the field; which if he had laid waste, all the poor people were utterly undone. So thought the multitude, and such talk used some, that had little fear of their own private want or poverty, but a great desire to gratify the *Carthaginian*. Of these, one *L. Bantius* was chief, a stout young gentleman and soldier of especial mark, well beloved in the city, and one that had done good service to the *Romans*; but was found by *Hannibal* half dead at *Canne*, and after much gentle usage, good attendance, and cure of his wounds, friendly dismissed with liberal gifts. He therefore thought that it concerned him in honour, to return the greatest thanks he could unto so courteous an enemy. *Marcellus*, perceiving this, wrought upon the same easy nature of the gentleman; and taking notice of him, as if it had been by chance, seemed to wonder why one that had so well deserved of the *Roman* state, had not repaired unto him the pretor, who desired nothing more than such acquaintance. So with many commendations, gifts, and loving entertainment, being himself also a man highly reputed for his personal valour, he made this *Bantius* so far in love with him, that nothing could be attempted within *Nola* against the *Romans*, whereof he had not presently advertentment. At the coming of *Marcellus*, *Hannibal* removed from about *Nola*; and assayed, as formerly he had done, the *Neapolitans*; but they had lately

^a Liv. l. 24.^b Liv. l. 25.

taken in a *Roman* garrison, upon confidence whereof they gave him a peremptory answer, to his discontent. Thence went he to *Nuceria*, which he took by composition, and so returned back again to *Nola*. He was not ignorant what good affection the common people of *Nola* bore unto him, who although they durst not stir in his quarrel, being over-awed by the *Roman* garrison; yet if they saw *Marcellus* hardly bested, and forced to turn his care from watching them within, to repelling the enemy's assailing him without, like enough it seemed, that they would not be wanting unto the accomplishment of their own desires. He therefore brought his army close to the town, and skirmished often with *Marcellus*, not in hope thereby to do much good, but only to make shew of a meaning to force the town, which he sought in the mean while to take by intelligence. In the night-time there passed messages between him and the citizens, his partakers; whereby it was concluded, that if once *Marcellus*, with all his forces, could be trained into the field, the multitude within the town should presently rise, and seizing upon the gates, exclude him as an enemy. Of this negotiation *Marcellus* was advertised, and fearing lest the conspirators would shortly adventure even to find him busied within the city, whilst the *Carthaginians* should scale the walls, he thought it the surest way to cut off the enemy's hope, and send him away betimes. Wherefore ordering his men in three companies, within three several gates looking towards the enemy, he gave a streight command that all the citizens should keep their houses. Thus he lay close a good part of the day, to the enemy's great wonder, against whom he had customarily issued forth before more early every day to skirmish. But when it was further noted, that the walls were bare, and not a man appearing on them, then thought *Hannibal* that surely all was discovered, and *Marcellus* now busied with the citizens. Whereupon he bad his men bring ladders, and make ready for the assault, which was done in all haste. But when the *Carthaginians* were at the very walls, and thought nothing less than that the *Romans* would meet them in the field, suddenly the middle gate was opened, whereat *Marcellus*, with the best and oldest of his soldiers, brake forth upon them with a great noise, to make his unexpected sally the more terrible. Whilst the *Carthaginians*, much out of order, were some of them flying before *Marcellus*, the rest making head against him, the other two gates opened, whereat in like sort issued they of the new-levied companies upon the enemy's backs. The sudden terror was more available unto the *Romans* than their force; yet the execution was so great, that this was accounted as a victory, and reputed one of the bravest acts performed in all that war; so much as hereby it was first proved, that *Hannibal* might be overcome. After this, *Marcellus*, being freed from his enemies that were departed, took a strict account of the citizens of *Nola*, condemning above seventy of high-treason, whose heads he struck off; and so leaving the town in quiet obedience unto their senate, went and encamped hard by about *Suessula*. *Hannibal*, in the mean season, was gone to *Acerra*, where, being excluded, he thought it no wisdom to lose time in persuasions, but laid siege unto it, and began on all sides to close it up. This terrified the people, who knew themselves unable to hold out. Therefore, before his works were finished, and they quite surrounded, they stole out by night, and left him the town empty, which he sacked and

burnt. Then hearing news of the dictator, that he was about *Casiline*, thither went *Hannibal*: as being unwilling, that an enemy so near should disquiet him at *Capua*: where he meant to winter. It seems, or rather indeed it is plain, that the late victory of *Marcellus*, had nothing abated the spirit of the *Carthaginian*: who durst with a small part of his army, seek out the dictator, that had with him the heart of the *Roman* strength. Wherefore the joy of his enemies, upon so slight an occasion as the death of some two thousand of his men, at the most, and those not slain in plain battle, but by a sudden eruption; witnesseth chiefly, in what great fear they stood of *Hannibal*, and how crest-fallen they were: that having three years since demanded at *Carthage*, the body of *Hannibal*, to be delivered unto their pleasure, by his own citizens, could now please themselves, as with good news, to hear, that in a skirmish not far from *Rome* he appeared to be a man, and not resistless. At *Casilinum* the dictator was not; but many companies of *Italians*, confederates of *Rome*, were gotten into the town, and held it. Five hundred of the *Preneftines* there were, and above four hundred of *Perusia*, with some of the *Latins*. All these had the good hap to come too late to the battle of *Canne*, being sent by their several states to the camp: whither whilst they were marching, the tidings of that great misfortune encountered them, and sent them back sorrowful; for they loved well their lords the *Romans*, under whose government they lived happily. So came they all, one after another, to *Casiline*, where they met and stayed. Neither had they stayed there long, ere they heard news from *Capua*. How that great city became the ring-leader of all the *Campanians* into rebellion. The people of *Casiline* were affected as they of *Capua*: and therefore sought how to rid their hands of those *Preneftines* and their fellows; but the soldiers were too hard for them, and after many trains laid one for another, at last they slew all the townsmen in a night, and fortified the western part of the town (for it was divided by the river *Vulturnus*) against the enemy. If they had run away with the goods, and pretended, that these of *Casiline* were, as the rest of the *Campanians*, all traitors; they themselves might have been reputed, as no better than the *Mamertines*. But their constancy in defence of the place witnesseth, upon what honest reasons they surprised it. *Hannibal* came thither, thinking to have encountered with greater forces: but these few found him more work than he expected. Divers assaults he gave them, but was still repelled with loss: and many sallies they made, with variable event. The enemy mined; and they countermined: opposing so much industry to his force, that he was driven to close them up, and seek to win them by famine. *T. Sempronius Gracchus*, that was master of the horse, lay with the *Roman* army higher up the river, who lain would have relieved *Casiline*, but that the dictator, being gone to *Rome*, about some matters of religion, had given him express charge not to fight till his return. *Marcellus* from *Suessula* could not come, his way being stopped by the overflowings of *Vulturnus*; the *Nolans* also beseeching him not to leave them, who were in danger of the *Campanians* if he departed. Thus it is reported: but if the water stayed his journey, such entreaties were needless. Neither is it like, that the dictator tarried at *Rome* so long, as till extreme famine had consumed the garrison in *Casiline*. Wherefore it may be thought, that the town was lost, because the *Romans* durst not adventure to raise the siege. Bar-

rels of corn were sent by night, floating down the river; and when some of these, being carried away by an eddy of the water, stuck among the willows on the bank, whereby this manner of relief was discovered and prevented; *Gracchus* cast a great quantity of nuts into the stream, which faintly sustained the poor besieged men. At length, when all food was spent, and whatsoever grew green under the walls was gathered for fallots; the *Carthaginians* ploughed up the ground: whereon the besieged presently sowed rape-seed. *Hannibal* seeing this, admired their patience; and said, that he meant not to stay at *Casiline* until the rapes were grown. Wherefore, though hitherto he had refused to hearken unto any composition, as intending to make them an example to all others, by punishing their obstinacy; yet now he was content to grant them their lives at an indifferent ransom, which when they had paid, he quietly dismissed them according to his promise. Seven hundred *Carthaginians* he placed in *Casiline*, as a garrison for defence of the *Campani*; unto whom he restored it. To the *Prænestine* soldiers great thanks were given, and loving rewards; among which, they had offer, in regard of their virtue, to be made citizens of *Rome*. But their present condition pleased them so well, that they chose rather to continue as they were, in *Præneste*: which is no weak proof of the good estate wherein the cities flourished that were subject to the *Roman* government. This siege of *Casiline* was not a little beneficial to the *Romans*; as having long detained *Hannibal*, and consumed much of his time, that might otherwise have been better spent. For winter overtook him, long before he could dispatch the business: which how to quit with his honour he knew not, when he was once engaged. Therefore he wintered at *Capua*: where he refreshed his army, or rather corrupted it, as all historians report, and made it effeminate; though, effeminate as it was, he therewithal did often beat the *Romans* in following times, as shall appear hereafter.

S E C T. X.

Of the great supply that was decreed at Carthage, to be sent to Hannibal in Italy. How by the malice of Hanno, and sloth or parsimony of the Carthaginians, the supply was too long deferred. That the riches of the Carthaginians grew faster, than of the Romans. Of Fabius and other old Roman Historians, how partial they were in their writings.

WHEN *Mago*, the son of *Amilcar*, had spent some time about the taking in of such *Italians*, as fell from the *Romans* after the battel at *Cannæ*, his brother *Hannibal* sent for him to *Capua*, and thence dispatched him away to *Carthage*, with the joyful message of victory. He told the *Carthaginian* senate, with how many *Roman* generals his brother had fought; what consuls he had chased, wounded, or slain; how the stout *Romans*, that in the former war never shunned any occasion of fight, were now grown so calm, that they thought their dictator *Fabius* the only good captain, because he never durst adventure to come to battel; that, not without reason, their spirits were thus abated, since *Hannibal* had slain of them above two hundred thousand, and taken above fifty thousand prisoners. He further told them of the

Brutians, Apulians, Samnites, Lucans, and other people of *Italy*; that following the fortune of those great victories, had revolted unto the *Carthaginians*. Among the rest he magnified *Capua*, as a goodly city, and fit to be not only (as already it was) head of all the *Capuans*, but the chief seat of their dominion in *Italy*: and there he informed them, how lovingly his brother had been entertained, where he meant to rest that winter, attending their supply. As for the war, he said it was even at an end, if they would now pursue it closely, and not give the *Romans* any breathing time, wherein to recollect themselves, and repair their broken forces. He willed them to consider, that the war was far from home, in the enemies country; that so many battels had much diminished his brother's army; that the soldiers, who had so well deserved, ought to be considered with liberal rewards; and that it was not good to burden their new *Italian* friends, with exactions of money, corn, and other necessaries; but that these things must be sent from *Carthage*: which the victory would require with large amends. Finally, he caused the golden rings, taken from the fingers of the *Roman Knights* that were slain, to be poured out openly in the court: which being measured, filled (as some say) three bushels, or (as others would rather have it) no more than one; adding, that by this might appear the greatness of the *Roman* calamity, forasmuch as none but the ^a principal of that order were accustomed to wear that ornament.

Who so considers the former *Punic* war, may easily find, that the state of *Carthage* never did receive, in all the durance thereof, any such hopeful advertisements from their captains abroad. Wherefore it is no marvel, if the errand of *Mago* found extraordinary welcome. In the vehemency of this joy, *Himilco*, a senator adverse to the faction of *Hanno*, is said to have demanded of that great perswader unto peace with *Rome*, whether he were still of opinion, that *Hannibal* should be yielded up unto the *Romans*; or whether he would forbid them to give thanks unto the gods, for this their good success. Hereunto though it be not likely that *Hanno* made the same formal answer, which *Livy* puts into his mouth, calling the *Carthaginian* senators *Patres conscripti*, by a term proper to the *Romans*, and putting them in mind of his own shameful overthrow received at the islands *Ægateis*: yet the sum of his speech appears to have been no less malicious, than it is set down, forasmuch as *Hannibal* himself, at his departure out of *Italy*, exclaimed against the wickedness of this *Hanno*; saying, that his hatred against the *Barchines*, had oppressed their family, when otherwise it could not, with the ruin of *Carthage*. Therefore it may well be, that he made such a jest of these victories, as is reported; saying, it ill befitted him, who had vanquished the *Romans*, to call for more help, as if he had been beaten; or him, that had taken their camp, filled forsooth with spoil, to make request for meat and money. To these cavils, if answer were needful, it might be said, that other booty than of horses and slaves, little was to be found in the *Roman* camp: the best of the soldiers carrying no other wealth into the field, than a few ^b silver studs in the bridles and trappings of their horses. If *Hannibal* had taken any main convoy of money and provisions, going to supply all wants of a great army in some

^a Thus *Livy* reports it: and credible it is, that while *Rome* was poor, the bravery of private men was not altogether so great, as it here would have permitted; though otherwise *Jus Annali*, the wearing of the ring, was the general privilege of the *Roman Equites*.

^b *Liv.* l. 22.

other province (as the two *Scipio's* are afterwards said to have done, when they won the camp of *Asdrubal*, that carried along with him all the wealth of *Spain*, in his journey to *Italy*) then might such an objection more justly have been made unto his demand of a supply. But the most likely part of *Hanno's* oration, and where he best might hope to prevail, contained a perswasion to use their fortune with moderation; and now to seek peace, whilst they had so much the better in war.

What would have been the issue of this counsel, if it had been followed, it were not easy to say. For though it be likely, that the *Roman* pride would have brooked much indignity, in freeing *Italy* from the danger of war; yet it is not likely, that the faith, so often broken to the *Carthaginians* in former times, would have been kept entire, when any opinion of good advantage had called for revenge of so many shameful overthrows; since after this war ended, and a new league concluded, no submissive behaviour could preserve *Carthage* from ruin, no longer than until such time, as *Rome* was at leisure from all other wars. This counsel therefore of *Hanno*, though it might seem temperate, was indeed very pestilent; and served only to hinder the performance of a noble resolution. For it was concluded by a main consent of the senate, that forty thousand *Numidians*, forty elephants, and great abundance of silver, should be sent over to *Hannibal*: and that, besides these, twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, should be levied in *Spain*; not only to supply, as need should require, the armies in that province, but to be transported into *Italy*.

This great aid, had it been as carefully sent, as it was readily decreed, the *Roman* historians would not have found cause, to tax the retchless improvidence of *Hannibal*, in forbearing to march directly from *Cannæ* to *Rome*, or in refreshing his army among the delights of *Capua*: the next year's work would have finished the business, with less dangerous adventure; and the pleasures, which his men enjoyed among the *Campans*, would have been commended, as rewards by him well thought upon, wherewith to animate both them and others, that were to be employed in the following war. But either the too much carelessness of those, that were loth to make haste in laying out their money, before extream necessity required it; or the crafty malice of *Hanno*, and his fellows, working upon the private humours of men, that had more feeling of their own commodity, than sense of the publick need; utterly perverted, and made unprofitable in the performance, the order that had been so well set down. The elephants were sent: and some money peradventure; uncertain it is, how long after. But those great forces of threescore thousand foot, and four thousand horse, came not into *Italy*, till much was lost of that which already had been gotten, and a great part of the old *Carthaginian* army was first consumed by time, and sundry accidents of war. Only some small numbers, no way answering unto the proportion decreed, were sent into *Spain*; and the journey of *Asdrubal* thence through *France* into *Italy* much talked of, but he not enabled thereunto, till many years were past, and the *Romans* had recovered their strength.

Here we may note, what great riches the *Carthaginians* drew into their city, both by the tributes received from their subjects, and by their wealthy trade of merchandize. For it is not long

since the war of the mercenaries; and the perfidious tyranny of the *Romans*, extorting, in time of the greatest necessity twelve hundred talents, had exceedingly impoverished *Carthage*: which was before brought into great want, even by the expence of so much money, as was to be disbursed for redeeming of peace, after the loss at *Ægates*. Yet we see, what great armies of *Numidians*, and *Spaniards*, besides those already on foot, are appointed to the service in *Italy*, and how little the *Carthaginians* fear the want of money in these chargeable undertakings: whereas the *Romans*, on the other side, having three or four years together been forced to some extraordinary cost, are fain to go upon credit, even for the price of those slaves, which they bought of their own citizens to arm for their defence. Such advantage, in means to enrich their treasury, had the wealthy merchants of *Carthage*, trading in all parts of the *Mediterranean* sea, even from *Tyrus* their mother-city in the bottom of the streights unto the great ocean, above the *Romans*: who lived on the fruits of their ground; and received their tributes from people following the same course of life. When time therefore was come, that the hatred of *Rome* found leisure to shew it self, in the destruction of *Carthage*; the impudence of *Roman* falsehood, in seeking an honest colour wherewith to shadow the intended breach of faith, discovered plainly whence the jealousy was bred, that this mighty city would again rebel. For the *Carthaginians*, having given up hostages, even before the *Roman* army did set forth, to perform whatsoever should be enjoined them, with condition that their city might not be destroyed; and having accordingly, when they were so required, yielded up all their weapons, and engines of war, the *Romans* told them plainly, that the city of *Carthage*, which was the body of the citizens, should be friendly dealt withal, but the town must needs be demolished, and removed into some other place, that should be twelve miles distant from the sea. For (said the *Romans*) this trade of merchandize, by which ye now live, is not so fit for peaceable men, such as ye promise to become hereafter, as is the trade of husbandry; an wholesome kind of life, and enduing men with many laudable qualities, which enable their bodies, and make them very apt for conversation. This villainous dealing of the *Romans*, though sugar'd with glossing words, plainly shews, what good observation the elder *Cato* had made of the hasty growth of *Carthage* in riches. For when, being demanded his opinion in the senate about any matter whatsoever it were, he added still this conclusion, *Thus I think; and that Carthage should be destroyed*; he may seem, not only to have had regard unto that present wealth, which at his being there he had found in the city, but much more unto these times, and the great height whereunto it rose, even suddenly as we see, out of many calamities, whilst the *Romans* thought, that it had not been in case to dare so terrible a war.

But as the *Carthagians*, in gathering wealth, were more industrious and skilful than the *Romans*; so came they far short of them, in the honourable care of the publick good: having every one, or most of them, a more principal regard of his own private benefit. This made them (besides the negligence commonly found in victors) when the first heat of their affection, wherein they conclude to pursue the war strongly, was over-past, go more leisurely to work, than had been requisite in the

execution. It was easy for *Hanno* to persuade covetous men, that they should first of all defend their own in *Spain*. This might be done with little charges. Afterwards, when that province was secured, they might send an army into *Italy*; so going to work orderly by degrees. For it were no wisdom to commit all the strength of the commonwealth to one hazard of fortune against the enemies; or (which perhaps were worse) to the government of an ambitious man, and his brethren; who having once (if they could so do) finished the war, might easily make *Hannibal* a king, and subdue *Carthage*, with the forces that she had given them to the conquest of *Rome*.

By such malicious working of *Hanno*, and by their own slackness, incredulity, dulness, or nigardize, the *Carthaginians* were persuaded rather to make small disbursements in *Spain*, than to set up all their rest at once in *Italy*. Yet was it indeed impossible to hold a country of so large extent, and so open a coast as that of *Spain*, free from all incursion of the enemy; especially the affection of the naturals being (as in a new conquest) ill established. A better way therefore it had been to make a running war, by which the *Romans* might have been found occupied, even with the ordinary *Carthaginian* garrisons, or some little addition thereunto. For if it were thought meet to defer the prosecution of their main intendment against *Rome* it self, until such time as every little thorn were pulled out of the sides of so great a province, then must *Emporie* have been besieged and forced; which, by reason of alliance with the *Massilians*, gave unto the *Romans*, at all times when they pleased, a ready and secure harbour. But the town of *Emporie* was too strong to be won in haste; it had long defended it self against the *Barbarians*, having not above four hundred paces of wall to the main land, and exceedingly well fortified, a great *Spanish* town of the same name, lying without it, that was three miles in compass, very strong likewise, and friend unto the *Grecians*, though not over-much trusted. Wherefore to force this town of *Emporie*, that was, besides the proper strength, like to be so well assisted by the *Massilians*, *Romans*, and some *Spaniards*, would have been a work of little less difficulty, than was the *Roman* war (in appearance) after the battel at *Cannæ*; yea, it had been in effect none other, than to alter the seat of the war, which *Hannibal* had already fixed, with better judgment, near unto the gates of *Rome*. The difficulty of this attempt being such, as caused it altogether to be forborn, great folly it was to be much troubled about expelling the *Romans* utterly out of *Spain*, whom they might more easily have diverted thence, and drawn home to their own doors, by making strong war upon their city. For even so the *Romans* afterwards removed *Hannibal* into *Afric*, by sending an army to *Carthage*; and by taking the like course, they now endeavour'd to change the seat of the war, transferring it out of *Italy* into *Spain*. But the private affections of men regarding the common good no otherwise, than as it is necessary to their own purposes, did make them easily wink at opportunities, and hope that somewhat would fall out well of it self, though they set not to their helping hands. *Hanno* was a malicious wretch; yet they that thought him so, were well enough contented to hearken unto his discourses, as long as they were plausible, and tended to keep the purse full. In the mean while they suffered *Hannibal*,

and all the noble house of *Amilcar*, to weary themselves in travel for the commonwealth; which at *Carthage* in general highly commended, but weakly assisted; as if the industry of these *Barchines* had been somewhat more than needful. Surely the *Carthaginians*, in general, were far less honourable than the people of *Rome*, not only in government of their subject provinces, but in administration of their own estate; few of them preferring the respect of the weal-publick above their private interest. But as they thrived little in the end, by their parsimony used toward their own mercenaries, when the former *Roman* war was finished; so the conclusion of this war present, will make them complain, with feeling sighs, of their negligence in supplying *Hannibal* after the victory at *Cannæ*; when gladly they would give all their treasures to redeem the opportunity, that now they let pass, as if it were cost enough to send a few handfuls into *Spain*.

That both the *Spanish* business, and the state of *Afric* it self, depended wholly, or for the most part, upon success of things in *Italy*, the course of actions following will make manifest. Particularly, how matters were ordered in *Spain* by the *Carthaginian* governors, it is very hard, and almost impossible, to set down. For though we must not reprehend, in that worthy historian *Livy*, the tender love of his own country, which made him give credit unto *Fabius* and others; yet must we not, for his sake, believe those lies, which the impartial judgment of *Polybius* hath condemned in the writers that gave them original. It were needless to rehearse all that may be found in *Polybius*, concerning the truth of that *Roman* historian *Fabius*: one example may suffice. He saith of *Amilcar* and his men at *Eryx*, in the former war, that having clean spent their strength, and being even broken with many miseries, they were glad to submit themselves unto the *Romans*. Contrary hereunto, we find in the life of *Amilcar*, set down by *Æmilius Probus*, that *Eryx* was in such fort held by the *Carthaginians*, that it seemed to be in as good condition, as if in those parts there had not been any war. These words, being referred to the brave resolution of the *Carthaginian* soldiers, and the singular virtue of their general infusing such spirit into them, may be taken as not over-liberal. For in the treaty of peace between *Amilcar* and *Catulus*, when the *Roman* first of all required that this garrison of *Eryx* should lay down their arms, and forsake *Sicily*, threatening, that otherwise he would not talk of any composition; *Amilcar* boldly bad him chuse, whether he would talk of it, or no; for that the arms which his country had put into his hands to use against her enemies, it was not his purpose to yield up unto them. Now since the *Romans*, contrary to their custom upon like advantages, were content to let *Amilcar* have his will, and not to stand with him upon point of honour, whilst otherwise they might quietly rid their hands of him; plain enough it is, that they were far from thinking him a man consumed with miseries, as *Fabius* would have him seem. Hereunto agrees the relation of *Polybius*, who flatly, and by name, chargeth *Fabius* with untruth; saying, that howsoever *Amilcar*, and his soldiers, had endured all extremity; yet they behaved themselves as men that had no sense thereof, and were as far from being either vanquished, or tired, as were their enemies. Such being the difference between *Fabius* (as also perhaps between other old writers of the *Roman* story) and those that had more regard of truth.

^a Of such ambition *Hanno* directly accused *Hannibal*, saying, that he made war upon war, that so he might live compassed with glory, as knowing no other way to make his self a king. Liv. l. 21.

^b Pol. l. 1.

than of flattering the mighty city of *Rome*; we must take it in good part, that howsoever *Livy* introduceth *Hanno*, in one place, joining very foolishly his own shameful overthrow at the islands ^a *Ægæis*, with the great services of *Amilcar* at *Eryx*, as if both of them had had a like event; yet ^b elsewhere he forbeareth not to put a more likely tale (though with as impudent a commemoration of his own unhappy conduct) into the same *Hanno's* mouth, making him say, that the affairs of *Carthage* went never better, than a little before the loss of their fleet in that battel at sea, wherein himself was general. Now concerning the doings of the *Scipio's* in *Spain*, there is cause to wish that this *Fabius*, with *Val. Antias*, and others of the like stamp, had either written (if they could not write more temperately) nothing at all; or that the tender affection of *Livy* to his *Rome*, had not caused him to think too well of their relations: which are such as follow.

S E C T. XI.

Strange reports of the Roman victories in Spain, before Asdrubal, the son of Amilcar, followed thence his brother Hannibal into Italy.

IT hath been shewed already, how *P. Cornelius Scipio*, the consul, returning from *Gaul* into *Italy*, to encounter with *Hannibal* at his descent from the *Alps*, sent before him his brother *Cneus*, with part of his fleet and army, into *Spain*. Two *Roman* legions, with fourteen thousand foot of the confederates, and twelve hundred horse, had been allotted unto the consul, therewith to make war in *Spain* against *Hannibal*; who since he was marching into *Italy* with the strength of his army, *P. Scipio* believed, that a good part of these his own forces might well be spared from the *Spanish* expedition; and therefore made bold to carry some of the number back with him, sending on his brother with the rest, as his lieutenant. *Publius* himself remained in *Italy* all the time of his consulship; which being expired, he was sent proconsul into *Spain*, by the senate, with an army of eight thousand men, and a fleet of thirty galleys.

The acts of these two brethren, in their province, were very great; and, as they are reported, somewhat marvellous. For they continually prevailed in *Spain* against the *Carthaginians*, whom they vanquished in so many battels, and withdrew from their alliance so many of the *Spaniards*, their confederates, that we have cause to wonder how the enemy could so often find means to repair his forces, and return strong into the field. But as the *Romans*, by pretending to deliver the country from the tyranny of *Carthage*, might easily win unto their confederacy, as many as were galled with the *African* yoke, and durst adventure to break it; so the ancient reputation of the first conquerors might serve to arm the naturals against these invaders; and to reclaim those that had revolted unto the *Romans*, were it only by the memory of such ill success, as the like rebellion in former times had found. Here-to may be added the *Carthaginian* treasure, which easily raised soldiers among those valiant, but (in that age) poor, and gold-thirsty nations. Neither was it of small importance, that so many of the *Spaniards* had their children, kinsmen and friends, abroad with *Hannibal* in his *Italian* wars, or serving the *Carthaginians* in *Africa*. And peradventure, if we durst be bold to say it, the victories of the *Scipio's* were neither so many, nor so great, as they are set out by *Livy*. This we may be bold to say, that the

great captain *Fabius*, or *Livy* in his person, maketh an objection unto *Scipio*, which neither *Scipio*, nor *Livy* for him, doth answer, that if *Asdrubal* were vanquished, as *Scipio* would say, by him in *Spain*: strange it was, and as little to his honour, as it had been extremely dangerous to *Rome*; that the same vanquished man should invade *Italy*. And it is indeed an incredible narration, that *Asdrubal* being enclosed on all sides, and not knowing how to escape out of a battel, save only by the steep descent of rocks, over a great river that lay at his back, ran away with all his money, elephants, and broken troops, over *Tagus*, directly toward the *Pyrenees*, and so toward *Italy*; upon which he fell with more than three-score thousand armed soldiers. Neither do I see, how it hangs well together, that he chose a piece of ground very defensible, but most incommodious for his retreat, if he should happen to be vanquished; and yet, that he sent all his money and elephants away before him, as not intending to abide the enemy: or how it could be true, that these his elephants, being so sent before, could hinder the *Romans* (for so are they said to have done in the last battel between him and *Scipio*) from breaking into his camp. Wherefore we can no more than be sorry, that all *Carthaginian* records of this war, and *Spanish* (if there were any) being utterly lost, we can know no more thereof, than what it hath pleased the *Romans* to tell us: unto whom it were no wisdom to give too much credit. In this regard, I will summarily run over the doings of the *Scipio's* in *Spain*; not greatly insisting on particulars, whereof there is no great certainty.

Cn. Cornelius landed at *Emporiae*, an haven-town not far within the *Pyrenees*, retaining still the same name with little inflexion. That by the fame of his clemency he allured many nations to become subject unto *Rome*, as the story begins of him, I could easily believe, if I understood by what occasion they had need to use his clemency, or he to give such famous example thereof, being a mere stranger, and having no jurisdiction in the country. Yet is it certain, that he was a man very courteous, and one that could well insinuate himself into the love of the *Barbarians*; among whom, his dexterity in practice had the better success, for that he seemed to have none other errand, than setting them at liberty. This pretext availed with some: others were to be hired with money; and some he compelled to yield by force or fear; especially, when he had won a battel against *Hanno*. Into all treaties of accord made with these people, likely it is that he remembered to insert this article, which the *Romans* in their alliances never forgot, unless in long times past, and when they dealt with the *Carthaginians*, or their superiors; ^c *Majestatem Pop. Rom. comiter conservent*, which is, as *Tully* interprets it, that they should gently (or kindly) uphold the majesty of the people of *Rome*. This was in appearance nothing troublesome: yet implied it indeed an obscure covenant of subjection. And in this respect it may be true, that the *Spaniards* became ^d *ditionis Romanæ*, of the *Roman Jurisdiction*: though hereafter they will say, they had no such meaning. That part of the country wherein *Scipio* landed, was newly subdued by *Hannibal* in his passage toward *Italy*; and therefore the more easily shaken out of obedience. Particularly in the *Barguntians*; *Hannibal* had found, at his coming among them, such an apprehension of the *Roman* greatness, as made him suspect, that any light occasion would make

^a *Ægæis Insulae*. *Eryx* que ante oculos proponit, &c. *Liv.* l. 21. ^b *Liv.* l. 23. ^c *Orat. pro Corn. Balbo.* ^d *Liv.* l. 21.

them start from the *Carthaginians*. Wherefore he not only appointed *Hanno* governour over them, as over the rest of the province between *Iberus* and the *Pyrenees*, but made him also their Lord; that is (as I conceive it; for I do not think he gave the principality of their country unto *Hanno* and his heirs) he made him not only lieutenant-general over them, in matters of war, and things concerning the holding them in obedience to *Carthage*; but took from them all inferior Officers of their own, leaving them to be governed by *Hanno*, at his discretion. These therefore had good cause to rejoice at the coming of *Scipio*; with whom, others also (no doubt) found reasons to join; it being the custom of all conquered nations, in hatred of their present Lords, to throw themselves indifferently into the protection of others, that many times prove worse than the former. So were the *Neapolitans* and *Milanais*, in the age of our grandfathers, weary by turns of the *Spaniards* and *French*; as more sensible still of the present evil which they felt, than regardful of the greater mischief, whereinto they ran by seeking to avoid it. This bad affection of his province, would not suffer *Hanno* to temporize. Ten thousand foot, and a thousand horse, *Hannibal* had left unto him: besides which, it is like, that some forces he was able to raise out of his province. Therefore he adventured a battel with *Scipio*; wherein he was overthrown and taken. Following this victory, *Scipio* besieged *Stiffum*, a town hard by, and won it. But *Asdrubal*, having passed *Iberus*, and coming too late to the relief of *Hanno*, with eight thousand foot and a thousand horse, fell upon the *Roman* sea-forces, that lay not far about *Tarracon*, whom he found careless, as after a victory, roving abroad in the country; and with great slaughter drove them aboard their ships. This done, he ran up into the country, where he withdrew the *Illergetes* from the *Roman* party, though they had given hostages to *Scipio*. *Scipio* in the mean season was gone to visit and aid his fleet: where having set things in order, he returned back, and made toward *Asdrubal*; who durst not abide his coming, but withdrew himself again over *Iberus*. So the *Illergetes*, were compelled by force, having lost *Athanagia*, their chief city, to pay a fine to the *Romans*, and increase the number of their hostages. The *Ausetani* likewise, confederates of the *Carthaginians*, were besieged in their chief town; which they defended thirty days; hoping in vain, that the sharp winter, and great abundance of snow that fell, would have made the *Romans* to dislodge. But they were lain at length to yield: and for this their obstinacy, they were amerced twenty talents of silver. During the siege, the *Lacetani* came to help their distressed neighbours; and were beaten home by *Scipio*, leaving twelve thousand of their company dead behind them. I cannot but wonder, how these *Lacetani*, that are said to be the first which embraced the friendship of *Scipio*, should, without any cause remembred, become *Carthaginian* on a sudden, in the next news that we hear of them. As also it is strange, that all the sea-coast northward of *Iberus*, having lately become voluntarily *ditionis Romanæ*, subject unto Rome, should, in continuance of the story, after a few lines, hold war against *Scipio*, without any assistance of the *Carthaginians*. Neither can I believe, that *Asdrubal*, as it were by a charm, stirred up the *Illergetes*, making them lay aside all care of their hostages, and take arms in his quarrel; whilst himself

had not the daring to stand against *Scipio*; but ran away, and saved himself beyond *Iberus*. *Philinus* perhaps, or some *Carthaginian* writer, would have told it thus: That *Scipio*, adventuring too far into the country, was beaten by *Asdrubal* back to his ships, whence he durst not stir, until winter came on: at what time this *Carthaginian* returned into the heart of his province, leaving some few garrisons to defend those places, that after *Scipio* won, by returning upon them, unlooked for, through a deep snow. As for the *Lacetani*, *Illergetes*, and the rest, we may reasonably think, that they fought their own benefit; helping themselves one while by the *Romans* against the *Carthaginians*; and contrariwise, upon sense of injuries received, or apprehension of more grievous tyranny, under which they feared to be brought by these new masters, hearkening again unto the comfortable promises of those, that had ruled them before. For that it was their intent to live under their own country laws, and not under governors sent from *Rome* or *Carthage*, their demeanour in all ages following may testify: even from henceforth unto the days of *Augustus Cesar*; till when they were never thoroughly conquered.

The year following this, *Cn. Scipio* had a victory against the *Carthaginians*, in fight at sea; or rather came unto them, unlooked for, while they rode at anchor, most of their men being on shore. All their ships, that ran not too far on ground, he took, and thereby grew master of the whole coast; landing at pleasure, and doing great hurt in all places that were not well defended. After this victory, above one hundred and twenty nations, or petty estates in *Spain*, are said to have submitted themselves unto the *Romans*, and given hostages: whereby *Asdrubal* was compelled to fly into the utmost corners of the land, and hide himself in *Lusitania*. Yet it follows; that the *Illergetes* did again rebel; that *Asdrubal* hereupon came over *Iberus*; and that *Scipio* (though having easily vanquished the *Illergetes*) went not forth to meet him, but stirred up against him the *Celtiberians*, that lately was become his subjects and had given him hostages. These took from the *Carthaginian* three towns, and vanquished him in two battels, wherein they slew fifteen thousand of his men, and took four thousand prisoners. Then arrived *P. Scipio*, with the supply before-mentioned: and henceforward the two brethren jointly administered the business in *Spain*.

The *Carthaginians* being occupied in the *Celtiberian* war, the two *Scipio's* did, *haud cunctanter*, without fear or doubt, pass over *Iberus*, and besiege *Saguntum*. Little cause of doubt had they, if *Cn.* had already subdued many nations beyond it, and among many others, the same *Celtiberians*, that with their proper forces were able to vanquish *Asdrubal*. *Bossar*, the governour of *Saguntum*, a simple man, suffered himself to be persuaded by one *Acedux*, a *Spaniard*, that the only way to get the favour and hearty good-will of the country, was by freely restoring unto them their hostages; as resting, without any pledge, assured of their faith. But the crafty *Spaniard*, being trusted with this message and restitution of the hostages, carried them all to the *Roman* generals: persuading them, as he had done *Bossar*, to make the liberty their own. Hereby the *Romans* purchased much love: if the tale were true; and if it were not rather true, as afterwards, and ere this we find, that all the *Spanish* hostages were left in new *Carthage*.

I am weary of rehearsing so many particularities, whereof I can believe so few. But since we find no better certainties, we must content our selves with these.

The year following was like unto this: *Asdrubal* must be beaten again. The two *Scipio's* divide their forces: *Cn.* makes war by land; *P.* by sea. *Asdrubal*, with much labour and entreaty, hath gotten four thousand foot, and five hundred horse out of *Afric*: he repairs his fleet, and provides every way to make resistance. But all his chief sea-men, and masters of his ships, revolt unto the *Romans*, because they had been chidden the last year for their negligence, which had betrayed the navy. The revolt of these ship-masters animates to rebellion the *Carpesians*, or *Carpetani*, an inland-people about *Toledo*, in the very center of *Spain*. These do much mischief, so that *Asdrubal* is fain to make a journey to them. His sudden coming cuts off some of them that were found scattered abroad in the fields. But they making head, so valiantly assail him, that they drive him, for fear, to incamp himself strongly on an high piece of ground, whence he dares not come forth to give them battel. So they take a town by force, wherein he had laid up all his provisions; and shortly make themselves masters of the country round about. This good success breeds negligence, for which they dearly pay. *Asdrubal* comes upon them, takes them unprepared, beats them, kills the most of them, and disperseth the rest, so that the whole nation yieldeth to him the next day. Then come directions from *Carthage*, that *Asdrubal* should lead his army forth- with into *Italy*: which we may wonder, why the *Carthaginians* would appoint him to do, if they had been informed by his letters in what hard case he was, and had so weakly supplied him, as is shewed before. But thus we find it reported; and that upon the very rumour of this his journey, almost all *Spain* was already to fall to the *Romans*. *Asdrubal* therefore sends word presently to *Carthage*, that this must not be so: or if they will needs have it so, that then they must send him a successor, and well attended with a strong army, which to im- ploy, they should find work more than enough; such notable men were the *Roman* generals. But the se- nate of *Carthage* is not much moved with this ex- cuse: *Asdrubal* must needs be gone; and *Himilco*, with such forces as are thought expedient for that service, both by land and sea, is sent to take the charge of *Spain*. Wherefore *Asdrubal* hath now no more to do, than to furnish himself with store of money, that he might have wherewithal to win the friendship of the *Gauls*; through whose coun- tries he must pass, as *Hannibal* had done before him. The *Carthaginians* were greatly to blame, for not remembering to ease him of his care. But since it can be no better, he lays great impositions upon all the *Spaniards* his subjects: and having gotten together as much treasure as he could, on- ward he marched toward *Iberus*. The *Scipio's* hearing these news, are careful how to arrest him on the way. They besiege *Ibera* (so called of the ri- ver's name running by it) the richest town in all those quarters, that was confederate with *Asdru- bal*: who thereupon steps aside to relieve it. The *Romans* meet him, and fight a battel with him: which they win the more easily, for that the *Spa- niards*, his followers, had rather be vanquished at home, than get the victory, and afterwards be haled into *Italy*. Great numbers are slain, and few should have escaped, but that the *Spaniards* ran

away, ere the battels were thoroughly joined. Their camps the *Romans* take and spoil: whereby (questionless) they are marvellously enriched: all the money that could be raked together in *Spain*, being carried along in this *Italian* expedition. This day's event joins all *Spain* to the *Romans*, if any part of the country stood in doubt before; and puts *Asdrubal* so far from all thought of travelling into *Italy*, that it leaves him small hope of keeping him- self safe in *Spain*. Of these exploits advertisement is sent to *Rome*; and letters to the senate from *P.* and *Cn. Scipio*, whereof the contents are, * That they have neither money, apparel, nor bread, where- with to sustain their army and fleet; that all is wanting, so as unless they may be supplied from *Rome*, they can neither hold their forces together, nor tarry any longer in the province. These letters come to *Rome* in an evil season, the senate being scarcely able, after the loss at *Cannæ*, to help it self at home. Yet relief is sent, how hardly, and how much to the commendations of that love and care, which the private citizens of *Rome* bare unto the commonwealth, shall be inserted elsewhere, into the relation of things whereof the truth is less question- able. At the coming of this supply, the two *Scipio's* pursue *Asdrubal*, and hunt him out of his lurking holes. What else can we think, that remember the last news of him, and how fearfully he mistrust- ed his own safety? They find him, and *Mago*, and *Amilcar*, the son of *Bomilcar*, with an army of sixty thousand men besieging *Illiturgi* (which the learned *Orelinus*, and others, probably conjecture to have stood where *Carinena* is now, in the king- dom of *Arragon*; for there was *Illiturgis*, after- wards called *Forum Julii*, quite another way) a town of the *Illyrgetes*, their nearest neighbours, for having revolted unto the *Romans*. The town is greatly distressed, but most of all, for want of vic- tuals. The *Romans* therefore break through between the enemy's camps, with terrible slaughter of all that resist them; and having victualled the place, encourage the townsmen to defend their walls as stoutly, as they should anon behold them fighting manfully with the besiegers in their behalf. ^b So they issue forth, about sixteen thousand against sixty thousand; and, killing more of the enemies, than themselves were in number, drove all the *Cartha- ginian* commanders, every one, out of his quarter; and took that day, besides prisoners and other booty, fifty-eight ensigns. The *Carthaginian* army, be- ing thus beaten from *Illiturgi*, fall upon *Incibili*, that stood a little southward from the mouth of *Iberus*. The *Spaniards* are blamed, as too greedy of earning money by war, for thus re-inforcing the broken *Carthaginians*. But it may be wonder- ed whence the *Carthaginians* had money to pay them, since *Asdrubal* was lately driven to poll the country, wanting money of his own; and being beaten in this journey, had lost his wealthy carriages, when his camp was taken after the battel by *Ibera*. Howsoever it happens, the *Carthaginians* (accord- ing to their custom) are beaten again at *Incibili*, where there were of them about thirteen thousand slain, and above three thousand taken, besides forty- two ensigns, and nine elephants. After this (in a manner) all the people of *Spain* fell from them unto the *Romans*. Thus could *Fabius*, *Kalerius Antias*, or some other historian, to whom *Livy* gave credit, conquer all *Spain* twice in one year, by winning fa- mous victories, whereof these good captains, *P.* and *Cn. Scipio*, perhaps were not aware.

* Liv. l. 23.

^b Liv. l. 23.

^c Liv. l. 23.

The *Romans*, notwithstanding this large access of dominion, winter on their own side of *Iberus*. In the beginning of the next year, great armies of the *Spaniards* rise against *Asdrubal*, and are overthrown by him. *P. Scipio*, to help these his friends, is forced to make great haste over the river. At *Castrum altum*, a place in the mid-way between *New Carthage* and *Saguntum*, famous by the death of the great *Amilcar*, *P. Scipio* encampeth; and stores the place with victuals, being strong and defensible; as intending to make it his seat for a while. But the country round about is too full of enemies: the *Carthaginian* horse have charged the *Romans* in their march, and are gone off clear; falling also upon some stragglers, or such as lagged behind their fellows in march, they have cut off two thousand of them. Hereupon it is thought behoveful, to retire unto some place more assured. So *Publius* withdraws himself unto *Mons Victorie*; that rising somewhat eastward from *Incibili*, overlooks the southern out-let of *Iberus*. Thither the *Carthaginians* pursue him: his brother *Cn.* repairs unto him; and *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gesco*, with a full army, arrives to help his companions. As they lie thus near encamped together, *P. Scipio*, with some light-armed, going closely to view the places thereabouts, is discovered by the enemies, who are like to take him, but that he withdraws himself to an high piece of ground; where they besiege him, till his brother *Cn.* fetch him off. After this (but I know not why) *Castulo*, a great city of *Spain*, whence *Hannibal* had taken him a wife, joineth with the *Romans*; though being far distant from them, and seated on the head of the river *Bætis*. Nevertheless, the *Carthaginians* pass over *Iberus*, to besiege *Illiturgi* again, wherein lodgeth a *Roman* garrison, hoping to win it by famine. We may justly wonder, what should move them to neglect the rebellion of *Castulo*, yea, and the *Roman* army lying so close by them, and to seek adventures further off, in that very place wherein they had been so grievously beaten the year before. But thither they go; and thither follows them *Cn. Scipio* with one legion, who enters the town by force, breaks out upon them the next day, and in two battels kills above twelve thousand, and takes more than a thousand of them prisoners, with thirty-six ensigns. This victory (doubtless) is remarkable, considering that the greatest *Roman* legion at this time consisted of no more than five thousand men. The vanquished *Carthaginians* besiege *Bigarra*; but that siege is also raised by *Cn. Scipio*. Thence the *Carthaginians* remove to *Munda*, where the *Romans* are soon at their heels. There is a great battel fought, that lasteth four hours, wherein the *Romans* get a notable victory; and a more notable would have gotten, had not *Cn. Scipio* been wounded. Thirty-nine elephants are killed, and twelve thousand men; three thousand prisoners taken, and fifty-seven ensigns. The *Carthaginians* fly to *Auriges*, and the *Romans* pursue them. *Cn. Scipio*, in a litter, is carried into the field, and vanquisheth the *Carthaginians* again; but kills not half so many of them as before; good cause why, for there are fewer of them left to fight. * Notwithstanding all these overthrows, the *Spaniards*, a people framed even by nature to set war on foot, quickly fill up the broken troops of *Asdrubal*; who having also hired some of the *Gauls*, adventures once more to try his fortune with the *Romans*. But he is beaten again, and loseth eight thousand of his men, besides prisoners, elephants, ensigns, and other appurtenances. After

so many victories, the *Romans* are even ashamed to leave *Saguntum* enthralled unto the *Carthaginians*; since, in behalf of that city, they had first entered into this war. And well may we think it strange, that they had not recovered it long before, since we may remember, that long before this they had won all the country once and again. But it must not be forgotten, that they had ere now besieged *Saguntum*, and were fain (as appears) to go their way without it; so as they need not to blush for having so long forbore to do that, which ere now they had attempted, but were unable to perform. At the present they win *Saguntum*, and restore the possession thereof unto such of the poor dispersed citizens as they can find out. They also waste and destroy the country of the *Turdetani*, that had ministered unto *Hannibal* matter of quarrel against the *Saguntines*. This last action (questionless) was much to their honour, and wherein we may be assured, that the *Carthaginians* would have disturbed them, if they had been able.

But overlooking now this long continuance of great victories which the *Romans* have gotten in *Spain*, other print or token of all their brave exploits we can perceive none, than this recovery of *Saguntum*, excepting the stopping of *Asdrubal's* journey; which was indeed of greatest importance, but appertaining to their own defence. For they have landed at *Emporiae*, an haven-town, built and peopled by a colony of the *Phoceans*, kin to the *Massilians*, friends to the *Romans*. They have easily won to their party, lost, recovered, and lost again, some petty bordering nations of the *Spaniards*, that are carried one while by persuasion, other whiles by force, and sometimes by their own unsettled passions; and now finally, they have won a town, whereof the *Carthaginians* held entire possession, who had rooted out the old inhabitants. Wherefore we may easily believe, that when they took *Saguntum* (if they took it not by surprize, which is to be suspected, since in this action we find no particulars remembered, as when the same place was taken by *Hannibal*) they had gotten the better of their enemies in some notable fight. In like sort also must we think that all those battels lately remembered, after every one of which *Asdrubal* set down before some place that had rebelled, or seemed ready to rebel, were prosperous unto the *Carthaginians*. For it is not the custom of armies vanquished, to carry the war from town to town, and beleaguer cities of their enemies; but to fortify themselves within their own places of strength, and therein to attend the levy and arrival of new supplies. And surely, if the *Romans* had been absolute masters of the field, when they won *Saguntum*, they would not have consumed a whole year following, in practising only with the *Celtiberians*, the next adjoining people. Yet made they this, little less than two years before. Of these *Celtiberians* we hear before, that they have yielded up themselves unto the *Romans*; for security of their faith, given hostages to *Scipio*; and, at his appointment made war against the *Carthaginians*, with their proper forces. Wherefore it is strange, that they are now thus hardly wrought; and, not without express condition of a great sum, hired to serve in the *Roman* camp. How this may hold together, I cannot perceive; unless perhaps in those days it were the *Roman* custom, or rather the custom of some bad author whom *Livy* follows, to call every messenger, or straggler, that entered their camp, an hostage of that people from whom he came,

The *Celtiberians* at length, hired with great rewards, send an army of thirty thousand to help the *Romans*; out of which, three hundred the fittest men are chosen, and carried into *Italy*, there to deal with their countrymen that follow *Hannibal* in his wars. But if any of these three hundred return back into *Spain*, it is to be feared, that he brings with him such news of the riches and welfare of *Hannibal's* men, that all his fellows at home are the less unwilling to follow *Asdrubal*, when he shall next have a desire to lead them into *Italy*. Hereof we find more than probability, when these mercenary *Celtiberians* meet the *Carthaginian* army in the field. The two *Scipio's*, presuming on this access of strength, divide their forces, and seek out the enemies, who lie not far off with three armies. *Asdrubal*, the son of *Amilcar*, is nearest at hand: even among the *Celtiberians*, at *Anitorgis*. With him *Cn. Scipio* doubts not to take good order: but the fear is, that this one part of the *Carthaginian* forces being destroyed, *Mago*, and *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gesco*, hearing the news, will make use of their distance, which is five days march, and, by running into the furthest parts of the country, save themselves from being overtaken. *Publius* therefore must make the more haste, and take with him the better soldiers, that is, two parts of the old *Roman* army; leaving the third part, and all the *Celtiberians*, to his brother. He that hath the longer journey to make, comes somewhat the sooner to his life's end. *Mago*, and *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gesco*, are not studying how to run away: they find no such necessity. They join their forces together; meet with *P. Scipio*; and lay at him so hardly, that he is driven to keep himself close within his trenches: wherein he thinks himself not well assured. Especially he is vexed by *Masanissa*, prince of the *Masseyli*, *Numidians* bordering upon *Mauritania*, in the region called now *Tremizen*: to whom the chief honour of this service is ascribed, for that he becomes afterwards confederate with the *Romans*. In this dangerous case *P. Scipio* gets intelligence, that *Indibilis*, a *Spanish* prince, is coming with seven thousand and five hundred of the *Suessetani*, to join with his enemies. Fearing therefore to be straight shut up, and besieged, he issues forth by night, to meet with *Indibilis* upon the way; leaving *T. Fonteius*, his lieutenant, with a small company, to defend the camp. He meets with *Indibilis*; but is not able, according to his hope, to defeat him at the first encounter. The fight continues so long, that the *Numidian* horse appear (whom he thought to have been ignorant of his departure) and fall upon the *Romans* on all sides: neither are the *Carthaginians* far behind; but come so fast upon him in rear, that *P. Scipio*, uncertain which way to turn, yet fighting, and animating his men, where need most requireth, is struck through with a lance, and slain: very few of his army escaping the same destiny, through benefit of the dark night. The like end hath *Cn. Scipio*, within nine and twenty days after. At his meeting with *Asdrubal*, the *Celtiberian* mercenaries all forsake him; pretending that they had war in their own country. If *Anitorgis*, where *Asdrubal* then lay, were, as *Ortelius* following *Bentzen* takes it, a *Celtiberian* town; this was no vain pretence, but an apparent truth. But we may justly believe, that they were won by *Asdrubal*, and easily persuaded to take as much money for not fighting, as they should have had for hazarding their lives. *Cn. Scipio* therefore being unable to stay them; and no less unable, without their help, either to resist the enemy, or to join with his brother, makes a very violent retreat; herein only differing from plain flight, that he keeps his men together. *Asdrubal* presseth hard upon him: and *Mago*, with *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gesco*, having made an end of *Publius*, hasten to dispatch his brother after him. *Scipio* steals from them all, by night; but is overtaken the next day by their horse, and arrested, in an open place of hard stony ground, where grows not so much as a shrub, unfit for defence of his legions against such enemies. Yet a little hill he finds, of easy ascent on every side, which he takes for want of a more commodious place, and fortifies with pack-saddles, and other luggage, for default of a better pallisado. These weak defences the *Carthaginians* soon tear in sunder; and, breaking in on all hands, leave very few of them alive; that saving themselves, I know not how, within some woods adjoining, escape unto *T. Fonteius*, whom *Publius* had left in his camp, as is before said. It is a terrible overthrow, they say, out of which no man escapes. Yet, how they that were thus hemmed in on every side, in so bare a ground as afforded not a shrub to cover them, could break out, and shrowd themselves within woods adjoining, I should much wonder; did not a greater miracle following call away mine attention. *T. Fonteius* is in *P. Scipio's* camp, on the north-side of *Iberus*, fearful (as may be supposed) of his own life; since his general, with two parts of the *Roman* army, had little hope to remain long safe within it. Thither comes *L. Martius*, a young *Roman* gentleman, of a notable spirit: who having gathered together the scattered soldiers, and drawn some companies out of their garrisons, makes a pretty army. The soldiers, being to choose a general by most voices, prefer this *L. Martius* before *Fonteius*, the lieutenant; as well they may. For *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gesco*, coming upon them; this *L. Martius* so encourageth his men (fondly weeping when he led them forth, upon remembrance of their more honourable generals lately slain) and admonisheth them of their present necessity, that he beats the *Carthaginians* into their trenches. A notable victory perhaps he might have gotten, but that he wisely sounds the retreat; reserving the fury of his soldiers to a greater occasion. The *Carthaginians* are at first amazed, and wonder whence this new boldness grows, in enemies lately vanquished, and now again little better than taken: but when they see, that the *Roman* dares not follow his advantage, they return to their former security; and, utterly despising him, set neither *Corps du guard*, nor sentinels, but rest secure, as if no enemy were near. *Martius* therefore animates his soldiers with lively words, and tells them, that there is no adventure more safe, than that which is furthest from suspicion of being undertaken. They are soon persuaded to follow him, in any desperate piece of service. So he leads them forth by night, and steals upon the camp of *Asdrubal*: where finding no guard, but the enemies fast asleep, or very drowsy, he enters without resistance, fires their cabins, and gives a terrible alarm; so that all afrighted, the *Carthaginians* run head-long one upon another, they know not which way. All passages out of their camp, *Martius* hath pre-possessed, so that there is no way to escape, save by leaping down the rampart: which as many do as can think upon it, and run away toward the camp of *Asdrubal*, son of *Amilcar*, that lay six miles off. But *Martius* hath way-laid them. In a valley between their two camps he hath bestowed a *Roman* cohort, and I know not what number of horse; so that into this

this ambush they fall every one, and are cut in pieces. But lest perchance any should have escaped, and give the alarm before his coming; *Martius* hastens to be there as soon as they. By which diligent speed, he comes early in the morning upon this further camp: which with no great difficulty he enters; and partly by force, partly by apprehension of danger which the enemies conceived, when they beheld the *Roman* shields, foul, and bloodied with their former execution, he drives head-long into flight, all that can save themselves from the fury of the sword. Thirty-seven thousand of the enemies perish in this night's work; besides a thousand eight hundred and thirty, that are taken prisoners. Hereunto *Valerius Antius* adds, that the camp of *Mago* was also taken, and seven thousand slain: and that in another battel with *Asdrubal*, there were slain ten thousand more; besides four thousand three hundred and thirty taken prisoners. Such is the power of some historians. *Livy* therefore hath elsewhere well observed, that there is none so intemperate as *Valerius Antius*, in multiplying the numbers that have fallen in battels. That, whilst *Martius* was making an oration to his soldiers, a flame of fire shone about his head, *Livy* reporteth as a common tale, not giving thereto any credit: and temperately concludeth, that this captain *Martius* got a great name; which he might well do, if with so small forces, and in such distress, he could clearly get off from the enemies, and give them any parting blow, though it were far less than that which is here set down.

Of these occurrences *L. Martius* sent word to *Rome*, not forgetting his own good service, whatsoever it was, but setting it out in such wise, as the senate might judge him worthy to hold the place of their vicegerent in *Spain*: which the better to intimate unto them, he stiled himself propretor. The *Fathers* were no less moved with the tidings, than the case required: and therefore took such careful order, for supplying their forces in *Spain*, that although *Hannibal* came to the gates of *Rome*, ere the companies, levied to serve in that province, could be sent away; yet would they not stay a tide for the defence of the city it self, but shipped them in all haste for *Spain*. As for that title of propretor, which *Martius* had assumed, they thought it too great for him, and were offended at his presumption in usurping it: foreseeing well, that it was a matter of ill consequence, to have the soldiers abroad make choice, among themselves, of those that should command armies and provinces. Therefore *C. Claudius Nero* was dispatched away, with all convenient haste, into *Spain*: carrying with him about six thousand of the *Roman* foot, and as many of the *Latins*, with three hundred *Roman* horse, and of the *Latins* eight hundred.

It happened well, that about these times, the affairs of *Rome* began to prosper in *Italy*, and afforded means of sending abroad such a strong supply: otherwise, the victories of *Martius* would ill have served, either to keep footing in *Spain*, or to stop the *Carthaginian* armies from marching towards the *Alps*. For when *Claudius*, landing with his new forces, took charge of that remainder of the army, which was under *Martius* and *Ponticus*; he found surer tokens of the overthrows received, than of those miraculous victories, whereof *Martius* had made his vaunts unto the senate. The *Roman* party was forsaken by most of the *Spanish* friends: whom how to reclaim, it could not easily be devised. Yet *Claudius* advanced boldly towards

Asdrubal, the brother of *Hannibal*: whom he found among the *Austini*, near enough at hand, incamped in a place called *Lapides atri*; out of which there was no issue, but only through a streight, whereon the *Roman* seized at his first coming. What should have tempted any man of understanding to incamp in such a place, I do not find: and as little reason can I find in that which followed. For it is said, that *Asdrubal*, seeing himself thus lock'd up, made offer to depart forthwith out of *Spain*, and quit the province to the *Romans*, upon condition, that he and his army might be thence dismissed; that he spent many days in entertaining parley with *Claudius* about this business; that night by night he conveyed his foot-men (a few at a time) through very difficult passages, out of the danger; and that finally taking advantage of a misty day, he stole away with all his horse and elephants, leaving his camp empty. If we consider, that there were at the same time, besides this *Asdrubal*, two other *Carthaginian* generals in *Spain*; we shall find no less cause to wonder at the simplicity of *Claudius*, who hoped to conclude a bargain for so great a country, with one of these three chieftains, than at the strange nature of those passages, through which the foot-men could hardly creep out by night, the horse and elephants easily following them in a dark misty-day. Wherefore, in giving belief to such a tale, it is needful that we suppose, both the danger wherein the *Carthaginians* were, and the conditions offered for their safe departure, to have been of far less value. Howsoever it was; neither this, nor ought else that the *Romans* could do, served to purchase any new friends in *Spain*; or to recover the old which they had lost. Like enough it is, that the old soldiers, which had chosen *Martius* their propretor, took it not well, that the senate, regardless of their good deserts, had repealed their election, and sent a propretor whom they fancied not so well. Some such occasion may have moved them to desire a proconsul, and (perhaps) young *Scipio* by name: as if a title of greater dignity, were needful to work regard in the *Barbarians*; and the beloved memory of *Cn.* and *Publius*, like to do good, were it revived in one of the same family. Whether upon these, or upon other reasons; *C. Claudius* was recalled out of the province, and *Publius*, the son of *P. Scipio*, sent proconsul into *Spain*.

This is that *P. Scipio*, who afterwards transferred the war into *Africa*: where he happily ended it, to the great honour and benefit of his country. He was a man of goodly presence, and singularly well conditioned: especially he excelled in temperance, continency, bounty, and other virtues that purchase love; of which qualities what great use he made, shall appear in the tenor of his actions following. As for those things that are reported of him, favouring a little too much of the great *Alexander's* vanity; how he used to walk alone in the *Capitol*, as one that had some secret conference with *Jupiter*; how a dragon (which must have been one of the gods; and, in likelihood, *Jupiter* himself) was thought to have conversed with his mother, entering her chamber often, and vanishing away at the coming in of any man; and how of these matters he nourished the rumour, by doubtful answers; I hold them no better than mere fables, devised by historians, who sought thereby to add unto the glory of *Rome*: that this noble city might seem, not only to have surpassed other nations in virtue of the generality, but also in great worth of one single man. To this end nothing is left

left out, that might serve to adorn this *Roman* champion. For it is confidently written, as a matter of unquestionable truth, that when a proconsul was to be chosen for *Spain*, there durst not any captain of the principal citizens offer himself as petitioner, for that honourable, but dangerous charge; that the people of *Rome* were much astonished thereat; that when the day of election came, all the princes of the city stood looking one another in the face, not one of them having the heart to adventure himself in such a desperate service; and finally, that this *P. Cornelius Scipio*, being then about four and twenty years of age, getting up on an high place, where he might be seen of all the multitude, requested, and obtained, that the office might be conferred upon him. If this were true, then were all the victories of *L. Martius* no better than dreams: and either very unreasonable was the fear of all the *Roman* captains, who durst not follow *Claudius Nero*, that not long before was gone into *Spain* propretor; or very bad intelligence they had out of the province, which *Asdrubal*, the *Carthaginian*, as we heard even now, was ready to abandon. But upon these incoherences, which I find in the too partial *Roman* historians, I do not willingly insist.

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by the natural strength. These falling suddenly upon the backs of the *Carthaginians* within the city; easily forced a gate, and gave free entrance to the *Roman* army. What booty was found within the town, *Livy* himself cannot certainly affirm; but is fain to say, that some *Roman* historians told lies without measure, in way of amplification. By that small proportion of riches, which was afterward carried by *Scipio* into the *Roman* treasury, we may easily perceive how great a vanity it was to say, that all the wealth of *Afric* and *Spain*, was heaped up in that one town. But therein were bestowed all the *Spanish* hostages (or at least of the adjoining provinces) whom *Scipio* entreated with singular courtesy; restoring them unto their kindred and friends, in such gracious manner as doubled the thanks due to so great a benefit. Hereupon a prince of the *Celtiberians*, and two petty kings of the *Illergetes* and *Lacetani*, nearest neighbours to *Tarracon*, and dwelling on the north side of *Iberus*, forsook the *Carthaginian* party, and joined with the *Romans*. The speech of *Indibilis*, king of the *Illergetes*, is much commended; for that he did not vaunt himself, as commonly fugitives use, of the pleasure which he did unto the *Romans*, in revolting from their enemies; but rather excused this his changing side, as being thereto compelled by injuries of the *Carthaginians*; and invited by the honourable dealing of *Scipio*. This temperate estimation of his new professed friendship, was indeed no unsure token, that it should be long lasting. But if the *Illergetes* had long ere this (as we have heard before) forsaken the *Carthaginian* party, and stoutly held themselves as friends to *Cn. Scipio*; then could nothing have been devised more vain, than this oration of *Indibilis* their king; excusing, as new, his taking part with the same, when he should have rather craved pardon for his breach of alliance, formerly contracted with the father and the uncle. Most likely therefore it is, that howsoever the two elder *Scipio's* had gotten some few places among these their neighbours, and held them by strength; yet were the *Romans* never masters of the country, till this worthy commander, by recovering their hostages from the *Carthaginians*, and by his great munificence in sending them home, won unto himself the assured love and assistance of these princes. The *Carthaginian* generals, when they heard of this loss, were very sorry: yet nevertheless they set a good face on the matter; saying, that a young man having stol'n a town by surprise, was too far transported and over-joyed; but that shortly they would meet with him, and put him in mind of his father and uncle; which would alter his mood, and bring him to a more convenient temper.

Now if I should here interpose mine own conjecture; I should be bold to say, that the *Carthaginians* were at this time busy in setting forth towards *Italy*; and that *Scipio*, to divert them, undertook *New Carthage*, as his father and uncle, upon the like occasion, sat down before *Ibera*. And in this respect I would suppose, that it had not been much amiss, if the passage over the lake had been undiscovered, and the town held out some longer while. For howsoever that particular action was the more fortunate, in coming to such good issue upon the first day: yet in the generality of the business, between *Rome* and *Carthage*, it was more to be wished, that *Asdrubal* should be stayed from going into *Italy*, than that half of *Spain* should be taken from him. Whereas therefore it had nothing left to do, that should hinder his journey; *Mago*, and *Asdrubal*, the son

this ambush they fall every one, and are cut in pieces. But lest perchance any should have escaped, and give the alarm before his coming; *Martius* hastens to be there as soon as they. By which diligent speed, he comes early in the morning upon this further camp: which with no great difficulty he enters; and partly by force, partly by apprehension of danger which the enemies conceived, when they beheld the *Roman* shields, foul, and bloodied with their former execution, he drives head-long into flight, all that can save themselves from the fury of the sword. Thirty-seven thousand of the enemies perish in this night's work; besides a thousand eight hundred and thirty, that are taken prisoners. Hereunto *Valerius Antius* adds, that the camp of *Mago* was also taken, and seven thousand slain: and that in another battel with *Asdrubal*, there were slain ten thousand more; besides four thousand three hundred and thirty taken prisoners. Such is the power of some historians. *Livy* therefore hath elsewhere well observed, that there is none so intemperate as *Valerius Antius*, in multiplying the numbers that have fallen in battels. That, whilst *Martius* was making an oration to his soldiers, a flame of fire shone about his head, *Livy* reporteth as a common tale, not giving thereto any credit: and temperately concludeth, that this captain *Martius* got a great name; which he might well do, if with so small forces, and in such distress, he could clearly get off from the enemies, and give them any parting blow, though it were far less than that which is here set down.

Of these occurrences *L. Martius* sent word to *Rome*, not forgetting his own good service, whatsoever it was, but setting it out in such wise, as the senate might judge him worthy to hold the place of their vicegerent in *Spain*: which the better to intimate unto them, he stiled himself propretor. The *Fathers* were no less moved with the tidings, than the case required: and therefore took such careful order, for supplying their forces in *Spain*, that although *Hannibal* came to the gates of *Rome*, ere the companies, levied to serve in that province, could be sent away; yet would they not stay a tide for the defence of the city it self, but shipped them in all haste for *Spain*. As for that title of propretor, which *Martius* had assumed, they thought it too great for him, and were offended at his presumption in usurping it: foreseeing well, that it was a matter of ill consequence, to have the soldiers abroad make choice, among themselves, of those that should command armies and provinces. Therefore *C. Claudius Nero* was dispatched away, with all convenient haste, into *Spain*: carrying with him about six thousand of the *Roman* foot, and as many of the *Latins*, with three hundred *Roman* horse, and of the *Latins* eight hundred.

It happened well, that about these times, the affairs of *Rome* began to prosper in *Italy*, and afforded means of sending abroad such a strong supply: otherwise, the victories of *Martius* would ill have served, either to keep footing in *Spain*, or to stop the *Carthaginian* armies from marching towards the *Alps*. For when *Claudius*, landing with his new forces, took charge of that remainder of the army, which was under *Martius* and *Fonteus*; he found surer tokens of the overthrows received, than of those miraculous victories, whereof *Martius* had made his vaunts unto the senate. The *Roman* party was forsaken by most of the *Spanish* friends: whom how to reclaim, it could not easily be devised. Yet *Claudius* advanced boldly towards

Asdrubal, the brother of *Hannibal*: whom he found among the *Austrani*, near enough at hand, incamped in a place called *Lapides atri*; out of which there was no issue, but only through a streight, whereon the *Roman* seized at his first coming. What should have tempted any man of understanding to incamp in such a place, I do not find: and as little reason can I find in that which followed. For it is said, that *Asdrubal*, seeing himself thus lock'd up, made offer to depart forth-with out of *Spain*, and quit the province to the *Romans*, upon condition, that he and his army might be thence dismissed; that he spent many days in entertaining parley with *Claudius* about this business; that night by night he conveyed his foot-men (a few at a time) through very difficult passages, out of the danger; and that finally taking advantage of a misty day, he stole away with all his horse and elephants, leaving his camp empty. If we consider, that there were at the same time, besides this *Asdrubal*, two other *Carthaginian* generals in *Spain*; we shall find no less cause to wonder at the simplicity of *Claudius*, who hoped to conclude a bargain for so great a country, with one of these three chieftains, than at the strange nature of those passages, through which the foot-men could hardly creep out by night, the horse and elephants easily following them in a dark misty-day. Wherefore, in giving belief to such a tale, it is needful that we suppose, both the danger wherein the *Carthaginians* were, and the conditions offered for their safe departure, to have been of far less value. Howsoever it was; neither this, nor ought else that the *Romans* could do, served to purchase any new friends in *Spain*; or to recover the old which they had lost. Like enough it is, that the old soldiers, which had chosen *Martius* their propretor, took it not well, that the senate, regardless of their good deserts, had repealed their election, and sent a propretor whom they fancied not so well. Some such occasion may have moved them to desire a proconsul, and (perhaps) young *Scipio* by name: as if a title of greater dignity, were needful to work regard in the *Barbarians*; and the beloved memory of *Cn.* and *Publius*, like to do good, were it revived in one of the same family. Whether upon these, or upon other reasons; *C. Claudius* was recalled out of the province, and *Publius*, the son of *P. Scipio*, sent proconsul into *Spain*.

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of *Gesco*, were thought sufficient to hold *Scipio* work, in that lingering war of taking and re-taking towns, whilst the main of the *Carthaginian* forces, under *Asdrubal*, the son of *Amilcar*, went to a greater enterprise; even to fight in trial of the empire. But the *Roman* historians tell this after another fashion; and say, that *Asdrubal* was beaten into *Italy*: whither he ran for fear, as thinking himself ill assured of the *Spaniards*, as long as they might but hear the name of *Scipio*. *Scipio*, say they, coming upon *Asdrubal*; his vant-coureurs charged so lustily the *Carthaginian* horse, that they drove them into their trenches: and made it apparent, even by that small piece of service, how full of spirit the *Roman* army was, and how dejected the enemy. *Asdrubal* therefore by night retired out of that even ground, and occupied an hill, compassed on three sides with a river, very steep of ascent, and not easy of access on the fore-side; by which himself got up, and was to be followed by the *Romans*. On the top of it there was a plain, whereon he strongly incamped himself: and in the mid-way, between the top and root of the hill, was also another plain; into which he descended, more upon bravery, that he might not seem to hide himself within his trenches, than for that he durst adventure his army to the hazard of a battel, for which this was no equal ground. But such advantage of place could not save him from the *Romans*. They climbed up the hill to him; they recovered even footing with him; drove him out of this lower plain, up into his camp on the hill-top: whither although the ascent were very difficult, and his elephants bestowed in the smoothest places to hinder their approach; yet compassing about, and seeking passage where it was hardest to be found; but much more strongly breaking their way, where the *Carthaginians* had got up before them, they drove both men and elephants headlong, I know not whither: for it is said, that there was no way to fly. Out of such a battel, wherein he lost eight thousand men, *Asdrubal* is said to have escaped; and gathering together his dispersed troops, to have marched towards the *Pyrenees*, having sent away his elephants ere the fight began. Nevertheless *Mago*, and *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gesco*, are reported after this, to have consulted with him about this war; and finally to have concluded, that go he needs must, were it but to carry all the *Spaniards* as far as might be, from the name of *Scipio*. How likely this was to have been true, it shall appear at his coming into *Italy*; whence these incoherent relations of the *Spanish* affairs have too long detained us.

SECT. XII.

The great troubles that Hannibal raised in all quarters, to the city of Rome. Posthumius, the Roman general, with his whole army, is slain by the Gauls. Philip, king of Macedon, enters into a league with Hannibal, against the Romans. The Romans joining with the Etolians, make war upon Philip in Greece: and afterwards conclude a peace with him, the better to intend their business against the Carthaginians.

WE left *Hannibal* wintering at *Capua*: where he and his new confederates rejoiced (as may be thought) not a little, to hear the good news from *Carthage*, of such mighty aid, as was decreed to be sent thence unto him. In former times he had found work enough, to carry the *Roman* corn into his own barns, and to drive away their cattle to *Geryon*: his victories affording him little other

profit, than sustenance for his army; by making him master of the open field. He might perhaps have forc'd some walled towns, in like sort as he did *Geryon*, and the castle of *Cannæ*: but had he spent much time about the getting of any one place well defended; the hunger, that his army must have endured the winter and spring following, until corn were ripe, would have grievously punished him for such employment of the summer. This may have been the reason, why he forbore to adventure upon *Rome* after his victory at *Cannæ*. For had he failed (as it was a matter of no certainty) to carry the city at his first coming; want of victuals would have compelled him to quit the enterprise. Yea, many of the people that opened so hastily their gates unto him, upon the fresh bruit of his glorious success, would have taken time of deliberation, and waited perhaps the event of another battel: if being, either for want of means to force the city, or of necessities to continue a siege before it, repelled (as might seem) from the walls of *Rome*, he had presented himself unto them with a lessened reputation, somewhat later in the year; when time to force their obedience was wanting, unless they would freely yield it. But this great part of the care and travel was past, when so many states of *Italy* were become his: the year following, the *Samnites*, and other old enemies of *Rome*, were like to receive a notable pleasure of their new alliance with *Carthage*, by helping to lay siege unto that proud city, which so long had held them in subjection. Thus the winter was passed over joyfully, saving that there came not any tidings of the preparations, to second the welcome report of those mighty forces, that were decreed and expected. The spring drew on: and of the promised supply, there arrived no more, than only the elephants. How late it was ere these came, I find not: only we find, that after this he had above thirty of them; whereas all, save one, that he brought over the *Alps*, had been lost in his journey through the marshes of *Hetruria*. Very bad excuse of this exceeding negligence, they that brought the elephants could make unto *Hannibal*. If they were his friends, they told him truly, what mischiefs the persuasion of *Hanno* wrought among the too niggardly *Carthaginians*. Otherwise, they might perhaps inform him, that it was thought a safer, though a farther way about, to pass along through *Spain* and *Gaul*, as he himself had done; and increase the army, by hiring the *Barbarians* in the journey; than to commit the main strength of their city, to the hazard of the seas: especially wanting a commodious haven, to receive the fleet that should carry such a number of men, horses, and elephants, with all needful provisions. With these allegations *Hannibal* must rest content; and seek, as well as he can, to satisfy his *Italian* confederates. Therefore, when time of the year served, he took the field: and having finished what rested to be done at *Castellum*, sought to make himself master of some good haven-town thereabout, that might serve to entertain the *Carthaginian* fleet; or take from his enemies at home all excuse, which they might pretend by want thereof. To the same purpose, and to do what else was needful, he sent *Himilco* unto the *Locrians*, and *Hanno* to the *Lucans*: not forgetting at once to assuage all quarters of *Italy*, yea, the isles of *Sicily* and *Sardinia*; since the siege of *Rome* must needs be deferred unto another year. *Hanno* made an ill journey of it, being met, or overtaken, by *T. Sempronius Longus*: who slew about two thousand of his men, with the loss of fewer than three hundred *R-*

mans. But *Himilco* sped far better. By help of the *Brutians*, his good friends, he won *Petelia*, or *Petilia*, by force, after it had held out some months. He won likewise *Consentia*, and *Croton*, that was forsaken by the inhabitants. Also the city of *Locri*, which was of great importance, yielded unto him; as did all other places thereabout, except only the town of *Rhegium*, over-against *Sicily*.

The great faith of the *Petilians* is worthy to be recorded, as a notable testimony of the good government under which the *Roman* subjects lived. As for the *Samnites*, *Campanians*, and others, whose earnestness in rebellion may seem to prove the contrary, we are to consider, that they had lately contended with *Rome* for sovereignty, and were now transported with ambition; which reason can hardly moderate, or benefits allay. The *Petilians*, in the very beginning of their danger, did send to *Rome* for help, where their messengers received answer from the senate, that the publick misfortunes had not left means to relieve their associates that were so far distant. The *Petilian* messengers (ambassadors they are termed, as were all others, publicly sent from cities of the *Roman* subjection, that had a private jurisdiction within themselves) fell down to the ground, and humbly besought the fathers not to give them away, promising to do and suffer whatsoever was possible in defence of their town against the *Carthaginians*. Hereupon the senate fell to consultation again, and having thoroughly considered all their forces remaining, plainly confessed, that it was not in their power to give any relief. Wherefore these ambassadors were willed to return home, and to bid their citizens provide hereafter for their own safety, as having already discharged their faith to the utmost. All this notwithstanding, the *Petilians* (as was said) held out some months; and having striven in vain to defend themselves, when there was no apparent possibility, gave to the *Carthaginians* a bloody victory over them, being vanquished as much by famine, as by any violence of the assailants.

The *Romans* at this time were indeed in such ill case, that *Hannibal*, with a little help from *Carthage*, might have reduced them into terms of great extremity. For whereas, in a great bravery, before their loss at *Cannæ*, they had shewed their high minds, by entertaining the care of things far off, notwithstanding the great war that lay upon them so near at hand; it now fell out miserably all at once, that their fortune abroad was no whit better than at home. *L. Posthumius Albinus*, their pretor, they had sent with an army of twenty-five thousand into *Gaul*; to the *Illyrian* king *Pineus*, they had sent for their tribute due, whereof the pay-day was past, willing him, if he desired forbearance, to deliver hostages for his performance of what was due; and to *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, they had sent to require, that he should deliver up unto them *Demetrius Pharius*, their subject and rebel, whom he had received. But now from all quarters they hear tidings little suitable to their former glorious conceits. *Posthumius*, with all his army, was cut in pieces by the *Gauls*, in such sort, that scarce ten men escaped. The manner of his overthrow was very strange. There was a great wood, call'd by the *Gauls* *Litana*, through which he was to pass. Against his coming, the enemies had sawed the trees so far, that a little force would serve to cast them down. When therefore *Posthumius*, with his whole army, was entered into this dangerous passage, the *Gauls*, that lay about the wood, began to cast down the trees; which falling one against another, bore all down so fast, that the *Romans* were over-whelmed, men and horses, in such wise,

that no more escaped than is said before. How this tedious work of sawing so many trees, could take desired effect, and neither be perceived, nor made frustrate, either by some wind, that might have blown all down before the *Romans* entered, or by some other of those many accidents whereto the device was subject, I do not well conceive. Yet some such thing may have been done, and what failed in the stratagem, supplied with the enemy's sword. It is not perhaps worthy to be omitted, as a monument of the savage condition wherewith *Lombardy*, a country now so civil, was infected in elder times, that of *Posthumius*'s skull being cleansed, and trimmed up with gold, a drinking cup was made, and consecrated in their principal temple, as an holy vessel for the use of the priest in their solemnities. Of this great overthrow, when word was brought to *Rome*, the amazement was no less than the calamity. But sorrow could give no remedy to the mischief; and anger was vain, where they wanted forces to revenge. Tribute from the *Illyrians* there came none, neither do I find that any was a second time demanded: this we find, that with *Pleuratus* and *Scerdiletus*, *Illyrian* kings, as also with *Gentius*, who reigned within a few years following, the *Romans* dealt upon even terms, intreating their assistance against *Philip* and *Perseus*, not commanding their duty as vassals. The *Macedonian* troubled them yet a little further; for having assured his affairs in *Greece*, and enjoying leisure to look into the doings abroad, he sent ambassadors to *Hannibal*, with whom he made a league upon these conditions; that the king in person should come into *Italy*, and with all his forces by land and sea assist the *Carthaginians* in the *Roman* war, until it were finished; that *Rome* and all *Italy*, together with all the spoil therein to be gotten, should be left entire unto the state of *Carthage*; and that afterwards *Hannibal*, with his army, should pass into *Greece*, and there assist *Philip* until he had subdued all his enemies (which were the *Etolians*, *Thracians*, king *Antiochus*, and others) leaving probably unto him the full possession of that country, and the isles adjoining. But such pre-disposition of kingdoms and provinces, is lightly controlled by the divine providence, which therein shews it self not (as *Herodotus* falsely terms it, and like an atheist) envious or malicious, but very just and majestic, in upholding that unspeakable greatness of sovereignty, by which it rules the whole world, and all that therein is.

The first ambassadors that *Philip* sent, fell into the *Romans* hands, in their journey towards *Hannibal*; and being examined what they were, adventured upon a bold lie, saying, that they were sent from the king of *Macedon* to *Rome*, there to make a league with the senate and people, and offer his help in this time of great necessity. These news were so welcome, that the joy thereof took away all care of making better enquiry. So they were lovingly feasted, and friendly dismissed, with guides that should lead them the way, and shew them how to avoid the *Carthaginians*. But they being thus instructed concerning their journey, fell willfully into the camp of *Hannibal*, who entertained them after a better fashion, and concluded the business about which they came upon the points before remembered. In their return homeward, they happened again unluckily to be descried by the *Roman* fleet, which, mistaking them to be of the *Carthaginian* party, gave them chase. They did their best to have escaped, but being overtaken, they suffered the *Romans* to come aboard, and trusting to the lie that once had served them, said it again, that having been sent from king *Philip* to make a league with the people

of *Rome*, they were not able, by reason of the *Carthaginians* lying between, to get any farther than to *M. Valerius*, the pretor, unto whom they had signified the good affection of the king their master. The tale was now less credible than before, and (which marred all) *Gesco*, *Boftar*, and *Mago*, with their followers, *Carthaginians* that were sent with them from *Hannibal* to ratify the agreement, being presently detected, made the matter apparent. Wherefore a little inquisition served to find all out; so that at length *Hannibal's* own letters to king *Philip* were delivered up, and the whole business confessed. The ambassadors and their followers were sent close prisoners to *Rome*, where the chief of them were cast into prison, and the rest sold for bond-slaves. Yet one of their ships that escaped, carried word into *Macedon* of all that had happened. Whereupon a new ambassage was sent, that went and returned with better speed; concluding as was agreed before, only with some loss of time.

The *Romans* were exceedingly perplexed, thinking with what heavy weight this *Macedonian* war, in an evil hour, was likely to fall upon them, when their shoulders were over-burdened with the load of the *Carthaginian*. Yet they took a noble resolution, and suitable unto that whereby they kept off the storm, that else would have beaten upon them from *Spain*. They judged it more easy with small forces to detain *Philip* in *Greece*, than with all their strength to resist him in *Italy*. And herein they were in the right. For that the very reputation of a king of *Macedon*, joining with *Hannibal* in such a time, would have sufficed to shake the allegiance not only of the *Latins*, and other their most faithful subjects, but even of the *Roman* colonies that held all privileges of the city, it will appear by the following success of things. *M. Valerius*, the pretor, with twenty *Quinquereme* galleys, was appointed to attend upon the *Macedonian*, and to set on foot some commotion in *Greece*, or to nourish the troubles already therein begun. *Philip* was busy about the sea-towns that looked towards *Italy*, setting upon *Apollonia*; and thence falling upon *Oricum*, which he won, and so returned to *Apollonia* again. The *Epirots* craved help of *M. Valerius*, or rather accepted his kind offers, who had none other business to do. The garrison that *Philip* had left in *Oricum*, was strong enough to hold the townsmen in good order; but not to keep out the *Romans*, of whose daring to attempt any thing against him on that side the sea, *Philip* as then had no suspicion. *Valerius* therefore easily re-gained the town, and sent thence a thousand men, under *Necius Crispus*, an undertaking and expert captain, which got by night into *Apollonia*. These made a notable sally, and brake into *Philip's* trenches with so great slaughter, that they forced him to forsake his camp, and raise the siege. The king purposed (as it is said) to have departed thence by sea; but *Valerius*, coming with his fleet from *Oricum*, stopped up the mouth of the river; so that he was fain to burn his ships (which belike were no better than long-boats) and depart ill furnished of carriages by land. After this, *Valerius* dealt with the *Etolians*, a nation always enemy to the crown of *Macedon*, and easily persuaded them (being so affected, as hath elsewhere been shewed) to make strong war on *Philip*, wherein he promised them great assistance from the *Romans*. That which most moved the troublesome spirits of the *Etolians*, was the hope of getting *Acarnania*, after which they had gaped long; and whereof the *Roman* was as liberal in making promise, as if already it had been his own. So a league was made between them, and afterwards solemnly published at *Olympia* by the *Eto-*

lians, and by the *Romans* in their capitol. The conditions were, that from *Etolia* to *Corcyra*, in which space *Acarnania* was contained, all the country should be subdued, and left unto the *Etolians*; the pillage only to be given to the *Romans*. And that if the *Etolians* made peace with *Philip*, it should be with provision to hold no longer, than whilst he abstained from doing injury to the *Romans*, or their associates. This was indeed the only point whereat *Valerius* aimed, who promised as much on the *Romans* behalf, that they should not make peace with the *Macedonian*, unless it were with like condition of including the *Etolians*. Into this league was place reserved for the *Lacedemonians* and *Eleans*, as to those that had made or favoured the side of *Cleomenes* against the *Macedonian*, to enter at their pleasure. The like regard was had of *Attalus*, *Pleuratus*, and *Scerdiletus*; the first of which reigned at *Pergamus*, in *Asia* the less, a prince hereafter much to be spoken of; the other two held some part of *Illyria*, about which the *Romans* were so far from contending with them, that gladly they sought to get their friendly acquaintance. But the names of these associates are thrust into the treaty, rather to give it countenance, than for any readiness which they disclose to enter thereinto. The *Etolians* alone, and chiefly *Scopas*, their pretor, with *Dorymachus*, and others, are yet-a-while the only men of whom the *Roman* generals must make much; as the late *French* king *Henry* the fourth, when he had only the title of *Navarro*, was said to court the majors of *Rochelle*. *Philip* was not idle, when he heard whereunto the *Etolians* tended. He repaired his army, made a countenance of war upon the *Illyrians*, and other his borderers, that were wont in times of danger to infest the kingdom of *Macedon*; wasted the country about *Oricum* and *Apollonia*, and over-running the *Pelagonians*, *Dardanians*, and others, whom he held suspected, came down into *Thessaly*, whence he made shew as if he would invade *Etolia*. By the fame of this expedition, he thought to stir up all the *Greeks* adjoining against the *Etolians*, whom they generally detested as a nest of robbers, troublesome to all the country. To which purpose, and to hinder the *Etolians* from breaking into *Greece*, he left *Perseus*, his son and heir, with four thousand men, upon their borders: with the rest of his army, before greater business should overtake and entangle him, he made a long journey into *Thrace*, against a people called the *Medes*, that were wont to fall upon *Macedon*, whensoever the king was absent. The *Etolians*, hearing of his departure, armed as many as they could against the *Acarnanians*, in hope to subdue those their daily enemies, and win their little country, ere he should be able to return. Here-to it much availed, that the *Romans* had already taken *Oeniade* and *Naxos*, *Acarnanian* towns, conveniently situated to let in an army, and consigned them unto the *Etolians*, according to the tenor of the contract lately made with them. But the stout resolution of the *Acarnanians*, to die (as we say) every mother's son of them, in defence of their country; together with the great haste of the *Macedonians* (who laid aside all other business) to succour their friends, caused the *Etolians* to forsake their enterprise. When this expedition was given over, the *Romans* and *Etolians* fell upon *Ancyra*, which they took; the *Romans* assailing it by sea, the *Etolians* by land. The *Etolians* had the town, and the *Romans* the spoil.

For these good services *M. Valerius* was chosen consul at *Rome*; and *P. Sulpicius* sent in his stead, to keep the war on foot in *Greece*. But besides the *Roman* help, *Attalus*, out of *Asia*, came over

assist the *Etolians*. He was chiefly moved, by his own jealousy of *Philip's* greatness: though somewhat also tickled with the vanity, of being chosen by the *Etolians* their principal magistrate; which honour, though no better than titular, he took in very loving part. Against the forces which *Attalus* and the *Romans* had sent, being joined with the main power of *Etolia*, *Philip* tried the fortune of two battels: and was victorious in each of them. Hereupon these his troublesome neighbours desired peace of him; and used their best means to get it. But when the day, appointed for the conclusion thereof, was come; their ambassadors, instead of making submission, proposed unto him such intolerable conditions, as ill beseemed vanquished men to offer; and might therefore well testify, that their minds were altered. It was not any love of peace, but fear of being besieged in their own towns, that had made them desirous of composition. This fear being taken away, by the encouragements of *Attalus* and the *Romans*, they were as fierce as ever: and thrust a garrison of their own, and some *Roman* friends, into *Elis*; which threatened *Achaia*, wherein *Philip* then lay. The *Romans*, making a cut over the streight from *Naupactus*, wasted the country in a terrible bravery: wherein *Philip* requited them; coming upon them in haste from the *Nemean* games (which he was then celebrating) and sending them faster away, but nothing richer than they came.

In the heat of this contention, *Prusias*, king of *Bithynia*, fearing the growth of *Attalus*, no less than *Attalus* held suspected the power of *Philip*; sent a navy into *Greece*, to assist the *Macedonian* party. The like did the *Carthaginians*: and upon greater reason; as being more interested in the success of his affairs. *Philip* was too weak by sea: and though he could man some two hundred ships; yet the vessels were such, as could not hold out against the *Roman* *Quinqueremes*. Wherefore it behoved him, to use the help of his good friends the *Carthaginians*. But their aid came somewhat too late: which might better at first have kept those enemies from fastning upon any part of *Greece*; than afterwards it could serve to drive them out, when they had pierced into the bowels of that country. Ere *Philip* could attempt any thing by sea; it was needful that he should correct the *Eleans*, bad neighbours to the *Achaians* his principal confederates. But in assailing their town, he was encountered by the *Etolian* and *Roman* garrison; which drove him back with some loss. In such cases, especially where God intends a great conversion of empire, fame is very powerful in working. The king had received no great detriment, in his retreat from *Elis*: rather he had given testimony of his personal valour, in fighting well on foot, when his horse was slain under him. He had also soon after taken a great multitude of the *Eleans*, to the number of four thousand; with some twenty thousand head of cattle, which they had brought together into a place of safety, as they thought, when their country was invaded. But it had happened, that in his pursuit of the *Roman* foragers about *Sicyon*, his horse running hastily under a low tree, had torn off one of the horns, which (after the fashion of those times) the king wore in his crest. This was gathered up by an *Etolian*; who carried it home, and shewed it as a token of *Philip's* death. The horn was well known, and the tale believed. All *Macedon* therefore was in an uproar: and not only the borderers ready to fall upon the country, but some captains of *Philip* easily corrupted; who thinking to make themselves a fortune in that

change of things, ran into such treason; as they might better hope to make good, than to excuse. Hereupon the king returned home; leaving not three thousand men to assist his friends the *Acheans*. He also took order, to have beacons erected, that might give him notice of the enemies doings; upon whom he meant shortly to return. The affairs of *Macedon*, his presence quickly established. But in *Greece* all went ill-favouredly; especially in the isle of *Euboea*, where one *Plator* betrayed to *Attalus*, and the *Romans*, the town of *Oreum*, ere *Philip* could arrive to help it; where also the strong city of *Chalcis* was likely to have been lost, if he had not come the sooner. He made such hasty marches, that he had almost taken *Attalus* in the city of *Opus*. This city, lying over-against *Euboea*, *Attalus* had won, more through the cowardize of the people, than any great force that he had used. Now because the *Roman* foldiers had defrauded him in the sack of *Oreum*, and taken all to themselves: it was agreed, that *Attalus* should make his best profit of the *Opuntians*; without admitting the *Romans* to be his sharers. But whilst he was busy, in drawing as much money as he could out of the citizens: the sudden tidings of *Philip's* arrival, made him leave all behind him, and run away to the seaside, where he got aboard his ships; finding the *Romans* gone before, upon the like fear. Either the indignity of this misadventure; or tidings of *Prusias* the *Bithynian* his invasion upon the kingdom of *Pergamus*; made *Attalus* return home, without staying to take leave of his friends. So *Philip* recovered *Opus*; won *Torone*, *Tritonos*, *Drymus*, and many small towns in those parts; performing likewise some actions, of more bravery than importance, against the *Etolians*. In the mean season, *Machanidas*, the tyrant of *Lacedemon*, had been busy in *Peloponnesus*; but hearing of *Philip's* arrival, was returned home.

The *Lacedemonians*, hearing certain report of *Cleomenes's* death in *Egypt*, went about to choose two new kings; and to conform themselves to their old manner of government. But their estate was so far out of tune, that their hope of redressing things within the city, proved no less unfortunate, than had been their attempts of recovering a large dominion abroad. *Lycurgus*, a tyrant, rose up among them: unto whom succeeded this *Machanidas*; and shortly after came *Nabis*, that was worse than both of them. They held on the *Etolian* and *Roman* side, for fear of the *Acheans*, that were the chief confederates of *Philip*, and hated extremely the name both of *Tyrant*, and of *Lacedemonian*. But of these we shall speak more hereafter.

Philip entering into *Achaia*, and seeing his presence had brought the contentment of assurance to that country, spake brave words to the assembly of their states, saying, that he had to do with an enemy, that was very nimble, and made war by running away. He told how he had followed them to *Chalcis*, to *Oreum*, to *Opus*, and now into *Achaia*: but could no where find them; such haste they made, for fear of being overtaken. But slight, he said, was not always prosperous: he should one day light upon them; as ere this he sundry times had done, and still to their loss. The *Achaians* were glad to hear these words; and much the more glad, in regard of his good deeds accompanying them. For he restored unto their nation some towns, that were in his hand, belonging to them of old. Likewise to the *Megalopolitans* their confederates, he rendred *Aliphera*. The *Dymeans*, that had been taken by the *Romans*, and sold for slaves, he sought out, ransomed, and put in quiet possession of their own city

city. Further, passing over the *Corinthian* gulf, he fell upon the *Etolians*: whom he drove into the mountains and woods, or other their strongest holds; and wasted their country. This done, he took leave of the *Acheans*: and returning home by sea, visited the people that were his subjects, or dependants; and animated them so well, that they rested fearless of any threatening danger. Then had he leisure to make war upon the *Dardaniens*, ill neighbours to *Macedon*: with whom nevertheless he was not so far occupied, but that he could go in hand with preparing a fleet of an hundred galleys, whereby to make himself master of the sea; the *Romans* (since the departure of *Attalus*) having not dared to meet or pursue him, when he lately ran along the coast of *Greece*, fast by them where they lay.

This good success added much reputation to the *Macedonian*; and emboldened him to make strong war upon the *Etolians*, at their own doors. As for the *Romans*; either some displeasure, conceived against their confederates, or some fear of danger at home, when *Asdrubal* was ready to fall upon *Italy*, caused them to give over the care of things in *Greece*, and leave their friends there to their own fortunes. The *Etolians* therefore, being driven to great extremity, were fain to sue for peace unto *Philip*, and accept it, upon whatever conditions it best pleased him. The agreement was no sooner made, than *P. Sempronius*, with ten thousand foot, a thousand horse, and thirty five galleys, came over in great haste (though somewhat too late) to trouble it. Hearing how things went in *Etolia*, he turned aside to *Dyrrachium* and *Apollonia*; making a great noise, as if with these his own forces he would work wonders. But it was not long, ere *Philip* came to visit him; and found him tame enough. The king presented him battle: but he refused it; and suffering the *Macedonians* to waste the country round about, before his eyes, kept himself close within the walls of *Apollonia*; making some overtures of peace: which caused *Philip* to return home quietly. The *Romans* had not so great cause to be displeased with the *Etolians*, as had *Philip*, to take in evil part the demeanor of the *Carthaginians*. For notwithstanding the royal offer that he made them, to serve their turn in *Italy*, and assist them in getting their hearts desire, before he would expect any requital: they had not sent any fleet, as in reason they ought, and as (considering his want of sufficient ability by sea) it is likely they were bound, either to secure the transportation of his army, or to free his coast from the *Roman* and *Etolian* Pyracies. Only once they came to his help, which was, at his last journey into *Achaia*. But they were gone again before his arrival: having done nothing; and pretending fear of being taken by the *Romans*, even at such time as *Philip*, with his own navy, durst boldly pass by sea, and found none that durst oppose him. This wretched dealing of the *Carthaginians*, may therefore seem to have been one of *Hanno's* tricks; whereof *Hannibal* so bitterly complained. For it could not but grieve this malicious man exceedingly, to hear, that so great a king made offer to serve in person under *Hannibal*, and required the assistance of the same *Hannibal*, as of a man likely to make monarchs, and alter the affairs of the world at pleasure. Therefore he had reason, such as envy could suggest, to persuade the *Carthaginians* unto a safe and thrifty course: which was, not to admit into the fellowship of their *Italian* wars so mighty a prince, whom change of affection might make dangerous to their empire; or his much affection unto *Hannibal*, more dan-

gerous to their liberty. Rather they should do well to save charges, and feed the *Macedonian* with hopes, by making many promises of sending a fleet, and some other succours. This would cost nothing: yet would it serve to terrify the *Romans*, and compel them to send part of their forces from home; that might find this enemy work abroad. So should the *Roman* armies be lessened in *Italy*; and *Philip*, when once he was engaged in the war, be urged unto the prosecution by his own necessity, putting the *Carthaginians* to little or no charges; yea, scarce to the labour of giving him thanks. Now if it might come to pass, as *Hannibal* every day did promise, that *Rome*, and all *Italy*, should within a while be at the devotion of *Carthage*; better it were that the city should be free, so as the troublesome *Greeks* might address their complaints unto the *Carthaginians*, as competent judges between them and the *Macedonian*, than that *Hannibal*, with the power of *Africa*, should wait upon *Philip*, as his executioner, to fulfill his will and pleasure, in doing such injuries, as would both make the name of a *Carthaginian* hateful in *Greece*, and oblige *Philip* to be no less impudent, in fulfilling all requests of *Hannibal*. Whether the counsel of *Hanno*, and his fellows, were such as this; or whether the *Carthaginians*, of their own disposition without his advice, were too sparing, and careless, the matter (as far as concerned *Philip*) came to one reckoning. For they did him no manner of good: but rather dodged with him; even in their little courtesie which they most pretended. And this perhaps was part of the reason, why he began the building of an hundred galleys, as if he would let them and others know, whereto his proper strength would have reached, had he not vainly given credit to faithless promises. When therefore the *Etolians* had submitted themselves already: and when the *Romans* desired his friendship, as might be thought, for very fear of him; with reputation enough, and not as a forsaken client of the *Carthaginians*, but a prince able to have succoured them in their necessity, he might give over the war, and, without reprehension, leave them to themselves. For he had wilfully entered into trouble for their sakes: but they despised him, as if the quarrel were merely his own, and he unable to manage it. The vanity of which their conceits would appear unto them, when they should see, that with his proper strength he had finished the war, and concluded it highly to his honour. So the year following it was agreed, by mediation of the *Epirots*, *Acarnanians*, and others, that the *Romans* should retain three or four towns of *Illyria*, which they had recovered in this war, being part of their old *Illyrian* conquest: places no way belonging to the *Macedonian*; and therefore perhaps inserted into the covenants, that somewhat might seem to have been gotten. On the other side, the *Atintanes* were appointed to return under the obedience of *Philip*: who, if they were (as *Ortelius* probably conjectures) the people of the country about *Apollonia*, then did the *Romans* abandon part of their gettings; whereby it appears, that they did not give peace, as they would seem to have done, but accepted it, upon conditions somewhat to their loss.

The confederates and dependants of the *Macedonian*, comprehended in this peace, were *Prusias*, king of *Bythia*, the *Acheans*, *Bacrians*, *Thes-salians*, *Acarnanians*, and *Epirots*. On the *Roman* side were named, first, the people of *Ilum*, as an honourable remembrance of the *Romans* descent from *Troy*; then, *Attalus*, king of *Pergamus*; *Pleuratus*, an *Illyrian* prince; and *Nabis*, the ty-

rant of *Lacedemon*, together with the *Eleans*, *Messenians*, and *Athenians*. The *Etolians* were omitted, belike, as having agreed for themselves before. But the *Eleans* and *Messenians*, followers of the *Etolians*, (and by them, as is most likely, comprised in their league with *Philip*) were also inserted by the *Romans*, that were never slow in offering their friendship to small and feeble nations. As for the *Athenians*, they stood much upon their old honour; and loved to bear a part, though they did nothing in all great actions. Yet the setting down of their names in this treaty, served the *Romans* to good purpose; forasmuch as they were a busy people, and ministered occasion to renew the war, when means did better serve to follow it.

S E C T. XIII.

How the Romans began to recover their strength by degrees. The noble affection of the Romans, in relieving the publick necessities of their commonweal.

IT was a great fault in the *Carthaginians*, that, embracing so many enterprizes at once, they followed all by the halves; and wasted more men and money to no purpose, than would have served (if good order had been taken) to finish the whole war in far shorter space, and make themselves lords of all that the *Romans* held. This error had become the less harmful, if their care of *Italy* had been such as it ought. But they suffered *Hannibal* to weary himself with expectation of their promised supplies; which being still deferred from year to year, caused as great opportunities to be lost, as a conqueror could have desired. The death of *Posthumius*, and destruction of his whole army in *Gaul*; the begun rebellion of the *Sardinians*; the death of *Hiero* their friend in *Syracuse*; with great alterations, much to their prejudice, in the whole isle of *Sicily*; as also that war, of which we last spake, threatened from *Macedon*, happening all at one time, and that so nearly alter their terrible overthrow at *Cannæ*, among so many revolts of their *Italian* confederates, would utterly have sunk the *Roman* state, had the *Carthaginians*, if not the first year, yet at the least the second, sent over to *Hannibal* the forces that were decreed. It is not to be doubted, that even this diversity of great hopes, appearing from all parts, administered matter unto *Hanno*, or such as *Hanno* was, whereupon to work. For though it were in the power of *Carthage* to perform all that was decreed for *Italy*, yet could not that proportion hold, when so many new occurrences brought each along with them their new care, and required their several armies. This had not been a very bad excuse, if any one of the many occasions offered had been thoroughly prosecuted; though it stood with best reason, that the foundation of all other hopes and comforts, which was the prosperity of *Hannibal* in his *Italian* war, should have been strengthened, whatsoever had become of the rest. But the slender troops wherewith the *Carthaginians* fed the war in *Spain*; the lingering aid which they sent to uphold the *Sardinian* rebellion, when it was already well-near beaten down; their trifling with *Philip*; and (amongst all these their attempts) their hasty catching at *Sicily*, little deserved to be thought good reasons of neglecting the main point, whereto all the rest had reference. Rather every one of these actions, considered apart by it self, was no otherwise to be allowed as discreetly undertaken, or substantially followed, than by making supposition, that the care of *Italy* made the *Carthaginians* more negligent in all things else. Yet if these allegations would not serve to content

Hannibal, then must he patiently endure to know, that his own citizens were jealous of his greatness, and durst not trust him with so much power, as should enable him to wrong the state at home.

Whatsoever he heard or thought, *Hannibal* was glad to apply himself to necessity; to feed his *Italian* friends with hopes, and to trifle away the time about *Nola*, *Naples*, *Cumæ*, and other places; being loth to spend his army in an hard siege, that was to be reserved for a work of more importance. Many offers be made upon *Nola*, but always with bad success. Once *Marcellus* fought a battel with him there, yet under the very walls of the town, having the assistance of the citizens, that were grown better affected to the *Roman* side, since the heads that inclined them to rebellion, were cut off. About a thousand men *Hannibal* in that fight lost, which was no great marvel, his forces being then divided, and employed in sundry parts of *Italy* at once. *Naples* was, even in those days, a strong city, and required a year's work to have taken it by force. Wherefore the earnest desire of *Hannibal* to get it, was always frustrate. Upon the town of *Cumæ* they of *Capua* had their plot, and were in hope to take it by cunning. They sent to the chief magistrates of the *Cumans*, desiring them (as being also *Campans*) to be present at a solemn sacrifice of the nation, where they would consult about their general good, promising to bring thither a sufficient guard, to assure the whole assembly from any danger that might come by the *Romans*. This motion the *Cumans* made shew to entertain, but privily sent word of all to *T. Sempronius Gracchus*, the *Roman* consul.

Gracchus was a very good man of war, and happily chosen consul in so dangerous a time. His colleague should have been *Posthumius Albinus*, that was lately slain by the *Gauls*; after whose death *Marcellus* was chosen, as being judged the fittest man to encounter with *Hannibal*. But the *Roman Augures* either found some religious impediment that nullified the election of *Marcellus*, or at least they fained so to have done, because this was the first time that ever two *Plebeian* consuls were chosen together. *Marcellus* therefore gave over the place, and *Q. Fabius Maximus*, the late famous dictator, was substituted in his room. But *Fabius* was detained in the city about matters of religion, or superstition, wherewith *Rome* was commonly, especially in times of danger, very much troubled. So *Gracchus* alone, with a consular army, waited upon *Hannibal* among the *Campans*, not able to meet the enemy in field; yet intente to all occasions that should be presented. The *Volones*, or slaves, that lately had been armed, were no small part of his followers. These, and the rest of his men, he continually trained; and had not a greater care to make his army skilful in the exercises of war, than to keep it from quarrels, that might arise by their upbraiding one another with their base conditions.

Whilst the consul was thus busied at *Linternum*, the senators of *Cumæ* sent him word of all that had passed between them and the *Capuans*. It was a good occasion to flesh his men, and make them confident against the enemy, of whom hitherto they had bad experience. *Gracchus* therefore put himself into *Cumæ*, whence he issued at such time as the magistrates of that city were expected by the *Campans*. The sacrifice was to be performed by night, at a place called *Ilamæ*, three miles from *Cumæ*. There lay *Marius Alfus*, the chief magistrate of *Capua*, with fourteen thousand men, not wholly intent either to the sacrifice, or to any danger that might interrupt it, but rather devising how

to surprize others, than fearing himself to be assailed. The consul therefore suffering none to go forth of *Cumæ*, that might bear word of him to the enemies, issued out of the town when it grew dark, his men being well refreshed with meat and sleep the day before, that they might hold out the better in this night's service. So he came upon the *Capuans* unawares, and slew more than two thousand of them, together with their commander, losing not above an hundred of his own men. Their camp he took, but tarried not long to rife it, for fear of *Hannibal*, who lay not far off. By this his providence, he escaped a greater loss than he had brought upon the enemies. For when *Hannibal* was informed how things went at *Hamæ*, forthwith he marched thither, hoping to find those young soldiers and slaves busied in making spoil, and loading themselves with the booty. But they were all gotten safe within *Cumæ*, which, partly for anger, partly for desire of gaining it, and partly at the urgent entreaty of the *Capuans*, *Hannibal* assailed the next day. Much labour, and with ill success, the *Carthaginians* and their fellows spent about this town. They raised a wooden tower against it, which they brought close unto the walls, thinking thereby to force an entry. But the defendants on the inside of the wall, raised against this an high tower, whence they made resistance, and found means at length to consume with fire the work of their enemies. While the *Carthaginians* were busy in quenching the fire, the *Romans*, fallying out of the town at two gates, charged them valiantly, and drove them to their trenches, with the slaughter of about fourteen hundred. The consul wisely sounded the retreat, ere his men were too far engaged, and *Hannibal* in a readiness to requite their service. Neither would he, in the pride of this good success, adventure forth against the enemy, who presented him battel the day following, near unto the walls. *Hannibal* therefore, seeing no likelihood to prevail in that which he had taken in hand, broke up the siege, and returned to his old camp at *Tifata*. About these times, and shortly after, when *Fabius* the other consul had taken the field, some small towns were recovered by the *Romans*, and the people severely punished for their revolt.

The *Carthaginian* army was too small to fill with garrisons all places that had yielded, and withal to abide (as it must do) strong in the field. Wherefore *Hannibal*, attending the supply from home, that should enable him to strike at *Rome* it self, was driven in the mean time to alter his course of war; and, instead of making (as formerly he had done) a general invasion upon the whole country, to pass from place to place, and wait upon occasions, that grew daily more commodious to the enemy than to him. The country of the *Hirpines* and *Samnites* was grievously wasted by *Marcellus*, in the absence of *Hannibal*; as also was *Campania*, by *Fabius* the consul, when *Hannibal*, having followed *Marcellus* to *Nola*, and received there the loss before-mentioned, was gone to winter in *Apulia*. These people shewed not the like spirit in defending their lands, and fighting for the *Carthaginian* empire, as in former times they had done, when they contended with the *Romans* in their own behalf to get the sovereignty. They held it reason, that they should be protected by such as thought to have dominion over them, whereby at once they over-burdened their new lords, and gave unto their old the more easy means to take revenge of their defection.

The people of *Rome* were very intentive, as necessity constrained them, to the work that they had in hand. They continued *Fabius* in his consulship,

and joined with him *Marcus Claudius Marcellus*, whom they had appointed unto that honour the year before. Of these two, *Fabius* was called the shield, and *Marcellus*, the *Roman sword*. In *Fabius* it was highly, and upon just reason, commended, that being himself consul, and holding the election, he did not stand upon nice points of formality, or regard what men might think of his ambition, but caused himself to be chosen with *Marcellus*, knowing in what need the city stood of able commanders. The great name of these consuls, and the great preparations which the *Romans* made, served to put the *Campanians* in fear that *Capua* it self should be besieged. To prevent this, *Hannibal*, at their earnest entreaty, came from *Arpi* (where he lay hearkening after news from *Tarentum*) and, having with his presence comforted these his friends, fell on the sudden upon *Puteoli*, a sea-town of *Campania*, about which he spent three days in vain, hoping to have won it. The garrison in *Puteoli* was six thousand strong, and did their duty so well, that the *Carthaginian*, finding no hope of good success, could only shew his anger upon the fields there, and about *Naples*; which having done, and once more (with as ill success as before) assayed *Nola*, he bent his course to *Tarentum*, wherein he had very great intelligence. Whilst he was in his progress thither, *Hanno* made a journey against *Beneventum*; and *T. Gracchus*, the last year's consul, hasting from *Nuceria*, met him there, and fought with him a battel: *Hanno* had with him about seventeen thousand foot, *Brutians* and *Lucans* for the most part, besides twelve hundred horse, very few of which were *Italians*, all the rest *Numidians* and *Moors*. He held the *Roman* work four hours, ere it could be perceived to which side the victory would incline. But *Gracchus's* soldiers, which were all (in a manner) the late armed slaves, had received from their general a peremptory denuntiation, that this day, or never, they must purchase their liberty, bringing every man, for price thereof, an enemy's head. The sweet reward of liberty was so greatly desired, that none of them feared any danger in earning it; howbeit that vain labour, imposed by their general, of cutting off the slain enemy's heads, troubled them exceedingly, and hindered the service, by employing of so many hands, in a work so little concerning the victory. *Gracchus* therefore finding his own error, wisely corrected it, proclaiming aloud, that they should cast away the heads, and spare the trouble of cutting off any more; for that all should have liberty immediately after the battel, if they won the day. This encouragement made them run headlong upon the enemy, whom their desperate fury had soon overthrown, if the *Roman* horse could have made their part good against the *Numidian*. But though *Hanno* did what he could, and pressed so hard upon the *Romans* battel, that four thousand of the slaves (for fear either of him, or of the punishment which *Gracchus* had threatened before the battel, unto those that should not valiantly behave themselves) retired unto a ground of strength; yet was he glad at length to save himself by flight, when the gross of his army was broken, being unable to remedy the loss. Leaving the field, he was accompanied by no more than two thousand, most of which were horse, all the rest were either slain or taken. The *Roman* general gave unto all his soldiers that reward of liberty which he had promised; but unto those four thousand which had recoiled unto the hill, he added this light punishment, that as long as they served in the wars, they should neither eat nor drink otherwise than standing, unless sickness forced them to break his order. So the victorious army returned to *Beneventum*.

tum : where the newly enfranchised soldiers were feasted in publick by the townsmen ; some sitting, some standing, and all of them having their heads covered (as was the custom of slaves manumised) with caps of white wool. The picture of this feast (as a thing worthy of remembrance) was afterwards hung up in a table by *Gracchus*, in the temple of *Liberty* ; which his father had built and dedicated. This was indeed the first battel, worthy of great note, which the *Carthaginians* had lost since the coming of *Hannibal* into *Italy* : the victories of *Marcellus* at *Nola*, and of this *Gracchus* before at *Hama*, being things of small importance.

Thus the *Romans* through industry, by little and little, repaired that great breach in their estate, which *Hannibal* had made at *Cannæ*. But all this while, and long after this, their treasury was so poor, that no industry nor art could serve to help it. The fruits of their grounds did only (and perhaps hardly) serve, to feed their towns and armies, without any surpluse, that might be exchanged for other needful commodities. Few they were in *Italy*, that continued to pay them tribute : which also they could worse do than before ; as living upon the same trade, and subject to the same inconveniencies, which enfeebled *Rome* it self. *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, that were wont to yield great profit, hardly now maintained the *Roman* armies that lay in those provinces, to hold them safe and in good order. As for the citizens of *Rome*, every one of them suffered his part of the detriment, which the commonwealth sustained, and could now do least for his country, when most need was : as also the number of them was much decreased : so as if money should be raised upon them by the *Poll*, yet must it be far less than in former times. The senate therefore, diligently considering the greatness of the war within the bowels of *Italy*, that could not be thence expelled without the exceeding charge of many good armies ; the peril, wherein *Sicily* and *Sardinia* stood, both of the *Carthaginians*, and of many among the naturals declining from the friendship or subjection of *Rome* ; the threats of the *Macedonian*, ready to land in the eastern parts of *Italy*, if they were not at the cost to find him work at home ; the greater threats of *Asdrubal*, to follow his brother over the *Alps*, as soon as he could rid himself of the *Scipio's* in *Spain* ; and the poverty of the commonwealth, which had not money for any one of these mortal dangers, were driven almost even to extreme want of counsel. But being urged by the violence of swift necessity, signified in the letters of the two *Scipio's* from *Spain* ; they resolved upon the only course, without which the city could not have subsisted.

They called the people to assembly : wherein *Q. Fulvius*, the pretor, laid open the publick wants, and plainly said, that in this exigent, there must be no taking of money for victuals, weapons, apparel, or the like things needful to the soldiers : but that such as had stuff, or were artificers, must trust the commonwealth with the loan of their commodities, and labours, until the war were ended. Hereunto he so effectually exhorted all men, especially the publicans or customers, and those which in former times had lived upon their dealing in the common revenues, that the charge was undertaken by private men ; and the army in *Spain* as well supplied, as if the treasury had been full. Shortly after this, *M. Atilius Regulus*, and *P. Furius Philus*, the *Roman* censors, taking in hand the redress of disorders within the city, were chiefly intentive to the correction of those that had misbehaved themselves in this present war. They began with

L. Cecilius Metellus : who, after the battel at *Cannæ*, had held discourse with some of his companions, about flying beyond the seas ; as if *Rome*, and all *Italy*, had been no better than lost. After him they took in hand those, that having brought to *Rome* the message of their fellows made prisoners at *Cannæ*, returned not back to *Hannibal*, as they were bound by oath ; but thought themselves thereof sufficiently discharged, in that they had stepped once back into his camp ; with pretence of taking better notice of the captives names. All these were now pronounced infamous by the censors : as also were a great many more ; even whosoever had not served in the wars, after the term which the laws appointed. Neither was the note of the censors at this time (as otherwise it used to be) hurtful only in reputation : but greater weight was added thereunto by this decree of the senate following ; *That all such as were noted with infamy by these censors, should be transported into Sicily, there to serve until the end of the war, under the same hard conditions that were imposed upon the remainder of the army beaten at Cannæ.* The office of the censors was, to take the list and account of the citizens ; to choose or displace the senators ; and to set notes of disgrace (without further punishment) upon those, whose dishonest or unseemly behaviour fell not within the compass of the law. They took also an account of the *Roman* gentlemen : among whom they distributed the publick horses of service, unto such as they thought meet ; or took them away for their misbehaviour. Generally, they had the oversight of men's lives and manners : and their censure was much revered and feared ; though it extended no further, than to putting men out of rank ; or making them change their tribe ; or (which was the most that they could do) causing them to pay some duties to the treasury, for which others were exempted. But besides the care of this general tax, and matters of morality, they had the charge of all publick works ; as mending of high-ways, bridges, water-courses ; the reparations of temples, porches, and such other buildings. If any man encroached upon the streets, high-ways, or other places that ought to be common ; the censors compelled him to make amends. They had also the letting out of lands, customs, and other publick revenues, to farm : so that most of the citizens of *Rome* were beholden unto this office, as maintaining themselves by some of the trades thereto belonging. And this was no small help to conserve the dignity of the senate : the commonalty being obnoxious unto the censors ; which were always of that order, and careful to uphold the reputation thereof. But the common-weal being now impoverished by war, and having small store of lands to let, or of customs that were worth the farming ; *Regulus* and *Philus* troubled not themselves much with perusing the temples, or other decayed places, that needed reparations : or if they took a view of what was requisite to be done in this kind ; yet forbore they to set any thing in hand, because they had not wherewith to pay. Herein again appeared a notable generosity of the *Romans*. They that had been accustomed, in more happy times, to undertake such pieces of work, offered now themselves as willingly to the censors, as if there had been no such want : promising liberally their cost and travel, without expectation of any payment, before the end of the war. In like sort, the masters of those slaves, that lately had been enfranchised by *Gracchus*, were very well contented to forbear the price of them, until the city were in better case to pay. In this general inclination of the multitude,

to relieve, as far forth as every one was able, the common necessity; all the goods of orphans, and of widows living under patronage, were brought into the treasury; and there the questor kept a book of all that was laid out for the sustenance of these widows and orphans: whilst the whole stock was used by the city. This good example of those which remained in the town, prevailed with the soldiers abroad: so that (the poorer sort excepted) they refused to take pay; and called those mercenaries, that did accept it when their country was in so great want.

The twelve hundred talents, wrongfully extorted from the *Carthaginians*; nor any injuries following, done by the *Romans* in the height of their pride; yielded half so much commodity, as might be laid in ballance against these miseries, whereunto their estate was now reduced. Nevertheless, if we consider things aright, the calamities of this war did rather enable *Rome* to deal with those enemies, whom she forthwith undertook, than abate or slacken the growth of that large dominion, whereto she attained, ere the youngest of those men was dead, whose names we have already mentioned. For by this hammering, the *Roman* metal grew the more hard and solid; and by paring the branches of private fortunes, the root and heart of the commonwealth was corroborated. So grew the city of *Athens*, when *Xerxes* had burnt the town to ashes, and taken from every particular citizen all hope of other felicity, than that which rested in the common happiness of the universality. Certain it is (as *Sir Francis Bacon* hath judiciously observed) that a state, whose dimension or stem is small, may aptly serve to be a foundation of a great monarchy: which chiefly comes to pass, where all regard of domestical prosperity is laid aside; and every man's care addressed to the benefit of his country. Hereof I might say that our age hath seen a great example, in the united provinces in the *Netherlands*; whose present riches and strength, grew chiefly from that ill assurance, which each of their towns, or almost of their families, perceived it self to hold, whilst the generality was oppressed by the duke of *Alva*; were it so, that the people had thereby grown as warlike, as by extreme industry, and straining themselves to fill their publick treasury, they are all grown wealthy, strong at sea, and able to wage great armies for their services by land. Wherefore, if we value at such a rate as we ought, the patient resolution, conformity to good order, obedience to magistrates, with many other virtues, and, above all other, the great love of the common-weal, which was found in *Rome* in these dangerous times; we may truly say, that the city was never in greater likelihood to prosper. Neither can it be deemed otherwise, than that if the same affection of the people had lasted, when their empire, being grown more large and beautiful, should in all reason have been more dear unto them, if the riches and delicacies of *Asia* had not infected them with sensuality, and carried their appetites mainly to those pleasures, wherein they thought their well-being to consist; if all the citizens, and subjects of *Rome*, could have believed their own interest to be as great, in those wars which their late emperors made for their defence, as in these which were managed by the consuls: the empire, founded upon so great virtue, could not have been thrown down by the hands of rude *Barbarians*, were they never so many. But unto all dominions God hath set their periods: who, though he hath given unto man the knowledge of those ways, by which kingdoms rise

and fall; yet hath left him subject unto the affections, which draw on these fatal changes, in their times appointed.

SECT. XIV.

The Romans win some towns back from Hannibal. Hannibal wins Tarentum. The siege of Capua. Two victories of Hannibal. The journey of Hannibal to the gates of Rome. Capua taken by the Romans.

AS the people of *Rome* strained themselves to the utmost, for maintaining the war: so their generals abroad omitted no part of industry, in seeking to recover what had been lost. The town of *Casiline* *Fabius* besieged. It was well defended by the *Carthaginian* garrison; and likely to have been relieved by those of *Capua*, if *Marcellus* from *Nola* had not come to the assistance of his colleague. Nevertheless the place held out so obstinately, that *Fabius* was purposed to give it over: saying, that the enterprize was not great; yet as difficult, as a thing of more importance. But *Marcellus* was of a contrary opinion. He said, that many such things, as were not at first to have been undertaken by great commanders, ought yet, when once they were taken in hand, to be prosecuted unto the best effect. So the siege held on: and the town was pressed so hard, that the *Campans* dwelling therein grew fearful, and craved parley; offering to give it up, so as all might have leave to depart in safety, whither they pleased. Whilst they were thus treating of conditions: or whilst they were issuing forth, according to the composition already made (for it is diversly reported) *Marcellus*, seizing upon a gate, entred with his army, and put all to the sword that came in their way. Fifty of those that were first gotten out, ran to *Fabius* the consul: who saved them, and sent them to *Capua* in safety; all the rest were either slain, or made prisoners. If *Fabius* deserved commendations, by holding his word good unto these fifty; I know not how the slaughter of the rest, or imprisonment afterward of such, as escaped the heat of execution, could be excused by *Marcellus*. It may be that he helped himself, after the *Roman* fashion, with some equivocation, but he shall pay for it hereafter. In like sort was *Mount Marsam*, in *Gascoigne*, taken by the marshal *Montluc*, when I was a young man in *France*. For whilst he entertained parley about composition, the besieged ran all from their several guards, upon hasty desire of being acquainted with the conditions proposed. The marshal therefore discovering a part of the walls ungarded, entred by *Scalado*, and put all, save the governor, unto the sword. Herein that governor of *Mount Marsam* committed two gross errors: the one, in that he gave no order for the captains and companies, to hold themselves in their places: the other, in that he was content to parley, without pledges for assurance given and received. Some such oversight the governor of *Casiline* seemeth to have committed: yet neither the advantage taken by *Marcellus*, or by *Montluc*, was very honourable. When this work was ended, many small towns of the *Samnites*, and some of the *Lucans* and *Apulians*, were recovered: wherein were taken, or slain, about five and twenty thousand of the enemies; and the country grievously wasted by *Fabius*, *Marcellus* lying sick at *Nola*.

Hannibal in the mean while was about *Tarentum*, waiting to hear from those, that had promised to give up the town. But *M. Paterius*, the *Roman* proprietor,

proprietor, had thrust so many men into it, that the traitors durst not stir. Wherefore the *Carthaginian* was fain to depart, having wearied himself in vain with expectation. Yet he wasted not the country; but contented himself with hope, that they would please him better in time following. So he departed thence toward *Salapia*: which he chose for his wintering place; and began to victual it, when summer was but half past. It is said, that he was in love with a young wench in that town: in which regard if he began his winter more timely, than otherwise need required, he did not like the *Romans*; whom necessity enforced, to make their summer last as long, as they were able to travel up and down the country.

About this time began great troubles in *Sicily*, whither *Marcellus* the consul was sent, to take such order for the province, as need should require. Of the doings there, which wore out more time than his consulship, we will speak hereafter.

The new consuls, chosen at *Rome*, were *Q. Fabius*, the son of the present consul, and *T. Sempronius Gracchus* the second time. The *Romans* found it needful for the publick service, to imploy oftentimes their best able men: and therefore made it lawful, during the war, to recontinue their officers, and choose such, as had lately held their places before; without regarding any distance of time, which was otherwise required. The old *Fabius* became lieutenant unto his son: which was perhaps the respect, that most commended his son unto the place. It is noted, that when the old man came into the camp, and his son rode forth to meet him: eleven of the twelve lictors, which carried each an axe, with a bundle of rods before the consul, suffered him, in regard of due reverence, to pass by them on horseback; which was against the custom. But the son perceiving this, commanded the last of his lictors to note it: who thereupon bade the old *Fabius* alight, and come to the consul on his feet. The father cheerfully did so, saying, *It was my mind, son, to make trial, whether thou didst understand thy self to be consul.* *Cassius Albinus*, a wealthy citizen of *Arpi*, who, after the battel at *Canne*, had holpen the *Carthaginian* into that town, seeing now the fortune of the *Romans* to amend; came privily to this consul *Fabius*, and offered to render it back unto him, if he might be therefore well rewarded. The consul purposed to follow old examples: and to make this *Albinus* a pattern to all traitors; using him, as *Camillus* and *Fabius* had done those, that offered their unfaithful service against the *Falisci*, and king *Pyrrhus*. But *Q. Fabius*, the father, was of another opinion: and said, it was a matter of dangerous consequence, that it should be thought more safe to revolt from the *Romans*, than to turn unto them. Wherefore it was concluded, that he should be sent to the town of *Gales*, and there kept as prisoner, until they could better resolve what to do with him, or what use to make of him. *Hannibal*, understanding that *Albinus* was gone, and among the *Romans*, took it not sorrowfully; but thought this a good occasion, to seize upon all the man's riches, which were great. Yet, that he might seem rather severe, than covetous, he sent for the wife and children of *Albinus* into his camp: where having examined them by torment, partly concerning the departure and intention of this fugitive; partly, and more strictly, about his riches, what they were, and where they lay; he condemned them, as partakers of the treason, to be burnt alive; and took all their goods unto himself. *Fabius*, the consul, shortly after came to *Arpi*; which he won by *Scalado*,

in a stormy and rainy night. Five thousand of *Hannibal's* soldiers lay in the town; and of the *Arpines* themselves, there were about three thousand. These were thrust foremost by the *Carthaginian* garrison, when it was understood, that the *Romans* had gotten over the wall, and broken open the gate. For the soldiers held the townsmen suspected; and therefore thought it no wisdom, to trust them at their backs. But after some little resistance, the *Arpines* gave over fight, and entertained parley with the *Romans*: protesting, that they had been betrayed by their princes; and were become subject to the *Carthaginians*, against their wills. In process of this discourse, the *Arpine* pretor went unto the *Roman* consul: and receiving his faith for the security of the town, presently made head against the garrison. This notwithstanding, like it is, that *Hannibal's* men continued to make good resistance. For when almost a thousand of them, that were *Spaniards*, offered to leave their companions, and serve on the *Roman* side, it was yet covenanted, that the *Carthaginians* should be suffered to pass forth quietly, and return to *Hannibal*. This was performed: and so *Arpi* became *Roman* again, with little other loss, than of him that had betrayed it. About the same time, *Cliternum* was taken by *Sempronius Tuditanus*, one of the pretors: and unto *Cneius Fulvius*, another of the pretors, an hundred and twelve gentlemen of *Capua* offered their service; upon no other condition, than to have their goods restored unto them, when their city should be recovered by the *Romans*. This was a thing of small importance: but, considering the general hatred of the *Campanians* toward *Rome*, it served to discover the inclination of the *Italians* in those times; and how their affections recoiled from *Hannibal*, when there was no appearance of those mighty succours, that had been promised from *Carthage*. The *Consentines* also, and the *Thurines*, people of the *Brutians*, that had yielded themselves to *Hannibal*, returned again to their old allegiance. Others would have followed their example, but that one *L. Pomponius*, who of a *Publican* had made himself a captain, and gotten reputation by petty exploits in foraging the country, was slain by *Hanno*, with a great multitude of those that followed him. *Hannibal* in the mean while had all his care bent upon *Tarentum*; which if he could take, it seemed that it would stand him in good stead, for drawing over that help out of *Macedon*, which his *Carthaginians* failed to send. Long he waited, ere he could bring his desire to pass: and being loth to hazard his forces, where he hoped to prevail by intelligence, he contented himself, with taking in some poor towns of the *Salentines*. At length, his agents within *Tarentum* found means to accomplish their purpose, and his wish. One *Phileas*, that was of their conspiracy, who lay at *Rome*, as ambassador, practising with the hostages of the *Tarentines*, and such as had the keeping of them, conveyed them by night out of the city. But he and his company were the next day so closely pursued, that all of them were taken, and brought back to *Rome*; where they suffered death, as traitors. By reason of this cruelty, or severity, the people of *Tarentum* grew to hate the *Romans*, more generally and earnestly than before. As for the conspirators, they followed their business the more diligently; as knowing what reward they were to expect, if their intention should happen to be discovered. Wherefore they sent again to *Hannibal*: and acquainting him with the manner of their plot, made the same composition with him for the *Tarentines*, which they

they of *Capua* had made before. *Nico* and *Philomenes*, two the chief among them, used much to go forth of the town on hunting by night, as if they durst not take their pleasure by day, for fear of the *Carthaginians*. Seldom or never they missed of their game: for the *Carthaginians* prepared it ready for their hands, that they might not seem to have been abroad upon other occasion. From the camp of *Hannibal*, it was about three days journey to *Tarentum*, if he should have marched thither with his whole army. This caused his long abode in one place the less to be suspected: as also, to make his enemies the more secure, he caused it to be given out, that he was sick. But when the *Romans* within *Tarentum* were grown careless of such his neighbourhood, and the conspirators had set their business in order, he took with him ten thousand the most expedite of his horse and foot, and long before break of day, made all speed thitherward. Four-score light horse of the *Numidians* ran a great way before him, beating all the ways, and killing any that they met, for fear lest he, and his troop following him, would be discovered. It had been often the manner of some few *Numidian* horse, to do the like in former times. Wherefore the *Roman* governour, when he heard tell in the evening, that some *Numidians* were abroad in the fields, took it for a sign, that *Hannibal* was not as yet dislodged; and gave order, that some companies should be sent out the next morning, to strip them of their booty, and send them gone. But when it grew dark night, *Hannibal*, guided by *Philomenes*, came close to the town: where, according to the tokens agreed upon, making a light to shew his arrival; *Nico*, that was within the town, answered him with another light, in sign that he was ready. Presently *Nico* began to set upon one of the gates, and to kill the watchmen. *Philomenes* went toward another gate: and whistling (as was his manner) called up the porter; bidding him make haste, for that he had killed a great boar, so heavy, that scarce two men could stand under it. So the porter opened the wicket; and forthwith entered two young men, laden with the boar; which *Hannibal* had prepared large enough, to be worthy the looking on. While the porter stood wondering at the largeness of the beast, *Philomenes* ran him through with his boar-spear: and letting in some thirty armed men, fell upon all the watch; whom when he had slain, he opened the great gate. So the army of *Hannibal*, entering *Tarentum* at two gates, went directly toward the marketplace; where both parts met. Thence they were distributed by their general, and sent into all quarters of the city, with *Tarentines* to be their guides. They were commanded to kill all the *Romans*; not to hurt the citizens. For better performance hereof, *Hannibal* willed the conspirators, that when any of their friends appeared in sight, they should bid him be quiet, and of good cheer. All the town was in an uproar; but few could tell what the matter meant. A *Roman* trumpet was unskillfully sounded by a *Greek* in the theatre; which helped the suspicion, both of the *Tarentines*, that the *Romans* were about to spoil the town; and of the *Romans*, that the citizens were in commotion. The governour fled into the port: and taking boat, got into the citadel, that stood in the mouth of the haven; whence he might easily perceive the next morning, how all had passed. *Hannibal*, assembling the *Tarentines*, gave them to understand, what good affection he bore them; inveighing bitterly against the *Romans*, as tyrannous oppressors; and spake what else he thought fit for the present. This

done: and having gotten such spoil as was to be had of the soldiers goods in the town, he addressed himself against the citadel; hoping, that if the garrison would fall out, he might give them such a blow, as should make them unable to defend the place. According to his expectation it partly fell out. For when he began to make his approaches, the *Romans* in a bravery falling forth, gave charge upon his men: who fell back of purpose, according to direction, till they had drawn on as many as they could, and so far from their strength, as they durst adventure. Then gave *Hannibal* a sign to his *Carthaginians*, who lay prepared ready for the purpose: and fiercely setting upon the enemy, drove him back with great slaughter, as fast as he could run; so that afterwards he durst not issue forth. The citadel stood upon a demi-island, that was plain ground; and fortified only with a ditch and wall against the town, whereunto it was joined by a cawsey. This cawsey *Hannibal* intended to fortify in like sort against the citadel; to the end, that the *Tarentines* might be able, without his help, to keep themselves from all danger thence. His work in few days went so well forward, without impediment from the besieged, that he conceived hope of winning the place itself, by taking a little more pains. Wherefore he made ready all sorts of engines, to force the place. But whilst he was busied in his works, there came by sea a strong supply from *Metapontum*: which took away all hope of prevailing; and made him return to his former counsel. Now, forasmuch as the *Tarentine* fleet lay within the haven, and could not pass forth, whilst the *Romans* held the citadel: it seemed likely, that the town would suffer want, being debarred of accustomed trade and provisions by sea; whilst the *Roman* garrison, by help of their shipping might easily be relieved, and enabled to hold out. Against this inconvenience, it was rather wished by the *Tarentines*, than any way hoped, that their fleet could get out of the haven, to guard the mouth of it, and cut off all supply from the enemy. *Hannibal* told them, that this might well be done: for that their town standing in plain ground, and their streets being fair and broad, it would be no hard matter to draw the galleys over land, and launch them into the sea without. This he undertook and effected: whereby the *Roman* garrison was reduced into great necessity; though with much patience it held out, and found *Hannibal* oftentimes otherwise busied, than his affairs required.

Thus with mutual loss on both sides, the time passed: and the *Roman* forces, growing daily stronger, *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, with *Appius Claudius*, lately chosen consuls, prepared to besiege the great city of *Capua*. Three and twenty legions the *Romans* had now armed. This was a great and hasty growth from that want of men, and of all necessities, whereunto the loss at *Canne* had reduced them. But, to fill up these legions, they were fain to take up young boys, that were under seventeen years of age: and to send commissioners above fifty miles round, for the seeking out such lads as might appear serviceable, and pressing them to the wars; making yet a law, that their years of service, whereunto they were bound by order of the city, should be reckoned for their benefit, from this their beginning so young, as if they had been of lawful age. Before the *Roman* army drew near, the *Campans* felt great want of victuals, as if they had already been besieged. This happened partly by sloth of the nation, partly by the great waste and spoil, which the *Romans* had in fore-

going years made upon their grounds. They sent therefore ambassadors to *Hannibal*; desiring him to succour them ere they were closed up, as they feared to be shortly. He gave them comfortable words; and sent *Hanno*, with an army, to supply their wants. *Hanno* appointed them a day, against which they should be ready, with all manner of carriages, to store themselves with victuals, that he would provide. Neither did he promise more than he performed. For he caused great quantity of grain, that had been laid up in cities round about, to be brought into his camp, three miles from *Beneventum*. Thither at the time appointed came no more than forty carts or waggons, with a few pack-horses; as if this had been enough to victual *Capua*. Such was the retchlessness of the *Campans*. *Hanno* was exceeding angry hereat; and told them, they were worse than very beasts, since hunger could not teach them to have greater care. Wherefore he gave them a longer day, against which he made provision to store them throughly. Of all these doings word was sent to the *Roman* consuls, from the citizens of *Beneventum*. Therefore *Q. Fulvius*, the consul, taking with him such strength as he thought needful for the service, came into *Beneventum* by night; where with diligence he made enquiry into the behaviour of the enemy. He learned, that *Hanno*, with part of his army, was gone abroad to make provisions; that some two thousand waggons, with a great rabble of carters, and other varlets, lay among the *Carthaginians* in their camp; so that little good order was kept; all thought being set upon a great harvest. Hereupon the consul bade his men prepare themselves to assail the enemies camp: and leaving all his impediments within *Beneventum*, he marched thitherward so early in the morning, that he was there with the first break of day. By coming so unexpected, he had well-near forced the camp on the sudden. But it was very strong, and very well defended: so that the longer the fight continued, the less desire had *Fulvius* to lose more of his men in the attempt; seeing many of them cast away, and yet little hope of doing good. Therefore he said, that it were better to go more leisurely and substantially to work; to lend for his fellow-consul, with the rest of their army, and to lie between *Hanno* and home; that neither the *Campans* should depart thence, nor the *Carthaginians* be able to relieve them. Being thus discoursing, and about to sound the retreat; he saw, that some of his men had gotten over the enemies rampart. There was great booty; or (which was all one to the soldiers) an opinion of much that might be gotten in that camp. Wherefore some ensign-bearers threw their ensigns over the rampart, willing their men to fetch them out, unless they would endure the shame and dishonour following such a loss. Fear of such ignominy, than which none could be greater, made the soldiers adventure so desperately, that *Fulvius*, perceiving the heat of his men, changed his purpose, and encouraged those that were somewhat backward, to follow the example of them that had already gotten over the trenches. Thus the camp was won: in which were slain above six thousand; and taken, above seven thousand; besides all the store of victuals, and carriages, with abundance of booty, that *Hanno* had lately gotten from the *Roman* confederates. This misadventure, and the nearer approach of both the consuls, made them of *Capua* send a piteous embassy to *Hannibal*: putting him in mind of

all the love that he was wont to protest unto their city; and how he had made shew to affect it no less than *Carthage*. But now, they said, it would be lost, as *Arpi* was lately, if he gave not strong and speedy succour. *Hannibal* answered with comfortable words, and sent away two thousand horse to keep their grounds from spoil; whilst he himself was detained about *Tarentum*, partly by hope of winning the citadel, partly by the disposition which he saw in many towns adjoining to yield unto him. Among the hostages of the *Tarentines* that lately had fled out of *Rome*, and, being overtaken, suffered death for their attempt, were some of the *Metapontines*, and other cities of the *Greeks*, inhabiting that eastern part of *Italy*, which was called of old *Magna Græcia*. These people took to heart the death of their hostages, and thought the punishment greater than the offence. Wherefore the *Metapontines*, as soon as the *Roman* garrison was taken from them to defend the citadel of *Tarentum*, made no more ado, but opened their gates to *Hannibal*. The *Thurines* would have done the like, upon the like reason, had not some companies lain in their town, which they feared that they should not be able to master. Nevertheless, they helped themselves by cunning; inviting to their gates *Hanno* and *Mago*, that were near at hand, against whom, whilst they professed their service to *Atinius*, the *Roman* captain, they drew him forth to fight; and recoiling from him, closed up their gates. A little formality they used, in pretending fear lest the enemy should break in together with the *Romans*; in saving *Atinius* himself, and sending him away by sea; as also in consulting a small while (because perhaps many of their chief men were unacquainted with the practice) whether they should yield to the *Carthaginian*, or no. But this disputation lasted not long, for they that had removed the chief impediment, easily prevailed in the rest, and delivered up the town to *Hanno* and *Mago*. This good success, and hope of the like, detained *Hannibal* in those quarters; whilst the consuls, fortifying *Beneventum*, to secure their backs, addressed themselves unto the siege of *Capua*.

Many disasters beset the *Romans* in the beginning of this great enterprize. *T. Sempronius Gracchus*, a very good man of war, that had of late been twice consul, was slain, either by treachery of some *Lucans*, that drew him into an ambush, or by some *Carthaginian* stragglers, among whom he fell unawares. His body, or his head, was very honourably interred either by *Hannibal* himself, or (for the reports agree not) by the *Romans*, to whom *Hannibal* sent it. He was appointed to lie in *Beneventum*, there to secure the back of the army that should besiege *Capua*. But his death happened in an ill time, to the great hindrance of that business. The *Volones*, or slaves, lately manumitted, forsook their ensigns, and went every one whither he thought good, as if they had been discharged by the decease of their leader; so that it asked some labour to seek them out, and bring them back into their camp. Nevertheless, the consuls went forward with their work; and drawing near to *Capua*, did all acts of hostility which they could. *Mago*, the *Carthaginian*, and the citizens of *Capua*, gave them an hard welcome; wherein above fifteen hundred *Romans* were lost. Neither was it long, ere *Hannibal* came thither, who fought with the consuls, and had the better, insomuch that he caused them to dislodge. They removed by night, and went several ways: *Fulvius* toward *Canne*; *Claudius* into *Lucania*. *Hannibal* followed after *Claudius*, who having led him a great walk, fetched a com-

pass about, and returned to *Capua*. It so fell out, that one *M. Centenius Penula*, a stout man, and one that with good commendations had discharged the place of a centurion, lay with an army not far from thence, where *Hannibal* rested, when he was very weary of hunting after *Claudius*. This *Penula* had made great vaunts to the *Roman* senate, of wonders which he would work, if he might be trusted with the leading of five thousand men. The fathers were unwilling in such a time, to reject the virtue of any good soldier, how mean soever his condition were. Wherefore they gave him the charge of eight thousand; and he himself being a proper man, and talking bravely, gathered up so many voluntaries, as almost doubled his number. But meeting thus with *Hannibal*, he gave proof of the difference between a stout centurion, and one able to command in chief. He and his fellows were all (in a manner) slain, scarce a thousand of them escaping. Soon after this *Hannibal* had word, that *Cn. Fulvius*, a *Roman* pretor, with eighteen thousand men, was in *Apulia*, very careless, and a man insufficient for the charge which he held. Thither therefore he halted to visit him, hoping to deal the better with the main strength of *Rome*, which pointed at *Capua*, when he should have cut off those forces that lay in the provinces about, under men of small ability. Coming upon *Fulvius*, he found him and his men so jolly, that needs they would have fought the first night. Wherefore it was not to be doubted what would happen the day following. So he bestowed *Mago*, with three thousand of his lightest armed, in places thereabout most fit for ambush. Then offering battel to *Fulvius*, he soon had him in the trap, whence he made him glad to escape alive, leaving all, save two thousand of his followers, dead behind him.

These two great blows, received one presently after the other, much astonished the *Romans*. Nevertheless, all care was taken to gather up the small remains of the broken armies; and that the consuls should go substantially forwards with the siege of *Capua*, which was of great consequence, both in matter of reputation, and in many other respects. The two consuls sat down before the town, and *C. Claudius Nero*, one of the pretors, came with his army from *Suessula* to their assistance. They made proclamation, that whosoever would issue out of *Capua* before a certain day prefixed, should have his pardon, and be suffered to enjoy all that unto him belonged; which day being pass'd, there should be no grace expected. This offer was contumeliously rejected, the *Capuans* relying on their own strength, and the succours attended from *Hannibal*. Before the city was closed up, they sent messengers to the *Carthaginian*, which found him at *Brundisium*. He had made a long journey, in hope of gaining the *Tarentine* citadel; of which expectation failing, he turned to *Brundisium*, upon advertisement that he should be let in. There the *Capuans* met him; told him of their danger with earnest words; and were with words as bravely re-comforted. He bade them consider, how a few days since he had chased the consuls out of their fields; and told them, that he would presently come thither again, and send the *Romans* going as fast as before. With this good answer the messengers returned, and hardly could get back into the city, which the *Romans* had almost intrenched round. As for *Hannibal* himself, he was of opinion, that *Capua*, being very well manned, and heartily devoted unto his friendship, would hold out a long time; and thereby give him leisure to do what he thought requisite among the *Tarentines*, and in those eastern parts of *Italy*,

whilst the *Roman* army spent it self in a tedious siege. Thus he lingered, and thereby gave the consuls time both to fortify themselves at *Capua*, and to dispatch the election of new magistrates in *Rome*, whilst he himself pursued hopes, that never found success.

Claudius and *Fulvius*, when their term of office was expired, were appointed to continue the siege at *Capua*, retaining the same armies, as pro-consuls. The townsmen often sallied out, rather in a bravery, than likelihood to work any matter of effect, the enemy lying close within his trenches, as intending, without other violence, to subdue them by famine. Yet against the *Campan* horse (for their foot was easily beaten) the *Romans* used to thrust out some troops, that should hold them skirmish. In these exercises the *Campan*s usually had the better, to the great grief of their proud enemy, who scorned to take foil at the hands of such rebels. It was therefore devised, that some active and courageous young men, should learn to ride behind the *Roman* men at arms, leaping up, and again dismounting lightly, as occasion served. These were furnished like the *Velites*, having each of them three or four small darts; which, alighting in time of conflict, they discharged thick upon the enemy's horse; whom vanquishing in this kind of service, they much disheartened in the main. The time thus passing, and famine daily increasing within the city, *Hannibal* came at length, not expected by the *Romans*; and taking a fort of theirs, called *Galatia*, fell upon their camp. At the same time the *Capuans* issued with their whole power, in as terrible manner as they could devise; setting all their multitude of unserviceable people on the walls; which, with a loud noise of pans and basons, troubled those that were occupied in fight. *Appius Claudius* opposing himself to the *Campan*s, easily defended his trenches against them; and so well repressed them, that he drove them at length back into their city. Nevertheless, in pursuing them to their gates, he received a wound, that accompanied him in short space after to his grave. *Q. Fulvius* was held harder to his task by *Hannibal*, and the *Carthaginian* army. The *Roman* camp was even at point to have been lost; and *Hannibal*'s elephants, of which he brought with him thirty-three, were either gotten within the rampart, or else (for the report varies) being some of them slain upon it, fell into the ditch; and filled it up in such sort, that their bodies served as a bridge unto the assailants. It is said, that *Hannibal* in this tumult caused some fugitives, that could speak *Latin* well, to proclaim aloud, as it were in the consul's name, that every one of the soldiers should shift for himself, and fly betimes unto the next hills, soasmuch as the camp was already lost. But all would not serve. The fraud was detected, and the army, having sitten there so long, had at good leisure strongly intrenched it self, so as little hope there was to raise the siege by force.

This did extremely perplex the *Carthaginian*. The purchase of *Capua* had (as was thought) withheld him from taking *Rome* it self; and now his desire of winning the *Tarentine* citadel, had well near lost *Capua*, in respect of which, neither the citadel, nor the city of *Tarentum*, were to have been much regarded. Falling therefore into a desperate anger with himself and his hard fortune, that of so many great victories he had made no greater use; on the sudden he entertained an haughty resolution even to set upon *Rome*, and carry to the walls of that proud city the danger of war that threatened *Capua*. This he thought would be a mean to draw the *Roman* generals, or one of them at least, unto the defence of their own home. If they rose from the siege with their

their whole army, then had he his desire: if they divided their forces, then was it likely that either he, or the *Campans*, should well enough deal with them apart. Neither did he despair that the terror of his coming might so astonish the multitude within *Rome*, as he might enter some part or other of the city. His only fear was, lest the *Campans*, being ignorant of his purpose, should think he had forsaken them, and thereupon forthwith yield themselves to the enemy. To prevent this danger, he sent letters to *Capua* by a subtle *Numidian*; who running as a fugitive into the *Roman* camp, conveyed himself thence over the innermost trenches into the city. The journey to *Rome* was to be performed with great celerity; no small hope of good success resting in the suddenness of his arrival there. Wherefore he caused his men to have in a readiness ten days victuals; and prepared as many boats as might in one night transport his army over the river of *Vulturnus*. This could not be done so closely, but that the *Roman* generals, by some fugitives, had notice of his purpose. With this danger therefore they acquainted the senate, which was therewith affected, according to the diversity of mens opinions in a case of such importance. Some gave counsel to let alone *Capua*, yea, and all places else, rather than to put the town of *Rome* into peril of being taken by the enemy. Others were so far from allowing of this, as they wondered how any man could think that *Hannibal*, being unable to relieve *Capua*, should judge himself strong enough to win *Rome*; and therefore stoutly said, that those legions which were kept at home for defence of the city, would serve the turn well enough to keep him out, and send him thence, if he were so unwise as to come thither. But it was finally concluded, that letters should be sent to *Fulvius* and *Claudius*, acquainting them perfectly with the forces that at the present were in *Rome*; who since they knew best what the strength was which *Hannibal* could bring along with him, were best able to judge what was needful to oppose him. So it was referred unto the discretion of these generals at *Capua*, to do as they thought behoveful; and, if it might conveniently be, neither to raise their siege, nor yet to put the city of *Rome* into much adventure. According to this decree of the senate, *Q. Fulvius* took fifteen thousand foot and a thousand horse, the choice of his whole army, with which he hastened toward *Rome*, leaving *App. Claudius*, who could not travel by reason of his wound, to continue the siege at *Capua*.

Hannibal, having passed over *Vulturnus*, burnt up all his boats, and left nothing that might serve to transport the enemy, in case he should offer to pursue or coast him. Then hastened he away toward *Rome*, staying no longer in any one place than he needs must. Yet found he the bridges over *Liris* broken down by the people of *Fregelle*; which, as it stopped him a little on his way, so it made him the more grievously to spoil their lands whilst the bridges were in mending. The nearer that he drew to *Rome*, the greater waste he made: his *Numidians* running before him, driving the country, and killing or taking multitudes of all sorts and ages, that fled out of all parts round about. The messengers of these news came apace, one after another, into the city; some few bringing true advertisements, but the most of them reporting the conceits of their own fear. All the streets and temples in *Rome* were pelted with women, crying, and praying, and rubbing the altars with their hair, because they could do none other good. The senators were all in the great market, or place of assembly; ready to give their advice, if it

were asked, or to take directions given by the magistrates. All places of most importance were stuffed with soldiers: it being uncertain, upon which part *Hannibal* would fall. In the midst of this trepidation, there came news, that *Q. Fulvius*, with part of the army from *Capua*, was hastening to the defence of the city. The office of a proconsul did expire, at his return home, and entry into the gates of *Rome*. Wherefore, that *Fulvius* might lose nothing by coming into the city in time of such need, an act was passed, that he should have equal power with the consuls, during his abode there. He and *Hannibal* arrived at *Rome*, one soon after another: *Fulvius* having been long held occupied in passing over *Vulturnus*; and *Hannibal* receiving impediment in his journey, as much as the country was able to give. The consuls, and *Fulvius*, incamped without the gates of *Rome*; attending the *Carthaginian*. Thither they called the senate: and as the danger grew nearer and greater; so took they more careful and especial order, against all occurrences. *Hannibal* came to the river *Anio* or *Anien*, three miles from the town: whence he advanced with two thousand horse, and rode along a great way under the walls; viewing the site thereof, and considering how he might best approach it. But he either went, or (as the *Roman* story saith) was driven away, without doing, or receiving any hurt. Many tumults rose in this while among the people; but were suppressed by the care and diligence of the senators. Above the rest, one accident was both troublesome, and not without peril. Of *Numidians* that had shifted side, and fallen (upon some displeasures) from *Hannibal* to the *Romans*, there were some twelve hundred then in *Rome*: which were appointed by the consuls, to pass through the town, from the mount *Aventine*, to the gate *Collina*, where it was thought that their service might be useful, among broken ways, and garden-walls lying in the suburbs. The faces of these men, and their furniture, wherein they differed not from the followers of *Hannibal*, bred such mistaking, as caused a great uproar among the people: all crying out, that *Aventine* was taken, and the enemy gotten within the walls. The noise was such, that men could not be informed of the truth: and the streets were so full of cattle, and husbandmen, which were fled thither out of the villages adjoining, that the passage was stop'd up; and the poor *Numidians* pitifully beaten from the house-tops, with stones and other weapons that came next to hand, by the desperate multitude, that would have run out of the gates, had it not been certain who lay under the walls. To remedy the like inconveniences, it was ordained, That all which had been dictators, consuls, or censors, should have authority as magistrates, till the enemy departed. The day following, *Hannibal* passed over *Anien*, and presented battle to the *Romans*, who did not wisely if they undertook it. It is said, that a terrible shower of rain, caused both *Romans* and *Carthaginians* to return into their several camps: and that this happened two days together, the weather breaking up, and clearing, as soon as they were departed asunder. Certain it is, that *Hannibal*, who had brought along with him no more than ten days provision, could not endure to stay there, until his victuals were all spent. In which regard, the *Romans*, if they suffered him to waste his time and provisions, knowing that he could not abide there long, did as became well advised men: if they offered to fight with him, and either had the better, or were parted (as is said) by some accident of weather; the commendations must be given

given to their fortune. The terror of *Hannibal's* coming to the city, how great soever it was at the first, yet, after some leisure, and better notice taken of his forces, which appeared less than the first apprehension had formed them, was much and soon abated. Hereunto it helped well, that at the same time the supply appointed for *Spain*, after the death of the two *Scipio's*, was sent out of the town, and went forth at the gate, whilst one *Carthaginian* lay before another. In all *Panick terrors*, as they are called, whereof there is either no cause known, or no cause answerable to the greatness of the sudden consternation, it is a good remedy, to do somewhat quite contrary to that which the danger would require; were it such, as men have fashioned it in their amazed conceits. Thus did *Alexander* cause his soldiers to disarm themselves, when they were all on a sudden in a great fear of they knew not what. And thus did *Clearchus* pacify a foolish uproar in his army, by proclaiming a reward unto him, that could tell who had sent the ass into the camp. But in this present example of the *Romans*, appears withal a great magnanimity: whereby they sustained their reputation, and augmented it no less, than by this bold attempt of *Hannibal* it might seem to have been diminished. Neither could they more finely have checked the glorious conceits of their enemies, and taken away the disgrace of that fear, which clouded their valour at his first coming, than by making such demonstrations, when once they had recovered spirit, how little they esteemed him. To this purpose therefore that very piece of ground, on which the *Carthaginian* lay incamped, was sold in *Rome*: and sold it was nothing under the value, but at as good a rate, as if it had been in time of peace. This indignity coming to his ear, incensed *Hannibal* so much, that he made port-sale of the silver-smiths shops, which were near about the market or common place in *Rome*, as if his own title to the houses within the town were no worse than any *Roman* citizens could be unto that piece of ground, whereon he raised his tent. But this counter-practice was nothing worth. The *Romans* did seek to manifest that assurance which they justly had conceived; *Hannibal*, to make shew of continuing in an hope, which was already past. His victuals were almost spent: and of those ends that he had proposed unto himself, this journey had brought forth none other, than the same of his much daring. Wherefore he broke up his camp: and doing what spoil he could in the *Roman* territory, without sparing religious places, wherein wealth was to be gotten, he passed like a tempest over the country; and ran toward the eastern sea so fast, that he had almost taken the city of *Rhegium* before his arrival was feared or suspected. As for *Capua*, he gave it lost: and is likely to have cursed the whole faction of *Hanno*, which thus disabled him to relieve that fair city, since he had no other way to vent his grief.

¶ *Fulvius* returning back to *Capua*, made proclamation a-new, that who so would yield, before a certain day, might safely do it. This, and the very return of *Fulvius*, without any more appearance of *Hannibal*, gave the *Capuans* to understand, that they were abandoned, and their case desperate. To trust the *Roman* pardon proclaimed, every man's conscience of his own evil deserts, told him, that it was a vanity: and some faint hope was given by *Hanno* and *Bostar*, captains of the *Carthaginian* garrison within the town, that *Hanni-*

bal should come again, if means could only be found how to convey such letters unto him, as they would write. The carriage of the letters was undertaken by some *Numidians*; who running, as fugitives, out of the town, into the *Roman* camp, waited fit opportunity to make an escape thence with their packets. But it happened, ere they could convey themselves away; that one of them was detected by an harlot following him out of the town; and the letters of *Bostar* and *Hanno* were taken and opened, containing a vehement intreaty unto *Hannibal*, that he would not thus forsake the *Capuans*, and them. For (said they) we came not hither to make war against *Rhegium* and *Tarentum*, but against the *Romans*: whose legions wheresoever they lie, there also should the *Carthaginian* army be ready to attend them; and by taking of such course, have we gotten those victories at *Trebia*, *Thrasymene*, and *Cannæ*. In fine, they besought him, that he would not dishonour himself, and betray them to their enemies, by turning another way; as if it were his only care, that the city should not be taken in his full view: promising to make a desperate sally, if he would once more adventure to set upon the *Roman* camp. Such were the hopes of *Bostar* and his fellow. But *Hannibal* had already done his best: and now began to faint under the burden of that war, wherein (as afterwards he protested) he was vanquished by *Hanno* and his partisans in the *Carthaginian* senate, rather than by any force of *Rome*.^a It may well be, as a thing incident in like cases, that some of those which were besieged in *Capua*, had been sent over by the *Hannonians*, to observe the doings of *Hannibal*, and to check his proceedings. If this were so, justly might they curse their own malice, which had cast them into this remediless necessity. Howsoever it were, the letters directed unto *Hannibal*, fell (as is shewed) into the *Roman* proconsul's hands; who cutting off the hands of all such counterfeit fugitives, as carried such messages, whipt them back into the town. This miserable spectacle broke the hearts of the *Capuans*: so that the multitude crying out upon the senate, with menacing terms, caused them to assemble, and consult about the yielding up of *Capua* unto the *Romans*. The bravest of the senators, and such as a few years since had been most forward in joining with *Hannibal*, understood well enough whereunto the matter tended. Wherefore one of them invited the rest home to supper; telling them, that when they had made good cheer, he would drink to them such an health, as should set them free from that cruel revenge, which the enemy sought upon their bodies. About seven and twenty of the senators there were, that liking well of this motion, ended their lives together, by drinking poison. All the rest, hoping for more mercy than they had deserved, yielded simply to discretion. So one of the town-gates was set open: whereat a *Roman* legion, with some other companies, entering, disarmed the citizens, apprehended the *Carthaginian* garrison, and commanded all the senators of *Capua* to go forth into the *Roman* camp. At their coming thither, the proconsuls laid irons upon them all, and, commanding them to tell what store of gold and silver they had at home, sent them into safe custody; some to *Cales*, others to *Theanum*. Touching the general multitude: they were reserved unto the discretion of the senate; yet so hardly used by *Fulvius* in the mean while, that they had little cause of hope or comfort in this adversity. *Ap. Claudius* was brought

SECT. XV.

even to the point of death, by the wound which he had lately received: yet was he not inexorable to the *Campanians*; as having loved them well in former times, and having given his daughter in marriage to that *Pacuvius*, of whom we spake before. But this facility of his colleague, made *Fulvius* the more hasty in taking vengeance: for fear, lest upon the like respects, the *Roman* senate might prove more gentle, than he thought behoveful to the common safety, and honour of their state. Wherefore he took the pains, to ride by night unto *Theanum*, and from thence to *Cales*: where he caused all the *Campan* prisoners to suffer death; binding them to stakes, and scourging them first a good while with rods; after which he struck off their heads.

This terrible example of vengeance, which the *Carthaginians* could not hinder, made all towns of *Italy* the less apt to follow the vain hope of the *Campanians*: and bred a general inclination, to return upon good conditions to the *Roman* side. The *Atellans*, *Calatines*, and *Sabatines*, people of the *Campanians*, that in the former change had followed the fortune of *Capua*, made also now the like submission, for very fear, and want of ability to resist. They were therefore used with the like rigor, by *Fulvius*: who dealt so extremely with them all, that he brought them into desperation. Wherefore some of their young gentlemen, burning with fire of revenge, got into *Rome*: where they found means by night-time, to set on fire so many houses, that a great part of the city was like to have been consumed. The beginning of the fire in divers places at once, argued that it was no casualty. Wherefore liberty was proclaimed upon any slave, and other sufficient reward unto any freeman, that should discover who those incendiaries were. Thus all came out: and the *Campanians*, being detected by a slave of their own (to whom, above his liberty promised, was given about the sum of an hundred marks) had the punishment answerable to their deserts. *Fulvius* hereby being more and more incensed against this wretched people, held them in a manner as prisoners within their walls: and this extreme severity caused them at length to become suppliants unto the *Roman* senate; that some period might be set unto their miseries. That, whereupon the senators resolved in the end, was worse than all that which they had suffered before. Only two poor women in *Capua* (of which one had been an harlot) were found not guilty of the late rebellion. The rest were, some of them, with their wives and children, sold for slaves, and their goods confiscated; others laid in prison, and reserved to further deliberation: but the generality of them, commanded to depart out of *Campania* by a certain day; and confined unto several places, as best liked the angry victors. As for the town of *Capua*, it was suffered to stand, in regard of the beauty and commodious site: but no corporation, or form of polity, was allowed to be therein: only a *Roman* provost was every year sent, to govern over those that should inhabit it, and to do justice. This was the greatest act, and most important, hitherto done by the people of *Rome*, after many great losses in the present war. After this, the glory of *Hannibal* began to shine with a more dim light than before: his oil being far spent: and that which should have revived his flame, being unfortunately shed; shall be told in place convenient.

No. XLII.

How the Carthaginians, making a party in Sardinia, and Sicily, held war against the Romans in those islands; and were overcome.

WHILST things passed thus in *Italy*, the commotions raised in *Sardinia* and *Sicily* by the *Carthaginians* and their friends, were brought to a quiet and happy end, by the industrious valour of the *Romans*. The *Sardinian* rebellion was great and sudden: above thirty thousand being up in arms, ere the *Roman* forces could arrive there to suppress it. One *Harscoras*, with his son *Hioflus*, mighty men in that island, were the ring-leaders; being incited by *Hanno*, a *Carthaginian*, that promised the assistance of his country. Neither were the *Carthaginians* in this enterprise so careless, as in the rest of their main undertakings, about the same time. Yet it had been better, if their care had been directed unto the prosecution of that main business in *Italy*; whereon this, and all other hopes depended. For it would have sufficed, if they could have hindered the *Romans* from sending an army into *Sardinia*. *Harscoras*, with his followers, might well enough have served to drive out *Q. Mutius*, the pretor; who lay sick in the province; and not more weak in his own body, than in his train. But whilst they sought revenge of that particular injury, whereof the sense was most grievous: they neglected the opportunity of requiting those that had done them wrong, and of the securing themselves from all injuries in the future. Their fortune also in this enterprise was such, as may seem to have discouraged them from being at the like charge, in cases of more importance. For whereas they sent over *Asdrubal*, surnamed *the bald*, with a competent fleet and army; assisted in this expedition by *Hanno*, the author of the rebellion, and by *Mago*, a gentleman of the *Barchine* house, and near kinsman to *Hannibal*: it so fell out, that the whole fleet, by extremity of foul weather, was cast upon the *Baleares*; so beaten, and in such evil plight, that the *Sardinians* had even spent their hearts, and were in a manner quite vanquished, ere these their friends could arrive to succour them.

Titus Manlius was sent from *Rome* with two and twenty thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse, to settle the estate of that island, which he had taken in, and annexed unto the *Roman* dominion, long before this, in his consulship. It was a laudable custom of the *Romans*, to preserve and uphold in their several provinces, the greatness and reputation of those men, and their families, by whom each province had been first subdued unto their empire. If any injury were done unto the provincials; if any grace were to be obtained from the senate; or whatsoever accident required the assistance of a patron: the first conqueror, and his race after him, were the most ready and best approved means, to procure the benefit of the people subdued. Hereby the *Romans* held very sure intelligence in every province, and had always in readiness fit men to reclaim their subjects, if they fell into any such disorder, as would otherwise have required a greater charge and trouble. The coming of *Manlius* retained in obedience all that were not already broken too far out. Yet was *Harscoras* so strong in field, that *Manlius* was compelled to arm his

mariners: without whom he could not have made up that number of two and twenty thousand, whereof we have spoken before: He landed at *Calaris*, or *Carallis*: where mooring his ships, he passed up into the country, and fought out the enemy. *Hyoflus*, the son of *Harficoras*, had then the command of the *Sardinian* army left unto him by his father, who was gone abroad into the country, to draw in more friends to their side. This young gentleman would needs adventure to get honour, by giving battel to the *Romans* at his own discretion. So he rashly adventured to fight with an old soldier: by whom he received a terrible overthrow; and lost in one day above thirty thousand of his followers. *Hyoflus* himself, with the rest of his broken troops, got into *Cornus*, the chief town of the island: whither *Manlius* pursued them. Very soon after this defeature came *Asdrubal* with his *Carthaginians*: too late to win all *Sardinia*, in such haste as he might have done, if the tempest had not hindered his voyage; yet soon enough, and strong enough to save the town of *Cornus*, and to put a new spirit into the rebels. *Manlius* hereupon withdrew himself back to *Calaris*: where he had not stayed long, ere the *Sardinians* (such of them as adhered to the *Roman* party) craved his assistance; their country being wasted by the *Carthaginians*, and the rebels, with whom they had refused to join. This drew *Manlius* forth of *Calaris*: where if he had stayed a little longer, *Asdrubal* would have fought him out with some blemish to his reputation. But the fame of *Asdrubal* and his company, appears to have been greater than was their strength. For, after some trial made of them in a few skirmishes, *Manlius* adventured all to the hazard of a battel: wherein he slew twelve thousand of the enemies; and took of the *Sardinians* and *Carthaginians* three thousand. Four hours the battel lasted: and victory at length fell to the *Romans*, by the flight of the islanders; whose courage had been broken in their unprosperous fight not many days before. The death of young *Hyoflus*, and of his father *Harficoras*, that slew himself for grief, together with the captivity of *Asdrubal* himself, with *Mago* and *Hanno*, the *Carthaginians*; made the victory the more famous. The vanquished army fled into *Cornus*: whither *Manlius* followed them; and in short space won the town. All other cities of the isle that had rebelled, followed the example of *Cornus*, and yielded unto the *Roman*: who imposing upon them such increase of tribute, or other punishment, as best suited with the nature of their several offences, or their ability to pay, returned back to *Calaris* with a great booty, and from thence to *Rome*; leaving *Sardinia* in quiet.

The war in *Sicily* was of greater length, and every way more burdensome to *Rome*: as also the victory brought more honour and profit; for that the *Romans* became thereby not only saviors of their own, as in *Sardinia*, but lords of the whole country, by annexing the city and dominion of *Syracuse*, to that which they enjoyed before. Soon after the battel of *Canna*, the old king of *Syracuse* died: who had continued long a steadfast friend unto the *Romans*; and greatly relieved them in this present war. He left his kingdom to *Hieronimus*, his grand-child, that was about fifteen years of age; *Gelo*, his son, that should have been his heir, being dead before. To this young king his successor, *Hiero* appointed fifteen tutors; of which the principal were *Andronodorus*, *Zoilus*, and *Themistius*; who had married his daughters, or the daughters of *Gelo*. The rest were such, as he judged

most likely to preserve the kingdom, by the same art, whereby himself had gotten, and so long kept it. But within a little while, *Andronodorus*, waxing weary of so many coadjutors, began to commend the sufficiency of the young prince, as extraordinary in one of his years: and said, that he was able to rule the kingdom without help of any protector. Thus by giving over his own charge, he caused others to do the like: hoping thereby to get the king wholly into his hands; which came to pass in a sort as he desired. For *Hieronimus*, laying aside all care of government gave himself wholly over to his pleasures: or if he had any regard for his royal dignity, it was only in matter of exterior shew, as wearing a diadem with ornaments of purple, and being attended by an armed guard. Hereby he offended the eyes of his people, that had never seen the like in *Hiero*, or in *Gelo*, his son. But much more he offended them, when by his insolent behaviour, suitable to his outward pomp, he gave proof, that, in course of life, he would revive the memory of tyrants dead long since, from whom he took the pattern of his habit. He grew proud, lustful, cruel, and dangerous to all that were about him: so that such of his late tutors as could escape him by flight, were glad to live in banishment: the rest, being most of them put to death by the tyrant; many of them dying by their own hands, to avoid the danger of his displeasure, that seemed worse than death it self. Only *Andronodorus*, *Zoilus*, and one *Thrafo*, continued in grace with him, and were his counsellors, but not of his cabinet. These, howsoever they agreed in other points, were at some dissension about that main point, of adhering, either to the *Romans*, or to the *Carthaginians*. The two former of them, were wholly for the king's pleasures, which was set on change: but *Thrafo*, having more regard for his honour and profit, was very earnest to continue the amity with *Rome*. Whilst as yet it remained somewhat doubtful, which way the king would incline; a conspiracy against his person, was detected by a groom of his; to whom one *Theodorus* had broken the matter. *Theodorus* hereupon was apprehended, and tormented; thereby to wring out of him the whole practice, and the names of the undertakers. Long it was ere he would speak any thing: but yielding (as it seemed) in the end, unto the extremity of the torture; he confessed, that he had been set on by *Thrafo*; whom he impeached of the treason, together with many more, that were near in love or place unto *Hieronimus*. All these therefore were put to death, being innocent of the crime wherewith they were charged. But they that were indeed the conspirators, walked boldly in the streets, and never shrunk for the matter: assuring themselves, that the resolution of *Theodorus* would yield to no extremity. Thus they all escaped, and soon after found means to execute their purpose. The king himself, when *Thrafo* was taken out of the way, quickly resolved upon siding with the *Carthaginians*; whereto he was very inclinable before. Young men, when first they grow masters of themselves, love to seem wiser than their fathers, by taking different courses. And the liberality of *Hiero* to the *Romans*, in their great necessity, had of late been such, as might have been termed excessive, were it not in regard of his providence, wherein he took order for his own estate, that depended upon theirs. But the young nephew, taking little heed of dangers far off, regarded only the things present; the weakness of

Rome; the prevalent fortunes of *Carthage*; and the much money that his grandfather had laid out in vain, to shoulder up a falling house. Wherefore he dealt with *Hannibal*, who readily entered into good correspondence with him; that was maintained by *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, *Carthaginians* born, but grand-children of a banished *Syracusan*. These grew into such favour with *Hieronymus*, that they drew him whither they listed. So that when *Appius Claudius*, the *Roman* pretor, hearing what was towards, made a motion of renewing the confederacy between the people of *Rome* and the king of *Syracuse*, his messengers were dismissed with an open scoff. For *Hieronymus* would needs have them tell him the order of the fight at *Cannæ*, that he might thereby learn how to accommodate himself: saying, that he could hardly believe the *Carthaginians*; so wonderful was the victory, as they reported it. Having thus dismissed the *Romans*, he sent ambassadors to *Carthage*, where he concluded a league: with condition, at first, that a great part of the island should be annexed to his dominion; but afterwards, that he should reign over all *Sicily*, and the *Carthaginians* rest satisfied with what they could get in *Italy*. At these doings *Ap. Claudius* did not greatly stir; partly for the indignities that were offered; partly for that it behoved not the *Romans* to entertain more quarrels than were enforced upon them by necessity; and partly (as may seem) for that the reputation both of himself, and of his city, had received such blemish by that which happened unto him in his journey, as much discountenanced him when he came into *Sicily*, and forbade him to look big. The money that *Hiero* had bestowed formerly upon the *Romans*, wherewith to relieve them in their necessity, this *Appius* was to carry back unto him; it being refused by the *Roman* senate with greater bravery than their present fortune would allow. But instead of returning the money with thanks, as he had been directed, and as it had been noised abroad that he should do; the war against *Philip*, king of *Macedon* (whereof we have spoken before) compelled the *Romans* to lay aside their vain-glory, and send word after him, that he should consign that money over to *Marcus Valerius*; of whose voyage into *Greece*, the city had not otherwise wherewith to bear the charge. This was done accordingly, and hereby *Claudius* (which name, in the whole continuance of that family, is taxed with pride) his errand was changed, from a glorious ostentation of the *Roman* magnanimity, into such a pitiful tune of thanksgiving, as must needs have bred sorrow and commiseration, in so true a friend as *Hiero*; or, if it were delivered after his death, matter of pastime and scorn, in *Hieronymus*, the new king.

But whilst *Hieronymus* was more desirous of war, than well resolved how to begin it; his own death changed the form of things, and bred a great innovation in the state of *Syracuse*, which thereby might have prospered more than ever, had it been wisely governed. *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, of whom we spoke before, were sent about the country with two thousand men, to solicit the towns, and perswade them to shake off their obedience to the *Romans*. The king himself, with an army of fifteen thousand horse and foot, went to *Leontium*, a city of his own dominion, hoping that the fame of his preparation would make the whole island fall to him in all haste, and accept him for sovereign. There the conspirators took him on the sudden, as he was passing through a narrow street; and, rushing between him and his guard, struck him dead. Forthwith liberty was proclaimed, and the sound of that word so joyfully answered by the *Leontines*, that the guard

of *Hieronymus* had little courage to revenge their master's death. Yet for fear of the worst, a great largess was promised unto the soldiers, with rewards unto their captains; which wrought so effectually, that when many wicked acts of the murdered king were reckoned up, the army, as in detestation of his bad life, suffered his carcase to lie unburied. These news ran quickly to *Syracuse*, whither some of the conspirators, taking also of the king's horses, posted away, to signify all that had passed, to stir up the people to liberty, and to prevent *Andronodorus*, if he or his fellows would make offer to usurp a tyranny. The *Syracusans* hereupon presently took arms, and made themselves masters of their own city. *Andronodorus*, on the other side, fortified the palace and the island; being yet uncertain what to do, between desire of making himself a sovereign lord, and fear of suffering punishment as a tyrant, if his enterprize miscarried. His wife *Demarata*, that was the daughter of *Hiero*, cherished him in his hopes, putting him in mind of that well-known proverb which *Dionysius* had used; *That a tyrant should keep his place, till he were haled out of it by the heels, and not ride away from it on horse-back*. But fear, and better counsel prevailed so far, that *Andronodorus*, having slept upon the matter, dissembled his affections, and deferred his hope unto better opportunity. The next day he came forth, and made a speech unto the people, telling them, that he was glad to see how prudently they behaved themselves in so great a change; that he had stood in fear, lest they would not have contained themselves within bounds of discretion, but rather have sought to murder all, without difference, that any-way belonged to the tyrant; and that since he beheld their orderly proceeding, and their care not to ravish their liberty perforce, but to wed it unto them for ever; he was willingly come to them forth of his strength, and surrendered up the charge committed unto him, by one that had been an evil master both to him and them. Hereupon great joy was made, and pretors chosen (as in former times) to govern the city; of which *Andronodorus* was one, and the chief. But such was his desire of sovereignty, and so vehement were the instigations of his wife, that shortly he began to practise with *Hippocrates*, *Epicides*, and other captains of the mercenaries; hoping to make himself strong by their help, that were least pleased with the change. *Hippocrates* and *Epicides* had been with the *Syracusan* pretors, and told them, that, being sent from *Hannibal* to *Hieronymus*, they, according to instructions of their captain, had done him, whilst he lived, what service they could; and that now they were desirous to return home. They requested therefore that they might be friendly dismissed, and with a convoy, that might keep them from falling into the hands of the *Romans*, and set them safe at *Locri*. This was easily granted, both for that the *Syracusan* magistrates were well contented to earn thanks of *Hannibal* with such a little courtesy; and for that they thought it expedient to rid their town quickly of this troublesome couple, which were good soldiers, and gracious with the army, but otherwise lewd men. It was not the desire of these two *Sicilians* to be gone so hastily as they made shew; they were more mindful of the business for which *Hannibal* had sent them. Wherefore they insinuated themselves into the bosoms of such as were most likely to fill the army with tumult, especially of the *Roman* fugitives, and those that had cause to mistrust what should become of themselves, when the *Romans* and *Syracusans* were come to agreement. Such instruments as these *Andronodorus* had great need of; as also of many other, to help him in his dangerous attempt.

attempt. He found *Themistius*, that had married *Harmonia*, the sister of *Hieronymus*, ready to take his part; as being carried with the like passions of his own, and of his wife. But in seeking to increase the number of his adherents, he revealed the matter to one, that revealed all to the rest of the pretors. Hereupon it followed, that he and *Themistius* entering into the senate, were slain out of hand; and afterwards accused to the people of all the evil which they had done whilst *Hieronymus* lived, as by his authority; and now since attempted, in seeking to usurp the tyranny themselves. It was also declared, that the daughters of *Hiero* and *Gelo* were accessory to this dangerous treason; and that the unquiet spirits of these women would never cease to work, until they had recovered those royal ornaments, and sovereign power, whereof their family was now dispossessed. These daughters therefore of *Hiero* and *Gelo* were also condemned to die, and executioners presently sent by the enraged people to take away their lives. *Demarata* and *Harmonia* had perhaps deserved this heavy sentence; but *Heraclea*, the daughter of *Hiero*, and wife of *Sosippus*, being altogether innocent, was murdered, together with her two young daughters, in the hasty execution of this rash judgment. Her husband *Sosippus*, was a lover of the common-wealth, and in that respect so hated by *Hieronymus*, that being sent ambassador to king *Ptolemy*, &c. he durst not return home, but stayed in *Egypt*, as a banished man. This consideration, when it was too late, together with some pitiful accidents accompanying the slaughter, so affected the multitude, that (pardoning themselves) all cried out upon the authors of so foul a butchery. Being thus incensed against the senate, and knowing not otherwise how to satisfy their anger, they called for an election of new pretors, in the room of *Andronodorus* and *Themistius*, that were lately slain; meaning to substitute such in their places, as the senators should have little cause to like. At the election were present a great rout, not only of the poorer citizens, but of soldiers that pressed into the throng. One of these named *Epicides* pretor; another named *Hippocrates*: and the less that the old pretors and senators approved this nomination, the more eager was the multitude; and, by a general cry, forced them to be accepted. These, being made pretors, did what they could to hinder the agreement that was in hand between the *Syracusians* and the *Romans*. But having striven in vain, and seeing that the people stood in fear of *Ap. Claudius*, and of *Marcellus*, that was lately come into *Sicily*, they gave way unto the time, and suffered the old league of *Hiero* to be re-confirmed; which afterwards they purposed to dissolve by practice. The *Leontines* had some need of a garrison, and to them was sent *Hippocrates* the pretor, attended by such fugitives and mercenary soldiers as were most burdensome to *Syracuse*. Thither when he came, he began to do many acts of hostility against the *Romans*: first in secret, afterwards more openly and boldly. *Marcellus*, rightly understanding the purpose of these two brethren, sent word unto the *Syracusians*, that they had already broken the league; and that the peace would never be kept sincerely, until this turbulent pair of brethren were expelled the island. *Epicides*, fearing to bear the blame of his brother's proceedings, and more desirous to set forward the war, than to excuse any breach of peace, went himself unto the *Leontines*, whom he persuaded to rebel against the *Syracusians*. For he said, that since they had all of late served one master, there was little reason why the *Leontines* should not be enfranchised by his death, as well as the *Syracu-*

sians; yea, or much rather, all things considered; since in their streets the tyrant was slain, and liberty first proclaimed. Wherefore, since they of *Syracuse* were not contented to enjoy the freedom purchased among the *Leontines*, but thought it good reason that they should bear dominion over those that had broken the chain, wherewith the one and the other were bound; his advice was, that such their arrogance should be checked betimes, ere it could get any colour of right by prescription. Hereunto occasion was given by one article of the league made of late by the *Romans* and *Syracusians*. For it was agreed, That all which had been subject to *Hiero* and *Hieronymus*, should henceforth be vassals unto the state of *Syracuse*. Against this article, if the *Leontines* would take exception, and thereby challenge their own due; *Epicides* told them, that in this novelty of change, they had fit opportunity to recover the freedom which their fathers had lost not many ages before. Neither was it unreasonable which this crafty *Carthaginian* propounded, if the *Leontines* had been subdued by the same hand which took liberty from the *Syracusians*. But seeing they had long since yielded unto *Syracuse*, and been subject unto that city, by what form soever it was governed, this claim of liberty was rather seasonable than just. Nevertheless, the motion of *Epicides* was highly approved; insomuch that when messengers came soon after from *Syracuse*, to rebuke the *Leontines* for that which they had done against the *Romans*, and to denounce unto *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, that they should get them gone either to *Locri*, or whither else they listed, so that they stayed not in *Sicily*; word was returned, that they of *Leontium* had not requested the *Syracusians* to make any bargains for them with the *Romans*, nor thought themselves bound to observe the covenants, which others, without warrant, had made in their names. This peremptory answer was forthwith reported unto *Marcellus* by the *Syracusians*, who offered him their assistance in doing justice upon the *Leontines*, their rebels; with condition that when the town was taken, it might be theirs again. *Marcellus* required no better satisfaction, but forthwith took the business in hand, which he dispatched in one day. At the first assault, *Leontium* was taken: all, save the castle, whereinto *Hippocrates* and *Epicides* fled; and, stealing thence away by night, conveyed themselves into the town of *Herbesus*. The first thing that *Marcellus* did, when he had won the town, was the same which other *Roman* captains used after victory; to seek out the fugitive *Roman* slaves and renegadoes, whom he caused all to die: the rest, both of the townsmen and soldiers, he took to mercy; forbearing also to strip or spoil them. But the fame of his doings was bruited after a contrary sort. It was said, that he had slain man, woman and child, and put the town to sack. These news met the *Syracusan* army upon the way, as it was going to join with *Marcellus*, who had ended his business before. About eight thousand mercenaries there were that had been sent out of *Syracuse*, under *Sosis* and *Dinomenes*, two of the pretors, to serve against the *Leontines*, and other rebels. These captains were honest men, and well affected to their country; but the soldiers that followed them, had those diseases with which all mercenaries are commonly infected. They took the matter deeply to heart, that their fellow-soldiers (as now they termed those against whom they went) had been so cruelly butchered; and hereupon they fell to mutiny, though what to demand, or with whom to be angry, they could not tell. The pretors therefore thought it best to turn their unquiet thoughts another way, and

and set them at work in some place else; forasmuch as at *Leontium* there was no need of their service. So toward *Herbesus* they marched, where lay *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, the architects of all this mischief, devising what further harm they might do; but now so weakly accompanied, that they seemed unable to escape the punishments belonging to their offences pass'd. Hereof the two brethren were no less well aware, and therefore adventured upon a remedy little less desperate than their present case. They issued out of *Herbesus* unarmed, with olive-branches in their hands, in manner of supplicants, and so presented themselves to the army. Six hundred men of *Crete* were in the vanguard, that had been well used by *Hieronymus*; and some of them greatly bound unto *Hannibal*, who had taken them prisoners in the *Italian* war, and lovingly dismissed them. These *Crétans* therefore welcomed the two brethren, and bade them be of good cheer; saying, that no man should do them harm as long as they could use their weapons. Herewithal the army was at a stand, and the rumour of this accident ran swiftly from man to man, with general approbation. The pretors thought to help the matter by severity, which would not serve. For when they commanded these two traitors to be laid in irons, the exclamation was so violent against them, that fain they were to let all alone, and return, uncertain what course to take, unto *Megara*, where they were lodged the night before. Thither when they came, *Hippocrates* devised a trick, whereby to help himself, and better the uncertain case wherein he stood. He caused letters of his own penning to be intercepted by some of his most trusty *Crétans*; directed (as they made shew) from the *Syracusan* pretors to *Marcellus*. The contents hereof were, that *Marcellus* had well done in committing all to the sword among the *Leontines*; but that it farther behoved him to make the like dispatch of all the mercenaries belonging to *Syracuse*, which were offensive, all of them in general, to the liberty of the city, and the peace with *Rome*. When this counterfeit epistle was openly rehearsed, the uproar was such, that *Sofis* and his fellow-pretor were glad to forsake the camp, and fly for their lives. All the *Syracusians* remaining behind, had been cut in pieces by the enraged soldiers, if the two artificers of the sedition had not saved their lives, rather to keep them as pledges, and by them, to win their friends within the town, than for any good-will. They perswaded also a mischievous knave, that had served among the *Leontines*, to justify the bruit of *Marcellus's* cruelty; and to carry home the news to *Syracuse*, as an eye-witness. This incensed not only the multitude, but some of the senate, and filled the whole town with causeless indignation. In good time (said some) was the avarice and cruelty of the *Romans* detected; who, had they in like sort gotten into *Syracuse*, would have dealt much worse, where their greedy appetites might have been tempted with a far greater booty. Whilst they were thus discoursing and devising how to keep out the wicked *Romans*, *Hippocrates*, with his army, came to the gates, exhorting the citizens to let him in, unless for want of help, they would be betrayed to their enemies. The pretors, with the best and wisest of the senate, would fain have kept him out; but the violence of the soldiers to force a gate, was no whit greater than the head-strong fury of those within the town, that laboured to break it open. So he entered, and immediately fell upon the pretors, whom (being forsaken by all men) he put to the sword, and made slaughter of them and their followers until night. The next day he went openly to work;

and, after the common example of tyrants, gave liberty to all slaves and prisoners; and being fortified with adherents of the worst and basest sort, made himself and his brother pretors, in title, but in effect, lords of *Syracuse*.

When *Marcellus* was advertised of this great alteration, he thought it no time for him to sit still, and attend the further issue. He sent ambassadors to *Syracuse*, that were not admitted into the haven, but chased out as enemies. Then drew he near with his army, and lodging within a mile and an half of the town, sent before him some to require a parley. These were entertained without the walls by the two new pretors, to whom they declared, that the *Romans* were come thither, not with purpose to do hurt, but in favour of the *Syracusians*, which were oppressed by tyrants; and to punish those that had murdered and banished so many of the principal citizens. Wherefore they required, that those worthy men, their confederates, which were chased out of the town, might be suffered to return, and enjoy their own; as also that the authors of the great slaughter lately committed, might be delivered up. Hereto *Epicides* briefly answered, that if their errand had been to him, he could have told what to say to them: but since it was directed unto others, they should do well to return, when those, to whom they were sent, had the government in their hands. As for the war which they threatened, he told them, they should find by experience, that to besiege *Syracuse*, was another manner of work than to take *Leontium*. Thus he sent them gone, and returned back into the city. Immediately began the siege, which endured longer than the *Romans* had expected. The quick and easy winning of *Leontium*, did put *Marcellus* in hope, that so long a circuit of walls as compassed *Syracuse*, being manned with no better kind of soldiers than those with whom he had lately dealt, would, in some part or other, be taken at the first assault. Wherefore he omitted no violence or terror in the very beginning, but did his best both by land and sea. Nevertheless, all his labour was disappointed, and his hope of prevailing by open force taken from him, by the ill success of two or three of the first assaults. Yet was it not the virtue of the defendants, or any strength of the city, that bred such despair of hasty victory. But there lived at that time in *Syracuse*, *Archimedes* the noble mathematician, who, at the request of *Hiero* the late king, that was his kinsman, had framed such engines of war, as being in this extremity put in use, did more mischief to the *Romans* than could have been wrought by the cannon, or any instruments of gun-powder, had they in that age been known. This *Archimedes*, discoursing once with *Hiero*, maintained, that it were possible to remove the whole earth out of the place wherein it is, if there were some other earth, or place of sure footing, whereon a man might stand. For proof of this bold assertion, he performed some strange works, which made the king intreat him to convert his study unto things of use, that might preserve the city from danger of enemies. To such mechanical works *Archimedes*, and the philosophers of those times, had little affection. They held it an injury done unto the liberal sciences, to submit learned propositions unto the workmanship and gain of base handicraftsmen. And of this opinion *Plato* was an author, who greatly blamed some geometricians, that seemed unto him to profane their science, by making it vulgar. Neither must we rashly task a man so wise as *Plato*, with the imputation of supercilious austerity, or affected singularity in his reprehension. For it hath been the unhappy fate of great inventions,

tions, to be vilified as idle fancies, or dreams, before they were published; and being once made known, to be under-valued, as falling within compass of the meanest wit, and things, that every one could well have performed. Hereof (to omit that memorable example of *Columbus's* discovery, with the much different sorts of neglect which he underwent before and after it) in a familiar and most homely example, we may see most apparent proof. He that looks upon our *English* brewers, and their servants, that are daily exercised in the trade, will think it ridiculous to hear one say, that the making of malt was an invention proceeding from some of an extraordinary knowledge in natural philosophy. Yet is not the skill of the inventors any whit the less, for that the labour of workmanship grows to be the trade of ignorant men. The like may be said of many handicrafts, and particularly in the printing of books, which being devised and bettered by great scholars and wise men, grew afterwards corrupted by those to whom the practice fell; that is, by such as could slubber things easily over, and feed their workmen at the cheapest rate. In this respect therefore, the alchymists, and all others, that have, or would seem to have, any secret skill, whereof the publication might do good unto mankind, are not without excuse of their close concealing. For it is a kind of injustice, that the long travels of an understanding brain, beside the loss of time, and other expence, should be cast away upon men of no worth, or yield less benefit unto the author of so great a work, than to meer strangers; and perhaps his enemies. And surely, if the passion of envy have in it any thing allowable and natural, as having anger, fear, and other the like affections; it is in some such case as this, and serveth against those which would usurp the knowledge wherewith God hath denied to endue them. Nevertheless, if we have regard unto common charity, and the great affection that every one ought to bear to the generality of mankind, after the example of him *that suffereth his sun to shine upon the just and unjust*; it will appear more commendable in wise men to enlarge themselves, and to publish unto the world those good things that lie buried in their own bosoms. This ought specially to be done, when a profitable knowledge hath not annexed to it some dangerous cunning, that may be perverted by evil men to a mischievous use. For if the secret of any rare antidote contained in it the skill of giving some deadly and irrecoverable poison, much better it were that such a jewel remain close in the hands of a wise and honest man, than being made common, bind all men to use the remedy, by teaching the worst men how to do mischief. But the works, which *Archimedes* published, were such as tended to very commendable ends. They were engines, serving unto the defence of *Syracuse*; not fit for the *Syracusians* to carry abroad, to the hurt and oppression of others. Neither did he altogether publish the knowledge how to use them; but reserved so much to his own direction, that after his death more of the same kind were not made, nor those of his own making were employed by the *Romans*. It sufficed unto this worthy man, that he had approved even unto the vulgar the dignity of his science, and done especial benefit unto his country: for to enrich a mechanical trade, or teach the art of murdering men, it was besides his purpose.

Marcellus had caused certain of his *Quinquoreme* galleys to be fastened together, and towers erected on them, to beat the defendants from the wall. Against these *Archimedes* had sundry devices, of

which any one fort might have repelled the assailants; but all of them together shewed the multiplicity of his great wit. He shot heavy stones, and long pieces of timber, like unto the yards of ships, which brake some of the galleys by their force and weight. These afflicted such as lay far off. They that were come nearer the walls, lay open to a continual volley of shot, which they could not endure. Some with an iron grapple were taken by the prow, and hoisted up, shaking out all the men, and afterwards falling down into the water. Some by strange engines were lifted up into the air, where turning round a-while, they were broken against the walls, or cast upon the rocks; and all of them were so beaten, that they durst never come to any second assault. In the like sort was the land-army handled, stones and timber falling upon it like hail, did not only overwhelm the men, but broke down the *Roman* engines of battery, and forced *Marcellus* to give over the assault. For remedy hereof it was conceived, that if the *Romans* could early, before day, get near unto the walls, they should be (as it were) under the *point-blanc*, and receive no hurt by these terrible instruments, which were wound up hard, to shoot a great compass. But this vain hope cost many of the assailants lives, for the shot came down-right upon them; and, beating them from all parts of the wall, made a great slaughter of them all the way as they fled (for they were unable to stay by it) even till they were gotten very far off. This did so terrify the *Romans*, that if they perceived any piece of timber, or a rope's end, upon the walls, they ran away, crying out, that *Archimedes's* engines were ready to discharge. Neither knew *Marcellus* how to overcome these difficulties, or to take away from his men that fear, against the cause whereof he knew no remedy. If the engines had stood upon the wall, subject to firing, or any such annoyance from without, he might have holpen it by some device to make them unserviceable. But all, or most of them, were out of sight, being erected in the streets behind the walls, where *Archimedes* gave directions how to use them. Wherefore the *Roman* had none other way left, than to cut off from the town all provision of victuals both by land and by sea. This was a very desperate piece of work: for the enemies having so goodly an haven, the sea in a manner free, and the *Carthaginians*, that were strong by sea, willing to supply them, were not likely so soon to be consumed with famine, as the besiegers to be wearied out, by lying in leaguer before so strong a city, having no probability to carry it. Yet, for want of better counsel to follow, this was thought the best and most honourable course.

In the mean while *Himilco*, admiral of a *Carthaginian* fleet, that had waited long about *Sicily*, being by *Hippocrates* advertised of these passages, went home to *Carthage*; and there so dealt with the senate, that twenty-five thousand foot, three thousand horse, and twelve elephants, were committed unto his charge, wherewith to make war upon the *Romans* in *Sicily* by land. He took many towns, and many, that had anciently belonged unto the *Carthaginians*, did yield unto him. To remedy this mischief, and to stay the inclination of men, which following the current of fortune, began to turn unto the *Carthaginians*, *Marcellus*, with a great part of his army, rose from *Syracuse*, and went from place to place about the island. He took *Pelorus* and *Herbesus*, which yielded unto him. He took also *Megara* by force, and sacked it, either to terrify others that were obstinate, especially the *Syracusians*; or else because *Rome* was at this time poor, and his army must have somewhat to keep it in heart. His
especial

especial desire was to have saved *Agrigentum*: whether he came too late; for *Himilco* had gotten it before. Therefore he returned back toward *Syracuse*; carefully, and in as good order as he could, for fear of the *Carthaginian*, that was too strong for him. The circumspection that he used, in regard of *Himilco*, stood him in good stead, against a danger that he had not mistrusted. For *Hippocrates*, leaving the charge of *Syracuse* unto his brother, had lately issued out of the city, with ten thousand foot; and five hundred horse; intending to join his forces with *Himilco*. *Marcellus* fell upon him, ere either were aware of the other: and the *Romans*, being in good order, got an easy victory against the dispersed, and half-unarmed *Syracusians*. The reputation hereof helped a little to keep the *Sicilians* from rebellion. Yet it was not long, ere *Himilco*, joining with *Hippocrates*, ran over all the island at his pleasure; and presented battel to *Marcellus*, even at his trenches; but the *Roman* wisely refused it. *Bomilcar* also, a *Carthaginian*, entred with a great fleet into the haven of *Syracuse*, and victualled the city. After this, the disposition of the islanders changed so again, that although another legion was come from *Rome*, which escaped from *Himilco*, and safely arrived at *Marcellus's* camp: yet many places revolted unto the *Carthaginians*; and slew or betrayed the *Roman* garrisons.

In the midst of these troubles, winter enforced both parts to take breath a while: and *Marcellus* leaving some of his army before *Syracuse*, that he might not seem to have given over the siege, went unto *Leontium*; where he lay intente to all occasions. In the beginning of the spring, he stood in doubt, whether it were better to continue the laborious work of besieging *Syracuse*; or to turn all his forces to *Agrigentum*, against *Himilco* and *Hippocrates*. But it would greatly have impaired his reputation, if he had gone from *Syracuse*, as unable to prevail: and he himself was of an eager disposition, ever unwilling to give ground, or to quit, as not feasible, an enterprise, that he had once taken in hand. He came therefore to *Syracuse*: where, though he found all the difficulties remaining as before, and no likelihood to take the city by force or famine; yet was he not without hope, that continuance of time would bring forth somewhat, which might fulfil his desire. Especially he assayed to prevail by treason; against which no place can hold out. And to this end, he dealt with the *Syracusan* gentlemen that were in his camp; exhorting them to practise with their friends that remained in the city. This was not easy for them to do; because the town would hearken to no parley. At length a slave unto one of these banished men, making shew to run away from his master, got into *Syracuse*; where he talked in private with some few, as he had been instructed. Thus began *Marcellus* to have intelligence within the city: whence the conspirators used to send him advertisement of their proceedings, by a fisher-boat that passed forth in the night. But when they were grown to the number of fourscore, and thought themselves able to effect somewhat of importance: all was discovered; and they, like traitors, put to death. In the mean while, one *Damasippus*, a *Lacedemonian*, that had been sent out of the town, as an ambassador to *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, was fallen into the hands of *Marcellus*. *Epicides* was very desirous to ransom him: and many meetings were appointed for that purpose, not far from the walls. There one of the *Romans* looking upon the wall, and wanting the more compendious art of

geometry, fell to numbring the stones: and, making an estimate of the height, judged it less than it had been formerly deemed. Herewith he acquainted *Marcellus*: who causing better notice to be taken of the place, and finding that ladders of no extraordinary length would reach it; made all things ready, and waited a convenient time. It was the weakest part of the town, and therefore the most strongly guarded: neither was there hope to prevail by force against *Archimedes*, if they failed to take it by surprise. But a fugitive out of the town brought word, that a great feast was to be held unto *Diana*, which was to last three days: and that, because other good cheer was not so plentiful within the city, as in former times, *Epicides*, to gratify the people, had made the more large distribution of wine. A better opportunity could not be wished. Wherefore *Marcellus*, in the dead of the festival night, came unto the walls; which he took by *Scaludo*. *Syracuse* was divided into four parts (or five, if *Epipolæ* were reckoned as one) each of which was fortified as distinct cities. When therefore *Marcellus* had gotten some pieces, he had the commodity of a better and safe lodging, with good store of booty; and better opportunity than before, to deal with the rest. For there were now a great many, as well of those in *Acradina*, and the island, inner parts of the town, as of those that were already in the hands of *Marcellus*, that began to hearken unto composition; as being much terrified by the loss of those parts, which the *Romans* had taken and sack'd. As for the weapons of *Archimedes*, little harm, or none, they did unto those that were sheltred under strong houses: although it may seem, that the inner walls, were not altogether unfurnished of his help; since they held out a good while, and were not taken by force. The *Roman* fugitives, and renegadoes, were more careful than ever to defend the rest of the city; being sure to be rewarded with a cruel death, if *Marcellus* could prevail. *Hippocrates* and *Himilco*, were daily expected; and *Bomilcar* was sent away to *Carthage*, to bring help from thence. It was not long ere *Hippocrates* and *Himilco* came: who fell upon the old camp of the *Romans*, whilst *Epicides* sallied out of *Acradina* upon *Marcellus*. But the *Romans* made such defence in each part, that the assailants were repelled. Nevertheless, they continued to beset *Marcellus*: whom they held in a manner as streightly besieged, as he himself did besiege the town. But the pestilence at length consumed, together with the two captains, a great part of the army, and caused the rest to dislodge. The *Romans* were (though somewhat less) afflicted with the same pestilence, insomuch that *Bomilcar* did put the city of *Carthage* in hope, that he might be taken where he lay, if any great forces were sent thither. This *Bomilcar* wanted no desire to do his country service: but his courage was not answerable to his good will. He arrived at *Pachynus* with a strong fleet: where he stayed; being loth to double the cape; for that the winds did better serve the enemy than him. Thither sailed *Epicides* out of *Syracuse*; to acquaint him with the necessities of the city, and to draw him on. With much intreaty, at length he came forwards; but meeting with the *Roman* fleet, that was ready for him, he stood off into the deep; and sailed away to *Tarentum*, bidding *Sicily* farewell. Then durst not *Epicides* return into *Syracuse*, but went to *Agrigentum*: where he expected the issue, with a very faint hope of hearing any good news.

The *Sicilian* soldiers, that remained alive of *Hippocrates's* army, lay as near as they could safely,

safely, unto *Marcellus*; and some of them, in a strong town three miles off. These had done what good they could to *Syracuse*, by doing what hurt they could unto the *Romans*. But when they were informed, that the state of *Sicily* was given as desperate by the *Carthaginians*: they sent ambassadors to treat of peace; and made offer to compound, both for themselves, and for the town: hereunto *Marcellus* willingly gave ear: for he had stayed there long enough; and had cause to fear, that after a little while, the *Carthaginians* might come thither strong again. He therefore agreed, both with the citizens, and with the soldiers that lay abroad; that they should be masters of their own, enjoying their liberty and proper laws; yet suffering the *Romans* to possess whatsoever had belonged unto the Kings. Hereupon they, to whom *Epicides* had left his charge, were put to death; new pretors chosen; and the gates even ready to be opened unto *Marcellus*: when suddenly the *Roman* fugitives disturbed all. These perceiving their own condition to be desperate, perswaded the other mercenary soldiers, that the citizens had bargained for themselves, and betrayed the army to the *Romans*. Wherefore they presently took arms, and fell upon the new chosen pretors; whom they slew, and made election of six captains that should command over all. But shortly it was found out, that there was no danger at all to the soldiers; excepting only the fugitives. The treaty therefore was again set on foot, and wanted little of conclusion; which yet was delayed, either by some fear of the citizens, that had seen (as they thought) proof of the *Roman* avarice in the sack of *Epipolæ*, *Tyche*, and *Neapolis*, the parts already taken; or by some desire of *Marcellus* to get the town by force, that he might use the liberty of a conqueror, and make it wholly subject unto *Rome*. *Mericus*, a *Spaniard*, was one of the six captains, that had been chosen in the last commotion: a man of such faith, as usually is found in mercenaries; holding his own particular benefit above all other respects. With this captain, *Marcellus* dealt secretly: having a fit instrument, of the same nation, one *Belligenes*; that went in company with the *Roman* ambassadors, daily passing to and fro. This crafty agent perswaded *Mericus*, that the *Romans* had already gotten all *Spain*: and that if ever he purposed to make his own fortune good, either at home in *Spain*, or any-where else; it was now the only time to do it; by conforming himself to the will of the *Roman* general. By such hopes the *Spanish* captain was easily won: and sent forth his own brother among the *Syracusan* ambassadors, to ratify the covenant with *Marcellus*.

This under-hand dealing of *Marcellus* against the *Syracusians*, cannot well be commended as honest: neither was it afterwards thoroughly approved at his coming to *Rome*. For the benefits of *Hiero* to the *Romans* had been such, as deserved not to be requited with the ruin of his country: much less, that the miseries of his people, oppressed (though partly through their own folly) by an army of mercenaries, should minister unto the people of *Rome*, advantage against them. The poor citizens could not make good their parts against the hired soldiers; and therefore were fain to yield unto the time, and obey those ministers of *Hannibal*, that ruled the army. But as long as they were free after the death of *Hieronimus*; and now of late, when they had gathered courage by the flight of *Epicides*: it had been their chief care to maintain amity with the people of *Rome*. They had lately slain many the principal of *Epicides*'s followers; and many of

themselves had also been slain, both lately and in former times, because of this their desire unto the peace. What though it were true, that the rascality, and some ill advised persons, joined with the soldiers in hatred of the *Romans*, by occasion of the slaughter which they heard to be done at *Leontium*, and afterwards beheld in those parts of their own city which was taken? Ought therefore the *Roman* general, in a treaty of peace held with the *Syracusians*, to make a bargain under-hand against them, with a captain of the mercenaries? These things were objected against *Marcellus*, at his return home. But the senators thought it a great deal better, to comfort the *Syracusians* with gentle words, and promises of good usage in time to come; than to restore the booty, and give over the dominion of a city, so great, wealthy, strong, and many ways important. Nevertheless, if we consider the many inconveniencies and great mischiefs, whereunto *Syracuse* was obnoxious, both by evil neighbours, and by that very form of polity, after which it was governed: we may truly affirm, that it received no small benefit, by becoming subject unto *Rome*. For thereby it was not only assured against all foreign enemies, domestical conspiracies, and such tyrants as of old had reigned therein: but freed from the necessity of banishing, or murdering the most worthy citizens; as also from all factions, intestine seditions, and a thousand the like miseries, that were wont to grow out of the jealousy, wherein they held their liberty in vain. Neither enjoyed that city, from her first foundation, any such long time of happiness, as that wherein it flourished, when it rested secure under the protection of *Rome*; and was no more molested by the disease of ambition; whereof by *Marcellus*'s victory it was thoroughly cured. But such benefit, arising from wrongs done, serves not to make injustice the more excusable; unless we should approve the answer of that thief, who being found to have stolen a silver cup from a sick man, said, *He never leaves drinking*.

By the treason of *Mericus*, the *Roman* army was let into possession of all *Syracuse*: wherein the booty that it found, was said to have been no less, than could have been hoped for, if they had taken *Carthage* it self; that maintained war by land and sea against them. All the goodly works and imageries, wherewith *Syracuse* was marvellously adorned, were carried away to *Rome*; and nothing left untouched, save only the houses of those banished men, that had escaped from *Hippocrates* and *Epicides*, into the *Roman* camp. Among other pitiful accidents, the death of *Archimedes*, was greatly lamented, even by *Marcellus* himself. He was so busy about his geometry, in drawing figures, that he hearkened not to the noise and uproar in the city; no, nor greatly attended the rude soldier that was about to kill him. *Marcellus* took heavily the death of him; and caused his body to be honourably buried. Upon his tomb (as he had ordained in his life-time) was placed a cylinder and sphere, with an inscription of the proportion between them; which he first found out. An invention of so little use, as this may seem, pleased that great artist better, than the devising of all those engines, that made him so famous. Such difference is between the judgment of learned men, and of the vulgar sort. For many a one would think the money lost, that had been spent upon a son, whose studies in the university had brought forth such fruit, as the proportion between the sphere and a cylinder.

After the taking of *Syracuse*, all the towns in *Sicily* yielded unto the *Romans*; except *Agigentum*, and

and a few places thereabout. At *Agrigentum* lay *Epicides*, with one *Hanno*, a *Carthaginian*, and *Mutines*, an *African*, that was lately sent from *Hannibal*. This *Mutines*, by many good pieces of service, had added some credit to the beaten *Carthaginian* side; and withal made his own name great. By his persuasions, *Hanno* and *Epicides* adventured to meet *Marcellus* without the town; and not behave themselves as men expecting to be besieged. Neither was he more valiant in counsel; than in execution. Once and again he set upon the *Roman*, where they lay encamped; and drove them fearfully into their trenches. This bred envy in *Epicides* and *Hanno*: especially in *Hanno*, that having been lately sent from *Carthage*, with commission and authority from the state, thought himself wronged greatly by *Hannibal*; in that he had sent unto him this *Mutines*, to be his companion, and to take upon him, like as good a man as himself. The indignity seemed the greater, when *Mutines* being to step aside unto *Heraclea*, for the pacifying of some troubles there among the *Numidians*, advised (as directing *Hanno* and *Epicides*) not to meddle with the enemy, until his return. So much therefore the rather would *Hanno* fight: and offered battel unto *Marcellus*, before he sought it. It is like, that a great part of the *Roman* army was left behind in *Syracuse*, as need required: which made the *Carthaginians* the better able to deal with those that came against them. But whatsoever disproportion was between the two armies; far greater were the odds between the captains. For howsoever the people of *Carthage* would give authority by favour; yet could they not give worth, and ability, in matter of war. The *Numidians*, having before conceived some displeasure against their captains: and being therefore some of them gone away to *Heraclea*; were much more offended, when they saw that the vain-glorious envy of *Hanno* carried him into the fight, upon a foolish desire to get victory, without the help of *Mutines*, their countryman. Wherefore they sent unto the *Roman* general, and bade him be confident: for that it was not their purpose to shew themselves his enemies that day; but only look on, and see the proud *Carthaginians* well beaten, by whom they had been misused. They made good their promise, and had their desire. For *Marcellus* finding likelihood of truth in their message, did so lustily set upon the enemies, that he brake them at the first charge; and with the slaughter of many thousands, drove them back into *Agrigentum*.

If *Hanno* could have been contented to follow the directions of one, that was a better man of war than himself, and not have hazarded a battel without need; the *Romans* would shortly have been reduced into terms of great difficulty in their *Sicilian* war. For *Marcellus* was shortly after to leave the province; and soon upon his departure, there landed in the island a supply of eight thousand foot, and three thousand *Numidian* horse, that were sent from *Carthage*. The same of this new army drew many of the *Sicilians* into rebellion. The *Roman* army, consisting (for the most part) of the legions of *Cannae*, took it very heinously, that no good service done, could bring them into the favour of the senate; but that, as banished men, they were sent far from home and not suffered to return back to *Rome* with their general. *Mutines* had pacified his countrymen the *Numidians*; and, like an honest man, did the best that he could for those whom he served, without contending against the foolish pride of *Hanno*. He recovered those inland towns that had rebelled: finding that there was a great altera-

tion; and a greater might have been, if the army lately overthrown had been intire. *M. Cornelius*, the *Roman* pretor, used all diligence, both to pacify his own men, and to hinder the *Carthaginians*. He recovered those inland towns that had rebelled: and though he could not hinder *Mutines* from overrunning all the country; yet he hindered the country from revolting unto *Mutines*. Above threescore towns, great and small, the *Carthaginians* held in *Sicily*: of which, *Agrigentum* was the principal; and far bigger than any of the rest. Thence issued *Mutines* as often as he pleased, in despite of the *Romans*: not only to the succour of his own adherents, but to the great waste of those that followed the contrary part. But *Hanno*, instead of being pleased with all these good services, was filled more and more with envy, against the man that performed them. He had (belike) received instructions from old *Hanno* at *Carthage*, not to suffer *Hannibal*, or any *Hannibalian*, to have share in the honour of these *Sicilian* wars: which were therefore perhaps the more diligently supplied; whilst *Italy* was neglected, that should have been regarded more than all the rest. Wherefore, to shew his authority, and that it was not in the power of *Hannibal*, to appoint unto him an assistant, or director: he took away from *Mutines* his charge, and gave it to his own son; thinking thereby to discountenance the man, and make him little esteemed, as one out of office, among his *Numidians*. But it fell out quite contrary: and this spiteful dealing occasioned the loss of whatsoever the *Carthaginians* held in *Sicily*. For the *Numidians* were so incensed by the indignity offered unto their countryman, being such a brave commander, that they offered him their service to requite the wrong, and were thenceforth absolutely at his own disposition. *M. Valerius Levinus*, the *Roman* consul, was newly come into the province, when this fell out: and with him did *Mutines* enter into intelligence. For he could no longer brook these indignities: but being neither a *Carthaginian*, nor favoured by those that bore all the sway in *Carthage*; he thought it the wisest way, to play the best of his own game, and forsake that city, which was likely to perish by the evil counsel that governed it. He did not therefore, as his countrymen had lately done, content himself to see his adversaries reap the bitter fruits of their own malicious over-weening: and to suffer that harm, in doing whereof he would not bear a part; but conspired against them, to deliver up *Agrigentum*, and to help to expel them utterly out of *Sicily*. The consul was glad of his friendship; and carefully followed his advertisements. Neither was there much cunning needful, to the performance of that which *Mutines* had undertaken. For he, with his *Numidians*, did forcibly seize upon a gate; whereat they let in some *Roman* companies, that lay near in a readiness for the purpose. *Hanno*, when first he heard the noise, thought it had been no worse matter, than some such tumult of the *Numidians*, as he had been well acquainted with of late. But when, making haste to pacify the trouble, he saw and heard the *Romans* intermixed among those discontented followers of *Mutines*, forthwith he betook himself to flight: and saving himself, with *Epicides*, in a small bark, set sail for *Africa*; leaving all his army and adherents in *Sicily*, to the mercy of the *Romans*, that henceforward continued masters of the whole island.

Levinus, the consul, having taken *Agrigentum*, did sharp execution of justice upon all the citizens. The principal of them he scourged with rods, and afterwards beheaded, as was the manner of the *Romans*:

mans : all the rest of them he sold for slaves, and confiscated their goods ; sending home to *Rome* the money that was raised of the booty. This was indeed a time, wherein *Rome* stood in no less necessity of gold than of steel : which may have been the reason, why *Levinus* dealt so cruelly with the *Agirgentines*. Nevertheless, the fame of such severity bred a terror among all the dependants of the *Carthaginians* ; so that in great haste they sought to make their peace. About forty towns yielded themselves quickly unto the *Romans* ; twenty were delivered up by treason ; and six only staid to be won by force. These things done, *Levinus* returned home to *Rome* ; carrying with him about four thousand men from *Agatirna* ; that were a company of out-laws, bankrupts, and banished men, accustomed to live by spoil of others, in these troublesome times. He bestowed them about *Rhegium* in *Italy*, where they might exercise their own occupation against the *Brutians*, a thievish kind of people, that were enemies unto those of *Rhegium*, and to the *Romans*. As for *Mutines*, he was well rewarded, and made citizen of *Rome* : where he lived in good account ; accompanying the two *Scipio's* in their journey against *Antiochus*, and therein doing (as it is said) very especial service. So by this enterprize of *Sicily*, the *Carthaginians* wasted much of their forces, that with greater profit might have been employed in *Italy* : leaving yet unto the *Romans*, in the end of this war, the entire possession of this island ; which they wanted when it began.

SECT. XVI.

How the war passed between the Romans and Hannibal in Italy, from the taking of Capua to the great victory at Metaurus.

SHORTLY after the winning of *Capua*, *Marcellus* came to *Rome* : where, for his good services done in the island of *Sicily*, he had granted unto him the honour of the lesser triumph, which was called *Ovation*. The greater triumph was denied him : because he had not finished the war, but was fain to leave his army behind him in the province. He staid not long in *Rome*, before he was again chosen consul, together with *M. Valerius Levinus*, who succeeded him in the government of *Sicily*, and was, at the time of his election, making war against king *Philip* in *Greece*. Great complaint was made against the consul *Marcellus*, by the *Syracusians*, for that which he had done unto them : they alledging their great friendship to the people of *Rome*, in the time of their late king *Hiero* ; and affirming, that their city did never willingly brake the alliance, excepting when it was oppressed by such tyrants, as were not greater enemies to *Rome*, than to all good men that lived in *Syracuse*. The consul, on the other side, reckoned up the labours and dangers whereunto they had put him : willing them to bemoan themselves to the *Carthaginians* that had holpen them in their necessity ; and not unto the *Romans*, whom they had kept out. Thus each part having some good matter to alledge, the senate made such an end of the controversy, as best agreed with the benefit of their own commonwealth : blaming the too much rigor of *Marcellus*, yet not restoring the booty that he had taken, nor making the *Syracusians* free from their subjection ; but comforting them, with gentle words, and hopeful promises, as hath been shewed before. The two new consuls, *Marcellus* and *Levinus*, were appointed to make war, as their lots should fall out ; the one in *Italy*, the other in *Sicily*. The isle of *Sicily* fell

unto *Marcellus*, which province he willingly changed with his colleague, to the end that the *Syracusians* (whose cause had not as yet been heard in the senate) might not seem hindred by fear, from uttering their grievances freely. Afterwards, when his business with them was dispatch'd, he gently undertook the patronage of them : which remained long in his family ; to the great benefit of the country in times following. So *Valerius*, the other consul, was sent into *Sicily*, whose doings there have been already rehearsed : but *Marcellus* was employed against *Hannibal*.

Before the consuls departed out of *Rome*, they were much troubled with pressing of soldiers to the war ; and most of all, with getting mariners for their navy. They were all of the poorer sort, that used to be employed in sea-service ; especially in rowing. These could not live without present wages : neither was there money enough in the treasury to give them pay. Wherefore it was ordained, that they should be set out at the expence of private men ; who in this necessity of the state, were driven to sustain all publick charges. Hereat the people murmured ; and were ready to fall into sedition, had not the consuls deferred the matter unto further consideration. The senate could ill tell, what to determine or do, in a case of such extremity. For manifest it was, that the multitude had already endured so much as well it could undergo ; and somewhat more than could with honesty have been imposed upon it. Nevertheless, it was impossible to maintain the war against the *Carthaginians*, or to keep the *Macedonian* out of *Italy*, without a strong fleet. Wherefore some were of opinion, that, since the common treasury was so empty, the people must be forced, by right or wrong, to take the burthen upon them. At last the consuls began to say, That no persuasions would be so effectual with the people, as good examples : and that if the senators would follow the consuls, like it was, that the people also would follow the senate. Wherefore they propounded, and it was immediately concluded, that every one of them should bring forth, and put into the treasury, all the money that he had ; and that no senator should keep any vessel of gold, or plate whatsoever, excepting one salt-seller, and a bowl, wherewith to make their offerings unto the gods : as also a ring for himself, with such other tokens of ingenuity for his wife and children, as every one did use, and those of as small value as might be. This advice of the consuls was not more thankfully accepted by the senate, than the ready performance thereof by the senate was highly applauded, and hastily followed by the gentlemen of *Rome*. Neither did the commonalty refuse to do that, which their betters had openly done before them. For since the publick necessity could no otherwise be holpen, every one was contented that his private estate should run the same fortune with the commonwealth, which if it suffered wrack, in vain could any particular man hope to enjoy the benefit of his proper substance. This magnanimity deserved well that greatness of empire, whereof it was the foundation.

Convenient order being thus taken for an army and fleet : *Marcellus* went forth of the city against *Hannibal* ; and *Levinus* towards *Sicily*. The army of *Hannibal* was greatly diminished, by long and hard service : neither did his *Carthaginians* seem to remember him, and think upon sending the promised supply, or any such proportion as he needed. His credit also among his *Italian* friends, was much weakened, by the loss of *Capua* : which gave them cause to look unto themselves ; as if in

his help there were little trust to be reposed, when they should stand in need. This he well perceived; yet could not tell how to remedy. Either he must thrust garrisons into all towns that he suspected, and thereby so diminish his army, that he should not be able to keep the field; or else he must leave them to their own fidelity; which now began to waver. At length his jealousy grew so outrageous, that he sacked, and wasted those places that he was unable to defend: thinking that the best way to enrich himself; and make unprofitable, to his enemies, the purchase from which he could not hinder them. But by this example, many were quite alienated from him; and some of those, whom before he had least cause to doubt. The town of *Salapia* yielded unto *Marcellus*: and betrayed unto him a gallant regiment of *Numidian* horse, the best of all that served under *Hannibal*; which was a greater loss than the town it self. *Blasius*, the author of this rebellion, could not bring his desire to effect, without getting the consent of one *Dasius*, that was his bitter enemy. Wherefore he brake the matter to this *Dasius* in private; and was by him accused unto *Hannibal*. But when he was convened, and charged of treason, he so stoutly denied it, and by way of recrimination, so vehemently pressed his accuser with the same fault; that *Hannibal* thought it a matter devised out of mere malice; knowing well what enemies they were; and seeing, that neither of them could bring any proof of what he affirmed. This notwithstanding, *Blasius* did not cease to press his adversary a-new, and urge him from time to time, with such lively reasons, that he who could not be believed by *Hannibal*, was contented at length to win the favour of *Marcellus*. Presently after this, the consul took by force, *Maronea* and *Mel'es*, towns of the *Samnites*: wherein he slew about three thousand of *Hannibal's* men.

Hannibal could not look to all at once: but was fain to catch advantages where he might get them; the *Romans* now being grown stronger in the field than he. The best was, that his *Carthaginians*, having wearied themselves with ill speed in many petty enterprises, and laid aside all this while the care of *Italy*, to follow business of far less importance; had now at length resolved to send presently the great supply, that had been so long promised and expected. This if they had done in better season, *Rome* it self might have been stricken down, the next year after that great blow received at *Canne*. But since that which is past cannot be amended; *Hannibal* must force himself to make a good countenance; and tell his followers, that this mighty succour would come time enough. For *Masimissa* was at *Carthage* with five thousand *Numidians*, ready to set sail for *Spain*: whither when he came, it was appointed, that *Asdrubal* should forthwith take his journey into *Italy*, of which there had been so long talk. These news did not more comfort *Hannibal* and his followers, than terrify the *Romans*. Wherefore each did their best: the *Romans*, to prevent the threatening mischief, and win as much as they could upon *Hannibal*, before the coming of his brother: *Hannibal*, on the contrary, to hold his own, and weaken the *Romans* as much as he was able. He had intelligence, that *Cn. Fulvius*, a *Roman* pretor, lay near unto *Herdonea*, to get the town by practice. It was not long, since, near unto the same place, another *Cn. Fulvius* had lost his army. Therefore *Hannibal* had made great marches thitherward; and came to *Herdonea* ere *Fulvius* had news of his approach. As soon as he came, he offered battel to the *Roman* pretor: who

accepted it with more haste than good speed. The *Roman* legions made good resistance a-while, till they were compassed round with the *Carthaginian* horse. Then fell they to rout, and great slaughter was made of them. *Fulvius* himself, with twelve tribunes or colonels, were lost: of the common soldiers that were slain, the number is uncertain; some reporting seven, others thirteen thousand. The town of *Herdonea*, because it was at point to have yielded unto *Fulvius*, *Hannibal* did set on fire; and, putting those to death that had practised with the enemy, carried away the multitude, whom he bestowed among the *Thurians* and *Metapontines*. The consul *Marcellus* hearing of this, wrote unto the senate, and exhorted them to be of a good cheer; for that he would shortly abate the enemy's pride. He followed the *Carthaginian* apace, and overtaking him at *Numistro*, in the country of the *Lucans*, fought with him a battel; which beginning at nine of the clock in the morning, lasted until night; and ended, by reason of the darkness, with uncertain victory. Afterwards *Hannibal* departed thence into *Apulia*, whither *Marcellus* followed him. At *Venusia* they met, and had many skirmishes, but none of importance. *Hannibal* removed often, and sought to bring the enemy within danger of some ambush. But *Marcellus*, though he was very eager of battel, would yet adventure nothing, but by open day-light, and upon fair ground.

Thus passed the time away, until *Q. Fabius Maximus*, and *Q. Fulvius*, he that lately had taken *Capua*, were chosen consuls. *Fabius*, considering how much the *Roman* affairs were bettered by the taking of *Capua*, purposed that year to besiege *Tarentum*; which if he could win, like it was, that scarce one good city would afterwards remain true to *Hannibal*. Wherefore he vehemently exhorted his colleague, and *Marcellus* (to whom was continued the command of those legions that served under him the year before) to press the *Carthaginian* so hard, as he might have no leisure to help *Tarentum*. *Marcellus* was very glad of this charge, for he thought no *Roman* fitter than himself, to deal with *Hannibal* in open field. He followed him therefore to *Cannusum*, and thence from place to place, desiring ever to come to battel, but upon equal terms. The *Carthaginian* had not mind to hazard much in fight, but thought it enough to entertain his enemy with skirmish, as being desirous to keep his army strong until the coming of *Asdrubal*. Yet could he not avoid the importunity of *Marcellus*, nor brook the indignity of being daily braved. He therefore bade his men to be lully, and to beat soundly this hot-spirited *Roman* captain, that would never suffer them to be at quiet, until they once had cooled well his courage, by letting him blood. Hereupon followed a battel, wherein *Hannibal* had the victory, took six ensigns, and slew of the *Romans* almost three thousand; among which were some of mark. *Marcellus* was so impatient of this dishonour, that he rated his men as peasants, and base cowards; telling them, that they were the first of the *Roman* legions which had been beaten by *Hannibal*, by plain force and manhood, without being circumvented by any stratagem. With these, and many other the like words, which they were ashamed to hear, he did so vex them, that thinking themselves better able to endure any violence of the enemy, than such displeasure of their general, they besought him to pardon them, and lead them forth once again to fight. He did so, and placing those companies foremost, that had lost their ensigns the day before, bade them be careful

ful to win a victory, whereof the news might be at *Rome*, before the report of their shameful overthrow. *Hannibal* was angry, to see that nothing could make this enemy quiet, and therefore was ready to fight again, since all other motives continued the same, and his men had been heartened by the late victory. But the *Romans* were stirred up with desire of revenge, and of repairing their honour lost, which affections gave a sharp edge unto their valour; whereas the *Carthaginians* were grown dull, and weary, by seeing themselves disappointed of their hope; and the enemy, notwithstanding their late victory, as ready to molest them as before. In this second battel *Marcellus* got the victory, which he purchased at so dear a rate, that neither he nor *Hannibal* had great cause to vaunt the second night. For if eight thousand of the *Carthaginians* were slain, and three thousand of the *Roman* side, in this next battel, the difference was no greater, than even to recompense the late received overthrow; especially since the number of the *Romans* that were wounded was so great, as disabled *Marcellus* from pursuing *Hannibal*, who dislodged by night. Nevertheless it sufficed, that *Fabius* the consul hereby got leisure to follow his business at *Tarentum*, without any disturbance. *Q. Fulvius* the other consul, about the same time, took in many of the *Hirpines*, *Lucans*, and *Volscentes*, that willingly yielded themselves, and betrayed the garrisons of *Hannibal* that lay in their towns, whom *Fulvius* entertained in loving sort; gently rebuking them for their errors past, without punishing those that had been authors, or busy doers in the rebellion. That rabble of *Sicilian* thieves, which *Levinus* had lately brought from *Agaterina*, was then also set on work to besiege *Caulonia*, a town of the *Brutians*; and nothing was omitted, that might serve to divert *Hannibal* from the succour of *Tarentum*.

Q. Fabius the consul having taken *Manduria*, a town of the *Salentines*, sat down before *Tarentum*; making all preparation that seemed needful to carry it either by assault, or long siege. Of the garrisons in the town, a good part were *Brutians*, placed there by *Hannibal*, under a captain of their own nation. This captain fell in love with a *Tarentine* wench, whose brother served under *Fabius*. Hereof she gave notice by letters to her brother, as thinking, belike, to draw him from the *Roman* side; by telling him how rich, and of what great account her lover was. But her brother made the consul acquainted with these news, and said, that if the *Brutian* were far in love, he might perhaps be won by intreaty of his mistress, to do what she would have him. The consul hearing this, and finding likelihood in the matter, willed his soldier to convey himself into the town as a fugitive, and try what good might be done. It fell out according to his desire. The soldier grew acquainted with this *Brutian* captain, and partly by his own persuasions, partly by the flattering entreaty of his sister, won him to betray the town to the *Romans*. When they had agreed upon the business, and resolved how to order it, the same soldier got out of the town by night, and acquainted the consul with his proceedings; telling him in which part that *Brutian* kept watch, and what might conveniently be done. So in the night-time *Fabius* gave an alarm to the city, especially about those parts of the wall which were farthest from the place where he meant to enter. The captains in the town prepared to make resistance in those places, where the noise did threaten them with greatest likelihood of danger. But *Fabius* himself, with the choicest of his men, came in great silence to the quarter of the *Brutians*; who

being wrought by their captain, helped the *Romans* to get up, and break open the next gate, whereat the army was let in. The *Tarentines* and *Carthaginian* soldiers made head against *Fabius* in the market-place; but (as it happeneth in like cases, where the main confidence is already taken away) not very obstinately. *Nico*, *Democrates*, and *Philomenes*, with those that before had let in *Hannibal*, used now the last of their courage, in dying against the *Romans*. *Carthalo*, who commanded the garrison within the town, offered himself prisoner, hoping to be well used, because of hospitality that had passed between his father and the consul. But he was slain by the way, ere he could come at *Fabius*. The *Romans* did put all indifferently to the sword; in such sort, that they spared few of the *Brutians*. This slaughter of the *Brutians* was thought to have been made by appointment of the consul, to the end that he might seem to have won the town by force, and not by treason, though he thereby failed of his purpose; and neither had the glory which he expected, nor preserved his reputation of faithful dealing, and keeping his word. The booty found in *Tarentum* was very great, whereof the *Roman* treasury, whither it was carried, had great need. As for the imageries, and other curiosities that were in the city, *Fabius* was contented to let them alone; and being told of some idols, that seemed worthy to be carried away, being very goodly pieces, in such habit and posture as if they were fighting, he said, let us leave unto the *Tarentines* their angry gods.

Hannibal, being gotten clear from *Marcellus*, fell upon those that besieged *Caulonia*. They fled at his coming, but he was so near, that they were fain to betake them to a hill, which served to no other purpose, than to bear off the first brunt. There they defended themselves a little while, and then they yielded. When this business was done, he halted away to relieve *Tarentum*; but when he came within five miles of the city, he had news that it was lost. This grieved him; yet he said no more than this; *The Romans have also their Hannibal*; we have lost *Tarentum* in such sort as we got it. That he might not seem to turn back amazed, or in any fear of the victorious consul, he encamped a few days together so near as he was unto *Tarentum*; and thence departing to *Metapontum*, bethought himself how to take *Fabius* in a trap. He caused the chief of the *Metapontines* to write unto *Fabius*, and offer to betray into his hands the *Carthaginian* garrison, with condition, that he should in that respect forgive them all offences past. These letters were sent by two young men of the same city, who did their errand so well, that the consul wrote back by them unto the *Metapontines*, and appointed the day when they should expect him. Hereof *Hannibal* was exceeding glad, and at good leisure, made ready his ambushes for the wary *Fabius*. But whether some secret notice of the plot were given, or whether indeed (as it is related) some tokens in sacrificing, terrified the superstitious *Roman*, the journey to *Metapontum* was deferred. Hereupon the same two messengers were employed again; but being apprehended, and threatened with torture, they discovered all.

This year was happy to the *Romans*, in all their wars; for they got every-where, save only at *Caulonia*, where they lost a company of such lewd fellows, that it may seem good fortune to have so been rid of them. But their common poverty, and disability to maintain their charge, continued, and grew greater than it was before. Thirty *Roman* colonies were then in *Italy*, of which, twelve refused to contribut

contribute any longer to the wars: for it was considered, that the legions of *Cannæ*, and those unhappy companies that had been beaten under the one and the other *C. Fulvius*, were transported into *Sicily*, where they lived, in a sort, as banished men. This grieved their friends at home, and made them reckon up the more diligently those other miseries which they daily felt. Ten years together they had been exhausted with levies of men, and impositions of money, in every of which years they had received some notable overthrow. In this case, the least that they could fear, or rather, the best which they could hope, was, to fall into the hands of the enemy to be made prisoners. For *Hannibal* did gently send home their people that was taken by him; whereas the *Romans* did banish from their homes those that had escaped. It was therefore likely to come to pass within a-while, that they should be all consumed, since new soldiers were daily pressed out of their towns, and the old ones never did return. Such talk was frequent among those of the colonies, especially where they that were transported into *Sicily*, had most compassionate friends. Wherefore it was concluded by the people of *Ardea*, *Saturnia*, *Alba*, and other good towns, to the number of twelve, that they should boldly deny unto the *Romans* their farther help. This was thought the likeliest way to obtain peace, whereof otherwise they saw little hope, so long as *Hannibal* lived. When the consuls heard the ambassadors of these towns make such declaration, and protest their disability of giving any farther help, they were much amazed. They willed the ambassadors to return home, and bring a better answer; forasmuch as this was none other than treason: they bade them consider, that their people were not *Campanians*, or *Tarentines*, but the offspring of the *Romans*; and no less partakers of the empire, than they that inhabited the mother-city. But all would not serve, the ambassadors continuing to protest that they had already done what they could, and that they had remaining neither men nor money. It was well for the *Romans*, that the other eighteen colonies did not imitate these twelve, but shewed themselves willing to undergo whatsoever should be laid upon them, without shrinking under the burden. This their offer was so highly pleasing to the consuls, that the ambassadors of those faithful colonies, were brought unto the senate, and produced into the assembly of the people, where, with commemoration of all their former good services, this their present love unto the state was magnified, and thanks accordingly bestowed upon them; with promise, that it should not be forgotten. As for the ambassadors of those twelve colonies that refused to contribute, it was thought best neither to retain them in the city, nor yet to dismiss them, nor to take any notice of them at all, but leave them to their own consideration of their ill-deserving.

It may greatly be doubted, what the example of these twelve people would have wrought in those that were so willing to help the state, if *Asdrubal* had been then coming into *Italy*: for then must the *Romans* have betaken themselves wholly to their own defence; whereas now, to the great comfort of their subjects, they employed their forces in the conquest of *Italy*, with hopeful and fortunate success. Nevertheless, they were fain to open their most privy treasury, and thence take out the gold that had been laid up to serve them in cases of greatest extremity. Of the money thus extracted, one quarter was delivered to *Fabius* the consul, to set him well out against the *Tarentines*: all the rest was sent into *Spain* to *Scipio*, for the maintenance

of his army, and to provide that *Asdrubal* might not pass from thence into *Italy*. It is likely that *Fabius* did not spend all his money; finding such easy success at *Tarentum*, as was shewed before. But to stop the journey of *Asdrubal*, neither the money sent into *Spain*, nor any victories won by *Scipio*, could suffice. Nevertheless, it fell out happily for the people of *Rome*, that this year and the next were spent before his coming; and they better prepared, than at less warning they could have been, to entertain him. Here it were not amiss to note, that since the *Romans*, being in so great necessity of money, were driven to furnish the army in *Spain* with the greatest part of all their stock that was left; it must needs be, that either the booty taken in *New Carthage*, was far less than fame had reported it; or else that *Scipio* had not as yet won it: howsoever *Livy* rather inclines to those, who say that he got it soon after his arrival.

M. Claudius Marcellus, and *T. Quintius Crispinus*, were chosen consuls after *Fabius* and *Fulvius*. In this year it was, that *Asdrubal* took his journey out of *Spain*, though he came not into *Italy* till the year following. After the great battel at *Cannæ*, *Hannibal* had lost much time about *Cume* and *Naples*, in seeking to make himself master of a good haven, for the landing of those succours that were promised from *Carthage*. The hope that he reposed in *Philist*, caused him to turn his principal care to the eastern parts of *Italy*, where he made ready a fair entrance for the *Macedonian*, if he had been ready to come. But since his hope was vanished, and the long promised succour of *Asdrubal* was (though far later than had been expedient) ready to arrive, he began to deal with the people of *Umbria*, through whose countries his brother was to pass, that therein he might make a party against the *Romans*. The loss of *Capua*, *Tarentum*, and many other towns, might have terrified all other of the *Italian* towns from hearkening to any solicitation of the *Carthaginians*; yet the poverty of the *Romans*, and the weariness of their adherents, together with the fame of a greater army coming, than that which *Hannibal* brought into *Italy*, did embolden many of the *Umbrians*, especially the *Aretines*, to take such counsel as they thought most expedient for themselves, without regard of their fidelity to *Rome*. The *Roman* senate, hearing the rumour of their conspiracy, sent *Marcellus* the new chosen consul into *Umbria*, whose coming did so terrify them, that they rested quiet for a-while. All the year following they were devising how to break out; as contrariwise, the *Roman* pretors, partly by terror of severe judgments and inquisitions, and partly by the force of two or three legions, with which they visited all suspected places, kept them honest against their wills, and took many hostages for better assurance. The two consuls had an earnest desire to make strong war upon *Hannibal*, without more temporizing; persuading themselves, that in battel they should be too strong for him, *Crispinus* had further his particular desire to make his consulship notable, by the winning of some good town: as *Fulvius* and *Fabius* had gotten honour by *Capua* and *Tarentum*. Therefore he went about the siege of *Locri*, one of the best cities which the *Carthaginian* then held in *Italy*; and brought thither all sorts of engines, sending for a fleet out of *Sicily* to help him. But *Hannibal* was not slow to relieve the city, the fame of whose approach, made *Crispinus* desist from his enterprize, and retire unto his colleague, that lay at *Venusia*. Thither followed *Hannibal*, to whom the consuls daily offered battel. This great man of war had no need

to stand upon his reputation, which was already so confirmed, that his refusing to fight, was not likely to be ascribed unto fear, but rather deemed as a part of his wisdom. He entertained the consuls with many light skirmishes, and fought to take them at some advantage; reserving his own numbers as full as he could unto a time of greater employment. In this lingering manner of war *Marcellus* took no pleasure, but fought to compel the enemy to battle whether he would or no. The admiral of the *Roman* fleet about *Sicily*, *L. Cincius*, was commanded again to assail the town of *Locri*, which might well enough be forced, if *Hannibal* continued, as he began, to trifle away the time at *Venusia*. To the same purpose a part of the garrison that lay in *Tarentum*, was appointed to go by land to the assistance of *Cincius*; but *Hannibal* had an eye behind him. He laid an ambush in the way, between *Tarentum* and *Locri*, whereinto the *Romans* fell; and having lost above three thousand of their company, were well glad, the rest of them, to quit their enterprize, and save their own lives within *Tarentum*. As for the consuls, it was the desire of *Hannibal* to waste their army by little and little; which to do, he neglected no advantage. There lay between him and them an hillock, over-grown with wood, that seemed fit to cover a number of men; who lying there undiscerned, might fall upon such as should straggle from the *Roman* camp, and cut them off. Therefore he sent thither by night some companies of *Numidians*, whom he willed to keep themselves close, and attend their best advantage. To this piece of ground the consuls thought it fit to remove their camp; *Marcellus* thinking that he never lay near enough unto *Hannibal*. Thither therefore both of them rode to view the place, accompanied with the son of *Marcellus*, a few colonels, and other principal men, and not many more than two hundred horse, most of them *Hetrurians*. The *Numidian* centinel gave warning of their approach to his fellows, who discovered not themselves until they had surrounded the consuls and their train. The consuls, as necessity compelled them, defended themselves, hoping to be quickly relieved from their camp, that was near at hand. But the *Hetrurians* ran away from them at the first, and left them in that great danger to the weak assistance of no more than forty horse-men, that were of the colony of *Fregelle*. These *Fregellans* abode by the consuls, and did what they could to have brought them safe off. But when *Marcellus* was stricken through with a lance, and fell down dead, then began every one to shift for himself, and escape as they might. *Crispinus*, the other consul, had his death's wound, being stricken with two darts; and young *Marcellus* was likewise wounded; yet these two recovered their camp. The rest of the colonels and officers, together with the lictors that carried the bundles of rods and axes before the consuls, were all slain or taken. To the dead body of the consul *Marcellus*, *Hannibal* gave honourable funeral, according to the custom of those times; and bestowing his ashes in a silver pot, covered it with a crown of gold, and so sent them to young *Marcellus*, to be by him interr'd where he thought good.

Presently after this, *Crispinus* bethought himself how that the signet-ring of *Marcellus* was fallen into the custody of *Hannibal*, who might use it to his own purposes, ere that which had happened were well known abroad. Wherefore he sent word unto all the towns about, that his colleague was slain, and that *Hannibal* had gotten his ring; wishing them in that regard to give no credit to any letters therewithal signed. This providence of *Crispinus*, was

not more than requisite: for his messenger was but a little before come to *Salapia*, when another messenger arrived there, sent from *Hannibal*, bringing letters in the name of *Marcellus*, and sealed with the captive ring, whereof the contents were, that it was his purpose to come the same night unto *Salapia*; where he willed, that the foldiers of the garrison should be in a readiness, for such employment as he should think needful. The device was plain: and no less plain was the revengeful mind, which he bare against that city; because of his brave *Numidian* companies, that had therein been betrayed. The *Salapians* hereupon bethought themselves, how to take their enemy in his own snare. They sent back the messenger, which was a *Roman* fugitive, without letting him perceive any sign of distrust in them. This done, they prepared all things in a readiness, for the entertainment of such a friend. Late in the night he came thither, with a troop of *Roman* fugitives, armed *Roman*-like, leading the way. These all talking *Latin* together, called unto the watch, and bade open the gate; for the consul was there. The gate was opened, fair and leisurely, and the port-cullis drawn up no higher than needs it must be, to let them enter. But when six hundred of them were gotten in, down fell the port-cullis again: and they that thought to have taken others, were taken themselves; being laid at on all hands by the *Salapians*, that quickly made an end with them.

Hannibal being thus over-reached with this stratagem, hasted away to *Locri*; whereunto *Cincius*, the admiral of the *Roman* fleet about *Sicily*, did lay hard siege. The first appearance of the *Numidians*, *Hannibal's* vant-currors, made the *Romans* in all confused haste run to their ships: leaving all their engines, and whatsoever was in their camp, to the enemies disposition.

The *Roman* senate, hearing of these accidents, sent unto *Crispinus*, the surviving consul, and requested him to name a dictator: that might take charge of the commonwealth, and dispatch the election of new magistrates, with other business; whereunto himself was disabled by his hurts. He did so: and soon after died. Then it was thought needful, that new consuls should be chosen out of hand: forasmuch as two *Roman* armies lay so near unto the enemy, without any general. Especially it was desired, that election should be made of such men, as were not only valiant, but well advised: since the best, and most fortunate of their great doers, *M. Marcellus*, by losing himself so strangely, had given them a fair warning, not to commit their army unto rash heads. Among those that stood for the consulship, *C. Claudius Nero* was the most eminent. He was of great nobility, a good foldier, and one, whose many services in this present war, did forcibly commend unto the place. Yet he seemed a little too violent; and one, whose temper needed the allay of a more staid wit. The *Fathers* therefore endeavoured to join unto him in the consulship *M. Livius*: one that had borne the same office, long before. This *M. Livius* had been consul with *L. Aemilius Paulus*, in the year foregoing the beginning of this war. After their consulship, wherein they did good service, they had both of them been called unto judgment by the people: and this *Livius* condemned, *Aemilius* hardly escaping. Though it hath been once already noted, yet I cannot forbear to remember it again; how it pleased God to upbraid the unthankful *Romans*, with the malicious judgment, given by their multitude upon honourable men. For in the battle of *Canne*, it was apparent, what lamentable effects the

the memory of their injustice wrought: when *L. Æmilius* rather chose to yield to the forward ignorance of his colleague; and afterwards to die in the greatest overthrow that ever fell upon the state of *Rome*; than by resisting the pernicious courses of *Terentius Varro*, to cast himself a-new upon the danger of the popular fury. As for *M. Livius*, he is even now ready, and will so continue, to tell the people of their faults in a diverse manner. Eight years together after his condemnation had he been absent out of the city, and lived in his country grange; still vexing himself with the indignity of his condemnation. *Marcellus* and *Levinus*, being consuls two or three years ago, had brought him into *Rome*; where he lived private, in discontented sort, as might appear, both by his carelessness in apparel, and by the wearing of his long hair and beard; which in that age were the badges of men afflicted. Very lately he was compelled by the censors to pull his hair, and come into the senate: where he used to sit silent, and signify his assent or dislike to what was proposed; either in short formal words, or in passing from side to side, when the house was divided. At length it happened, that in some business weightily concerning one that was his kinsman, he stood up, and made a set speech: whereby he drew all the *Fathers* to attention; and bade them enquire of him, and take better notice what he was, and what he had been. The senate was much altered since he had left it; many brave men were lost; new ones were chosen; such as rather served to fill up the number, than to answer to the dignity of the place: and they that were left of ancient standing, had ever spent their virtues to no great effect. Wherefore, all began to say, that it was a great pity, so worthy and able a man, as this *Livius*, had been all this while forgotten; one, of whom the commonwealth stood in great need, yet had not used in this dangerous war. Now seeing that the consuls ought, one of them, to be chosen a *Patrician*; the other, of necessity a *Plebeian*: and since, neither *Fabius*, nor *Valerius Levinus*, being both of them *Patricians*, could be joined with *Claudius Nero*: every one was of opinion, that there could not be chosen and coupled together, two fitter men than *C. Claudius*, and this *Marcus Livius*. But *Livy* would not endure to hear of this. He said, it was unreasonable, that one condemned as a dishonest man, should afterwards be chosen ruler of the city. If they had done ill to trust him with one consulship, what meant they then to offer him another? With these and the like phrases, he resisted their desires: till by persuasions, and examples rehearsed, of such as had patiently digested injuries done by the people, and repayed good for evil; he was contented to accept the honour.

Here we may behold a true figure of that emblem, with which *Themistocles* checked the ingratitude of the *Athenians*: resembling himself to a plane-tree, the branches and boughs whereof men brake in fair weather; but run under it for shelter in a storm. Such unthankfulness, to well-deserving men, is not rarely found in the outrageous multitude. Neither was the late example hereto much unlike, of *Philip* the second, king of *Spain*, his dealing with the duke of *Alva*. For although he had committed the duke to prison, upon some small offence conceived, without all regard of his former deserts: yet, when his intended conquest of *Portugal*, required the service of a man, more than ordinarily sufficient; he stood no longer upon the scanning of late displeasures; but employed the

same duke, whom he had newly disgraced. This is wisdom often taught by necessity.

It was a dangerous year toward, when *C. Claudius Nero*, and *M. Livius* were chosen consuls. *Asdrubal* was already come into *France*, and waited only to have the ways of the *Alps* thawed by warm weather, for his passage into *Italy*. The *Romans* used at this time the service of three and twenty legions; and wanted not employment, for many more, if they had known how to levy and maintain them. Of these which they had, four served in *Spain*, two in *Sicily*, and two in *Sardinia*; the rest were so disposed, in several parts of *Italy*, where need seemed to require, that only two legions were left to each of the consuls. But the consuls were men of execution, and would not be tied to the punctual observance of what the senate thought fit. *M. Livius* would not stir out of *Rome*, against so mighty a power as followed *Asdrubal*; until he had first obtained, that he might carry with him as many as could well be spared from other employments; and those, or the most of them, chosen companies. It was true, that two legions, appointed to serve under *Lucius Porcius*, a pretor of that year, among the *Cisalpine Gauls*, might be reckoned as an additament to the forces of *Livius*; to whom the war against *Asdrubal* was allotted. So might also two other legions, that were among the *Salentines*, near unto *Tarentum*, under another of the pretors, be accounted a part of *Claudius's* army, that was sent against *Hannibal*. Nevertheless the consuls, by the special instance of *Livy*, did obtain, that all might be left to their own discretion. For news came, that *Asdrubal* was already passing the *Alps*; the *Ligurians*, who dwelt in the country about *Genua*, with their neighbour people, were in readiness to join with him; and *L. Porcius* sent word, that he would adventure no further, than he safely might. When all was ordered, as themselves thought best, the two consuls went forth of the city, each his several way. The people of *Rome* were now quite otherwise affected, than they had been, when *L. Æmilius Paulus*, and *C. Terentius Varro*, were sent against *Hannibal*. They did no longer take upon them, to direct their generals, or bid them dispatch, and win the victory betimes; but rather they stood in fear, lest all diligence, wisdom, and valour, should prove too little. For since few years had passed, wherein some one of their generals had not been slain; and since it was manifest, that if either of these present consuls were defeated, or put to the worst, the two *Carthaginians* would forthwith join, and make short work with the other: it seemed a greater happiness than could be expected, that each of them should return home victor; and come off with honour, from such mighty opposition, as he was like to find. With extreme difficulty had *Rome* held up her head ever since the battle of *Canne*: though it were so, that *Hannibal* alone, with little help from *Carthage*, had continued the war in *Italy*. But there was now arrived another son of *Amilcar*; and one, that in his present expedition, had seemed a man of more sufficiency than *Hannibal* himself. For, whereas in that long and dangerous march, through barbarous nations, over great rivers and mountains, that were thought unpassable, *Hannibal* had lost a great part of his army: this *Asdrubal*, in the same places, had multiplied his numbers; and, gathering the people that he found in the way, descended from the *Alps* like a rowling snow-ball, far greater than he came over the *Pyrenees*, at his first setting out of *Spain*. These

These considerations, and the like, of which, fear presented many unto them; caused the people of *Rome*, to wait upon their consuls out of the town; like a pensive train of mourners: thinking upon *Marcellus* and *Crispinus*, upon whom in the like sort they had given attendance the last year, but saw neither of them return alive, from a less dangerous war. Particularly, old *Q. Fabius* gave his accustomed advice to *M. Livius*, that he should abstain from giving, or taking battel, until he well understood the enemies condition. But the consul made him a froward answer, and said, That he would fight the first day: for that he thought it long, till he should either recover his honour by victory; or, by seeing the overthrow of his own unjust citizens, satisfy himself with the joy of a great, though not an honest, revenge. But his meaning was better than his words.

Of the overthrow that *Asdrubal* received in *Spain*, from *Scipio*, a little before he took his journey into *Italy*; such mention hath already been made, as agreed with the report of that noble historian *Livy*. Yet I think it not amiss to add in this place, what may be gathered out of the remaining fragments of *Polybius's* history, concerning the accident. *Asdrubal* had wrestled with many difficulties in *Spain*, by reason of those captains that were sent from the city of *Carthage*, to join with him in the administration of that province: they being, as it may seem, of the *Hannonian* faction; which is to say, thus far forth traitors, that they preferred the advantage of their own side, before the good of their commonwealth. In what particulars they wronged this worthy son of *Amilcar*, and how they hindered his courses undertaken, it cannot be known: since of these books, wherein *Polybius* hath exactly handled these matters, there are to us remaining, only a few broken pieces. But by the spiteful dealing of *Hanno*, in *Sicily*, with *Mutines*, a better man of war than himself, whom *Hannibal* had sent into the island; we may conceive, that against the brother of *Hannibal*, it was thought needful, by these mischievous partisans of *Hanno*, to use the violent opposition of more earnest malice. Nevertheless *Asdrubal* was a good patriot: and therefore endured patiently such indignities as *Mutines* could not long digest. His journey into *Italy* being resolved upon; he lay with part of the army at *Betula*, not far from the mines of silver; whence he was to furnish his expedition. Thither came *Scipio*; and drove him out of his camp, though he were strongly lodged, before the other *Carthaginian* captains could, or would, come to his assistance. The overthrow seems not to have been so great, as it must have been supposed, if no way lay open to those that fled. Rather it appears, that *Asdrubal* dealt like a provident man: and seeing that his camp was likely to be forced, sent away all his money, with his elephants before him: but staid behind himself to sustain the *Romans* a while, until his carriages might be out of danger. Herein he had his desire. Afterwards, he gathered his broken troops together; and retired in such sort, that *Scipio* thought it not good to pursue him; and so passed over *Tagus*. Then taking unto him the forces assigned for his expedition, he marched away towards the *Pyrenees*: leaving the care of *Spain* unto his brother *Mago*, and to *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gesco*, that thought himself the fittest man for the administration thereof. Fain would *Scipio* have stopped him in his journey, by sending to defend against him the ordinary way of the mountains.

But whether *Asdrubal* took another way, or whether he forced the guards that *Scipio* had set to keep the *Pyrenees* (as the defence of hard passages commonly sorts to no good effect) he was not letted in his voyage by any such impediment. Coming into *Gaul*, and following the steps of his brother *Hannibal*: he found the nations that lay in his way, so well affected, either to him or his money, that no passages were defended against him, nor any sort of resistance made; but he, and his army well entertained, and their numbers much increased, by access of such as were desirous to take his pay. Of these he had the better choice: for that he was driven to winter in their country, whilst that the passages of the *Alps* were closed up with ice and snow. The mountains likewise, that had so greatly molested *Hannibal* in his journey over the *Alps*, were easily won to take part with *Asdrubal*, when he travelled through their country. For these poor men, at the first coming of *Hannibal*, were verily perswaded, that it was his purpose to rob them of their cattel, and to make spoil of that little wealth, which they had painfully scraped together out of the desolate rocks. But now in process of time they were better informed. Therefore understanding, that there were two mighty cities, far disjoining asunder, which made war upon each other, by land and sea: and that the *Alps* did only lie in their way; they gladly condescended, to take their part in the fortune of the invaders. The like affection, upon greater cause, was afterwards found in the *Cisalpine Gauls*. The *Ligurians* also joined with *Asdrubal*: and so would the *Hetrurians* have done, if he had arrived in their country. There was no other *Roman* army near, than *L. Percius*, with his two legions; of whom there was no great fear. Therefore did *Asdrubal* set upon *Placentia*, a *Roman* colony: in hope to make his coming the more terrible, by the destruction of that town. But there he lost a dreat deal of time, and finally was driven to quit the enterprise: by undertaking which, he gave the *Roman* consuls leisure to make ready for him; and caused his brother *Hannibal* (who upon the first bruit of *Asdrubal's* so timely, and easily passing the *Alps*, was about to leave his wintering camp, and go forth to meet with him) to sit still a while, as well aware, that *Placentia* would not be taken in haste.

C. Claudius Nero, the *Roman* consul, made what speed he could to meet with *Hannibal*, and stop him from joining with his brother. He had about forty thousand foot, and five hundred horse: with which he daily offered battel to the *Carthaginian*; and had of him the better in many skirmishes. *Hannibal* was once driven to make a tedious march from the borders of the *Salernians* and *Apulians*, into the country of the *Brutians*, there to increase his forces; which were otherwise too weak for the journey intended. Afterwards coming to *Grumentum*, a town of the *Lucans*; he there fought unprosperously with *Nero* the consul. Nevertheless he got off, and marched away to *Venusia*. But *Nero* followed him; and had there again the better of him. Wherefore he was driven to return to *Metapontum*: where joining with *Hanno*, that had made ready a good army, he assayed again to make way by force to his brother. So he passed onward, and came again to *Venusia*, having *Nero* still at his heels. Thence went he over the river *Ausidus*, to *Canusium*; where he lay down, not far from the place in which he had obtained his most memorable victory. There also

did *Nero* sit down by him; and both of them rested, without making offer to fight. It seemed perhaps unto *Hannibal*, who knew the country very well, that his brother might, with little impediment, overcome the way to *Canusium*: where if he could once again deal with both the consuls, and all the *Roman* forces together, he had reason to hope for such another victory, as once he had gotten in the same open country. If this had so fallen out, *Rome* would have been undone for ever. But the *Carthaginians* should not have needed to wish any second victory, in the naked champans about *Cannae*; if such an army, as this which *Asdrubal* now brings, had come to second *Hannibal*, when he was in his full strength, and the *Romans* not able to keep the field. Wherefore this worthy general had good reason afterwards to say, that *Hanno* was the man, who, by delaying the supply, did beat him out of *Italy*; which else no power of the *Romans* could have done.

Whilst *Nero* waited upon the *Carthaginians*, and thought it enough to hinder them from meeting with the army that was coming to their succour: he was advertised of *Asdrubal's* approach; by letters and messengers intercepted; as they were going to *Hannibal*. These gave notice, that *Asdrubal* had left the siege of *Placentia*, and drew onwards apace: being already come within two hundred miles of his brother; notwithstanding all opposition that could be made by *Livy* the consul. Of these news *Claudius Nero* was nothing joyful. For if *Hannibal* could once be joined as head, unto that great body of an army, which *Asdrubal* brought with him: it was most apparent, that howsoever the fortune of *Rome* should avoid, for the present, any great calamity; yet the very continuance of so strong a war at home, would enforce the *Latins*, and other faithful associates, to faint under the burden; as twelve of the thirty *Roman* colonies had already done. Wherefore he resolved, that it were better to make any desperate adventure, than to suffer the conjunction of two such malevolent planets: whose pestilent influence, if not on the sudden, yet within few years, was like to work most lamentable effects. It seemed apparent, that his colleague was unable to stay the progress of *Asdrubal*: neither were there any good legions in a readiness, that could do service in such a needful case; excepting those that were already employed under the two consuls. Hereupon he concluded, that it was not expedient for him to tie himself to his own charge, which was the war against *Hannibal*: but rather that it behoved him to help where more necessity required; and to carry part of his forces unto his colleague. This could not be without much danger. Yet since the meeting of the two *Carthaginian* brethren, was far more dangerous to the *Roman* commonwealth; it seemed the best way to put fortune in trust with that which was of the less importance. Six thousand foot, and a thousand horse he therefore took, that were the very choice of his army: and making shew, as if he would only step aside, to do some small piece of service near at hand; away he posted as fast as he could, to assist his fellow-consul. His messengers ran before him, to give warning to all towns by which he was to pass, that they should be ready to meet him, with victuals, and all other necessities for his army. *Livius*, the other consul, at that time, lay encamped near unto *Sena Gallica*; and *Asdrubal* within half a mile of him. In six days *Nero* had finished his journey thither; and when he drew near, sent messengers before him, to give notice of his coming. *Livy* thought it fittest that he should stay

No. XLIII.

in some place of covert until dark night, and then enter secretly into the camp: lest the enemy, perceiving this access of strength, should accordingly frame his counsels. This was done: and a token given, that the colonels, captains, and all soldiers, as well horse as foot, that *Nero* had brought with him, should be lodged and entertained by men of their own sort. Their company was somewhat increased by volunteers that joined with them on the way. Nevertheless, it was not needful, that the quarter which received them, should be enlarged, since they had brought with them nothing but their arms. The next day they held a counsel of war: wherein some were of opinion, that it was best for these new-arrived companies, to refresh themselves a few days after their weary journey, before they should be drawn forth to battle. But against this, *Nero* was very earnest: and besought his colleague, to make use of him out of hand; that he might betimes return to his own camp, ere *Hannibal* should have notice of his absence. The soldiers also of *Nero* were full of spirit; perceiving that the honour of the victory was like to be theirs: forasmuch as the battle would not have been undertaken, without this their coming to help. Finally, it was agreed when the counsel brake up, that the sign of battle should be hung out; which was commonly a purple coat over the general's pavillion.

Asdrubal was no less willing than the *Romans* to come to battle: having long desired it, and hitherto not found occasion before. But when he had put his men in order, and was riding before the head of his army, to behold the enemies countenance; it seemed to him, that they were more than they had been; and some of their arms and horses, looked as though they had wanted dressing, after a long journey. Hereupon he began to withdraw his army back into the camp: and gave order, that if no prisoners could be taken, by whom he might be certified of the truth; yet should there good observation be made, whether the enemies camp were enlarged, or no; or what other alteration could be noted, that might shew their forces to be increased. The camp, as hath been said, was not extended: but the trumpet, that sounded only once in the quarter of *L. Porcius* the pretor, did now, contrary to former custom, sound twice in the quarter of *Livius* the consul. Hereat *Asdrubal* greatly mused: and being well acquainted with the *Roman* orders; held this for a sure token, that the other consul was there arrived. How this might be, if *Hannibal* were alive, and in good case, he was not able to conjecture: but thought it the best way, to go leisurely to work, till he might be better informed. Upon confidence in his own forces, he had not cared hitherto, how near he lay to the *Romans*; nor troubled himself perhaps with over-strongly fortifying his own camp. Yet when he now perceived, that somewhat was fallen out beside his expectation, he changed his resolution; and held it no dishonour to remove a little further off. So he dislodged secretly by night: intending to get over the river *Metaurus*; whereby to keep himself as long as he could, from necessity of battle. But whether it were so, that his guides did steal away from him in the dark, so that he could not find the way to the fords; or whether his carriages were too heavy, and hindered his speed: far he had not gone, ere the consul *Nero* was at his heels with all the *Roman* horse, and stayed him from passing any further. Soon after came *L. Porcius* with the light armature: whom the other consul followed anon with all his legions, in good order, and ready for battle. *Asdrubal*, seeing him-

self overtaken with necessity to fight, omitted no care and circumspection. His *Gauls*, in whom he reposed least confidence, he placed in his left wing, upon a hill, which the enemy should not, without much difficulty, be able to climb: in the right wing he stood himself, with his *Africans* and *Spaniards*; his *Ligurians* he placed in the midst; and his elephants be bestowed in the front of his battels. On the *Roman* side, *Nero* had the leading of the right wing, *Livius* of the left, and *Porcius* of the battel. Both *Romans* and *Carthaginians* well understood how much depended upon the fortune of this day, and how little hope of safety there was unto the vanquished. Only the *Romans* herein seemed to have had the better in conceit and opinion; that they were to fight with men desirous to have fled from them.

And according to this presumption, came *Livius* the consul with a proud bravery, to give charge on the *Africans*; by whom he was so sharply entertained, that the victory seemed very doubtful. The *Africans* and *Spaniards* were stout soldiers, and well acquainted with the manner of the *Roman* fight. The *Ligurians* also were a hardy nation, and not accustomed to give ground, which they needed the less, or were able now to do, being placed in the midst. *Livius* therefore, and *Porcius*, found strong opposition; and, with great slaughter on both sides, prevailed little or nothing. Besides other difficulties, they were exceedingly troubled by the elephants, that broke their first ranks; and put them in such disorder, as the *Roman* ensigns were driven to fall back. All this while *Claudius Nero*, labouring much in vain against a steep hill, was unable to come to blows with the *Gauls*, that stood opposite unto him, but out of danger. This made *Asdrubal* the more confident, who, seeing his own left wing safe, did the more boldly and fiercely make impression on the other side, upon the left wing of the *Romans*. But *Nero*, perceiving that the place wherein he stood, was such as would compel him to remain idle till the fight were ended, took a part of his forces, and led them round behind the forces of *Porcius* and *Livius*; which having compassed, he fell upon *Asdrubal*, and charged him in the flank. Here began the victory to be manifest on the *Roman* side: for *Nero*, finding none to resist him in front, ran all along the depth of *Asdrubal's* battel; and, falling upon the skirts thereof, disordered the enemies, and put all to rout. Of the *Spaniards* therefore and *Africans*, that were laid at on every side, the greatest part was slain. The *Ligurians* and *Gauls* escaped as they could, and saved themselves by timely flight. Of the elephants, four were taken alive, the rest were slain; some by the enemy's weapons, others by their own guides that rode them. For when any of them, being sore wounded, began to wax unruly, and rush back upon their own battels following them, the guide had in readiness a mallet and a chizzel, wherewith he gave them a stroke between the ears, in the joint of the neck, next unto the head, wherewith he killed the beast upon the sudden. This speedy way of preventing such harm as the elephants, being hurt, were wont to do to the squadrons following them, is said to have been the device of *Asdrubal* himself, who died in this battel.

Great commendations are given to *Asdrubal*, both by *Polybius*, and by *Livy*. He is said, at all times, to have shewed himself worthy of *Amilcar* his father, and *Hannibal* his brother; to have striven with great patience against many difficulties, wherinto he fell by the means of those captains that were sent from *Carthage* into *Spain*; to have performed in this last battel all duties of a worthy general; and

finally, when he saw the loss irreparable, to have ridden manfully into the thickest of his enemies; where, fighting bravely, he was slain. Of the number that died with him in this battel, the report of *Livy*, and of *Polybius*, do very much disagree: for *Livy* saith, that the *Carthaginians* had no less an overthrow, than was that which they gave to the *Romans* at *Cannæ*; that fifty-six thousand of them were slain, five thousand four hundred taken prisoners, and above four thousand *Roman* citizens, whom they had captives with them, delivered, and set at liberty. He saith also, that of the *Romans* and their associates there were slain eight thousand; and of the booty, that it was exceeding great; not only in other kinds, but in gold and silver. Concerning the booty, *Polybius* hath no mention of it. Likely it is to have been as rich as *Livy* reporteth it; for *Asdrubal* came well stored with money. But *Polybius* (who had no desire to make this battel of *Metaurus* a parallel unto that of *Cannæ*) reports no more than about ten thousand on the *Carthaginian* side, and two thousand of the *Roman* to have been slain. The number of the prisoners he doth not mention; but only saith, that some of the *Carthaginian* princes were taken alive, and that all the rest died in the battel: whereby it may seem that they were all *Barchines*, forasmuch as they preferred the honour of themselves, and of their country, above their lives.

The joy of this victory was no less in *Rome*, than had been the fear of the event: for ever since it was known in what sort *Nero* had left his army, the whole city was troubled, as much as lately at *Hannibal's* coming thither. Men thought it strange, that the consul should make such a great adventure, as thus to put the one half of all the *Roman* forces unto hazard of the dice. For what if *Hannibal* should chance to have notice of this his departure, and either pursue him, or set upon the army that stayed behind, much weakened, and without a general? Thus did they talk; yet reserving their censure unto the success, with liberty to approve or condemn, according to the issue. In the meanwhile the people filled the market-place; the women ran to the temple with vows and prayers, and the senators were daily in council, waiting still ready at hand upon the magistrates; as if some great matter were likely to fall out, that would require every one's help. In brief, they were all so full of melancholy, that when the first news of the victory came, there were not many that would believe it. Afterwards, when messengers arrived from the consuls, with letters containing all that had passed, there was not only a great and joyful concourse of all sorts of men unto the temples, but the very face of the city was altered; and men from thenceforth began to follow their private business, making contracts one with another (which they had long forbore to do) and attending their own affairs in such wise, as if *Hannibal* were already driven out of *Italy*.

Nero, returning to his camp, threw forth openly the head of *Asdrubal* before the *Carthaginians*; and producing his *African* prisoners bound, sent two of them loose to give *Hannibal* notice of what had happened. These two prisoners might have served well enough to certify *Hannibal* of the misadventure, without doing wrong to the dead body of *Asdrubal*; especially since *Hannibal* in honourable, and far different manner, had given burial to *Gracchus* and *Marcellus*; yea, to all the *Roman* generals, whose carcases fell into his hands. But it may seem, that howsoever the people of *Carthage* wanted much of the generous disposition which was found among

among the *Romans*, in their love unto the common-weal; yet in dealing with enemies, they were far more civil, and less prone to the insolency of revenge. The best excuse of this outrage done by *Nero*, is, that he hoped much more by the sudden terror of such a spectacle, than by the simple relation of that which had passed, to make a deep impression of fear into the *Carthaginians*. It may also be said, that he forgot himself, being over-joyed with the greatness of his prosperity: for it was the battel of *Metaurus* that weighed down the balance, and turned the tide of the *Roman* fortune; which being then at the lowest ebb, ceased not afterwards to flow, till it could not be contained within any banks. *Hannibal*, having lost in this unhappy fight (besides that worthy gentleman his brother) all the hope that so long sustained him in *Italy*, withdrew himself into the country of the *Brutians*; and thither he caused all the *Lucans*, that were of his party, to remove; as likewise all that dwelt in *Metapontum*. For he wanted men, to defend so many places as he held at the present, because they lay too far asunder. Wherefore he drew them all into a lesser compass, in the utmost corner of *Italy*, it being a country of much fastness, and the people exceedingly devoted to his service. In this business, *Nero* gave him no memorable impediment, either because *Hannibal* was too strong for him, having all his forces united, or because it is likely that this remove of the *Lucans* and *Metapontines* was not before the end of summer, when their harvest was gathered in; at which time the senate called him home to *Rome*. *M. Livius*, the other consul, tarried among the *Cisalpine Gauls* until the end of summer; there to set things in such order as he thought requisite: which done, he wrote unto the senate, that there was no more need of him and his army in that province; but that *L. Porcius*, with the two legions that were there before, might very well discharge the place. For this cause he desired leave to return home, and that he might bring his army with him. The senate well understood his meaning, which was to have the honour of triumph, as he well deserved. But forasmuch as it was well known what interest *Nero* had in the late victory, order was given, that not only *Livy*, with his army, should come home, but likewise *Nero*; though leaving his army behind him, to confront *Hannibal*. So the honour of triumph was granted to them both; in the pomp whereof *Livy* made the greater shew, as riding in a chariot, and followed by his soldiers; because in his province, and upon his day of command, the victory was gotten; his army also being present at the triumph. But *Nero*, that rode on horseback, and without such attendance, was the more extolled both by the people and soldiers, by whom the victory was in a manner wholly ascribed unto his great worth. Neither wanted *L. Veturius Philo*, and *Q. Cecilius Metellus*, lieutenants to the generals, the due acknowledgment of their good service. For they were commended unto the people, as men worthy to be chosen consuls; and consuls they were chosen for the year following: but nothing was done by them worthy of memory in their consulship. Neither indeed from this year, which was the thirteenth of the present war, until the eighteenth year, wherein it ended, was there any matter of importance wrought in *Italy*; save only the taking of *Locri* from the *Carthaginians* by surprize: for *Hannibal* wanted strength wherewith to make any great offer; and the *Romans* had little mind to provoke him, but thought it well that he was quiet. Such opinion had they conceived of him, that though all about him went to ruin, yet in him alone they thought

there was force enough to hold himself upright. And surely very notable are the commendations given unto him by *Polybius*, whom *Livy* therein follows: that making war upon a people, of all other the most warlike, he obtained so many victories by his own good conduct; and that leading an army, compounded of so many sundry nations, *Africans*, *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, *Carthaginians*, *Italians*, and *Greeks*, which were neither in language, laws, conditions, or any other thing, one like to another, he held them all in such good order; that they never fell to sedition among themselves, or against their general. But that which *Livy* adds hereto, is yet perhaps of greater admiration: that he sustained his army, without help from other places, from this time forward, upon the hungry soil of the *Brutians*; which, when it was best manur'd in time of peace, could hardly suffice to nourish the inhabitants. It is therefore apparent, that by his proper worth and virtue, he kept his army in such order and obedience, rather than by any greatness of reward and booty; since after the death of *Asdrubal*, he made no invasion upon the wealthier parts of *Italy*, but held himself still among the poor *Brutians*. Where we must leave him until he be drawn into *Africa* by *Scipio*, whose doings will henceforth entertain, and lead us unto the end of this war.

S E C T. XVII.

How P. Cornelius Scipio, the Roman, made entire conquest of Spain.

†. I.

How the Carthaginians were driven by Scipio from the continent into the isle of Gades.

MAGO, and *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gesco*, took upon them the charge of *Spain*, when *Asdrubal*, the son of *Amilcar*, departed thence into *Italy*. These agreed together, that *Mago* should make a voyage to the *Baleares*, there to levy a supply of men; and *Asdrubal* withdraw himself into *Lusitania* (which is now *Portugal*) whither the *Romans* had ill means to follow, being altogether unacquainted in those parts. *Mago* had soon ended his business, and returned into *Spain*, where he met with one *Hanno* (the same perhaps that had lately been employed in *Sicily*) who brought new forces out of *Africa*, and came to succeed in place of *Asdrubal* the *Barchine*. It is not unlikely that *Spain* was now the better, and more readily furnished with men, and all things needful, from *Carthage*, when that son of *Amilcar*, whose authority had been greatest, was thence departed. For hereby might the factious diligence of old *Hanno* approve it self, against that noble race of warriors, when it should appear, that things did prosper much the better, by being left unto the handling of other men. Whether it were upon desire to make good some such opinion raised of him at home, or whether upon confidence in the forces that he brought over, *Hanno* took the field, and led *Mago* with him, as purposing afresh to set upon the *Romans*. So he entered into the country of the *Celtiberians*, not very far from *New Carthage*, where, by money, and other persuasions, he levied above nine thousand men.

P. Scipio, in the mean while, contained himself in the eastern parts of *Spain*, attentive, as it may seem, to the proceedings of *Asdrubal*, the son of *Amilcar*; against whom, he is reported, by some writers, to have sent part of his forces into *Italy*, to the assistance of *C. Claudius Nero*, and *M. Livius*, the

the consuls. But hearing of the levy made by *Hanno* and *Mago*, among the *Celtiberians*, he sent *M. Syllanus*, the propretor, with ten thousand foot and five hundred horse. *Syllanus* got intelligence by some fugitive *Celtiberians*, who became his guides, that their countrymen encamped a-part from the *Carthaginians* in great disorder, as men fearing no danger, because they were at home. Wherefore, as closely as he was able, he drew near to these *Celtiberians*; and, falling upon them on the sudden, gave them such an overthrow, that *Hanno* and *Mago*, coming to their succour, instead of heartning and reinforcing them, became partakers of the loss. *Mago* saved himself, with all the horse and old companies of foot, which were about two thousand, and in ten days journey brought them safe to *Asdrubal*. The rest of the *Africans* were either slain or taken, among whom, *Hanno* had the ill luck to be taken prisoner; though he kept himself out of the fight until all was lost. As for the *Celtiberians*, they knew better how to make shift, and saved most of themselves by running into the woods.

It could no otherwise be, but that *Scipio* was much troubled with the danger wherein *Italy* stood, by the coming thither of *Asdrubal*. Ten thousand foot and eighteen hundred horse he did therefore send out of *Spain* (as it is reported by some authors) to the defence of his own country, or was perhaps about to send them; and thereupon remained at *New Carthage*, intente to the necessity and success of his countrymen at home. But when he had word of the great victory at *Metaurus*, which fell out long before the end of this summer, then might he well adventure to take in hand the entire conquest of *Spain*; which must needs be much alienated from the *Carthaginians*, by the report of such an overthrow. The *Spanish* soldiers that served under *Hannibal*, and those that had been sent over into *Africa*, were as pledges heretofore, by whom their country was held obnoxious to the *Carthaginians*. But when it was noised abroad, that all which had followed *Asdrubal* into *Italy*, were fallen into the hands of the *Romans*; and that *Hannibal*, with his army, was closed up in a streight, whence he could not get out; then did it greatly behove the *Spaniards* to conform themselves unto the will of the victors. That it was the success of things in *Italy*, which gave such confidence unto *Scipio*, it is the more probable, because he took not this great enterprize in hand till the summer was almost spent. *Asdrubal* therefore used the benefit of the season; and by disposing his army into many garrisons, hindered the enemy from doing any great exploit before winter. So the very length of way, and the time of the year, caused *Scipio* to return back, without any other matter performed, than that his brother, *L. Scipio*, took by assault the town of *Oringis*.

Against the next year's danger, *Asdrubal* prepared a great army, and spared not cost nor travel in strengthening himself for the trial of his last fortune in *Spain*. With seventy thousand foot, four thousand horse, and thirty-two elephants, he took the field; which number, I believe, that he could hardly have raised, without boldly denying the truth of those reports that came from *Italy*. *Scipio* thought his *Roman* legions too weak, to encounter with such a multitude; wherefore he judged it needful to use the help of his *Spanish* friends. But the death of his father and uncle, that were cast away by the treason of such false auxiliaries, made him, on the other side, very doubtful of relying upon those that might perhaps betray him in his greatest need. Yet since one *Colchas*, that was lord of twenty-

eight towns, had promised him the last winter, to raise three thousand foot, and five hundred horse for his service; he resolved to make use of those, and some few others, that might help to make a shew; and yet not be able to do great harm, if they would revolt. So with five and forty thousand foot, and three thousand horse he fought the enemy; near to whom he incamped. At his first coming, *Mago* and *Masaniissa* fell upon him; with hope to take him unprepared, whilst he was making his lodgings. But he laid certain troops of horse in covert: which breaking upon them unexpected, caused them to fall off. They made at first an orderly retreat: but being more hardly pressed, they shortly betook themselves to plain flight. After this encounter, which added some courage to the *Romans*, and abated the presumption of the *Carthaginians*: there were daily skirmishes between the horse, and light armature, on both sides; wherein was nothing done of importance. *Asdrubal* drew forth his army, and arranged it before his trenches: the like did *Scipio*; each of them to shew that he durst fight; yet not proceeding any further. Thus they continued many days: *Asdrubal* being still the first that issued forth in the morning; and the first that, in the evening, withdrew himself into his trenches. The *Spanish* auxiliaries were placed on both sides in the wings: the *Carthaginians* were in the midst, with their elephants before them; and opposite to these on the other side were the *Roman* legions. When they had in this order confronted one another, though at far distance, many days together: it grew to be the common opinion, that they should shortly meet in the same form, and be matched on each part, with the enemies, long before designed. But *Scipio*, when he purposed indeed to fight, altered the form of his army; and withal, came forth earlier than he had been wont. He caused his men, and horses, to be well fed betimes in the morning, before day: and then sent forth his horse and light armature, to train out the *Carthaginians*, with their bellies empty: using herein the same trick, whereby he might remember that *Hannibal* had beaten his father in the battel of *Trebia*. His *Roman* legions he bestowed in the wings; his *Spaniards* in the battel. *Asdrubal* sent forth his horse in all haste, to entertain the *Romans*; whilst he himself arranged his men, in their wonted order, at the hill foot, upon which he incamped. In the skirmishes of the horse it could not be discerned which part had the better: since being over-pressed on either side, they had a safe retreat unto their foot; and one troop seconding another by course, returned to charge. This fight was protracted by *Scipio* to a great length: because his men, having well fed themselves, were like to hold out better than the enemy. But about noon he caused his wings to advance a good pace; leaving their battel of *Spaniards* far behind them, that came on leisurely, according to direction. The *Spanish* mercenaries, that stood in *Asdrubal's* wings, were no way comparable, save only in number, to the *Latin* and *Roman* soldiers, that came against them; for they were fresh soldiers, levied in haste; and fighting only in respect of their pay. Being therefore charged in front by the legions, and in flank, at the same time, by the *Roman Velites*, and by some cohorts, that were appointed to wheel about for the same purpose: they were sorely pressed; and with much difficulty made resistance. The *Carthaginians* would fain have succoured them; but that they durst not stir out of their places, because of the *Spanish* battel which was coming against

against them; though it were as yet far off. Thus the best part of *Asdrubal's* army stood idle, until the wings were broken. For, had he adventured to meet with the *Spaniards*, he must have cast himself into the open space that lay before him, between the *Roman* wings: to the depth whereof when he had arrived, he should have found himself inclosed in such a fort, as was the consul *Paulus* at the battel of *Cannæ*. Wherefore he did not only employ his elephants; which did, according to their manner, no greater harm to his enemies, than to his friends. When they were chased with wounds, they could no longer be ruled by their guides: but ran, as chance led them, and troubled both parts; or those perhaps the more, that were the more unwilling to kill them. In process of the fight, the *Romans*, who had well refreshed their bodies in the morning, endured lusty; when the others began to faint with travel, and heat of the day. Wherefore perceiving their advantage, they followed it the more hotly: and gave not over, till they had forc'd the enemy to change his pace, and run from him. *Asdrubal* did his best to have made an orderly retreat; and afterwards again, to have caused his men to turn head, at the hill foot. But the *Romans* would not suffer the victory to be so extorted from them: neither was it easy to put fresh courage into the vanquished; led by the obstinate passion of fear, which hearkens to no perswasion. the camp of *Asdrubal* had that day been taken, if a storm of rain, which fell violently on the sudden, and bred some superstition in the *Romans*, had not caused them to give over.

The same night, *Asdrubal* gave no rest to his men: but caused them, hungry, and over-laboured as they were, to take pains in fortifying the camp; wherein he feared to be assaulted. But little assurance could he have in the strength of his trenches, when he had lost the hearts of his *Spanish* soldiers. One *Attanes*, that was lord of the *Turdetani*, fled from him to the *Romans*, with a great band of his subjects: many followed this example; and soon after, two strong towns were yielded up to *Scipio*, and the garrisons betrayed. It seems, that the perverse fortune of this late battel, whereupon *Asdrubal* had set his rest; bred in the *Spaniards* a disposition, to believe the more easily those reports which they heard from *Italy*: for henceforward, they never did good office to the *Carthaginians*. *Asdrubal*, perceiving this, withdrew himself, and marched away, faster than an ordinary pace, towards the ocean sea. *Scipio* followed the next morning; and overtaking the *Carthaginians* with his horse, caused them so often to make stand, that they were at length attacked by the *Roman* legions. Here began a cruel slaughter: for there was no resistance made, but all fell to rout, save only seven thousand, that with *Asdrubal* himself recovered a very strong piece of ground, which they fortified in haste. This place he made shut a while to defend: but wanting there necessities to sustain himself long, he was forsaken by some of those few, that continued hitherto partakers of his fortune. Wherefore he resolved to make shift for one; and stealing from his company by night away to the sea-side, that was not far thence; he took shipping, and set sail for *Gades*. When *Scipio* understood that *Asdrubal* was thus gone: he left *Syllanus* with ten thousand foot, and a thousand horse, to besiege their camp (which was not taken in haste; for *Mago* and *Masanissa* stayed in it) whilst he with the rest of the army, did what was needful in the country abroad. It was not long ere *Mago* and *Masanissa* followed *Asdrubal* to *Gades*: and their army dis-

persed it self; some flying over to the *Romans*; others taking what way they liked. So upon all the continent of *Spain*, there were only three towns left, *Illiturgi*, *Castulo*, and *Astapa*, that made continuance of war against the *Romans*: of which only *Castulo* had in it a *Carthaginian* garrison; consisting of such as had saved themselves by flight, in the late overthrows. Hereby it seems, that the report of those historians was ill grounded, who said, that *Castulo* yielded long since unto the *Romans*; though *Hannibal* took a wife in that city. For this was one of the last three towns that held out, on the *Carthaginian* side. *Illiturgi* had sometimes been inclinable to the *Romans*; if not altogether at their devotion. Yet after the death of the two elder *Scipio's*, following too earnestly the *Carthaginian* fortune; it not only rebelled; but with great cruelty betrayed, and slew the poor men that escaped thither from the overthrows. *Astapa* was a town that still adhered to the *Carthaginians*; and, which was worse, had thriven by the spoil of the *Romans* and their confederates. Wherefore (though not until the next year) *Scipio* went against these, and took himself *Illiturgi* and *Castulo*: *Illiturgi* by assault, and with a general slaughter of the inhabitants; *Castulo*, by treason of one *Cerdubellus*. *Astapa* was taken by *Lucius Marcus*; or rather destroyed by the inhabitants. For a great pile of wood was raised in the market-place; whereinto was thrown all the gold and silver, with whatsoever else was precious; the women and children standing by it under a sure guard, that should kill and burn them if the *Romans* got into the town. This provision being made; all the inhabitants that could bear arms, rushed forth desperately, and fell upon the *Roman* camp; where striving beyond their power, they were every one slain. Then was the town forthwith set on fire, by those that had taken charge to do it: and many of the *Romans* consumed with the flame; whilst they rushed over-hastily to catch the gold and silver, which they saw lying on the pile ready to melt.

Asdrubal, being beaten into the island of *Gades*, found no cause of long stay there: but returned home to *Carthage*, with seven gallies: leaving *Mago* behind him, to wait upon occasion, if any should be offered. He visited in his way home, *Syphax*, king of the *Masafili*, a people of the *Numidians*, hoping to win him to the friendship of the *Carthaginians*. But he met with *Scipio*, as it were with his evil *Angel*, in the king's port: who, landing at the same time, carried *Syphax* quite another way. For *Scipio*, having driven the *Carthaginians* out of *Spain*, did forthwith bethink himself, how to finish the war, by putting them to the like distress in *Afric*. Hereunto it seemed, that the help of *Syphax* would be much available: a king that had many times fallen out with the *Carthaginians*, and sustained much hurt by their procurement; of which in all likelihood he might easily be moved to seek revenge. He had also been beholden to *P.* and *Cn. Scipio*, that sent him over a captain into *Afric*; who instructed him so well in marshalling his forces, as he thereby often became victorious. Upon these reasons the *Numidian* king sent ambassadors to *Rome*, and made league with the city, in a time of great extremity. So that hereby *P. Scipio* conceived hope of laying a foundation to the war, which he intended in *Afric*, upon the friendship of this ill neighbour to the *Carthaginians*. For which cause he sent over *C. Laelius* his ambassador, to deal with *Syphax*: who declaring, that the *Carthaginians* did very ill in *Italy*, and had nothing now at all to do in *Spain*; easily perswaded the king to take part with those that had the better, and were

without question his better friends. Only *Syphax* requested, that the *Roman* general should visit him in person, to conclude the league; by which he was to enter into conditions of more importance, than in any former treaty. Hereto *Scipio* condescended; thinking the friendship of so great a king, that was neighbour to *Carthage*, and not far distant from *Spain*, well worthy of the adventure. So with two *Quinquereme* gallies he took sea: and arrived in the king's port, at the same time with *Asdrubal*. This would have been very dangerous to him, had he been defied by his enemies further at sea: but in the haven, they forbore to make offer one upon the other. *Syphax* might well be proud; seeing at one time, two such captains of the two most powerful cities, came to desire his friendship. He would have brought them to treat of peace: but the *Roman* excused himself, by want of such commission from the senate. He feasted them together: and shortly dismissed *Scipio*, with whom he readily entered into covenant; which in time of performance, he as readily brake.

†. II.

Funeral games held by Scipio. A duel between two Spanish princes. A digression, concerning duels.

SCIPIO returning into *Spain*, and resting that winter, took vengeance the next year upon those of *Illiturgi*, *Castulo*, and *Astapa*, as hath been said before. The conquest of the country being then in a manner at an end; he performed at *New Carthage*, with great solemnity, some Vows that he had made; and honoured the memory of his father and uncle, with funeral games, especially of those that fought at sharp, according to the manner of the times. Neither was it needful, that he should trouble himself with preparing slaves for that spectacle, to hazard their lives, as was used in the city of *Rome*: for there were enough, that either offered themselves as voluntiers, or were sent from their princes, to give proof in single combat, of the valour that was in their several countries. Some also there were, that being in contention, which they could not, or would not otherwise end, agreed to refer the decision of their controversy, to trial of the sword, in single fight. Among these, the most eminent, were *Corbis* and *Orsua*, cousin-germans, that contended for the principality of a town called *Ibes*. *Corbis* was the elder, and the elder brother's son: wherefore he claimed the lordship, as eldest of the house, after the manner of our *Irish Tanistry*. But the father of *Orsua* stood lately seized of the principality: which though himself received by the death of his elder brother, yet this his son would not let it go back; but claimed to hold it as heir unto his father, and old enough to rule. Fain would *Scipio* have compounded the matter. But they answered peremptorily, That all their friends, and kindred had already laboured in vain, to take up that quarrel; and that neither God, nor man, but only *Mars*, their god of battel, should be umpire between them. So they had their wills: and the elder, who was also the stronger, and more skillful at his weapon, easily vanquished the fool-hardiness of the younger.

Such combats have been very ancient; and perhaps more ancient, than any other kind of fight. We read of many performed before the war of *Troy*, by *Theseus*, *Hercules*, *Pollux*, and others: as also of two more at the war of *Troy*; the one between *Paris* and *Menelaus*; the other between *Hector* and *Ajax*. Neither want their examples of them

among the *Hebrews*: whereof that between *David* and *Goliath*; and others performed by some of *David's* worthies, against those that challenged them; are greatly celebrated. Unto the same kind appertains the fight, between twelve of the tribe of *Juda* and as many of the *Benjamites*. The *Romans* had many of them: whereof that was principal, in which they ventured their dominion upon the heads of three brethren the *Horatii*, against the three brethren *Curatii*, that were *Albans*. The combat of *Manlius Torquatus*, and shortly after, of *Valerius Corvinus*, with two champions of the *Gauls*, which challenged any *Roman*; were of less importance, as having only reference to bravery. In *England* there was a great combat fought, between *Edmond Ironside* and *Canutus* the *Dane*, for no less matter than the kingdom. The use of them was very frequent in the *Saxon* times; almost upon every occasion, great or small. In the reign of *Edward* the third, who sustained the party of *Mountfort* against the earl of *Blois*, contending for the dutchy of *Bretagne*; there was a fight, for honour of the nations, between thirty of the *Bretanes*, and thirty *English*: two of which *English*, were *Calverly*, a brave captain, and that *Sir Robert Knolles*, who afterwards became a renowned commander in the *French* wars, and did highly honour his blood, whereof the lord *Knolles* is descended. It were infinite to reckon the examples of the like, found in *English*, *French*, and *Italian* histories. Most of them have been combats of bravery, and of *gayeté de cœur*, as the *French* term it; for honour of several nations; for love of mistresses; or whatsoever else gave occasion unto men, desirous to set out themselves. But besides those of this sort, there are two other natures of combats; which are, either upon accusation for life; or upon trial of title and inheritance, as in *writ of right*. And of this latter kind was that, of which we spake even now, between *Corbis* and *Orsua*. Unto these (methinks) may be added, as of different condition from the rest, the combat upon wager; such as were that between *David* and *Goliath*; or that between the *Horatii* and *Curatii*: in which, (without regard of title, the dominion of nations, one over the other, is adventured upon the head of champions. ^a Upon an accusation for life, there was a combat appointed between the lord *Henry* of *Boulinbrook*, duke of *Hereford*, and *Moubray*, duke of *Norfolk*. ^b There was a combat performed by *Sir John Ansley*, and one *Cattrington*: whom *Ansley* charged with treason; and proved it upon him, by being victorious. The like was fought between *Robert* of *Mountfort*, and *Henry* of *Effex*. ^c The like also between a *Navarrois*, and one *Welch* of *Grimsby*, whom the *Navarrois* accused of treason: but, being beaten in fight, confessed that he had belied him; and was therefore drawn and hanged. Whether our trial by battel do determine, that the false accuser, if he be vanquished, shall suffer the punishment which had been due to the offender, if the accusation had been proved, I cannot affirm. But we every-where find, that if he which is accused of treason, or, according to the customs of *Normandy*, of murder, rape, or burning of places (offences punished by death) be overcome, he shall suffer the pains appointed for those crimes. In combats for trial of right, it is not so: neither is the appellant or defendant bound to fight in person, but he may try it by his champion; as did *Paramor* and *Lowe*, or offered to do, in the reign of queen *Elizabeth*. And in this case, he that is beaten, or yieldeth, loseth only his cause,

^a Anno 21. Ric. 2.

^b Anno 3. Ric. 2.

^c Anno 9. Hen. 2.

not his life. Neither are the combats, upon accusation, or trial of right, fought in open field, as are those of bravery, but in *campe close*; that is, within rails. Now this trial by combat was so ordinary in *France*, before the time of *St. Lewis*, and *Philip the fair*, his grand-child, as every lord of fee, ecclesiastical or temporal, had power to grant it within his own jurisdiction. And it seemeth, that the *French* kings, and other lords, made their profit hereby. For in the * *Memorials of the chamber of accounts*, is found an article to this effect: That if a combat were once accepted, and after, by consent of the the lord, were taken up, each of the parties should pay two shillings and six-pence; but if it were performed, then should the party vanquished forfeit an hundred and twelve shillings. And upon this custom grew the *French* proverb, which they use when any man hath had an hard or unjust judgment, saying, that *he was tried by the law of Loray, or Berne; ou le battu paye l'amende*, where he that is beaten gives the recompence. Of these frequent trials by battel, that great learned man *Yvo*, bishop of *Chartres*, did often complain, and especially against the *French* church-men: as appears by ^b his letters to the bishop of *Orleans*, to the arch-deacon of *Paris*, to *Rembert* archbishop of *Sens*, and to others; wherein he rebukes the judgment of their churches, that had ratified such challenges of combat. But this liberty, and kind of trial, was retrenched by *St. Lewis*, and *Philip the fair*; so that no man should decree or grant it, save the king himself. It hath since been granted, though more sparingly, by the *French* kings; as to the lord of *Carouges* against *Jaques les gris*; and to *Julian Romero* the Spaniard, against *Moro* his country-man: wherein Sir *Henry Kneuet*, father of the lord *Kneuet*, now living, was patron to *Romero*, that had the victory; and lastly, to the lord of *Chast*. Now in those challenges, upon accusation of treason, murder, or other offence deserving death (and in those only) the rule held; That *le defendeur estoit tenu de proposer ces deffenses par une dementir*; The defendant was bound to plead not guilty, by giving the accuser the lie: otherwise it was concluded, that the defendant did *taiblement confesser le crime*; silently confess the crime. But after such time as *Francis* the *French* king, upon some dispute about breach of faith, had sent the *lie* unto the emperor *Charles* the fifth, thereby to draw him to a personal combat: every petty companion in *France*, in imitation of their master, made the giving of the *lie* mortality it self; holding it a matter of no small glory, to have it said, that the meanest gentleman in *France*, would not put up, what the great emperor *Charles* the fifth had patiently endured.

From this beginning is derived a challenge of combat, grounded upon none of those occasions that were known to the antient. For, the honour of nations, the trial of right, the wager upon champions, or the objection and refutation of capital offences, are none of them, nor all of them together, the argument of half so many duels, as are founded upon mere private anger; yea, or upon matter seeming worthy of anger in the opinion of the duellists. So that in these days, wherein every man takes unto himself a kingly liberty, to offer, accept, and appoint personal combats; the giving of the *lie*, which ought to be the negation only in accusations for life, is become the most fruitful root of deadly quarrels. This is held

a word so terrible, and a wrong so unpardonable, as will admit no other recompence, than the blood of him that gives it. Thus the fashion, taken up in haste by the *French* gentlemen, after the pattern of their king, is grown to be a custom: whence we have derived a kind of art and philosophy of quarrel, with certain grounds and rules, from whence the points of honour, and the dependencies thereof, are deduced. Yea, there are (among many other no less ridiculous) some so mystical curiosities herein, as that it is held a far greater dishonour to receive from an enemy a slight touch with a cane, than a sound blow with a sword; the one having relation to a slave; the other to a soldier. I confess, that the difference is pretty; though, for mine own part, if I had had any such *Italianated* enemy in former times, I should willingly have made with him such an exchange, and have given him the point of honour to boot.

But let us examine indifferently the offence of this terrible word, the *lie*, with their conditions, who are commonly, of all other, the most tender in receiving it. I say, that the most of these, who present death on the points of their swords to all that give it them, use nothing so much in their conversation and course of life, as to speak and swear falsely. Yea, it is thereby that they shift and shuffle in the world, and abuse it. For how few are there among them, which having assumed and sworn to pay the monies, and other things they borrow, do not break their word and promise as often as they engage it? Nay, how few are there among them, that are not *liars by record*, by being sued in some court or other of justice, upon breach of word, or bond? For he which hath promised that he will pay money by a day, or promised any thing else, wherein he faileth, hath directly lied to him to whom the promise hath been made. Nay, what is the profession of love that men make now-a-days? What is the vowing of their service, and of a they have used in their ordinary compliments, and (in effect) to every man whom they bid but good-morrow, or salute, other than a courteous and court-like kind of lying? It is, saith a wise *Frenchman* (deriding therein the apish custom of his country) *une marché & complot fait ensemble se mocquer, mentir, & piper les uns les autres*; A kind of merchandise, and complot made among them, to mock, belie, and deride each other: and so far now-a-days in fashion, and in use; as he that useth it not, is accounted either dull, or cynical. True it is notwithstanding (omitting the old distinction) that there is great difference between these mannerly and complimentary lies, with those which are sometime perswaded by necessity upon breach of promise; and those which men use out of cowardice and fear: the latter confessing themselves to be in greater awe of men, than of God; a vice, of all other, stiled the most villainous. But now for the *lie* it self, as it is made the subject of all our deadly quarrels in effect: to it I say, that whoso gives another man the *lie*, when it is manifest that he hath lied, doth him no wrong at all; neither ought it to be more heinously taken, than to tell him, that he hath broken any promise which he hath otherwise made. For he that promiseth any thing, tells him to whom he hath promised, that he will perform it; and, in not performing it, he hath made himself a liar. On the other side, he that gives any man the *lie*, when he himself knows that he to whom it is given, hath not lied,

* Si homines de Loraico vadia duelli temere dederint, &c.

^b Clerici vestri nuper ad nos revertentes, qui causae comitis Theodaldi Aurelianensis interfuerunt, retulerunt nobis, quod quidam miles Domini Rodulphi quendam militem comitis ad Monomachiam provocavit, & hanc provocationem Ecclesiae vestrae judicio confirmaverit, &c.

doth therein give the lie directly to himself. And what cause have I, if I say that the sun shines, when it doth shine, and that another fellow tells me I lie, for it's mid-night, to prosecute such an one to death, for making himself a foolish ruffian, and a liar in his own knowledge? For he that gives the lie in any other dispute, than in defence of his loyalty or life, gives it impertinently, and ruffian-like. I will not deny, but it is an extreme rudeness to tax any man in publick with an untruth (if it be not pernicious, and to his prejudice against whom the untruth is uttered) but all that is rude, ought not to be civilized with death. That were more to admire and imitate a *French* custom, and a wicked one, than to admire and to follow the counsel of God: but you will say, that these discourses favour of cowardise. It is true, if you call it cowardise to fear God or hell; whereas he that is truly wise, and truly valiant, knows that there is nothing else to be feared. For against an enemy's sword we shall find ten thousand seven-penny men (waged at that price in the wars) that fear it as little, or perchance less, than any profess'd swordsman in the world. *Diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo*; Fortitude is a diligent preserver of it self. It is (saith *Aristotle*) a mediocrity between doubting and daring. *Sicut non martyrem poena; sic nec fortem pugna, sed causa*: As it is not the punishment that makes the martyr; so it is not fighting that declares a valiant man, but fighting in a good cause. In which whosoever shall resolvedly end his life, resolvedly in respect of the cause, to wit, in defence of his prince, religion, or country; as he may justly be numbered among the martyrs of God; so may those that die with malicious hearts, in private combats, be called the martyrs of the devil. Neither do we indeed take our own revenge, or punish the injuries offered us, by the death of the injurious. For the true conquest of revenge is, to give him, of whom we would be revenged, cause to repent him; and not to lay the repentance of another man's death on our own consciences; *animasq; in vulnere ponere*; And to drown our souls in the wounds and blood of our enemies. Hereupon you will again ask me, if I condemn in generous and noble spirits the defence of their honours, being pressed with injuries? I say, that I do not, if the injuries be violent. For the law of nature, which is a branch of the eternal law; and the laws of all christian kings and states, do favour him that is assailed, in the slaughter of the assailant. You will secondly ask me, whether a noblemen, or a gentleman, being challenged by *cartel*, by one of like quality, be not bound, in point of honour, to satisfy the challenger in private combat? I answer, that he is not; because (omitting the greatest, which is the point of religion) the point of the law is directly contrary and opposite to that, which they call the point of honour; the law which hath dominion over it, which can judge it, which can destroy it; except you will stile those acts honourable, where the hangman gives the garland. For, seeing the laws of this land have appointed the hangman to second the conqueror; and the laws of *God* appointed the *Devil* to second the conquered dying in malice: I say, that he is both base, and a fool, that accepts of any *cartel* so accompanied. To this perchance it will be answered, that the kings of *England*, and other christian kings, have seldom taken any such advantage over men of quality; who upon even terms have slain their private enemies. It is true, that as in times of trouble and combustion they have not often done

it; so did our noblemen and gentlemen in former ages, in all important injuries, sue unto the king, to approve themselves by battel and publick combat. For as they dared not to brave the law: so did they disdain to submit themselves to the shameful revenge thereof; the same revenge (because it detesteth murder) that it hath declared against a common cut-purse, or other thieves. Nay, let it be granted, that a pardon be procured for such offenders; yet is not the man-slayer freed by his pardon. For these two remedies hath the party grieved notwithstanding; that is, to require justice by grand-assize, or by battel, upon his appeal, which (saith ** Sir Thomas Smith*) is not denied; and he further saith (for I use his own words) that if the defendant (to wit, the man-slayer) be convinced either by great assize, or by battel, upon that appeal; the man-slayer shall die, notwithstanding the prince's pardon. So favourable (saith the same learned gentleman) are our princes, and the law of our realm, to justice, and to the punishment of blood violently shed. It may further be demanded, how our noblemen and gentlemen shall be repaired in honour, where an enemy, taking the start either in words or blows, shall lay on them an infamy unsufferable? I say, that a marshal's court will easily give satisfaction in both. And if we hold it no disgrace to submit our selves, for the recovery of our debts, goods, and lands, and for all things else, by which the lives of our selves, our wives, and children, are sustained, to the judges of the law; because it may be felony, to take by violence even that which is our own: why should we not submit our selves to the judges of honour in cases of honour; because to recover our reputation by strong hand, may be murder? But yet again it may be objected, that the loss of honour ought to be much more fearful unto us, than either the loss of our goods, of our lands, or of our lives; and I say so too. But what is this honour, I mean honour indeed, and that which ought to be so dear unto us, other than a kind of history, or some following actions of virtue, actions accompanied with difficulty or danger, and undertaken for the publick good? In these, he that is imployed and trusted, if he fail in the performance, either through cowardise, or any other base affection; it is true that he loseth his honour. But the acting of a private combat, for a private respect, and most commonly a frivolous one, is not an action of virtue; because it is contrary to the law of God, and of all christian kings: neither is it difficult; because even and equal in persons and arms: neither for a publick good, but tending to the contrary; because the loss or mutilation of an able man, is also a loss to the commonweal.

Now that a marshal of *England* hath power to save every man's fame and reputation, as far as reputation may sustain injury by words, I think no man doubteth. For to repent us of any evil words that we have given, and to confess that we have done him wrong to whom we have given them, is a sufficient satisfaction; and, as it may fall out, more than sufficient. For he, that gives ill words in choler, and suddenly denies them, or repents himself of them upon advisement, hath the disadvantage in point of reputation. Concerning blows, which are indeed not to be given but to those that are servile, whether sufficient recompence will be made for them, it shall appear by a notable example of a most worthy gentleman, *Monsieur de Pleffis*, that was stricken in *France* not long since,

* Sir Thomas Smith, in his commonwealth of England.

by a baron of the same nation. The satisfaction which was given him by a judgment of the constable, and marshals of *France*, was this: In the open court, wherein the constable gave judgment, *M. de Pleffis* was set in a chair under the degrees where the constable and marshals sat: the baron, who had given him the blow, did kneel before him on both knees, holding in his right hand a sword, with the point towards himself, and in his left hand the like cudgel, or bastinado, wherewith he had stricken *M. de Pleffis*; both which weapons he delivered into *Pleffis's* hands, submitting himself to such revenge, as it should please him to take with either of those weapons; the constable and marshals having formally left it to the will of *Pleffis* to use his own discretion in the revenge of his own wrongs. Now whether the baron had reason to please himself, as one before-hand in point of honour, who struck *M. de Pleffis*, like a ruffian, coming behind him, and (having advantage of company, and his horses ready) shifted himself away on the sudden, but being afterwards taken, was taught to repent himself in this shameful manner; or whether *M. de Pleffis* (of whose valour no man doubted) had not far juster cause to rest satisfied, since he might at his pleasure have beaten or wounded his enemy, but forgave him; let any wise man judge. To this if it be said, that the baron was constrained to make his submission, that his repentance was enforced, and not voluntary; and therefore no disgrace unto him: I answer, that one may say as well, that it is no disgrace to a thief, when he is brought to the gallows, to repent him of the robberies by him committed, because his repentance also is constrained. And it is true, that enforced repentance is no disgrace, in respect of the force, but in respect of the fact: which (but for our sins to God) makes all appearance shameful; because all forced repentance is inflicted upon us for somewhat unworthy of a gentleman and of an honest man. Nay, voluntary repentance it self, as it hath relation to men, ariseth either out of the fear of the ill that may befall us, or out of the acknowledgment of our own weakness. Certainly, as wise men, and valiant men, do rather deride petty injuries, or sudden injuries, that are not offered from malice fore-thought, than revenge them: so men, apt to quarrel, do commonly suspect their own valour; and rather desire, that thereby the world should believe them to be of great daring, than know any such resolution in themselves. For he that knows himself indeed to be a valiant man, scorns to hunt after opinion.

Now the same power, which the constable and marshals of *France* have, hath also a marshal of *England*, or his Deputies; by whose judgment, in all disputes of honour, every man's reputation may be preserved; we may therefore as well submit our selves to the judges of honour, in all disputes of honour, as we do submit our selves in all controversies of livelihood and life, to the judges of the law. And, out of doubt, the institution of this court of chivalry in *England*, in *France*, and elsewhere, was no less charitable than politic. For the blood of man, violently spilt, doth not bring forth honey-bees, as that of bulls doth, which sting but the fingers, or the face: but it produceth that most monstrous beast, *Revenge*; which hath stung to death, and eaten up of several nations, so many noble patronages, as there is nothing more lamentable, nor more threatening the wrath of God upon supreme governors, than the permission.

His majesty therefore (which *Henry* the fourth of *France* also endeavoured) hath done a most kingly and christian-like deed in *Scotland*, which the most renowned of all his predecessors could never do: in beating down, and extinguishing, that hereditary prosecution of malice, called *the deadly feud*; a conquest, which will give him the honour of prudence and kingly power for evermore. And we have cause to hope, that his royal care shall be no less happy in preventing the like mischief, which threatens *England*, by the audacious, common, and brave, yet outrageous vanity of duellists.

Unto this that I have spoken of lying, and of man-slaughter, it must be added, that each of these are of great latitude; and worthy of reproof and vengeance proportionably, more or less, in their several degrees. There is much difference between lies of necessity, upon breach of promise, or complimentary lies; and such pernicious lies, as proceed from fear and cowardise, or are uttered by false witnesses: the former sort, being excusable by weakness or levity; the latter, being altogether detestable. No less, if not more, difference there is, between killing of a man in open field, with even weapons; and that killing, which the scriptures call *killing by guile*, *dolo* or *per insidias*; though our laws do not much distinguish them in punishment. For in the latter, God, forsaking his own privilege, commandeth, that the *guileful* murderer be drawn by force, from the protection of his altar. Neither is every guileful murder performed by the sword; nor by overt violence: but there is a guileful murder also, by poysoning; and by the pen, or by practice. For such distinction is found, between coming *presumptuously* upon a man, *to slay him with guile*, and *lying in wait for blood, privily, for the innocent without a cause*, upon hope of spoil, after such manner as *the net is spread before the eyes of the birds*. *Francis* the first, queen *Mary* of *England*, and the king's majesty now reigning, have given notable testimony of their justice, upon three noblemen, who committed *guileful* murder. Of the first kind, king *Francis* upon the lord of *Talard*: who being (saith the *French* historian) *de haute & ancienne lignée, & supporté de plusieurs grandes alliances*; who being of high and ancient lineage, and supported by divers great alliances, of which the cardinal of *Bellay* (in special favour with the king) was one, was notwithstanding delivered over into the hands of a hangman. Queen *Mary*, upon a nobleman of her own religion, and in many other respects very dear unto her. His majesty, upon a baron of *Scotland*; whose house was no less ancient and faithful, than himself valiant, and greatly friended both at home and abroad. Of killing guilefully by poyson, and of punishment following such wicked artificers, every age hath had too many examples. Of killing guilefully by the pen (that I may not speak of any *English* judge) the author of the *French Recherches* gives us two notable instances: the one of *des Esbars*, who (saith *Pasquire*) *fit mourir Montaigne grand maitre de France, pour contenter l'opinion de celuy dont il estoit lors idolâtre; & Dieu permit que depuis il fut pendu & estranglé*; who caused *Montaigne*, great master of *France* to die, to content his mind (to wit, the duke of *Burgoyne*) whom at that time *Esbars* worshipped as his idol; but God permitted, that he himself was soon after hanged and strangled. The other was of the great *Francis* the first, upon his chancellor *Poyer*;

a Exod. 21.

b Exod. 21. 14.

c Prov. 1. 11.

d Lib. 5. cap. 12. & cap. 11.

who, to satisfy the king's passion, practised the destruction of admiral *Chabot*, a man most nobly descended, and of great service. For as in other men, so in kings, the passion of love grows old, and wears out by time. So the king's affection being changed towards the admiral, he charged him with some offences which he had formerly committed. The admiral, presuming upon the great good service which he had done the king in *Piedmont*, and in the defence of *Marseilles* against the emperor, gave the king other language than became him; and desired nothing so much as a publick trial. Hereupon the king (it being easy to provoke an ill disposition) gave commission to the chancellor, as president, and other judges, upon an information of the king's advocate, to question the admiral's life. The chancellor, an ambitious man, and of a large conscience (which is not rare in men towards the law) hoping highly to content the king; wrought with some of the judges with so great cunning; with others, with so sharp threats; and with the rest, with so fair promises; as, albeit nothing could be proved against the admiral, worthy of the king's displeasure; yet the chancellor subscribed, and got others to subscribe, to the forfeiture of his estate, offices, and liberty; though not able to prevail against his life. But what was the chancellor's reward (the king hating falshood in so great a magistrate) other than his own degradation, arraignment, and condemnation? *Belle leçon certes* (saith *Pasquire*) *à tout juge pour demeurer toujours en soy, & de laisser fluctuer sa conscience dedans les vagues d'une imaginaire faveur, qui pour fin de jeu le submerge*; a fair lesson to all judges, to dwell always in themselves, and not to suffer their consciences to float upon the waves of imaginary favour, which in the end overwhelm them. And as for the admiral: though it might have been answered unto his friends, if any bewailed his calamity, as undeserved, that he was tried, according to his own desire, by the laws of his country, and by the judges of parliament; yet the king's justice, surmounting all other his passions, gave back unto him his honour, his offices, his liberty, and his estate.

† III.

The last acts of Scipio in Spain. His return to Rome, where he is chosen consul.

THE last business that troubled *Scipio* in *Spain*, grew by the rebellion of the people, and mutiny of his soldiers. He fell dangerously sick, in such sort, that the rumour of his death ran current throughout *Spain*. This encouraged *Mandonius* and *Indibilis*, petty kings, that had forsaken the *Carthaginians*, and followed *Scipio* a while before, to take arms against the *Romans*. They were vainly perswaded, that after the *Carthaginians* were driven out, they themselves should become the mightiest in all *Spain*. But seeing now, that things were no way answerable to the greatness of their hopes, they thought it best, to take the present advantage, and hammer out their own fortunes. So they rashly fell upon the *Sufsetani* and *Sedetani*, confederates of the *Romans*, and wasted their country. Part of the *Roman* army lying at *Sucro*, instead of making head against these rebels, grew to be affected with the like distemper. They had not reaped such profit of their *Roman* conquests, as might satisfy their desires; or as they thought easy to be gotten, if they might be their own carvers. Wherefore, when the death of *Scipio* was reported, they thought, that the time

served very well, to enrich themselves with the spoil of the country. Many outrages they committed; and, which was greatest of all, driving away their colonels, that should have bridled their fury; they chose out of their own number, two base fellows, *Albius Calenus*, and *Atrius Umber*, to be their commanders. These took upon them all the ensigns of proconsuls, or propretors; as if this their election had been like to that, wherein *Lucius Martius* was chosen by the soldiers, after the death of the two *Scipio's*. But whilst they were devising, what exploits they might do, for the enriching of themselves, in a time of such combustion, as was expected; there arrived more certain news, that *Scipio* was both alive, and in good health. There came also new colonels, sent unto them from their general: who mildly rebuking their want of consideration, and seeming to be glad, that they had no further over-shot themselves, led them to *Carthage*, there to receive their pay. Before their coming, *Scipio* had resolved to do exemplary justice on the principal offenders; and to put the whole multitude of them in fear of what they had deserved. Therefore he caused *Syllanus* to make ready the companies which lay before in the town, as it were to make an expedition against *Mandonius*, and *Indibilis*; he caused *Albius* and *Atrius*, with some thirty other of their complices, to be secretly apprehended in their lodgings; he called the mutineers to assembly; and having them unarmed as they were, encircled round by *Syllanus*, and his companies, prepared for the purpose; he bitterly inveighed against them all, as traitors. This done, *Albius*, and *Atrius*, with the other prisoners, were haled to the stake; where they were whipt, and beheaded, as was the *Roman* custom towards such offenders. The rest of the soldiers, to the number of eight thousand, were caused to take their oath of obedience a-new; and received every man his pay when he was sworn.

Mandonius and *Indibilis* continued in arms, notwithstanding that they had certain word of *Scipio's* life and health. Well they could have been contented to be quiet: but, by the severity used to the *Roman* soldiers, they stood in fear, as being *Spaniards*, and greater offenders, of harder measure. *Scipio* went against them; and found them in a valley, that was scarce large enough to hold all their army. In the entrance thereof he fought with them: and sending *Laelius*, with all his horse, to fetch a compass about the hills, and charge them in rear; he overthrew them. *Indibilis* and *Mandonius* had after this no hope remaining, to preserve themselves and their estates, otherwise than by making submission. *Mandonius* therefore came to *Scipio*: and, humbly craving pardon, both for himself, and for his brother *Indibilis*, obtained his request; yet so, that they were taught to acknowledge themselves less free princes than formerly they had been.

Afterwards *Scipio* went towards *Gades*: and was met on the way by *Masanissa*; who secretly promised to do him all service, if the people of *Rome* would send him to make war in *Africa*. Unto *Mago*, that lay in *Gades*, came directions from *Carthage*; that letting all care of *Spain* alone, he should thence depart with his fleet into *Italy*; and there wage an army of *Gauls* and *Ligurians*, to join with *Hannibal*. For this purpose, was money sent unto him from *Carthage*: and he himself laid hold upon all that he could find in the town of *Gades*: without sparing either private men, the common treasury, or the temples. In his voyage thence, he landed at *Carthage*: hoping

ping to have taken it by surprise. But he failed in the attempt; and was so beaten to his ships, that he returned back to repose himself a-while at *Gades*. The *Gaditanes*, offended with the robberies and spoil that he had made at his taking leave of them, would not suffer him again to enter into their city. By this he foresaw, that it would not be long ere they became *Roman*. Wherefore sending messengers into the town, to complain of this uncourteous dealing, he allured their magistrates forth unto him; whom, notwithstanding all the excuse they could make, he whipped and crucified. This done, he followed his former intended voyage, bidding *Spain* farewell for ever.

The isle and city of *Gades* was yielded to the *Romans* presently after the departure of *Mago*. Then did *Scipio* deliver up the province to those that were sent from *Rome* to succeed him therein, and himself, with ten ships, returned home. At his coming to *Rome*, he made suit for the honour of a triumph: but it was denied him, for that it had as yet been granted unto no proconsul, excepting to such as received that dignity after a consulship, as it were by prorogation. But to make amends for this repulse, the election of new consuls being then in hand, by general voice of the city, *P. Cornelius Scipio* was chosen consul; and *P. Licinius Crassus* joined with him. This *Crassus*, being high-priest, or bishop of the *Romans*, might not, by the custom of those times, go far from the city, as being to intend the matters of their superstition: though *Cesar*, and others, who in ages following held the same office, were stayed by no such religious impediment from being far, and long absent. Hereby it came to pass, that *Scipio* desiring to have the war transferred into *Afric*, was in no danger to lose that honourable charge by any mischance of lot in the division of provinces; for that his colleague was not capable of employment so far off.

SECT. XVIII.

Scipio obtains leave to make war in Afric. His preparations. Of Masaniſſa, who joined with Scipio. The victories against Asdrubal and Syphax.

P*U. B. Cornelius Scipio*, and *P. Licinius Crassus*, entering into their consulship, held a meeting of the senate in the capitol; wherein it was decreed, that *Scipio* should be allowed to bestow part of the money which he had brought out of *Spain* into the treasury, upon the setting forth of solemn plays that he had vowed to make whilst he was busied in his *Spanish* wars. This helped well to revive the memory of his victories already gotten, and to give hope unto the people of greater victories in the war which he intended to make in *Afric*. To the same purpose did the *Spanish* embassages avail much in the senate, especially that of the *Saguntines*, who magnified his actions highly and deservedly; saying, that they were the most happy of all their countrymen, since they being present, had seen him chosen consul, and should carry home such joyful news. The *Saguntine* ambassadors were lovingly entertained by the senate, as their faith to *Rome* (though costly it were, both to them and to the *Romans*) had well deserved. Nevertheless, when *Scipio* proposed that *Afric* might be decreed unto him for his province, there wanted not many, even of the principal men, that vehemently gainſay'd him. Of these was *Q. Fabius Maximus* the chief, who seems to have been troubled with that disease, which too often causeth men renowned for long approved virtue, to look askint upon the actions of those that follow them in the same kind. He alledged many

reasons against the purpose of the consul, whereof the chief were, that the treasury was unable to sustain the charges of a war in *Afric*; and that it was extremely perilous to hazard so great forces, where they could not at pleasure be recalled unto the defence of *Rome* it self, if need required. Hereunto he added many words concerning the danger wherein *Italy* stood; not only of *Hannibal*, but of *Mago* his brother, that was arming the *Ligurians*: as also concerning the honour of the consul, which would (he said) be greater in setting *Italy* free from enemies, than it could be in doing any harm to *Afric*. Neither did he forget both to elevate the *Spanish* wars, as of less moment than the intended voyage against *Carthage*; nor withal, to lay great blame upon *Scipio*, for having suffered *Asdrubal* to pass into *Italy*: shewing, that it was greatly to be feared lest the like might happen again; and that a new army, notwithstanding the good success of *Scipio* (if it had happened to be good) might be sent from *Carthage*, to the utter endangering of *Rome*, whilst the *Roman* forces were employed abroad. But the main point which he urged, was, that neither the senate had ordained, nor the people commanded, *Afric* to be that year a province; which the consul nevertheless propounded in such wise, as if it were a matter already concluded, and no longer to be argued. *Scipio*, on the other side, insisted upon this one point, that it was better to make an offensive, than a defensive war, especially against such as the *Carthaginians*; who being ill-provided of able men at home, did furnish themselves by help of money, with levies made abroad. As for the care of *Italy*, he doubted not but *P. Licinius* his colleague, would be as well able to discharge it now, as others had done in times of greater danger. So promising to draw *Hannibal* into *Afric*, for defence of his own home; and taxing as civilly as he could the envy of *Fabius*, which withstood such a gallant enterprise, he proposed the matter again unto the senate. Much alteration there was about the manner of his proceeding, forasmuch as it was noised abroad, that if he could not bring the senate to his mind, he would carry it by the people. This offended many of the antients, who resented in this honourable man a little spice of that arrogance, which in following ages grew to be much hotter in those that had commanded long abroad. But in conclusion, *Scipio* referred himself wholly unto the senate's good-will and pleasure; whereby he obtained thus much, that the isle of *Sicily* might be appointed unto him for his province, with leave to pass over into *Afric*, if he found it expedient.

Want of money, and no great liking to his voyage, made the *Roman* senate have little care to furnish out *Scipio* to the war, by him intended upon *Afric*. Herewithal it fell out, that *Mago*, coming on the sudden from the *Baleares* to *Genoa*, and winning the town, bred a fear of no less terrible invasion upon *Italy*, than that which *Asdrubal* had lately made. He could not indeed raise any great army of the *Ligurians*, for that he found them distracted with civil wars. Therefore he was driven to make choice of his party, and to help those whom he thought fittest for his turn, against the others. This troublesome business, though it occupied more of his time than he could willingly have spared; yet it got him reputation by his victories, and made the unsteady *Gauls* ready to enter into his pay. Hereupon the dispersed legions of the *Romans*, that, under proconsuls and pretors, lay ready to be employed where need should require, were directed unto the borders of *Lombardy*, and *Liguria*, there to make head against *Mago*. But all his menaces passed away

in vapour: for a fleet, either coming to his aid from *Carthage*, or by him sent thither (the report is uncertain) laden with the booty that he had taken, fell into the hands of the *Roman* pretor that governed in *Sardinia*. This did much disable him; and though after a while there came letters from *Carthage*, together with store of money, heartning him in his proceedings; yet some impediments which he found, and that fatal voyage of *Scipio* into *Afric*, disturbed all, and made him be recalled home.

Against *Hannibal* was nothing done this year. Neither was any thing done by him, of which the *Roman* historians have been pleased to take notice; only it is said, that he spent the summer by the temple of *Juno Lucina*, where he raised an altar, with a huge title of all that he had performed, graven in *Punic* and *Greek* letters. Such account of winnings pass'd, is commonly in gamesters that are at the height of their fortune, a cause of remission and carelessness; in those that are upon the losing hand, a cause both of the same for the present, and shortly after of dejection, when they find a notable change. A great pestilence, infecting both the *Carthaginian* and the *Roman* camp, is said to have been the occasion of this year's idleness; which fell out not much amiss for the city of *Rome*, that was marvelously impoverished by this war; and had already tried the utmost way to defray the charges, which grew insupportable. To relieve the present necessity, it was well thought upon, that a great part of *Campania* (not many years since confiscated) should be sold, or let out; in which bargain, that the city might receive no loss, the tenth part of the fine was ordained as a reward unto the detectors of lands concealed.

Of this, or other money, none was given to *Scipio*; neither was he allowed to make press of soldiers for his *African* voyage; neither did he over-much labour to obtain it. That which the senate refused, the people did for him; or rather, they did it for themselves, that were therein wiser than the senate. It is usually found in counsels of state, that the busy, or obstinate heads of a few, do carry all the rest: And many times men make a surrender of their own judgments, to the wisdom that hath gotten it self a name, by giving happy direction in troubles fore-pass'd. Therefore he, that reposeth himself upon the advice of many, shall often find himself deceived; the counsel of those many, being wholly directed by the temper of a few, that over-throw the rest. *Q. Fabius* was accounted the oracle of his time, for his wary nature sort'd well with the business that fell out in the chief of his employment. Unto him therefore *Q. Fulvius* adhered, with other of the senators, that were grown old in following one course, from whence they could not shift, as the change of times required. But the people (who, though they could not well advise and deliberate, yet could well apprehend) embraced the needful resolution of *Scipio*; in such sort, that besides his *Roman* forces, he had from divers parts of *Italy* about seven thousand volunteers. He had also provision from the several towns; corn, iron, canvas for sails, axes, breed-hooks, hand-mills, and the like implements; fir for building of ships, many thousands of targets, helmets, and spears of all kinds; every place furnishing him with that commodity which it best could afford. Unto this willingness of the people, the diligence of *Scipio* was correspondent. In the compass of forty-five days, he had both sell'd his timber, built and launched twenty *Trireme*, and ten *Quinquereme* galleys, wherewith he transported his army into *Sicily*. In *Sicily* he found, besides other forces, two legions that had

served at *Canne*, which were old soldiers; and (as he himself well knew) not guilty of the overthrow, for which they had long undergone a heavy censure. They had served under *Marcellus*, and *Levinus*, at the taking of many cities and strong places; in which regard, they were like to be of good use to him in *Afric*, where would be store of such employment. For, increasing the number of his horse, he press'd three hundred *Sicilians*, all wealthy young men, and such as loved well their ease. These he afterwards discharged from the war, highly to their contentment; but with condition, that they should deliver their horse and arms to as many *Roman* gentlemen, which he brought over with him for the purpose. Whilst he was providing to have things in a readiness for *Afric*, the banished *Locrians* that followed the *Roman* side, made him acquainted with an intelligence, whereby they hoped to recover their city. Some handicraftsmen, that wrought for the *Carthaginians* in one of the citadels of *Locri* (for there were two in the town) being taken prisoners by the *Romans*, promised to betray the place, if they might be ransomed, and rewarded. *Scipio*, being advertised of this, gave order to have the attempt made by night, which happily succeeded, and that citadel was surprized. The other citadel was strongly defended by the *Carthaginian* garrison, which sent to *Hannibal* for aid. The *Romans*, in like sort, fearing lest their own paucity should make them too weak for *Hannibal*, craved help of the consul *Scipio*. The townsmen were doubtfully affected; but the best, and most of them, inclining to the *Romans*, kept *Hannibal* out, whom the coming of *Scipio* caused thence to depart; and caused likewise the *Carthaginian* garrison to abandon the other citadel. Many outrages were committed by the *Roman* soldiers, that were left by *Scipio* in custody of the town. Wherefore a vehement complaint was made by the *Locrians* unto the *Roman* senate, not only against those of the garrison, but much more against *Pleminius* the captain, who gave bad example, and was worse than all the rest. Besides many murders, robberies, rapes, and other villanies, the temple of *Proserpina*, that had a great fame of sanctity, was spoiled by these barbarous thieves. The *Locrians* therefore advised the senate to make present amends to the gods for this sacrilege; saying, that the like had never been committed, without notorious vengeance by her taken upon the authors. The senate gave good ear to this complaint, comforted the *Locrians*, and redressed the injuries done unto them; sent for *Pleminius*, with the other principal offenders, whom they cast into prison, and used according to their deserts; as also they restored unto *Proserpina* her money twice told. But old *Q. Fabius* was not herewithal contented. He laid much of the blame upon *Scipio*, that had placed such a man in *Locri*; and had not carefully hearkned to the complaints made against him, but suffered him to run on in these his wicked courses. By the sharp invective that *Fabius* made, others took courage to speak what they pleased, as well against the demeanor of *Scipio*, as against the dissoluteness of his army, which lay, as they said, idle in *Sicily*; neither mindful of any service toward, nor fit for it, if need should require. Finally, things were so far urged, that ten legates were sent over into *Sicily*, together with the pretor appointed for that island, two of the *Tribunes*, and one of the *Aediles*, who should examine these matters; and either cause the general to return into *Italy*, or continue him in his charge, as they thought fit. The end of all was, they found him so well prepared against *Carthage*, that they hastened him on his

his journey, and gave him high commendations at their return.

Scipio had already employed *Lælius* in *Afric*, rather to make discovery, than to work any other great effect of war. He took a great booty, and struck no little terror into the *Carthaginians*, who saw their affairs to be upon terms of change. But the greatest fruit of his journey was, that, speaking with *Masanissa*, he well inform'd himself of the state of *Afric*; and knew what was to be expected of those two kings, that had promised to join with the *Romans* at their landing.

Concerning *Masanissa*'s revolt from the *Carthaginians*, and his compact made underhand with the *Romans*: ^a *Livy* doth profess, that there was no such evident cause thereof at the present; but that the long continuance of his faith and constancy, in following times, must help to prove, that this his change was not without some good cause. But *Appianus* (an historian, far inferior to *Livy*, both in worth and time) gives one reason so probable of this, and many accidents thereto belonging, as that it carries with it a great appearance of necessary truth. Only the doubt is, how it could any way come to pass, that the knowledge of such a matter should have escaped the diligence of *Livy*, if it had been true; unless we should believe, that he wilfully forbore to rehearse a tragedy, the sorrow whereof would cause men to think amiss of *Scipio*. Howsoever it was, thus ^a *Appian* tells it, and many circumstances of things done, confirm it. *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gisco*, had a fair daughter, whom both king *Syphax* and *Masanissa* loved. *Masanissa*, being brought up at *Carthage*; and being withal a goodly gentleman of person, and excellent in qualities, was chosen by *Asdrubal* to be his son-in-law. When the virgin was betrothed unto him, he went into *Spain*, and there did great service. But afterwards, the *Carthaginian* senate thought the marriage of *Asdrubal*'s daughter to be a matter of state, and bestowed her upon *Syphax*, without standing to acquaint her father or *Masanissa* therewith. This they did, for that *Syphax* was the more mighty prince; and for that the indignity of the repulse had made him become their enemy. Hereof *Masanissa* was advertised, and forthwith entered into intelligence with *Scipio*, secretly, as he thought; yet not so secretly, but that some notice was taken of it, which would have cost him his life, had he not, with great circumspection, conveyed himself home into his father's kingdom. Thus far forth we may believe *Appianus*, all the narration well cohering with things pass'd and following; only it seems, that howsoever *Sophonisba*, the daughter of *Asdrubal*, was promised by the *Carthaginians* unto *Syphax*; yet since this their courtesy proceeded from fear, he thought it wisdom to continue and increase the same their fear, by making fair promises to the *Romans*, until *Asdrubal* had sent for his daughter from *Carthage*, and the marriage was consummated.^c In other matters concerning the war it self, wherein *Appian* differs much from *Livy*, and from *Polybius*, whom (as appears by the broken pieces of his works remaining) *Livy* did follow; it will be no offence, to take little heed unto his reports.

Masanissa was the son of *Gala*, a king of the *Numidians*, whose father dying, the crown descended, by order of the country, unto *Desalces* the brother, not unto *Masanissa* the son. But this uncle of *Masanissa* shortly died, and his elder son, who took possession of the kingdom, was vanquished, and slain in battel by a rebel, that made himself pro-

tector over the younger, which was a child. The traitor fortified himself against *Masanissa*, whose return he feared, by alliances with the *Carthaginians* and *Syphax*. But all would not serve: he and his pupil were dispossessed of their estates by *Masanissa*, that was a skilful warrior, and well-beloved for the memory of his father *Gala*. The *Carthaginians* in reason should have been glad that *Masanissa*, who had done them notable service, was thus confirmed in his estate, had they not been guilty of the injury by them done unto him, whilst his uncle or cousin reigned, and he seemed unlikely to stand them in any stead. But *Syphax*, by their procurement, and perhaps by his own malice towards his rival, warred upon him; and, over-charging him with numbers, drove him out of his kingdom. Nevertheless *Masanissa* still retained the hearts of his people, and thereby remained strong enough to infect both *Syphax* and the *Carthaginians*; though he was often put in distress by great forces that were sent against him. He therefore keeping much about the lesser *Syrtis*, between the borders of the *Carthaginians* and the nation of the *Garamants*, expected the coming of the *Romans*; yet so, as he made long roads over all the country, even as far as to *Hippo*; and, when *Lælius* arrived thereabouts, exhorted and encouraged him to hasten on *Scipio* to the invasion of *Afric*.

But *Syphax*, in whose great aid and succour was reposed more hope of good success, than could be expected from the good-will of poor *Masanissa*, sent an embassy into *Sicily* about the same time, which was little pleasing unto *Scipio*. He excused himself of his promise lately made, and signified his alliance with the *Carthaginians*; adding, that he could not chuse but fight for the defence of *Afric*, wherein he was born and reigned; and for the defence of his beloved wife's country, if it were invaded. Nevertheless he promised to remain a neuter, so long as the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* held war abroad far enough from *Afric*, as hitherto they had done. This message hastned *Scipio* in his expedition, much more than any persuasion could have done. For the promised assistance of *Syphax* had not a little advanced his enterprise, in procuring both the assent of the senate, and the forwardness of many adventurers. Lest therefore the failing of this hope should work too great a change in common opinion, he thought it the best way, to prevent all discourse, and set the war undertaken immediately on foot. The ambassadors he dismissed in all haste, with letters to their king, wherein he willed him to consider, that what he had promised, he had also sworn; and therefore should do well to make it good. Having sent them away, he called his soldiers together, and bade them make ready for the voyage, which he intended no longer to defer. For, said he, *Masanissa* hath been with *Lælius*, and *Syphax* hath newly sent to me, greatly wondering upon what I should thus stay; and saying, that they will provide for themselves, if I fail their expectation, by tarrying any longer. This fine tale prevented all further inquisition, that might else have been made concerning the message of these ambassadors, whose followers had been seen walking up and down *Syracusa*. And, lest any thing should afterwards break out, that might hinder the business, *Scipio* immediately sent about his fleet unto *Lilybeum*; and requesting by letters *M. Pomponius*, that was pretor in *Sicily*, to meet him there, hastned thither with his army. At *Lilybeum* he agreed with the pretor about the division of the legions

^a Liv. l. 28.

Appian, Alex. de Bell. Punic.

^c Liv. l. 29.

between them; which to leave behind for defence of the island; and which to carry with him into *Afric*. What numbers he transported, it is not certain; some historians reckoning only ten thousand foot and twenty-two hundred horse; others increasing them to thirty-five thousand horse and foot. Concerning his directions for embarking, and other matters belonging to their course, I hold it needless to set them down; since they were points of ordinary care; and which, it is like, that neither he, when he took his voyage into *Spain*, nor others, upon like occasions, have omitted; they being also word for word, set down by an historian, who borrowed them from *Livy*, and fitted them to a prince of later age.

This *Roman* army landed in *Afric*, near unto a foreland, then called the *Fair Promontory*; which, how far it was from *Carthage*, or toward what point of the compass, I cannot precisely affirm; because it is uncertain whether it were that cape or head-land, which bore the name of *Mercury*, and lay to the north-east of *Carthage*; or whether that of *Apollo*, which lay northerly from *Carthage*, and by west. The coming of *Masanissa* unto *Scipio*, at his first arrival, helps to confirm the opinion of *Xylander*, who thinks the *Fair Promontory* to have been the same that was also called *Mercury's Cape*; since, with little difficulty, *Masanissa* might come thither from the lesser *Syrtis*, whereabout was his common abiding. But forasmuch as without any memorable impediment, soon after his arrival, *Scipio* encamped before *Utica*, that stood westward from *Carthage*, beyond the river *Bagradas*; it may rather seem that he landed within the promontory of *Apollo*, whence the way to *Utica* was not long. This is also strongly proved, for that out of *Carthage* were sent the next day five hundred horse, to trouble him in his disembarking. Neither was it so hard for *Masanissa*, that roved about the country with a troop of horse, to find out the *Romans*, though they landed far from the place to the which he usually resorted, like as before he had met with *Laelius* at *Hippo*, that was farther off, as it would have been for *Scipio*, with his army and carriages, to overcome the trouble of a long journey, and fetch a great compass to *Utica* by land, when he might have disembarked nearer unto it. Nevertheless it may pass as a conjecture, that *Scipio* came first of all from *Emporia*, a plentiful region about the lesser *Syrtis*; since he gave charge to the masters of his ships, at the setting forth from *Lilybaeum*, to shape their course for that coast. The country thereabout was very rich, and fit for sustenance of an army; neither were the inhabitants warlike, or well provided to make resistance. Thus much perhaps *Masanissa* had signified unto *Laelius*, when he spake with him at *Hippo*; thinking that the *Romans*, howsoever they made brave promises, would not come strong enough to fight at hand. But when he saw their fleet and army to be such, as not only served to invade the lands of *Carthage*, but threatened a conquest of the city, and whole estate; then might he better advise them to set sail for *Utica*, and make war upon the enemies at their own doors.

The *Carthaginians* had at that time neither any captain of great worth at home, nor better army than of raw soldiers, that were levied, or to be levied in haste. *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gisco*, the same that had lately been chased out of *Spain* by *Scipio*, was their best man of war. And good enough perhaps he was thought by *Hanno*, and his fellows, of whose faction he was; or if ought were want-

ing in him, yet his riches and nobility, together with the affinity of king *Syphax*, made him passable. He was at that present with the king his son-in-law, working him (no doubt) against the *Romans*; when letters were brought from *Carthage*, both to *Syphax* and to him; informing them of the invasion; entreating the one of them to give assistance, and commanding the other to make his repair unto the city, where he was chosen general. But ere these could be ready, *Scipio* had beaten the troop of *Carthaginian* horse, that were sent out of the city to disturb his landing, and slain *Hanno*, a young gentleman that was their leader. He had also taken and sacked a town of the *Carthaginians*, wherein, besides other booty, he took eight thousand prisoners; all which he conveyed aboard his hulks, or ships of burden, and sent them back loaded into *Sicily*. He took likewise a town called *Salera*, which he held and fortified. In *Salera* lay another *Hanno*, with four thousand *Numidian* horse, whose service being fitter for the field, than for defence of walled places, made *Scipio* to perceive the unskilfulness of their leader, that had thus housed them. Wherefore he sent *Masanissa* before him, who rode up to the gates; and, by making a bravado, trained out the improvident *Hanno* so far, that he drew him unto a place where the *Romans* lay in wait for him. The victory was easily gotten, and *Hanno* either taken or slain. With those that fled, the *Romans* entered pell-mell into the town, which presently they made their own. Thence went *Scipio* to *Utica*, a city of great importance, of which mention hath been formerly made, and sat down before it. Forty days he spent about it, assailing it both by land and sea, and using all his engines of battery, whereof he had plenty; yet was in no likelihood of prevailing. And now the summer was quite spent, so that it was time for him to chuse a place, and fortify his winter-camp, which must be well stored the year following. Whilst thus necessity urged him to leave *Utica*, and shame of taking the repulse in his first great enterprize, rather than any hope of better success, caused him to stay there: *Asdrubal* and *Syphax* gave him the honour of a fair pretence to leave the siege. *Asdrubal* had made a levy of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, yet adventured not with this ill-trained army to draw near unto the *Romans*, before the coming of *Syphax*. *Syphax* brought with him unto *Carthage* fifteen thousand foot and ten thousand horse; which joining unto the forces of *Asdrubal*, they marched bravely towards *Scipio*, who thereby took occasion to dislodge. He chose for his winter-camp the banks of an in-let, that had good harbour for his navy. His foot-men he lodged on a promontory, joining to the continent by an arm of land: his horse-men he bestowed upon lower ground, on the other shore: in the bottom of the creek he moored his ships, and there he quartered the mariners, with all that belonged unto the fleet. The whole camp he strongly fortified, and so attended the season of the year, when it should serve him again to fight. Of cattle, and other booty, *Masanissa* had brought in great store, by driving the country, before the coming of *Asdrubal* and *Syphax*. Corn also he had gotten some; and great store was sent him from *Sicily* and *Sardinia*. Likewise apparel for his soldiers, was sent from home, or from *Sardinia*; though scarce enough to serve turn, for that it was a matter of more cost. The ships that brought these things,

he freighted homewards with such part of his booty, as he could best spare; especially with captives, to be sold for slaves. *Asdrubal* and *Syphax* encamped near unto *Scipio*: not so strongly fortifying themselves, as did the *Romans*; either for that they wanted the severe institution, which the *Romans* used in discipline of war; or for that they presumed upon their multitude, against which they found in *Scipio* no disposition to issue forth of his strength, and fight. So the winter passed without action.

When spring drew near; *Scipio* thought it good to assay his old friend the *Numidian* king, if perhaps he might be won by persuasions to forsake the *Carthaginians*. It was considered, that those *Barbarians* were naturally unconstant; and particularly, that *Syphax* had given proof before this of his much levity. It might therefore be hoped, that having wearied himself, by lodging a whole winter in the camp: and being peradventure no less weary with satiety of his wife, who had caused him to enter into this war: he might be moved with a little entreaty, to withdraw himself home into his kingdom, and rest a *Neuter*. But it is not unlikely, that such a friend as this king had been highly entertained and honoured in the city of *Carthage*, which was near at hand, as often as during this winter it had pleased him, or as he had been invited, to make a step thither and repose himself a while: his wife queen *Sophonisba* lying also there at the same time, to cherish him in his resolution. Howsoever it were, *Syphax* did only make an overture of peace: propounding it as reasonable, That *Hannibal* should be recalled out of *Italy* by the *Carthaginians*: and that the *Romans* in like sort should quietly depart out of *Africa*; and so make an end of the war, wherewith now both *Africa* and *Europe* were disquieted. Unto this would not *Scipio* at the first give ear: yet being pressed earnestly by many messages from *Syphax*, and desiring to continue the intercourse of ambassadors: he began to make a shew, as if he would consider of the motion. He was given to understand by those whom he had sent unto the king, that their enemies had their camps without any great defence of earth, full of wooden cabins, and covered with boughs: and that the *Numidians*, such of them as came first with *Syphax*, used coverings of mats and reeds; others that came later, had thatched their lodgings with dry boughs and leaves: under which they lay carefully without their trenches. Upon this advertisement he be- wrought himself, that it would not be hard for him to set their camps on fire; and thereby give them a notable overthrow. Without help of some such stratagem, he foresaw that it would be a work of great difficulty for him, to proceed in his wars when time should serve. It was a plain open country wherein he lay: and the enemies had great advantage of him in number, especially in horse; which upon such ground, could not be resisted by the *Roman* legions. The longer therefore that he thought upon the matter, the more needful he found it for himself, to make some sudden attempt upon their camp. To this end he sent many ambassadors, under pretence of treating about the peace; but indeed of purpose to discover all that concerned the intended surprize. With these ambassadors he sent, as attendants, many old soldiers disguised like slaves; that wandring (as it were) idly up and down the camp, might observe the ways and entrances, with whatsoever was needful. When he had learned as much as he desired: upon the sudden he sent word to *Syphax*, that it was vain to

hold any longer treaty; forasmuch as he could not get the consent of his council of war; without whose approbation, all that himself could do was no more than the good will of one man. This he did, to the end, that without any breach of faith, he might put his design in execution. The truce being thus cut off: *Asdrubal* and *Syphax* were very penfive; as having lately perswaded themselves, that their trouble was almost at an end. But since it could be no better, they began to devise, by what art they might draw *Scipio* out of his camp; and provoke him to battle in those plains. This if they could do, they hoped to make his council of war repent as greatly the refusal of peace, as did *M. Atilius* after the like presumption. But if he should refuse to come forth of his trenches, what else remained than to besiege him? which they themselves were well able to do by land; and the *Carthaginian* fleet should do by sea, that was making ready for the purpose. By such discourses these two comforted themselves; recompensing in conceit the loss of their hopes past, with that of victory to come. But herein they were extremely and worthily disappointed: for that, consulting about the future, they provided not against present danger; but continued in the same negligence, which was grown upon them by the long discourse of peace. As for *Scipio*, he was not idle but made preparation out of hand; as it were to do somewhat against *Utica*. Two thousand soldiers he had made ready; and appointed to take the same piece of ground, whereon he lay against *Utica* before. This he did; partly to keep secret that which he had in hand, lest being suspected by his own soldiers, the enemy might happen to have notice of it; partly to hinder those of *Utica* from setting upon the few, that he purposed to leave behind him in his camp. He caused his men that night to sup well and betimes; that they might be ready for the journey. After supper, he appointed such companies as he thought fit, unto the defence of his camp; all the rest of the army he led forth, about nine of the clock at night. The *Carthaginians* lay from him seven miles and an half: whom he purposed to undertake himself with the one half of his army: the other half he committed unto *Lælius* and *Masanissa*, whom he sent before him to set upon the camp of *Syphax*, that was farther off. It was his meaning that the camp of *Syphax* should be on a light fire, ere he would meddle with the *Carthaginians*. For the fire might seem to have taken hold by casualty upon the *Numidians*, that lay farther off: whereas, if it first appeared in the camp of *Asdrubal*, it would be suspected as the doing of enemies; and give *Syphax* warning to look unto himself. To this end therefore *Scipio* marched fair and softly: that *Lælius* and *Masanissa*, who had a longer journey, and were to fetch a compass about for fear of being discovered, might have time to get before him, and do their feat. It was about two or three of the clock in the morning, when the camp of *Syphax* began to blaze: which not only the *Numidians*, but their king himself, imputed unto casualty; as thinking themselves safe enough from enemies, for that the *Carthaginian* lay interposed between them and the danger. Wherefore, as if there were no more to do, some, starting half asleep; and others, that had stien up late a drinking; ran out of their cabins to quench the fire. But so great was the tumult, that they neither could rightly understand in what case they were; nor give any remedy to the mischance, as it was supposed. Many were smothered, and burnt in the flame, which grew greater and greater;

greater : many, leaping into the trenches for fear of the sudden mischief, were trampled to death by the multitude, that followed them. They that escaped the fire fell upon the enemies sword, which was ready to receive them. Especially *Masanissa*, that best knew the country, did great execution upon them ; having laid all the ways, by which he foresaw that they would seek to escape. The *Carthaginians* perceiving this fire, thought none other than that it was a pitiful mischance : so that some ran out to help the poor *Numidians* ; carrying only what would serve to quench the fire. Others ran up to the rampart : where, fearless of any danger towards themselves, they stood beholding the greatness of the flame, and lamenting the misfortune. This fell out right as *Scipio* would have it. He therefore lost no time : but setting upon those that were running towards the *Numidians*, he killed some, and pursued the rest back into their camp ; which in a little while he made to burn as bright, as did that of *Syphax*. *Asdrubal* seeing this, and knowing that the *Romans* were there, did not stand to make resistance, but shifted only for himself, and escaped with a few of his horse about him. If *Hannibal*, or any of the *Barchine* faction, had been taken in such a manner : it is more than probable, that old *Hanno* would have judged him worthy to be crucified. It would then have been said, that with less than one half of thirty-thousand men, he might at least have given some bad recompence, to them that were taking pains in kindling these fires, had he not been only careful how to save his own fearful head. Nevertheless *Polybius* acknowledgeth, and it is most likely to have been true, That if *Asdrubal*, or any of those about him, would have striven to shew valour, when the camp was once on fire : he should not thereby have done any manner of good ; because of the tumult and consternation. I shall not need to tell what a fearful thing it was, to hear the cries of so many thousands that perished by fire and sword, or to behold the cruel flame that consumed them ; which (as *Polybius* affirms) none that hath being is able to describe. It is enough to say, that of those many thousands very few did escape, which accompanied *Asdrubal* and *Syphax* in their several ways to flight. Besides these, also there were some scatterers, especially of the *Numidians*, that saved themselves in the dark : but they were not many ; as after shall appear. Surely it must needs have been very hard to tell, how many were burnt or otherwise made away ; and what numbers escaped in the dark of night. Wherefore *Livy*, who, in the rest of this relation, as often elsewhere, doth follow *Polybius*, may seem to have followed some less worthy author, and him no good arithmetician, in casting up the sum. For he reckons only two thousand foot, and five hundred horse, to have escaped ; forty thousand to have perished by sword or fire ; and above six thousand to have been taken prisoners : the whole number of all which together, is far short of ninety three thousand, which were in these two camps.

Asdrubal, putting himself into the next town that was very strongly fortified ; thought there to find the *Romans* work ; until the *Carthaginians* at good leisure might repair their army. He had with him no more than two thousand foot, and five hundred horse ; which he thought sufficient to defend the town, if the townsmen would not be wanting to themselves. But he found the inhabitants of the place very earnest in contention, whe-

ther it were better to fight or to yield. Unto this disputation, he well foresaw that the arrival of *Scipio* would soon give an end. Wherefore, lest they should lay hold upon him, and seek the victor's favour by delivering him up ; he shrunk away betimes, and made all haste to *Carthage*. As for the town, which he left, it opened the gates to *Scipio*, at his first coming : and thereby preserved it self from all manner of loss. The two next towns, adjoining would needs be valiant, and make countenance of war : but their strength not being answerable, they were soon taken by *Scipio* ; who abandoned them to the pleasure of his soldiers. This being done, he returned to the siege of *Utica*.

The *Carthaginians* were fore troubled, as they had good reason ; when, instead of either peace or victory, which they lately hoped for, they heard news of such a lamentable overthrow. Necessity enforced them to make hasty provision for the future : but how to do it, few of them saw any means. Some gave advice to crave peace of *Scipio* ; others to send for *Hannibal* out of *Italy* : but the most, and they which finally prevailed, were of opinion, that notwithstanding the loss of this army, they might well defend themselves against the *Romans*, by raising new forces ; especially, if *Syphax* would not leave them. It was therefore concluded, that they should bend all their care this way : levying in all haste another army ; and sending ambassadors to deal with *Syphax*, who lay then at a town called *Abba*, not passing eight miles from *Carthage*. Immediately the same their unfortunate commander, *Asdrubal* the son of *Gesco*, was employed to make new levies of men : and queen *Sophonisba* went forth with ambassadors to her husband *Syphax* ; who having gathered together as many as he could of his subjects that had escaped from the late slaughter, was thinking to return into his own kingdom. *Sophonisba* laboured so with her husband, that at length she won him to her own desire. And it fell out at the same time that four thousand *Spaniards*, waged by the *Carthaginians*, were brought over to serve in *Afric*. Of these were made such brave reports ; as if their courage, and the arms which they used, were not to be resisted. Even the multitude within *Carthage* believed these tales, and were more glad than they had cause to be ; which is great wonder, since in one age, the whole country of *Spain* had been twice conquered ; first by the *Carthaginians* themselves, and after by the *Romans*. But with *Syphax* these tales prevailed much : which the *Carthaginian* ambassadors helped with a lie ; saying, that there were come ten thousand of these terrible *Spaniards*. Upon this confidence the people of *Carthage* and their friends gathered such spirit, that in thirty days they made up an army consisting well near of thirty thousand men ; reckoning the *Spaniards*, and *Syphax* with his *Numidians*, in the number. So they encamped in a region called the great Fields, about five days journey from *Utica*. *Scipio* hearing of this, came from *Utica* thither, to visit them : leaving behind him his impediments, with some part of his army, to make a shew of continuing the siege. Two or three days, after the meeting of both armies, passed away in skirmishes, without any great thing done. It had now been time for *Asdrubal* to follow the example of the *Roman*, *Pabius* ; and seek to weary out the enemy by delays. But either (which is likely) he was a far worse commander, or else it was not in his power to give such directions as best pleased himself. The fourth

day the armies met in battel: wherein the *Romans* were marshalled by *Scipio* after their wonted manner; having their *Italian* horse in their right wing; and *Masanissa* with his *Numidians* in the left. On the contrary side, *Asdrubal* and his *Carthaginians* had the right wing; *Syphax* the left, and the *Spaniards* the battel. The victory was gotten without many blows: for the untrained followers of *Syphax* and *Asdrubal*, could not sustain the first charge of the *Italians*, or of *Masanissa*. Only the *Spaniards* fought a long time, even till they were all in a manner slain: rather as men desperate, and not hoping for mercy, since they were thus come over to fight against *Scipio*, who had otherwise deserved of them; than upon any likelihood or conceit of victory. This their obstinacy was beneficial unto those that fled; for that it hindered the *Romans* from making any great pursuit. Hereby *Asdrubal* and *Syphax* escaped: *Asdrubal*, to *Carthage*; and *Syphax* home, to his own kingdom: whither his wife was either gone before, or immediately followed him.

Scipio, having thus gotten the mastery of the field, took counsel about the prosecution of the war. It was resolved upon, as the best course, that he himself, with part of the army, should attempt the cities round about him: and that *Masanissa*, with his *Numidians*, and *Laelius*, with some of the *Roman* legions, should follow after *Syphax*, not permitting him to take rest within his own kingdom, where easily else he might repair his forces, and put them to new trouble. This advice it seems that *Masanissa* gave: who knew best the quality of the *Numidians*; and what good might be done among them, by the reputation of a victory. The least that could be expected, was his restitution into his own kingdom, usurped by *Syphax*: which to accomplish, it no less concerned the *Romans* at the present, than it did himself. According to this order concluded, *Laelius* was sent away with *Masanissa*: and *Scipio* stayed behind; carrying the war from town to town. Many places yielded for fear: many were taken by force: and all the subjects of *Carthage* wavered in their fidelity; as if the time was now come, wherein they might take notice of those unreasonable burdens, which their proud masters had laid upon them, for maintenance of the war in *Spain* and *Italy*. What to do in this case, the *Carthaginians* could hardly resolve. Fortune was their enemy: they had lost their armies, and many of their towns: neither durst they make bold to trouble their own subjects with any violent exaction of men or money; who nevertheless of their own free will were likely to give little help. Very much it grieved them, to send for *Hannibal* out of *Italy*: yet since there was no other hope remaining, than in him and his good army; it was decreed, that ambassadors should be forthwith sent to call him home. Some there were that gave advice, to set out a fleet against that of *Scipio*; that rode before *Utica*, weakly manned, and easy to be taken, whilst *Scipio* himself was busied in the inland countries. Some were of opinion, that it should be their principal care, to fortify by all means the city of *Carthage*: upon the safety whereof, they said, all depended; adding, that whilst they were true, and at unity amongst themselves, they might well enough subsist, and expect those opportunities, with which fortune (doubtless) would present them. These counsels were not rejected: but order was forthwith taken, both for all things concerning the defence of the city, and for the attempt upon the *Roman* fleet at *Utica*. Nevertheless it was considered,

that hereby they should only protract the war: without any way advancing their own affairs towards likelihood of victory; no, though it should fall out, that all the ships at *Utica* might be taken or destroyed. Wherefore the determination held concerning *Hannibal*, that he should immediately come over into *Africa*, as the last refuge of *Carthage*. The council was no sooner broken up, than all the senators betook themselves to the execution of that which was decreed: some to the fortification of the town: some to make ready the fleet: and some, appointed thereunto, forthwith to embark themselves for *Italy*. In this their trepidation, *Scipio* comes to *Tunis*, a city in those days very strong; and standing in prospect almost of every part of *Carthage*. This place, or rather some defensible piece adjoining, he easily took; the garrison forsaking it, and running away, as soon as he drew near. But whilst he was about there to encamp, and fortify himself against the city; he might perceive the *Carthaginian* fleet setting forth, and making towards *Utica*. What this meant, he readily conceived: and stood in great fear, lest his own ships, that were very ill prepared for sea-fight (as being heavily laden with engines of battery, and wholly disposed in such order, as was most convenient for assaulting the town) should make bad resistance, against a fleet appointed for that special service. Wherefore he halted away towards *Utica*, to assist with his presence in this needful case. It fell out well, that he had sent his carriages, and all the great booty which he drew along with him, thither before, at his going to *Tunis*. For had not he now made great expedition, he should have come too late. Neither could he indeed have been there in due time; if the *Carthaginians* had used such diligence as was convenient. But they rested one night in harbour by the way: and at their coming to *Utica*, they tarried a while to make a bravado: presenting themselves in order of battel, as if the *Romans* would have put forth to sea against them. But *Scipio* had no such intent: he thought it would be sufficient, if he could preserve his galleys. As for the pleasure of their bravery at sea; it should little avail the *Carthaginians*; if they got nothing by it, and lost their whole estate by land. Wherefore he took his ships of burden, and, fastning them together with cables, in four ranks, one behind another, made a fourfold bridge over the channel of the haven: whereon he placed a thousand of his choice men, with store of darts, and other casting weapons, to make defence. Some open spaces he left; whereat his frigats, and other small vessels might run out, and back again, upon any advantage or need: but these he covered with planks; using the masts and yards of his ships instead of raters, to join all together, that his men might help one another, and the bridge it self not be torn asunder. Scarce was this work finished, when the *Carthaginians*, seeing none issue forth against them, came into the haven. The fight between them and the *Romans*, that were in the hulks, was rather like to the assaulting of a wall, than to any sea-fight. For they that stood upon the bridge, had sure footing, and threw their weapons downwards with their whole strength and violence; which the *Carthaginians* out of their galleys, that were lower and unsteady, could not do. But the *Roman* frigats and long-boats, adventuring forth from behind the bridge, were greatly over-borne by the force of the galleys; and were one occasion of that small loss which followed. They that stood upon the bridge, were neither able to relieve them: nor yet could freely bestow their weapons among the *Carthagini-*

ans, as before, for fear of hurting these their friends, that were entangled and mixed among the enemies. The *Carthaginians* had brought with them grappling-hooks, hanging at iron-chains. These they threw upon the masts and yards, which served as arches to join the bridge together: then rowing backwards, they tore all asunder, in such sort, that one ship followed another, and all the first rank was broken, or defaced. The defendants had no other way, than to save themselves as hastily as they could, by shifting into the next rank of ships, that lay behind them untouched. Neither did the *Carthaginians* trouble themselves any further in this laborious work; but having haled away six ships of burden, and towed them out of the haven, returned home to *Carthage*. Their welcome was greater than their victory: because among so many grievous losses, only this exploit had succeeded well; though it were of small importance.

Whilst things thus passed about *Carthage*, *Laelius* and *Masanissa*, in their journey against *Syphax*, found as good success as could be desired. The fame of the victories already gotten, restored *Masanissa* to his kingdom, without further contention: the *Masseyli* his subjects, joyfully receiving him; and forsaking the usurper. But here they stayed not: neither indeed would *Syphax* permit them to be quiet. He had such abundance of men and horses, that he felt not greatly the losses past: and therefore being solicited by *Asdrubal* and *Sophonisba*, he prepared again for war. But beside the instigation of his beloved wife; the loss of the *Masseyli* would let him take no rest: neither was it the purpose of *Laelius* and *Masanissa*, to give him any breathing time. It is common in men, to depart no less unwillingly from that which they have gotten by extortion, than from their proper inheritance: but to think all alike their own, whereof they are in possession; be the title unto some part never so unjust. Hereunto alludes the fable of the young kite: which thought that she had vomited up her own guts; when it was only the garbage of some other fowl, that she had hastily swallowed, and was not able to digest. But whether or no *Syphax*, like the young kite, believed the kingdom of the *Masseyli* to be part of his entrails: *Laelius* and *Masanissa* will shortly give him somewhat, that shall make him cast his gorge. For to this purpose chiefly are they come so far. It concerned the *Romans* to dispossess (if it might be) that king; whose false and hollow friendship towards them, had been converted into strong enmity: as also to set in his place another, who might do them such good offices, as *Syphax* had lately done unto the *Carthaginians*. How easily this might be effected, *Masanissa* knew best: as being well acquainted with the nature of those countries; wherein, even to this day, though there be many strong towns, yet the fortune of a battle is enough to translate the kingdom from one competitor to another. So they met with *Syphax*: who came against them with no less an army than his former, and marshalled in the *Roman* order; according to the skill which he had learned of the *Roman* centurion, long ago sent unto him out of *Spain*, from *Cn. Scipio*. But though he could teach his men, how to march in order; yet could he not teach them to fight courageously. They were a rabble of all sorts, gathered up in haste: and few of them had seen war before. Encamping near unto the *Romans*, it fell out, as commonly, that some troops of horse on both sides, encountered one another in the mid-way: and they that had the worst, were seconded by other of their fel-

lows. By continuance of the skirmish, more and more were drawn out from either camp: so that at length *Syphax*, unwilling to dishearten his men, by taking any foil at their first meeting with the enemy, came up with all his horse, which were the best part of his forces, and therewith overcharged *Masanissa*, whose numbers were far less. But whilst he was prosecuting his hope of victory: some *Roman* squadrons of foot came against him through their own troops of horse; which fell to the sides, and made a lane for them. So their battle standing now more firm than a little before; *Syphax* was unable, though he laboured much in vain, to make them give ground. *Masanissa* likewise, and his troops, grew confident upon this assistance: and charging afresh the enemy, that could not make way forward, caused him to give back. Herewithal the legions came in sight: which so terrified the *Numidian* horse, that they began presently to disband. Fain would *Syphax* have stayed them from flight: and to that end, made head in person against the *Romans*; with hope, that his men would be ashamed to leave him. But it fell out unhappily, that he was cast from his horse, which received a wound; and so taken prisoner. Of others that were slain or taken, the multitude was not great. It sufficed, that they forsook the place, and fled: and that their king, upon whom all depended, was in the *Roman's* hand. *Masanissa* told *Laelius*, that this victory should make an end of the *Numidian* war, if presently they hastened away to *Cirta*, the chief city of the kingdom; whither he himself desired to be sent before with the horse, carrying *Syphax* along with him. Hereunto *Laelius* agreed. *Masanissa* coming to *Cirta*, before any news of the king's mischance was there arrived, called out the chief of the city to parley: wherein by many fair promises and threats, but especially by shewing unto them *Syphax* bound, he prevailed so far, that the gates were forthwith opened unto him; and every one strove to get his favour, that was like to be their king hereafter. Among the rest, queen *Sophonisba* yielded her self into his hands; and vehemently besought him, that she might not be delivered up unto the *Romans*. Her youth, and excellent beauty, so commended her suit, that *Masanissa* forthwith granted it: and to make good his promise, married her himself that very day: thereby to prevent *Laelius* and *Scipio* from determining otherwise of her, since she was his wife. But *Laelius*, when he came thither, took the matter heinously; so that at first he would have haled her away, together with *Syphax* and other prisoners, and have sent her unto *Scipio*. But being over-entreated by *Masanissa*, he suffered the matter to rest a while as he found it, and referred all to *Scipio's* discretion: to whom he sent away *Syphax*, and other captives immediately; following shortly after himself, with *Masanissa*, when they had done what was needful in the kingdom.

At the coming of *Syphax* there was great joy in the *Roman* camp: the mighty armies which he had lately brought into the field; and his entertainment of *Scipio* and *Asdrubal*, both at one time, when *Rome* and *Carthage* together sought his friendship, with such other commemoration of his past and present fortune; ministering to every one a large argument of discourse. *Scipio* demanded of him, what had moved him, not only to forsake the *Roman* friendship, but to make war upon them unprovoked. He briefly answered, that his wife had moved him so to do; calling her a fury, and a pestilent creature: and saying, that *Masanissa* was no wiser than himself; since he had now taken

ken the same woman to his wife, who would shortly draw him to the same courses. Hereat *Scipio* was greatly troubled: and stood in great doubt, lest this perilous woman should deprive him of *Masanissa*, as she had done of *Syphax*. It was not long, ere *Masanissa* and *Laelius* came unto him: both of whom together he lovingly welcomed; and highly commended in publick, for their notable service in this expedition. Then taking *Masanissa* apart, he brake with him, as touching *Sophonisba*: letting him understand, that the *Romans* had title to her head; and that she was a mischievous enemy of theirs. Wherefore he entreated him to moderate his affection: and not to deface the memory of his great services already done, (for which he should be highly rewarded, to his own contentment) by committing a great offence upon little reason. *Masanissa* blush'd, and wept: and finally promised to be governed by *Scipio*; whom he nevertheless entreated, to think upon his faith given to *Sophonisba*, that she should not be delivered into the *Roman* power. So he departed to his own tent, where, after some time spent in agony, he called unto him a servant of his, that had the custody of his poison (which princes used then to have in readines, against all mischances that might make them unwilling to live;) and tempering a potion for *Sophonisba*, sent it unto her with this message; that gladly he would have had her to live with him as his wife: but since they, who had power to hinder him of his desire, would not yield thereto, he sent her a cup, that should preserve her from falling alive into the hands of the *Romans*; willing her to remember her birth and estate, and accordingly to take order for her self.

At the receipt of this message and present, she only said, That if her husband had no better token to send unto his new wife, she must accept of this; adding, that she might have died more honourably, if she had not wedded so lately before her funeral. And herewithal she boldly drank off the poison. Thus *Livy* reporteth. But *Appian* varies from this; and sets it down agreeably to that which hath been spoken before, concerning the pre-contract between *Masanissa* and *Sophonisba*. He saith, that after the taking of *Syphax*, ambassadors from *Cirta* met with *Laelius* and *Masanissa* upon their way thither, yielding up their city, and the king's palace: and that *Sophonisba*, for her own private, sent messengers to excuse her marriage with *Syphax*; as made against her will, by compulsion of those in whose power she was. *Masanissa* readily admitted of this excuse; and accepted her to wife. But when *Scipio* had received information from *Syphax*, how cunning in perswasion *Sophonisba* was; and that all her thoughts laboured for the good of *Carthage*: he fell out about her with *Masanissa* at his return; and challenged her, as a part of the booty belonging to the *Romans*. *Masanissa* said, she was his own wife, and unto him betrothed many years before. But *Scipio* would not hear of this: or if it were true, yet he said, it was no reason, that *Masanissa* should keep her in possession, as long as it was disputable, unto whom she might appertain. Wherefore he willed him first of all to produce her, and then afterwards to make his claim unto her; wherein he should have no wrong. Herewithal he sent to fetch her away: and *Masanissa* accompanied the messengers, as it were to deliver her; but making her acquainted with the necessity, gave unto her a

cup of poison, wherewith she ended her life, before they came that should have apprehended her. So he shewed unto the *Romans* her dead body, which he royally interred. The sudden violence of *Masanissa*'s love, and the ready consent of *Sophonisba* to marry with him, add not so much credit unto this relation of *Appian*, as doth the want of all other evident cause (which *Livy* notes) of the sudden falling out between him and the *Carthaginians*, under whom he had been trained up, and done them great service. Howsoever it were, *Scipio*, hearing of this tragical accident, sent for *Masanissa*, and comforted him as well as he could, lest his melancholy should lead him to some inconvenience. Having therefore gently rebuked him for his rashness, he brought him forth in presence of the army; where, extolling his noble acts, and shewing how highly he had deserved of the city of *Rome*, he proclaimed him king; and gave unto him a crown of gold, with other royal ornaments. This was indeed the ready way to divert his thoughts from the sad remembrance of that which was pass'd, unto the more chearful contemplation of good fortune, that began to smile upon him.

This was the first time that the *Romans* took upon them to create or proclaim a king. Which honour, though *Masanissa* well deserved, yet would not the title have redounded unto his great benefit; neither should he have been much beholden to them for it, if he had not, by their means, recovered possession of his country, together with the greatest part of *Syphax*'s dominions. It seems not unlikely, that had he remained a neuter in these wars, and sustained himself, with his troop of horse, in such sort as he did before the coming of the *Romans*, he might nevertheless have recovered his proper inheritance, by the love of his own subjects, without other help, when *Syphax* had once or twice been vanquished. As for the enlargement of his kingdom, it was not more than he deserved; neither were the *Romans* then in case to make a conquest of *Numidia* for themselves, neither could they have wished a fitter opportunity, than of such a man, upon whom to bestow it, that was their assured friend, and passable withal among the *Numidians*, as being (for the *Masseyli* were a *Numidian* tribe) a great prince of the same nation. Yet this liberality of the *Romans* was noised abroad as very glorious; and the *Romans* themselves, in a politick sort of gravity, took highly upon them; as if even their saluting him by the name of king, had been a matter of great consequence. He thrived indeed well after it, and by their maintenance, waxed mighty in times followings, encroaching upon his neighbours on all sides; but most of all upon the state of *Carthage*, whereat they were little displeased. Hence it grew, that *Vermina*, the son of *Syphax* (of whom we shall shortly speak more) which held some piece of his father's kingdom, desiring friendship of the *Romans*, and promising by all means to deserve their love, requested therewithal, that they would call him king. But though it were so, that never any before him had made this a matter of suit; yet the *Roman* senate was punctilious herein; and answered very gravely, ^b that it was not their custom to give the honour of that appellation, save only unto such kings as had greatly deserved of their city. Thus they made it a matter of state, and in process of time grew so proud of this their imaginary prerogative, that they imputed as a singular benefit unto

^a Lib. 28.^b Liv. l. 31.

kings, that no way depended upon them, the salutation by *that name*, though it were not accompanied with any other favour or profit thence redounding.

S E C T. XIX.

The Carthaginians desire truce, and break it.

THE *Carthaginians* were extremely dismayed, when they heard of the great calamity that was befallen their good friend *Syphax*, and understood that *Masanissa*, their mortal enemy, had got possession of his kingdom. To increase their fear, *Scipio* returned again to *Tunis*, in view of their city, where he made an end of that fortification which he had begun at his last being there. The *Carthaginians* had neither forces, nor courage to withstand him; but their hearts so failed them, that they sent forth unto him thirty ambassadors, princes of the city, which were their privy-council, to make suit for peace. These being admitted into the presence of *Scipio*, did not only prostrate themselves on the ground, but kissed the feet of him, and of those that sat in council with him.

Answerable to this base adoration, was their speech that followed. They confessed themselves to have unjustly broken the peace between them and *Rome*, and to have deserved whatsoever punishment it should please the *Romans* to inflict upon them. Yet they humbly besought *Scipio*, and the rest, that, in common regard of those misfortunes whereto all men are subject, they would shew mercy unto the city of *Carthage*, and let it remain as a monument of their clemency; which, by the folly of her citizens, had now twice deserved to be overthrown. Herewithal they did not forget to lay the blame upon *Hannibal*, who, without their appointment, had begun the war; and was maintained in his doings by a faction, without the good-liking of the whole city. By this it appears, that these ambassadors were no *Barchines*, but rather, that they were *Hanno*, and the choice of his company, who had now their long desired work in hand, of suing unto the *Romans* for peace. Whatsoever they were, it must needs be that they were most insolent men over those that were subject unto their power; for they would not have made such adoration to the *Romans*, in their own necessity, unless they themselves had expected the like, where they had the advantage.

It was not unknown to *Scipio*, or to his assistants, in what poor case the city of *Rome* then was, and how unable to defray the charges of continuing the war. Neither were the *Carthaginians*, notwithstanding the loss of so many armies, in such ill case, as the *Romans* themselves had very lately been. For they had money enough wherewith to wage more men: they had a city far stronger than *Rome*, and they had the sea free. But they wanted the *Roman* resolution, and therefore distrustful the walls of *Carthage*, though *Utica*, a weaker city, had all this while held out against *Scipio*, and could not yet be forced by him and his army, though so often victorious in the field. *Scipio* therefore accepted their submission, and told them, that though he came into *Africa* to make a conquest, and not a peace; yet having the conquest, as it were, in his hand, he would not deny to grant them the peace which they desired; for thereby should all nations understand, that the people of *Rome* did follow the rule of justice, both in making war, and in concluding it. The conditions which he imposed upon them,

were these: that they should render up unto him all the prisoners that they had taken, together with all the renagadoes and fugitive slaves: that they should withdraw their armies out of *Italy* and *Gaul*; that they should not meddle in *Spain*, nor yet in any island between *Italy* and *Africa*: that they should deliver up all their ships of war, save twenty; and that they should pay a great sum of money, with certain hundred thousand bushels of wheat and barley. To consider of these articles, he gave them three days; and when they had approved them, he granted a truce, that they might send ambassadors unto the *Roman* senate.

This done, *Masanissa* was dismissed, and went home into his kingdom, as if the war had been already at an end. *Syphax* was a little before sent with *Lælius* unto *Rome*, where the fame of these victories filled men with joy, and gave hope that the long endured miseries would be shortly at an end. Wherefore all the temples were set open, and an holy-day appointed for thanksgiving and supplication to their gods. *Lælius* was accompanied with ambassadors from king *Masanissa*, who, gratulating the happy success of the *Romans* in their *African* war, and giving thanks unto the senate for the benefits done by *Scipio* unto their master, made request for the *Numidians*, such as were now his subjects, and prisoners in *Rome*, that they might be bestowed upon him; who, by rendering them to liberty, should do an act very plausible, that would make him gracious among his people in the beginning of his reign. The *Roman* senate were not behind with *Masanissa* in compliment; but shewing themselves to be highly pleased with all that *Scipio* had done, and should do for him; they called him king again; released his *Numidians* that were captives; and sent him two purple cassocks, that had each of them one gold button; with such other presents, as in time of their poverty, might serve to testify their good-will. Scarcely were these and *Lælius* gone from *Rome*, when the news came that ambassadors from *Carthage* were arrived to desire peace. These ambassadors were not admitted into the city, but were lodged without; until *Lælius*, being sent for, came back from *Ostia*, to be present when their demands were to be heard. Then was audience given them in the temple of *Bellona*, that stood in the suburbs. The errand of these ambassadors was peace; but the meaning of them, and of their city, was only to win time, and get respite from war, until *Hannibal* and *Mago* should come out of *Italy*, either to chase the *Romans* out of *Africa*, or to obtain peace for *Carthage*, by terror of their great names and armies, upon more easy conditions. Wherefore they made an idle discourse of the league that was concluded between them and *Lucretius Catulus*, at the end of the former war. This league, they said, all things well considered, did still remain in force; neither had there since been any war at all between the people of *Rome* and the *Carthaginians*. For it was only *Hannibal*, that, without any leave from *Carthage*, had of his own head besieged and ras'd the town of *Saguntum*: and after that, adventured in like sort, without commission, to pass the *Alps*, and trouble (as he had done) the quiet of *Italy*. This being so, their message was none other, than to desire that the league, before spoken of, made in the time of *Catulus*, might hereafter stand in force, as indeed it hitherto did, and ought to do. The senators had cause to wonder at this tale, hearing these ambassadors make (as it were) a jest of a war, that had been so

^a Cæsar's Com. lib. 1.

^b Excerpt. à Polyb. lib. 15. Liv. lib. 30.

terrible. Wherefore they asked them a great many questions concerning that peace made by *Lucretius*, and other passages following, between the two cities. But they excused themselves by their age (for they were all young men) and said, that those things were beyond their knowledge and remembrance. Forthwith it appeared, that all was but collusion, and that they sought no other than to gain time, until they might repair the war. Wherefore they were sent home in company of *Laelius*, without any conclusion at all of peace; and, in effect, without answer. This notwithstanding, we find in ^a *Polybius*, that the senate receiving advertisement from *Scipio*, of that which had passed between him and the *Carthaginians* in this treaty of peace, approved the conditions by him propounded; and gave him licence thereupon to proceed unto conclusion. This may, with good reason, be believed; since it was not unknown, that if the war continued, all these goodly hopes must rest upon the uncertain hope of one battle between *Hannibal* and *Scipio*; wherein, if fortune should be averse to them, their forces in *Africa* were no better than quite lost.

Matters thus hanging in suspense, before the *Carthaginian* ambassadors came back from *Rome*, a fleet out of *Sicily*, wherein were two hundred ships of burden, and thirty galleys, being bound for *Africa*, to victual the *Roman* camp, was overtaken by foul weather at sea; and, hardly escaping wreck, was dispersed, and driven a-ground in divers parts of the bay of *Carthage*, even in view, and under command of the city. There was at that time, as we find in ^b *Appian*, and may gather out of *Polybius*, a great dearth of victuals in *Carthage*; which caused the people to cry out upon their magistrates, that they should not let such a booty escape them; saying, that the danger of famine was greater and worse than of breaking truce. Whether it were so that hunger urged them, or that they yielded to their own greedy desires, the multitude in *Carthage* understood (as it seems) that all this discourse of peace in hand, was no better than mere mockery; and therefore cared not for observation of particular points, when they meant deceit in the whole. ^c It was the manner in *Carthage*, as likewise in *Alexandria*, for all the rascality, together with women and boys, to be meddling in uproars; the clamours of the boys being in such tumults no less violent than of the men. Wherefore it is no marvel, if little regard were had of reason, or of honour, in any such commotion. A fleet was sent out under *Asdrubal*, to gather up the dispersed *Roman* ships of burden (for the galleys, by force of oars, recovered the station whereto their camp adjoined) and bring them into *Carthage*, which was done. *Scipio* was hereat much offended, not only for the loss, and for that the town was thereby relieved; but for that by this breach of truce, he foresaw the intention of the *Carthaginians* to renew the war, and put him to more trouble. Wherefore he sent ambassadors unto them, both to require satisfaction for the injury done, and to deter them from entertaining any other hope, than in the peace which they had so much desired. These gave the *Carthaginians* to understand, that letters were come from *Rome* unto *Scipio*, with allowance to conclude the peace upon those conditions which he had propounded. But (said they) we hold it strange, that ye, who so lately have cast your selves to the ground before us, and kissed our feet, after an unusual manner of humility, confessing your selves to have perfidiously broken the league that was between us, and thereby to have de-

served such punishment as is due unto rebels, should so soon forget what ye then uttered, and run headlong again into the same crimes, for which ye acknowledged your selves worthy to be destroyed, having only recourse unto our mercy. We are not ignorant, that it is the confidence which ye repose in *Hannibal*, that thus emboldens you. Yet were it not amiss, that ye should consider, how long he hath been pent up in a corner of *Italy*, among the *Brutians*, where he is in a manner besieged, and unable to stir; so that ye are like to find his help wanting in your greatest need. Or let it be supposed, that he were now in *Africa*, and ready to give us battle; yet should it well agree with your wisdom, to doubt what might befall; remembering that he is a man, and not invincible. Now if it should happen that he were overcome, what refuge have ye left unto your selves against hereafter? What gods will ye either swear by, to be believed, or call upon in your misery? What words, and lamentable gesture will ye henceforth use to move compassion; Surely ye have already wasted all your forces of persuasion, and shall not again deceive us, if ye refuse the grace, whereof at this present ye are capable. It is no marvel though the *Carthaginians* were angry, when they heard themselves upbraided with the base demeanor of their ambassadors. For it was not the general opinion of the city, that the truce was broken by themselves, though it had pleased *Hanno*, or such as were of his faction, to gratify the *Romans* with all manner of submission; and to renounce not only their hope of the future, but all justification of matters past. And indeed it seems that the *Roman* ambassadors were very much delighted in the rehearsal of that point, which was yielded unto them, as knowing that thereon depended the justice of the quarrel. But the *Carthaginians* took this in so ill part, that hardly could they refrain from doing violence unto the men who had used unto them such insolent speeches. Yet the fury of the multitude was in some sort appeased, either by *Hanno*, whom *Appian* (I know not why) calls *Hanno the great*; or by the very reverence due unto the place of those that had uttered such liberal words. So they were dismissed in friendly sort, though it were without answer to their proposition. There were also two galleys appointed for their safe convoy home, though with little intent of good unto their persons. *Asdrubal* was then in the mid-way, as men sailed from *Carthage* towards *Utica*. He, whether only desirous to please the multitude, of whose disposition he was informed; or whether directed by publick order, to cut off these ambassadors in their way homeward, lay waiting for them behind a cape that was a little beyond the mouth of the river *Bagradas*. Their convoy having brought them on the way as far as to the mouth of *Bagradas*, wished them a good voyage, and so took leave of them, as if they had been then in safety, since the *Roman* camp was even in sight. The ambassadors took this in ill part, not as fearing any danger toward; but thinking themselves too much neglected, forasmuch as their attendants did so abruptly leave them. But no sooner had they doubled the cape, than *Asdrubal* fell upon them in such manner, as they might well discern his purpose, which was to have stemmed them. They rowed hard therefore, and being in a quinqueme, that had more banks of oars than had any galley of *Asdrubal*, they slipped away, and made him over-shoot himself. Yet he gave them chase, and had well near surprised them; but they discovered some *Roman* companies on the shore over-

^a Excerpt. à Polyb. l. 15.

App. de bello Punico.

^c Excerpt. à Polyb. l. 15.

against them, and therefore adventured to run their vessel a-ground; whereby they saved their own lives, though a great part of their company were slain, or hurt. This practice of the *Carthaginians* was inexcusable; and for the same cause perhaps were the citizens heartned in such a dishonourable attempt, by those that were desirous to continue the war, that thereby they might be driven to study nothing else than how to get the victory, as having none other hope remaining. Yet likely it is, that the same fear which had caused them to make such earnest suit for peace, would also have caused them to be better advised, than thus to abandon all hope of treaty, had they not been given to understand that *Hannibal* was already landed in *Afric*, in whom they reposed no small confidence; but verily persuaded themselves that he would change their fortune, and teach the *Romans* to hold themselves contented with more easy conditions than were those that *Scipio*, in the pride of his fortune, had of late propounded.

S E C T. XX.

In what sort Hannibal spent the time after the battel of Metaurus. The doings of Mago in Italy. Hannibal and Mago called out of Italy. How the Romans were diversly affected by Hannibal's departure.

EVER since the loss of that battel at *Metaurus*, *Hannibal* remained in the country of the *Bruttians*, waiting for another supply from *Carthage*. The *Roman* consuls, that succeeded unto *Claudius* and *Livius*, by whom *Asdrubal* was overcome and slain, were contented to be quiet all their year. Neither did *Licinius*, the colleague of *Scipio*, ought worthy of remembrance against *Hannibal*, being hindered by the pestilence that was in his army. *Sempronius* the consul, who followed *Licinius*, and *Cn. Servilius Sæpe*, who followed *Sempronius*, were earnestly bent to have done somewhat; but their diligence was in a manner fruitless. In some skirmishes with *Hannibal* they had the better; in some the worse; and a few poor towns they got from him, as it were, by stealth; his care being more to preserve his army, than to keep those places that were weak.

The *Romans* had at this time so many great pieces of work in hand, that their chief enemy was become not the chief part of their care. Their thoughts were mainly bent upon *Afric*, wherein they were at no small charges to maintain the army, which (as was hoped) should bring the war to a short and happy conclusion. They stood nevertheless in much fear of *Mago*, the brother of *Hannibal*, who took exceeding pains among the *Ligurians* and *Gauls* to raise an army, wherewith to kindle anew the war in *Italy*, that began to wax cold. *Mago* solicited also the *Ætrurians*, and found them so ready to stir in his behalf, that if he could have entered their country strong, it might have proved no less needful for *Scipio* to return home out of *Afric*, than shortly it was for *Hannibal* to make speed unto the defence of *Carthage*. These dangers caused the *Romans* to employ one of their consuls, or proconsuls, with an army, among the *Ætrurians*; another among the *Gauls*; and a third among the *Ligurians*; forasmuch as it was uncertain upon which side *Mago* would break out. Being thus busied, it is no wonder though they forbore to over-charge *Hannibal* with any great power.

As for *Mago*, when things were in some readiness for his setting forwards, he met in the country of the *Insubrians*, which is about *Milan*, with *M. Cornelius* the *Roman* proconsul, and *P. Quin-*

tilius Varus, one of the pretors. With these he fought a battel, wherein though his virtue shewed it self worthy of his father and brethren, yet his fortune was *Carthaginian*. The fight continued a long while doubtful, in such sort, that the *Roman* commanders began to distrust the issue. Wherefore *Quintilius* the pretor, taking unto him all the *Roman* horse, thought to have shaken the enemies to pieces. The legions at the same time gave a loud shout, and strained themselves hard, as if at that brunt the victory should have been carried before them. But *Mago* opposed his elephants to the horse, the service of those beasts being fitter for such use, than against the squadrons of foot. The figure, scent, and braying of these elephants, did so affright the horse, that they started aside, and were scattered over the field, their riders being unable to manage them. Hereby the *Numidians* got advantage upon them, whose manner of fight was more available against those that were loose, than against the troops that were close and thick. Then fell the elephants upon the legions, which entertained them after the accustomed manner, with a shower of darts, and killed four of them, causing all the rest to give back. This notwithstanding, the same legions were so vehemently pressed by the enemy, that, more for shame of running away, than by any great force to make resistance, they held their ground. The proconsul therefore brought up those forces, which he had kept unto the last, to succour where need should most require. Against these *Mago* employed some of his *Gauls*, whom he had in readiness for the like occasion. But these *Gauls* discharged their parts very ill; they were soon beaten off, and recoiled so hastily, that they brought fear upon all the rest. When *Mago* saw that his men began to shrink, he put himself in the head of his army, and held them so well to it, that, keeping their order, they made a fair retreat, with their faces towards the enemy. But at length he received a grievous wound in his thigh, whereof shortly after he died. He was taken up, and carried out of danger by some of his own men: the rest of them, after little further resistance, provided every one for himself. So the *Romans* obtained victory, not without great cost, as purchasing the death of about five thousand enemies, with the loss of twenty-three hundred of the pretor's army, besides those that died of the proconsul's legions; also besides divers colonels, captains, and gentlemen of mark, that fell in this hot piece of service. Neither were there any prisoners taken; whereby it may seem that the enemies did not fall to rout, before they had recovered some ground that might assure them from pursuit. However it were, this victory would have much more imported for the assurance of *Italy*, if the state of *Carthage* could longer have permitted these valiant sons of *Amilcar* to abide therein. But *Mago*, withdrawing himself (by easy journies, because of his wound) into *Liguria*, found there some hostages from *Carthage* attending him, who gave him to understand the pleasure of their city, which was, that both he and *Hannibal* should presently repair home with all their forces, not staying any longer to think upon the conquest of *Italy*, since *Carthage* it self was ready to be lost. He obeyed this commandment, and embarked shortly his army; but died of his wound about *Sardinia*, in the way homewards.

About the same time *Hannibal* received the like command from *Carthage* to return into *Afric*. He heard it with great impatience, gnashing his teeth, and groaning, and hardly keeping in the tears, that were ready to burst out, whilst the ambassadors were

were delivering their errand. When their message was done, he told them, that *this was yet plain dealing*. For, said he, *They that now directly bid me come home, have long ago done their best to bale me out of Italy; though more closely and crookedly they went to work, by stopping the supply that should have enabled me to manage the war here.* Scipio therefore shall not need to brag, that he hath drawn me home by the heels; it is Hanno that hath wrought this noble feat, and overwhelmed the house of the Barchines; for lack of other means to do it, with the ruin of Carthage. He had before prepared a fleet in readiness, doubting that, which after came to pass; wherein he embarked, besides his own men, as many of the *Italians* as were content to be partakers of his fortune. Many there were that shrunk back from him, and refused to do service in this expedition: of whom such as he could take he slew, not sparing those that fled into the temple of *Juno Lucina*, which had been held an inviolable sanctuary unto that day. He was indeed then wholly transported with rage, and departed out of *Italy* no less passionate, than men are wont to be when they leave their own countries to go into exile. He looked back unto the shore; accusing both gods and men, and cursing his own dulness, in that he had not led his army from *Cannæ*, hot and bloodied as it was, directly unto the walls of *Rome*. With such vexation of spirit he quitted the possession of *Italy*, wherein he had lived almost half his time.

If it could have been foretold unto the *Romans*, in the first beginning of this war, with what exceeding joy in times following they should entertain the news of *Hannibal's* departure out of *Italy*: they would (I think) less earnestly have pressed the *Carthaginians* to send him over thither. When sure advertisement was brought into the city, that *Hannibal* was gone with all his army, an holy-day was appointed for thanksgiving unto their gods, and extraordinary great sacrifices publickly made for joy of such happy tidings. Yet old *Q. Fabius* was of opinion, that the danger did still remain the same, though the place were changed; for that *Hannibal*, at his coming into *Afric*, would find *P. Scipio* other manner of work, than he had been troubled with at any time before; and would do greater matters in his own country, than ever he was able to perform abroad in a land of strangers. The remove of the war from their own doors, and the conceit of that victory for which they hoped, was enough to make them presume further than at other times they would have done. When therefore the *Saguntine* ambassadors brought unto them a great mass of gold and silver, together with some agents of the *Carthaginians*, taken by them in *Spain*: only the *Carthaginian* prisoners were accepted; the treasure was rendered back unto the *Saguntines*, that had surprised it. Upon like confidence of the future, a little before this, order was taken for the repayment of those monies that had been borrowed in time of more necessity from private men. Hence also proceeded the severe chastisement laid upon those twelve colonies, that, for want either of means, or of goodwill, had refused to give aid to the *Romans*. They were commanded, and enforced to give double the number of foot to that which they had been wont to set out for the wars, with a proportion of horse answerable to the very most of their ability. So confident were the *Romans* grown (though their wealth were not as yet suitable to the greatness of their spirit) upon the good success of the battel of *Metanum*, and the hopes which they reposed in *Scipio*. All this notwithstanding, when they considered more nearly of that which might happen; and were

informed, that the terrible army, whereof *Italy* had been few days since discharged, was landed safe in *Afric*, they began to revolve a thousand fearful matters in their heads, and to stand in doubt lest *Q. Fabius* (who died about the same time) would be found a true prophet. For, bethinking themselves of that which might comfort them in their hopes, they found in the victories against *Syphax* and *Asdrubal* no specialty of such great worth, as might promise the like success against another manner of general, followed by other manner of men than were either of those two. The *Numidian* king had been wont to bring into the field a rascally multitude of half-scurillions, that were good for nothing, being himself a fit captain for such soldiers. Likewise *Asdrubal*, the son of *Gisco*, was well thought of by the *Carthaginian* senate; but otherwise, one that in the field was only good at saving himself by a swift retreat. But now there came an army of men, hardened from their childhood with incredible patience, fleshed many hundred times in *Roman* blood, and wearing the spoils not only of good soldiers, but brave captains, by them slain. Such talk used the people of *Rome*, saying, that *Scipio* was like to meet in battel with many, that had slain *Roman* pretors, yea, and consuls, with their own hands; with many, that had been first in getting over the trenches of several *Roman* camps, or in winning the tops of walls at the siege of towns; briefly, that he should now be opposed by an army as good as had ever served in war, and following the dreadful name of *Hannibal*.

S E C T. XXI.

Hannibal in Afric prepares to fight with Scipio; treats with him about peace in vain; loseth a battel at Nadagara, and perswades the Carthaginians to sue for peace. Of the peace granted from Rome to Carthage.

Hannibal disembarked his army at *Leptis*, almost an hundred miles from *Carthage*, eastward from the headland of *Mercury*, and somewhat more than one degree to the south. He was ill-provided of horse, which it was not easy for him to transport out of *Italy*. Therefore it behoved him to land, as he did, somewhat far from the enemy, that he might furnish himself with this and the like needful helps against the day of battel. From *Leptis* he passed on to *Adumetum*, and so along through the inland country, gathering friends unto him by the way. *Tychæus*, a *Numidian* prince, and a familiar friend of *Syphax*, was said to have in those days the best horses of service that were to be found in *Afric*. Him therefore did *Hannibal* allure unto his party, making him understand, that if the *Romans* got the victory, it should be easy for *Masanissa*, by their countenance and help, to oppress both him, and as many other of the neighbour princes as hindered his prospect. This argument, and the same of him that used it, prevailed with *Tychæus*, who shortly after brought unto the *Carthaginian* two thousand horse. *Appian* further adds, that *Mezetullus* (the same who had made himself protector over *Masanissa's* cousins, and was head of a family, and adverse to the *Numidian* kings of that race) brought unto *Hannibal* another thousand horse; as likewise that *Vermine*, the son of *Syphax*, holding a great part of his father's kingdom, began at the same time to assail the places that yielded obedience to *Masanissa*. This *Vermine*, as we find in *Livy*, came with more than sixteen thousand men (for he lost more than so many) to succour *Hannibal*, when it was too late.

The *Carthaginians* were at this time in such hard estate, or (at least) so impatient of the state wherein they were; that they could not attend the leisure of those preparations, which would have made the victory assured. When they considered the worth of *Hannibal*, and the greatness of his acts: it offended them to think, that they had been so base, as to make humble suit unto the *Romans* for peace; whilst they had such a brave champion alive, to maintain their cause by war. But when they bethought themselves of their own sufferings, which, for want of *Roman* magnanimity to endure them, appeared greater than indeed they were: then cried they out earnestly, that it was no time to linger, but presently to fight; that so they might see an end of these troubles, either good or bad. And to this purpose, they sent their mandates to *Hannibal*: requiring him, without any further protraction, to do what he could do out of hand. *Hannibal* made answer, that they were his good lords, and had power to dispose of him and his army: but since he was general of their forces, he thought it reasonable, that they should suffer him to do as a general ought to do; and to choose his own times. Nevertheless, to give them satisfaction, he made great marches to *Zama*; and there encamped.

The breach of truce, made by the *Carthaginians*: the violence done to his ambassadors: and the news of *Hannibal's* being landed in *Afric*; made *Scipio* to understand the resolution of the *Carthaginians*, which was, not to yield unto any conditions unprofitable for themselves, as long as they were able to make resistance. Wherefore he sent unto *Masanissa*: and informed him of all that was fallen out; praying him to come away with speed, and lay all other business a-part. Ten *Roman* companies, of horse and foot together, *Masanissa* had with him; that were lent unto him by *Scipio*, to do him service in the establishing and enlarging of his kingdom. But he well understood, that those, and many more besides all his own forces, would little avail him; if *Hannibal* should drive the *Romans* out of *Afric*. Wherefore taking such order as he could upon the sudden, for the safety of his own kingdom; with four thousand horse, and six thousand foot, he made all haste unto *Scipio*.

Soon after the beginning of these new troubles, the *Carthaginian* ambassadors that had been at *Rome*, returned back under the conduct of *Laelius* and *Fulvius*: who brought them safe into the *Roman* camp. There when they arrived, and understood what had lately passed, especially how their citizens had behaved themselves towards the *Roman* ambassadors: they made little doubt, how their own heads should answer for such notorious outrage. To confirm them in this opinion, *M. Babinus*, one of the late ambassadors that had been in *Carthage*, being left by *Scipio* to take charge of the camp, laid hands upon them, and detained them; sending word unto his general, who was gone abroad to make war in the country, that he had them in his power, and that now the *Carthaginians* might be repaid in their own coin, for the injury by them lately done. *Scipio* was very glad to hear of this; and commanded *Babinus* to use them with all possible courtesy, and send them safe home. By this doing he brake the hearts of his enemies; and caused them to acknowledge themselves (which was a great victory) far less honourable than the *Romans*. This notwithstanding, he made more cruel war upon them than before: ta-

king their towns by force; and putting them to sack, without hearkning to any composition. It was the manner of the *Romans*, as often as they took a town by assault, to put all that came in their way to the sword, whatsoever they were, without regard. This they did, to make themselves terrible: and the better to work such impression in the minds of those, with whom they had to do, they used oftentimes to kill the very dogs and other beasts, that ran athwart them in the streets; hewing their bodies asunder, as men delighted in shedding of blood. ^a This being their practice at other times: it is likely, that now they omitted no piece of cruelty; when they meant to give proof of their vehement indignation, and revengeful minds, for the injuries received. Hence it partly grew, that the *Carthaginians* were so earnest in pressing *Hannibal* to fight.

Hannibal being encamped at *Zama*, sent forth his scouts and spies to discover where the *Romans* lay; what they were doing; and as much as might be of their demeanour. Some of these were taken, and brought unto *Scipio*: who, instead of trusting them up, gave them free leave to view his camp at pleasure; appointing one to conduct them up and down, and shew them whatsoever they desired. This done, he gave them liberty to depart; and sent them away safe unto their general. *Hannibal* understanding this, admired the bravery and courage of his enemy: with whom on the sudden he grew desirous to have an interview, and personal conference; and signified so much unto him, by a messenger sent of purpose. Of this motion the *Roman* liked well: and returned answer, that he would meet him shortly in place convenient. The next day *Masanissa* came with his army: whom *Scipio* taking with him removed unto a town called *Nodagara*; near unto which he sat down, in a place otherwise commodious, and close by a water that might opportunely serve his camp. Thence he sent word unto the *Carthaginian*, that the time and place did fitly serve, if he had ought to say to him. *Hannibal* thereupon removed from *Zama*, and came within four miles of the enemy: where he encamped well to his own good liking in all things else; excepting that his men were driven to take much pains, in fetching their water somewhat far off. Then was order taken for their meeting: and the two generals, each of them with a troop of horse, rode forth of their camps, till they came unto a piece of ground, which was before well searched, for fear of ambush. There they will their followers to stand off; and themselves, with each of them one interpreter, encountered each other in the mid-way between their companies. They remained a while silent, viewing one the other with mutual admiration. Then began the *Carthaginian*, saluting the *Roman*, to deliver his mind to this effect: That it had been better both for *Carthage* and *Rome*, if they could have limited and contained their ambition within the shores of *Afric* and of *Italy*; for that the countries of *Sicily* and of *Spain*, about which their fathers and themselves had striven, were no sufficient recompence for so many fleets as had been lost, and for so much blood as had been shed, in making those costly purchases. But since things pass'd could not be recalled: He said, that it was meet for them to consider, unto what extreme dangers their own cities had been exposed, by the greedy desire of extending their empires abroad; and that it was even time for them now at length, to make an end of their

^a Excerpt. i Polyb. lib. 10.

obstinate contention, and pray the gods to endow them with greater wisdom hereafter. And to such peaceable disposition, he affirmed that his own years, and long trial of fortune both good and evil, had made him inclinable. But much he feared, that Scipio, by want of the like experience might rather fix his mind upon uncertain hopes, than upon the contemplation of that mutability, whereunto all human affairs are subject. Yet (said he) mine own example may peradventure suffice to teach thee moderation. For I am that same Hannibal, who after my victory at Cannæ won the greatest part of Italy: and devised with my self, what I should do with your city of Rome; which I hoped verily to have taken. Once I brought mine army to your walls, as thou hast since brought thine to ours of Carthage: but now, see the change! I stand here entreating thee to grant us peace. This may serve as a document of fortune's instability. I have fought with thy father Scipio: he was the first of the Roman generals, that ever met me in the field. I did then little think; that the time would come, that I should have such business, as now at the present, with his son. But this is even one of fortune's pageants, whereof she hath many. And thou mayest have experience of the like in thy self, who knows how soon? Think upon M. Atilius. If he would have harkened unto such persuasions, as I now use to thee; he might have returned home to Rome an happy man. And so mayest thou do now, if any reasonable offer will give thee satisfaction. How sayest thou? Canst thou be contented, that all Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and whatever islands else are situate between Italy and Afric, be abandoned by the Carthaginians for ever; and left unto the Romans to bear dominion therein? Thou shalt have glory enough by effecting thus much, and the Romans may well be glad of such a bargain. As for us: our own quiet shall henceforth give us contentment. And the same contentment of ours, shall make us faithfully observe the peace with you. But if thou thinkest all too little; I must desire thee to ponder well how great an hazard thou must undergo, for the obtaining of a very little more, than that which thou mayest have without contention. It is now in thine own power, to lay hold of good fortune, if it please thee: stay but till to-morrow night, and thou mayest take such fortune, as it shall please the gods. The issue of battle is uncertain, and many times beguileth expectation. Men and steel we shall each of us bring into the field: but of the victory, neither of us hath the assurance. Let us therefore without more ado make peace: And do not tell me, that some false hearted citizens of ours dealt fraudulently of late in the like treaty: It is I Hannibal that now desires peace with thee; which I would never do, if I thought it not expedient for my country. And thinking it expedient I will always maintain it: like as I have maintained unto my power, as long as the gods did not envy me, the war by me begun. Hereunto Scipio made answer, That it was no ambitious desire of ruling in Sicily and in Spain, which had moved the Romans to enter into this or the former war: but that the defence of the *Mamertines*, and afterwards of the *Saguntines*, their confederates, had caused them to put on those arms; which the gods by the final issue of the wars had approved, and would approve to be most just. As for the mutability of fortune: he said, that he was not thereof ignorant; and that without any note of insolence, or over-weening, he might well refuse the conditions offered. For was it not plain, that all these countries, with which the Carthaginians now so willingly departed were already won from them by

the Romans? If, said he, these conditions had been propounded whilst as yet we detained some part of Italy, they might peradventure not have been rejected. But as the case now stands, I see no reason why I should remit unto you any one piece of those my former demands; to which the Carthaginians have yielded already, and thought me to deal graciously in being so moderate. Rather I say, that the injuries which they have done me since, have made them unworthy of obtaining peace upon so friendly terms. But I cannot blame thee, Hannibal, though thou wouldst be glad to make thy citizens understand, from how much of their burden they are by thy means eased. Only thou must think, that in like sort it concerns me in honour, not to let them be gainers or savers by the wrongs which they have done of late. Thou knowest well, that besides those offers which thou here hast made, they were well contented to restore unto us ransom-free all prisoners that they have of ours; to pay us five thousand talents; to deliver up their galleys; and to deliver hostages for assurance of fair dealing. And must they now be discharged of all this, by their breach of truce; their spoiling of our fleet; and their violating our ambassadors? Not so. But if they can be contented, besides all this, to make such amends as I shall require, for these injuries newly done; then will I take advice with my council what answer to give you; otherwise, you may even prepare for war, and blame your own selves, for that I have denied you peace.

Hereupon they brake off; and returned each to his own camp, with no other news than war; bidding their soldiers prepare for a battle, wherein should be decided the quarrel between Rome and Carthage. The next morning at break of day they issued into the field: a notable match, and such as hath very seldom been found; whether we regard the generals; their armies; the two cities that contended, or the great importance of the battle at hand. Scipio ordered his men after the Roman manner: placing first the *Hastati*, divided into their maniples, or small batallions, with reasonable distance between them: Not far behind these followed the *Principes*, likewise divided; and so after them the *Triarii*. But herein Scipio altered a little the ordinary custom of the Romans: he placed not the maniples of his *Principes* opposite unto the void spaces between the *Hastati*, that to the *Hastati*, as was usual, might fall back between the *Principes*; but he placed them directly one behind another, as it were in file. This he did because of the elephants; whereof Hannibal had many. For of those beasts the danger was less, whilst there was open way to let them through. Therefore he took such order, that when they had passed through the spaces between the first battalions, they should not come upon the *Principes* in front. Unto his *Velites*, or those of the light armature, that were to begin the fight, he gave direction, that when they found themselves to be overcharged, either by the enemies, or (which was most to be feared) by the elephants, they should run back through those lanes that were between the maniples, and that those which were swiftest, or otherwise best able, should continue on their flight, until they were got behind all their own army; thereby leaving room enough unto those that were wounded, or cast behind, to save themselves on the void ground, that was betwixt the first and second, or the second and third battalions, without cloying up the way between the maniples which he desired to keep open. His Italian horse he placed in the left wing under G. Lælius. In the right wing was Masaniissa with his Numidians. He himself riding up and down, exhorting his men to do valiantly; using

using words not many, but very forcible. He bade them remember what they had atchieved, since their coming into *Africa*. He told them, that if this day were theirs, the war was at an end: and that their victory in this war, should make them lords of all the world; for that afterwards, none would be found able to resist them. On the contrary; if they were beaten, he asked them whither they would fly. They were far from home, yea, and far from their own standing camp: neither was there any place in *Africa*, that would give them shelter; if they fell into the *Carthaginians* hands, they knew what to expect. And therefore there was none other way, but death or victory; unless they would live like wretched slaves under most merciless enemies. In such necessity, he said, that they which consider themselves to be, and take resolution answerable thereunto, have never been known to fail of getting victory.

Hannibal on the other side placed his elephants, that were more than fourscore, in front of his battel. Next behind these, he made his vanguard all of mercenaries, *Ligurians*, *Gauls*, *Baleares*, and *Moors*. Then followed his battel; which was of *Carthaginians* and *Africans*, more interested in the quarrel than were those mercenaries, though not so good soldiers; but to help (if it might be) their want of courage, they had with them four thousand *Macedonians*, lately sent from king *Philip*. More than the space of a furlong behind these came his rearward consisting of those brave soldiers which had served him in his *Italian* wars; and were the only men, in whom he reposed any confidence. Opposite to *Laelius*, in his own right wing he bestowed the *Carthaginian* horse. *Tychæus* and the *Numidians* he placed in his left wing against *Masanissa*. He was indeed far too weak for the enemy in horse, both in number and in goodness. For *Tychæus* and *Mezetullus* had no more than three thousand; and those not so well exercised, as were the four thousand of *Masanissa*. The *Carthaginians* also were no more, nor none other than such as could be levied in the haste of a few days; and the remainder of those that had of late been often vanquished, and accustomed to fly. But it was no time for *Hannibal*, neither had he perhaps authority, to make these his companions alight and serve on foot, setting better men in their saddles. All that he could have done, was to stay a little longer, and expect more help. Had *Vermina* the son of *Syphax* come thither, as he did in few days after, with sixteen thousand and upwards, the most of them horse; the advantage of number might have served well to supply all other defect. Yet since the lords of *Carthage* would brook no delay: *Hannibal* must be fain to comfort himself, with the hope that he reposed in his old *Italian* soldiers; whose virtue had wrought greater wonders, when it was more strongly opposed. He encouraged therefore his men, with words agreeable to their several conditions: promising unto the mercenaries bountiful rewards, threatening the *Carthaginians* with inevitable servitude, if they lost that day; but especially animating his old fellow-soldiers, by the many victories which they had obtained against far greater numbers. He bade them to look upon the enemies; and make an estimate, whether they were any thing like so many, as that large army which they had slaughtered at *Cannæ*. He willed them to remember, that it was one *P. Scipio*, even the father of this man, whom they had first of all compelled to run away. He told them that these legions which they yonder beheld, were, for the most part of

them, the very worst of the *Roman* soldiers; even such, as for their dastardly flight out of sundry battels could no longer be trusted to bear arms in their own country. As for the rest, they were young men, the sons of cowards; and bred up in the continual fear of those weapons, by which their fathers were daily slain or chased. Wherefore he entreated these his old companions, upon whose virtue he meant wholly to repose himself, that they would this day strive to make good their honour; and to purchase the fame of *Men invincible*.

Such exhortations used the two generals before the fight. When they drew near together, the *Numidian* horsemen on both sides began to skirmish. The trumpets, and other instruments of war, sounded to battel; and *Hannibal* commanded his elephants to break upon the *Romans*. Of these elephants (as they were always an uncertain kind of help) those that stood near unto the point of the left wing, turned back for fear, and ran upon their own *Numidian* horse; which they affrighted and disordered. *Masanissa* espying this, gave charge upon the same *Numidians*; and not suffering them to rally themselves, drove them quite out of the field. The rest of those beasts made a great spoil of the *Roman Velites*, whom they followed into the spaces between the maniples: but without any harm to the battalions themselves; which gave them open way, according as *Scipio* had well provided. Divers of them receiving many wounds, and growing therewith furious could no longer be governed: but ran back upon the right point of their own battel, and beyond that into the open field. Herewithal they disordered the *Carthaginian* horse which were in that wing: against whom they gave to *Laelius* the same advantage, that *Masanissa* had against the *Numidians*; which he used in like sort. In the mean while the battels of foot advanced, and drew near together with a slow and stately pace, till they were almost within a weapon's cast: at what time they gave a shout and ran one at the other. The mercenaries for a time seemed both in audacity, and in quickness, to have the better of the *Romans*; wounding many, and doing more harm, than they took. But the *Roman* discipline, after a while, prevailed against the boisterous violence of these untrained *Barbarians*. Whereunto it helped not a little, that the battel of the *Principes*, following somewhat near after the *Hastati*, encouraged their fellows; and shewed themselves ready, if need were, to relieve them. Contrariwise, the mercenaries received no manner of help or comfort, from those that should have seconded them. For the new levied *Carthaginians* and *Africans*, when they saw their hired soldiers give back, did also themselves retire. This caused the *Ligurians*, *Gauls*, and the rest, to think themselves betrayed: whereupon they inclined unto flight. The *Carthaginian* battel was herewith more terrified than before, so as it refused to give way unto the mercenaries for their safe retreat: and yet withal forbore to make head against the enemies, that pursued them. It was no time to ask them what they meant by this; fear and indignation caused those that were at once chased by the *Romans*, and betrayed, as they thought, by their own fellows, to turn their arms with an heedless fury against both the one and the other. Thus were many of the *Carthaginians* beaten down and slain, through their own indiscretion, by their own mercenaries. The *Roman Hastati* in like sort, fighting with desperate men in a throng, had their hands so full of work, that the *Principes* were fain to come up unto them, and help to over-bear this great medley

of enemies, that were together by the ears among themselves. In this place was made a great slaughter, both of the mercenaries and of the *Carthaginians*; which hindering one another, could neither fight, nor easily fly. Such of them as escaped, ran towards *Hannibal*, who kept his ground, and would not stir one foot to help or save these run-aways. He caused his men to bend their pikes at those of his own side, that would have rushed upon him, whom he thereby compelled to turn aside beyond his battel, and save themselves in the open field. The ground, over which the *Romans* were now to march, ere they could meet with *Hannibal*, was covered with such thick heaps of dead bodies and weapons, and so slippery with blood; that *Scipio* began to stand in great doubt lest the order of his battalions should be dissolved in passing that way. In such case, if he should fight with that warlike army which he saw before him, remaining yet entire, and without fear expecting him, he might be well assured to receive a notable overthrow. He caused therefore the *Hastati* to make a stand there where they were, opposite unto the main battel of the *Hannibals*. Then drawing up his *Principes* and *Triarii*, he placed them, when they had overcome the bad way, all in one front with the *Hastati*, and made of them his two cornets. This done, he advanced towards *Hannibal*, who entertained him after another manner than ever he had been received in his life before. All the day's work, till now, seemed to have been only a matter of pastime, in regard of the sharp conflict that was maintained between these notable soldiers. The *Romans* were encouraged, by their having prevailed all the day before: they were also far the more in number. But these old soldiers of *Hannibal* were fresh, and (perhaps) the better men. They fought with such obstinate resolution, that no man gave back one foot, but rather chose to die upon the ground whereon he stood. So that after a long time, it was uncertain which part had the worse, unless it may seem that the *Romans* were beginning to shrink; forasmuch as the return of a *Mafaniffa* and *Lælius*, from pursuit of the enemy's horse, is said to have been most happy, and in a needful time. These upon the sudden charged the *Hannibals* in rear, and over-bearing them by mere violence, compelled them to fall to rout.

In this battel there died of the *Romans* fifteen hundred and upwards; on the *Carthaginian* side above twenty thousand, besides as many that were taken; of whom *Sopater*, captain of the *Macedonians*, was one. The singular skill that *Hannibal* shewed in this his last fight, is highly commended by *Polybius*; and was acknowledged, as *Livy* reports, by *Scipio* himself. But the enemies were too strong for him in horse; and being enjoined, as he was, by the state of *Carthage*, to take battel with such disadvantage, he could work no marvels. He saved himself, with a few horse, and staid not in his journey, till he came to *Adrumetum*. Thence was he sent for to *Carthage*, from which he had been about thirty-six years. At his coming into the senate, he said plainly, that there was none other way left, than to take such peace as could be gotten. Wherefore the *Carthaginians*, not knowing what other course to take, resolved to send ambassadors again, and try the favour of *Scipio*, whose arms they could not now resist.

Scipio having spoiled the enemy's camp, returned back to *Utica*, where he found *P. Lentulus* newly arrived, with fifty galleys, and an hundred ships of burden. With this fleet, and that which he had

before, he thought it best to make towards *Carthage*; rather of purpose to terrify the city, than with any hope to take it. His legions he committed unto *Cn. Octavius*, whom he willed to meet him there by land. Then sending *Lælius* away to *Rome*, with news of the victory, he set sail from *Utica* towards *Carthage*. He was encountered on the way by ten ambassadors from the city; who bearing up with the admiral galley, began to use the pitiful gesture of suppliants. But they received none other answer, than that they should meet him at *Tunis*, where he would give them audience. So rowing along before the city, and viewing it more in bravery, than with meaning to attempt it; he returned back to *Utica*; and called back *Octavius* thither, with whom, in person, he set forwards to *Tunis*. As they were in their journey thither, they heard the news that *Vermine*, the son of *Syphax*, was coming with an army of more horse than foot, to the succour of those that were already vanquished. This *Vermine* seems to have been both careless of getting intelligence how things passed, and very defective in all other duties requisite in the commander of an army. Part of the *Roman* foot, with all their power of horse, was sent against him; which did not only beat him, but so compass him in, that he hardly escaped himself with a few; leaving fifteen thousand of his followers dead behind him, and twelve hundred taken prisoners. If this good company had been with *Hannibal* at *Nadagara*; they should have been far better conducted, and might well have changed the fortune of the day, which the *Carthaginian* lost by default of horse. But God had otherwise determined. It is not to be doubted that this victory, though it were no great access unto the former, yet served well to daunt the *Carthaginians*, and imprint in them the greater fear of *Scipio*. When he came to *Tunis*, there met him thirty ambassadors from *Carthage*, whose behaviour, though it was more pitiful than it had been before, yet procured it less commiseration, by reason of their late false dealing, after they had in like sort humbled themselves. Nevertheless it was considered, what a long and laborious work it would prove, to besiege the mighty city of *Carthage*. And particularly *Scipio* stood in great doubt lest the honour of this war, if it were protracted, should be taken out of his hands, and given to one of the consuls. *Cn. Servilius Sæpio*, that consul who had charge of the war against *Hannibal*, at such time as he departed out of *Italy*, was bold to pass over into the isle of *Sicily* (as it were in chase of *Hannibal*, by him terrified and driven away) with a purpose thence to have proceeded into *Afric*, and taken from *Scipio* the command of the army there. But a dictator was chosen of purpose to restrain the ambition of this consul *Servilius*. After him followed *Tiberius Claudius*, who made suit for the same province of *Afric*, and was therein so earnest, that though neither the senate nor people would grant him his desire; yet he needs would be going, procuring only leave of the senate, that he, being consul, might join with *Scipio*, were it with no more than equal authority. But ere he could have his fleet, and all things in a readiness for the journey, wherein no man cared to further him, winter came on, and he was only tossed at sea with foul weather; first upon the coast of *Hebruria*, and afterwards by *Sardinia*, where his consulship expired; and so he returned home a private man. Then came the joyful news to *Rome* of the victory obtained against *Hannibal*, and that the war was now even at an end. Yet was *Lentulus*,

the new consul, so passionate in desiring *Afric* for his province, that he said he would suffer nothing to pass in the senate, until he had first his will. Much ado there was about this; and after many contentions, both in the senate and before the people, at last it was ordered, that if peace were granted, it should be granted by *Scipio*; if the war continued, *Scipio* should have command therein by land; and the consul at sea. The ambition of these men, caused *Scipio* to give the more favourable answer unto the *Carthaginian* ambassadors. He willed them to consider what they had deserved, and in regard thereof, to think themselves well dealt withal, in that he was contented to leave unto them their liberty, and their own laws, without appointing any governor over them, or garrison to hold them in subjection; leaving also unto them their possessions in *Afric*, such as they were at the beginning of this war. As touching the rest, he was at a point, that, before he either granted them peace or truce, they should make satisfaction for wrongs which they had done whilst the late treaty was in dependance. Hereunto, if they would yield, then required he, *That immediately they should deliver up unto the Romans all prisoners, fugitives, and renegadoes, that they had of theirs; likewise all their gallies, excepting ten, and all their elephants: That they should make no war at all thenceforth out of Afric, neither yet within Afric, without licence of the Romans: that the countries, towns, goods whatsoever, belonging anywise unto Masanissa, or to any of his ancestors, which were in their possession, should be all by them restored unto him: that they should find corn for the Roman army, and wages for their auxiliaries, during the time of truce, until the peace were fully concluded: that they should pay ten thousand talents of silver, in the term of fifty years, by two hundred talents a year: and that for observance of conditions, they should give an hundred hostages, such as Scipio would chuse, being none of them under fourteen years of age, nor above thirty.*

With these conditions the ambassadors returned home, and reported them unto the city. They were very displeasing, and therefore one *Gisco* stood up to speak against them, and exhorted the people, who gave good attention, that they should not condescend unto such intolerable demands. But *Hannibal*, perceiving this, and noting withal what favourable audience was given to this vain orator by the unquiet, yet unwarlike multitude, was bold to pull him down from his standing by plain force. Hereat all the people murmured, as if their common liberty were too much wronged by such insolence of this presumptuous captain. Which *Hannibal* perceiving, rose up, and spake unto them, saying, that they ought to pardon him, if he had done otherwise than the customs of the city would allow; forasmuch as he had been thence absent ever since he was a boy of nine years old, until he was now a man of forty-five. Having thus excused himself of the disorder, he discoursed unto them concerning the peace, and perswaded them to accept it, as wanting ability to defend themselves, had the demands of the enemy been yet more rigorous. Finally, upon good advice, they resolved to yield unto the conditions propounded by *Scipio*, to whom they payed out of hand twenty-five thousand weight of silver, in recompence of dangers and injuries by them done to his fleet and ambassadors. *Scipio* granted them truce for three months, in which time they might negotiate with the state of *Rome* about confirmation of the league. But herewithal he gave injunction, that they should neither in the mean while send ambassadors any-where else, nor yet dismiss any ambassa-

dors to them, sent, without first making him acquainted what they were, and what their errand was.

At this time *Hanno*, and they of his faction, were become wise and honourable men, by the miseries whereinto *Carthage* was fallen, through their malicious counsels. *Asdrubal*, surnamed *the Kid*, a venerable man, and a great friend of *Hanno*, was chief of the embassies which they sent to *Rome* for obtaining peace. They went thither in company of *Scipio's* ambassadors, who related unto the senate and people these joyful news. About the same time arrived at *Rome* ambassadors from *Philip* king of *Macedon*, who, together with the *Carthaginians*, were fain to wait a while for audience, till the election of new consuls, then in hand, was finished, and order taken for the provinces of them, and the new pretors. Then were the *Macedonian* ambassadors called into the senate, who first answering unto some points, wherein the *Romans* had lately signified unto their king, that they found themselves grieved, returned the blame upon those *Greeks* themselves that had made their complaint at *Rome*. Then accused they *M. Aurelius*, who being one of the three ambassadors that had lately been sent from *Rome* unto king *Philip*, tarried in *Greece* behind his fellows; and there levying men, made war upon the king, without any regard at all of the league that was between him and the *Romans*. Further, they desired of the senate, that one *Sopater*, a *Macedonian* gentleman, with other of their countrymen, that had lately served *Hannibal* for pay; and being taken prisoners in *Afric*, were kept in bonds by *Scipio*, might be released, and delivered unto them. Unto all this *M. Furius*, whom *Aurelius* had sent to *Rome* for that purpose, made a sharp answer. He said, that the *Greeks*, which were confederate with *Rome*, endured so many injuries at the hands of *Philip*, that *M. Aurelius* was fain to stay behind, to help them as he might; which else were like to be brought under the king's subjection. As for *Sopater*, he affirmed him to be one of the king's council, and very inward with him; one that served not for money, but carried money with him, and four thousand men, sent from the king to the aid of *Hannibal*. About these points, when the *Macedonian* ambassadors could make unto the senate no good answer, they were willed to return, and tell their master, that war he sought, and war he should find, if he proceeded as he had begun. For in two main points, he had broken the league that was between him and the *Romans*: first, in that he had wronged their confederates; and secondly, in that he had aided their enemies against them with men and money.

These quarrels with *Philip*, that promised to open a way into *Greece*, and the eastern countries, helped well the *Carthaginian* ambassadors in their solicitation of peace. They appeared a very reverend company when they entered into the senate; and *Asdrubal*, above the rest, was much respected, as one, whose good offices had kept the *Romans* from necessity of sending ambassadors to *Carthage* upon the like errand. He liberally granted, that the justice of the quarrel had been wholly on the *Roman* side, saying, that it was the fault of some violent men, through which the peace was broken. Yet could he not altogether excuse the city, that had been too vehement in the prosecution of bad counsel. But if *Hanno* and himself might have had their wills, the *Carthaginians*, even at the best of their fortune, should have granted the peace which they now desired. Herewithal he commended the moderation of the *Romans*, as no small

argument of their valour, by which always they had been victorious. To the same effect spake the rest of the ambassadors, all of them entreating to have the peace ratified; though some with more lamentable words than others, according to the diversity of their style. They had patience enough to endure such reproof of perjury, as they themselves might have laid upon the *Romans*, if their diligence and fortune had been such as the *Romans* was. Among the rest, when one of the senators demanded by what gods they would swear to keep the peace hereafter; *Asdrubal* made answer, *Even by the same gods that are so severe unto those that violate their leagues.*

Lentulus the consul, interposing the authority of his office, would have hindered the senate from proceeding unto conclusion of peace; for that hereby he was like to lose the honour which he purposed to get by making war in *Afric*. But the matter was propounded unto the people, in whom rested the sovereign command of *Rome*, and by them referred wholly unto the pleasure of the senate. So it was decreed that *Scipio*, with ten delegates sent unto him from *Rome* of purpose, should make a league with the *Carthaginians*, upon such conditions as seemed best, which were none other than the same which he had already propounded. For this favour, the *Carthaginian* ambassadors humbly thanked the senate, and craved licence that they might visit their countrymen which were prisoners in *Rome*; afterwards, that they might ransom, and carry home with them some that were their especial friends, of whom they gave in writing almost two hundred names. Whereupon the senate ordained that two hundred of those prisoners, which the ambassadors would chuse, should be sent over into *Afric*, and be freely restored to liberty by *Scipio* when the peace was fully concluded. So they took leave, and returned home, in company of the ten delegates that were appointed by the senate to join with *Scipio* in commission.

At their coming into *Afric*, the peace was given, and accepted, without any controversy or disputation. The prisoners, fugitives, and renegadoes, were delivered up to *Scipio*; likewise the gallies and the elephants. *Scipio* took more vengeance upon the renegadoes than upon the fugitives; and upon those of the *Romans* than upon the *Latins*, or other *Italians*. The *Latins* he beheaded, the *Romans* he crucified. About the first payment of their money, the *Carthaginians* were somewhat troubled: for though perhaps their common treasury could have spared two hundred talents for the present, yet since the pension was annual, and to continue fifty years, it was thought meet to lay the burden upon the citizens. At the collection of the sum there was piteous lamentation, as if now the *Roman* yoke had begun to pinch them; so as many, even of the senators, could not forbear weeping. Contrariwise, *Hannibal* could not refrain from laughter: for which, when he was check'd by *Asdrubal Hædus*, and told, that it worst of all becomed him to laugh, since he had been the cause why all others did weep; he answered, *That laughter did not always proceed from joy; but sometimes from extremity of indignation. Yet, said he, my laughter is more seasonable, and less absurd, than your tears. For ye should have wept when ye*

gave up your ships and elephants, and when ye bound your own hands from the use of arms, without the good leave of the Romans first obtained. This miserable condition keeps us under, and holds us in assured servitude: but of these matters ye had no feeling. Now, when a little money is wrung out of your private purses, ye have thereof some sense. God grant that the time come not hereafter, wherein ye shall acknowledge, that it was the very least part of your misery for which ye have shed these tears. Thus discoursed *Hannibal* to those, who, tasting the bitter fruits of their own malicious counsel, repented when it was too late; and, instead of cursing their own disorders, which had bred this grievous disease, accused that physician, whose noble endeavours had been employed in procuring the remedy.

Scipio, being to take leave of *Afric*, produced *Masanissa*, and magnified him in presence of the army with high commendations, not undeservedly. To him also he consigned over those towns of king *Syphax*, which the *Romans* at that present held; wherein, to say truth, he gave him but his due, and that which otherwise he knew not well how to bestow. But the love of the *Romans* and friendship of *Scipio*, was fully answerable now, and hereafter, to all the deservings of this *Numidian* king. About *Carthage* there rested no more to be done. Wherefore the *Romans* embarked themselves for *Sicily*, where, when they arrived at *Lilybæum*, *Scipio*, with some part of his army, took his way home to *Rome* by land, and sent the rest before him thither by sea. His journey through *Italy* was no less glorious than any triumph, all the people thronging out of the towns and villages to do him honour as he passed along. He entered the city in triumph: neither was there ever before or after any triumph celebrated with so great joy of the people, as was this of *Scipio*; though, in bravery of the pomp, there were others in time shortly following that exceeded this. Whether *Syphax* were carried through the city in this triumph, and died soon after in prison; or whether he were dead a-while before, it cannot be affirmed. Thus much may be avowed, that it was a barbarous custom of the *Romans* to insult over the calamities of mighty princes, by leading them contumeliously in triumph, yea, though they were such as had always made fair and courteous war. But hereof we shall have better example, ere the same age pass. It was neither the person of *Syphax*, nor any other glory of the spectacle, that so much beautified the triumph of *Scipio*, as did the contemplation of that grievous war pass'd, whereof the *Romans* had been in a manner *without hope that ever they should set Italy free*^a. This made them look chearfully upon the author of so great a conversion, and filled them with more joy than they well could moderate. Wherefore they gave to *Scipio* the title of the *African*, styling him by the name of that province, which he had subdued. This honourable kind of surname, taken from a conquered province, grew afterwards more common, and was usurped by men of less desert, especially by many of the *Cæsars*, who sometimes arrogated unto themselves the title of countries, wherein they had performed little or nothing; as if such glorious attributes could have made them like in virtue unto *Scipio the African*.

^a Excerpt. d Polyb. l. 16.

C H A P. IV.

Of Philip the father of Perseus, king of Macedon; his first acts, and war with the Romans, by whom he was subdued.

S E C T. I.

How the Romans grew acquainted in the East countries, and desirous of war there. The beginning of many princes, with great wars, at one time. The Etolians over-run Peloponnesus. Philip, and his Associates, make war against the Etolians. Alteration of the state in Sparta. The Etolians invade Greece and Macedon, and are invaded at home by Philip.

OF the great similitude found in worldly events, the limitation of *a matter* hath been assigned as a probable cause. For since nature is confined unto a subject that is not unbounded; the works of nature must needs be finite, and many of them resemble one the other. Now in those actions, that seem to have their whole dependance upon the will of man, we are less to wonder, if we find less variety: since it is no great portion of things which is obnoxious unto human power; and since they are the same affections, by which the wills of sundry men are over-ruled, in managing the affairs of our daily life. It may be observed in the change of empires, before those times whereof we now write, how the *Assyrians* or *Chaldeans* invaded the kingdom of the *Medes*, with two hundred thousand foot, and threescore thousand horse: but failing in their intended conquest, they became subject within a while themselves unto the *Medes* and *Persians*. In like manner *Darius*, and after him *Xerxes*, fell upon the *Greeks*, with such numbers of men, as might have seemed resistless. But after that the *Persians* were beaten home, their empire was never secure of the *Greeks*: who at all times of leisure from intestine war devised upon that conquest thereof, which finally they made under the great *Alexander*. If *Nabuchodonosor*, with his rough old soldiers, had undertaken the *Medes*: or *Cyrus*, with his well-trained army, had made the attempt upon *Greece*; the issue might, in human reason, have been far different. Yet would it then have been expedient for them, to employ the travel and virtue of their men, rather than the greatness of their names, against those people; that were no less valiant, though less renowned, than their own. For the menacing words used by *Cyrus*, and some small displeasures done to the *Greeks* (in which kind it may be, that *Nabuchodonosor* likewise offended the *Medes* and *Persians*) were not so available to victory, as to draw on revenge in the future. Great kingdoms, when they decay in strength, suffer, as did the old lion, for the oppression done in his youth; being pinched by the wolf, gored by the bull; yea, and kick'd by the ass. But princes are often carried away from reason, by misunderstanding the language of fame: and despising the virtue, that makes little noise, adventure to provoke it against themselves; as if it were not possible that their own glory should be foil'd by any

of less noted excellence. Against the same stone, whereat *Xerxes*, and before him (as I take it) *Evilmerodach*, had stumbled; *Pyrrhus*, the *Epirot*, had dash'd his foot. He was not indeed the king of all *Greece*; though most of mark, and a better soldier than any other *Greekish* king, when he entered into war against the *Romans*. This war he undertook, as it were, for his mind's sake: having received no injury; but hoping by the glory of his name, and of the *Greeks* that served under him, to prevail so easily against the barbarous *Romans*, that they should only serve as a step to his further intended conquests, of *Sicily* and *Africa*. But when the *Romans*, by their victory against *Pyrrhus*, had found their own virtue to be of richer metal, than was the more shining valour of the *Greeks*: then did all the bravery of the *Epirot* (his elephants, and whatsoever else had served to make him terrible) serve only to make the *Romans*, in time following, to think more highly of themselves.^b For since they had overcome the best warrior in *Greece*; even him, that, being thus beaten by them, could in a year after make himself lord of *Greece* and *Macedon*: what should hinder them from the conquest of all those unwarlike provinces, which in compass of twelve years a *Macedonian* king of late memory had won? Certainly there was hereunto requisite no more, than to bring to their own devotion, by some good means, the whole country of *Greece*: all the rest, this done, would follow of it self. How to deal with the *Greeks*, *Philip* and *Alexander* had shewed a way: which, or perhaps a better, they might learn, by getting more acquaintance with the nation.

When therefore the first *Punic* war was ended, which followed soon after the wars of *Pyrrhus*, and of the *Tarentines*: then were the *Romans* at good leisure to hearken after news in *Greece*; and to entertain any good occasion, that should be on that side presented. They had also then a strong fleet: and were become, though not otherwise very skilful mariners, yet good fighters at sea. So it fell out as happily as could be wished, that the *Illyrian* queen *Tenta* made at the same time cruel war upon the *Greeks*: wasting their country, and sackings their towns, only because they were unable to resist, though they had done her none offence. Into this quarrel, if the *Romans* were desirous to enter, the queen was not slow to give them a cause. And their happy accomplishing of that war which they made with her, was, in their own opinion, a matter not unworthy to make their patronage to be desired by the *Greeks*. But no such thing happened: though they sent ambassadors, as it were, to offer themselves; by signifying, that for the love of *Greece* they had undertaken this *Illyrian* war. Thus began the first acquaintance betwixt the *Greeks* and *Romans*: which afterwards increased very hastily, through the indiscretion of king *Philip* the *Macedonian*; whose business with

^a Plut. in vita Sertorii.

^b The king of Spain's pretended invincible navy, being beaten out of the British seas, invited us to those of Spain: and having broken the greatest fleet that ever the Spaniards gathered together, we never made account of any of his preparations after that time.

^c Lib. 5. ch. 2. §. 7.

them being now the subject of our story, it is meet that we should relate (though somewhat briefly) the beginning of his reign, and his first actions.

It was like to prove a busy time in the world, when, within the space of four years, new kings began to reign in most of all the countries known; and three of them young boys, in three of the greatest kingdoms. This happened from the third year of the hundred thirty ninth *Olympiad*, unto the third of the *Olympiad* following. For in this time died *Seleucus Ceraunus* king of *Asia* and *Syria*, in whose room succeeded his brother *Antiochus*, afterwards call the Great. *Ptolemy Philopator* succeeded in the kingdom of *Egypt* unto his father *Euergetes*. And *Philip*, the son of *Demetrius*, being sixteen or seventeen years old, received the kingdom of *Macedon*, together with the patronage of the *Acheans* and most of the *Greeks*; by the decease of his uncle *Antigonus Dofon*, that was called the Tutor or Protector. About the same time also was the like change in *Cappadocia*, *Lacedemon*, and the countries about mount *Taurus*. For *Ariarathes* then began his reign in *Cappadocia*. *Lycurgus* found means to make himself king over the *Lacedemonians*, whose common-weal, since the flight of *Cleomenes*, had continued in a manner headless; and *Acheus*, a kinsman of *Antiochus*, but a rebel unto him, occupied the regions near unto mount *Taurus*, and kept a while the state of a mighty king. Lastly, in the second and third years of the hundred and fortieth *Olympiad* it was, that open war brake out between *Rome* and *Carthage*; and that *Hannibal* began his great invasion upon *Italy*. Those troubles of the western world, which were indeed the greatest, we have already followed unto an end: of *Antiochus*, *Ptolemy*, and the rest, we shall speak hereafter, when the *Romans* find them out.

Philip, soon after the beginning of his reign, came into *Peloponnesus*; greatly desired of the *Acheans*, and many others his dependants. That country, having freed it self by the help of *Antigonus* from the danger (accounted great) of an easy subjection unto *Cleomenes*; was now become no less obnoxious to the *Macedonian*, than it should have been to the *Spartan*; and therewithal it lay open unto the violence of the *Etolians*, who despised even the *Macedonian* kings, that were patrons thereof. The *Etolians* were no men to be idle; nor were much addicted to any other art, than war. Therefore wanting employment, they fell upon the *Messenians* that were their own clients, and (excepting the *Eleans*, that were anciently of their consanguinity) the only good friends which they had at the present in *Peloponnesus*. Their invasion was no less unexpected, than it was unjust: whereby with greater ease they made spoil of the country; finding none prepared to make resistance. The *Acheans* were called by the *Messenians* to help: which they did the more willingly; because the *Etolians*, passing without leave through their territory, had (as was their manner) done what harm they listed. Old *Aratus* could ill abide these *Etolians*; as both knowing well their nature, and remembering the injuries, wherewith most ungratefully they had requited no small benefits done to them by the *Acheans*. He was therefore so hasty to fall upon this their army, that he could hardly endure to stay a few days until the time of his own office came; being chosen pretor of the *Acheans* for the year following. * But his anger was greater than his courage: and he shewed himself a man

fitter (as hath been already noted of him) for any other service, than leading of an army. He suffered them to pass quietly along with their booty, through a part of the country; whereist he might easily have distressed them; and afterwards pressed them so near, when they had recovered ground of advantage, that they easily defeated all his army. So they departed home rich, and well animated to return again. As for the *Acheans*; they got hereby only the friendship of the *Messenians*; with whom, by licence of king *Philip*; they made confederacy. Shortly after, the *Etolians* invaded *Peloponnesus* again; having no more to do, than to pass over the narrow streights of the *Corinthian* bay, called now the gulph of *Lepanto*, where they might land in the country of the *Eleans*. There joined with them in this their second invasion a great number of the *Illyrians*: who neglecting that condition imposed upon them by the *Romans*, of setting out no ships of war unto the coast of *Greece*; made bold to seek adventures again, and did great mischief. ^b *Demetrius Pharius*, a creature of the *Romans*; commanded a part of these *Illyrians*: who shortly repented him of this his voyage; which caused him to lose his kingdom, as is shewed before. But this *Demetrius* went another way, and fell upon the islands of the *Cyclades* in the *Egean* sea: whence returning, he did some good offices for king *Philip* or his friends. The rest of the *Illyrians* under *Scerillaidas*, or *Sceridetus*, having gotten what they could elsewhere by roving at sea, accompanied the *Etolians* into *Peloponnesus*: who made greater havoc in the country now, than in their former expedition; and returned home without finding any resistance.

Of these things great complaint was made unto *Philip*; when he came to *Corinth*. And because men were desirous to satisfy themselves with some speedy revenge; there were that urged to have some grievous punishment laid upon the *Lacedemonians*: who were thought under-hand to have favoured the *Etolians*, in meer despite of the *Acheans* and *Macedonians*; by whom themselves had lately been subdued. It is true; that the *Lacedemonians* had been so affected: and (which was worse) at the arrival of *Philip*, they slew such friends of his, as having checked their inclination, seemed likely to impeach them of the intended rebellion. Neither durst they well commit themselves to judgment: but entreated the king, that he would abstain from coming to them with an army: since their town was lately much disquieted with civil discord, which they hoped soon to appease; and meant always to remain at his devotion. *Philip* was easily satisfied with this: not for that he (or rather old *Aratus*, who then wholly goverred him) did misunderstand the *Lacedemonians*: but for that a greater work was in hand, which ought not to be interrupted. There met at *Corinth*, in presence of the king, the ambassadors of the *Acheans*, *Beotians*, *Epirots*, and *Acarnanians*: all complaining upon the *Etolians*; and desiring to have war decreed against them, by common assent. *Philip* sent his letters unto the *Etolians*: requiring them to make ready their answer in some convenient time; if they could alledge any thing in excuse of that which they had done. They returned word, that a diet should be holden at *Rhium* for that purpose: whither if it pleased him to come or send, he should be well informed of them and their whole meaning. The king prepared to have been there at the day. But when the *Etolians* under-

* Lib. 5. ch. 2. §. 6. *ibid*.

^b Chap. 3. §. 1.

flood this for certainty, they adjourned the council unto a further time: saying, That such weighty matters ought not to be handled; save in the great parliament of all *Ætolia*. This trick of law notwithstanding, open war was proclaimed against them. And they, as it were, to shew how well they had deserved it, made election of *Scopas* to be their pretor, that was author of these invasions made on *Peloponnesus*; and the only man, in a sort, upon whom they must have lay'd the blame of these actions, if they would have shifted it from the publick.

After this, *Philip* went into *Macedon*; where he prepared busily for the war against the year following. He also assayed the *Illyrian*, *Scerdilaidas*, with fair words and promises: whom he easily won from the *Ætolian* side, forasmuch as the *Ætolians* had couzened him of his share, when he was partner with them in their late robberies. In like sort the *Acheans*, who had first of all others proclaimed the war in their own country, sent unto the *Acaruanians*, *Epirots*, *Messenians*, and *Lacedemonians*: requesting them forthwith to declare themselves, and to denounce war unto the *Ætolians*; without staying (as it were) to await the event. Hereunto they received divers answers, according to the qualities of those with whom they dealt. The *Acaruanians*, a free-hearted and valiant, though a small nation, and bordering upon the *Ætolians*, of whom they stood in continual danger; said, That they could not honestly refuse to shew their faithful meaning in that war, which was concluded by general assent. The *Epirots*, that were more mighty, were nevertheless more cunning and reserved: so that they stood upon a needless point; and desired to be held excused, until *Philip* (of whose meaning they needed not to have made any doubt) should first proclaim the war. The *Messenians*, for whose cause the war was undertaken, excused themselves, by reason of a town which the *Ætolians* held upon their borders; and said, that they durst not be over-bold, until that bridle were taken out of their mouths. As for the *Lacedemonians*; the chief of them studied only how to manage the treason, for which their city had been so lately pardoned: and therefore dismissed the ambassadors of the confederates without any answer at all. They had three years together continued subject against their wills to the *Macedonians*, expecting still when *Cleomenes* should return out of *Egypt* to reign over them again; and maintain, as he was wont, the honour of their city. In this regard they chose not any kings; but were contented with the rule of *Ephori*. Of these there were some, that thought the publick safety to consist, in holding their faith with the *Macedonian* that had preserved them: And hereto they referred all their councils; being perhaps a little moved with respect of the benefit, which might redound unto themselves, by adhering firmly to those which at the present bore rule over them. Others, and those the greater part, were still devising, how to make all ready for *Cleomenes* against his return; and therefore sought to join with the *Ætolians*, which were the most likely to give him strong assistance. The *Macedonian* faction had the more authority, and durst more freely speak their minds: but the contrary side was the more passionate; and spared not by murders, or any other violent courses, to set forward their desire. Neither did it suffice, that about these times there came certain report of *Cleomenes*'s death. For it was the liberty and honour of *Sparta*, which these intended: fancying unto themselves the glory of their ancestors in such ages past, as were not

like to come again. *Cleomenes* was, they knew, the most able man to restore them unto their greatness and lustre; which once he had in a manner performed: But since he was dead, and that, without injury to his well deserving virtue, they might proceed to the election of new kings: kings they would have, and those of the race of *Hercules*, as in former times; for that without such helps, they must continue little better than subjects unto the *Macedonian*, and far less by him respected, than were the *Acheans*. Thus were they transported, by contemplation of their own nobility and fame. Some of the most working spirits among them, procured the *Ætolians* to send an ambassy to *Sparta*: which propounded the matter openly unto the people; whereof no one of the citizens durst have made himself the author. Much disputation and hot there was, between those of the *Macedonian* party and these their opposites: in such wise, that nothing could be concluded; until by massacre or banishment of all, or the chief, that spake against the *Ætolians*, the diversity of opinion was taken quite away. Then forthwith a league was concluded between the *Lacedemonians* and the *Ætolians*: without all regard of the *Macedonians* or *Acheans*; who had spared the city, when they might have destroyed it. Then also they went in hand with the election of new kings: wherein their diligence was so nice, and so regardful of their ancient laws, as touching the choosing of the one king; that we may justly wonder, how they grew so careless in making choice of the other. In the one of their royal families they found *Agessipolis* the son of *Agessipolis* the son of king *Cleombrotus*: and him they admitted to reign over them, as heir apparent to his grandfather. This *Agessipolis* was a young boy, standing in need of a guardian, and had an uncle, his father's brother, that was fit for the government. Yet because the law required, that the son, how young soever, should have his father's whole right and title: the *Lacedemonians*, though standing in need of a man, were so punctual in observation of the law; that they made this child their King, and appointed his uncle *Cleomenes* to be his protector. But in the other branch of the royal family, though there was no want of heirs: yet would not the people trouble themselves about any of them, to examine the goodness of his claim; but made election of one *Lycurgus*, who having no manner of title to the kingdom, bestowed upon each of the *Ephori* a talent, and thereby made himself be saluted king of *Sparta*, and a gentleman of the race of *Hercules*. This *Lycurgus*, to gratify his partisans, and to approve his worth by action, invaded the country of the *Argives*: which lay open and unguarded, as in a time of peace. There he did great spoil, and won divers towns; whereof two he retained, and annexed unto the state of *Lacedemon*. After such open hostility, the *Lacedemonians* declared themselves on the *Ætolian* side; and proclaimed war against the *Acheans*.

Thus the beginnings of the war fell out much otherwise, than the *Acheans* and their confederates had expected, when they first made preparation. *Philip* was not ready: the *Epirots* gave uncertain answer: the *Messenians* would not stir: all the burden must lie upon themselves and the poor *Acaruanians*, whom the *Ætolians*, by favour of the *Eleans*, could invade at pleasure, as they were like to do; and by help of the *Lacedemonians*, could assail on all parts at once. It was not long ere the *Ætolians*, passing over the bay of *Corinth*, surprised the town of *Ægira*: which if they could

could have held, they should thereby grievously have molested the *Acheans*; for that it stood in the mid-way between *Egium* and *Sicyon* two of their principal cities, and gave open way into the heart of all their country. But as *Egira* was taken by surprize: so was it presently lost again, through greediness of spoil; whilst they that should have made it their first care to assure the place unto themselves, by occupying the citadel and other pieces of strength, fell heedlessly to ransack private houses, and thereby gave the citizens leave to make head, by whom they were driven with great slaughter back unto their fleet. About the same time, another *Etolian* army landing among the *Eleans*, fell upon the western coast of *Achaia*; wasting all the territory of the *Dymeans* and other people, that were first beginners of the *Achean* confederacy. The *Dymeans* and their neighbours made head against these invaders; but were so well beaten, that the enemy grew bolder with them than before. They sent for help unto their pretor, and to all the towns of their society. In vain. For the *Acheans*, having lately been much weakened by *Cleomenes*, were now able to do little of themselves: neither could they get any strength of mercenaries; forasmuch as at the end of *Cleomenes's* war, they had covetously withheld part of their due from those that served them therein. So through this disability of the *Acheans*, and insufficiency of their pretor; the *Dymeans*, with others, were driven to withhold their contribution heretofore made for the publick service, and to convert the money to their own defence. *Lycurgus* also with his *Lacedemonians*, began to win upon the *Arcadians*; that were confederate with *Philip* and the *Acheans*.

Philip came to the borders of the *Etolians*, whilst their army was thus employed afar off in *Peloponnesus*. The *Epirots* joined all their forces with him: and, by such their willing readiness, drew him to the siege of a frontier piece; which they desired to get into their own hands; for that, by commodity thereof, they hoped shortly to make themselves masters of *Ambracia*. There he spent forty days, ere he could end the business; which tended only to the benefit of the *Epirots*. Had he entered into the heart of *Etolia* at his first coming; it was thought that he might have had an end of the war. But it happens oft, that the violence of great armies is broken upon small towns and forts: and not seldom, that the importunity of associates, to have their own desires fulfilled, converts the preparations of great kings to those uses for which they never were intended; thereby hindering the prosecution of their main designs. Thus was our king *Henry* the eighth led aside, and quite out of his way, by *Maximilian* the emperor, to the siege of *Tournay*: at such time as the French King *Lewis* the twelfth, hearing that the strong city of *Terwin* were lost, and that of his cavalry, wherein rested his chief confidence, two thousand were beaten by the earl of *Essex* with seven hundred *English*; was thinking to withdraw himself into *Britain*, in fear that *Henry* would have come to *Paris*.

The stay that *Philip* made at *Ambracus*, did wonderfully embolden the *Etolians*: in such sort, as their pretor *Scopas* adventured to lead all their forces out of the country; and therewith not only to over-run *Thessaly*, but to make impression into *Macedon*. He ran as far as to *Dium*, a city of *Macedon* upon the *Egean* sea: which, being forsaken by the inhabitants at his coming, he took, and razed to the ground. He spared neither temple, nor any other of the goodly buildings therein,

but overturned all: and among the rest, he threw down the statues that were there erected, of the *Macedonian* kings. For this he was highly honoured by his countrymen at his return; forasmuch as thereby they thought their nation to be grown terrible, not only (as before) unto *Peloponnesus*, but even to *Macedon* it self. But this their pride was soon abated; and they rewarded shortly at home in their own country, for their pains taken at *Dium*. *Philip*, having dispatched his work at *Ambracus*, made a strong invasion upon *Etolia*. He took *Phoetia*, *Metropolis*, *Oeniade*, *Paanium*, *Eleus*, and divers other towns and castles of theirs: of which he burnt some, and fortified others. He also beat the *Etolians* in sundry skirmishes; and wasted all the country over, without receiving any harm. This done, while he was about to make a cut over the streights into *Peloponnesus*, and to do the like spoil in the country of the *Eleans*, whereto he was vehemently solicited by the *Achean* ambassadors: news came out of *Macedon*, that the *Dardaniens* were ready with a great army to fall upon the country. These *Dardaniens* were a barbarous people, divided by mount *Hemus* from the northern part of *Macedon*; and were accustomed to seek booty in that wealthy kingdom, when they found their own times. Having therefore intelligence, that *Philip* was about to make a journey into *Peloponnesus*; they proposed in his absence, which they thought would be long, to get what they could for themselves in his country; as had been their manner upon the like advantages. This made the king to dismiss the *Achean* ambassadors (whom he should have accompanied home with his army) and to bid them have patience until another year. So he took his way home: and, as he was passing out of *Acarnania* into *Epirus*, there came to him *Demetrius Pharius* with no more than one ship, that was newly chased out of his kingdom by the *Romans*. This *Demetrius* had lately shewed himself a friend to *Antigonus Doson*; in the wars of *Cleomenes*: and returning in his last voyage from the *Cyclades*, was ready, at their first request, to take part with *Philip's* captains. These, or the like considerations, made him welcome unto the *Macedonian* king: whose counsellor he was ever after. The *Dardaniens* hearing of the king's return, brake up their army; and gave over for the present their invasion of *Macedon*, towards which they were already on their way.

All that summer following the king rested at *Larissa* in *Thessaly*, whilst his people gathered in their harvest. But the *Etolians* rested not. They avenged themselves upon the *Epirots*: whom for the harms by them and *Philip* done in *Etolia*, they requited with all extremities of war; among which, the most notable was the ruin of the most famous temple of *Dodona*. When winter grew on, and all thought of war until another year was laid aside: *Philip* stole a journey into *Peloponnesus*, with five thousand foot, and about four hundred horse. As soon as he was within *Corinth*, he commanded the gates to be shut, that no word might be carried forth of his arrival. He sent privily for old *Aratus* to come thither unto him: with whom he took order, when, and in what places, he would have the *Achean* soldiers ready to meet him. The enemies were then abroad in the country, with somewhat more than two thousand foot and an hundred horse; little thinking to meet with such opposition. Indeed they had little cause to fear: since the *Acheans* themselves were not aware that the king was in their land with his *Macedonians*; until they heard, that these two thousand *Eleans*,
Etolians,

Etolians, and their fellows, were by him surprised, and all made prisoners, or slain. By this exploit which he did at his first coming, *Philip* got very much reputation: and likewise he purchased both reputation and love, by divers actions immediately following. He won *Psophis*, an exceeding strong town, in the borders of *Arcadia*; which the *Eleans* and *Etolians* then held. He won it by assault at his first coming: wherein it much availed him, that the enemy, not believing that he would undertake such a piece of work at such an unreasonable time of the year, was careless of providing even such store of weapons, as might have served to defend it. The town was preserved by the king from sack; and given to the *Acheans* of his own mere motion, before they requested it. Thence went he to *Lafion*, which yielded for very fear; hearing how easily he had taken *Psophis*. This town also he gave to the *Acheans*. The like liberality he used towards others; that had ancient title unto places by him recovered. Then fell he upon the country of *Elis*, where was much wealth to be gotten: for that the people were addicted to husbandry, and lived abroad in villages; even such as were of the wealthier sort among them. So he came to the city of *Olympia*: where having done sacrifice to *Jupiter*, feasted his captains, and refreshed his army three days; he proceeded on the spoil of those that had taken pleasure to share with the *Etolians*, in the spoils of their otherwise deserving neighbours. Great abundance of cattle he took, with great numbers of slaves, and much wealth of all sorts: such as could be found in rich villages. Then fell he in hand with the towns whereinto a great multitude of the country people were fled. Some of these were taken at the first assault. Some yielded for fear. Some prevented the labour of his journey, by sending ambassadors to yield before he came. And some that were held with garrisons against their wills, took courage to set themselves at liberty, by seeing the king so near; to whose patronage thenceforth they betook themselves. And many places were spoiled by the *Etolian* captains; because they distrusted their ability to hold them. So the king won more towns in the country, than the sharpness of winter would suffer him to stay there days. Fain he would have fought with the *Etolians*: but they made such haste from him, that he could not overtake them, until they had covered themselves within the town of *Samicum*; where they thought to have been safe. But *Philip* assaulted them therein so forcibly, that he made them glad to yield the place; obtaining licence to depart, with their lives and arms. Having performed so much in this expedition, the king reposed himself a while in *Megalopolis*; and then removed to *Argos*, where he spent all the rest of the winter.

Before the king's arrival in *Peloponnesus*, the *Lacedemonians* with *Lycurgus* their new king, had gotten somewhat in *Arcadia*; and threatened to do great matters. But when they were admonished, by the calamity that fell upon the *Eleans*, of the danger hanging over their own heads; they quitted their winnings, and withdrew themselves home. This *Lycurgus*, as he had no other right to the kingdom of *Sparta*, than that which he could buy with money: so was he neither free from danger of conspiracies made against him; nor from those jealousies, with which usurpers are commonly perplexed. There was one *Chilon*, of the royal blood, that thinking himself to have best right unto the kingdom, purposed to make way thereunto, by massacre of his opposites; and afterwards to confirm

himself, by propounding unto the multitude such reformation of the state as was most popular: namely, by making an equal distribution of all the lands among the whole number of the citizens, according to the ancient institution of that commonwealth. He won to his party some two hundred men; with whom he fell upon the *Ephori* as they were together at supper, and slew them all. Then went he to *Lycurgus's* house: who perceiving the danger, stole away and fled. It remained that he should give account of these doings to the people, and procure them to take part with him. But their minds being not hereto predisposed; they so little regarded his goodly offers, as even whilst he was using his best persuasions, they were consulting how to apprehend him. *Chilon* perceived whereabouts they went, and shifted presently away. So he lived afterwards among the *Acheans* a banished man, and hated of his own people. As for *Lycurgus*, he returned home: and suspecting thenceforth all those of *Hercules's* race, found means to drive out his fellow-king young *Agefipolis*; whereby he made himself lord alone. His doings grew to be suspected, in such sort as once he should have been apprehended by the *Ephori*: But though his actions hitherto might have been defended; yet rather than to adventure himself into judgment, he chose to fly for a time, and sojourn among his friends the *Etolians*. His well known vehemency in opposition to the *Macedonians*, had procured unto him such good liking among the people, that in his absence they began to consider the weakness of their own surmises against him; and pronouncing him innocent, recalled him home to his estate. But in time following, he took better heed unto himself: not by amending his condition (for he grew a tyrant, and was so acknowledged) but by taking order, that it should not be in the power of the citizens to expel him when they listed. By what actions he got the name of a tyrant: or at what time it was, that he chased *Agefipolis* out of the city; I do not certainly find. Like enough it is, that his being the first of three usurpers, which followed in order one after another, made him to be placed in the rank of tyrants; which the last of the three very justly deserved. Whatsoever he was towards some private citizens: in the war against *Philip*, he behaved himself as a provident man, and careful of his country's good.

S E C T. II.

How Philip was misadvised by ill counsellors: who afterwards wrought treason against him, and were justly punished. He invadeth the Etolians a second time: and forceth them to sue for peace: which is granted unto them.

WHILST the king lay at *Argos*, deviling upon his business for the year following; some ambitious men that were about him studied so diligently for their own greatness, as they were like to have spoiled all that he took in hand. *Antigonus Doson* had left unto *Philip* such counsellors, as to him did seem the fittest men for governing of his youth. The chief of these was *Apelles*; that had the charge of his person, and also the ordering of his treasures. This man seeming to himself a great politician, thought that he should do a notable piece of service to his prince; if he could reduce the *Acheans* unto the same degree of subjection, wherein the *Macedonians* lived. To bring this to pass; during the late expedition he had caused some of the *Macedonians* to thrust the *Acheans* out of their lodgings.

lodgings, and to strip them of the booty that they had gotten. Proceeding further, as occasion fell out, he was bold to chastise some of that nation, causing his ministers to take and whip them. If any of them offered (as there were some of them that could not refrain) to help their fellows; then he laid by the heels, and punished as mutineers. Hereby he thought to bring it to pass by little and little, that they should be qualified with an habit of blind obedience, and think nothing unjust that pleased the king. But these *Acheans* were tenderly sensible in matter of liberty, whereof if they could have been contented to suffer any little diminution, they needed not have troubled the *Macedonians* to help them in the war against *Cleomenes*: they bemoaned themselves unto old *Aratus*, and besought him to think upon some good order, that they might not be oppressed by degrees. *Aratus* forthwith dealt earnestly with the king, as in a matter more weighty than at first it might seem. The king bestowed gracious words upon those that had been wronged, and forbade *Apelles* to follow the course begun. Hereat *Apelles* was inwardly vexed, though he dissembled his choler for a time. He thought so well of his own project, that he could not endure to lay it aside; being perhaps unable to do the king any valuable service in business of other nature. He purposed therefore hereafter to begin at the head, since, in biting at the tail, the fish had shot away from his mouth. It could not otherwise be, than that among the *Acheans* there were some who bore no hearty affection to *Aratus*. These he enquired out, and, sending for them, entertained them with words of court; promising to become their especial friend, and commend them unto the king. Then brake he his purpose with the king himself, letting him know, that as long as he continued to make much of *Aratus*, he must be fain to deal precisely with the *Acheans*, and, as it were, by indenture, according to the letter of the contract; whereas if he would be pleased to give countenance unto those others whom he himself commended, then should the *Acheans*, and all other *Peloponnesians*, be quickly brought to conform themselves unto the duty of obedient subjects. By such persuasions, he drew the king to be present at *Egium*, where the *Acheans* were to hold election of a new pretor. There, with much more labour than would have been needful in a business of more importance, the king, by fair words and threatnings together, obtained so much, that *Eperatus*, a very insufficient man, but one of *Apelles's* new favourites, was chosen pretor, instead of one more worthy, for whom *Aratus* had laboured. This was thought a good introduction unto greater matters that should follow. The king from thence passed along by *Patras* and *Dyma*, to a very strong castle held by the *Eleans*, which was called *Tichos*. The garrison yielded it up for fear at his first coming, whereof he was glad; for that he had an earnest desire to bestow it upon the *Dymeans*, as he presently did.

The king thought it strange, that all this while he heard of no messengers from the *Eleans* to sue for peace; for at his departure out of their country the last winter, he had let loose one *Amphidamus*, a captain of theirs, that was his prisoner; because he found him an intelligent man, and one that undertook to make them forsake their alliance with the *Etolians*, and join with him upon reasonable terms. This, if they could be contented to do, he willed *Amphidamus* to let them understand, that he would render unto them freely all prisoners which he had of theirs; that he would defend them from all foreign invasion; and that they should hold their

liberty entire, living after their own laws, without paying any manner of tribute, or being kept under by any garrison. These conditions were not to be despised, if they had found credit as they might have done. But when *Philip* came to the castle of *Tichos*, and made a new invasion of their country, then began the *Eleans* (that were not before over-hasty to believe such fair promises) to suspect *Amphidamus* as a traitor, and one that was set on work for no other end, than to breed a mutual diffidence between them and the *Etolians*. Wherefore they purposed to lay hands upon him, and send him prisoner into *Etolia*; but he perceived their intent, and got away to *Dyma*; in good time for himself; in better for *Aratus*. For the king (as was said) marvelling what should be the cause that he heard no news from the *Eleans*, concerning the offers which he had made unto them by *Amphidamus*; *Apelles*, his counsellor, thereby took occasion to supplant *Aratus*. He said, that old *Aratus*, and his son together, had such devices in their heads as tended little to the king's good; and long of them he said it was, that the *Eleans* did thus hold out; for when *Amphidamus* was dismissed home, the two *Arati* (the father and the son) had taken him aside, and given him to understand, that it would be very prejudicial to all *Peloponnesus*, if the *Eleans* once became at the devotion of the *Macedonian*; and this was the true cause, why neither *Amphidamus* was very careful in doing this message, nor the *Eleans* in hearkning to the king's offers. All this was a false lie, devised by *Apelles* himself, upon no other ground than his own malice. *Philip* had no sooner heard his tale, but in a great rage he sent for the two *Arati*, and bade *Apelles* rehearse it over again to their faces. *Apelles* did so, and with a bold countenance, talking to them as to men already convicted. And when he had said all the rest, ere either *Philip* or they spake any word, he added this clause, as it were, in the king's name: Since the king hath found you such ungrateful wretches, it is in his meaning to hold a parliament of the *Acheans*; and therein having made it known what ye are, to depart into *Macedon*, and leave you to your selves. Old *Aratus* gravely admonished the king, that whensoever he heard any accusation, especially against a friend of his own, or a man of worth, he should forbear a-while to give credit, until he had diligently examined the business. For such deliberation was kingly, and he should never thereof repent him. At the present, he said, there needed no more than to call in those that had heard his talk with *Amphidamus*; and especially him that had brought this goodly tale to *Apelles*. For it would be a very absurd thing, that the king should make himself author of a report in the open parliament of *Achaia*, whereof there was none other evidence than one man's *yea*, and another's *no*. Hereof the king liked well, and said, that he would make sufficient enquiry. So passed a few days, wherein, whilst *Apelles* delayed to bring in the proof, which he wanted, *Amphidamus* came from *Elis*, and told what had befallen him there. The king was not forgetful to examine him about the conspiracy of the *Arati*; which, when he found no better than a meer device against his honourable friends, he entertained them in loving manner, as before. As for his love to *Apelles*, though it was hereby somewhat cooled, yet by means of long acquaintance and daily employment, no remission therein could be discerned.

The unrestful temper of *Apelles*, having, with much vehemency, brought nothing to pass, began (as commonly ambition useth) to swell and grow venomous for want of his free motion. He berakes himself

himself to his cunning again; and, as before, being checked in his doings with those of the vulgar, he had prepared a snare for the *Arati*; so failing of them, he thinks it wisdom to lay for the king himself, and for all at once which were about him. In such manner sometime the spider thought to have taken the swallow, which drove away flies out of the chimney; but was carried (net and all) into the air by the bird that was too strong to be caught and held by the subtil workmanship of a cobweb. Of the four that, next unto *Appelles*, were left by *Antigonus* in chief place about *Philip*, *Taurion*, his lieutenant in *Peloponnesus*, and *Alexander*, captain of the guard, were faithful men, and such as would not be corrupted. The other two, *Leontius*, captain of the targueters, and *Megaleas*, chief of the secretaries, were easily won to be at *Apelles's* disposition. This politician therefore studied how to remove the other two from their places, and put some creatures of his own into their rooms. Against *Alexander* he went to work the ordinary way, by calumny and privy detraction. But for the supplanting of *Taurion* he used more fineness, loading him with daily commendations, as a notable man of war, and one, whom, for his many virtues, the king might ill spare from being always in his presence. By such art he thought to have removed him, as we say, out of God's blessing into a warm sun. In the mean season, *Aratus* retired himself, and sought to avoid the dangerous friendship of the king, by forbearing to meddle in affairs of state. As for the new pretor of *Achaia*, lately chosen by such vehement instance of the king, he was a man of no dispatch, and one that had no grace with the people. Wherefore a great deal of time was lost, whilst *Philip* wanted both the money and the corn wherewith he should have been furnished by the *Acheans*. This made the king understand his own error, which he wisely sought to reform betimes. He perswaded the *Acheans* to rejourn their parliament from *Aegium* to *Sicyon*, the town of *Aratus*. There he dealt with the old man and his son, perswading them to forget what was pass'd, and laying all the blame upon *Apelles*, on whom thenceforth he intended to keep a more diligent eye. So by the travel of these worthy men, he easily obtained what he would of the *Acheans*. Fifteen talents they gave him out of hand, with great store of corn; and further decreed, that so long as he himself in person followed the wars in *Peloponnesus*, he should receive ten talents a month. Being thus enabled, he began to provide shipping, that so he might invade the *Etolians*, *Eleans*, and *Lacedemonians*, that were maritime people, at his pleasure, and hinder their excursions by sea.

It vexed *Apelles* beyond measure to see things go forward so well without his help, even by the ministry of those whom he most hated. Wherefore he entered into conspiracy with *Leontius* and *Megaleas*, binding himself and them by oath, to cross and bring to nought, as well as they were able, all that the king should take in hand. By so doing, they thought to bring it to pass, that very want of ability to do any thing without them, should make him speak them fair, and be glad to submit himself to their directions. The king, it is like, had stood in some awe of them whilst he was a child; and therefore these wise men perswaded themselves, that, by looking big upon him, and imputing unto him all that fell out ill, through their own misgovernment of his affairs, they might rule him as a child still. *Apelles* would needs go to *Chalcis*, there to take order for the provisions which were to come that way out of *Macedon*: the other two staid behind with the king, to play their parts; all more mindful of their wicked oath, than of their duty.

His fleet and army being in a readiness, *Philip* made countenance as if he would have bent all his forces against the *Eleans*; to whose aid therefore the *Etolians* sent men, little fearing that the mischief would have fallen, as soon after it did, upon themselves. But against the *Eleans*, and those that came to help them, *Philip* thought it enough to leave the *Acheans*, with some part of his and their mercenaries. He himself, with the body of his army, putting to sea, landed in the isle of *Cephalenia*, whence the *Etolians*, dwelling over-against it, used to furnish themselves of shipping, when they went to rove abroad. There he besieged the town of *Palaea*, that had been very serviceable to the enemy against him and his confederates; and might be very useful to him, if he could get it. Whilst he lay before this town, there came unto him fifteen ships of war from *Scerdilaidas*, and many good soldiers from the *Epirots*, *Acarnanians*, and *Messenians*. But the town was obstinate, and would not be terrified with numbers. It was naturally fenced on all parts, save one, on which side *Philip* carried a mine to the wall, wherewith he overthrew two hundred foot thereof. *Leontius*, captain of the targueters, was appointed by the king to make the assault. But he, remembering his covenant with *Apelles*, did both wilfully forbear to do his best, and caused others to do the like. So the *Macedonians* were put to foil, and many slain; not of the worst soldiers, but such as had gotten over the breach, and would have carried the town, if the treason of their captain, and some by him corrupted, had not hindered the victory. The king was angry with this, but there was no remedy; and therefore he thought upon breaking up the siege. For it was easier to the townsmen to make up the gap in their wall, than for him to make it wider. Whilst he stood thus perplexed, and uncertain what course to take, the *Messenians* and *Acarnanians* lay hard upon him, each of them desirous to draw him into their own country. The *Messenians* alledged, that *Lycurgus* was busy in wasting their country, upon whom the king might come unawares in one day; the *Etesian* winds, which then blew, serving fitly for his navigation. Hereto also *Leontius* perswaded, who considered that those winds, as they would easily carry him thither, so would they detain him there perforce (blowing all the dog-days) and make him spend the summer to small or no purpose. But *Aratus* gave better counsel, and prevailed. He shewed how unfitting it were to let the *Etolians* overrun all *Thessaly* again, and some part of *Macedon*, whilst the king withdrew his army far off to seek small adventures. Rather, he said, that the time now served well to carry the war into *Etolia*, since the pretor was gone thence abroad on roving, with the one half of their strength. As for *Lycurgus*, he was not strong enough to do much harm in *Peloponnesus*; and it might suffice, if the *Acheans* were appointed to make head against him. According to this advice, the king sets sail for *Etolia*, and enters the bay of *Ambracia*, which divided the *Etolians* from *Acarnania*. The *Acarnanians* were glad to see him on their borders, and joined with him as many of them as could bear arms, to help in taking vengeance upon their bad neighbours. He marched up into the in-land country, and, taking some places by the way, which he filled with garrisons to assure his retreat, he passed on to *Thermum*, which was the receptacle of the *Etolians* and surest place of defence in all extremities. The country round about was a great fastness, environed with rocky mountains of very narrow, steep, and

and difficult ascent. There did the *Etolians* use to hold all their chief meetings, their fairs, their election of magistrates, and their solemn games. There also they used to bestow the most precious of their goods, as in a place of greatest security. This opinion of the natural strength, had made them careless in looking unto it. When *Philip* therefore had overcome the bad way, there was nothing else to do than to take spoil, whereof he found such plenty, that he thought the pains of his journey well recompensed. So he loaded his army, and, consuming all that could not be carried away, forgot not to raze a goodly temple, the chief of all belonging unto the *Etolians*, in remembrance of the like their courtesy shewed upon the temples of *Dium* and *Dodona*. This burning of the temple might (questionless) more for the king's honour, have been forborn. But perhaps he thought, as *Monsieur du Gournes*, the *French* captain, told the *Spaniards* in *Florida*, That *they which had no faith, needed no church*. At his return from *Thermum*, the *Etolians* laid for him, which that they would do, he believed before; and therefore was not taken unawares. Three thousand of them there were, that, lying in ambush, fell upon his skirts: but he had laid a counter-ambush for them of his *Illyrians*, who, staying behind the rest, did set upon the backs of the *Etolians*, whilst they were busily charging in the rear the army that went before. So, with slaughter of the enemy, he returned the same way that he came; and, burning down those places that he had taken before, as also wasting the country round about him, he safely carried all that he had gotten aboard his fleet. Once the *Etolians* made countenance of fight, issuing out of *Stratus* in great bravery. But they were beaten home faster than they came, and followed to their very gates.

The joy of this victorious expedition being every way compleat, and not deformed (as commonly happens) by any sinister accident, it pleased the king to make a great feast unto all his friends and captains. Thither were invited among the rest *Leontius*, with his fellow *Megaleas*. They came, because they could not chuse; but their heavy looks argued what little pleasure they took in the king's prosperity. It grieved them to think, that they should be able to give no better account unto *Apelles*, of their hindering the king's business, since *Apelles* himself, as will be shewed anon, had played his own part with a most mischievous dexterity. The sorrow and indignation, which they could ill dissemble in their faces, broke out after supper, when they had warmed themselves with drink, into open riot. Finding *Aratus* on the way home to his tent, they fell to reviling him, throwing stones at him, so that they caused a great uproar; many running in (as happens in such cases) to take part with the one or the other. The king, sending to enquire of the matter, was truly informed of all that had passed: which made him send for *Leontius* and his fellows. But *Leontius* was gotten out of the way; *Megaleas*, and another with him, came. The king began to rate them for their disorder; and they to give him forward answers; insomuch as they said at length, that they would never give over till they had rewarded *Aratus* with a mischief as he deserved. Hereupon the king committed them to ward. *Leontius*, hearing of this, comes boldly to the king, with his targetiers at his heels, and with a proud grace demanded, who it was that had dared to lay hands upon *Megaleas*, yea, and to cast him into prison? Why, said the king, it was even I. This resolute answer, which *Leontius* had not expected, made him depart both sad and angry; seeing himself out-

frowned, and not knowing how to remedy the matter. Shortly after *Megaleas* was called forth to his answer, and was charged by *Aratus* with many great crimes. Among which were, the hinderance of the king's victory at *Palea*, and the compact made with *Apelles*; matters no less touching *Leontius*, that stood by as a looker on, than *Megaleas* that was accused. In conclusion, the presumptions against him were so strong, and his answers thereto so weak, that he, and *Crinon*, one of his fellows, were condemned in twenty talents: *Crinon* being remanded back to prison, and *Leontius* becoming bail for *Megaleas*. This was done upon the way homeward, as the king was returning to *Corinth*.

Philip dispatched well a great deal of business this year: for as soon as he was at *Corinth*, he took in hand an expedition against the *Lacedemonians*. These, and the *Eleans*, had done what harm they could in *Peloponnesus* whilst the king was absent. The *Acheans* had opposed them as well as they could, with ill success; yet so, as they hindered them from doing such harm as else they would have done. But when *Philip* came, he over-run the country about *Lacedemon*, and was in a manner at the gates of *Sparta*, ere men could well believe that he was returned out of *Ætolia*. He took not in this expedition any cities, but made great waste in the fields; and having beaten the enemy in some skirmishes, carried back with him to *Corinth* a rich booty of cattel, slaves, and other country-spoil. At *Corinth* he found attending him ambassadors from the *Rhodiens* and *Chians*, that requested him to let *Greece* at quiet, by granting peace unto the *Etolians*. They had gracious audience, and he willed them to deal first with the *Etolians*, who, if they would make the same request, should not find him unreasonable. The *Etolians* had sped ill that year; neither saw they any likely hopes for the years following. The army, that they had sent forth to waste *Thessaly* and *Macedon*, found such opposition on the way, that, not daring to proceed, it returned home without bringing any thing to effect. In the mean season, they had been grievously afflicted, as before is shewed, by *Philip*, in the center of their own country. All *Greece* and *Macedon* was up in arms against them, and their weak allies the *Eleans* and *Lacedemonians*. Neither was it certain how long the one or other of these their *Peloponnesian* friends should be able to hold out; since they were not strong enough to keep the field, but had already suffered those miseries of war, which, by a little continuance, would make them glad each to seek their own peace, without regard of their confederates. Wherefore the *Etolians* readily entertained this negotiation of peace; and, taking truce for thirty days with the king, dealt with him by intercession of the same ambassadors, to entreat his presence at a diet of their nation, that should be held at *Rhium*; whither, if he would vouchsafe to come, they promised that he should find them conformable to any good reason.

Whilst these things were in hand, *Leontius* and *Megaleas* thought to have terrified the king, by raising sedition against him in the army. But this device sorted to no good effect. The soldiers were easily and quickly incensed against many of the king's friends, who were said to be the cause why they were not rewarded with so much of the booty, as they thought to belong of right unto them. But their anger spent it self in a noise, and breaking open of doors, without further harm done. This was enough to inform the king (who easily pacified his men with gentle words) that some about him were very false. Yea, the soldiers themselves, repenting of their insolence, desired

desired to have the authors of the tumult sought out, and punished according to their deserts. The king made shew, as if he had not cared to make such inquisition. But *Leontius* and *Megaleas* were afraid, lest the matter would soon come out of itself, to their extreme danger. Wherefore they sent unto *Apelles*, the head and architect of their treason; requesting him speedily to repair to *Corinth*, where he might stand between them and the king's displeasure. *Apelles* had not all this while been wanting to the business, undertaken by him and his treacherous companions. He had taken upon him, as a man that had the king's heart in his own hand: and thereby was he grown into such credit, that all the king's officers in *Macedon* and *Thessaly* addressed themselves unto him; and received from him their dispatch in every business. Likewise the *Greeks*, in all their flattering decrees, took occasion to magnify the virtue of *Apelles*; making slight mention (only for fashion sake) of the king: who seemed no better than the minister and executioner of *Apelles*'s will and pleasure. Such was the arrogance of this great man, in setting himself out unto the people: but in managing the king's affairs, he made it his especial care, that money, and all things needful for the publick service, should be wanting. Yea, he enforced the king, for very need, to sell his own plate, and household vessels: thinking to resolve these, and all other difficulties, by only saying, *Sir, be ruled wholly by me, and all shall be as you would wish*. Hereto if the king would give assent, then had this politician obtained his heart's desire. Now taking his journey from *Chalcis* in the isle of *Eubœa*, to the city of *Corinth*, where *Philip* then lay: he was fetch'd in with great pomp and royalty, by a great number of the captains and soldiers; which *Leontius* and *Megaleas* drew forth to meet him on the way. So entering the city with a goodly train, he went directly to the court, and towards the king's chamber. But *Philip* was well aware of his pride, and had vehement suspicion of his falshood. Wherefore one was sent to tell him, that he should wait a while, or come another time; for the king was not now at leisure to be spoken with. It was a pretty thing, that such a check as this made all his attendants forsake him, as a man in disgrace; in such sort, that going thence to his lodging, he had none to follow him, save his own pages. After this, the king vouchsafed him now and then some slender graces: but in consultations, or other matters of privacy, he used him not at all. This taught *Megaleas* to look unto himself, and run away betimes. Hereupon the king sent forth *Taurion*, his lieutenant of *Peloponnesus*, with all the targettiers, as it were to do some piece of service; but indeed of purpose to apprehend *Leontius* in the absence of his followers. *Leontius*, being taken, dispatched away a messenger presently to his targettiers, to signify what was befallen him: and they forthwith sent unto the king in his behalf. They made request, That if any other thing were objected against him, he might not be called forth to trial before their return: as for the debt of *Megaleas*, if that were all the matter, they said, that they were ready to make a purse for his discharge. This affection of the soldiers made *Philip* more hally than else he would have been, to take away the traitor's life. Neither was it long, ere letters of *Megaleas* were intercepted, which he wrote unto the *Etolians*; vilifying the king with opprobrious words; and bidding them not to hearken after peace, but to hold out a while, for that *Philip* was even ready to sink under the burden of his

own poverty. By this the king understood more perfectly the falshood, not only of *Megaleas*, but of *Apelles*; whose cunning head had laboured all this while to keep him so poor. Wherefore he sent one to pursue *Megaleas*, that was fled to *Thebes*. As for *Apelles*, he committed both him, his son, and another that was inward with him, to prison; wherein all of them shortly ended their lives. *Megaleas* also, neither daring to stand to trial, nor knowing whither to fly, was weary of his own life, and slew himself about the same time.

The *Etolians*, as they had begun this war upon hope of accomplishing what they listed in the nonage of *Philip*: so finding that the vigour of this young prince, tempered with the cold advice of *Aratus*, wrought very effectually towards their overthrow; they grew very desirous to make an end of it. Nevertheless, being a turbulent nation, and ready to lay hold upon all advantages: when they heard what was happened in the court, the death of *Apelles*, *Leontius*, and *Megaleas*, together with some indignation thereupon conceived by some of the king's targettiers; they began to hope a-new, that these troubles would be long lasting, and thereupon brake the day appointed for the meeting at *Rhium*. Of this was *Philip* nothing sorry. For being in good hope thoroughly to tame this unquiet nation: he thought it much to concern his own honour, that all the blame of the beginning, and continuing the war, should rest upon themselves. Wherefore he willed his confederates, to lay aside all thought of peace, and to prepare for war against the year following; wherein he hoped to bring it to an end. Then gratified he his *Macedonian* soldiers, by yielding to let them winter in their own country. In his returning homeward, he called into judgment one *Ptolemy*, a companion with *Apelles* and *Leontius* in their treasons: who was therefore condemned by the *Macedonians*, and suffered death. These were the same *Macedonians*, that lately could not endure to hear of *Leontius*'s imprisonment: yet now they think the man worthy to die, that was but his adherent. So vain is the confidence, on which rebels use to build, in their favour with the multitude.

During his abode in *Macedon*, *Philip* won some bordering towns; from which the *Dardaniens*, *Etolians*, and other his ill neighbours, were accustomed to make roads into his kingdom. When he had thus provided for safety of his own; the *Etolians* might well know what they were to expect. But there came again ambassadors from the *Rhodiens* and *Cbians*, with others from *Ptolemy* king of *Egypt*, and from the city of *Byzantium*, re-continuing the former solicitation about the peace. This fashion had been taken up in matters of *Greece*, ever since the kings that reigned after *Alexander* had taken upon them to set the whole country at liberty: no sooner was any province or city in danger to be oppressed, and subdued by force of war, but presently there were found intercessors, who pitying the effusion of *Greekish* blood, would importune the stronger to relinquish his advantage. By doing such friendly offices in time of need, the princes and states abroad sought to bind unto them those people, that were, howsoever weak in numbers, yet very good soldiers. But hereby it came to pass, that the more forward sort, especially the *Etolians*, whose whole nation was addicted to falshood and robbery, durst enter boldly into quarrels with all their neighbours: being well assured, that if they had the worst, the love of *Greece* would be sufficient to redeem their quiet. They had, since the late treaty of peace, done what

what harm they could in *Peloponnesus*: but being beaten by the *Acheans*, and standing in fear to be more soundly beaten at home, they desired now, more earnestly than before, to make an end of the war as soon as they might. *Philip* made such answer to the ambassadors as he had done the former year; that he gave not occasion to the beginning of this war, nor was at the present either afraid to continue it, or unwilling to end it: but that the *Etolians*, if they had a desire to live in rest, must first be dealt withal, to signify plainly their determination, whereto himself would return such answer as he should think fit.

Philip had at this time no great liking unto the peace, being a young prince, and in hope to increase the honour which he daily got by the war. But it happened in the midst of this negotiation, that he was advertised by letters out of *Macedon*, what a notable victory *Hannibal* had obtained against the *Romans* in the battel of *Thrasymene*. These letters he communicated unto *Demetrius Pharius*: who greatly encouraged him to take part with *Hannibal*; and not to sit still, as an idle beholder of the *Italian* war. Hereby he grew more inclinable than before unto peace with the *Etolians*: which was concluded shortly in a meeting at *Naupactus*. There did *Agelaus*, an *Etolian*, make a great oration: telling how happy it was for the *Greeks*, that they might at their own pleasure dispute about finishing war between themselves, without being molested by the *Barbarians*. For when once either the *Romans*, or *Carthaginians*, had subdued one the other; it was not to be doubted, that they would forthwith look eastward, and seek by all means to set footing in *Greece*. For this cause he said it was good, that their country should be at peace within it self: and that *Philip*, if he were desirous of war, should lay hold on the opportunity, now fitly serving, to enlarge his dominion, by winning somewhat in *Italy*. Such advice could the *Etolians* then give, when they stood in fear of danger threatening them at hand: but being soon after weary of rest, as being accustomed to enrich themselves by pillage, they were so far from observing and following their own good counsel, that they invited the *Romans* into *Greece*; whereby

they brought themselves and the whole country (but themselves before any other part of the country) under servitude of strangers. The condition of this peace was simple, that every one should keep what they held at the present, without making restitution, or any amends for damages past.

S E C T. III.

Philip, at the persuasion of Demetrius Pharius, enters into league with Hannibal, against the Romans. The tenor of the league between Hannibal and Philip.

THIS being agreed upon: the *Greeks* betook themselves to quiet courses of life; and *Philip*, to prepare for the business of *Italy*, about which he consulted with *Demetrius Pharius*. And thus passed the time away, till the great battel of *Cannæ*: after which he joined in league with *Hannibal*, as hath been shewn before. *Demetrius Pharius* bore great malice unto the *Romans*; and knew no other way to be avenged upon them, or to recover his own lost kingdom, than by procuring the *Macedonian*, that was in a manner wholly guided by his counsel, to take part with their enemies. It had otherwise been far more expedient for *Philip*, to have supported the weaker of these two great cities against the more mighty. For by so doing, he should perhaps have brought them to peace upon some equal terms; and thereby, as did *Hiero*, a far weaker prince, have both secured his own estate, and caused each of them to be desirous of chief place in his friendship. The issue of the counsel which he followed, will appear soon after this. His first quarrel with the *Romans*; the trouble which they and the *Etolians* did put him to in *Greece*; and the peace which they made with him for a time, upon conditions that might easily be broken: have been related in another place, as belonging unto the second *Punic* war. Wherefore I will only here set down the tenor of the league between him and *Carthage*: which may seem not unworthy to be read, if only in regard of the form it self then used; though it had been over-long to have been inserted into a more busy piece.

The O A T H and C O V E N A N T S,

Between *HANNIBAL*, General of the *Carthaginians*, and *XENOPHANES*, Ambassador of *PHILIP*, king of *Macedon*.

THIS is the league ratified by oath, which *HANNIBAL*, the general, and with him *MAGO*, *MYRCAL*, and *BARMOCAL*, as also the senators of *Carthage* that are present, and all the *Carthaginians* that are in his army, have made with *XENOPHANES*, the son of *CLEOMACHUS*, Athenian, whom king *PHILIP*, the son of *DEMETRIUS*, hath sent unto us, for himself, and the *Macedonians*, and his associates: before Jupiter and Juno, and Apollo: before the god of the *Carthaginians*, Hercules, and Iolaus: before Mars, Triton, Neptune: before the gods accompanying arms, the sun, the moon, and the earth; before rivers, and meadows, and waters; before all the gods that have power over *Carthage*:

before all the gods that rule over *Macedon*, and the rest of *Greece*; before all the gods that are presidents of war, and present at the making of this league. *HANNIBAL* the general hath said, and all the senators that are with him, and all the *Carthaginians* in his army: Be it agreed between you and us. That this oath stand for friendship and loving affection, That we become friends, familiar, and brethren, upon covenant, That the safety of the lords, the *Carthaginians*, and of *HANNIBAL*, the general, and those that are with him, and of the rulers and provinces of the *Carthaginians*, using the same laws, and of the *Uticans*, and as many cities and nations as obey the *Carthaginians*, and of the soldiers and associates, and of all towns and nations

with which we hold friendship in Italy, Gaul, and Liguria, and with whom we shall hold friendship, or make alliance hereafter in this region, be preserved by king PHILIP, and the Macedonians, and such of the Greeks as are their associates. In like manner shall king PHILIP, and the Macedonians, and other the Greeks his associates, be saved and preserved by the Carthaginian armies, and by the Uticans, and by all cities and nations that obey the Carthaginians, and by their associates and soldiers, and by all cities in Italy, Gaul, and Liguria. that are of our alliance, or shall hereafter join with us in Italy. We shall not take counsel one against the other, nor deal fraudulently one with the other. With all readiness and good-will, without deceit or subtilty, we shall be enemies unto the enemies of the Carthaginians, excepting those kings, towns, and havens, with which we have already league and friendship. We also shall be enemies to the enemies of king PHILIP, excepting those kings, cities, and nations, with which we have already league and friendship. The war that we have with the Romans, have ye also with them, until the gods shall give us a new and happy end. Ye shall aid us with those things whereof we have need, and shall do according to the covenants between us. But if the gods shall not give unto you and us their help in this war against the Romans and their associates; then if the Romans offer friendship, we shall make friendship in such wise, that ye shall be partakers of the same friendship, with condition, that they shall not have power to make war upon you: neither shall the Romans be lords over the Corcyreans, nor over those of Apollonia, nor Dyrrachium, nor over Pharos, nor Dimalle, nor the Parthini, nor Atintania. They shall also render unto DEMETRIUS PHARIUS all those that belong unto him, as many as are within the Romans dominions. But if the Romans (after such peace made) shall make war upon ye or us; we will succour one another in that war, as either shall have need. The same shall be observed in war made by any other, excepting those kings, cities, and states, with whom we hold already league and friendship. To this league if we or ye shall think fit to add or detract, such addition or deduction shall be made by our common consent.

SECT. IV.

Now Philip yielded to his natural vices, being therein foisted by Demetrius Pharius. His desire to tyrannize upon the free states his associates: With the troubles into which he thereby fell, whilst he bore a part in the second Punic War. He poisoneth Aratus; and grows hateful to the Achæans.

Hitherto Philip had carried himself as a virtuous prince. And though with more commendation of his wisdom, he might have offered his friendship to the Romans, that were like to be oppressed, than to the Carthaginians, who had the better hand; yet this his meddling in the Punic war, proceeded from a royal greatness of mind, with a desire to secure and increase his own estate; adding therewithal reputation to his country. But in this business he was guided (as hath been said) by Demetrius Pharius; who, looking thoroughly into his nature, did accommodate himself to his desires, and thereby shortly governed him, as he listed. For the virtues of Philip were not indeed such as they seemed. He was lustful, bloody, and tyrannical; desirous of power to do what he listed, and not otherwise listening to do what he ought, than so far forth, as by making a fair shew, he might breed in men such a good opinion of him, as should help to serve his turn in all that he took in hand. Be-

fore he should busy himself in Italy, he thought it requisite in good policy, to bring the Greeks, that were his associates, under a more absolute form of subjection. Hereunto Apelles had advised him before, and he had liked reasonably well of the course. But Apelles was a boisterous counsellor, and one, that, referring all to his own glory, thought himself deeply wronged, if he might not wholly have his own way, but were driven to await the king's opportunity at better times. Demetrius Pharius could well be contented to observe the king's humours; and guided, like a coachman, with the reins in his hand, those affections which himself did only seem to follow. Therefore he grew daily more and more in credit; so as, without any manner of contention, he supplanted Aratus, which the violence of Apelles could never do.

There arose about these times a very hot faction among the Messenians, between the nobility and commons; their vehement thoughts being rather diverted (as happens often after a foreign war) unto domestick objects, than allayed and reduced unto a more quiet temper. In process of no long time, the contention among them grew so violent, that Philip was entreated to compound the differences. He was glad of this, resolving so to end the matter, that they should not henceforth strive any more about their government; for that he would assume it wholly to himself. At his coming thither, he found Aratus busy among them to make all friends, after a better manner than agreed with his own secret purpose. Wherefore he consulted not with this reverend old man, but talked in private with such of the Messenians as repaired unto him. He asked the governors what they meant to stand thus disputing, and whether they had not laws to bridle the insolence of the unruly rabble. Contrariwise, in talking with the heads of the popular faction, he said it was strange that they, being so many, would suffer themselves to be oppressed by a few; as if they had not hands to defend themselves from tyrants. Thus, whilst each of them presumed on the king's assistance, they thought it best to go roundly to work, ere he were gone that should countenance their doings. The governors therefore would have apprehended some seditious orators, that were, they said, the stirrers up of the multitude unto sedition. Upon this occasion the people took arms; and, running upon the nobility and magistrates, killed of them in a rage almost two hundred. Philip thought, it seems, that it would be easy to worry the sheep, when the dogs, their guardians, were slain. But his falshood and double dealing was immediately found out. Neither did the younger Aratus forbear to tell him of it in publick, with very bitter and disgraceful words. The king was angry at this; but having already done more than was commendable, or excusable; and yet further intending to take other things in hand, wherein he should need the help and countenance of his best friends, he was content to smother his displeasure, and make as fair weather as he could. He led old Aratus aside by the hand, and went up into the castle of Ithome, that was over Messene. There he pretend to do sacrifice, and sacrifice he did. But it was his purpose to keep the place to his own use; for that it was of notable strength, and would serve to command the further parts of Peloponnesus, as the citadel of Corinth, which he had already, commanded the entrance into that country. Whilst he was therefore sacrificing, and had the entrails of the beast delivered into his hand, as was the manner, he shewed them to Aratus, and gently asked him, whether the tokens that he saw therein did signify, that being now in possession of this

this place, he should quietly go out of it; or rather keep it to himself. He thought, perhaps, that the old man would have soothed him a little, were it only for desire to make amends for the angry words newly spoken by his son. But as *Aratus* stood doubtful what to answer, *Demetrius Pharius* gave this verdict: *If thou be a soothsayer, thou may'st go thy ways, and let slip this good advantage; if thou be a king, thou must not neglect the opportunity, but bold the ox by both his horns.* Thus he spake, resembling *Ithome* and *Acrocorinthus*, unto the two horns of *Peloponnesus*. Yet would *Philip* needs hear the opinion of *Aratus*, who told him plainly, that it were well done to keep the place, if it might be kept without breach of his faith with the *Messinians*: but if, by seizing upon *Ithome*, he must lose all the other castles that he held, and especially the strongest castle of all, which was left unto him by *Antigonus*, which was his credit, then were it far better to depart with his soldiers, and keep men in duty, as he had done hitherto, by their own good-wills, than by fortifying any strong places against them, to make them of his friends become his enemies.

To this good advice *Philip* yielded at the present; but not without some dislike, thenceforth growing between him and the *Arati*, whom he thought more froward than becomed them, in contradicting his will. Neither was the old man desirous at all, to deal any longer in the king's affairs, or be inward with him: for as he plainly discovered his tyrannous purposes; so likewise he perceived, that in resorting to his house, he had been dishonest with his son's wife. He therefore staid at home, where, at good leisure, he might repent, that in despite of *Cleomenes*, his own countryman, and a temperate prince, he had brought the *Macedonians* into *Peloponnesus*.

Philip made a voyage out of *Peloponnesus* into *Epirus*, wherein *Aratus* refused to bear him company. In this journey he found by experience what *Aratus* had lately told him, that dishonest counsels are not so profitable in deed, as in appearance. The *Epirots* were his followers and dependants, and so they purposed to continue: but he would needs have them so to remain, whether they purposed it or not. Wherefore, to make them the more obnoxious unto his will, he seized upon their town of *Oricum*, and laid siege to *Apollonia*, having no good colour of these doings, but thinking himself strong enough to do what he listed, and not seeing whence they should procure friends to help them. Thus, instead of settling the country, as his intended voyage into *Italy* required, he kindled a fire in it which he could never quench, until it had laid hold on his own palace. Whilst he was thus labouring to bind the hands that should have fought for him in *Italy*, *M. Valerius*, the *Roman*, came into those parts; who not only maintained the *Epirots* against him, but procured the *Etolians* to break the peace which they had lately made with him.

Thus began that war, the occurrences whereof we have related before, in place whereto it belonged. In managing whereof, though *Philip* did the offices of a good captain; yet, when leisure served, he made it apparent that he was a vicious king. He had not quite left his former desire, of oppressing the liberty of the *Messinians*, but made another journey into their country, with hope to deceive them, as before. They understood him better now than before, and therefore were not hasty to trust him too far. When he saw that his cunning would not serve,

he went by force; and calling them his enemies, invaded them with open war. But in that war he could do little good; perhaps, because none of his confederates were desirous to help him in such an enterprise. In this attempt upon *Messene*, he lost *Demetrius Pharius*, that was his counsellor and flatterer, not his perverter; as appears by his growing daily more nought in following times. The worse that he sped, the more angry he vexed against those that seemed not to favour his injurious doings. Wherefore, by the ministry of *Taurion*, his lieutenant, he poisoned old *Aratus*; and shortly after that, he poisoned also the younger *Aratus*; hoping that these things would never have been known, because they were done secretly, and the poisons themselves were more sure, than manifest in operation. The *Sicyonians*, and all the people of *Achaia*, decreed unto *Aratus* more than human honours; as sacrifices, hymns, and processions, to be celebrated every year twice, with a priest ordained unto him for that purpose; as was accustomed unto the heroes, or men, whom they thought to be translated into the number of the gods. Hereunto they are said to have been encouraged by an oracle of *Apollo*; which is like enough to have been true, since the help of the devil is never failing to the increase of idolatry.

The loving memory of *Aratus*, their patron and singular benefactor, could not but work in the *Acheans* marvellous dislike of that wicked king, which had made him thus away. He shall therefore hear of this hereafter, when they better dare to take counsel for themselves. At the present, the murder was not generally known or believed; neither were they in case to subsist, without his help that had committed it. The *Etolians* were a most outrageous people, great darers, and shameless robbers. With these the *Romans* had made a league, whereof the conditions were soon divulged, especially that main point, concerning the division of the purchase which they should make; namely, that the *Etolians* should have the country and towns, but the *Romans* the spoil, and carry away the people to sell for slaves. The *Acheans*, who, in times of greater quiet, could not endure to make straight alliance with the *Etolians*, as knowing their uncivil disposition, were much more averse from them, when they perceived how they had called in the *Barbarians* (for such did the *Greeks* account all other nations, except their own) to make havock of the country. The same consideration moved also the *Lacedemonians* to stand off a-while, before they would declare themselves for the *Etolians*, whose friendship they had embraced in the late war. The industry therefore of *Philip*, and the great care which he seemed to take of the *Acheans*, his confederates, sufficed to retain them; especially at such time as their own necessity was thereto concurrent. More particularly, he obliged unto himself the *Dymeans*, by an inestimable benefit, recovering their own after it had been taken by the *Romans* and *Etolians*, and redeeming their people wheresoever they might be found, that had been carried away captive, and sold abroad for slaves. Thus might he have blotted out the memory of offences pass'd, if the malignity of his condition had not otherwhiles broken out, and given men to understand that it was the time, and not his virtue, which caused him to make such a shew of goodness. Among other foul acts, whereof he was not ashamed, he took *Polycratia*, the wife of the younger *Aratus*, and carried her into *Macedon*; little regarding how this might serve to confirm in

the people their opinion, that he was guilty of the old man's death. But of such faults he shall be told, when the *Romans* make war upon him the second time: for of that which happened in this their first invasion, I hold it superfluous to make repetition.

S E C T. V.

Of Philopœmen, general of the Achæans, and Machanidas, tyrant of Lacedæmon. A battel between them, wherein Machanidas is slain.

IT happens often, that the decease of one eminent man discovers the virtue of another. In the place of *Aratus* there stood up *Philopœmen*, whose notable valour, and great skill in arms, made the nation of the *Achæans* redoubtable among all the *Greeks*, and careless of such protection, as in former times they had needed against the violence of their neighbours. This is that *Philopœmen*, who, being then a young man, and having no command, did especial service to *Antigonus* at the battel of *Selasia*, against *Cleomenes*. Thenceforward until now, he had spent the most part of his time in the isle of *Crete*; the inhabitants whereof being a valiant people, and seldom or never at peace between themselves, he bettered among them his knowledge and practice in the art of war. At his return home, he had charge of the horse, wherein he carried himself so strictly, travailing with all the cities of the confederacy, to have his followers well mounted and armed at all pieces; as also he so diligently trained them up in all exercise of service, that he made the *Achæans* very strong in that part of their forces. Being afterwards chosen pretor, or general of the nation, he had no less care to reform their military discipline throughout, whereby his country might be strong enough to defend it self, and not any longer (as in former times) need to depend upon the help of others. He perswaded the *Achæans* to cut off their vain expence of bravery, in apparel, household-stuff, and curious fare, and to bestow that cost upon their arms; wherein by how much they were the more gallant, by so much were they like to prove the better soldiers; and suitable in behaviour unto the pride of their furniture. They had served hitherto with little light bucklers, and slender darts, to cast afar off, that were useful in skirmishing at some distance, or for surprises, or sudden and hasty expeditions; whereto *Aratus* had been most accustomed. But when they came to handy-strokes, they were good for nothing; so as they were wholly driven to rely upon the courage of their mercenaries. *Philopœmen* altered this, causing them to arm themselves more weightily; to use a larger kind of shield, with good swords, and strong pikes, fit for service at hand. He taught them also to fight in close order, and altered the form of their embatteling; not making the files so deep as had been accustomed, but extending the front, that he might use the service of many hands.

Eight months were spent of that year in which he first was pretor of the *Achæans*, when *Machanidas*, the tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, caused him to make trial how his soldiers had profited by his discipline. This *Machanidas* was the successor unto *Lycurgus*, a man more violent than his fore-goer. He kept in pay a strong army of mercenaries; and he kept them not only to fight for *Sparta*, but to hold the city in obedience to himself perforce. Wherefore it behoved him not to take part with the *Achæans*, that were favourers of liberty; but to strengthen

himself by friendship of the *Etolians*; who, in making alliances, took no further notice of vice or virtue, than as it had reference to their own profit. The people also of *Lacedæmon*, through their inveterate hatred unto the *Argives*, *Achæans*, and *Macedonians*, were in like sort (all, or most of them) inclinable to the *Etolian* faction. Very unwisely: for in seeking to take revenge upon those that had lately hindered them from getting the lordship of *Peloponnesus*, they hindered themselves thereby from recovering the mastery of their own city. This affection of the *Spartans*, together with the regard of his own security, and no small hope of good that would follow, suffered not *Machanidas* to be idle; but always made him ready to fall upon his neighbours backs, and take of theirs what he could, whilst they were enforced, by greater necessity, to turn face another way. Thus had he often done, especially in the absence of *Philip*, whose sudden coming into those parts, or some other opposition made against him, had usually made him fail of his attempts. At the present he was stronger in men than were the *Achæans*, and thought his own men better soldiers than were theirs.

Whilst *Philip* therefore was busied elsewhere, he entered the country of the *Mantineans*, being not without hope to do as *Cleomenes* had done before him; yea, and perhaps to get the ^a lordship of *Peloponnesus*, as having stronger friends, and weaker opposition, than *Cleomenes* had found. But *Philopœmen* was ready to entertain him at *Mantineæ*, where was fought between them a great battel. The tyrant had brought into the field upon carts a great many of engines, wherewith to beat upon the squadrons of his enemies, and put them into disorder. To prevent this danger, *Philopœmen* sent forth his light armature a good way before him; so as *Machanidas* was fain to do the like. To second these, from the one and the other side came in continual supply, till at length all the mercenaries both of the *Achæans* and of *Machanidas* were drawn up to the fight, being so far advanced each before their own *Phalanx*, that it could no otherwise be discerned which pressed forward, or which recoiled, than by the rising of the dust. Thus were *Machanidas's* engines made unserviceable, by the interposition of his own men; in such manner, as the cannon is hindered from doing execution in most of the battels fought in these our times. The mercenaries of the tyrant prevailed at length, not only by their advantage of number, but (as ^b *Polybius* well observeth) by surmounting their opposites in degree of courage, wherein usually the hired soldiers of tyrants exceed those that are waged by free states. For as it is true, that a free people are much more valiant than they which live oppressed by tyranny; since the one, by doing their best in fight, have hope to acquire somewhat beneficial to themselves; whereas the other do fight (as it were) to assure their own servitude: so the mercenaries of a tyrant, being made partakers with him in the fruits of his prosperity, have good cause to maintain his quarrel as their own; whereas they that serve under a free state, have no other motive to do manfully, than their bare stipend. Further than this, when a free state hath gotten the victory, many companies (if not all) of foreign auxiliaries are presently cast; and therefore such good fellows will not take much pains to bring the war to an end. But the victory of a tyrant, makes him stand in need of more helpers: because that after it he doth wrong to more, as having more subjects; and therefore stands in fear of more, that should

^a Excerpt. à Polyb. l. ii. Plut. in vita Philopam. ^b Polyb. ibid.

seek to take revenge upon him. The stipendiaries therefore of the *Acheans*, being forced to give ground, were urged so violently in their retreat by those of *Machanidas*, that shortly they betook themselves to flight; and could not be stay'd by any persuasions of *Philopæmen*, but ran away quite beyond the battel of the *Acheans*. This disaster had been sufficient to take from *Philopæmen* the honour of the day; had he not wisely observed the demeanor of *Machanidas*, and found in him that error which might restore the victory. The tyrant, with his mercenaries, gave chase unto those that fled: leaving behind him in good order of battel his *Lacedemonians*; whom he thought sufficient to deal with the *Acheans*, that were already disheartened by the flight of their companions. But when this his rashness had carried him out of sight, *Philopæmen* advanced towards the *Lacedemonians* that stood before him. There lay between them athwart the country a long ditch, without water at that time; and therefore passable (as it seemed) without much difficulty, especially for foot. The *Lacedemonians* adventured over it, as thinking themselves better soldiers than the *Acheans*; who had in a manner already lost the day. But hereby they greatly disordered their own battel; and no sooner had the foremost of them recovered the further bank, than they were stoutly charged by the *Acheans*, who drove them headlong into the ditch again. The first ranks being broken, all the rest began to shrink: so as *Philopæmen* getting over the ditch, easily chased them out of the field. *Philopæmen* knew better how to use his advantage, than *Machanidas* had done. He suffered not all his army to disband and follow the chase: but retained with him a sufficient strength, for the custody of a bridge that was over the ditch, by which he knew that the tyrant must come back. The tyrant with his mercenaries returning from the chase, looked very heavily when he saw what was fallen out. Yet, with a lusty troop of horse about him, he made towards the bridge: hoping to find the *Acheans* in disorder, and to set upon their backs, as they were carelessly pursuing their victory. But when he and his company saw *Philopæmen* ready to make good the bridge against them; then began every one to look, which way he might shift for himself. The tyrant, with no more than two in his company, rode along the ditch-side; and searched for an easy passage over. He was easily discovered by his purple cassock, and the costly trappings of his horse. *Philopæmen* therefore leaving the charge of the bridge unto another, coasted him all the way that he rode; and falling upon him at length in the ditch it self, as he was getting over it, slew him there with his own hand. There died in this battel on the *Lacedemonians* side about four thousand: and more than four thousand were taken prisoners. Of the *Achean* mercenaries, probable it is that the loss was not greatly cared for; since that war was at an end, and for their money they might hire more when they should have need.

S E C T. VI.

Philip leaving peace with Rome, and with all Greece, prepares against Asia. Of the kings of Pergamus, Cappadocia, Pontus, Paphlagonia, Bithynia, and their lineages. Of the Galatians.

BY this victory the *Acheans* learned to think well of themselves. Neither needed they indeed

after a while (such was their discipline, and continual exercise) to account themselves in manner of war inferiour to any, that should have brought against them no great odds of number. As for the *Macedonian*, he made no great use of them: But when he had once concluded peace with the *Romans* and *Etolians*. He studied how to enlarge his dominions eastward; since the fortune of his friends, the *Carthaginians*, declined in the west. He took in hand many matters together, or very nearly together, and some of them not honest: wherein if the *Acheans* would have done him service; they must, by helping him to oppress others that never had wronged him, have taught him the way how to deal with themselves. He greatly hated *Attalus* king of *Pergamus*, who had joined with the *Romans* and *Etolians* against him.

This *Attalus*, though a king, was scarce yet a nobleman, otherwise than as he was ennobled by his own, and by his father's virtue. His fortune began in *Philetærus* his uncle: who being gelded, by reason of a mishap which he had when he was a child, grew afterwards thereby to be more esteemed: as great men in those times reposed much confidence in eunuchs, whose affections could not be obliged unto wives or children. He was entertained into the family of *Docimus*, a captain following *Antigonus the first*; and after the death of *Antigonus*, he accompanied his master, that betook himself to *Lyfimachus* king of *Thrace*. *Lyfimachus* had good opinion of him; and put him in trust with his money and accompts. But when at length he stood in fear of this king, that grew a bloody tyrant: he fled into *Asia*, where he seized upon the town of *Pergamus*, and nine thousand talents belonging to *Lyfimachus*. The town and money, together with his own service, he offered unto *Seleucus the first*, that then was ready to give *Lyfimachus* battel. His offer was kindly accepted, but never performed; for that *Seleucus* having slain *Lyfimachus*, died shortly after himself, before he made use of *Philetærus* or his money. So this eunuch still retained *Pergamus* with the country about it; and reigned therein twenty years as an absolute king. He had two brethren: of which the elder is said to have been a poor carter; and the younger perhaps was not much better; before such time as they were raised by the fortune of this eunuch. *Philetærus* left the kingdom to the elder of these, or to the son of the elder called *Eumenes*. This *Eumenes* enlarged his kingdom; making his advantage of the dissension, between *Seleucus Callinicus* and *Antiochus Hierax*, the sons of the second *Antiochus*. He fought a battel with *Hierax*, near unto *Sardes*; and won the victory. At which time, to animate his men against the *Gauls* that served under his enemy, he used a pretty device. He wrote the word *Victory* upon the hand of his soothsayer, in such colours as would easily come off; and when the hot liver of the beast that was sacrificed, had clearly taken the print of the letters, he published this unto his army as a miracle, plainly fore-shewing that the gods would be assistant in that battel.

After this victory, he grew a dreadful enemy to *Seleucus*: who never durst attempt to recover from him, by war, the territory that he had gotten and held. Finally, when he had reigned two and twenty years, he died by a surfeit of over-much drink; and left his kingdom to *Attalus*, of whom we now intreat, that was son unto *Attalus* the

youngest brother of *Phileterus*. *Attalus* was an undertaking prince, very bountiful, and no less valiant. By his own proper forces he restored his friend *Ariarathes* the *Cappadocian* into his kingdom, whence he had been expelled. He was grievously molested by *Acheus*: who setting up himself, as king, against *Antiochus the great*, reigned in the lesser *Asia*. He was besieged in his own city of *Pergamus*: but by the help of the *Tectosage*, a nation of the *Gauls*, whom he called over out of *Thrace*, he recovered all that he had lost. When these *Gauls* had once gotten footing in *Asia*, they never wanted employment: but were either entertained by some of the princes reigning in those quarters; or interposed themselves, without invitation, and found themselves work in quarrels of their own making. They caused *Prusias* king of *Bithynia* to cease from his war against *Byzantium*. Whereunto when he had condescended; they nevertheless within a while after invaded his kingdom. He obtained against them a great victory; and used it with great cruelty, sparing neither age nor sex. But the swarm of them increasing, they occupied the region about *Hellepont*: where, in seating themselves, they were much beholden unto *Attalus*. Nevertheless, presuming afterwards upon their strength; they forced their neighbour princes and cities to pay them tribute. In the sharp exaction whereof, they had no more respect unto *Attalus* than to any that had worse deserved of them. By this they compelled him to fight against them; and he being victorious, compelled them to contain themselves within the bounds of that province, which took name from them in time following, and was called *Galatia*. Yet continued they still to oppress the weakest of their neighbours; and to fill up the armies of those that could best hire them.

The kings reigning in those parts, were the posterity of such as had saved themselves and their provinces, in the slothful reign of the *Persians*; or in the busy times of *Alexander*, and his *Macedonian* followers. The *Cappadocians* were very ancient. For the first of their line had married with *Atossa*, sister unto the great king *Cyrus*. Their country was taken from them by *Perdiccas*, as is shewed before. But the son of that king, whom *Perdiccas* crucified, espying his time while the *Macedonians* were at civil wars among themselves; recovered his dominion, and passed it over to his off-spring. The kings of *Pontus* had also their beginning from the *Persian* empire; and are said to have issued from the royal house of *Achemenes*. The *Paphlagonians* derived themselves from *Pylæmenes*, a king that assisted *Priamus* at the war of *Troy*. These, applying themselves unto the times, were always conformable unto the strongest. The ancestors of *Prusias* had begun to reign in *Bithynia*, some few generations before that of the *Great Alexander*. They lay somewhat out of the *Macedonians* way: by whom therefore, having other employment, they were the less molested. *Calanus*, one of *Alexander's* captains, made an expedition into their country; where he was vanquished. They had afterwards to do with a lieutenant of *Antigonus*, that made them somewhat more humble. And thus they shuffled, as did the rest, until the reign of *Prusias*, whom we have already sometimes mentioned.

S E C T. VII.

The town of *Cios* taken by Philip, at the instance of *Prusias* king of *Bithynia*, and cruelly destroyed.

By this and like actions Philip grows hateful to many of the Greeks; and is warred upon by *Attalus* king of *Pergamus*, and by the *Rhodians*.

PRUSIAS, as a neighbour king, had many quarrels with *Attalus*, whose greatness he suspected. He therefore strengthened himself, by taking to wife the daughter of *Philip*; as *Attalus*, on the contrary side, entered into a strict confederacy with the *Etolians*, *Rhodians*, and other of the *Greeks*. But when *Philip* had ended his *Etolian* war, and was devising with *Antiochus* about sharing between them two the kingdom of *Egypt*; wherein *Ptolemy Philopater*, a friend unto them both, was newly dead, and had left his son *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, a young child, his heir; the *Bithynian* entreated this his father-in-law to come over into *Asia*, there to win the town of the *Ciani*, and bestow it upon him. *Prusias* had no right unto the town, nor just matter of quarrel against it; but it was fitly seated for him, and therewithal rich. *Philip* came, as one that could not well deny to help his son-in-law: but hereby he mightily offended no small part of *Greece*. Ambassadors came to him, whilst he lay at the siege, from the *Rhodians*, and divers other states; entreating him to forsake the enterprize. He gave dilatory, but otherwise gentle answers, making shew as if he would condescend to their request; when he intended nothing less. At length he got the town, where, even in presence of the ambassadors, of whose sollicitation he had seemed so regardful, he omitted no part of cruelty. Hereby he rendered himself odious to his neighbours, as a perfidious and cruel prince. Especially his fact was detested of the *Rhodians*, who had made vehement intercession for the poor *Ciani*; and were advertised by ambassadors of purpose sent unto them from *Philip*, that, howsoever it were in his power to win the town as soon as he listed; yet, in regard of his love to the *Rhodians*, he was contented to give it over. And by this his clemency, the ambassadors said, that he would manifest unto the world what slanderous tongues they were, which noised abroad such reports as went, of his falshood and oppressions. Whilst the ambassadors were declaiming at *Rhodes*, in the theatre, to this effect, there came some that made a true relation of what had happened; shewing that *Philip* had sacked and destroyed the town of *Cios*, and, after a cruel slaughter of the inhabitants, had made slaves of all that escaped the sword. If the *Rhodians* took this in great despite, no less were the *Etolians* inflamed against him, since they had sent a captain to take charge of the town; being warned before by his doings at *Lyfismachia* and *Chalcedon* (which he had withdrawn from their confederacy to his own) what little trust was to be reposed in the faith of this king. But most of all others was *Attalus* moved with consideration of the *Macedonians* violent ambition, and of his own estate. He had much to lose, and was not without hope of getting much, if he could make a strong party in *Greece*. He had already, as a new king, followed the example of *Alexander's* captains, in purchasing with much liberality the love of the *Athenians*, which were notable trumpeters of other mens virtue, having lost their own. On the friendship of the *Etolians* he had cause to presume, having bound them unto him by good offices, many and great, in their late war with *Philip*. The *Rhodians*, that were mighty at sea, and held very good intelligence with the *Egyptians*, *Syrians*, and many other princes and states, he easily drew into a straight alliance with him, by their hatred newly conceived against *Philip*.

Upon

Upon confidence in these his friends, but most of all in the ready assistance of the *Rhodians*, *Attalus* prepared to deal with the *Macedonian* by open war. It had been unseasonable to procrastinate; and expect whereto the doings of the enemy tended; since his desire to fasten upon *Asia* was manifest, and his falsehood no less manifest, than was such his desire. They met with him shortly not far from *Chios*; and fought with him a battel at sea; wherein, though *Attalus* was driven to run his own ship on ground, hardly escaping to land; though the admiral of the *Rhodians* took his death's wound; and though *Philip*, after the battel, took harbour under a promontory, by which they had fought; so that he had the gathering of the wrecks upon the shore: yet forasmuch as he had suffered far greater loss of ships and men, than had the enemy, and since he durst not in few days after put forth to sea, when *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* came to brave him in his port, the honour of the victory was adjudged to his enemies. This notwithstanding, *Philip* afterwards besieged, and won some towns in *Caria*; whether only in a bravery, and to despise his opposites, or whether upon any hopeful desire of conquest, it is uncertain. The stratagem, by which he won *Prinassus*, is worthy of noting. He attempted it by a mine, and finding the earth so stony, that it resisted his work, he nevertheless commanded the pioneers to make a noise under-ground; and secretly in the night-time he raised a great mount about the entrance of the mine, to breed an opinion in the besieged, that the work went marvellously forward. At length he sent word to the townsmen, that by his undermining, two acres of their wall stood only upon wooden props; to which, if he gave fire, and entered by a breach, they should expect no mercy. The *Prinassians* little thought that he had fetched all his earth and rubbish by night a great way off, to raise up those heaps which they saw, but rather that all had been extracted out of the mine. Wherefore they suffered themselves to be out-faced, and gave up the town as lost, which the enemy had no hope to win by force. But *Philip* could not stay to settle himself in those parts. *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* were too strong for him at sea, and compelled him to make haste back into *Macedon*, whither they followed him all the way in manner of pursuit.

SECT. VIII.

The Romans, after their Carthaginian war, seek matter of quarrel against *Philip*. The Athenians upon slight cause proclaim war against *Philip*, moved thereto by *Attalus*, whom they flatter. *Philip* wins divers towns, and makes peremptory answer to the Roman ambassador. The furious resolution of the Abydeni.

THESE *Asiatic* matters, which no way concerned the *Romans*, yet served well to make a noise in *Rome*, and fill the people's heads, if not with a desire of making war in *Macedon*, at least with a conceit that it were expedient so to do. The *Roman* senate was perfectly informed of the state of those eastern countries, and knew that there was none other nation than the *Greeks*, which lay between them and the lordship of *Asia*. These *Greeks* were factious, and seldom or never at peace. As for the *Macedonian*, though length of time, and continual dealings in *Greece* ever since the reigns of *Philip* and *Alexander*, had left no difference between him and the naturals; yet most of them abhorred

his dominion, because he was originally, forsooth, a *Barbarian*: many of them hated him upon ancient quarrels; and they that had been most beholden unto him, were nevertheless weary of him, by reason of his personal faults. All this gave hope, that the affairs of *Greece* would not long detain the *Roman* armies; especially since the divisions of the country were such, that every petty estate was apt to take counsel apart for it self, without much regarding the generality. But the poor commonalty of *Rome* had no great affection to such a chargeable enterprize. They were already quite exhausted by that grievous war with *Hannibal*, wherein they had given by loan to the republick all their money; neither had they as yet received, neither did they receive until fifteen or sixteen years after this, their whole sum back again. That part of payment also which was already made, being not in present money, but much of it in land, it behoved them to rest a-while, and bestow the more diligence in tilling their grounds, by how much they were the less able to bestow cost. Wherefore they took no pleasure to hear, that *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* had sent ambassadors to solicit them against *Philip*, with report of his bold attempts in *Asia*: or that *M. Aurelius*, their Agent in *Greece*, had sent letters of the same tenor to the senate; and magnified his intelligence, by setting out the preparations of this dangerous enemy, that solicited not only the towns upon the continent, but all the islands in those seas; visiting them in person, or sending ambassadors, as one that meant shortly to hold war with the *Romans* upon their own ground. *Philip* had indeed no such intent; neither was he much too strong, either of himself, or by his alliance in *Greece*, to be resisted by *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, especially with the help of the *Etolians*, their good friends; and (in a manner) his own professed enemies. But such things must be published abroad, if only to predispose men unto the war, and give it the more honest colour.

Philip was a man of ill condition, and therefore could not thrive by intermeddling in the affairs of those that were more mighty than himself. He was too unskillful, or otherwise too unapt, to retain his old friends; yet would he needs be seeking new enemies. And he found them such as he deserved to have them; for he offered his help to their destruction, when they were in misery, and had done him no harm. It behoved him therefore either to have strained his forces to the uttermost, in making war upon them; or, in desisting from that injurious course, to have made amends for the wrongs pass'd, by doing friendly offices of his own accord. But he, having broken that league of peace, which is of all other the most natural, binding all men to offer no violence willingly, unless they think themselves justly provoked, was afterwards too fondly perswaded, that he might well be secure of the *Romans*, because of the written covenants of peace between him and them. There is not any form of oath, whereby such articles of peace can be held inviolable, save only ^a by the water of *Styx*, that is, by necessity; which whilst it binds one party, or both, unto performance, making it apparent, that he shall be a loser, who starts from the conditions; it may so long (and so long only) be presumed that there shall be no breach. Till *Hannibal* was vanquished, the *Romans* never hearkened after *Philip*; for necessity made them let him alone. But when once they had peace with *Carthage*, then was this river of *Styx* dried up; and then could they swear, as ^b *Mercury* did in the comedy, by

^a Sir Fia. Bacon de Sap. veterum. ^b Plant. Amphitr.

their own selves, even by their good swords, that they had good reason to make war upon him. The voyage of *Sopater* into *Afric*, and the present war against *Attalus*, were matter of quarrel as much as needed; or, if this were not enough, the *Athenians* helped to furnish them with more.

The *Athenians*, being at this time lords of no more than their own barren territory, took state upon them nevertheless, as in their ancient fortune. Two young gentlemen of *Acarmania*, entering into the temple of *Ceres*, in the days of initiation (wherein were delivered the mysteries of religion, or rather, of idolatrous superstition, vainly said to have been available unto felicity after this life) discovered themselves, by some impertinent questions, to be none of those that were initiated. Hereupon they were brought before the officers; and though it was apparent, that they came into the place by mere error, not thinking to have therein done amiss; yet, as it had been for some heinous crime, they were put to death. All their countrymen at home took this in ill part, and sought to revenge it as a publick injury, by war upon the *Athenians*. Procuring therefore of *Philip* some *Macedonians* to help them, they entered into *Attica*, who wasted it with fire and sword, and carried thence away with them a great booty. This indignity stirred up the high-minded *Athenians*, and made them think upon doing more than they had ability to perform. All which at the present they could do, was to send ambassadors to king *Attalus*, gratulating his happy success against *Philip*, and intreating him to visit their city. *Attalus* was hereto the more willing, because he understood that the *Roman* ambassadors, hovering about *Greece* for matter of intelligence, had a purpose to be there at the same time. So he went thither, accompanied, besides his own followers, with some of the *Rhodians*. Landing in the *Piræus*, he found the *Romans* there, with whom he had much friendly conference, they rejoicing that he continued enemy to *Philip*; and he being no less glad when he heard of their purpose to renew the war. The *Athenians* came forth of their city, all the magistrates, priests, and citizens, with their wives and children, in as solemn a pomp as they could devise, to meet and honour the king. They entertained the *Romans* that were with him in very loving manner; but towards *Attalus* himself, they omitted no point of observance, which their flattery could suggest. At his first coming into the city, they called the people to assembly; where they desired him to honour them with his presence, and let them hear him speak. But he excused himself, saying, that with an evil grace he should recount unto them those many benefits, by which he studied to make them know what love he bore them. Wherefore it was thought fit that he should deliver in writing, what he would have to be propounded. He did so. The points of his declaration were; first, what he had willingly done for their sake; then, what had lately passed between him and *Philip*; lastly, an exhortation unto them, to declare themselves against the *Macedonian*, whilst he, with the *Rhodians* and the *Romans*, were willing and ready to take their part; which if they now refused to do, he protested that afterwards it would be vain to crave his help. There needed little intreaty, for they were as willing to proclaim the war, as he to desire it. As for other matters, they loaded him with immoderate honours, and ordained, that unto the ten tribes, whereof the body of their citizens consisted, should be added another, and called after his name; as if he were in part one of their founders. To the *Rhodians* they also decreed a

crown of gold, in reward of their virtue, and made all the *Rhodians* free citizens of *Athens*.

Thus began a great noise of war, wherein little was left unto the *Romans* for their part; *Attalus*, and the *Rhodians*, taking all upon them. But while these were vainly mispending the time, in seeking to draw the *Etolians* to their party, that contrary to their old manner were glad to be at quiet, *Philip* won the towns of *Maronea* and *Ænus*, with many other strong places about the *Hellepont*. Likewise passing over the *Hellepont*, he laid siege unto *Abydus*; and won it, though he was fain to stay there long. The town held out, rather upon an obstinate resolution, and hope of succour from *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, than any great ability to defend it self against so mighty an enemy. But the *Rhodians* sent thither only one quadrireme gally, and *Attalus* no more than three hundred men; far too weak an aid to make good the place. The *Roman* ambassadors wondered much at this great negligence of them that had taken so much upon them.

These ambassadors, *C. Claudius*, *M. Æmilius*, and *P. Sempronius*, were sent unto *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, king of *Egypt*, to acquaint him with their victory against *Hannibal* and the *Carthaginians*; as also to thank him for his favour unto them shewed in that war; and to desire the continuance thereof, if they should need it against *Philip*. This *Egyptian* king was now in the third or fourth year of his reign, which (as his father *Philopator* had done before him) he began a very young boy. The courtesie for which the *Romans* were to thank him, was, that out of *Egypt* they had lately been supplied with corn, in a time of extreme dearth; when the miseries of war had made all their own provinces unable to relieve them. This message could not but be welcome to the *Egyptian*: since it was well known, how *Philip* and *Antiochus*, had combined themselves against him; conspiring to take away his kingdom. And therefore it might in reason be hoped, that he, or his council for him, should offer to supply the *Romans* with corn: since this their *Macedonian* expedition, concerned his estate no less than theirs.

But as the errand was for the most part complementary: so had the ambassadors both leisure and direction from the senate, to look unto the things of *Greece* by the way. Wherefore they agreed, that *M. Æmilius*, the youngest of them, should step aside, and visit *Philip*, to try if he could make him leave the siege of *Abydus*; which else he was like to carry. *Æmilius*, coming to *Philip*, tells him, that his doings are contrary to the league that he had made with the *Romans*. For *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, upon whom he made war, were confederate with *Rome*: and the town of *Abydus*, which he was now besieging, had a kind of dependency upon *Attalus*. Hereto *Philip* answered, that *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* had made war upon him: and that he did only requite them with the like. Do you also (said *Æmilius*) requite these poor *Abydeni* with such terrible war, for any like invasion by them first made upon you? The king was angry to hear himself thus taken short: and therefore he roundly made answer to *Æmilius*: It is your youth, Sir, and your beauty; and (above all) your being a *Roman*, that makes you thus presumptuous. But I would wish ye to remember the league that ye have made with me, and to keep it: if ye do otherwise, I will make ye understand, that the kingdom and name of *Macedon* is in matter of war, no less noble than the *Roman*. So he dismissed

missed the ambassador; and had the town immediately yielded to his discretion. The people had entertained a resolution, to have died every one of them, and set their town on fire; binding themselves hereto by a fearful oath, when *Philip* denied to accept them upon reasonable conditions. But having in desperate fight, once repelling him from the breach, lost the greatest number of their youth: it was thought meet by the governors and ancients of the city, to change this resolution, and take such peace as could be gotten. So they carried out their gold and silver to *Philip*: about which whilst they were busy, the memory of their oath wrought so effectually in the younger sort; that, by exhortation of their priests, they fell to murdering their women, children, and themselves. Hereof the king had so little compassion, that he said, he would grant the *Abydeni* three days leisure to die: and to that end forbad his men to enter the town; or hazard themselves in interrupting the violence of those mad fools.

SECT. IX.

The Romans decree war against Philip, and send one of their consuls into Greece, as it were in defence of the Athenians their confederates. How poor the Athenians were at this time, both in quality and estate.

THIS calamity of the *Abydeni*, was likened by the *Romans* unto that of the *Saguntines*: which indeed it nearly resembled; though *Rome* was not alike interested in the quarrel. But to help themselves with pretence for the war, they had found out another *Saguntum*, even the city of *Athens*: which if the *Macedonian* should win; then rested there no more to do, than that he should presently embark himself for *Italy*, whither he would come, not as *Hannibal* from *Saguntum*, in five months, but in the short space of five days sailing. Thus *P. Sulpicius*, the consul, told the multitude, when he exhorted them to make war upon *Philip*; which at his first propounding they had denied. The example of *Pyrrhus* was by him alledged, to shew, what *Philip*, with the power of a greater kingdom, might dare to undertake: as also the fortunate voyage of *Scipio* into *Afric*; to shew the difference of making war abroad, and admitting it into the bowels of their own country. By such arguments was the commonalty of *Rome* induced to believe, that this war with the *Macedonian* was both just and necessary. So it was decreed: and immediately the same consul hastened away towards *Macedon*, having that province allotted unto him before, and all things in a readiness, by order from the senate; who followed other motives, than the people must be acquainted with. Great thanks were given to the *Athenian* ambassadors, for their constancy (as was said) in not changing their faith at such time as they stood in danger of being besieged. And indeed great thanks were due to them; though not upon the same occasion. For the people of *Rome* had no cause to think it a benefit unto themselves, that any *Greek* town, refusing to sue unto the *Macedonian* for peace, requested their help against him. But the senate intending to take in hand the conquest of the eastern parts, had reason to give thanks unto those that ministered the occasion. Since therefore it was an untrue suggestion, that *Philip* was making ready for *Italy*: and since neither *Attalus*, the *Rhodian*, nor any other state in those quarters, desired the *Romans* to give them protection: these busy-headed *Athen-*

ians, who falling out with the *Arcarnanians*; and consequently with *Philip*, about a matter of *Maygame* (as was shewed before) sent ambassadors into all parts of the world, even to *Ptolemy* of *Egypt*, and to the *Romans*, as well as to *Attalus*, and other their neighbours; must be accepted as cause of the war, and authors of the benefit thence redounding.

Nevertheless, as it loves to fall out where the meaning differs from the pretence: the doings of *P. Sulpicius*, the consul, were such, as might have argued *Athens* to be the least part of his care. He sailed not about *Peloponnesus*, but took the ready way to *Macedon*; and landing about the river of *Apfus*, between *Dyrrachium* and *Apollonia*, there began the war. Soon upon his coming, the *Athenian* ambassadors were with him, and craved his help; whereof they could make no benefit whilst he was so far from them. They bemoaned themselves as men besieged, and entreated him to deliver them. For which cause he sent unto them *C. Claudius*, with twenty gallies, and a competent number of men: but the main of his forces he retained with him, for the prosecution of a greater design. The *Athenians* were not indeed besieged: only some rovers of *Chalcis*, in the isle of *Eubœa*; and some bands of adventurers out of *Corinth*; used to take their ships, and spoil their fields, because they had declared themselves against king *Philip*, that was lord of these two towns. The robberies done by these pirates, and free-booters, were by the more eloquent than warlike *Athenians*, in the declining age of their fortune and virtue, called a siege. From such detriment the arrival of *Claudius*, and shortly after of three *Rhodian* gallies, easily preserved them. As for the *Athenians* themselves; they that had been wont, in ancient times, to undertake the conquests of *Egypt*, *Cyprus*, and *Sicily*; to make war upon the great *Persian* king; and to hold so much of *Greece* in subjection, as made them redoubtable unto all the rest: had now no more than three ships, and those open ones, not much better than long boats. Yet thought they not themselves a whit the worse men; but stood as highly upon the glory and virtue of their ancestors, as if it had been still their own.

SECT. X.

The town of Chalcis, in Eubœa, taken and sack'd by the Romans, and their associates, that lay in garrison at Athens. Philip attempteth to take Athens by surprise: wasteth the country about: and makes a journey into Peloponnesus. Of Nabis, the tyrant of Lacedemon, and his wife. Philip offers to make war against Nabis for the Achæans. He returneth home through Attica, which he spoileth again: and provides against the enemies. Some exploits of the Romans. Divers princes join with them. Great labouring to draw the Etolians into the war.

PHILIP, returning home from *Abydus*, heard news of the *Roman* consul's being about *Apollonia*. But ere he stirred forth to give him entertainment; or perhaps before he had well resolved, whether it were best a while to sit still, and try what might be done for obtaining of peace, or whether to make opposition, and resist these invaders with all his forces: he received advertisement from *Chalcis* of a grievous mishap there befallen him, by procurement of the *Athenians*. For *C. Claudius*, with his *Romans*, finding no such work at *Athens* as they had expected, or as was answerable

to the same that went abroad; purposed to do somewhat that might quicken the war, and make his own employment better. He grew soon weary of sitting as a scare-crow, to save the *Athenians* grounds from spoil; and therefore gladly took in hand a business of more importance. The town of *Chalcis* was negligently guarded by the *Macedonian* soldiers therein, for that there was no enemy at hand; and more negligently by the townsmen, who reposed themselves upon their garrison. Hereof *Claudius* having advertisement, sailed thither by night, for fear of being descried; and arriving there a little before break of day, took it by scalado. He used no mercy, but slew all that came in his way: and wanting men to keep it (unless he should have left the heartless *Athenians* to their own defence) he set it on fire; consuming the king's magazines of corn, and all provisions for war, which were plenteously filled. Neither were he and his associates contented with the great abundance of spoil which they carried aboard their ships; and with enlarging all those, whom *Philip*, as in a place of most security, kept there imprisoned: but, to shew their despight and hatred unto the king, they overthrew, and brake in pieces the statues unto him there erected. This done, they hastened away towards *Athens*: where the news of their exploit were like to be joyfully welcomed. The king lay then at *Demetrias*, about some twenty miles thence: whither when these tidings, or part of them, were brought him, though he saw that it was too late to remedy the matter; yet he made all haste to take revenge. He thought to have taken the *Athenians*, with their trusty friends, busy at work in ransacking the town, and loading themselves with spoil: but they were gone before his coming. Five thousand light-armed foot he had with him, and three hundred horse: whereof leaving at *Chalcis* only a few to bury the dead, he marched thence away speedily towards *Athens*: thinking it not impossible to take his enemies, in the joy of their victory, as full of negligence, as they had taken *Chalcis*. Neither had he much failed of his expectation, if a foot-post, that stood scout for the city upon the borders, had not descried him afar off, and swiftly carried word of his approach to *Athens*. It was mid-night when this post came thither; who found all the town asleep, as fearless of any danger. But the magistrates, hearing his report, caused a trumpet out of their citadel to sound the alarm, and with all speed made ready for defence. Within a few hours *Philip* was there: who seeing the many lights, and other signs of busy preparation usual in such a case, understood that they had news of his coming; and therefore willed his men, to repose themselves till it were day. It is like, that the paucity of his followers did help well to animate the citizens, which beheld them from the walls. Wherefore though *Claudius* were not yet returned (who was to fetch a compass about by sea, and had no cause of haste) yet having in the town some mercenary soldiers, which they kept, of their own, besides the great multitude of citizens; they adventured to issue forth at a gate, whereto they saw *Philip* make approach. The king was glad of this; reckoning all those his own, that were thus hardy. He therefore only willed his men to follow his example; and presently gave charge upon them. In that fight he gave singular proof of his valour: and beating down many of the enemies with his own hands, drove them with great slaughter back in-

to the city. The heat of his courage transported him further, than discretion would have allowed; even to the very gate. But he retired without harm taken; for that they, which were upon the towers over the gate, could not use their casting weapons against him, without endangering their own people, that were thronging before him into the city. There was a temple of *Hercules*, a place of exercise, with a grove, and many goodly monuments besides, near adjoining unto *Athens*: of which he spared none, but suffered the rage of his anger to extend, even unto the sepulchres of the dead. The next day came the *Romans*, and some companies of *Attalus's* men from *Egina*; too late, in regard of what was already past; but in good time, to prevent him of satisfying his anger to the full, which as yet he had not done. So he departed thence to *Corinth*: and hearing that the *Acheans* held a parliament at *Argos*, he came thither to them unexpected.

The *Acheans* were devising upon war, which they intended to make against *Nabis*, the tyrant of *Lacedemon*: who being started up in the room of *Machanidas*, did greater mischief than any that went before him. This tyrant relied wholly upon his mercenaries; and of his subjects had no regard. He was a cruel oppressor; a greedy extortioner upon those that lived under him; and one, that in his natural condition smelt rankly of the hangman. In these qualities, his wife *Apega*, was very fitly matched with him: since his dexterity was no greater in spoiling the men, than hers in fleecing their wives; whom she would never suffer to be at quiet, till they had presented her with all their *jewels* and *apparel*. Her husband was so delighted with her property, that he caused an image to be made lively representing her, and apparelled it with such costly garments as she used to wear. But it was indeed an *engine*, serving to torment men. Hereof he made use, when he meant to try the virtue of his rhetoric. For calling unto him some rich man, of whose money he was desirous, he would bring him into the room where this counterfeit *Apega* stood, and there use all his art of persuasion to get what he desired, as it were by good-will. If he could not so speed, but was answered with excuses, then took he the refractory denier by the hand, and told him, that perhaps his wife *Apega* (who sat by in a chair) could persuade more effectually. So he led him to the image, that rose up, and opened the arms, as it were for embracement. Those arms were full of sharp iron nails, the like whereof were also sticking in the breasts, though hidden with her cloaths: and herewith she griped the poor wretch, to the pleasure of the tyrant, that laughed at his cruel death. Such, and worse (for it were long to tell all here that is spoken of him) was *Nabis* in his government. In his dealings abroad, he combined with the *Etolians*, as *Machanidas* and *Lycurgus* had done before him. By these he grew into acquaintance with the *Romans*; and was comprehended in the league which they made with *Philip*, at the end of their former war. Of *Philopemen's* virtue he stood in fear; and therefore durst not provoke the *Acheans*, as long as they had such an able commander. But when *Cycliades*, a far worse captain, was their pretor; and all, or the greatest part of their mercenaries were discharged; *Philopemen* being also gone into *Crete*, to follow his beloved occupation of war; then did *Nabis* fall upon their territory; and wasting all the fields,

made them distrust their own safety in the towns.

Against this tyrant, the *Acheans* were preparing for war, when *Philip* came among them; and had set down what proportion of soldiers every city of their corporation should furnish out. But *Philip* willed them, not to trouble themselves with the care of this business; forasmuch as he alone would ease them of this war, and take the burden upon himself. With exceeding joy and thanks they accepted of this kind offer. But then he told them, that whilst he made war upon *Lacedemon*, he ought not to leave his own towns unguarded. In which respect, he thought they would be pleased to send a few men to *Corinth*, and some companies into the isle of *Eubœa*, that so he might securely pursue the war against *Nabis*. Immediately they found out his device, which was none other, than to engage their nation in his war against the *Romans*. Wherefore their pretor *Cycliades* made him answer; that their laws forbade them to conclude any other matters in their parliament, than those for which it was assembled. So passing the decree, upon which they had agreed before; for preparing war against *Nabis*, he broke up the assembly, with every man's good-liking; whereas in former times, he had been thought no better than one of the king's parasites.

It grieved the king to have thus failed in his purpose with the *Acheans*. Nevertheless he gathered up among them a few volunteers, and so returned by *Corinth* back into *Attica*. There he met with *Philocles*, one of his captains, that, with two thousand men, had been doing what harm he might unto the country. With this addition of strength, he attempted the castle of *Eleusine*; the haven of *Pyreus*, and even the city of *Athens*. But the *Romans* made such haste after him by sea, thrusting themselves into every of these places, that he could no more than wreak his anger upon those goodly temples, with which the land of *Attica* was at that time singularly beautified. So he destroyed all the works of their notable artificers, wrought in excellent marble, which they had in plenty of their own; or, having long ago been masters of the sea, had brought from other places, where best choice was found. Neither did he only pull all down, but caused his men to break the very stones, that they might be unserviceable to the reparation. His loss at *Chalcis* being thus revenged upon *Athens*, he went home into *Macedon*, and there made provision both against the *Roman* consul that lay about *Apollonia*, and against the *Dardanians*, with other his bad neighbours, which were likely to infect him. Among his other cares, he forgot not the *Etolians*, to whose parliament, shortly to be held at *Naupactus*, he sent an embassy, requesting them to continue in his friendship. Thus was *Philip* occupied.

Sulpicius, the *Roman* consul, encamped upon the river of *Apfus*. Thence he sent forth *Apustius*, his lieutenant, with part of the army, to waste the borders of *Macedon*. *Apustius* took sundry castles and towns, using such extremity of sword and fire at *Antipatria*, the first good town, which he won by force, that none durst afterwards make resistance, unless they knew themselves able to hold out. Returning towards the consul with his spoil, he was charged in rear, upon the passage of a brook, by *Athenagoras*, a *Macedonian* captain: but the *Romans* had the better, and killing many of these enemies, took prisoners many more, to the increase of their booty, with which they arrived in safety at their camp. The success of this expedition, though it were not great, yet served to draw into the *Roman* friendship, those that had formerly no good inclina-

tion to the *Macedonian*. These were *Pleuratus*, the son of *Scerdilaidas* the *Illyrian*; *Aminander*, king of the *Athamanians*; and *Bato*, the son of *Longarus*, a prince of the *Dardanians*. They offered their assistance unto the consul, who thanked them, and said; that he would shortly make use of *Pleuratus* and *Bato*; when he entered into *Macedon*; but that the friendship of *Aminander*, whose country lay between the *Etolians* and *Thessaly*, might be perhaps available with the *Etolians*, to stir them up against *Philip*.

So the present care was wholly set upon the *Etolian* parliament at hand. Thither came ambassadors from the *Macedonians*, *Romans*, and *Athenians*. Of which, the *Macedonian* spake first, and said; that as there was nothing fallen out which should occasion the breach of peace between his master and the *Etolians*; so was it to be hoped that they would not suffer themselves, without good cause, to be carried away after other men's fancies. He prayed them to consider, how the *Romans* heretofore had made shew as if their war in *Greece* tended only to the defence of the *Etolians*; and yet notwithstanding had been angry, that the *Etolians*, by making peace with *Philip*, had no longer need of such their patronage. What might it be that made them so busy in intruding their protection upon those that needed it not? Surely it was even the general hatred which these *Barbarians* bore unto the *Greeks*. For even after the same sort had they lent their help to the *Mamertines*; and afterwards delivered *Syracuse*, when it was oppressed by *Carthaginian* tyrants; but now both *Syracuse* and *Messina* were subject unto the rods and axes of the *Romans*. To the same effect he alledged many examples; adding, that in like sort it would happen to the *Etolians*; who, if they drew such masters into *Greece*, must not look hereafter to hold, as now, free parliaments of their own, wherein to consult about war and peace: the *Romans* would ease them of this care, and send them such a moderator as went every year from *Rome* to *Syracuse*. Wherefore he concluded, that it was best for them, whilst as yet they might, and whilst one of them as yet could help the other, to continue in their league with *Philip*, with whom, if at any time upon light occasion they happened to fall out, they might as lightly be reconciled; and with whom they had three years ago made the peace, which still continued, although the same *Romans* were then against it, who sought to break it now.

It would have troubled the *Romans*, to frame a good answer to these objections. For the *Macedonian* had spoken the very truth, in shewing whereto this their patronage, which they offered with such importunity, did tend. Wherefore the *Athenians* were set on by them to speak next, who had store of eloquence, and matter of recrimination enough, to make *Philip* odious. These affirmed, that it was a great impudence in the *Macedonian* ambassador to call the *Romans* by the name of *Barbarians*, knowing in what barbarous manner his own king had, in few days past, made war upon the gods themselves, by destroying all their temples in *Attica*. Herewithal they made a pitiful rehearsal of their own calamities; and said, that if *Philip* might have his will, *Etolia*, and all the rest of *Greece*, should feel the same that *Attica* had felt; yea, that *Athens* itself, together with *Minerva*, *Jupiter*, *Ceres*, and other of the gods, were like to have felt, if the walls and the *Roman* arms had not defended them.

Then spake the *Romans*, who excusing, as well as they could, their own oppression of all those in whose defence they had heretofore taken arms, went roundly to the point in hand. They said, that they

had of late made war in the *Etolians* behalf, and that the *Etolians* had, without their consent, made peace: whereof since the *Etolians* must excuse themselves, by alledging that the *Romans*, being busied with *Carthage*, wanted leisure to give them aid convenient; so this excuse being now taken away, and the *Romans* wholly bent against their common enemy, it concerned the *Etolians* to take part with them in their war and victory, unless they had rather perish with *Philip*.

It might easily be perceived, that they which were so vehement, in offering their help ere it was desired, were themselves carried into the war by more earnest motives than a simple desire to help those friends, with whom they had no great acquaintance. This may have been the cause why *Dorymachus*, the *Etolian* pretor, shifted them off a-while with a dilatory answer; though he told his countrymen, that, by reserving themselves till the matter were inclined one way or other, they might afterwards take part with those that had the better fortune. His answer was, first, in general terms; that over-much haste was an enemy to good counsel, for which cause they must further deliberate ere they concluded. But coming nearer to the matter in hand, he passed a decree, *That the pretor might at any time call an assembly of the states, and therein conclude upon this business; any law to the contrary notwithstanding*: whereas otherwise it was unlawful to treat of such affairs, except in two of their great parliaments that were held at set times.

SECT. XI.

The meeting of Philip with the Romans, and skirmishing with them on his borders. The Etolians invade his dominions, and are beaten home. Some doings of Attalus and the Roman fleet.

PHILIP was glad to hear, that the *Romans* had sped no better in their solicitation of the *Etolians*. He thought them hereby disappointed, in the very beginning, of one great help; and meant himself to disappoint them of another. His son *Perseus*, a very boy, was sent to keep the streights of *Pelagonia* against the *Dardanians*, having with him some of the king's council, to govern both him and his army. It was judged, as may seem, that the presence of the king's son, how young soever, would both encourage his followers, and terrify the enemies; by making them at least believe, that he was not weakly attended. And this may have been the reason why the same *Perseus*, a few years before this, was in like manner left upon the borders of *Etolia* by his father, whom earnest business called thence another way. No danger of enemies being left on either hand, it was thought that the *Macedonian* fleet under *Heracles* would serve to keep *Attalus*, with the *Rhodians* and *Romans*, from doing harm by sea, when the king's back was turned, who took his journey westward against *Sulpicius* the consul.

The armies met in the country of the *Dassaretii*, a people in the utmost borders of *Macedon*, towards *Illyria*, about the mountains of *Candavia*, that, running along from *Hemus* in the north, until they join in the south with *Pindus*, inclose the western parts of *Macedon*. Two or three days they lay in sight the one of the other, without making offer of battel. The consul was the first that issued forth of his camp into the open field. But *Philip* was not confident in the strength which he had then about him, and therefore thought it better to send forth some of his light-armed mercenaries, and some part of his horse, to entertain them with skirmish.

These were easily vanquished by the *Romans*, and driven back into their camp. Now although it was so that the king was unwilling to hazard all at first upon a cast, and therefore sent for *Perseus*, with his companies, to increase his own forces; yet being no less unwilling to lose too much in reputation, he made shew a day after as if he would have fought. He had found the advantage of a place fit for ambush, wherein he bestowed as many as he thought meet of his targetteers, and so gave charge to *Athenagoras*, one of his captains, to provoke out the *Romans* to fight; instructing both him and the targetteers how to behave themselves respectively, as opportunity should fall out. The *Romans* had no mistrust of any ambush, having fought upon the same ground a day before; wherefore perhaps they might have sustained some notable detriment, if the king's directions had been well followed. For when *Athenagoras* began to fall back, they charged him so hotly, that they drove him to an hasty flight, and pursued him as hard as they were able. But the captains of the targetteers, not staying to let them run into the danger, discovered themselves before it was time; and thereby made frustrate the work to which they were appointed. The consul hereby gathered, that the king had some desire to try the fortune of a battel, which he therefore presented the second time, leading forth his army, and setting it in order, with elephants in the front; a kind of help which the *Romans* had never used before, but had taken these of late from the *Carthaginians*. Such are the alterations wrought by time. It was scarce above eighty years ere this, that *Pyrrhus* carried elephants out of *Greece* into *Italy*, to affright the *Romans*, who had never seen any of those beasts before. But now the same *Romans* (whilst possibly some were yet alive which had known that expedition of *Pyrrhus*) come into *Macedon*, bringing elephants with them; whereof the *Macedonians* and *Greeks* have none. *Philip* had patience to let the consul brave him at his trenches, wherein he did wisely; for the *Roman* had greater need to fight than he. *Sulpicius* was unwilling to lose time; neither could he without great danger, lying so near the enemy, that was strong in horse, send his men to fetch in corn out of the fields. Wherefore he removed eight miles off, presuming that *Philip* would not adventure to meet him on even ground, and so the more boldly he suffered his foragers to over-run the country. The king was nothing sorry of this; but permitted the *Romans* to take their good pleasure, even till their presumption, and his own supposed fear, should make them careless. When this was come to pass, he took all his horse and light-armed foot, with which he occupied a place in the mid-way, between the foragers and their camp. There he stayed in covert with part of his forces, to keep the passages that none should escape. The rest he sent abroad the country, to fall upon the stragglers, willing them to put all to the sword, and let none run home with news to the camp. The slaughter was great, and those which escaped the hands of them that were sent abroad to scour the fields, lighted all, or most of them, upon the king and his companies in their flight; so as they were cut off by the way. Long it was ere the camp had news of this. But in the end there escaped some: who, though they could not make any perfect relation how the matter went; yet by telling what had happened to themselves, raised a great tumult. *Sulpicius* hereupon sends forth all his horse, and bids them help their fellows where they saw it needful: he himself with the legions followed. The companies of horse divided themselves, accordingly

cordingly as they met with advertisements upon the way, into many parts: not knowing where was most of the danger. Such of them as lighted upon *Philip's* troops, that were canvassing the field, took their task where they found it. But the main bulk of them fell upon the king himself. They had the disadvantage: as coming fewer, and unprepared, to one that was ready for them. So they were beaten away: as their fellows also might have been, if the king had well bethought himself, and given over in time. But while, not contented with such an harvest, he was too greedy about a poor gleaning, the *Roman* legions appeared in sight; which emboldened their horse to make a recharge. Then the danger apparent enforced the *Macedonians* to look to their own safety. They ran which way they could: and (as men that lie in wait for others, are seldom heedful of that which may befall themselves) to escape the enemy, they declined the fairest way; so as they were plunged in marshes and bogs, wherein many of them were lost. The king's horse was slain under him: and there had he been cast away, if a loving subject of his had not alighted, mounted him upon his own horse, and delivered him out of peril, at the expence of his own life, that running on foot was overtaken and killed.

In the common opinion *Philip* was charged with improvident rashness, and the consul with as much dulness, for this day's service. A little longer stay would have delivered the king from these enemies without any blow: since, when all the fields about them were wasted, they must needs have retired back to the sea. On the other side it was not thought unlikely, That if the *Romans* following the king, had set upon his camp, at such time as he fled thither half amazed with fear of being either slain or taken; they might have won it. But that noble historian *Livy* (as is commonly his manner) hath judiciously observed, That neither the one, nor the other, were much to blame in this day's work. For the main body of the king's army lay safe in his camp; and could not be so astonished with the loss of two or three hundred horse, that it should therefore have abandoned the defence of the trenches. And as for the king himself; he was advertised, that *Pleuratus* the *Illyrian*, and the *Dardanians*, were fallen upon his country; when they found the passage therein open, after *Perseus* was called away from custody of the streights. This was it which made him adventure to do somewhat betimes; that he might set the *Romans* going the sooner, and afterwards look unto his troublesome neighbours. In consideration of this, *Philip* was desirous to clear himself of the *Romans*, as soon as he might. And to that purpose he sent unto the consul; requesting a day of truce for burial of the dead. But, instead of so doing, he marched away by night; and left fires in his camp to beguile the enemy, as if he had not stirred out of the place. *Sulpicius*, when he heard of the king's departure, was not slow to follow him. He overtook the *Macedonians* in a place of strength, which they had fenced (for it was a woody ground) by cutting down trees, and laying them athwart the way where it was most open. In making of such places good, the *Macedonian Phalanx* was of little use; being a square battel of pikes, not fit for every ground. The archers of *Grete* were judged, and were indeed, more serviceable in that case. But they were few; and their arrows were of small force against the *Roman*

shields. The *Macedonians* therefore helped them; by flinging of stones. But to no purpose. For the *Romans* got within them; and forced them to quit the place. This victory (such as it was) laid open unto the consul some poor towns thereabout; which partly were taken by strong hand; partly yielded for fear. But the spoil of these, and of the fields adjoining, was not sufficient to maintain his army; and therefore he returned back to *Apollonia*.

The *Dardanians*, hearing that *Philip* was come back, withdrew themselves apace out of the country. The king sent *Athenagoras* to wait upon them home; whilst he himself went against the *Etolians*. For *Damocritus* the pretor of the *Etolians*, who had reserved himself and his nation unto the event of things, hearing report, that *Philip* was beaten once again; as also that *Pleuratus* and the *Dardanians* were fallen upon *Macedon*; grew no less busy on the sudden, than before he had been wise. He persuaded his nation to take their time: and so, not staying to proclaim war, joined his forces with *Aminander* the *Atthamanian*; and made invasion upon *Theffaly*. They took and cruelly sacked a few towns: whereby they grew confident; as if, without any danger, they might do what they listed. But *Philip* came upon them ere they looked for him: and, killing them as they lay dispersed, was like to have taken their camp; if *Alexander*, more wary than the *Etolians*, had not helped at need, and made the retreat through his own mountainous country.

About the same time, the *Roman* fleet, assisted by *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, had taken some small islands in the *Egean* sea. They took likewise the town of *Oreum* in the isle of *Eubœa*; and some other places thereabout. The towns were given to *Attalus*, after the same compact that had formerly been made with the *Etolians*: the goods therein found were given to the *Romans*; and the people for slaves. Other attempts on that side were hindered: either by foul weather at sea; or by want of daring, and of means.

S E C T. XII.

Villius the Roman consul wastes a year to no effect. War of the Gauls in Italy. An embassy of the Romans to Carthage, Masanissa, and Vermina. The Macedonian prepares for defence of his kingdom: and T. Quintius Flaminius is sent against him.

THUS the time ran away: and *P. Villius*, a new consul, took charge of the war in *Macedon*. He was troubled with a mutiny of his oldest soldiers: whereof two thousand, having served long in *Sicily* and *Afric*, thought themselves much wronged, in that they could not be suffered to look unto their own estates at home. They were (belike) of the legions that had served at *Cannœ*: as may seem by their complaint, of having been long absent from *Italy*; whither soon they would have returned, when by their colonels they were shipped for *Macedon*. How *Villius* dealt with them, it is uncertain. For the history of his year is lost: whereof the miss is not great; since he did nothing memorable. *Valerius Antias*, as we find in *Livy*, hath adorned this *Villius* with a great exploit against *Philip*. Yet since *Livy* himself, an historian to whom few of the best are matchable, could find no such thing recorded in any good author; we may reasonably believe, that *Villius's* year was idle.

In the beginning of this *Macedonian* war, the *Romans* found more trouble than could have been expected with the *Gauls*. Their colony of *Placentia*, a goodly and strong town, which neither *Hannibal*, nor after him *Asdrubal*, had been able to force, was taken by these *Barbarians*, and burnt in a manner to the ground. In like sort *Cremona* was attempted, but saved her self, taking warning by her neighbours's calamity. *Amilcar*, a *Carthaginian*, that had stayed behind *Asdrubal*, or *Mago*, in those parts, was now become captain of the *Gauls*, in these their enterprizes. This when the *Romans* heard, they sent ambassadors to the *Carthaginians*, giving them to understand, that, if they were not weary of the peace, it behoved them to call home and deliver up this their citizen *Amilcar*, who made war in *Italy*. Hereunto it was added (perhaps lest the message might seem otherwise to have favoured a little of some fear) that of the fugitive slaves belonging unto the *Romans*, there were some reported to walk up and down in *Carthage*; which if it were so, then ought they to be restored back to their masters, as was conditioned in the late peace. The ambassadors that were sent on this errand, had further charge to treat with *Masanissa*, as also with *Vermina* the son of *Syphax*. Unto *Masanissa*, besides matter of compliment, they were to signify what pleasure he might do them, by lending them some of his *Numidian* horse to serve in their war against the *Macedonian*. *Vermina* had intreated the senate to vouchsafe unto him the name of king, and promised thereafter to deserve it, by his readiness in doing them all good offices. But they were somewhat scrupulous in the matter, and said, that having been, and being still (as they took it) their enemy, he ought first of all to desire peace; for that the name of king, was an honour which they used not to confer upon any, save only upon such as had royally deserved it at their hands. The authority to make peace with him, was wholly committed unto these ambassadors upon such terms as they should think fit, without further relation to the senate and people: for they were then busied with greater cares. The *Carthaginians* made a gentle answer, that they wholly disclaimed *Amilcar*, banishing him, and confiscating his goods. As for the fugitives, they had restored as many as they could find; and would, in that point, as far as was requisite, give satisfaction to the senate. Herewithal they sent a great proportion of corn to *Rome*, and the like unto the army that was in *Macedon*. King *Masanissa* would have lent unto the *Romans* two thousand of his *Numidian* horse; but they were contented with half the number, and would accept no more. *Vermina* met with the ambassadors, to give them entertainment, on the borders of his kingdom; and, without any disputation, agreed with them upon terms of peace.

Thus were the *Romans* busied in taking order for their *Macedonian* war, that they might pursue it strongly, and without interruption. As for *Amilcar* and his *Gauls*, they laid siege unto *Cremona*, where *L. Furius*, a *Roman* pretor, came upon them, fought a battel with them, and overcame them. *Amilcar* the *Carthaginian* died in this battel, and the fruit of the victory was such, as both made amends for losses pass'd, and left the work easy to those that afterwards should have the managing of war among those *Gauls*. So was there good leisure to think upon the business of *Macedon*, where *Philip* was carefully providing to give contentment unto his subjects, by punishing a bad counsellor whom they hated; as also to assure unto himself the *Ache-*

ans, by rendering unto them some towns that he held of theirs; and finally, to strengthen his kingdom, not only by exercising and training his people, but by fortifying the passages that led thereinto out of *Epirus*. This was in doing, when *Villius*, having unprofitably laboured to find way into *Macedon*, taking a journey (as *Sulpicius* had done before him) wherein he could not be supplied with victuals, determined at length to try a new course. But then came advertisement, that *T. Quintius Flaminius* was chosen consul, and had *Macedon* allotted him for his province, whose coming was expected; and he very shortly arrived at the army.

S E C T. XIII.

The Romans began to make war by negotiation. T. Quintius wins a passage against Philip. The safety wasted by Philip, the Romans, and Etolians. The Acheans forsaking the Macedonian, take part with the Romans. A treaty of peace that was vain. Philip delivers Argos to Nabis the tyrant, who presently enters into league with the Romans.

THE *Romans* had not been wont in former times to make war after such a trifling manner. It was their use to give battel to the enemy as soon as they met with him. If he refused it, they besieged his towns, and so forced him to try the fortune of a day, with his disadvantage in reputation, when he had long forborn it (as it would be interpreted) upon knowledge of his own weakness. But in this their war with *Philip*, they began to learn of the subtle *Greeks* the art of negotiation; wherein hitherto they were not grown so fine, as within a little while they proved. Their treasury was poor, and stood indebted, a many years after this, unto private men, for part of those monies that had been borrowed in the second *Punic* war. This had made the commonalty averse from the *Macedonian* war, and had thereby driven the senators, greedy of the enterprise, to make use of their cunning. Yet being weary of the slow pace wherewith their business went forward, they determined to increase their army, that they might have the less need to rely upon their confederates. So they levied eight thousand foot and eight hundred horse (the greater part of them of the *Latins*) which they sent with *T. Quintius Flaminius*, the new consul, into *Macedon*. Their navy, and other means, could well have served for the setting forth and transportation of a greater army; but by straining themselves to the most of their abilities, they should (besides other difficulties incident unto the sustenance of those that are too many, and too far from home) have bred some jealousy in their friends of *Greece*, and thereby have lost some friends, yea, perhaps, have increased the number of their enemies more than of their own soldiers. This present augmentation of the forces was very requisite, for that *Attalus*, about the same time, excused himself unto them by his ambassadors; requesting that either they would undertake the defence of his kingdom against *Antiochus*, who invaded it; or else that they would not take it uncourtously, that he quitted the war with *Philip*, and returned home, to look unto that which more concerned him. Their answer was remarkable: they said, that it was not their manner to use the aid of their friends longer than their friends had good opportunity, and could also be well contented to afford it; that they could not honestly take part with *Attalus*, though he were their good friend, against *Antiochus*, whom

they held in the like account; but that they would deal with *Antiochus* by ambassadors, and (as common friends unto both of the kings) do their best to perswade an attonement between them. In such loving fashion did they now carry themselves towards their good friend the king *Antiochus*, who reciprocally, at their intreaty, withdrew his army from the kingdom of *Attalus*. But how little they regarded these terms of friendship, after that once they had made an end with *Philip*, it will very soon appear.

T. Quintius hastening away from *Rome*, came sometimes into his province, with the supply decreed unto him, which consisted for the most part of old soldiers, that had served in *Spain* and *Afric*. He found *Villius* the old consul (whom at his coming he presently discharged) and king *Philip* of *Macedon*, encamped one against the other in the streights of *Epirus*, by the river of *Apfus* or *Aous*. It was manifest, that either the *Romans* must fetch a compass about, and seek their way into *Macedon* through the poor country of the *Dasseretians*, or else win by force that passage which the king defended. In taking the former way, they had already two years together mispent their time, and been forced to return back without profit, for want of victuals; whereof they could neither carry with them store sufficient, nor find it on the way. But if they could once get over these mountains, which divided the south of *Epirus* from *Thessaly*, then should they enter into a plentiful country; and which, by long dependance upon the *Macedonian*, was become (in a manner) part of his kingdom, whereof it made the south border. Nevertheless the desire of winning this passage, was greater than the likelihood; for the river of *Apfus* running through that valley which alone was open between the mountains, made it all a deep marsh, and unpassable bog; a very narrow way excepted, and a path cut out of the main rock by man's hand. Wherefore *Quintius* assayed to climb in the mountains; but finding himself disappointed of this hope, through the diligence of his enemy, who neglected not the guard of them that was very easy, he was compelled to sit still, without doing any thing for the space of forty days.

This long time of rest gave hope unto *Philip*, that the war might be ended by composition, upon some reasonable terms. He therefore so dealt with some of the *Epirots* (among whom he had many friends) that he and the consul had a meeting together: but nothing was effected. The consul would have him to set all the towns of *Greece* at liberty; and to make amends for the injuries which he had done to many people in his late wars. *Philip* was contented to give liberty to those whom he had subdued of late; but unto such as had been long subject unto him and his ancestors, he thought it against all reason, that he should relinquish his claim and dominion over them. He also said, that as far forth as it should appear that he had done wrong unto any town or people whatsoever, he could well be pleased to make such amends, as might seem convenient, in the judgment of some free state, that had not been interested in those quarrels. But herewithal *Quintius* was not satisfied. There needed (he said) no judgment or compromise; forasmuch as it was apparent, that *Philip* had always been the invader, and had not made war, as one provoked, in his own defence. After this altercation, when they should come to particulars, and when the consul was required to name those towns that he would have to be set at liberty, the first that he named were the *Thessalians*. These had been subjects (though conditional) unto

the *Macedonian* kings ever since the days of *Alexander* the great, and of *Philip* his father. Wherefore as soon as *Flaminius* had named the *Thessalians*, the king, in a rage, demanded what sharper condition he would have laid upon him, had he been but vanquished. And herewithal abruptly he flung away, refusing to hear any more of such discourse.

After this, the consul strove in vain for two or three days together, to have prevailed against the difficulties of that passage which *Philip* kept. When he had well wearied himself, and could not resolve what course to take, there came to him an herdsman, sent from *Charopus*, a prince of the *Epirots*, that favoured the *Romans*, who, having long kept beasts in those mountains, was thoroughly acquainted with all by-paths; and therefore undertook to guide the *Romans*, without any danger, to a place where they should have advantage of the enemy. This guide, for fear of treacherous dealing, was fast bound; and, being promised a great reward in case he made good his word, had such companies as was thought fit appointed to follow his directions. They travelled by night (it being then about the full of the moon) and rested in the day-time, for fear of being discovered. When they had recovered the hill-tops, and were above the *Macedonians* (though undiscovered by them, because at their backs) they raised a great smoke, whereby they gave notice of their success unto the consul. Some skirmishes, whilst these were on their journey, *T. Quintius* had held with the *Macedonian*, thereby to avert him from the thought of that which was intended. But when on the third morning he saw the smoke arise more and more plainly, and thereby knew that his men had attained unto the place whither they were sent: he pressed as near as he could unto the enemy's camp, and assailed them in their strength. He prevailed as little as in former times, until the shoutings of those that ran down the hill, and charged *Philip* on the back, astonished so the *Macedonians*, that they betook themselves to flight. The king, upon the first apprehension of the danger, made all speed away to save himself. Yet anon, considering that the difficulty of the passage must needs hinder the *Romans* from pursuing him, he made a stand at the end of five miles, and gathered there together his broken troops, of whom he saw wanting no more than two thousand men. The greatest loss was of his camp and provisions, if not rather perhaps of his reputation; for that now the *Macedonians* began to stand in fear, lest being driven from a place of such advantage, they should hardly make good their party against the enemy upon equal ground: neither was *Philip* himself much better perswaded. Wherefore he caused the *Thessalians*, as many of them as in his hasty retreat he could visit, to forsake their towns and country, carrying away with them as much as they were able, and spoiling all the rest. But all of them could not be perswaded thus to abandon (for the pleasure of their king) their antient habitations, and all the substance which they had gotten. Some there were that forcibly resisted him; which they might the better do, for that he could not stay to use any great compulsion. He also himself took it very grievously, that he was driven to make such waste of a most pleasant and fruitful country, which had ever been well affected unto him; so that a little hinderance did serve to make him break off his purpose, and withdraw himself home into his kingdom of *Macedon*.

The *Etolians* and *Athamanians*, when this fell out, were even in a readiness to invade *Thessaly*, whereinto the ways lay more open, out of their several countries. When therefore they heard for certain,

certain, that *Philip* was beaten by the *Romans*, they foreflowed not the occasion, but made all speed, each of them to lay hold upon what they might. *T. Quintius* followed them within a little while: but they had gotten so much before his coming, that he, in gleaning after their harvest, could not find enough to maintain his army. Thus were the poor *Theffalians*, of whose liberty the *Romans* a few days since had made shew to be very desirous, wasted by the same *Romans* and their confederates; not knowing which way to turn themselves, or whom to avoid. *T. Quintius* won *Phaleria* by assault; *Metropolis* and *Piera* yielded unto him. *Rhage* he besieged, and having made a fair breach, yet was unable to force it; so stoutly it was defended both by the inhabitants, and by a *Macedonian* garrison therein. *Philip* also, at the same time, having somewhat recollected his spirits, hovered about *Tempe* with his army, thrusting men into all places that were like to be distressed. So the consul, having well near spent his victuals, and seeing no hope to prevail at *Rhage*, brake up his siege, and departed out of *Theffaly*. He had appointed his ships of burden to meet him at *Anticyra*, an haven town of *Phocis*, on the gulf of *Corinth*; which country being friend to the *Macedonian*, he presently invaded; not so much for hatred unto the people, as because it lay conveniently seated between *Theffaly* and other regions, wherein he had business, or was shortly like to have. Many towns in *Phocis* he won by assault; many were yielded up unto him for fear; and within short space he had (in effect) mastered it all.

In the mean time *L. Quintius* the consul's brother, being then admiral for the *Romans* in this war, joined with king *Attalus* and the *Rhodian* fleet. They won two cities in *Eubœa*, and afterwards laid siege unto *Cenchree*, an haven and arsenal of the *Corinthians* on their eastern sea. This enterprise did somewhat help forward the *Acheans* in their desire to leave the part of *Philip*: since it might come to pass, that *Corinth* it self, ere long time were spent, and that *Cenchree*, with other places appertaining to *Corinth*, now very shortly, should be rendered unto their nation, by favour of the *Romans*.

But there were other motives inducing the *Acheans* to prefer the friendship of the *Romans*, before the patronage of *Philip*, whereto they had been long accustomed. For this king had so many ways offended them in time of peace, that they thought it the best course to rid their hands of him; whilst being entangled in a dangerous war, he wanted means to hinder the execution of such counsel, as they should hold the safest. His tyrannous practices to make himself their absolute lord; his poisoning of *Aratus* their old governor; his false dealing with the *Messenians*, *Epirots*, and other people their confederates, and his own dependants; together with many particular outrages by him committed, had caused them long since to hold him as a necessary evil, even whilst they were unable to be without his assistance. But since, by the virtue of *Philopamen*, they were grown somewhat confident in their own strength, so as without the *Macedonians* help, they could as well subsist, as having him to friend: then did they only think how evil he was; and thereupon rejoice the more, in that he was become no longer necessary. It angered him to perceive how they stood affected; and therefore he sent murderers to take away the life of *Philopamen*. But failing

in this enterprise, and being detected; he did there by only set fire to the wood, which was thoroughly dry before, and prepared to burn. *Philopamen* wrought so with the *Acheans*, that no discourse was more familiar with them, than what great cause they had to withdraw themselves from the *Macedonians*. *Cycliadas*, a principal man among them, and lately their pretor, was expelled by them, for shewing himself passionate in the cause of *Philip*, and *Aristenus* chosen pretor, who laboured to join them in Society with the *Romans*.

These News were very welcome to *T. Quintius*. Ambassadors were sent from the *Romans* and their confederates, king *Attalus*, the *Rhodians*, and *Athenians*, to treat with the *Acheans*; making promise, that they should have *Corinth* restored unto them, if they would forsake the *Macedonian*. A parliament of the *Acheans* was held at *Sicyon*, to deliberate and resolve in this weighty case. Therein the *Romans* and their adherents desired the *Acheans* to join with them in making war upon *Philip*. Contrariwise, the ambassadors of *Philip*, whom he had also sent for this business, admonishing the *Athenians* of their alliance with the king, and of their faith due unto him; requested them, that they would be contented to remain as neutrals. This moderate request of *Philip's* ambassador, did no way advance his master's cause: rather it gave the *Acheans* to understand, That he, who could be satisfied with so little at their hands, knew himself unable to gratify them in any reciprocal demand. Yet were there many in that great council, who remembering the benefits of *Philip* and *Antigonus*, laboured earnestly for the preservation of the ancient league. But in fine, the sense of late injuries, and expectation of like or worse from him in the future, prevailed against the memory of those old good turns, which he (and *Antigonus* before him) had partly sold unto them, and partly had used as baits, whereby to allure them into absolute subjection. Neither was it perhaps of the least importance, that the *Romans* were strong, and likely to prevail in the end. So after much alteration the decree passed, That they should thenceforward renounce the *Macedonian*, and take part with his enemies in this war. With *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* they forthwith entred into society: with the *Romans* (because no league would be of force, until the senate and people had approved it) they forbore to decree any society at the present, until the return of those ambassadors from *Rome*, which they determined to send thither of purpose. The *Megalopolitans*, *Dimeans*, and *Argives*, having done their best for the *Macedonian*, as by many respects they were bound; rose up out of the council, and departed before the passing the decree, which they could not resist, nor yet with honesty thereto give assent. For this their good will, and greater, which they shortly manifested, the *Argives* had so little thanks, that all the rest of the *Acheans* may be the better excused, for escaping how they might, out of the hands of so fell a prince.

Soon after this, upon a solemn day at *Argos*, the affection of the citizens discovered it self so plainly, in the behalf of *Philip*, that they, which were his partisans within the town, made no doubt of putting the city into his hands, if they might have any small assistance. *Philocles*, a lieutenant of the king's, lay then in *Corinth*; which he had manfully defended against the *Romans* and *Attalus*: him the conspirators drew to *Argos*; whither

coming on a sudden, and finding the multitude ready to join with him, he easily compelled the *Achean* garrison to quit the place.

This getting of *Argos*, together with the good defence of *Corinth* and some other towns, as it helped *Philip* a little in his reputation, so they gave him hope to obtain some good end by treaty, whilst as yet with his honour he might seek it; and when (the winter being now come on) a new consul would shortly be chosen, who should take the work out of *Titus*'s hands, if it were not concluded the sooner. *Titus* had the like respect unto himself; and therefore thought it best, since more could not be done, to predispose things unto a conclusion, for his own reputation. The meeting was appointed to be held on the sea-shore, in the bay then called the *Malian*, or *Lamian Bay*, now (as is supposed) the gulf of *Ziton*, in the *Egean* sea, or *Archipelago*. Thither came *Titus*, with *Aminander* the *Athamanian*, an ambassador of *Attalus*; the admiral of *Rhodes*; and some agents for the *Etolians* and *Acheans*. *Philip* had with him some few of his own captains, and *Cycliadas*, lately banished for his sake out of *Achaia*. He refused to come on shore, though fearing (as he said) none but the immortal Gods; yet misdoubting some treachery in the *Etolians*. The demands of *Titus* in behalf of the *Romans* were, That he should set all cities of *Greece* at liberty; deliver up to the *Romans* and their confederates, all prisoners, which he had of theirs, and renagado's; likewise whatsoever he held of theirs in *Illyria*; and whatsoever about *Greece* or *Asia* he had gotten from *Ptolemy* then king of *Egypt*, after his father's death. *Attalus* demanded restitution to be made entire, of ships, towns, and temples, by him taken and spoiled, in the late war between them. The *Rhodians* would have again the country of *Peræa*, lying over-against their island; as also that he should withdraw his garrisons out of divers towns about the *Hellespont*, and other havens of their friends. The *Acheans* desired restitution of *Argos* and *Corinth*; about the one of which they might not unjustly quarrel with him; the other had been long his own by their consent. The *Etolians* took upon them angrily, as patrons of *Greece*; willing him to depart out of it, even out of the whole country, leaving it free; and withal to deliver up unto them whatsoever he held that had at any time been theirs. Neither were they herewithal content, but insolently declaimed against him, for that which he had lately done in *Thessaly*, corrupting (as they said) the rewards of the victors, by destroying, when he was vanquished, those towns, which else they might have gotten. To answer these malapert *Etolians*, *Philip* commanded his galley to row near the shore. But they began to ply him afresh, telling him, That he must obey his betters, unless he were able to defend himself by force of arms. He answered them (as he was much given to gybing) with sundry scoffs, and especially with one, which made the *Roman* consul understand what manner of companions these *Etolians* were. For he said, That he had often dealt with them, as likewise the best of the *Greeks*; desiring them to abrogate a wicked law, which permitted them to take spoil from spoil; yet could he get no better an answer, than *that they would sooner take Etolia out of Etolia*. *Titus* wondered what might be the meaning of this strange law. So the king told him, That they held it a laudable custom, as of-

ten as war happened between their friends; to hold up the quarrel, by sending volunteers to serve on both sides, that should spoil both the one and the other. As for the liberty of *Greece*, he said it was strange that the *Etolians* should be so careful thereof, since divers tribes of their own, which he there named, were indeed no *Grecians*; wherefore he would fain know, whether the *Romans* would give him leave to make slaves of those *Etolians*, which were no *Greeks*. *Titus* hereat smiled; and was no whit offended to hear the *Etolians* well rattled up; touching whom, he began to understand, how odious they were in all the country. As for that general demand of setting all *Greece* at liberty, *Philip* acknowledged, that it might well beseem the greatness of the *Romans*; though he would also consider what might beseem his own dignity. But that the *Etolians*, *Rhodians*, and other petty estates, should thus presume under countenance of the *Romans*, to take upon them, as if by their great might, he should be hereunto compelled; it was, he said, a strange and ridiculous insolence. The *Acheans* he charged with much ingratitude, reciting against them some decrees of their own; wherein they had laden both *Antigonus* and him, with more than human honours. Nevertheless he said, that he would render *Argos* unto them: but as touching *Corinth*, that he would further deliberate with *Titus* himself. Thus he addressed himself wholly to the *Roman* general; unto whom, if he could give satisfaction, he cared little for all the rest. With *Attalus* and the *Rhodians*, his late war (he said) was only defensive, they having been the offerers; or if he gave them any occasion, it was only in helping *Prusias*, his son-in-law; neither did he see why they should rather seek amends at his hands, than he at theirs. For where-as they complained, That spoiling a temple of *Venus*, he had cut down the grove and pleasant walks thereabouts: what could he do more than send gardeners thither with young plants, if one king of another would stand to ask such recompence. Thus he jested the matter out; but offered, nevertheless, in honour of the *Romans*, to give back the region of *Peræa* to the *Rhodians*; as likewise to *Attalus* the ships and prisoners of his, whereof he had then possession. Thus ended that day's conference, because it was late; *Philip* requiring a night's leisure to think upon the articles, which were many; and he ill provided of counsel wherewith to advise about them. For your being so ill provided of counsel, said *Titus*, you may even thank your self; as having murdered all your friends, that were wont to advise you faithfully. The next day *Philip* came not, until it was late at night, excusing his long stay by the weightiness of the things propounded, whereon he could not suddenly tell how to resolve. But it was believed, that he thereby sought to abridge the *Etolians* of leisure to rail at him. And this was the more likely, for that he desired conference in private with the *Roman* general. The sum of his discourse, as *Titus* afterwards related it, was, That he would give to the *Acheans* both *Argos* and *Corinth*; as also that he would render unto *Attalus* and the *Rhodians* what he had promised the day before; likewise to the *Etolians*, that he would grant some part of their demands; and to the *Romans* whatsoever they did challenge. This when *Titus*'s associates heard, they exclaimed against it, saying, That if the king were suffered to retain any thing in *Greece*, he would shortly get possession of all

which he now rendred up. The noise that they made came to *Philip's* ear; who thereupon desired a third day of meeting, and protested, that if he could not perswade them, he would suffer himself to be perswaded by them. So the third day they met early in the morning; at what time the king entreated them all, that they would with sincere affection hearken unto good offers of peace, and immediately conclude it, if they could like well of those conditions, which he had already tendered; or otherwise that they would make truce with him for the present, and let him send ambassadors to *Rome*, where he would refer himself to the courtesy of the senate.

This was even as *Quintius* would have it, who stood in doubt, lest a new consul might happen to defraud him of the honour, which he expected by ending of the war. So he easily prevailed with the rest to assent thereunto; forasmuch as it was winter, a time unfit for service in the war; and since, without authority of the senate, he should be unable to proceed resolutely either in war or peace. Further, he willed them to send their several ambassadors to *Rome*, which intimating unto the senate what each of them required, should easily hinder *Philip* from obtaining any thing to their prejudice. Among the rest, he perswaded king *Aminander* to make a journey to *Rome*, in person, knowing well, that the name of a king, together with the confluence of so many ambassadors, would serve to make his own actions more glorious in the city. All this tended to procure, that his own command of the army in *Greece*, might be prorogued. And to the same end had he dealt with some of the tribunes of the people at *Rome*, who had already (though as yet he knew not so much) obtained it from him, partly by their authority, partly by good reasons which they alledged unto the senate.

The ambassadors of the *Greeks*, when they had audience at *Rome*, spake bitterly against the king, with good liking of the senate, which was more desirous of victory than satisfaction. They magnified the honourable purpose of the *Romans*, in undertaking to set *Greece* at liberty. But this (they said) could never be effected, unless especial care were taken, that the king should be dispossessed of *Corinth*, *Chalcis*, and *Demetrias*. In this point they were so vehement, producing a map of the country, and making demonstration how those places held all the rest in servility, that the senate agreed to have it even so as they had desired. When therefore the ambassadors of *Philip* were brought in, and began to have made a long oration, they were briefly cut off in the midst of their preface, with this one demand; *Whether their master would yield up Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias?* Hereto they made answer, That concerning those places, the king had given them no direction or commission what to say or do. This was enough. The senate would no longer hearken to *Philip's* desire of peace, wherein they said he did no better than trifle. Yet might his ambassadors have truly said, That neither the *Italians*, *Acheans*, nor any of their fellows, had in the late treaty required by name, that *Chalcis* and *Demetrias* should be yielded up. For which of them indeed could make any claim to either of these towns? As for *Corinth*, whereto the *Acheans* had some right, (though their right were no better, than that having stolen it from one *Macedonian* king in a night, they had, after mature deliberation, made it away by bargain unto another) *Philip* had already condescended to give it back unto them. And this

perhaps would have been alledged, even against the *Greeks*, in excuse of the king, by some of *T. Quintius's* friends, that so he might have had the honour to conclude the war, if a successor had been decreed unto him. But since he was appointed to continue general, neither his friends at *Rome*, nor he himself, after the return of the ambassadors into *Greece*, cared to give ear to any talk of peace.

Philip, seeing that the *Acheans* had forsaken him, and joined with their common enemies, thought even to deal with them in the like manner, by reconciling himself unto *Nabis*, whom they hated most. There were not many years pass'd, since the *Lacedemonians* under *Cleomenes*, with little other help than their own strength, had been almost strong enough both for the *Macedonians* and *Acheans* together: but now the condition of things was altered. *Nabis's* force consisted in a manner wholly in his mercenaries, for he was a tyrant, though styling himself king. Yet he sorely vexed the *Acheans*, and therefore seemed unto *Philip* one likely to stand him in great stead, if he could be won. To this purpose, it was thought meet that the town of *Argos*, which could not otherwise be easily defended, should be consigned over into his hands; in hope, that such a benefit would serve to tie him fast unto the *Macedonian*. *Philocles*, the king's lieutenant, who was appointed to deal with *Nabis*, added further, that it was his master's purpose to make a straight alliance with the *Lacedemonian*, by giving some daughters of his own in marriage unto *Nabis's* sons. This could not but be well taken. Yet *Nabis* made some scruple in accepting the town of *Argos*, unless by decree of the citizens themselves he might be called into it. Hereabout *Philocles* dealt with the *Argives*; but found them so averse, that, in open assembly of the people, they detested the very name of the tyrant, with many railing words. *Nabis*, hearing of this, thought he had thereby a good occasion to rob and fleece them. So he willed *Philocles*, without more ado, to make over the town, which he was ready to receive. *Philocles* accordingly did let him, with his army, into it by night, and gave him possession of the strongest places therein. Thus dealt *Philip* with the *Argives*; who, for very love, had forsaken the *Acheans*, to take his part. Early in the morning, the tyrant made himself master of all the gates. A few of the principal men understanding how things went, fled out of the city at the first tumult: wherefore they were all banished, and their goods confiscated. The rest of the chief citizens that stayed behind, were commanded to bring forth out of hand, all their gold and silver. Also a great imposition of money was laid upon all those that were thought able to pay it. Such as made their contribution readily, were dismissed without more ado; but if any stood long upon the matter, or played the thieves, in purloining their own goods, they were put to the whip, and, besides loss of their wealth, had their torments to boot. This done, the tyrant began to make popular laws; namely, such as might serve to make him gracious with the rascally multitude; abrogating all debts, and dividing the lands of the rich among the poor. By such art of oppressing the great ones, it had been an old custom of tyrants to assure themselves of the vulgar for a time.

As soon as *Nabis* had gotten *Argos*, he sent the news to *T. Quintius*, and offered to join with him against *Philip*. *Titus* was glad of it, so as he took the pains to cross over the *Streights* into *Peloponnesus*, there to meet with *Nabis*. They had soon agreed (though king *Attalus*, who was present with

with the consul, made some cavil touching *Argos* and the tyrant lent unto the *Romans* six hundred of his mercenaries of *Crete*; as also he agreed with the *Acheans* upon a truce for four months, reserving the final conclusion of peace between them until the war of *Philip* should be ended; which, after this, continued not long.

SECT. XIV.

The battel at Cynoscephalæ, wherein Philip was vanquished by T. Quintius.

Titus *Quintius*, as soon as he understood that he was appointed to have command of the army, without any other limitation of time, than during the pleasure of the senate, made all things ready for diligent pursuit of the war. The like did *Philip*, who, having failed in his negotiation of peace, and no less failed in his hopes of getting *Nabis* to friend in that war, meant afterwards wholly to rely upon himself.

Titus had in his army about twenty-six thousand, and *Philip* a proportionable number: but neither of them knew the other's strength, or what his enemy intended to do. Only *Titus* heard that *Philip* was in *Thessaly*, and thereupon addressed himself to seek him out. They had like to have met unawares near unto the city of *Pheræ*, where the vant-couriers on both sides discovered each other, and sent word thereof unto their several captains: but neither of them were over-hasty to commit all to hazard upon so short warning. The day following, each of them sent out three hundred horse, with as many light-armed foot, to make a better discovery. These met, and fought a long while, returning finally back into their several camps, with little advantage unto either side. The country about *Pheræ* was thick set with trees, and otherwise full of gardens and mud-walls; which made it improper for service of the *Macedonian Phalanx*: wherefore the king dislodged, intending to remove back unto *Scotusa*, in the frontier of *Macedon*, where he might be plentifully served with all necessaries. *Titus* conceived aright his meaning, and therefore purposed also to march thitherwards, were it only to waste the country. There lay between them a great ledge of hills, which hindered the one from knowing what course the other took. Nevertheless they encamped not far asunder both the first and the second night; though neither of them understood what was become of the other. The third day was very tempestuous, and forced each of them to take up his lodging, where he found it by chance. Then sent they forth discoverers again, in greater number than before. These meeting together, held a long fight, wherein at first the *Macedonians* had the worse. But *Philip* anon sent in such a strong supply, that if the resistance of the *Etolians* had not been desperate, the *Romans*, their fellows, had been driven back into their camp. Yet, all resistance notwithstanding, the *Macedonians* prevailed; so that *Titus* himself was fain to bring forth his legions, that were not a little discouraged, by the defeat of all their horse, to animate those which were in flight.

It was altogether besides the king's purpose, to put the fortune of a battel in trust that day, with so much of his estate as might thereon depend. But the news came to him thick and tumultuously, how the enemies fled, and how the day was his own; if he could use an occasion, the like whereof he should not often find. This caused him to alter his purpose, inasmuch that he embattel'd his men, and

climbed up those hills; which, for that the knops thereon had some resemblance unto dogs heads, were called by a word signifying as much, *Cynoscephalæ*. As soon as he was on the hill-top; it did him good to see that they of his own light-armature were busy in fight, almost at the very camp of the enemies, whom they had repelled so far. He had also liberty to chuse his ground, as might serve best his advantage; forasmuch as the *Romans* were quite driven from all parts of the hill. But of this commodity he could make no great use, the roughness of the place among those dogs heads, as they were called, serving nothing aptly for his *Phalanx*. Nevertheless he found convenient room wherein to marshal the one part of his army, and gave order unto his captains to follow with the rest, embatteling them as they might. Whilst he was doing this, he perceived that his horsemen and light-armature began to shrink, as being fallen upon the *Roman* legion, by force whereof they were driven to recoil. He sets forward to help them, and they no less hastily draw unto him for succour, having the *Romans* not far behind them.

As the legions began to climb the hill, *Philip* commanded those of his *Phalanx* to charge their pikes, and entertain them. Here *Titus* found an extreme difficult piece of work; for this *Phalanx* being a great square battel of armed pikes, like in all points to those which are now used in our modern wars; and being in like manner used as are ours, was not to be resisted by the *Roman* targetteers as long as the *Phalanx* it self held together undissolved. The *Macedonians* were embattel'd in very close order, so that two of them stood opposite to one of the *Romans*; as also the pikes of the first rank had their points advanced two or three foot before their foreman. Wherefore it is no marvel if the *Romans* gave back, every one of them being troubled (as it were) with ten enemies at once, and not able to come nearer unto the next of them than a dozen foot, or thereabouts. *Titus* finding this, and not knowing how to remedy it, was greatly troubled; for that still the *Phalanx* bore down all which came in the way. But in the mean while he observed, that they which were appointed by *Philip* to make his left wing, were not able, through the much unevenness of the ground, to put themselves in order; so as either they kept their places on the hill-tops, or else (which was worse) upon desire either of beholding the pastime, or of seeming to be partakers in the work, run foolishly along by the side of their fellows which were occupied in fight.

Of this their disorder he made great and present use. He caused the right wing of his battel to march up the hill against these ill-ordered troops, his elephants leading the way to increase the terror. The *Macedonians* were readier to dispute what should be done in such a case, than well advised what to do; as having no one man appointed to command that part in chief. Indeed, if they should have done their best, it could not have served, since the ground whereon they stood, made their weapons useless. For, let it be supposed that *Philip*, having twenty-six thousand in his army (as he is said to have been equal to the enemy in number) had four thousand horse, four thousand targetteers, and four thousand light-armed; so shall there remain fourteen thousand pikes, whereof he himself had embattel'd the one half in a *Phalanx*; the other half in the left wing, are they whom *Quintius* is ready now to charge. The *Phalanx*, having usually sixteen in file, must, when it consisted of seven thousand, have well near

* Plut. in vita T. Q. Flam.

four hundred and forty in rank; but four hundred would serve to make a front long enough; the other forty, or thirty-seven files might be cut off, and reckoned in the number of the targetteers, or light-armed. Allowing therefore, as *Polybius* doth, to every man of them three foot of ground, this front must have occupied twelve hundred foot, or two hundred and forty paces; that is, very near a quarter of a mile in length. Such a space of open champaign, free from incumbrance of trees, ditches, hillocks, or the like impediments, that must of necessity dis-join this close battel of the *Phalanx*, was not every-where to be found. Here at *Cynoscephalæ*, *Philip* had so much room, as would only suffice for the one half of his men; the rest were fain to stand still, and look about them, being hindered from putting themselves in order, by the roughness of the *dogs heads*. But the *Romans*, to whom all grounds were much alike, were not hindered from coming up unto them; nor found any difficulty in mastering those enemies, whose feet were in a manner bound by the discommodity of the place. The very first impression of the elephants caused them to give back; and the coming on of the legions, to betake themselves unto flight. A *Roman* tribune, or colonel, seeing the victory on that part assured, left the prosecution of it unto others; and being followed by twenty ensigns, or maniples; that is, (as they might fall out) by some two thousand men, took in hand a notable piece of work, and mainly helpful to making of the victory compleat. He considered that *Philip*, in pursuing the right wing of the *Romans*, was run on so far, as that himself, with his fellows, in mounting the hill to charge the left wing of the *Macedonians*, was already gotten above the king's head. Wherefore he turned to the left hand, and, making down the hill after the king's *Phalanx*, fell upon it in the rear. The hindmost ranks of the *Phalanx*, all of them indeed, save the first five, were accustomed, when the battels came to joining, to carry their pikes upright, and with the whole weight of their bodies to thrust on their foremen; and so were they doing at the present. This was another great inconvenience in the *Macedonian Phalanx*, that it served neither for offence nor defence, except only in front. For though it were so, that *Alexander*, when he was to fight with *Darius* in *Mesopotamia*, arranged his *Phalanx* in such order, that all the four sides of it were as so many fronts, looking sundry ways, because he expected that he should be encompassed round; yet it is to be understood, that herein he altered the usual form; as also at the same time he embattelled his men in loose order, that so with ease they might turn their weapons which way need should require. Likewise it is to be considered, that *Alexander's* men being thus disposed, were fit only to keep their own ground; not being able to follow upon the enemy, unless their hindmost ranks could have marched backwards. But in this present case of *Philip*, there was no such provision for resistance. Therefore his men, being otherwise unable to help themselves, threw down their weapons, and fled. The king himself had thought, until now, that the fortune of the battel was every-where alike, and the day his own. But hearing a noise behind him, and turning a little aside, with a troop of horse, to see how all went, when he beheld his men casting down their weapons, and the *Romans* at his back on the higher ground, he presently betook himself to flight. Neither staid he afterwards in any place (except only a small while about *Tempe*, there to collect such as were

dispersed in this overthrow) until he was gotten into his own kingdom of *Macedon*.

There died of the *Roman* army in this battel, about seven hundred: of the *Macedonians*, about eight thousand were slain, and five thousand taken prisoners.

S E C T. XV.

T. Quintius falleth out with the Etolians; and grants truce unto Philip, with conditions, upon which the peace is ratified. Liberty proclaimed unto the Greeks. The Romans quarrel with Antiochus.

THE *Etolians* wonderfully vaunted themselves; and desired to have it noised through all *Greece*, That the victory at *Cynoscephalæ* was gotten (in a manner) wholly by their valour. They had gotten indeed the most of the booty, by sacking the *Macedonian* camp, whilst the *Romans* were busied in the chase. *Titus* therefore being offended both at their vain-glory, and at their ravenous condition; purposed to teach them better manners, by regarding them as slightly, as they thought highly of themselves. He also well perceived, that by using them with any extraordinary favour, he should greatly offend the rest of his confederates in *Greece*; who detested the *Etolians* much more vehemently, than ever they had done the *Macedonians*. But this displeasure brake not forth yet a while.

After the battel, *Titus* made haste unto *Larissa*, a city of *Thessaly*; which he presently took. Before his coming, *Philip* had sent thither one of his courtiers, to burn all his letters, and passages whatsoever in writing, betwixt him and others, of which many were there kept. It was well done of the king, that among the cares of so much adversity, he forgot not to provide for the safety of his friends. Yet by his thus doing, they of *Larissa* might well perceive, that he gave them as already lost. Wherefore we find not that they, or any of their neighbours, did make delay of opening their gates to *Titus*. At the same time, the town of *Leucas* bordering upon *Acarnania*, was taken by the *Roman* fleet: and very soon after, all the *Acarnanians*, a warlike nation, and in hatred of the *Etolians*, ever true to *Philip*; gave up themselves unto the *Romans*, hearing of the victory at *Cynoscephalæ*. The *Rhodians* also were then in hand with the conquest of *Peræa*, a region of the continent over-against their island; whereof they had demanded restitution, in the late treaty of peace with *Philip*. They did herein more manly, than any other of the *Greeks*: forasmuch as they awaited not the good leisure of the *Romans*; but with an army of their own, and some help which they borrowed of the *Acheans*, and other their friends, gave battel to *Dimocrates*, the king's lieutenant, wherein they had the victory, and consequently recovered the whole province. It angered *Philip* worse than all this, that the *Dardanians* gathered courage out of his affliction, to invade his kingdom; wasting and spoiling, as if all had been abandoned to their discretion. This made him gather an army in all haste, of six thousand foot, and five hundred horse: wherewith coming upon them, he drove them, with little or no loss of his own, and great slaughter of theirs, hastily out of the kingdom. Which done, he returned to *Thessalonica*.

In this one enterprise, he had success answerable to his desire: but seeing what bad fortune ac-

companied his affairs, in all other parts at the same time, he thought it wisdom to yield unto necessity; and therefore sent in all haste *Limneus* and *Demosthenes*, with *Cycliadas*, the banished *Achean*, in whom he reposed much confidence, ambassadors unto *Titus*. These had conference a long while in private, with *Titus*, and some of his *Roman* colonels: by whom they were gently entertained, and in very friendly wise dismissed. It seems that they had commission to refer all unto *Titus's* own discretion; as *Philip* himself in few days after did. There was granted unto them a truce for fifteen days: in which time, the king himself might come and speak with the *Roman* general. In the mean season many suspicious rumors went of *Titus*; as if he had been corrupted with great rewards from the king, to betray the *Greeks* his confederates. Of these bruits the *Etolians* were chief authors: who being wont to regard neither friendship nor honesty, where profit led them a wrong way, judged alike of all men else. But against the day appointed for the meeting betwixt him and *Philip*, *Titus* had sent letters unto his associates; willing them to have their agents ready by a time appointed, at the entrance of *Tempe*, where the treaty should be held. There, when they were all assembled, they entred into consultation before the king's arrival, what should be most expedient for the common benefit of them all, and for every estate in particular. The poor king *Aminander*, besought them all, and especially the *Romans*, that they would think upon him; and considering his weakness, which he confessed, make such provision, that after the *Romans* had turned their backs, and were gone home, *Philip* might not wreak his anger upon him, who was not able to resist. Then spake *Alexander*, one of the *Etolians*: who commending *Titus* for so much as he had thus assembled the confederates, to advise upon their own good, and had willed them to deliver their minds freely: added, That in the main of the purpose which he had in hand, he was utterly deceived: for that by making peace with *Philip*, he could neither assure the *Romans* of their quiet, nor the *Greeks* of their liberty. There was, he said, none other end to be made of the war, which could agree either with the purpose of the senate and people of *Rome*, or with the fair promises made by *Titus* himself unto the *Greeks*, than the chasing of *Philip* quite out of his kingdom. And to this effect he made a long discourse. But *Titus* answered, That this *Etolian* was ill acquainted, either with the good pleasure of the senate and people of *Rome*, or with the laudable customs which they generally held: for that it was not the manner of the *Romans*, to seek the utter destruction of any king or nation, at such time as they first made war with them; until by some rebellion they found it a matter of necessity, to take such a rigorous course. And hereof he alledged the *Carthaginians* as a notable example: adding, That victory, to generous minds, was only an inducement unto moderation. As concerning the publick benefit of *Greece*: it was (he said) expedient, that the kingdom of *Macedon* should be greatly weakened and brought low; not that it should be utterly destroyed: forasmuch as it served as a bar, to the *Thracians*, *Gauls*, and a multitude of other savage nations, which would soon overflow the whole continent of *Greece*, if this kingdom were not interposed. Wherefore he concluded, that if *Philip* would yield unto those demands, wherewith he had pressed him in the former treaty; then was there no reason to deny him peace.

As for the *Etolians*: if they thought otherwise, it should be at their own pleasure, to take counsel apart for themselves, as they thought good. Then began *Phaneas*, another of the *Etolians*, to say, That all was come to nothing; for that ere long *Philip* would trouble all the *Greeks*, no less than he had done in time before. But *Titus* interrupted him, and bad him leave his babling; saying, That himself would take such order, as that *Philip*, were he never so desirous, should thenceforth not have it in his power to molest the *Greeks*.

The next day king *Philip* came thither: whom *Titus* used friendly: and suffering him to repose himself that night, held a council the day following: wherein the king yielded unto all that had been required at his hands; offering yet further, to stand to the good pleasure of the senate, if they would have more added to the conditions. *Phaneas*, the *Etolian*, insulting over him, said it was to be hoped, that he would then at length give up to the *Etolians* a many of the towns (which he there named) bidding him speak, whether he would, or not. His answer was, That they might take them all. But *Titus* interposing himself, said, it should be otherwise. These were *Thessalonian* towns, and should all be free: one of them only excepted, which not long ago had refused to commit it self to the faith of the *Romans*, and therefore should now be given to the *Etolians*. Hereat *Phaneas* cried out, that it was too great an injury, thus to defraud them of the towns that had some time belonged unto their common-weal. Rather he willed *Titus* to consider, that by an ancient covenant between them and the *Romans*, all the towns taken ought to be their own, and the *Romans* to have nothing, save the pillage and captives. It is true, that there had been such a condition in the former war: but it ceased to be of any validity, as soon as the *Etolians* made peace with *Philip*. And thus much *Titus* gave them to understand; asking them, whether they thought it reasonable, that all the towns in *Greece*, which had let in the *Romans* by composition, should be delivered into subjection of the *Etolians*. The rest of the confederates were very much delighted, with these angry passages between the *Roman* and the *Etolians*: neither had they great reason, to fear any hard measure; since *Titus* was so earnest in behalf of those *Thessalonians*, to give them liberty, though they had stood out against him, even till very fear made them open their gates. Wherefore they opposed not themselves; but gave their consent willingly unto a truce for four months.

The chief cause that moved *Titus* to grant peace so readily to the *Macedonian*, besides that laudable custom by him before alledged; was, the fame of *Antiochus's* coming with an army from *Syria*, and drawing near towards *Europe*. He had also perhaps yet a greater motive; even the consideration, that his successor might happen to defraud him of the honour, if the war should happen to be protracted. And he was in the right. For when his letters, together with ambassadors from the *Macedonian*, and sundry states of *Greece*, came unto *Rome*, new consuls were chosen: who (especially the one of them) stood very earnestly against the peace; alledging frivolous matter of their own suspicion, in hope to get the honour of concluding the war. The senate began to be doubtfully affected, between the ambassadors of *Philip* offering to stand to whatsoever was demanded, and the letters of *Titus* pressing them to accept this offer, on the one side; and the importunity of the consul on the other; who said, that

all these goodly shews were fraudulent, and that the king would rebel, as soon as the army was called out of *Greece*. But the matter was taken out of the senators hands by two of the tribunes, that referred it to an assembly of the people; by whose sovereign authority it was concluded, That peace should be granted unto the king. So ten ambassadors were sent from *Rome* over into *Greece*: in which number were they, that had been consuls before *Titus*: and it was ordained by their advice, That *Titus* should go through with the business of peace. These would very fain have retained those three important cities of *Corinth*, *Chalcis*, and *Demetrias*, until the state of *Greece* were somewhat better settled. But finally *Titus* prevailed so, that *Corinth* was (though not immediately) rendred unto the *Acheans*; and all the other *Greek* towns which *Philip* held, as well in *Asia* as in *Greece*, restored unto liberty.

The conditions of the peace granted unto *Philip*, were, That before the celebration of the next *Isthmian Games*, he should withdraw his garrisons out of all the *Greek* towns which he held, and consign them over to the *Romans*: That he should deliver up unto them all captives that he had of theirs, and all renagado's: likewise all his ships of war, reserving to himself only five of the lesser sort, and one of extraordinary greatness, wherein sixteen men laboured at every oar: further, that he should pay a thousand talents, the one half in hand, the other in ten years next following, by even portions. Hereto ^b *Livy* adds, That he was forbidden to make war out of *Macedon*, without permission of the senate. But I find not that he observed this article, or was at any time charged with the breach of it. Four hundred talents he had already delivered unto *Titus*, together with his younger son *Demetrius*, to remain as hostage for his true dealing in this matter of peace, at such time as he lately sent his ambassadors to *Rome*: when it was promised, that the money, and his son, should be restored back unto him, if the senate were not pleased with the agreement. Whether this money were reckoned as part of the thousand talents, I cannot find: and it seemeth otherwise, forasmuch as young *Demetrius*, who together with those four hundred talents, was given for hostage, remained still in custody of the *Romans*, as a part of the bargain which *Titus* formerly had made. Letters also were then sent by *Titus*, unto *Prusias*, king of *Bithynia*: giving him to understand, what agreement was made with *Philip*, in behalf of the *Greeks*; and how the senate held it reasonable, that the *Ciani*, most miserably spoiled and oppressed by *Philip*, to gratify this *Bithynian*, his son-in-law, should be restored to liberty, and permitted to enjoy the same benefit of the *Romans*, which other of their nation did. What effect these letters wrought, it was not greatly material; since the *Romans* were shortly busied with *Antiochus*, in such wise, that they had not leisure to examine the conformity of *Prusias* to their will.

All *Greece* rejoiced at the good bargain, which *Titus* had made with *Philip*. Only the *Etolians* found themselves aggrieved, that they were utterly neglected; which was to the rest no small part of their contentment. The *Beotians* continued to favour the *Macedonian*; and thereby occasioned much trouble unto themselves. There were some among them well-affected to the *Romans*: who seeing how things were like to go, made their complaint unto *Titus*; saying, that they were no better

than lost, for the good-will which they had borne unto him; unless at this time, when he lay close by them with his army, their pretor, which was head of the opposite faction, might be made away. *Titus* refused to have an hand in the execution; yet nevertheless did animate them in their purpose. So they committed the fact, and hoped to have kept themselves undiscovered. But when the murder came out, and somewhat was confessed by those that were put to torture, the hatred of the people broke out violently against the *Romans*; in such wise, that howsoever they durst not take arms against them, yet such of them as they found straggling from their camp, they murdered in all parts of the country. This was detected within a while, and many of the dead bodies found. Hereupon *Titus* requires of the *Beotians* to have the murderers delivered into his hands; and for five hundred soldiers, which he had lost by them, to have paid unto him five hundred talents. Instead of making any such amends, they paid him with excuses, which he would not take as good satisfaction. He sends ambassadors to the *Acheans* and *Athenians*, informing them what had happened, and requested them not to take it amiss, though he dealt with these their friends as they had deserved. Herewithal he falls to wasting their country, and besiegeth two such towns of theirs, as did seem to be most culpable of the murders lately done. But the ambassadors of the *Acheans* and *Athenians* (especially of the *Acheans*, who offered, if he needed them, to help him in this war; yet besought him rather to grant peace unto the *Beotians*) prevailed so far with him, that he was pacified with thirty talents, and the punishment of such as were known offenders.

In like sort, though not so violently, were many states of *Greece* distracted; some among them rejoicing that they were free from the *Macedonian*; others greatly doubting that the *Roman* would prove a worse neighbour. The *Etolians* would have been glad of any commotion, and therefore published rumours abroad, that it was the purpose of the *Romans* to keep in their own hands all those places, wherein *Philip* lately had his garrisons. Little did they, or the rest of the *Greeks*, conceive, that this *Macedonian* war served as an introduction to the war to be made in *Asia* against *Antiochus*; where grew the fruit, that was to be reaped of this and many other victories. Wherefore to stay the progress of bad rumours, when the *Isthmian Games* were held, which in time of peace were never without great solemnity and concourse: *Titus*, in that great assembly of all *Greece*, caused proclamation to be made by sound of trumpet to this effect, That the senate and people of *Rome*, and *Titus Quintius Flaminius*, the general, having vanquished king *Philip* and the *Macedonians*, did will to be at liberty, free from impositions, free from garrisons, and living at their own laws, the *Corinthians*, *Phocians*, *Locrians*, *Eubeans*, *Acheans* of *Phthiotis*, *Magnetians*, *Thessalians*, and *Perrhebian*. The suddenness of this proclamation astonished men: so as tho' they applauded it with a great shout; yet presently they cried out to hear it again, as if they durst scarce credit their own ears. The *Greeks* were crafts-masters in the art of giving thanks; which they rendered now to *T. Quintius* with so great affection, as that they had well-near smothered him, by thronging officiously about him.

This good-will of the *Greeks*, was like to be much more available to the *Romans* in their war against *Antiochus*, than could have been the possession of a few towns; yea, or of all those provinces which were named in the proclamation. Upon confidence hereof, no sooner were these *Isthmian* games at an end, than *Titus*, with the *Romans* that were of his council, gave audience to *Hagesianax*, and *Lyfias*, king *Antiochus's* ambassadors, whom they willed to signify unto their lord, that he should do well to abstain from the free cities in *Asia*, and not vex them with war; as also to restore whatsoever he had occupied belonging to the kings *Ptolemy* or *Philip*. Moreover, they willed him by these his ambassadors, that he should not pass over his army into *Europe*; adding, that some of them would visit him in person ere it were long, to talk with him further concerning these points. This done, they fell to accomplishing their promises unto the *Greeks*; to the rest they gave what they had promised. But the *Phocians* and *Locrians* they gave unto the *Etolians*, whom they thought it no wisdom to offend over-much, being shortly to take a greater work in hand. The *Acheans* of *Phthiotis* they annexed unto the *Theffalians*, all save the town of *Thebes* in *Phthiotis*, the same which had been abandoned by *T. Quintius* to the *Etolians* in the last treaty with *Philip*. The *Etolians* contended very earnestly about *Pharfalus* and *Leucas*. But they were put off with a dilatory answer, and rejected unto the senate: for howsoever somewhat the council might favour them; yet it was not meet that they should have their will, as it were in despite of *Titus*. To the *Acheans* were restored *Corinth*, *Triphylia*, and *Herea*.

So the *Corinthians* were made free indeed (tho' the *Romans* yet a while kept the *Acrocorinthus*) for that all which were partakers of the *Achean* common-wealth, enjoyed their liberty in as absolute manner, as they could desire. To *Pleuratus*, the *Illyrian*, were given one or two places, taken by the *Romans* from *Philip*: and upon *Aminander* were bestowed those castles, which he had gotten from *Philip* during this war; to reign in them and the grounds which they commanded, as he did among his *Athamanians*. The *Rhodians* had been their own carvers. *Attalus* was dead a little before the victory; and therefore lost his share. Yet many that were with *Titus* in council, would have given the towns of *Oreum* and *Eretria*, in the isle of *Eubœa*, to his son and successor king *Eumenes*. But finally it was concluded, that these, as well as the rest of the *Eubeans*, should be suffered to enjoy their liberty. *Orestis*, a little province of the kingdom of *Macedon*, bordering on *Epirus*, and lying towards the *Ionian* sea, had yielded unto the *Romans* long ere this, and since continued true to them: for which cause it was also set at liberty, and made a free estate by it self.

These businesses being dispatch'd, it remained, that all care should be used, not how to avoid the war with king *Antiochus*, but how to accomplish it with most ease and prosperity. Wherefore ambassadors were sent both to *Antiochus* himself, to pick matter of quarrel; and about unto others, to pre-dispose them unto the assisting of the *Romans* therein. What ground and matter of war against this king the *Romans* now had, or shortly after found; as also how their ambassadors and agents dealt and sped abroad; I refer unto another place.

C H A P. V.

The wars of the Romans with Antiochus the Great, and his adherents.

S E C T. I.

What kings, of the races of Seleucus and Ptolemy, reigned in Asia and Egypt, before Antiochus the Great.

Seleucus^a *Nicator*, the first of his race, king of *Asia* and *Syria*, died in the end of the hundred twenty and fourth *Olympiad*. He was treacherously slain by *Ptolemy Ceraunus*, at an altar called *Argos*; having (as is said) been warned before by an oracle, to beware of *Argos*, as the fatal place of his death. But I never have read, that any man's life hath been preserved, or any mischance avoided, by the predictions of such devilish oracles. Rather I believe, that many such predictions of the heathen gods, have been antedated by their priests or by others, which devised them after the event.

Antiochus Sotus, the son and heir of this *Seleucus*, was dearly beloved of his father: who surrendered up unto him his own wife *Stratonica*, when he understood how much the young prince was enamoured on her. Wherefore *Ptolemy Ceraunus* had great cause to fear, that the death of *Seleucus*,

would not be revenged by this his successor. But *Antiochus* was contented to be pacified, either with gifts, or perhaps only with fair words; containing himself within *Asia*, and letting *Ceraunus* enjoy that quietly, which he had purchased in *Europe* with the blood of *Seleucus*. It is said of this *Antiochus*, that altho' he married with the queen *Stratonica* in his father's life; yet out of modesty he forbore to embrace her, till his father was dead. So that perhaps his incestuous love was partly, if not chiefly, the cause of his not prosecuting that revenge, whereunto nature should have urged him. Afterwards he had wars with *Antigonus Gonatas*, and with *Nicomedes* king of *Bithynia*. Also *Lutarius* and *Leonorius*, kings or captains of the *Gauls*, were set upon him by the said *Nicomedes*. With these he fought a great battle: wherein, tho' otherwise, the enemy had all advantage against him; yet by the terror of his elephants, which affrighted both their horses and them, he won the victory. He took in hand an enterprise against *Ptolemy Philadelphus*: but finding ill success in the beginning, he soon gave it over. To this king *Antiochus Sotus* it was, that *Berosus* the *Chaldean* dedicated his^b history of the kings of *Assyria*; the same, which

^a Polyb. lib. 2.

^b Genebrand. lib. 2. Jul. Mart. in Paren.

hath since been excellently falsified by the friar *Annius*. He left behind him one son, called *Antiochus Theos*; and one daughter, called *Apame*, that was married unto the king of *Cyrene*. So he died about the end of the hundred twenty and ninth *Olympiad*, or the beginning of the *Olympiad* following, in the fiftieth or one and fiftieth year of the kingdom of the *Greeks*; when he had reigned nineteen years.

Antiochus, surnamed *Theos* or the God, had this vain and impious title given unto him, by flattery of the *Milesians*; whom he delivered from *Timarchus*, a tyrant that oppressed them. He held long and difficult, but fruitless, war with *Ptolemy Philadelphus* king of *Egypt*; which finally he compounded, by taking to wife *Berenice* the daughter of *Ptolemy*.

Of these two kings, and of this lady *Berenice*, St. *Jerome*, and other interpreters have understood that prophecy of *Daniel*: * *The king's daughter of the south, shall come to the king of the north, to make an agreement*; and that which followeth.

Ptolemy Philadelphus was a great lover of peace and learning; and (setting apart his incestuous marriage with his own sister *Arfinoe*) a very excellent prince: howsoever, the worthiest of all that race. It was he, that built and furnished with books, that famous library in *Alexandria*: which to adorn, and to honour the more, he sent unto *Eleazar*, then high priest of the *Jews*, for the books of *Moses* and other scriptures. The benefits of this king unto the *Jews*, had formerly been very great: for he had set at liberty as many of them, as his father held in slavery throughout all *Egypt*; and he had sent unto the temple of God in *Jerusalem* very rich presents. Wherefore *Eleazar* yielding to the king's desire, presented him with an *Hebrew* copy: which *Ptolemy* caused to be translated into *Greek*, by seventy-two of the most grave and learned persons, that could be found among all the tribes. In this number of the seventy two interpreters, or (as they are commonly called) the *Seventy*; *Jesus*, the son of *Sirach*, is thought by *Genebrard* to have been one: who that he lived in this age, it seems to me very sufficiently proved by *Janeſinus*, in his preface unto *Ecclesiasticus*. The whole passage of this business between *Philadelphus* and the high priest, was written (as *Josephus* affirms) by *Aristæus* that was employed therein. Forty years *Ptolemy Philadelphus* was king: reckoning the time wherein he jointly reigned with his father. He was exceedingly beloved of his people; and highly magnified by poets, and other writers. Towards his end he grew more voluptuous, than he had been in his former years: in which time he boasted, that he alone had found out the way how to live for ever. If this had been referred unto his honourable deeds, it might have stood with reason: otherwise, the gout, with which he was often troubled, was enough to teach him his own error. He was the first of the kings, derived from *Alexander's* successors, that entered into league with the *Romans*: as also his off-spring was the last among the royal families, which by them was rooted up.

Antiochus Theos had another wife, called *Laodice*, at such time as he married with *Berenice* the daughter of this *Ptolemy*. After his second marriage,

he used his first wife with no better regard, than if she had been his concubine. *Laodice* hated him for this: yet adventured not to seek revenge; until her own son *Seleucus Callinicus*, was of ability to be king. This was two or three years after the death of *Ptolemy Philadelphus*: at what time she poisoned her husband *Theos*; and by permission of *Seleucus* her son, murdered *Berenice*, together with a son she had born to *Antiochus*.^d *Justin* reports, that *Berenice* saved herself, together with the young prince her child, awhile in the sanctuary at *Daphne*: and that not only some cities of *Asia* prepared to succour her, but her brother *Ptolemy Euergetes*, king of *Egypt*, came to rescue her with an army; tho' too late, for she was slain before.

With such cruelties *Seleucus Callinicus*, succeeding unto his father that had fifteen years been king, began his reign. His subjects were highly offended at his wicked nature, which they discovered at his first entrance. Wherefore it was like, that his estate would have been much endangered, if *Ptolemy Euergetes*, who came against him, had not been drawn back into his own country, by some commotions there in hand. For there were none that would bear arms against *Ptolemy*, in defence of their own king: but rather they sided with the *Egyptian*; who took *Laodice* the king's mother, and rewarded her with death, as she had well deserved. Wherefore *Seleucus*, being freed from this invasion, by occasion of those domestical troubles, which recalled *Euergetes* home into *Egypt*, went about a dangerous piece of work, even to make war upon his own subjects, because of their bad affection towards him; when as it had been much better, by well deserving, to have changed their hatred into love. A great fleet he prepared: in furnishing and manning whereof, he was at such charges, that he scarce left himself any other hope, if that should miscarry. Herein he embarked himself; and putting to sea, met with such a tempest, as devoured all save himself, and a very few of his friends, that hardly escaped. This calamity, having left him nothing else in a manner than his naked body, turned nevertheless to his great good; as anon after it seemed. For when his subjects understood, in what sort the gods (as they conceived it) had punished him for his offences: they had commiseration of his estate; and, presuming, that he would thenceforth become a new man, offered him their service with great alacrity. This revived him, and filled him with such spirit; as thinking himself well enough able to deal with the *Egyptian*, he made ready a mighty army for that purpose. But his fortune was no better at land, than it had been at sea. He was vanquished by *Ptolemy* in a great battle: whence he escaped hardly; no better attended, than after his late shipwreck. Hastening therefore back to *Antioch*, and fearing that the enemy would soon be at his heels; he wrote unto his brother *Antiochus Hierax*, who lay then in *Asia*, praying him to bring succour with all speed; and promising, in recompence of his faith and diligence, the dominion of a great part of *Asia*. *Antiochus* was then but fourteen years old, yet extremely ambitious; and therefore glad of such an occasion to make himself great. He levied a mighty army of the *Gauls*; wherewith he set forwards to help his brother; or rather to get what he could for himself. Hereof *Ptolemy* being

* Dan. c. 11. v. 6. b Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 18. c. 42. c Jos. Ann. l. 12. c. 2. Concerning that book, which now goes under the name of *Annius*; many learned men, and among the rest *Lodovicus Vives*, hold suspicion, that it is counterfeit, and the invention of some late author. Surely if it were to be suspected in the time of *Vives*; it may be now much more justly suspected, since a new edition of it is come forth, purged from faults (as the papists term those books, wherein they have charged what they think) and set forth by *Maldendorpius* at *Colem. An. Dom. 1578*.
d Jos. l. 27.

advertised; and having no desire to put himself in danger more than needed, took truce with *Seleucus* for ten years. No sooner was *Seleucus* freed from this care of the *Egyptian* war, but his brother *Antiochus* came upon him, and needs would fight with him, as knowing himself to have the better army. So *Seleucus* was vanquished again, and saved himself, with so few about him, that he was verily supposed to have perished in the battel. Thus did God's justice take revenge of those murders, by which the crown was purchased; and settled (as might have been thought) on the head of this bloody king. *Antiochus* was very glad to hear of his brother's death; as if thereby he had purchased his heart's desire: but the *Gauls*, his mercenaries, were gladder than he. For when he led them against *Eumenes*, king of *Pergamus*, being in hopes to get honour by making a conquest in the beginning of his reign, these perfidious *Barbarians* took counsel against him, and devised how to strip him of all that he had. They thought it very likely, that if there were none of the royal house to make head against them, it would be in their power to do what should best be pleasing unto themselves in the lower *Asia*. Wherefore they laid hands on *Antiochus*, and enforced him to ransom himself with money, as if he had been their lawful prisoner. Neither were they so contented, but made him enter into such composition with them, as tended but little to his honour. In the mean while *Seleucus* had gathered a new army, and prepared once more to try his fortune against his brother. *Eumenes* hearing of this, thought the season fit for himself, to make his profit of their discord. *Antiochus* fought with him, and was beaten; which is no great marvel, since he had great reason to stand in no less fear of the *Gauls*, his own foldiers, than of the enemy with whom he had to deal. After this, *Eumenes* won much in *Asia*, whilst *Antiochus* went against his brother. In the second battel fought between the brethren, *Seleucus* had the upper hand; and *Antiochus Hierax*, or the *Hawk* (which surname was given him, because he fought his prey upon every one, without care whether he were provoked or not) soared away as far as he could both from his brother, and his own *Gauls*. Having fetched a great compass through *Mesopotamia* and *Armenia*, he fell at length into *Cappadocia*, where his father-in-law, king *Artamenes*, took him up. He was entertained very lovingly in outward shew, but with a meaning to betray him. This he soon perceived, and therefore betook him to his wings again, though he knew not well which way to bend his flight. At length he resolved to bestow himself upon *Ptolemy*; his own conscience telling him, what evil he had meant unto *Seleucus*, his brother; and therefore what little good he was reciprocally to expect at his hands. Infidelity can find no sure harbour. *Ptolemy* well understood the perfidious and turbulent nature of this *Hierax*. Wherefore he laid him up in close prison; whence, though by means of an harlot, he got out; yet flying from his keepers, he fell into the hands of thieves, by whom he was murdered. Near about the same time died *Seleucus*. The *Parthians* and *Bactrians* had rebelled against him, during his wars with his brother. He therefore made a journey against *Asaces*, founder of the *Parthian* kingdom; wherein his evil fortune, or rather God's vengeance, adhered so closely to him, that he was taken prisoner. *Asaces* dealt friendly with him, and dismissed him, having every way given him royal entertainment; but in returning home, he broke his neck by a fall from his horse, and so ended his unhappy reign of twenty years. He had to wife *Laodice*, the sister of *Andromachus*, one of

his most trusty captains; which was father unto that *Achæus*, who, making his advantage of this affinity, became shortly after (as he styled himself) a king; though rather indeed a greater troubler of the world in those parts. By *Laodice* he had two sons, *Seleucus* the third, surnamed *Ceraunus*; and *Antiochus* the third, called afterwards the Great.

Seleucus Ceraunus reigned only three years; in which time he made war upon *Attalus* the first, that was king of *Pergamus*. Being weak of body, through sickness, and in want of money, he could not keep his men of war in good order: and finally, he was slain by the treason of *Nicanor*, and *Apaturius*, a *Gaul*. His death was revenged by *Achæus*, who slew the traitors, and took charge of the army, which he ruled very wisely and faithfully awhile; *Antiochus*, the brother of *Seleucus*, being then a child.

S E C T. II.

The beginning of the great Antiochus's reign. Of Ptolemy Euergetes, and Philopator, kings of Egypt. War between Antiochus and Philopator. The rebellion of Molo; and expedition of Antiochus against him. The re-continuance of Antiochus's Egyptian war; with the passages between the two kings: the victory of Ptolemy; and peace concluded. Of Achæus, and his rebellion; his greatness, and his fall. Antiochus's expedition against the Parthians, Bactrians, and Indians. Somewhat of the king's reigning in India, after the death of the Great Alexander.

ANTIOCHUS was scarcely fifteen years old, when he began his reign, which lasted thirty-six years. In his minority, he was wholly governed by one *Hermias*, an ambitious man, and one which maligned all virtue that he found in any of the king's faithful servants. This vile quality in a counsellor of such great place, how harmful it was unto his lord, and finally, unto himself, the success of things will shortly discover.

Soon after the beginning of *Antiochus's* reign, *Ptolemy Euergetes*, king of *Egypt*, died; and left his heir *Ptolemy Philopator*, a young boy likewise, as hath elsewhere been remembered. This was that *Euergetes*, who relieved *Aratus* and the *Acheans*; who afterwards took part with *Cleomenes*, and lovingly entertained him when he was chased out of *Greece* by *Antigonus Gonatas*. He annexed unto his dominion the kingdom of *Cyrene*, by taking to wife *Berenice*, the daughter of king *Magas*. He was the third of the *Ptolemies*, and the last good king of the race. The name of *Euergetes*, or the doer of good, was given to him by the *Egyptians*; not so much for the great spoils which he brought home, after his victories in *Syria*, as for that he recovered some of those images or idols, which *Cambyfes*, when he conquered *Egypt*, had carried into *Persia*. He was ready to have made war upon the *Jews*, for that *Onias*, their high-priest, out of mere covetousness of money, refused to pay unto him his yearly tribute of twenty talents: but he was pacified by the wisdom of *Josephus*, a *Jew*; to whom afterwards he let in farm the tributes and customs, that belonged unto him, in those parts of *Syria* which he held. For *Calesyria*, with *Palestina* and all those parts of the country that lay nearest unto *Egypt*, were held by the *Egyptian*; either as having fallen to the share of *Ptolemy* the first, at such time as the great *Antigonus* was vanquished

and

and slain in the battel at *Ipsus*; or as being won by this *Euergetes*, in the troublesome and unhappy reign of *Seleucus Callinicus*. The victories of this *Euergetes* in *Syria*, with the contentions that lasted for many succeeding ages between the *Ptolemies* and the *Seleucidae*; were all foretold by *Daniel* in the prophecy before cited, which is expounded by *St. Jerome*. This *Ptolemy Euergetes* reigned six and twenty years; and died towards the end of the hundred thirty and ninth *Olympiad*. It may seem by that, which we find in the prologue unto *Jesus* the son of *Sirach's* book, that he should have reigned a much longer time. For *Sirachides* there saith, that he came into *Egypt* in the eight and thirtieth year, when *Euergetes* was king. It may therefore be, That either this king reigned long together with his father: or that those eight and thirty years, were the years of *Jesus's* own age; if not perhaps reckoned (as the *Jews* did other whiles reckon) from some notable accident that had befallen them.

Not long after the death of *Euergetes*: *Hermias* the counsellor, and in a manner the protector of king *Antiochus*, incited his lord unto war against the *Egyptian*; for the recovery of *Cœlesyria* and the countries adjoining. This council was very unseasonably given; when *Molo*, the king's lieutenant in *Media*, was broken out into rebellion, and fought to make himself absolute lord of that rich country. Nevertheless *Hermias*, being more froward than wise, maintained stily, that it was most expedient, and agreeable with the king's honour, to send forth against a rebellious captain other captains that were faithful; whilst he in person made war upon one, that was like himself, a king. No man durst gainsay the resolution of *Hermias*; who therefore sent *Xenatas* an *Achean*, with such forces as he thought expedient, against the rebel; whilst in the mean season an army was preparing for the king's expedition into *Cœlesyria*. The king having marched from *Apamea* to *Laodicea*, and so over the desarts into the valley of *Marfyas*, between the mountains of *Libanus* and *Antilibanus*; found his way there stopped by *Theodotus* an *Etolian*, that served under *Ptolemy*. So he consumed the time there awhile to none effect; and then came news, that *Xenatas*, his captain, was destroyed with his whole army; and *Molo* thereby become lord of all the country, as far as unto *Babylon*.

Xenatas, whilst he was yet on his journey, and drew near to the river of *Tigris*; received many advertisements, by such as fled over unto him from the enemy, That the followers of *Molo* were, for the most part, against their wills, drawn by their commander to bear arms against their king. This report was not altogether false; but *Molo* himself stood in some doubt lest his followers would leave him in time of necessity. *Xenatas* therefore making shew, as if he had prepared to pass the river by boats in face of his enemy: left in the night time such as he thought meet to defend his camp; and with all the flower of his army went over *Tigris*, in a place ten miles lower than *Molo's* camp. *Molo* heard of this, and sent forth his horse to give impediment; but hearing that *Xenatas* could not so be stopped, he himself dislodged, and took his journey towards *Media*; leaving all his baggage behind him in his camp. Whether he did this, as distrusting the faith of his own soldiers; or whether thereby to deceive his enemy; the great folly of *Xenatas* made his stratagem prosperous. For *Xenatas*, having borne himself, proudly before, upon the countenance of *Hermias*, by whom he was

advanced unto this charge; did now presume, that all should give way to his authority, without putting him to much trouble of using the sword. Wherefore he suffered his men to feast, with the provisions which they found ready in the forsaken camp: or rather he commanded them so to do, by making proclamation, That they should cherish up themselves against the journey, which he intended to take next day, in pursuit of the rebels that fled. And to the same purpose he busied himself, in transporting the remainder of his army, which he had left on the other side of *Tigris*. But *Molo* went no further that day, than he could easily return the same night. Wherefore understanding what good rule the king's men kept: he made such haste back unto them, that he came upon them early in the morning; whilst they were yet heavy with the wine and other good cheer, that they had spent at supper. So *Xenatas*, and a very few with him, died fighting in defence of the camp: the rest were slaughtered, without making resistance; and many of them, ere they were perfectly awake. Likewise the camp on the other side of *Tigris* was easily taken by *Molo*: the captains flying thence, to save their own lives. In the heat of this victory, the rebel marched unto *Seleucia*, which he presently took; and, mastering within a little while the province of *Babylonia*, and all the country down to the *Red sea*, or *Bay of Persia*, he halted unto *Susa*: where at his first coming he won the city: but, failing to take the castle that was exceeding strong, returned back to *Seleucia*, there to give order concerning this business.

The report of these things coming to *Antiochus*, whilst he lay (as is said before) in the vale of *Marfyas*: filled him with great sorrow, and his camp with trouble. He took counsel what to do in this needful case; and was well advised by *Epigenes*, the best man of war he had about him, to let alone this enterprize of *Cœlesyria*; and bend his forces thither, where more need required them. This counsel was put in execution with all convenient haste. Yet was *Epigenes* dismissed by the way, and soon after slain, by the practice of *Hermias*: who could not endure to hear good counsel given, contrary to his own good liking and allowance. In the journey against *Molo*, the name and presence of the king was more available, than any odds which he had of the rebel in strength. *Molo* distrusted his own followers: and thought, that neither his late good success, or any other consideration, would serve to hold them from returning to the king's obedience; if once they beheld his person. Wherefore he thought it safest for him, to assail the king's camp in the night time. But going in hand with this; he was discovered by some that fled over from him to the king. This caused him to return back to his camp: which, by some error, took alarm at his return; and was hardly quieted, when *Antiochus* appeared in sight. The king was thus forward in giving battel to *Molo*, upon confidence which he had that many would revolt unto him. Neither was he deceived in this his belief. For not a few men, or ensigns: but all the left wing of the enemy, which was opposite unto the king, changed side forthwith as soon as ever they had sight of the king's person; and were ready to do him service against *Molo*. This was enough to have won the victory: but *Molo* shortned the work, by killing himself; as did also divers of his friends, who for fear of torments prevented the hangman with their own swords.

After this victory came joyful news, that the queen *Laodice*, daughter of *Mithridates* king of *Pontus*, which was married unto *Antiochus* a while before, had brought forth a son. Fortune seemed bountiful unto the king: and therefore he purposed to make what use he could, of her friendly disposition while it lasted. Being now in the eastern parts of his kingdom, he judged it convenient to visit his frontiers; were it only to terrify the *Barbarians*, that bordered upon him. Hereunto his counsellor *Hermias* gave assent: not so much respecting the king's honour; as considering what good might thereby happen to himself. For if it should come to pass, that the king were taken out of the world by any casualty: then made he no doubt of becoming protector to the young prince; and thereby of lengthening his own government. *Antiochus* therefore went against *Artabazanes*, who reigned among the *Atropatians*; having the greatest part of his kingdom, situate between the *Caspian* and *Euxine* sea. This barbarous king was very old and fearful; and therefore yielded unto whatsoever conditions it pleased *Antiochus* to lay upon him. So in this journey *Antiochus* got honour, such as well contented him; and then returned homewards. Upon the way, a physician of his brake with him as concerning *Hermias*; informing him truly, how odious he was unto the people; and how dangerous he would be shortly unto the king's own life. *Antiochus* believed this, having long suspected the same *Hermias*; but not daring, for fear of him, to utter his suspicions. It was therefore agreed, that he should be made away on the sudden: which was done; he being trained forth by a sleight a good way out of the camp, and there killed without warning or disputation. The king needed not to have used so much art, in ridding his hands of a man so much detested. For howsoever he seemed gracious whilst he was alive; yet they that for fear had been most obsequious to him, whilst he was in case to do them hurt, were as ready as the foremost, to speak of him as he had deserved, when once they were secure of him. Yea, his wife and children, lying then at *Apamea*, were stoned to death by the wives and children of the citizens; whose indignation brake forth the more outragiously, the longer that it had been concealed.

About these times, *Acheus* (of whom we spake before) thinking that *Antiochus* might happen to perish in some of these expeditions which he took in hand; was bold to set a diadem upon his own head, and take upon him as a king. His purpose was to have invaded *Syria*: but the fame of *Antiochus*'s returning thitherwards, made him quit the enterprise; and study to set some handsome colour on his former presumption. It is very strange, that *Antiochus* neither went against *Acheus*; nor yet dissembled the notice which he had taken, of these his traiterous purposes: but wrote unto him, signifying that he knew all; and upbraiding him with such infidelity, as any offender might know to be unpardonable. By these means he emboldened the traitors: who being already detected, might better hope to maintain his former actions by strong hand, than to excuse them, or get pardon by submission. *Antiochus* had at that time a vehement desire to recover *Celestria* or what else he could, of the dominions of *Ptolemy Philopator* in those parts. He began with *Seleucia*, a very strong city near unto the mouth of the river *Orontes*, which ere long he won, partly by force, partly by corrupting with bribes the captains that lay therein. This was that *Seleucia*, whereto *Antigonus the great*, who founded it, gave the name of *Antigonia*; but

Seleucus getting it shortly after, called it *Seleucia*; and *Ptolemy Evergetes* having lately won it, might, if it had so pleased him, have changed the name into *Ptolemais*. Such is the vanity of men that hope to purchase an endless memorial unto their names, by works proceeding rather from their greatness, than from their virtue; which therefore no longer are their own; than the same greatness hath continuance. *Theodotus* the *Etolian*, he that before had opposed himself to *Antiochus*, and defended *Celestria* in the behalf of *Ptolemy*, was now grown sorry that he had used so much faith and diligence in service of an unthankful and luxurious prince. Wherefore, as a mercenary, he began to have regard unto his own profit; which thinking to find greater, by applying himself unto him that was (questionless) the more worthy of these two kings; he offered to deliver up to *Antiochus*, the cities of *Tyrus* and *Ptolemais*. Whilst he was devising about this treason, and had already sent messengers to king *Antiochus*, his practice was detected, and he besieged in *Ptolemais* by one of *Ptolemy*'s captains that was more faithful than himself. But *Antiochus* hastening to his rescue, vanquished this captain who met him on the way, and afterwards got possession, not only of *Tyrus* and *Ptolemais*, with a good fleet of the *Egyptian* kings that was in those havens; but of so many other towns in that country, as emboldened him to think upon making a journey into *Egypt* it self. *Agathocles* and *Sosibius* bore all the sway in *Egypt* at that time; *Ptolemy* himself being loth to have his pleasures interrupted with business of so small importance, as the safety of his kingdom. Wherefore these two agreed together to make provision as hastily, and yet as secretly as might be, for the war; and nevertheless, at the same time to press *Antiochus* with daily ambassadors to some good agreement. There came in the heat of this business, ambassadors from *Rhodes*, *Bizantium*, and *Cyzicus*, as likewise from the *Etolians*, according to the usual courtesy of the *Greeks*, desiring to take up the quarrel. These were all entertained in *Memphis*, by *Agathocles* and *Sosibius*; who entreated them to deal effectually with *Antiochus*. But whilst this treaty lasted, great preparations were made at *Alexandria* for the war, wherein these two counsellors perswaded themselves reasonably, that the victory would be their own, if they could get for money a sufficient number of the *Greeks* to take their parts. *Antiochus* heard only what was done at *Memphis*, and how desirous the governours of *Egypt* were to be at quiet; whereunto he gave the readier belief, not only for that he knew the disposition of *Ptolemy*; but because the *Rhodians*, and other ambassadors, coming from *Memphis*, discoursed unto him all after one manner; as being all deceived by the cunning of *Agathocles* and his fellow. *Antiochus* therefore, having wearied himself at the long siege of a town called *Dura*, which he could not win; and being drowsy to refresh himself and his army in *Seleucia*, during the winter which then came on, granted unto the *Egyptian* a truce for four months, with promise that he would be ready to hearken unto equal conditions, when they should be offered. It was not his meaning to be so courteous, as he would fain have seemed, but only to lull his enemies asleep; whilst he took time to refresh himself, and to bring *Acheus* to some good order, whose treason daily grew more open and violent. The same negligence which he thought the *Egyptian* would have used, he used himself; as presuming, that when time of the year better served, little force would be

needful; for that the towns would voluntarily yield unto him, since *Ptolemy* provided not for their defence. Nevertheless he gave audience to the ambassadors, and had often conference with those that were sent out of *Egypt*, pleasing himself well to dispute about the justice of his quarrel; which he purposed shortly to make good by the sword, whether it were just or no. He said, that it was agreed between *Seleucus* his ancestor, and *Ptolemy* the son of *Lagi*, That all *Syria*, if they could win it from *Antigonus*, should be given in possession to *Seleucus*; and that this bargain was afterwards ratified by general consent of all the confederates after the battel at *Ipsus*. But *Ptolemy's* men would acknowledge no such bargain. They said, that *Ptolemy*, the son of *Lagi*, had won *Celofyria* and the provinces adjoining, for himself; as also that he had sufficiently gratified *Seleucus*, by lending him forces to recover his province of *Babylon*, and the countries about the river of *Euphrates*. Thus, whilst neither of them greatly cared for peace, they were in the end of their disputation as far from concluding as at the beginning. *Ptolemy* demanded restitution; *Antiochus* thought that he had not as yet gotten all that was his own: also *Ptolemy* would needs have *Acheus* comprehended in the league between them, as one of their confederates; but *Antiochus* would not endure to hear of this, exclaiming against it as a shameful thing, that one king should offer to deal so with another, as to take his rebel into protection, and seek to join him in confederacy with his own sovereign lord. When the truce was expired, and *Antiochus* prepared to take the field again, contrary to his expectation he was informed, That *Ptolemy* with a very puissant army, was coming up against him out of *Egypt*. Setting forward therefore to meet with the enemy, he was encountred on the way by those captains of *Ptolemy*, that had resisted him the year before. They held against him the passages of *Libanus*, whence nevertheless he drove them; and proceeding onward in his journey, won so many places, that he greatly increased his reputation, and thereby drew the *Arabians*, with divers of the bordering people, to become his followers. As the two kings drew near together, many captains of *Ptolemy* forsook his pay, and fled over to *Antiochus*. This notwithstanding, the *Egyptian* had the courage to meet his enemy in the field. The battel was fought at *Raphia*, where it was not to be decided, whether the *Egyptians* or *Asiatics* were the better soldiers (for that the strength of both armies consisted in mercenaries, chiefly of the *Greeks*, *Thracians*, and *Gauls*); but whether of the kings was the more fortunate. *Ptolemy*, with *Arfinoe* his sister and wife, rode up and down encouraging his men; the like did *Antiochus* on the other side, each of them rehearsing the brave deeds of their ancestors, as not having of their own, whereby to value themselves. *Antiochus* had the more elephants; as also his being of *Asia*, had they been fewer, would have beaten those of *Asia*. Wherefore, by the advantage of these beasts, he drove the enemies before him, in that part of the battel wherein he fought himself. But *Ptolemy* had the better men, by whose valour he brake the gross of his enemy's battel, and won the victory, whilst *Antiochus* was heedlessly following upon those, whom he had compelled to retire. *Antiochus* had brought into the field above seventy thousand foot, and six thousand horse, whereof though he lost scarce ten thousand foot, and not four hundred horse, yet the lame of his overthrow took from him all those places which he had lately won. When therefore he was returned home

to *Antioch*, he began to stand in fear, lest *Ptolemy* and *Acheus*, setting upon him both at once, should put him in danger of his whole estate. This caused him to send ambassadors to the *Egyptian* to treat of peace, which was readily granted; it being much against the nature of *Ptolemy* to vex himself thus with the tedious business of war. So *Ptolemy*, having staid three months in *Syria*, returned home into *Egypt*, clad with the reputation of a conqueror, to the great admiration of his subjects, and of all those that were acquainted with his voluptuous and slothful condition.

Acheus was not comprised in the league between these two kings; or, if he had been included therein, yet would not the *Egyptian* have taken the pains of making a second expedition for his sake. The best was, that he thought himself strong enough, if fortune were not too much against him, to deal with *Antiochus*. Neither was he confident without great reason. For besides his many victories, whereby he had gotten all that belonged unto *Antiochus* on this side of *Taurus*, he had also good success against *Attalus* king of *Pergamus*, that was an able man of war, and commanded a strong army. Neither was he, as *Molo* the rebel had been, one of mean regard otherwise, and carried beyond himself by apprehending the vantage of some opportunity; but cousin-german to the king, as hath been shewed before, and now lately the king's brother-in-law, by taking to wife a younger daughter of the same *Mithridates* king of *Pontus*, which was also called *Laodice*, as was her sister the queen, *Antiochus's* wife. These things had added majesty unto him, and had made his followers greatly to respect him, even as one to whom a kingdom was belonging. Neither made it a little for him, that king *Ptolemy* of *Egypt* held him in the nature of a friend; and that king *Antiochus* was now lately vanquished in the battel of *Raphia*, and had thereby lost all his gettings in *Syria*. But all these hopes and likelihoods came to nothing. For the king of *Pontus*, if he would meddle in that quarrel between his son-in-law, had no reason to take part against the more honourable. As for the *Egyptian*, he was not only slothful, but hindered by a rebellion of his own subjects, from helping his friends abroad. For the people of *Egypt*, of whom *Ptolemy*, contrary to the manner of his progenitors, had armed a great number to serve in the late expedition, began to entertain a good opinion of their own valour, thinking it not inferior to the *Macedonian*. Hereupon they refused to suffer as much as formerly they had done; since they less esteemed, than they had done, the force of the king's mercenary *Greeks*, which had hitherto kept them in straight subjection. Thus brake out a war between the king and his subjects: wherein though the ill-guided force of the multitude was finally broken; yet king *Ptolemy* thereby wasted much of his strength, and much of his time, that might have been spent, as he thought, much better in revelling; or, as others thought, in succouring *Acheus*. As for *Antiochus*, he had no sooner made his peace with the *Egyptian*, than he turned all his care to the preparation of war against *Acheus*. To this purpose he entered into league with *Attalus*, that so he might distract the forces of his rebel, and find him work on all sides. Finally, his diligence and fortune were such, that within a while he had pent up *Acheus* into the city of *Sardes*, where he held him about two years besieged. The city was very strong, and well victualled, so as there appeared not, when the second year came, any greater likelihood of taking

taking it, than in the first year's siege. In the end, one *Lagoran*, a *Cretan*, found means how to enter the town. The castle it self was upon a very high rock; and in a manner impregnable; as also the town-wall adjoining to the castle, in that part which was called *the Saw*, was in like manner situated upon steep rocks, and hardly accessible, that hung over a deep bottom, whereinto the dead carcases of horses, and other beasts, yea, and sometimes of men, used to be thrown. Now it was observed by *Lagoras*, that the ravens, and other birds of prey, which haunted that place by reason of their food, which was there never wanting, used to fly up unto the top of the rocks, and to pitch upon the walls, where they rested without any disturbance. Observing this often, he reasoned with himself, and concluded, that those parts of the wall were left unguarded, as being thought unapproachable. Hereof he informed the king, who approved his judgment, and gave unto him the leading of such men as he desired for the accomplishing of the enterprise. The success was agreeable to that which *Lagoras* had before conceived; and, though with much labour, yet without resistance, he scaled those rocks, and (whilst a general assault was made) entered the town in that part, which was at other times unguarded, then unthought upon. In the same place had the *Persians* under *Cyrus*, gotten into *Sardes*, when *Cræsus* thought himself secure on that side. But the citizens took not warning by the example of a loss many ages past'd, and therefore out of memory. *Achæus* held still the castle, which not only seemed by nature impregnable, but was very well stored with all necessaries, and manned with a sufficient number of such as were to him well assured. *Antiochus* therefore was constrained to waste much time about it, having none other hopes to prevail, than by famishing the inclosed. Besides the usual tediousness of expectation, his business called him thence away into the higher *Asia*, where the *Bactrians* and *Parthians*, with the *Hyrcanians*, had erected kingdoms taken out of his dominions, upon which they still encroached. But he thought it not safe to let *Achæus* break loose again. On the other side, there were some agents of *Ptolemy* the *Egyptian*, and good friends unto *Achæus*, that made it their whole study how to deliver this besieged prince. If they could rescue his person, they cared for no more; but presumed, that when he should appear in the countries under *Taurus*, he would soon have an army at command, and be strong enough to hold *Antiochus* as hardly to work, as at any time before. Wherefore they dealt with one *Bolis*, a *Cretan*, that was acquainted well with all the ways in the country, and particularly with the by-paths and exceeding difficult passages among those rocks whereon the castle of *Sardes* stood. Him they tempted with great rewards, which he should receive at the hands of *Ptolemy*, as well as of *Achæus*, to do his best for the performance of their desire. He undertook the business, and gave such likely reasons of bringing all to effect, that they wrote unto *Achæus* by one *Arianus*, a trusty messenger, whom *Bolis* found means to convey into the castle. The faith of these negotiators *Achæus* held most assured. They also wrote unto him in privy characters, or cyphers, where-with none save he and they were acquainted; whereby he knew, that it was no feigned device

of his enemies, in the name of his friends. As for the messenger, he was a trusty fellow, and one whom *Achæus* found, by examination, heartily affected unto their side. But the contents of the epistle, which were, that he should be confident in the faith of *Bolis*, and of one *Cambylus*, whom *Bolis* had won unto the business, did somewhat trouble him. They were men to him unknown; and *Cambylus* was a follower of *Antiochus*, under whom he had the command of those *Cretans*, which held one of the forts that blocked up the castle of *Sardes*. Nevertheless, other way to escape he saw none, than by putting himself to some adventure. When the messenger had therefore passed to and fro, it was at length concluded, that *Bolis* himself should come to speak with *Achæus*, and conduct him forth. There was none other than good faith meant by any of the rest, save only by *Bolis* and *Cambylus*, which were *Cretans*, and (as all their countrymen, ^a some few excepted, have been, and still are) false knaves. These two held a consultation together, that was, as ^b *Polybius* observes it, rightly *critical*, neither concerning the safety of him whose deliverance they undertook, nor touching the discharge of their own faith; but only how to get most, with least ado and danger to themselves. Briefly, they concluded, that first of all they would equally share between them ten talents, which they had already received in hand; and then that they would reveal the matter to *Antiochus*, offering to deliver *Achæus* unto him, if they might be well rewarded both with present money, and with promise of consideration answerable to the greatness of such a service, when it should be dispatched. *Antiochus*, hearing this promise of *Cambylus*, was no less glad, than were the friends of *Achæus* well pleased with the comfortable promises of *Bolis*. At length, when all things were in readiness on both sides, and that *Bolis*, with *Arianus*, was to get up into the castle, and convey *Achæus* thence, he first went with *Cambylus* to speak with the king, who gave him very private audience, and confirmed unto him by word of mouth, the assurance of his liberal promises. And after that, putting on the countenance of an honest man, and of one that was faithful unto *Ptolemy*, whom he had long served, he accompanied *Arianus* up into the castle. At his coming thither, he was lovingly entertained; yet questioned at large by *Achæus*, touching all the weight of the business in hand. But he discoursed so well, and with such gravity, that there appeared no reason of distrusting either his faith or judgment. He was an old soldier, had long been a captain under *Ptolemy*, and did not thrust himself into this business, but was invited by honourable and faithful men. He had also taken a safe course in winning (as it seemed) that other countryman of his, who kept a fort that stood in their way; and thereby had already sundry times given safe passage and repassage unto *Arianus*. But against all these comfortable hopes, the importance of so great an adventure stirred up some dissidence. *Achæus* therefore dealt wisely, and said, that he would yet stay in the castle a little longer; but that he meant to send away with *Bolis* three or four of his friends, from whom, when he received better advertisement concerning the likelihood of the enterprise, then

^a Among these few, I do not except one, calling himself Euclæmon John Andrew, a *Cretan*; who in one of his late shameful libels, wherein he traducth our king, religion, and country, with all the good and worthy men, of whom he could learn the names, hath, by importing my name, twice belied me, in calling me a puritan, and one that have been dangerous to my sovereign. It is an honour to be ill spoken of by so diligent a supporter of treasons, and architect of lies; in regard whereof I may not deny him the commendation of criticism, no less voluminous, than he in multiplicity of name is beyond any the *Cretans* in elder times, that were always liars, evil beasts, and false bellies.

^b Polyb. hist. l. 8.

would he issue forth himself. Hereby he took order not to commit himself wholly unto the faith of a man unknown. But, as *Polybius* well notes, he did not consider that he played the *Cretan* with a man of *Crete*; which is to say, that he had to do with one, whose knavery could not be avoided by circumspection. *Bolis* and *Cambylus* had layed their plot thus; that if *Achæus* came forth alone, then should he easily be taken by the ambush prepared for him; if he were accompanied with many of his friends, then should *Arianus* be appointed to lead the way, as one that of late had trodden it oft; and *Bolis* following behind, should have an eye upon *Achæus*, to prevent him not only from escaping in the tumult, but from breaking his own neck, or otherwise killing himself; to the end that, being taken alive, he might be to *Antiochus* the more welcome present. And in such order came they now forth. *Arianus* going before as guide, the rest following as the way served, and *Bolis* in the rear. *Achæus* made none acquainted with his purpose, till the very instant of his departure. Then signified he the matter to his wife *Laodice*; and, comforting her with hope as well as he could, appointed four of his especial friends to bear him company. They were all disguised, and one of them alone took upon him to have knowledge of the *Greek* tongue, speaking and answering as need should require, for all, as if the rest had been *Barbarians*. *Bolis* followed them, craftily devising upon his business, and much perplexed. For (saith *Polybius*) though he were of *Crete*, and prone to surmise any thing to the mischief of another, yet could he not see in the dark, nor know which of them was *Achæus*, or whether *Achæus* himself were there. The way was very uneasy, and in some places dangerous; especially to those that knew it not. Wherefore they were fain to stay in divers places, and help one another up or down. But upon every occasion, they were all of them very officious towards *Achæus*, lending him their hands, and taking such care of him, as easily gave *Bolis* to understand that he was the man; and so by their unseasonable duty they undid their lord. When they came to the place, where *Cambylus* lay in wait, *Bolis* whistled, and presently clasped *Achæus* about the middle, holding him fast that he should not stir. So they were all taken by the ambush, and carried forthwith to *Antiochus*, who sat up watching in his pavilion, expecting the event. The sight of *Achæus* brought in bound unto him, did so astonish the king, that he was unable to speak a word, and anon brake out into weeping. Yet was he before informed of the plot, which might have kept him from admiration; as also the next morning betimes assembling his friends together, he condemned *Achæus* to a cruel death; which argues, that he was not moved with pity towards this unhappy man. Wherefore it was the general regard of calamities, incident unto great fortunes, that wrung from him these tears; as also the rarity of the accident, that made both him and his friends to wonder; though it be so, that such a course as this of his, in employing two mischievous knaves against one traitor, doth not rarely succeed well, according to that *Spanish* proverb, *A un Traydor dos allevosos*. The death of *Achæus* brought such astonishment upon those which held the castle, that after a while they gave up the place and themselves unto the king, whereby he got entire possession of all to him belonging in the lesser *Asia*.

Some years passed after this, ere *Antiochus* was ready for his expedition against the *Parthians*, and *Hyrcanians*. The *Parthians* were a little nation of

obscure beginnings, and commonly subject unto those that ruled in *Media*. In the great shuffling for provinces after the death of *Alexander*, the government over them was committed by *Antipater* to one *Philip*, a man of small regard; shortly they fell to *Eumenes*, then to *Antigonus*, and from him, together with the *Medes*, to *Seleucus*, under whose posterity they continued until the reign of *Seleucus Callinicus*, being ruled by lieutenants of the *Syrian* kings. The lustful insolency of one of these lieutenants, together with the misfortune of *Callinicus*, that was vanquished, and thought to be slain by the *Gauls*, did stir up *Arfaces*, a nobleman of the country, to seek revenge of injuries done, and animate them to rebel. So he slew the king's lieutenant, made himself king of the *Parthians*, and lord of *Hyrcania*; fought prosperously with those that disturbed him in his beginnings, and took *Seleucus Callinicus* prisoner in battel, whom he royally entertained, and dismissed. Hereby he won the reputation as a lawful king, and, by good government of his country, procured unto himself such love of his subjects, that his name was continued to his successors, like as that of the *Ptolemies* in *Egypt*, and that of the *Cesars* afterwards in *Rome*. Much about the same time the *Bactrians* rebelled, though these at length, and all belonging to the *Seleucidae* beyond *Euphrates*, increased the *Parthians* dominion. Now *Antiochus* went against them with so strong an army, that they durst not meet him in the plain field; but kept themselves in woods, or places of strength, and defended the streights and passages of mountains. The resistances they made availed them not; for *Antiochus* had with him so great a multitude, and so well sorted, as he needed not to turn out of the way from those that lay fortified against him in woods and streights between their mountains; it being easy to spare, out of so great a number, as many, as fetching a compass about, might either get above the enemy's heads, or come behind, and charge them on the back. Thus did he often employ against them his light armature, wherewith he caused them to dislodge, and give way unto his *Phalanx*, upon which they durst not adventure themselves in open ground. *Arfaces*, the second of the name (for his father was dead before this) was then king of *Parthia*; who, though he was confident in the fidelity of his own subjects, yet feared to encounter with so mighty an invader. His hope was, that the bad ways, and desarts, would have caused *Antiochus*, when he was at *Ecbatane* in *Media*, to give over the journey without proceeding much further. This not so falling out, he caused the wells and springs in the wilderness, through which his enemy must pass, to be dammed up and spoiled. By which means, and the resistance before spoken of, when he could not prevail, he withdrew himself out of the way; suffering the enemy to take his pleasure for a time, in wasting the country; wherein, without some victory obtained, he could make no long abode. *Antiochus* hereby found, that *Arfaces* was nothing strongly provided for the war. Wherefore he marched through the heart of *Parthia*, and then forward into *Hyrcania*, where he won *Tambrace*, the chief city of that province. This indignity, and many other losses, caused *Arfaces* at length, when he had gathered an army that seemed strong enough, to adventure a battel. The issue thereof was such, as gave to neither of the kings hopes of accomplishing his desires, without exceeding difficulty. Wherefore *Arfaces* craved peace, and at length obtained it, *Antiochus* thinking it not amiss to make him a friend, whom he could not make a subject.

The next expedition of *Antiochus*, was against *Euthydemus*, king of the *Bactrians*; one that indeed had not rebelled against him, or his ancestors; but, having gotten the kingdom from those that had rebelled, kept it to himself. With *Euthydemus* he fought a battle by the river *Arius*, where he had the victory. But the victory was not so greatly to his honour, as was the testimony which he gave of his own private valour in obtaining it. He was thought that day to have demeaned himself more courageously, than did any one man in all his army. His horse was slain under him, and he himself received a wound in his mouth, whereby he lost some of his teeth. As for *Euthydemus*, he withdrew himself back into the furthest parts of his kingdom, and afterwards protracted the war, seeking how to end it by composition. So ambassadors passed between the kings; *Antiochus* complaining, that a country of his was unjustly usurped from him; *Euthydemus* answering, that he had won it from the children of the usurpers; and further, that the *Bactrians*, a wild nation, could hardly be retained in order, save by a king of their own; for that they bordered upon the *Scythians*, with whom if they should join, it would be greatly to the danger of all the provinces that lay behind them. These allegations, together with his own weariness, pacified *Antiochus*, and made him willing to grant peace upon reasonable conditions. *Demetrius*, the son of *Euthydemus*, being a goodly gentleman, and employed by his father as ambassador in this treaty of peace, was not a little available unto a good conclusion. For *Antiochus* liked him so well, that he promised to give him in marriage one of his own daughters, and therewithal permitted *Euthydemus* to retain the kingdom; causing him nevertheless to deliver up all his elephants; as also to bind himself by oath to such covenants as he thought requisite.

So *Antiochus*, leaving the *Bactrian* in quiet, made a journey over *Caucasus*, and came to the borders of *India*, where he renewed with *Sophaganeus*, king of the *Indians*, the society that had been between their ancestors. The *Indians* had remained subject unto the *Macedonians*, for a little while after *Alexander's* death. *Eumenes*, in his war against *Antigonus*, raised part of his forces out of their country. But when *Antigonus*, after his victory, turned westward, and was over-buffed in a great civil war; then did one *Sandrocottus*, an *Indian*, stir up his countrymen to rebellion; making himself their captain, and taking upon him as protector of their liberty. This office and title he soon changed, though not without some contention, into the name and majesty of a king. Finally, he got unto himself (having an army of six hundred thousand men) if not all *India*, yet as much of it as had been *Alexander's*. In this estate he had well confirmed himself, ere *Seleucus Nicator* could find leisure to call him to account. Neither did he faint, or humble himself, at the coming of *Seleucus*, but met him in field, as ready to defend his own; so strongly and well appointed, that the *Macedonian* was contented, to make both peace and affinity with him, taking only a reward of fifty elephants. This league, made by the founders of the *Indian* and *Syrian* kingdoms, was continued by some offices or love between their children, and now renewed by *Antiochus*, whose number of elephants were increased thereupon by the *Indian* king to an hundred and fifty; as also he was promised to

have some treasure sent after him, which he left one to receive. Thus parted these two great kings. Neither had the *Indians*, from this time forwards, in many generations, any business worthy of remembrance with the *Western* countries. The posterity of *Sandrocottus*, is thought to have retained that kingdom unto the days of *Augustus Caesar*: to whom *Porus*, when reigning in *India*, sent ambassadors with presents, and an epistle written in *Greek*: wherein, among other things, he said; That he had command over six hundred kings. There is also found, scattered in sundry authors, the mention of some which held that kingdom, in divers ages, even unto the time of *Constantine the Great*: being all peradventure of the same race. But *Antiochus*, who in this treaty with *Sophaganeus*, carried himself as the worthier person, receiving presents; and after marched home through *Drangiana* and *Carmania*, with such reputation, that all the potentates, not only in the higher *Asia*, but on the hither side of *Taurus*, humbled themselves unto him, and called him *The Great*; saw an end of his own greatness. within a few years ensuing, by presuming to stand upon points with the *Romans*; whose greatness was the same indeed; that his was only in seeming.

S E C T. III.

The lewd reign of Ptolemy Philopater in Egypt: with the tragical end of his favourites, when he was dead. Antiochus prepares to war on the young child Ptolemy Epiphanes, the son of Philopater. His irresolution in preparing for divers wars at once. His voyage toward the Hellespont. He seeks to hold amity with the Romans, who make a friendly shew to him; intending nevertheless to have war with him. His doings against the Hellespont; which the Romans made the first ground of their quarrel to him.

THIS expedition being finished; *Antiochus* had leisure to repose himself a-while, and study which way to convert the terror of his puissance, for the enlargement of his empire. Within two or three years *Ptolemy Philopater* died: leaving his son *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, a young boy, his successor in the kingdom; unlikely by him to be well defended, against a neighbour so mighty and ambitious. This *Ptolemy*, surnamed *Philopater*, that is to say, *a lover of his father*, is thought to have had that surname given him in meer derision; as having made away both his father and mother. His young years, being newly past his childhood, when he began to reign, may seem to discharge him of so horrible a crime, as his father's death: yet the beastliness of all his following life, makes him not unlike to have done any mischief, whereof he could be accused. Having won the battle at *Raphia*, he gave himself over to sensuality, and was wholly governed by a strumpet, called *Agathoclea*. At her instigation he murdered his own wife and sister; which had adventured herself with him, in that only dangerous action by him undertaken, and performed with honour. The lieutenantships of his provinces, with all commands in his army, and offices whatsoever, were wholly referred unto the disposition of this *Agathoclea*, and her brother *Agathocles*, and of *Oenanthe*, a filthy bawd, that was mother unto them both. So these governed the realm at their pleasure, to the great grief of all the country, till *Philopater* died: who having reigned seventeen years, left none other son than *Ptolemy*

Epiphanes, a child of five years old, begotten on *Arfinoe*, that was his sister and wife. After the king's death, *Agathocles* began to take upon him, as protector of young *Epiphanes*, and governor of the land. He assembled the *Macedons* (which were the king's ordinary forces in pay, not all born in *Macedonia*, but the race of those that abode in *Egypt* with *Ptolemy the first*, and would not be accounted *Egyptians*; as neither would the kings themselves) and bringing forth unto them his sister *Agathoclea*, with the young king in her arms, began a solemn oration. He told them, That the deceased father of this their king, had committed the child into the arms of his sister, but unto the faith of them: on whose valiant right hands, the whole state of the kingdom did now rely. He besought them therefore, that they would be faithful, and, as great need was, defend their king against the treason of one *Tlepolemus*, an ambitious man, who traiterously went about to set the diadem upon his own head, being a meer stranger to the royal blood. Herewithal he produced before them a witness, that should justify his accusation against *Tlepolemus*. Now, tho' it were so, that he delivered all this with a feigned passion of sorrow, and counterfeiting of tears: yet the *Macedons* that heard him, regarded not any word that he spake; but stood laughing, and talking one to another, what a shameless dissembler he was, to take so much upon him, as if he knew not how greatly he was hated. And so brake up the assembly: he that had called it, being scarce aware how. *Agathocles* therefore, whom the old king's favour had made mighty, but neither wise nor well qualified; thought to go to work, as had formerly been his manner, by using his authority, to the suppression of those that he distrusted. He haled out of a temple the mother-in-law of *Tlepolemus*; and cast her into prison. This filled *Alexandria* with rumors, and made the people (tho' accustomed to suffer greater things, whilst they were committed in the old king's name) to meet in knots together, and utter one to another their minds; wherein they had conceived extreme hate, against these three pernicious misgovernours of the old king. Besides their consideration of the present injury done to *Tlepolemus*, they were somewhat also moved with fear of harm; which, in way of requital, *Tlepolemus* was likely to do unto the city. For he was, tho' a man most unapt for government, as afterwards he proved; yet no bad soldier, and well beloved of the army. It was also then in his power, to stop the provision of victuals, which was to come into *Alexandria*. As these motives wrought with the people: so by the remedy which *Agathocles* used, were the *Macedons* more hastily, and more violently stirred unto uproar. He secretly apprehended one of their number, whom he suspected of conspiracy against him; and delivered him unto a follower of his own, to be examined by torture. This poor soldier was carried into an inner-room of the palace, and there stripped out of all his apparel, to be tormented. But whilst the whips were brought forth, and all things even in a readiness for that purpose; there was brought unto the minister of *Agathocles*, a sad report of *Tlepolemus's* being at hand. Hereupon the examiner, and his torturers, one after another, went out of the room; leaving *Meragenes*, the soldier, alone by himself, and the doors open. He perceiving this, naked as he was, conveyed himself out of the palace, and got unto the *Macedonians*; of whom he found some in a

temple thereby at dinner. The *Macedonians* were as fierce in maintenance of their privileges, as are the *Turks Janizaries*. Being assured therefore, that one of their fellows had thus been used; they fell to arms in a great rage, and began to force the palace; crying out, That they would see the king, and not leave him in possession of such a dangerous man. The whole multitude in the city, with loud clamours, made no less a-do than the foldiers, tho' to less effect. So the old bawd, *Oenanthe*, fled into a temple: her son and daughter staid in the court, until the king was taken from them; and they, by his permission, which he easily gave, and by appointment of those that now had him in their hands, delivered up to the fury of the people. *Agathocles* himself was stabbed to death, by some which therein did the office of friends; tho' in manner of enemies. His sister was dragged naked up and down the streets, as was also his mother, with all to them belonging: the enraged multitude committed upon them a barbarous execution of justice, biting them, pulling out their eyes, and tearing them in pieces.

These troubles in *Egypt*, served well to stir up king *Antiochus*; who had very good leisure, tho' he wanted all pretence, to make war on young *Ptolemy*. *Philip* of *Macedon* had the same desire, to get what part he could of the child's estate. But it happened well, that *Ptolemy Philopater*, in the *Punic* war, which was now newly ended, had done many good offices unto the *Romans*. Unto them therefore the *Egyptians* addressed themselves, and craved help against these two kings: who tho' they secretly maligned one the other, yet had entered into covenant, to divide between them, all that belonged unto this orphan, whose father had been confederate with them both. So ^a *M. Lepidus*, was sent from *Rome*, to protect from all violence the king of *Egypt*; especially against *Antiochus*. As for the *Macedonian*, he was very soon found busied, with war at his own doors. Also *Scopas*, the *Etolian*, being a pensioner to the *Egyptian*, was sent into *Greece*, to raise an army of mercenaries. What *Lepidus* did in *Egypt*, I do not find: and therefore think it not improbable, that he was sent thither only one of the three ambassadors, ^b in the beginning of the war with *Philip*, as hath been shewed before. As for *Scopas*, he shortly after went up into *Syria* with his army: where winning many places, amongst the rest of his acts, he subdued the *Jews*; who seem to have yielded themselves a little before unto *Antiochus*, at such time as they saw him prepare for his war, and despaired of receiving help from *Egypt*. ^c But it was not long, ere all these victories of *Scopas* came to nothing. For the very next year following, which was (according to *Eusebius*) the same year that *Philip* was beaten at *Cynoscephale*; *Antiochus* vanquished *Scopas* in battel, and recovered all that had been lost. Among the rest, the *Jews* with great willingness returned under his obedience; and were therefore by him very gently entreated.

The land of *Egypt* this great king did forbear to invade; and gave it out, that he meant to bestow a daughter of his own in marriage upon *Ptolemy*: either hoping, as may seem, that the country would willingly submit it self unto him, if this young child should happen to miscarry; or else that greater purchase might be made in the *Western* parts of *Asia*, whilst *Philip* was held over-laboured by the *Romans*. It appears, that he was

^a Justin. l. 30.^b Liv. l. 31.^c Vide Joseph. Ant. Jud. l. 17. c. 3.

very much distracted; hunting (as we say) two hares at once with one hound. The quarrels between *Attalus*, *Philip*, and the *Greeks*, promised to afford him great advantage, if he should bring his army to the *Hellepont*. On the other side, the state of *Egypt*, being such as hath been declared, seemed easy to be swallowed up at once. One while therefore he took what he could get in *Syria*; where all were willing (and the *Jews* among the rest, tho' hitherto they had kept faith with the *Egyptian*) to yield him obedience. Another while, letting *Egypt* alone, he was about to make invasion upon *Attalus's* kingdom; yet suffered himself easily to be persuaded by the *Roman* ambassadors, and desisted from that enterprise. Having thus far gratified the *Romans*; he sends ambassadors to the senate, to conclude a perfect amity between him and them. It is not lightly to be over-passed, that these his ambassadors were lovingly entertained at *Rome*; and dismissed, with a decree and answer of the senate, altogether to the honour of king *Antiochus*. But this answer of the *Romans* was not sincere; being rather framed according to regard of the king's good liking, than of their own intent. They had not as yet made an end with *Philip*: neither would they gladly be troubled with two great wars at once. Wherefore, not standing much upon the nice examination of what belonged unto their honour; they were content to give good words for the present. In the mean time, *Antiochus* fights with *Scopas* in *Syria*: and shortly prepares to win some towns elsewhere, belonging unto *Ptolemy*; yet withal he sends an army *Westward*, intending to make what profit he can of the distractions in *Greece*. Likewise it is considerable, as an argument of his much irresolution, how notwithstanding his attempts upon both of their kingdoms, he offered one of his daughters to *Ptolemy*, and another to *Eumenes*, the son of *Attalus*, newly king of *Pergamus*; seeking each of their friendships, at one and the same time, when he sought to make each of them a spoil. Thus was he acting and deliberating at once: being carried with an inexpressible desire of repugnancies; which is a disease of great, and over-swelling fortunes. Howsoever it was, he sent an army to *Sardes* by land, under two of his own sons: willing them there to stay for him; whilst he himself, with a fleet of an hundred gallies, and two hundred other vessels, intended to pass along by the coasts of *Cilicia* and *Caria*, taking in such places as held for the *Egyptian*. It was a notable act of the *Rhodians*, that, whilst the war of *Philip* lay yet upon their hands, they adventured upon this great *Antiochus*. They sent unto him a proud embassy; whereby they gave him to understand, that if he passed forward beyond a certain promontory in *Cicilia*, they would meet him, and fight with him; not for any quarrel of theirs unto him; but because he should not join with *Philip* their enemy, and help him against the *Romans*. It was insolently done of them, neither seemed it otherwise, to prescribe such limits unto the king; yet he tempered himself, and without any shew of indignation, gave a gentle answer; partly himself to their ambassadors; partly unto their whole city, by ambassadors which he thither sent. He shewed his desire, to renew the ancient confederacies between his ancestors and them: and willed them not to be afraid, lest his coming should tend unto any hurt, either of them, or of their confederates. As touching the *Romans*, whom they thought that he would molest: they were (he said) his very good friends; whereof, he thought, there needed no better proof, than the en-

tertainment and answer by them newly given to his ambassadors.

The *Rhodians* appear to have been a cunning people, and such as could foresee what weather was like to happen. This answer of the king, and the relation of what had passed between his ambassadors and the senate, moved them not a whit; when they were informed shortly after, that the *Macedonian* war was ended at the battel of *Cynoscephale*. They knew that *Antiochus's* turn would be next; and prepared to be forward on the stronger side. Wherefore they would not be contented to sit still; unless the towns on the *South* coast of *Asia*, belonging to *Ptolemy*, their friend and confederate, were suffered to be at quiet. Herein also they did well: for that they had ever been greatly beholden to all the race of the *Ptolemies*. They therefore, in this time of necessity, gave what aid they could unto all the subjects of the *Egyptian* in those parts. In like manner did king *Eumenes*, the son of *Attalus*, prognosticate as concerning the war that followed, between *Antiochus* and the *Romans*. For when king *Antiochus* made a friendly offer, to bestow one of his daughters upon him in marriage; he excused himself, and would not have her. *Attalus* and *Philetærus* his brethren, wondered at this. But he told them, that the *Romans* would surely make war upon *Antiochus*; and therein finally prevail. Wherefore he said, That by abstaining from this affinity, it should be in his power to join with the *Romans*, and strengthen himself greatly with their friendship. Contrariwise, if he leaned to *Antiochus*: as he must be partaker in his overthrow; so was he sure to be oppressed by him, as by an over-mighty neighbour, if he happened to win the victory.

Antiochus himself wintered about *Ephesus*: where he took such order as he thought convenient, for the reducing of *Smyrna* and *Lampsacus* to obedience; that had usurped their liberty, and obstinately strove to maintain it, in hope that the *Romans* would protect them. In the beginning of the spring he sailed unto the *Hellepont*: where having won some towns that *Philip* had gotten not long before this, he passed over unto *Europe* side; and in short space mastered the *Chersonesus*. Thence went he to *Lyfmachia*; which the *Thracians* had gotten and destroyed, when *Philip* withdrew his garrison thence, to employ it in the *Roman* war. The *Etolians* objected as a crime unto *Philip*, in the conference before *T. Quintius*, that he had oppressed *Lyfmachia*, by thrusting thereinto a garrison. Hereupon *Philip* made answer, that his garrison did not oppress the town, but save it from the *Barbarians*: who took and sack'd it, as soon as the *Macedonians* were gone. That this answer was good and substantial, though it were not accepted as such; might appear by the miserable case, in which *Antiochus* found *Lyfmachia* at his coming thither. For the town was utterly razed by the *Barbarians*; and the people carried away into slavery. Wherefore the king took order to have it re-edified: as also to redeem those that were in bondage; and to recollect as many of the citizens, as were dispersed in the country thereabout. Likewise he was careful to allure thither, by hopeful promises, new inhabitants; and to replenish the city with the wonted frequency. Now, to the end that men should not be terrified from coming thither to dwell, by any fear of the neighbour *Thracians*; he took a journey in hand against those barbarous people, with the one half of his army; leaving the other half, to repair the city. These pains he took, partly in regard of the convenient

venient situation, and former glory of *Lyfimachia*; partly for that he thought it highly redounding unto his own honour, to recover and establish the dominion in those parts, which his fore-father *Seleucus Nicator* had won from *Lyfimachus*, and thereby made his kingdom of greater extent, than it occupied in any following time. But for this ambition he shall dearly pay: and as after that victory against *Lyfimachus*, the death of king *Seleucus* followed shortly; so shall a deadly wound of the kingdom founded by *Seleucus* ensue very speedily, after the re-conquest of the same country, which was the last of *Seleucus's* purchases.

S E C T. IV.

The Romans hold friendly correspondence with Antiochus, during their war with Philip: after which they quarrel with him. The doings of Hannibal at Carthage: whence he is chased by his enemies, and by the Romans: his flight unto the king Antiochus. The Etolians murmur against the Romans in Greece. The war of the Romans and Achæans, with Nabis, the tyrant of Lacedæmon. The departure of the Romans out of Greece. T. Quintius's triumph. Peace denied to Antiochus by the Romans.

FOR the *Romans*, though they were unable to smother their desire of war with *Antiochus*, whereof notice was already taken both by their friends and by their enemies: yet was it much against their will to keep the rumour on foot, which they meant shortly to make good, of this intended war, so long as they wanted matter of quarrel; whereof they were furnished, by this enterprise of the king's about *Lyfimachia*. It was not long, since king *Attalus*, a friend and helper of the *Romans* in their war with *Philip*, could obtain of them none other help against *Antiochus*, than ambassadors to speak for him; because the one of these kings was held no less a friend than the other. Neither did there afterwards pass between them any other offices, than very friendly. *Antiochus*, at the request of their ambassadors, withdrew his invasion from the kingdom of *Pergamus*: also very shortly after he sent ambassadors to them, to make a perfect league of amity between them. This was whilst as yet they were busied with *Philip*; and therefore had reason to answer his good will with good acceptance; as they did in outward shew. But when the *Macedonian* war was at an end, and all, or most of all the states in *Greece*, were become little better than clients unto the *Romans*: then was all this good correspondence changed, into terms of worse, but more plain meaning. For *T. Quintius*, with his ten counsellors sent from *Rome*, required (as hath been shewed before) with a commination of war, this king's gratulation of their victory; as also his long professed amity, and desire to continue in the same.

These ten counsellors were able to inform *T. Quintius*, and acquaint him with the purpose of the senate: whereof yet it seems that he was not ignorant before; since, in regard of *Antiochus*, he was the more inclinable unto peace with *Philip*. It was therefore agreed, when they divided themselves to make progress through divers quarters of *Greece*, for the execution of their late decree, That two of them should visit king *Antiochus*; and the rest, where occasion served, use diligence to make a party strong against him. Neither

was the senate at *Rome* unmindful of the business: wherein, lest *T. Quintius*, with his ten assistants, should happen to forget any thing to their parts belonging; *L. Cornelius* was sent from *Rome* of purpose, to deal with the king about those controversies, that were between him and *Ptolemy*. What other private instructions *Cornelius* had, we may conjecture by the managing of this his embassy. For coming to *Selymbria*: and there understanding that *P. Villius* and *L. Terentius*, having been sent by *Titus*, were at *Lyfimachia*, he hastned thither; whither also came *P. Lentulus* (another of the ten counsellors) from *Bargilla*, to be present at the conference. *Hegesinax* and *Lyfias* were also there; the same, who had lately brought from *Titus* those peremptory conditions, which the ambassadors present shall expound unto their masters. After a few days *Antiochus* returned from his *Thracian* expedition. The meeting and entertainment between him and these *Romans*, was in appearance full of love. But when they came to treat of the business in hand; this good mood was quite altered. *L. Cornelius*, in two or three words, briefly delivered his errand from *Rome*: which was, That *Antiochus* had reason to deliver back unto *Ptolemy* those towns of his, whereof he had lately gotten possession. Hereunto he added, and that very earnestly, That he must also give up the towns of late belonging unto *Philip*; and by him newly occupied. For what could be more absurd, than such folly in the *Romans*, as to let *Antiochus* enjoy the profit of that war, wherein they had laboured so much, and he done nothing? Further he warned the king, that he should not molest those cities that were free: and finally, he demanded of him, upon what reason he was come over with so great an army into *Europe*; for that other cause of his journey there was none probable, than a purpose to make war upon the *Romans*. To this the king made answer, That he wondered why the *Romans* should so trouble themselves, with thinking upon the matters of *Asia*: wherewith he prayed them to let him alone; even as he, without such curiosity, suffered them to do in *Italy* what they thought good. As for his coming over into *Europe*: they saw well enough what business had drawn him thither; namely, the war against the barbarous *Thracians*; the rebuilding of *Lyfimachia*, and the recovery of towns to him belonging, in *Thrace* and *Chersonesus*. Now concerning his title unto that country, he derived it from *Seleucus*: who made conquest thereof, by his victory against *Lyfimachus*. Neither was it so, that any of the places in controversy between him and the other kings, had been still of old belonging to the *Macedonians* or *Egyptians*; but had been seized on by them, or by others from whom they received them, at such time as his ancestors, being lords of those countries, were hindered by multiplicity of business, from looking unto all that was their own. Finally, he willed them, neither to stand in fear of him, as if he intended ought against them from *Lyfimachia*; since it was his purpose to bestow this city upon one of his sons, that should reign therein: nor yet to be grieved with his proceedings in *Asia*; either against the free cities, or against the king of *Egypt*; since it was his meaning to make the free cities beholden unto himself, and to join ere long with *Ptolemy*, not only in friendship, but in a bond of near affinity. *Cornelius* having heard this, and being perhaps unable to refute it; would needs hear further, what the ambassadors of *Smyrna*

and of *Lampfacus*, whom he had there with him, could say for themselves. The ambassadors of *Lampfacus* being called in, began a tale; wherein they seemed to accuse the king before the *Romans*, as it were before competent judges. *Antiochus* therefore interrupted them, and bade them hold their peace; forasmuch as he had not chosen the *Romans*, but would rather take the citizens of *Rhodes*, to be arbitrators between him and them.

Thus the treaty held some few days, without any likelihood of effect. The *Romans*, having not laid their complaints in such sort, as they might be a convenient foundation of the war by them intended: nor yet having purpose to depart well satisfied, and thereby to corroborate the present peace; were doubtful how to order the matter, in such wise as they might neither too rudely, like boisterous *Gallo-Greeks*, pretend only the goodness of their swords; nor yet over-modestly, to retain among the *Greeks* an opinion of their justice, forbear the occasion of making themselves great. The king on the other side was weary of these tedious guests; that would take no answer, and yet scarce knew what to say. At length came news, without any certain author, That *Ptolemy* was dead. Hereof neither the king, nor the *Romans*, would take notice, though each of them were desirous to hasten into *Egypt*: *Antiochus*, to take possession of the kingdom; and *L. Cornelius*, to prevent him thereof, and set the country in good order. *Cornelius* was sent from *Rome* ambassador, both to *Antiochus* and to *Ptolemy*: which gave him occasion to take leave, and prepare for his *Egyptian* voyage. Both he, and his fellow ambassadors, had good leave to depart all together: and the king forthwith made ready, to be in *Egypt* with the first. To his son *Seleucus* he committed his army; and left him to oversee the building of *Lysimachia*: but all his sea-forces he took along with him, and sailed unto *Ephesus*. Thence he sent ambassadors to *Quintius*: whom he requested to deal with him in this matter of peace, after such sort, as might stand with honesty and good faith. But, as he was further proceeding on his voyage; he was perfectly informed that *Ptolemy* was alive. This made him bear another way from *Egypt*: and afterwards a tempest, with a grievous shipwreck, made him, without any further attempt on the way, glad to have safely recovered his port of *Seleucia*. Thence went he to *Antiochia*, where he wintered secure, as might appear, of the *Roman* war.

But the *Romans* had not so done with him. During the treaty at *Lysimachia* (at leastwise not long before or after it) one of their ambassadors that had been sent unto the *Macedonian*, gave him counsel, as in a point highly tending to his good; not to rest contented with the peace which was granted unto him by the *Romans*, but to desire society with them, whereby they should be bound to have the same friends and enemies. And this he advised him to do quickly before the war brake out with *Antiochus*; lest otherwise he might seem to have awaited some fit occasion of taking arms again. They, who dealt thus plainly, did not mean to be satisfied with weak excuses. In like manner some of the *Greeks* were solicited; and particularly the *Etolians*, that constantly and faithfully they should abide in the friendship of the people of *Rome*. It was needless to say plainly whereto this entreaty tended: the sroward answer made by the *Etolians*, declares them to have well understood the purpose. They complained, that they were not alike honoured by the *Romans* after the victory, as they had

been during the war. They that so complained were the most moderate of them. Others cried out, that they had been wronged, and defrauded of what was promised unto them: upbraiding withal the *Romans*, as men to them beholden; not only for their victory over *Philip*; but even for helping them to set foot in *Greece*, which else they never could have done. Hereto the *Roman* gave gentle answers: telling them, that there was no more to do, than to send ambassadors to the senate, and utter their griefs; and then should all be well.

Such care took the *Romans* in *Greece*, for their war intended against *Antiochus*. The same hereof arriving at *Carthage*, gave matter unto the enemies of *Hannibal*, wherewith both to pick a thank of the *Roman* senate; and to chace out of their city this honourable man, whom they so greatly hated. He had of late exercised his virtue against them in the civil administration; and given them an overthrow, or two, in the long robe. The judges at that time bore all the sway in *Carthage*: holding their places during life; and having subject unto them, the lives, goods, and fame of all the rest. Neither did they use this their power with moderation: but conspired in such wise together, that whoso offended any one of them, should have them all to be his enemies; which being once known, he was sure to be soon accused and condemned. In this their impotent rule of the city, *Hannibal* was chosen pretor. By virtue of which office, though he was superiour unto them during that year; yet had it not been their manner to bear much regard unto such an annual magistrate, as at the year's end must be accountable to them, if ought were laid unto his charge. *Hannibal* therefore sending for one of the questors, or officers of the treasury, to come and speak with him: the proud questor set lightly thereby, and would not come. For he was the adverse faction to *Hannibal*; and men of his place, were to be chosen into the order of judges: in contemplation whereof, he was filled already with the spirit of future greatness. But he had not to do with such a tame pretor, as were they that had occupied the place before. *Hannibal* sent for him by a purfivant; and having thus apprehended him, brought him into judgment before a publick assembly of the people. There he was not only shewed, what the undutiful stubbornness of this questor had been; but how unsufferable the insolency of all the judges at the present was: whose unbridled power, made them to regard neither laws nor magistrates. To this oration when he perceived that all the citizens were attentive and favourable; he forthwith propounded a law, which passed with the general good liking; That the judges should be chosen from year to year, and no one man be continued in that office two years together. If this law had been passed, before he passed over *Iberus*; it would not perhaps have been in the power of *Hanno*, to have brought him unto necessity of reforming another grievance, concerning the *Roman* tribute. This tribute the *Carthaginians* were fain to levy by taxation laid upon the whole commonalty, as wanting money in their publick treasury, wherewith to defray either that, or divers other needful charges. *Hannibal* considering this, began to examine the publick revenues; and to take a perfect note, both how much came into the treasury, by ways and means whatsoever; and in what sort it was thence laid out. So he found, That the ordinary charges of the commonwealth did not exhaust the treasury: but that wicked magistrates,

gistrates, and corrupt officers, turning the greatest Part of the monies to their own use, were thereby fain to load the people with needless burdens. Hereof he made such plain demonstration, that these robbers of the common treasure were compelled to restore with shame, what they had gotten by knavery: and so the *Carthaginians* were freed from the necessity of making such poor shifts; as formerly they had used, when they knew not the value of their own estate. But, as the virtue of *Hannibal* was highly commended by all that were good citizens: so they of the *Roman* faction, which had, since the making of the peace until now, little regarded him, began to rage extreamly; as being by him stripp'd of their ill-gotten goods, and ill-employed authority, both at once; even when they thought themselves to have been in full possession of the vanquished *Carthage*. Wherefore they sent letters to their friends at *Rome*: wherein they complained, as if the *Barchine* faction grew strong again, and *Hannibal* would shortly be in arms. Questionless, if oppressing the city by injustice, and robbing the treasury, were the only way to hold *Carthage* in peace with *Rome*: these enemies to the *Barchines* might well cry out, That having done their best already to keep all in quiet, they saw none other likelihood than of war. But having none other matter to alledge, than their own inventions: they said, That *Hannibal* was like unto a wild beast, which would never be tamed: that secret messages pass'd between him, and king *Antiochus*: and that he was wont to complain of idleness, as if it were harmful to *Carthage*; with what else to like effect they could imagine. These accusations they directed not unto the senate: but addressing their letters craftily, every one to the best of his own friends at *Rome*, and such as were senators; they wrought so well, that neither public notice of their conspiracy, was taken at *Carthage*; nor the authority of the *Roman* senate, wanting to the furtherance of their malicious purpose. Only *P. Scipio* is said to have admonished the *Fathers*, that they should not thus dishonourably subscribe, and become seconds to the accusers of *Hannibal*: as if they would oppress, by suborning or countenancing false witnesses against him, the Man, against whom in war they had not of long time prevailed, nor used their victory in such base manner, when they obtained it. But the *Romans* were not all so great-minded as *Scipio*: they wished for some such advantage against *Hannibal*; and were glad to have found it. Three ambassadors they sent over to *Carthage*, *C. Servilius*, *Q. Terentius*, and *Claudius Marcellus*; whose very names import sufficient cause of bad affection to *Hannibal*. These having pass'd the sea, were entertained by those that had procured their coming; and, being by them instructed how to carry themselves, gave out, That they were sent to end some controversies, between the *Carthaginians* and *Masanissa*. But *Hannibal* had kept such good espial upon the *Romans*, that he knew their meaning well enough: against which he was never unprepared. It were enough to say, That he escaped them by flight: but in the actions of so famous a man, I hold it not impertinent to rehearse the particulars. Having openly shewed himself, as was his manner, in the place of assembly, he went forth of the town when it began to wax dark, accompanied with two which were ignorant of his determination; though such as he might well trust. He had appointed horses to be in a readiness at a certain place: whence riding all night, he came to a tower of his own by the sea-side. There had he a ship furnished with

all things needful; as having long expected the necessity of some such journey. So he bade *Afric* farewell; lamenting the misfortune of his country, more than his own. Passing over to the isle of *Cercina*; he found there in the haven some merchants ships of *Carthage*. They saluted him respectively: and the chief among them began to enquire, whither he was bound. He said, he went ambassador to *Tyre*: and that he intended there in the island to make a sacrifice; whereunto he invited all the merchants, and masters of the ships. It was hot weather: and therefore he would needs hold his feast upon the shore; where, because there wanted covert, he made them bring thither all their sails and yards to be used instead of tents. They did so; and feasted with him till it was late at night: at which time he left them there asleep; and putting to sea, held on his course to *Tyre*. All that night, and the day following, he was sure not to be pursued. For the merchants did neither make haste to send any news of him to *Carthage*, as thinking him to be gone ambassador: neither could they, without some loss of time, such of them as made most speed homeward, get away from *Cercina*; being busied awhile in fitting their tackle. At *Carthage*, the miss of so great a person was diversly construed. Some guessed aright, that he was fled. But the more common opinion was, That the *Romans* had made him away. At length came news where he had been seen: and then the *Roman* ambassadors, having none other errand thither, accused him (with an evil grace) as a troubler of the peace; whereby they only discovered the mischief by them intended against him, and the malice of their senate; missing the while their purpose, and causing men to understand, that he fled not thus without great reason.

Hannibal, coming to *Tyre* the mother-city of *Carthage*, was there entertained royally: as one, in whose great worth and honour the *Tyrians*, by reason of affinity between their cities, thought themselves to have interest. Thence went he to *Antioch*; and, finding the king departed, visited his son in *Daphne*: who friendly welcomed him, and sent him unto his father at *Ephesus*, that exceedingly rejoiced at his coming.

As *Antiochus* had cause to be glad, in that he had gotten *Hannibal*: so had the *Romans* no great cause to be therefore sorry; otherwise than as they had much disgraced themselves, by discovering of their impotent malice, in chasing him thus out of his country. For it would not prove alike easy unto this great commander, to make stout soldiers of base *Asiatics*; as it had been by his training and discipline, to make very serviceable and skilful men of war of the *Spaniards*, *Africans*, *Gauls*, and other nations, that were hardly though unexperienced. Or were it supposed, that one man's worth, especially being so extraordinary, could alter the nature of a cowardly people: yet was it therewithal considerable, that the vanities of *Antiochus*, the pride of his court, the baseness of his flatterers, and a thousand other such vexations, would be far more powerful in making unprofitable the virtue of *Hannibal*, now a desolate and banished man; than had been the villany of *Hanno* and his complices, hindering him in those actions wherein he had the high command, and was seconded by his warlike brethren. Wherefore the name of this great *Carthaginian*, would only help to enoble the *Roman* victory: or if it further served to hearten *Antiochus*, and make him less careful to avoid the war; then should it further serve, to justify the *Romans* in their quarrel. And it seems

seems indeed, that it was no little part of their care to get a fair pretence of making war. For *Antiochus*, as is said before, having newly sent ambassadors to *T. Quintius*, requiring that the peace might faithfully be kept, it was not probable, that he had any meaning to take arms, unless by mere violence he were thereto enforced. Only the *Etolians* were greatly suspected, as a turbulent people, desirous of innovation, and therefore practising with this great king, whom they wished to see among them in *Greece*. In this regard, and to appease them, they had of late been answered with gentle words by one of the ten counsellors, that the senate would grant them whatsoever with reason they should ask: but this promise was too large, and unadvised. For when their ambassadors came to *Rome*, the senate would grant them nothing; but wholly referred them to *T. Quintius*, who favoured them least. Hereat they murmured, but knew not how to right themselves, otherwise than by speaking such words as might hasten the *Romans* out of *Greece* for very shame, who had no desire to be thence gone.

The daily talk at *Rome* was of war with *Antiochus*; but in *Greece*, when the *Romans* would leave the country. For the *Etolians* were wont to upbraid the rest of the *Greeks* with the vain liberty which the *Romans* had proclaimed; saying, that these their deliverers had laid heavier fetters upon them than formerly they did wear; but yet brighter and fairer than those of the *Macedonian*: likewise, that it was a gracious act of *Titus*, to take from the legs of the *Greeks* their chain, and tie it about their necks. There was indeed no cause of tarrying longer in *Greece*, if the *Romans* had no other meaning than what they pretended. For *Philip* made no delay in accomplishment of that which was laid upon him: all the towns of *Greece* were at liberty, and the whole country at peace, both with the *Romans*, and within it self. As for *Antiochus*, he made it his daily suit, that the peace between him and *Rome*, such as it was, might be confirmed, and strengthened by a league of more assurance. Nevertheless, *T. Quintius* would needs fear that *Antiochus* meant forthwith to seize upon *Greece*, as soon as he and his army were thence departed. And in this regard, he retained still in his own hands *Chalcis*, *Demetrias*, and the *Acrocorinthus*; by the benefit of which towns, he might the better withstand the dangerous invasion like to be made by *Antiochus*. Suitable unto the doings of *Quintius* were the reports of the ten ambassadors that had been sent over to assist him, when they returned back into the city. *Antiochus*, they said, would questionless fall upon *Greece*; wherein he should find not only the *Etolians*, but *Nabis*, the tyrant of *Lacedemon*, ready to give him entertainment. Wherefore there was none other way, than to do somewhat against these their suspected enemies, especially against *Nabis*, who could worst make resistance; whilst *Antiochus* was far away in *Syria*, and not intente to his business. These reports went not only current through the city, among the vulgar; but found such credit with the chief of the senate, that in the following year, against which time it was expected that *Antiochus* should be ready to take his great enterprise in hand, *P. Cornelius Scipio*, the *African*, desired and obtained a second consulship, with intention to be general in the war against the king and his *Hannibal*. For the present, the business with *Nabis* was referred unto *Titus*, to deal with him as he thought good. This would be a fair colour of his longer tarryance in *Greece*. Therefore he was glad of the employment, whereof also he knew that

many of the *Greeks* would not be sorry; though, for his own part, he wanted all good pretence of taking it in hand. For *Nabis* had entered into friendship with him two or three years before this, as is already shewed, whilst he had war with *Philip*: and had further been contented for the *Romans* sake to be at peace with the *Acheans*; neither since that time had he done any thing, whereby he should draw upon himself this war. He was indeed a detestable tyrant, and hated of the *Acheans*; as one that, besides his own wicked conditions, had formerly done to them great mischief. *Titus* therefore had a plausible theme whereon to discourse before the embassies of all the confederate cities, which he caused to meet for that purpose at *Corinth*. He told them, that in the war with *Philip*, not only the *Greeks*, but the *Romans* themselves, had each their motives apart (which he there briefly rehearsed) that should stir them up, and cause them to be earnest. But in this, which he now propounded to them concerning *Nabis*, the *Romans* had none other interest, than only the making perfect of their honour, in setting all *Greece* at liberty: which noble action was in some sort maimed, or incomplete, whilst the noble city of *Argos* was left in subjection to a tyrant, that had lately occupied it. It therefore belonged unto them, the *Greeks*, duly to consider, whether they thought the deliverance of *Argos* a matter worthy to be undertaken; or whether otherwise, to avoid all further trouble, they could be well contented to leave it as it was. This concerned them, and not the *Romans*, who, in taking this work in hand, or letting it alone, would wholly be ruled by the *Greeks* themselves. The *Athenian* ambassador made answer hereunto very eloquently, and as pleasing as he could devise. He gave thanks to the *Romans* for what was pass'd, extolled their virtues at large, and magnified them highly in regard of this their proposition; wherein, unrequested, they freely made offer to continue that bounty; which, at the vehement request of their poor associates, they had already of late extended unto the *Greeks*. To this he added, that great pity it was to hear such notable virtue and high deserts ill spoken of by some, which took upon them, out of their own imagination, to foretel what harm these their benefactors meant to do hereafter: when as thankfulness rather would have required an acknowledgment of the benefits and pleasures already received. Every one found the meaning of this last clause, which was directly against the *Etolians*. Wherefore *Alexander* the *Etolian* rose up, and told the *Athenians* their own, putting them in mind of their ancient glory, in those times when their city had been the leader of all *Greece*, for defence and recovery of the liberty general; from which honour they were now so far fallen, that they became parasites unto those whom they thought most mighty; and by their base assentation, would lead all the rest into servitude. Then spake he against the *Acheans*, clients that had been a long time unto the *Macedonian*, and soldiers of *Philip*, until they ran away from his adversity. These he said had gotten *Corinth*, and must now have war be made for their sakes, to the end that they might also be lords of *Argos*: whereas the *Etolians*, that had first made war with *Philip*, and always been friends unto the *Romans*, were now defrauded of some places, anciently to them belonging. Neither did he thus contain himself, but objected unto the *Romans* fraudulent dealing; forasmuch as they kept their garrisons in *Demetrias*, *Chalcis*, and the *Acrocorinth*; having been always wont to profess, that *Greece* could never be at liberty whilst those places were not free. Also now

now at last, what else did they seek by this discourse of war with *Nabis*, than business wherewith to find themselves occupied, that so they might have some seeming cause of abiding longer in the country? But they should do well, if they meant as they spake, to carry their legions home out of *Greece*, which could not indeed be free till their departure. As for *Nabis*, the *Etolians* themselves did promise, and would undertake, that they would either cause him to yield to reason, and relinquish *Argos* freely, withdrawing thence his garrison; or else compel him by force of arms to submit himself to the good pleasure of all *Greece*, that was now at unity. These words had been reasonable, if they had proceeded from better men. But it was apparent, that no regard of the common liberty wrought so much with these *Etolians*, as did their own ravenous desire of oppressing others, and getting unto themselves, that worse would use it, the whole dominion in *Greece* which *Philip* had lost. Neither could they well dissemble this, making it no small part of their grievance, that the old league was forgotten; wherein it had been covenanted, that the *Romans* should enjoy the spoil of all, but leave the towns and lands in possession of the *Etolians*. This, and the remembrance of a thousand mischiefs by them done in former times, made the whole assembly, especially the *Acheans*, cry out upon them; intreating the *Romans* to take such order before they went, that not only *Nabis* might be compelled to do right, but the *Etolian* thieves be enforced to keep home, and leave their neighbours in quiet. All this was highly to the pleasure of *Titus*, who saw, that by discountenancing the *Etolians*, he was become the more gracious with all the rest. But whether it pleased him so well, that *Antiochus's* ambassadors did presently after lie hard upon him to draw the peace to some good conclusion, it may be greatly doubted. He cast them off with a slight answer, telling them, that the ten ambassadors or counsellors which had been sent unto him from *Rome*, to be his assistants in these matters of weight, were now returned home; and that without them it was not in his power to conclude upon any thing.

Now concerning the *Lacedemonian* war, it was very soon ended: for *Titus* used the help of all his confederates, and made as great preparation against *Nabis*, both by land and sea, as if he should have had to do with *Philip*. Besides the *Roman* forces, king *Eumenes*, with a navy, and the *Rhodian* fleet, were invited to the service; as also *Philip* of *Macedon* sent aid by land, doing therein poorly, whether it were to get favour of the *Romans*, or whether to make one among the number, in seeking revenge upon *Nabis*, that had done him injury. But the most forward in this expedition were the *Acheans*, who set out ten thousand foot, and a thousand horse. As for the *Etolians*, rather to hold good fashion, and sound their dispositions, than in hopes to speed, their help was required, whereof they excused themselves as well as they thought best. Thus are the *Acheans* now become the prime friends of the *Romans* in *Greece*, having removed the *Etolians* from that degree of favour, like as they themselves hereafter (though not in all haste) shall be supplanted by the same *Lacedemonians* against whom they are now marching.

Some of the *Argives*, more bold than wise, began a conspiracy against the *Lacedemonians* that held their town; meaning to open their gates unto the *Roman*. But ere *Titus* drew near, they were all detected and slain, excepting a very few, that escaped out of the town. The same of this commotion caused the army to march apace towards *Argos*,

with hope to be there before things were at quiet: But there was no stir within the walls, the execution done upon the first movers having terrified all the rest of the citizens. *Titus* then thought it better to assail *Nabis* in the head of his strength at *Lacedemon*, than to consume time about other places; especially at *Argos*, for the freedom whereof, since the war was made, pity it were that the calamities of the war should thereon fall most heavily.

Nabis had in readiness an army of fifteen thousand, wherewith to defend himself against these invaders. Five thousand of them were mercenaries, the rest of his own country, but such as were of all others the worst; as, manumised slaves, malefactors, and base peasants, unto whom his tyranny was beneficial. Of the good and worthy citizens he stood in doubt, and since he could not hope to win their love, his meaning was to hold them quiet by fear. He called them all to an assembly, and encompassing them round with his army, told them of the danger that was towards him and them. If they could agree within themselves, they might, he said, hope the better to withstand the common enemy. But forasmuch as turbulent heads were invited by light occasions to raise tumults, and work dangerous treason, it seemed unto him the safest, and (withal) the mildest course to arrest before-hand, and put in ward, all those whom he found most reason to suspect. So should he keep them innocent perforce, and thereby preserve not only the city and his own person from danger, but them also from the punishment, which else they might have incurred. Hereupon he cites and apprehends about eighty of them, whom he leads away to prison, and the next night puts them all to death. Thus was he sure that they neither should offend, nor yet break loose. As for the death of them, if it should happen to be noised abroad, what could it else do, than terrify the people, who must thereby understand, that it was a mortal crime to be suspected? And to the same purpose his cruelty extended it self unto some poor wretches, whom he accused of a meaning to fly to the enemy. These were openly whipped through all the streets, and slain. Having thus affrighted the citizens, he turned the more freely all his thoughts towards the enemy, that came on apace. He welcomed them with a sally, wherein, as commonly happens, the soldiers of the town had the better at first; but were at length repelled with loss. *Titus* abode not many days before *Sparta*, but overran the country; hoping, belike, to provoke the tyrant forth to battle. The *Roman* fleet at the same time, with king *Eumenes* and the *Rhodians*, laid siege unto *Gythium*, the only or principal haven-town that *Nabis* had. Likely they were to have taken it by force, when there appeared hope of getting it by treason. There were two governors within the town, equal in authority; whereof the one, either for fear, or desire of reward, had a purpose to let in the *Romans*; but the other, finding what was in hand, and being somewhat more faithful, slew the traitor, after whose death, he himself alone made the better defence. Yet when *T. Quintius*, with part of his army, came thither to *Gythium*, this captain of the town had not the heart to abide the uttermost, and await what either time or his master might do for him, but was contented to give up the place; yet upon condition, to depart in safety to *Sparta* with his garrison. *Pythagoras*, the son-in-law of *Nabis*, and brother unto his wife, was come from *Argos*, whereof he had the government, with a thousand soldiers mercenaries, and two thousand *Argives*; it being (as may seem) the tyrant's purpose to relieve *Gythium*, which he thought would have

have held longer out. But when they heard that it was lost, then began they upon finishing the war, by some reasonable composition. *Pythagoras* therefore was sent ambassador to *Titus*, requesting only, that he would appoint a time and place for *Nabis* to meet and speak with him. This was granted. In that parley the tyrant spake very reasonably for himself, proving, that he suffered wrong, and had done none; and that by many good arguments, whereof the sum was, that whatsoever they now did, or could object unto him, was of elder date than the league which they had made with him. Whereupon he inferred, that neither for his keeping the town of *Argos*, nor for any other cause by them alledged, they ought to make war upon him; since *Argos* and all other their allegations whatsoever, had not hindered them, in time of their more need of him, from entering into that league with him; which was never broken on his part, nor ought to be on theirs. But *Quintus* was not herewith satisfied. He charged him with tyranny, and gave instance, as easily he might, of divers barbarous cruelties by him committed. In all which points, forasmuch as they knew this *Nabis* to be guilty, before they made peace and confederacy with him, it was expedient that some other cause of this invasion should be alledged. Wherefore he said further, that this tyrant had occupied *Messina*, a town confederate with the *Romans*; that he had bargained to join with *Philip*, when he was their enemy, not only in league, but also in affinity; and that his fleet had robbed many of their ships about the cape of *Malea*. Now touching this piracy, since in the articles by *Titus* propounded unto *Nabis*, there was restitution mentioned, other than of ships by him taken from the *Greeks*, his neighbours, with whom he had long held war, it may seem to have been objected only by way of compliment, and to enlarge the volume of those complaints, that were otherwise very frivolous. As for *Messina*, and the bargain of alliance made with *Philip*, they were matters foregoing the league that was made between the *Romans* and this tyrant, and therefore not to have been mentioned. All this it seems that *Aristæus*, the pretor of the *Acheans*, very well perceived; who therefore doubting lest the *Romans* (that were wont to talk so much of their own justice, honour, and faithful dealing) should now relent, and forbear to molest him; who, though a wicked man, was yet their confederate, and had never done them wrong, framed his discourse to another end. He intreated *Nabis* to consider well of his own estate, and to settle his fortunes, whilst he might do it without hazard, alledging the examples of many tyrants that had ruled in the neighbour-cities, and therein committed great outrages; yet were afterwards contented to surrender their estates, and lived in great security, honour, and happiness, as private men. Thus they discoursed until night. The next day *Nabis* was contented to relinquish *Argos*, and requested them to deliver unto him in writing their other demands, that he might take counsel with his friends. The issue of all was, that, in regard of the charges, whereat the confederates must be for maintenance of an army to lie in league all that winter (as there was no hope of making short work) before the city of *Sparta*, they were contented to make peace with the tyrant, upon such conditions as *Titus* should think meet. Besides the restitution of *Argos*, and all the places thereon depending, *Titus* propounded many other conditions to *Nabis*, and some of them very grievous. He would not suffer the *Lacedemonian* to have ought to do in the isle of *Crete*; no, nor to make any confederacies, nor war, either in

that island or elsewhere; not to build any town or castle upon his own lands; not to keep any other shipping than two small barks; besides many other troublesome injunctions, with the imposition of an hundred talents in silver, to be paid out of hand, and fifty talents yearly, for eight years next ensuing. For observance of these covenants, he demanded five hostages, such as he himself should name; and one of them to be the tyrant's own son. If it had been the meaning of *Titus* to withdraw the war from *Nabis*, because it was not to be grounded upon justice; then had it been enough, if not more than enough, to take *Argos* from him; which he himself did offer, though it were for fear, to deliver up. But if it were thought reasonable to dispense a little with the *Roman* faith, in regard of the great benefit which thereby might redound unto the state of their best friends in *Greece*, by the extirpation of this tyranny; then should this enterprise, when once it was taken in hand, have been prosecuted unto the very utmost. As for this middle course which the *Romans* held, as it was not honourable to them to enrich themselves by the spoil of one that had not offended them, nor pleasing to the *Acheans*, who judged it ever after a great blemish to the noble acts of *Titus*; so did it minister unto the *Etolians*, and to such as curiously pried into the faults of those which took upon them to be patrons of *Greece*, no barren subject of malicious discourse. For since *Philip*, a king, and descended of many famous kings, might not be suffered by these masterly *Romans* to hold any one of those countries or towns in *Greece*, that had belonged unto his ancestors, it was thought very strange that *Lacedemon*, once the most famous city among all the *Greeks*, was by the same *Romans* left in possession of a tyrant, that had usurped it but yesterday; and he therein rooted by their authority, as their friend and confederate. *Nabis*, on the other side, thought himself unmercifully dealt withal by the self-same *Romans*, whose amity he had preferred in time of a doubtful war, before the love and affinity of the *Macedonian* king, that had committed the city of *Argos* into his hands. But falsely had he dealt with the *Macedonian*, and falsely was he dealt with by those to whom he did betake himself. Among these articles propounded, there was nothing that pleased him, save only that for the banished *Lacedemonians* (of whom a great number were in the *Roman* camp, having among them *Agessipolis*, the natural king of *Sparta*, that, being a young child, was driven out by *Lycurgus*, the first of the tyrants) there was made no provision to have them restored unto their city and estates; but only leave required for as many of their wives, as would be so contented to live abroad with them in banishment. Wherefore he forbore to give consent unto these demands, and sustained an assault or two; hoping, belike, that the enemies would soon be weary. But his fearful nature shortly overcame the resolution, which the sense of these injuries had put into him. So yielding unto all that had been propounded, he delivered the hostages, and thereupon obtained peace, that was confirmed afterwards at *Rome* by the senate and people. From this time forward, he thought the *Romans* far more wicked than himself; and was ready, upon the first advantage, to do them all the mischief that he could.

The *Argives* had heard news that *Lacedemon* was even at the point of being taken. This erected them, and gave them heart to think upon their own good. So they adventured to set upon the garrison, which was much weakened by the remove of the three thousand carried thence by *Pythagoras*, to help the tyrant at *Sparta*. There needed unto their

their liberty no more, than that all of them jointly should set their hands to the getting of it; which no sooner they did, than they obtained it. Presently after this, came *T. Quintius* to *Argos*, where he was joyfully welcomed. He was deservedly acknowledged as author of that benefit, whereon the citizens had laid hold, without staying for him; and that he might the better entitle himself thereto, he caused the liberty of the *Argives* to be proclaimed at the *Nemean games*, as ratifying it by his authority. The city was annexed again to the council of *Achaia*, whereby the *Acheans* were not more strengthened, than the *Argives* themselves were secured from the danger of a relapse into the same extremities out of which they had newly escaped.

After this, *Titus* found little business, or none, wherewith to set on work his army in *Greece*. *Antiochus* was about to send another embassy to *Rome*, desiring peace and friendship of the senate. Things being therefore in appearance wholly disposed unto quiet, *Scipio* the *African*, that was chosen consul at *Rome*, could not have his desire of being sent commander into *Greece*. The unsincere meaning of *Antiochus*, and the tumultuous disposition of the *Etolians*, were held as considerations worthy of regard; yet not sufficient causes of making war. Neither appeared there any more honest way of confuting the *Etolians*, and of thoroughly perswading all the *Greeks* (which was not to be neglected by those that meant to assure unto themselves the patronage of *Greece*) that the good of the country was their sole intent, than by withdrawing thence their legions, and leaving the nation unto it self, till occasion should be ripe, and call them over again. Wherefore, after *Titus* had spent a winter there, without any matter of employment either found, or at any near distance appearing, he called an assembly of delegates from all parts of *Greece* to *Corinth*, where he meant to bid them farewell. There he recounted unto them all that had passed since his coming into those parts, and willed them to value the *Roman* friendship, according to the difference of estate wherein the *Romans* found and left them. Hereto he added some wholesome counsel, touching the moderate use of their liberty, and the care which they ought to have of living peaceably, and without faction. Lastly, he gave up *Acrocorinthus* to the *Acheans*, withdrawing thence the *Roman* garrison, and promising to do the like (which very soon he did) at *Chalcis* and *Demetrias*; that so it might be known what liars the *Etolians* were, who had accused the *Romans* of a purpose to retain those places. With joyful acclamations did the *Greeks* testify their good-liking of that which *Titus* had said and done: as also (at his request) they agreed to ransom and enlarge all *Romans* that had been sold into their country by *Hannibal*.

Thus *Titus* crowned his actions in *Greece* with an happy end; and, by leaving the country before his departure was urged, left therein behind him the memory of his virtue and benefits, untainted by jealousy and suspicion of any evil meaning. At his coming to the city, he had the honour of a triumph, which was the goodliest of all that *Rome* had until that day beheld. Three days together the shew of his pomp continued, as being set out with the spoils of a country, more abundant in things worthy of such a spectacle, than any wherein the *Romans* had before made war. All sorts of arms, with statues, and curious pieces of brass or marble, taken from the enemy, were carried in the first day's pageant. The second day was brought in all the treasure of gold and silver; some in the rude mass unwrought; some in divers sorts of coin; and some in vessels of

fundry kinds, that were the more highly prized by the workmanship. Among these were ten shields, all of silver, and one of pure gold. The third day *Titus* himself entered the city in his triumphant chariot. Before him were carried an hundred and fourteen crowns of gold, bestowed upon him by divers cities. There were also led the beasts for sacrifice, the prisoners, and the hostages; among which, *Demetrius*, the son of king *Philip*, and *Armenes*, the son of *Nabis*, were principal. After him followed his army, and (which added much grace and good-liking to the shew) the *Roman* captives, by his procurement, redeemed from slavery in *Greece*.

Not long after this triumph, the procured audience of the senate for many embassies that were come out of *Greece* and *Asia*. They had all very favourable answers, excepting those of king *Antiochus*, whom the senate would not hear, but referred over to *T. Quintius*, and the ten that had been his counsellors; because their business was said to be somewhat intricate. Hereat the king's ambassadors wondered. They said unto *Titus*, and his associates, that they could not discern wherein consisted any perplexity of their message. For all treaties of peace and friendship, were either between the victor and the vanquished; between those, that, having warred together, were upon equal terms of advantage; or between those that had lived always in good agreement, without any quarrel. Unto the victor, they said, that the vanquished must yield, and patiently endure the imposition of some covenants, that else might seem unreasonable. Where war had been made, and no advantage gotten, there was it usual to demand and make restitution of things and places claimed, gotten, or lost, accordingly as both parts could agree. But between those which had never fallen out, there ought no conditions of establishing friendship to be proposed; since it was reasonable that each part should hold their own, and neither carry it self as superior unto the other, in prescribing ought that might be troublesome. Now of this last kind, was the league and friendship that had been so long in conclusion betwixt *Antiochus* and the *Romans*. Which being so, they held it strange that the *Romans* should thus insist on points no way concerning them, and take upon them to prescribe unto the king, what cities of *Asia* he should set at liberty; from what cities they would give him leave to exact his wonted tributes; either putting, or not putting, his garrisons into them, as the senate should think fit. Hereto *Quintius* answered, that since they went so distinctly to work, he would also do the like. Wherefore he propounded unto them two conditions, and gave them their choice whether to accept: either that it should be lawful for the *Romans* to take part in *Asia* with any that would seek their friendship; or, if king *Antiochus* disliked this, and would have them forbear to meddle in *Asia*, that then he should abandon whatsoever he had gotten in *Europe*. This was plain dealing, but no reasonable nor pertinent answer to that which the king's ambassadors had propounded. For, if the *Romans* might be hired to abstain from *Asia*, by the gift of all that *Antiochus* had lately won in *Europe*, then did not the affairs of *Smyrna*, *Lampascus*, or any other *Asiatic*, whom they were pleased to reckon as their confederates, bind them in honour to make war with a king that sought their love, and had never done them injury. But they knew very well, that *Antiochus* could not without great shame be so base, as to deliver up unto them the city of *Lyfimaebia*, whereon of late he had been at so much cost; in build-

ing it up even from the foundations, and repeopling it with inhabitants, that had been dispersed, or captive to the *Barbarians*. And so much the ambassadors with great indignation alledged: saying, that *Antiochus* desired friendship of the *Romans*; but so, as it might stand with his honour. Now in point of honour, the *Romans* took upon them, as if their cause were far the superior. For it was, they said, their purpose to set at liberty those towns, which the king would oppress, and hold in subjection: especially, since those towns were of *Greekish* blood and language; and fell in that regard under the patronage, which *Rome* had afforded unto all *Greece* besides. By this colour they might soon have left *Antiochus* king of not many subjects on the hither side of *Euphrates*. Neither did they forbear to say, That unless he would quit what he held in *Europe*, it was their meaning, not only to protect those which relied upon them in *Asia*, but therein to make new alliances: namely (as might be understood) with such as were his subjects. Wherefore they urged his ambassadors to come to a point, and tell them plainly which of these two conditions their king would accept. For lack of a pleasing answer, which the ambassadors could not hereto make, little wanted of giving presently defiance to the king. But they suffered themselves to be entreated, and were contented once again to send over *P. Villius*, and others that had been already with the king at *Lyfimachia*; by whom they might receive a final answer, whether these demands made by *Quintius*, and his associates, would be accepted, yea, or no. By this respite of time, and the fruitless treaties ensuing, *Antiochus* got the leisure of two years, or thereabouts, to prepare for war, finding in the *Romans*, all that while, no disposition to let him live in peace.

S E C T. V.

Of long wars which the Romans had with the Gauls, Ligurians, and Spaniards. Of M. Porcius Cato. Injuries done by Masaniſſa to the Carthaginians: that sue to the Romans for justice in vain.

THE *Insubrians*, *Boijans*, and other of the *Cisalpine Gauls*, together with the *Ligurians*; made often, and (in a manner) continual war upon the *Romans* in *Italy*, even from such time as *Hannibal* and his brother *Mago* departed thence, until such time as they themselves were utterly subdued; which was not before the *Romans* were almost at the very height of their empire. These nations having served under *Mago* for wages, and afterwards having gotten *Amilcar*, a *Carthaginian*, to be leader unto them all, as hath been already shewed, by this their fellowship in arms, grew to be such willing partakers of each others fortune, that seldom afterwards either the *Gauls* or *Ligurians* did stir alone, but that their companions, hearing it, were ready to second them. How the *Romans* first prevailed, and got the large possessions in *Gallia Cisalpina*, now called *Lombardy*; it had been long since rehearsed, between the first and second *Punic* wars. As also it hath since appeared, how they lost the greatest part of their hold in that country, by means of *Hannibal's* passage there-through. Neither is it likely, that the re-conquest would have been more difficult or tedious unto the *Romans*, than was the first purchase: if, besides the greater employments which they had of

their armies abroad, their forces appointed unto this war had not been distracted by the *Ligurians*; that always made them to proceed warily, having an eye to the danger at their backs. The *Ligurians* were a stout nation, light and swift of body; well practised in laying ambushes, and not discouraged with any overthrow, but forthwith ready to fight again. Their country was mountainous, rough, woody, and full of streight and dangerous passages. Few good towns they had; but many castles, exceedingly well fortified by nature: so as without much labour, they could neither be taken nor besieged. They were also very poor; and had little or nothing that might give contentment, unto a victorious army that should spoil their land. In these respects they served excellently well, to train up the *Roman* soldiers to hardneſs, and military patience: teaching them (besides other exercises of war) to endure much, and live contented with a little. Their quarrel to *Rome*, grew partly from their love unto the *Gauls*, their neighbours and companions; partly from their delight in robbing and spoiling the territory of their borders, that were subject unto *Rome*. But their obstinate continuance in the war which they had begun, seems to have been grounded upon the condition of all salvages; to be friends or foes, by custom, rather than by judgment: and to acknowledge no such virtue in leagues, or formal conclusions of peace, as ought to hinder them from using their advantage, or taking revenge of injuries when they return to mind. This quality is found in all, or most of the *West-Indians*: who, if they be demanded a reason of the wars between them and any of their neighbours, use commonly this answer, *It hath still been the custom for us and them, to fight one against the other.*

Divers overthrows, though none that were great, these *Ligurians* gave unto the *Romans*: but many more, and greater, they received. Often they sought peace, when they found themselves in distress; and brake it again as often, when they thought it profitable so to do. The best was, that as their country was a good place of exercise unto the *Romans*; so out of their own country they did little harm: not sending any great armies far from home; perhaps, because they knew not how to make war, save on their own ground.

The country of *Spain*, as it was the first part of the continent out of *Italy* that became subject unto the *Romans*: so was it the last of all their provinces, which was wholly and thoroughly by them subdued. It is likened in figure by some geographers, unto an ox-hide: and the *Romans* found in it the property of that ox-hide, which *Calanus*, the *Indian*, shewed unto the great *Alexander*, as an emblem of his large dominions. For, treading upon any side of it, the further parts would rise from the ground. And thus was it with *Spain*. Seldom did it happen, that those parts, from which the *Roman* armies lay furthest, were not up in rebellion. The *Spaniards* were a very hardy nation, and easily stirred up to arms; but had not much knowledge in the art of war, nor any good captains. They wanted also (which was their principal hinderance) good intelligence among themselves: and being divided into many small signories, that had little other communion than of language, they seldom or never provided in general for the common good of their country; but made it their chief care, each of them to look unto their

own territory. Such private respects made them often to fall asunder; when many had united themselves together; for chacing out of the *Romans*. And these were the causes of their often overthrows; as desire of liberty, rather than complaint of any wrong done to them, was the cause of their often taking arms.

The *Carthaginians* had been accustomed, to make evacuation of this cholerick *Spanish* humour; by employing, as mercenaries in their wars abroad, those that were most likely to be unquiet at home. They had also taken soldiers from one part of the country, and used them in another: finding means to pay them all, out of the profits which they raised upon the whole country; as being far better husbands, and of more dexterity than were the *Romans*, in that kind. But contrariwise the *Romans*, using the service of their own legions, and of their sure friends the *Latins*, had little business for the *Spaniards*; and therefore were fain to have much business with them. *Spain* was too far distant, and withal too great, for them to send over colonies thither, whereby to hold it in good order, according to the course that they took in *Italy*. Wherefore it remained, that they should always maintain such armies in the country, as might serve to hold in obedience *per force*; and such heedful captains, as might be still ready to oppose the *Barbarians* in their first commotion. This they did: and thereby held the country, though seldom in peace.

Very soon after the departure of *Scipio*, there was raised a war in *Spain* against the *Romans*, even upon the same general ground, that was the foundation of all the *Spanish* wars following. It was thought unreasonable, that the *Spaniards* should one while help the *Carthaginians* against the *Romans*, and another while the *Romans* against the *Carthaginians*; basely forgetting to help themselves against those that were strangers, yet usurped the dominion over them. But the forces, which *Scipio* had left behind him in that country, being well acquainted with the manner of war in those parts, suppressed this rebellion by many victories: and, together with subjection, brought peace upon the country; which lasted five years. This victory of the *Romans*, though it happily ended the war; yet left it still remaining the cause of the war; which, after five years, brake out again. The *Spaniards* fought a battel with the *Roman* proconsul, whom they slew; and had a great victory, that filled them with greater hopes. Yet the happy success of their wars in *Greece*, made the *Romans* think it enough to send thither two pretors, and with each of them some two legions. These did somewhat; yet not so much, but that *M. Porcius Cato*, who was consul the year following, and sent into that province, found at his coming little less to do, than the reconquering of all *Spain*. But it fell out happily, that all the *Spaniards* were not of one mind: some were faithful to *Rome*; and some were idle beholders of the pains that others took. Yet, when *Cato* had won a great victory upon the chieftest of them; they rose against him in many parts of the country, and put him to much new trouble. Whilst he was about to make a journey against those that were as yet unsubdued, some of the lately vanquished were even ready to rebel. He therefore disarmed them: which they took so heavily, that many of them slew themselves for very grief. Hearing of this, and well understanding, that such desperation might work dangerous effects; he called unto him the principal among them; and commending unto them peace and qui-

etness, which they never had disturbed, but unto their own great loss, he prayed them to devise what course might be taken, for holding them assured unto *Rome*, without further trouble. None of them could, or would give counsel in a matter of this nature. Having therefore talked with them once or twice, and finding their invention barren in this kind of subject, he gave express charge, that upon a day appointed they should throw down the walls of all their towns. Afterwards he carried the war about from place to place; and with singular industry finished it in short time. Neither thought he it any disgrace to him, or to *Rome*, in this time of danger, to imitate the *Carthaginians*, and hire an army of the *Celtiberians*, against other of their countrymen: excusing the indignity, such as it seemed, with a jest, That if he were vanquished and slain, then should he need to pay them nothing; whereas if he had the victory, he could pay them with the enemy's money. Finally he brought the war to so good an end, that in long time after, though *Spain* were often troublesome, yet was in no danger of being lost. He increased also the publick revenues in that province, by causing some mines of iron and silver to be wrought, that had before lain unregarded. Herein he did benefit the commonwealth, by a virtue much agreeable to his own peculiar disposition.

For this *M. Cato* was not only very notable in the art of war, which might well be then termed, The occupation of the *Romans*; but so well furnished with all other useful qualities, that very little was wanting in him, which might seem requisite to the accomplishment of a perfect man. He was very skilful in the *Roman* laws, a man of great eloquence, and not unprofitable in any business either private or publick. Many books he wrote: whereof the principal were, of the *Roman* antiquities, and of husbandry. In matter of husbandry he was notable, and thereby most increased his substance; being of mean birth, and the first of his house. Strong of body he was, and exceeding temperate: so as he lived in perfect health to very old age. But that which most commended him unto the better sort of the *Romans*, was his great sincerity of life, abstinence from bribes, and fashioning himself to the ancient laudable customs of the city. Herein he had merited singular commendations, if the vehemency of his nature had not caused him to malign the virtue of that noble *Scipio* the *African*, and some other worthy men; that were no less honest than himself, though far less rigid, and more gallant in behaviour. Otherwise he was a very good citizen, and one of such temper, that he could fashion himself to all occasions, as if he never were out of his element. He loved business so well, or rather hated vice so earnestly; that, even unto the end of his life, he was exercised in defending himself, or accusing others. For at the age of fourscore and six years, he pleaded in his own defence; and four years after, he accused *Sergius Galba* unto the people. So began the nobility of *Cato's* family; which ended in his great-grandchild *M. Cato* the *Utican*: one, that being of like virtue and fervency, had all his good purposes dash'd, and was finally wearied out of his life, by men of such nobility and greatness as this his ancestor had continually vexed.

The *Spanish* wars, after *Cato's* departure out of the country, though they were not very dangerous, yet were they many; and the country seldom free from insurrection, in one part or other. The *Roman* pretors therefore, of which two every year were sent over commanders into *Spain* (that was divided

divided into two governments) did rarely fail of such work, as might afford the honour of triumph. One slew thirteen thousand *Spaniards* in a battle: another took fifty towns; and a third enforced many states of the country to sue for peace. Thus every one of them, or most of them, did some laudable service; and yet so, that commonly there were of men, towns and people, new that rebelled, instead of the old that were slain, taken or reclaimed. At the causes hereof I have already pointed: and therefore think it enough to say, That the business in *Spain* required not the employment of a *Roman* consul, from such time as *Cato* thence departed, until the *Numantian* war broke out; which was very long after.

In all other countries to the west of the *Ionian* seas, the *Romans* had peace: but so had not the *Carthaginians*. For when *Hannibal* was gone from them, and that the enemies of the *Barchine* house promised all felicity which *Rome* could grant, unto themselves and their obedient city: *Masanissa* fell to disputing with the sword, about the title to the best part of their lands. He began with *Emporia*, a fruitful region about the lesser *Syrtis*: wherein among other cities was that of *Leptis*, which daily paid a talent unto *Carthage* for tribute. This country the *Numidian* challenged; and by winning some part of it, seemed to better his claim unto the whole. He had a great advantage: for that the *Carthaginians* might not make any war, without leave obtained from their masters the *Romans*. They had none other way of redress, than by sending to *Rome* their complaint of his doings. And surely they wanted not good matter to alledge, if the judges had been impartial. For besides that *Scipio*, in limiting out unto them their bounds, had left them the possession of this country: *Masanissa* himself, now very lately, pursuing a rebel that fled out of his kingdom, desired leave of the *Carthaginians*, for himself to pass through it in his way to *Cyrene*: thereby acknowledging (had it otherwise been questionable) that the country was theirs. This notwithstanding, *Masanissa* had wherewith to justify his proceedings, especially unto the *Roman* senate. He gave the *Fathers* to understand by his ambassadors, what faithless people the *Carthaginians* were, and how ill-affected to the state of *Rome*. There had lately been sent unto them from *Hannibal* one, that should persuade them to take part with *Antiochus*. This man they had examined, upon some suspicion of his errand; yet neither arresting him nor his ship, had thereby afforded him means to escape. Hence the *Numidian* concluded, That certainly it was their purpose to rebel; and therefore good policy to keep them down. As for the country of *Emporia*: it had always, he said, been theirs, that were able to hold it by strong hand: and so belonged sometimes unto the *Numidian* kings; though now of late it was in possession of the *Carthaginians*. But if truth were known: the citizens of *Carthage* had not any very warrantable title, unto any more ground, than that whereon their city stood; or scarcely to so much. For they were no better than strangers in *Africa*, that had gotten leave there to build upon so much ground as they could encompass with an ox-hide cut into small thongs. Whatsoever they held without such a compass, was purchased by fraud, and wrongful encroachments. This considered, *Masanissa* requested of the senate, That they would not adjudge unto such usurpers, the country sometimes appertaining to the ancestors of him their assured friend. The *Romans* having heard these allegati-

ons on both sides, found the matter so doubtful, that they could not on the sudden tell what to determine. Wherefore because they would do nothing rashly; they sent over three ambassadors, of whom *P. Scipio* the *African* was one and the chief; to decide the controversy: yet secretly giving them instructions, to leave all as they found it, without making any end one way or other. The ambassadors followed their directions, and left all doubtful. So was it likely that *Masanissa* with a strong army should quickly prevail, against those that could no more than talk of their right, and exclaim against the wrong. By such arts were the *Carthaginians* held not only from stirring in favour of king *Antiochus*, if they had thereto any disposition; but were prepared by little and little unto their final destruction: that came upon them, when the *Romans* had leisure to express the utmost of their hatred.

SECT. VI.

The Etolians labour to provoke Antiochus, Philip, and Nabis, to war upon the Romans; by whom they hold themselves wronged and disgraced. Nabis besiegeth Gyttheum, and wasteth some part of Achaëa. The exact skill of Philopœmen, in advantage of ground: wherby he utterly vanquisheth Nabis. Antiochus being denied peace by the Romans, joins with the Etolians. The Etolians surprize Demetrius; and by killing Nabis their confederate, seize upon Sparta. But they are driven out by the citizens: who, at Philopœmen's persuasions, annex themselves to the Acheans.

ALL *Greece* being at peace, and the *Roman* armies thence departed: it grieved much the *Etolians* to think, that they, who had promised unto themselves the whole spoil of *Philip*, and the highest reputation among the *Greeks*; were not only disappointed of their covetous hopes, but quite forsaken by their ancient dependants; and of all other the most unregarded. Yet was there made a great access to their estate; by adding much unto them, of that which had been taken from the *Macedonian*. This might have well sufficed them, if their desires had not been immoderate; and their indignation more vehement, than their desire. But they were not so pleased with that which they had, since they thought it no more than part of their due; as they were vexed with the denial of that which they claimed, and with finding themselves to be wholly disesteemed, wherein they thought that they had unsufferable wrong. Wherefore they devised in a parliament, which they shortly held, by what means they might best right themselves; and give the *Romans* a sorrowful knowledge of the difference, between their enmity and friendship. To this purpose they soon agreed, as concurring all in one affection, That they would not only persuade *Antiochus* to make war upon the *Romans*, as one to whom the *Romans* had long refused peace; but that they would deal with the king of *Macedon* their ancient enemy, and with *Nabis* the tyrant of *Lacedemon*, to join all together in a new confederacy: whose joint forces could not in all likelihood but far surmount those of the *Romans*, *Acheans*, *Rhodians*, and king *Eumenes*, with all that were of their faction. This was a great enterprise, which the *Etolians* took in hand: and well becoming them, for they were great darers. They sent ambassadors to all these kings, with persuasions as they thought most forcible. But *Philip* was irresolute; and *Antiochus* willing to try first all other courses. *Nabis* the *Lacedemonian*, who

who neither (as *Philip*) had lost much nor (as *Antiochus*) was in fear of any war; yet shewed himself of all other the most forward: and not staying so much as to seek any good pretence, began immediately to lay siege to *Gyttheum*, that had been lately taken from him by the *Romans*. The *Acheans*, to whose care chiefly *Titus* at his departure had commended the affairs of *Peloponnesus*, were not slow to admonish *Nabis* of his duty: neither would they have stayed long from repressing his violence by open war; had not some of them thought it wisdom to ask counsel of the *Romans*, and particularly of *T. Quintius*, before they engaged themselves in a business of such importance. Whilst thus they spent time in sending ambassadors, and were advised by *Quintius* to let all alone, and to wait for the coming of the *Roman* forces that would shortly be amongst them: *Nabis* was bold to give them juster cause of complaint, by wasting their own territory.

Philopæmen was then pretor of the *Acheans*, who had long been absent in *Crete*; making war there for his mind's sake and recreation. Unto him the *Acheans* referred themselves, giving him leave to order the war at his pleasure; either staying until the *Romans* came; or doing otherwise, as he should think best. He made all haste to relieve *Gyttheum* by sea; fearing lest the town, and the *Achean* garrison within it, should be lost, if he used any delay. But *Philopæmen* was so bad a seaman, that he knew not a strong ship from a rotten. He made a quadrireme galley his admiral, that had fourscore years ago been counted a gallant vessel, in the navy of *Antigonus Gonatas*. Neither was the rest of his fleet so good, as might encounter with that of the *Lacedemonian*. Only it fell out well, that he committed himself to a light pinnace, or brigantine, that fought better with her wings, than with her talons. For his admiral galley was stemmed at the first; and being rotten with age, sprang so many leaks, and took in water so fast, that she was fain to yield without further resistance. When the rest of the fleet saw what was become of their admiral; all were presently discouraged, and saved themselves with what speed they could. But *Philopæmen* was not herewith daunted. If he had failed in sea-service, which was none of his occupation; he said, that he would make amends by land. The tyrant withdrew part of his army from the siege of *Gyttheum*, to stop the *Acheans* if they should invade his country. But upon these which were placed in guard of *Laconia*, *Philopæmen* came unexpected; fired their camp; and put all, save a very few of them, to the sword. Then marched he with all his army towards *Lacedemon*: within ten miles whereof he was, when the tyrant met him; that had already taken *Gyttheum*. It was not expected, that *Nabis* would have been ready for them so soon. Or if he should come from *Gyttheum* with any part of his forces: yet was it thought that he must overtake them, and charge them in rear. They marched therefore almost securely, in a long troop reaching some five miles: having their horie, and the greatest part of their auxiliaries at their backs to bear off any sudden impression. But *Nabis*, who formerly understood, or at least suspected, what course they would take: appeared in the front of them with all his army; encamped there where they meant to have lodged. It was the custom of *Philopæmen*, when he walked or travelled abroad with his friends, to mark the situation of the country about him; and to discourse, what might befall an army marching the same.

He would suppose, That having with him there such a number of soldiers, ordered and sorted in such manner, and marching towards such a place; he were upon that ground encountred by a greater army, or better prepared to fight. Then would he put the question, whether it were fit for him to hold on his way, retire, or make a stand? what piece of ground it were meet for him to seize upon; and in what manner he might best do it? In what sort he should order his men? Where bestow his carriages; and under what guard? In what sort encamp himself? And which way march the day following? By such continual meditation, he was grown so perfect, that he never met with any difficulty, whence he could not extricate himself and his followers. At this time he made a stand: and having drawn up his rear, he encamped near unto the place where he was; within half a mile of the enemy. His baggage, with all thereto belonging, he bestowed on a rock; encompassing them round with his soldiers. The ground was rough, the ways bad, and the day almost quite spent; so as *Nabis* could not at the present greatly molest him. Both armies were to water at one brook; whereto the *Acheans* lay the nearer. This watering therefore was like to minister the first occasion of skirmish. *Philopæmen* understood this; and laid an ambush in place convenient; whereinto the mercenaries of *Nabis* fell, and were slaughtered in great numbers. Presently after this, he caused one of his own auxiliaries to go to the tyrant, as a fugitive, and tell him, That the *Acheans* had a purpose to get between him and *Lacedemon*; whereby they would both debar his return into the city, and withal, encourage the people, to take arms for the recovery of their freedom. The tyrant hearing this, marched hastily away; and left his camp, which hardly otherwise would have been forced. Some companies he made to stay behind, and shew themselves upon the rampart, thereby to conceal his departure. But *Philopæmen* was not so to be beguiled. He easily won the camp; and gave chase to *Nabis*: whose followers being overtaken, had no courage to turn about and make head. The enemies being thus dispersed, and fled into woods, where they lay in covert all that day; *Philopæmen* conceived aright, that their fear and necessity would teach them to creep homewards, and save themselves, when it grew dark. Wherefore in the evening, when he had gathered together all those of his light-armature, which had followed the chase whilst it was day; he led forth the rest that had well refreshed themselves, and occupied the two most ordinary passages unto *Lacedemon*. So *Nabis's* men, when it was dark night, perceiving in *Philopæmen's* camp great store of lights, thought that all had been at rest: and therefore adventured to make an escape home. But they were so way-laid, that hardly one quarter of them got into *Sparta*. Thirty days together after this, did *Philopæmen* waste the country round about, whilst *Nabis* durst not issue forth of his town; and then returned home, leaving the tyrant in a manner without forces.

The *Roman* ambassadors were then in *Greece*, and *T. Quintius* among them; labouring to make their party strong against *Antiochus* and *Nabis*, whom they knew to be solicited by the *Etolians*. Very fair countenance they also made unto *Philip*; and with comfortable promises drew him to make shew, whatsoever he thought, of good correspondence. They promised to restore unto him his son: and were contented to let him hope, that he should

should receive other favours at their hands ; and regain possessions of many places by them taken from him. Thus did the *Romans* prepare for war against *Antiochus* in *Greece*, whilst their ambassadors that were with him in *Asia*, denied otherwise to grant him peace, than if he would yield unto one of the conditions, by them so often propounded. The long absence of this king in *Syria*, where he had accomplished the marriage between *Ptolemy* and his daughter ; together with the death of young *Antiochus* the king's son, which happened during the treaty, and hindered, or seemed to hinder, the king from giving audience in person to the ambassadors, caused them to return home to *Rome*, as uncertain of their answer as at their setting forth. One thing that might have been, and partly was beneficial unto them, they brought to pass during their abode at *Ephesus* ; either by cunning, or (as *Livy* rather thinks) by chance. Finding *Hannibal* there, they discoursed often with him, and blamed him for having thus fled unto *Antiochus*, upon a causeless suspicion wherein he held the *Romans*, that honoured his virtue, and intended him no harm. Many have affirmed that *P. Scipio* was one of these ambassadors ; and that he, among other discourses with *Hannibal*, demanded once, *Which of all the famous captains that had lived, Hannibal judged the most worthy ?* So *Hannibal* gave to *Alexander* of *Macedon* the first place ; to *Pyrrhus* the second ; and the third he challenged unto himself. But *Scipio*, who thought his own title better, than that it ought to be so forgotten, asked yet further, what wouldst thou have said then, *Hannibal*, if thou hadst vanquished me ? To whom the *Carthaginian* replied, then would not I have given the first place to *Alexander*, but have claimed it as due unto my self. Now whether this were so, or otherwise, the often and friendly conference of *Hannibal* with the *Roman* ambassadors, made him suspected of *Antiochus*, who therefore did forbear a while to use his counsel. Yet afterwards, when *Hannibal* perceived this change in the king, and plainly desiring him to tell the cause thereof, heard what it was, he easily recovered his former grace and credit. For he told how his father had caused him to swear at the altars, when he was a little boy, that he never should be a friend unto the *Romans*. Wherefore he willed the king not to regard any vain surmises ; but to know thus much, that as long as he thought upon war with *Rome*, so long would *Hannibal* do him all good service ; whereas, contrariwise, if he pretended to make peace, then should it behove him to use the counsel of some other man.

The *Etolians*, and their friends, were no less busy all this while in making their party strong against the *Romans*, than were the *Romans* in mustering up their friends in *Greece*. They had so often dealt with *Antiochus*, vaunting much of their own forces, and arrogating to themselves the honour of the victory against *Philip* ; that, finally, they prevailed with him ; especially when the *Roman* ambassadors had left him without hope of peace, unless he would buy it at too dear a rate. They dealt in like sort with the *Macedonian*, but in vain. He understood the *Romans*, and himself too well. Wherefore it concerned them to improve their own forces to the utmost, as knowing that all the burden must lie upon *Antiochus* and themselves, without help from any, save only from some few that were discontented in *Greece*. Whilst they were about this, and had with them an ambassador of the king *Antiochus*, that

animated them to resolution, the *Athenian* ambassadors, whom *Titus* had requested to be at their meeting, stayed their vehemency a little ; by exhorting them not to conclude rashly, without first hearing the *Romans*, that lay near at hand. For want of a ready answer hereto, they were contented to approve the motion. *Titus*, hearing this, thought the business worthy of his presence. For since *Antiochus* had now declared himself against the *Romans*, it would be no small piece of service, to withdraw from his friendship those by whose encouragement he had made the adventure. Wherefore he came to their *Panætolium*, or great assembly of the nation, where he forgot nothing that might serve to appease them. He willed them to consider the weight of the enterprise which they took in hand, whereby *Greece* was like to become a champain-field, on which, to the ruin of the country, the *Romans*, and king *Antiochus*, that commanded no small part of the world, should fight for the mastery ; the *Etolians*, as masters in that kind of fence, setting them on, and becoming ^a the sticklers. As for those grievances which did thus exasperate them, and urge them to such violent courses, he willed them to consider how slight they were, and how much better they might do to send ambassadors to *Rome*, that should either plead their right in the senate, or (if their right unto the places which they claimed were not good) make request to have what they desired, than thus to set the world in an uproar, and be afterwards the first that should repent it. But what he said, or could say, it skilled not much. They had already done ill to make the ambassador of the king, whose help they had sought, wait so long for an answer, and stay doubting what good end they should make with the *Romans*. Neither was it news unto them to hear those comfortable words, that, by sending to *Rome*, they might happen to obtain what they desired ; either as their right, or else by way of favour. For with such terms had they been feasted once already, and were by the senate rejected unto *Titus* ; who, having it in his own power, gave them no satisfaction ; yet would now again refer them to the senate. This were only loss of time, and might abate their credit with *Antiochus*. Wherefore without more ado they made a decree, that king *Antiochus the Great* should be intreated to come over into *Greece*, as well to set the country at liberty, as also to decide the controversies depending between the *Romans* and *Etolians*. Such a decree they would not have made, had they not understood the king's mind before. Having made it, they forgot no point of bravery, whereby to vaunt themselves to the king's ambassadors, and against the *Romans*. *Titus* desired of their pretor to let him see a copy of this new decree. The pretor answered, that then he had other things to do ; but that this decree, and their further answer, they would shortly let him know, if he came to their camp in *Italy* upon the river of *Tibris*. Gentler words would have done better, as the *Etolians* are like to understand hereafter. But having thus begun, they meant henceforth to go roundly to work. The care of the war they referred unto the more private council of their nation ; that no occasion might slip in waiting for the authority of a general assembly. The *Apocleti* (so were the privy-council of *Ætolia* called) went as hotly to work as any of the youngest heads could have done. They laid a plot, how to get into their hands at one time the towns of *Chalcis*, *Demetrias*, and *Sparta* ;

^a Liv. 35. admittit Ætolis fortè, laxissimè.

to each of which they sent men for the purpose. *Demetrius* they took upon the sudden; entering, some of them, as friends to conduct home a principal man of the city; who, for speaking words against *T. Quintius*, had been driven to fly thence; but was, by intercession of those that loved him, again recalled. His *Etolian* companions, that were not many, seized upon a gate, whereat they let in a troop, which they had not left far behind them; and so fell to murdering the chief of the *Roman* faction. At *Chalcis* they sped not so well. Thither also they had a banished man to bring home; but they came so strong, that their purpose was discovered, and the town prepared to defend it self against them. Being therefore demanded the cause of this hostility, they gave a gentle answer, saying, that they came not thither as enemies, but only to deliver the town from the *Romans*, who more insolently domineered over it than ever the *Macedonians* had done. By which rhetoric they prevailed no more than they could do by plain force. For the townsmen replied, that they neither found any arbidgment of their liberty, nor needed any garrison to keep them from the *Romans*; from whom they neither feared any danger, nor received injury. So this business was dash'd. The attempt upon *Sparta* was more strange and desperate. *Nabis*, their good friend, was lord of the town, styling himself king; but more truly by all men called tyrant. He had well-near lost all, by means of the overthrow which *Philopæmen* had lately given him; since he durst not stir abroad, and daily expected the mischief that on all sides threatned him. Wherefore he sent messengers, one after another, to the *Etolians*, requesting them, that as he had not been slow to stir in their behalf, but adventured himself upon the utmost of danger, when all others were backward; so they would be pleased to send him what help they might, since his bad fortune had caused him at present to need it. It hath been often said, that the ravenous *Etolians* were only true to themselves, and regarded neither faith nor friendship, otherwise than as it might conduce to their own ends. And so dealt they now. For since *Nabis's* mercenary forces, which upheld his tyranny, were in a manner consumed, they thought it expedient, for their estate, to put him out of the way; and, by so doing, to assure *Lacedemon* unto themselves. To this purpose, they sent thither *Alexamenus*, one whom they thought a man fit for such a work. To him they gave a thousand foot, and thirty horse, chosen for the purpose. These thirty were, by *Democritus* the pretor, brought into the council of the *Apocleti*, where they were commanded to be no wiser than they should be, nor to think that they were sent to make war with the *Acbeans*, or to do ought else, save only what *Alexamenus* should command them; which, were it never so desperate, and, in seeming, against all reason, yet must they understand, that unless they performed it, they should have no good welcome home. So *Alexamenus* came to the tyrant, whom he encouraged with brave words; telling him, that *Antiochus* was already in *Europe*, and would be anon in *Greece*, meaning to cover all the land and sea with his mighty armies; and that the *Romans* were like to find other manner of work, than of late with *Philip*; since the elephants of this great king, without other help, would suffice to tread them

down. As for the *Etolians*, he said, that if need should so require, they would presently send away to *Lacedemon* all the forces that they could raise; but that they were very desirous at the present to make as goodly a muster as they could before the great king, which caused them to send him thither afore with no greater company. Hereupon he willed *Nabis* to take heart; bring forth his men, that had been long pent up in the city, and train them without the walls; as if shortly he should employ them in work of conquest, rather than defence. *Nabis* was glad of this, and daily exercised his men in the field; riding up and down with his *Alexamenus*, and no more than three or four horse about him, from one point to another, to order and behold them. During this time of exercise, *Alexamenus* made it his fashion to step aside alone to his *Etolians*, and say somewhat as he thought fit; which done, he still returned again to *Nabis*. But when he saw time for the great work that he had in hand, he then went aside to his thirty horse-men, and bade them remember the task enjoined them at their setting forth; telling them, that they were all in case of banished men, unless they would anon come up to him, and help him to finish that which they should see him take in hand. Herewithal the tyrant began to draw near them; and, *Alexamenus* making towards him, charged him on the sudden, and struck him down. The thirty *Etolians* never stood to deliberate upon the matter, but all flew in; and, before any succour could arrive, had made an end of this wretched *Nabis*. Presently, upon the fact committed, the tyrant's mercenaries ran unto the dead body; where, instead of seeking revenge, they stood foolishly gazing as beholders. *Alexamenus*, with his *Etolians*, hastened into the city, and seized on the palace, where he fell to ransacking the treasure; and troubled himself with none other care, as though all were already done. Such of his followers as were dispersed in the town, did also the like; with the greater indignation of the citizens, who, seeing themselves free by the death of the tyrant, could not endure to see those that had slain him begin to tyrannize anew. Wherefore all the town was shortly in arms; and, for lack of another captain, they took a little boy of the royal flock, that had been brought up with *Nabis's* children, whom they mounted upon a good horse, and made him their chief. So they fell upon the *Etolians* that were idly stragling about, and put them all to the sword. *Alexamenus*, with not many of his company, were slain keeping the citadel; and those few that escaped thence into *Arcadia*, were taken by the magistrates, who sold them all as bond-slaves. In this doubtful estate of things at *Lacedemon*, *Philopæmen* came thither, who, calling out the chief of the city, and speaking such words unto them, as *Alexamenus* should have done after he had slain the tyrant, easily perswaded them, for their own good and safety, to incorporate themselves with the *Acbeans*. Thus by the enterprise, no less dishonourable than difficult, of the *Etolians*, and the small, but effectual travel of *Philopæmen*, the *Acbeans* made a notable purchase; and *Lacedemon*, that had hitherto been governed either by kings, or by tyrants that called themselves kings, became the member of a common-wealth, whereof the name had scarce any reputation when *Sparta* ruled over all *Greece*.

S E C T. VII.

Antiochus, perswaded by Thoas the Etolian, comes over into Greece, ill attended. Sundry passages between him, the Etolians, Chalcidians, and others. He wins Chalcis; and thereby the whole isle of Eubœa. The vanity of the king's ambassadors and the Etolians, with the civil answer of Titus to their discourse, before the Achæans. That it concerned the Greeks to have desired peace between the Romans and Antiochus, as the best assurance of their own liberty. Of many petty estates that fell to the king. Of Aminander; and an idle vanity, by which king Philip was lost. Hannibal gives good counsel in vain. Some towns won in Thessaly. The king retires to Chalcis, where he marrieth a young wife, and revels away the rest of winter. Upon the coming of the Roman consul, all forsake Antiochus. He, with two thousand Etolians, keeps the streights of Thermopylæ. He is beaten, and flies into Asia, leaving all in Greece unto the victors.

ANTIOCHUS was troubled much in *Asia* with *Smyrna* and *Lampascus*, that would not hearken to any composition. He thought it neither safe nor honourable to leave them enemies behind him; and to win them by force, was more than hitherto he was able. Yet was he desirous, with all speed convenient, to shew himself in *Greece*; where, he had been told, that his presence would effect wonders. It was said, that in all the country there was a very small number which bore hearty affection unto the *Romans*: that *Nabis* was already up in arms; that *Philip* was like a bandog in a chain, desiring nothing more than to break loose; and that the *Etolians*, without whom the *Romans* had done nothing, nor nothing could have done, were ready to confer upon him the greatness, which they had unworthily bestowed upon insolent *Barbarians*. Of all this, the least part was true; yet that which was true, made such a noise, as added credit unto all the rest. Whilst therefore the king was thinking to send *Hannibal* into *Africa*, there to molest the *Romans*, and so give him the better leisure of using his own opportunities in *Greece*: *Thoas*, the *Etolian*, came over to him, and bade him lay all other care aside; for that his countrymen had already taken *Demetrias*, a town of main importance, that should give him entertainment; whence he might proceed as became the greatness of his virtue and fortune. This did serve to cut off all deliberation. As for *Hannibal*, *Thoas* was bold to tell the king; first, that it was not expedient for him to divide his forces at such a time, when the very reputation of his numbers brought into *Greece* might serve to lay open unto him all places, without need of using violence; and, secondly, that in any such great enterprise, there could not be chosen a more unfit man to be employed in the king's service, than was that famous *Hannibal*, the *Carthaginian*. For he said, that the king should as greatly feel the loss of a fleet or army, perishing under such a notable commander, if his fortune were bad, as if the same had miscarried under one of meaner quality; whereas, nevertheless, if *Hannibal* prevailed, *Hannibal* alone should have all the honour, and not *Antiochus*. In this regard he was of opinion, that such a renowned warrior should be always near unto the king's person, to give advice; which being followed as often as it was found commodious, the good success would wholly redound unto the honour of him that had the sovereign command, even of the king himself. *Antiochus* gladly hearkened unto this admonition;

No. 48.

being jealous of the virtue that shined brighter than the majesty of his own fortune. And thereupon he laid aside the determination, which tended more to the advancement of his desires; than did any thing else by him then or after thought upon.

Presently after this, he made ready for *Greece*. Before his setting forth, in a frivolous pomp of ceremony, he went up from the sea-side to *Ilium*, there to do sacrifice to *Minerva* of *Troy*. Thence passing over the *Egean* sea, he came to *Demetrias*. *Eurylochus*, the *Magnetian*, the same whom the *Etolians* had lately waited on home, when by that pretext they won *Demetrias*; was now the chief man and ruler of his nation. He therefore, with his countrymen, in great frequency, came to do their duties to the king *Antiochus*, and bid him welcome. The king was glad of this, and took it as a sign of good luck, to be so entertained at the beginning. But it may be suspected, that the *Magnetians* found not the like cause of joy; for whereas they had expected a fleet and army somewhat like to that of *Xerxes*; they saw three hundred ships, of which no more than forty were serviceable for the wars, with an army of ten thousand foot, five hundred horse, and six elephants. The *Etolians* no sooner heard of his coming, than they called a parliament, and made decree, whereby they invited him into their country. He knew before that they would so do, and was therefore well onward on his way towards them, when they met him that brought the decree. At his coming to *Lania*, the *Etolians* gave him as joyful entertainment as they could devise. Being brought into their council, he made an oration, wherein he desired them to hold him excused, that he came not followed with a greater army. This was, he said, in true estimation, a sign of his goodwill; in that he staid not to make all things ready, but hastened unto their aid, even whilst the season was unfit for navigation. Yet it should not be long, ere the hope of all those which had expected him, would be satisfied unto the full. For it was his meaning to fill all *Greece* with armies, and all the sea-coasts with his fleets. Neither would he spare for any charge, travel, or danger, to follow the business which he had undertaken, even to drive the *Romans* and their authority out of *Greece*; leaving the country free indeed, and the *Etolians* therein the chief. Now as the armies that were following him, should be very great; so was it his meaning, that all provisions to them belonging should be correspondent, because he would not be any way burdensome unto his confederates. But at the present he must needs intreat them, having thus hastily come over unto their aid, unprovided of many necessities, that they would help him with corn and other victuals, whereof he stood in need. So he left them to their consultation, the conclusion whereof was, after a little dispute (for a vain motion was made by some, that the differences between the *Romans* and them should be put by compromise to the decision of *Antiochus*) that they would yield unto the king's desire, and assist him with all their forces. Here we may observe, how vain a thing it is for an absolute prince to engage himself, as did *Antiochus*, in a business of dangerous importance, upon the promised assurance of a state that is merely popular. For if the vehemency of *Thoas*, and some other of that faction, had not prevailed in this council, the *Etolians*, for gain of two or three towns, yea, for hope of such gain that might have deceived them, were like to have abandoned this king, their friend, unto the discretion of the *Romans*. And what remedy had there been, if this had so fallen out? He could have bemoaned himself to *Thoas*, and complained of the

wrong; but he must have been contented with this answer, that the fault was in those of the opposite side, whom *Thoas* would therefore have pronounced to be very wicked men. It happened much better for the present; though in the future it proved much worse, both for him, and for the *Etolians*. He was chosen general of all their forces: and thirty commissioners were appointed to be about him, as a council of war for the nation. These armed such as readily they could, whilst it was in dispute where they should begin the war. *Chalcis* was thought the meetest place to be first undertaken: whither if they came suddenly, they should not peradventure need to use much force. The king had brought with him into *Etolia* but a thousand foot; leaving the rest behind him at *Demetrias*. With these he hasted away directly towards *Chalcis*; being overtaken by no great number of the *Etolians*, which accompanied him thither. At his coming, the magistrates, and some of the chief citizens, issued forth to parley with him. There the *Etolians* began, as they had lately done before, to tell, how the *Romans* had only in words and false semblance set *Greece* at liberty. But such liberty as might be true and useful, they said would never be obtained; until by removing the necessity of obeying their pleasure that were most mighty, every several estate had where to find redress of any pressure. And to this end was the great *Antiochus* come thither; a king well able to counterpoise, yea to over-weigh the *Romans*: who nevertheless desired them only, so to join with him in league, as that if either the *Romans* or he should offer them wrong, they might keep it in their power, to seek and redress at the other hands. The *Carthaginians* made hereto the same answer, which, to the like allegations, they had made not long before: That their freedom was not imaginary, but absolute; for which they were to thank the *Romans*; without whose good liking, they would enter into no new confederacy. That which they spake of themselves, they could likewise affirm of all the *Greeks*: forasmuch as none of them payed any tribute; was kept under, by any garrison; or lived otherwise than by their own *Laws*, and without being tied unto condition which displeased them. Wherefore they wondered, why the king should thus trouble himself, to deliver cities that were already free. But since he, and the *Etolians*, requested their friendship: they besought both him, and the *Etolians*, to do a friendly office, in departing from them quietly, and leaving them in such good case as they were. With this answer the king departed: for he was not, as then, strong enough to force them. But very soon after, he brought thither a greater power; which terrified them, and made them yield, before all the succours could arrive, which *Titus* had sent for their defence.

The chief city of *Eubœa* being thus gotten; all the rest of the island shortly yielded to *Antiochus*. Four or five hundred *Roman* soldiers, that came over-late to have defended *Chalcis*, reposed themselves at *Delium*, a little town of *Beotia*, lying over-against the island; where was a temple and grove, consecrated unto *Apollo*, that had the privilege of an inviolable sanctuary. In this place were some of them walking, and beholding the things there to be seen, whilst others were busied as they found cause: without fear of any danger; as being in such a place, and no war hitherto proclaimed. But *Menippus*, one of *Antiochus's* captains, that had wearied himself in many vain treaties of peace; took advantage of their carelessness,

and used them with all extremity of war. Very few of them escaped: fifty were taken; and the rest slain. Hereat *Quintius* was grieved: yet so as it pleased him well to consider, that his *Romans* had now more just cause, than before, to make war upon the king.

Antiochus liked well these beginnings, and sent ambassadors into all quarters of *Greece*; in hope, that his reputation should persuade very many to take his part. The wiser sort returned such answer, as the *Chalcidians* had done. Some reserved themselves until he should come among them: knowing that either, if he came not, he must hold them excused for not daring to stir; or, if he came, the *Romans* must pardon their just fear, in yielding to the stronger. None of those that lay far off, joined with him in true meaning; save the *Eleans*, that always favoured the *Etolians*, and now feared the *Acheans*. Little reason there was, that he would think to draw the *Acheans* to his party. Nevertheless he assayed them, upon a vain hope that the envy, which *Titus* was said to bear unto *Philopœmen's* virtue, had bred a secret dislike between that nation and the *Romans*. Wherefore both he and the *Etolians* sent ambassadors to the council at *Ægium*, that spared not brave words, if the *Acheans* would have so been taken. The king's ambassador told of great armies and fleets that were coming: reckoning up the *Dabans*, *Medians*, *Elimeans* and *Cadusians*; names that were not every day heard of, and therefore, as he thought, the more terrible. Then told he them what notable men at sea, the *Sydonians*, *Tyrians*, *Aradians*, and *Pamphylians* were; such indeed as could not be resisted. Now concerning money, and all warlike furniture; it was, he said, well known, that the kingdoms of *Asia* had always thereof great plenty. So as they were much deceived: who, considering the late war made against *Philip*, did think that this with *Antiochus* would prove the like: the case was too far different. Yet this most powerful king, that for the liberty of *Greece* was come from the utmost parts of the east, requested no more of the *Acheans*, than that they would hold themselves as neutral, and quietly look on, whilst he took order with the *Romans*. To the same effect spake the *Etolian* ambassador: and further added, That in the battel at *Cynoscephale*, neither *Titus* had done the part of a general, nor the *Romans* of good soldiers: but that both he and his army had been there destroyed, had they not been protected by virtue of the *Etolians*, which carried the day. *Titus* was present at the council, and heard all this; to which he made as fit answer, as could have been desired. He told the *Acheans*, That neither the king's ambassador, nor the *Etolian*, did so greatly labour to persuade those unto whom they addressed their orations; as to vaunt themselves the one unto the other. So as a man might well discern, what good correspondence in vanity it was, that had thus linked the king and the *Etolians* together. For even such brags as here they made, before the *Acheans* who knew them to be liars, had the *Etolians* also made unto king *Antiochus*: proclaiming the victory over *Philip* to be merely their act: and the whole country of *Greece* to be dependant on them. Interchangeably had they been scalded by the king, with such tales as his ambassador told even now; of *Dabans*, and *Aradians*, and *Elimeans*, and a many others; that were all but a company of *Syrians*, such as were wont to be sold about for bond-slaves, and good for little else. These divers names of rascally people were, he said, like to the diversity of venison, wherewith

wherewith a friend of his at *Chalcis* (no such vaunter as were these ambassadors) had sometime feasted him. For all that variety, whereat he wondered, was none other, as his host then merrily told him; than so many pieces of one tame swine, dress'd after several fashions with variety of sauces. Setting therefore aside this vanity of idle pomp: it were good to make judgment of the great king, by his present doings. He had, notwithstanding all this great noise, no more than ten thousand men about him: for which little army he was fain, in a manner, to beg victuals of the *Etolians*; and take up money at usury, to defray his charges. And thus he ran up and down the country; from *Demetrias* to *Lamia*; thence back to *Chalcis*; and being there shut out, to *Demetrias* again. These were the fruits of lies; wherewith since both *Antiochus* and the *Etolians* had each deluded other; meet it was that they should, as perhaps already they did, repent, whilst wiser men took heed by their example. To a favourable auditory much persuasion is needless. The *Acheans* did not love so well the *Etolians*, as to desire that they should become princes of *Greece*: but rather wished to see them, of all other, made the veriest abjects. Wherefore they stood not to hearken after news, what *Antiochus* did, how he sped in *Eubœa*, or what other cities were like to take his part: but readily proclaimed war against him, and against the *Etolians*.

How the hatred between these two nations grew inveterate, sufficiently appears in the story foregoing. Now have they gotten each their patrons; the one, the *Romans*; the other king *Antiochus*. Herein did each of them unwisely: though far the greater blame ought to be laid on the turbulent spirits of the *Etolians*. For when the *Romans* departed out of *Greece*, and left the country at rest: there was nothing more greatly to have been desired, than that they might never find occasion to return with an army thither again. And in this respect ought the *Greeks* to have fought, not how *Smyrna* and *Lampsacus* might recover their liberty (which had never been held a matter worth regarding, until now of late) but how the powers of the east and west, divided and kept asunder by their country, as two seas by an *Isthmus* or neck of land might be kept from overflowing the bar that parted them. Neither had the *Romans* any better pretence for their seeking to make free those base *Asiatics*, which originally were *Greeks*; than the general applause wherewith all the nation entertained this their loving offer. Yet were *Lyfmachia*, and the towns in *Thrace*, lately gotten by *Antiochus*, pretended as a very great cause of fear, that should move them to take arms even in their defence. But if all *Greece* would have made intercession, and requested that things might continue as they were, promising jointly to assist the *Romans* with their whole forces both by land and sea, whenever king *Antiochus* should make the least offer to stir against them: then had not only this quarrel been at an end; but the *Roman* patronage over the country, had been far from growing, as soon after it did, into a lordly rule.

The *Acheans* were at this time, in a manner, the only nation of *Greece*, that freely and generously declared themselves altogether for the *Romans*, their friends and benefactors. All the rest gave doubtful answers of hope unto both sides; or if some few, as did the *Thessalians*, were firm against *Antiochus*; yet helped they nor one another in the quarrel, nor shewed themselves his enemies, till he pressed them with open force. The *Boeoti-*

ans willingly received him, as soon as he entered upon their borders, not so much for fear of his power, as in hatred of *Titus* and the *Romans*, by whom they had been somewhat hardly used. *Aminander*, the *Athamanian*, besides his old friendship with the *Etolians*, was caught with a bait; which it may be doubted, whether he did more foolishly swallow, or *Antiochus* cast out. He had married the daughter of an *Arcadian*, that was an idle-headed man, and vaunted himself to be descended from *Alexander* the great: naming his two sons, in that regard, *Philip* and *Alexander*. *Philip*, the elder of these brethren, accompanied his sister to the poor court of *Athamania*: where having made his folly known, by talking of his pedigree; he was judged by *Antiochus* and the *Etolians*, a man fit for their turns. They made him believe, that in regard of his high parentage, and the famous memory of *Alexander*, his fore-father; it was their purpose, to do their best for the conquest of *Macedon* to his behoof: since no man had thereto so good title as he. But for the enabling of them hereunto; it behoved him to draw *Aminander* to their party, that so they might the sooner have done with the *Romans*. *Philip* was highly pleased herewith; and by persuasions of himself, or of his sister, effected as much as they desired. But the first piece of service done by this imaginary king (whether it proceeded from his own phrenzy, in hope to get love of the *Macedonians* that should be his subjects, or whether from some vanity in king *Antiochus* that employed him) wrought more harm to his friends, than he and *Aminander* were able to do good. There were two thousand men committed to his leading: with which he marched unto *Cynosephale*, there to gather up the bones of the slaughtered *Macedonians*: whom their king had suffered all this while to lie unburied. The *Macedons* troubled not themselves to think on this charitable act, as if it were to them any benefit at all: but king *Philip* took it in high indignation; as intended merely unto his despatch. Wherefore he presently sent unto the *Romans*; and gave them to understand, that he was ready, with all his power, to aid them wherein they should be pleased to use him.

The *Etolians*, *Magnetians*, *Eubœans*, *Boeotians*, and *Athamanians*, having now all joined with him; *Antiochus* took counsel of them about the prosecution of the war in hand. The chief question was, Whether it were meet for him to invade *Thessaly*, that would not hearken to his persuasions; or whether to let all alone until the spring: because it was now mid-winter. Some thought one thing, and some another: confirming each his own sentence, with the weightiest reasons which he could alledge; as in a matter of great importance. *Hannibal* was at this meeting: who had long been cast aside, as a vessel of no use; but was now required to deliver his opinion. He freely told the king, That what he should now utter, was even the same which he would have spoken, had his counsel at any time before been asked since their coming into *Greece*. For the *Magnetians*, *Boeotians*, and other their good friends, which now so willingly took their parts: what were they else than so many poor estates, that, wanting force of their own, did adjoin themselves for fear unto him, that was strongest at the present; and would afterwards, when they saw it expedient, be as ready to fall to the contrary side, alledging the same fear for their excuse? wherefore he thought it most behoveful, to win king *Philip* of *Macedon* unto their party: who (besides that being once engaged, he should

not

not afterwards have power to recoil and forsake them at his pleasure) was a mighty prince, and one that had means to sustain the *Roman* war with his proper forces. Now that *Philip* might be easily persuaded to join with them; the benefit likely to redound unto himself, by their society, was a very strong argument: though indeed what need was there, of proving by inference the likelihood of this hope? For, said he, *these Etolians here present; and namely this Thoas, being lately ambassador from them into Asia, among other motives which he then used to excite the king unto this expedition, insisted mainly on the same point. He told us, that Philip was moved beyond all patience, with the lordly insolence of the Romans: likening that king to some wild beast that was chained, or lock'd up within some grate, and would fain break loose. If this be so, let us break his chain, and pull down the gate; that he may regain his liberty, and satisfy his angry stomach, upon those that are common enemies to us and him. But if it prove otherwise, and that his fear be greater than his indignation; then shall it behove us to look unto him, that he may not seek to please his good masters the Romans, by offending us. Your son Seleucus is now at Lyfimachia, with part of your army: if Philip will not hearken to your embassy; let Seleucus be in readiness, to fall upon Macedon, and find him work to defend his own on the other side, without putting us here to trouble. Thus much concerning Philip; and the present war in Greece. But more generally for the managing of this great enterprise, wherein you are now embarked against the Romans; I told you my opinion at the beginning. Whereto had you then given ear; the Romans by this time should have heard other news, than that Chalcis in Euboea was become ours. Italy and Gaul should have been on fire with war: and, little to their comfort, they should have understood, that Hannibal was again come into Italy. Neither do I see what should hinder us even now from taking the same course. Send for all your fleet, and army hither (but in any case let ships of burden come along with them, loaden with store of victuals: for as the case now stands, we have here too few hands, and too many mouths.) Whereof let the one half be employed against Italy; whilst you in person with the other half, tarrying on this side the Ionian sea, may both take order for the affairs of Greece, and therewithal make countenance, as if you were even ready to follow us into Italy: yea, and be ready to follow us indeed, if it shall be requisite. This is my advice: who though perhaps I am not very skillful in all sorts of war: yet how to war with the Romans, I have been instructed by long experience, both to their cost and mine own. Of this counsel which I give, I promise you my faithful and diligent service for the execution: but what counsel soever you shall please to follow; I wish it may be prosperous. Many were pleased with the great spirit of the man; and said, he had spoken bravely: but of all this was nothing done; save only that one was sent into *Asia*, to make all things ready there. In the mean while, they went in hand with *Thessaly*; about which they had before disputed. There when they had won one town by force, many other places, doubting their own strength, were glad to make submission. But *Larissa*, that was chief of the country, stood out: not regarding any terrible threats of the king, that lay before the walls with his whole army. This their faith and courage was rewarded by good fortune. For *M. Babius*, a *Roman* propretor, did send help thither. Likewise *Philip* of *Macedon*, protested himself enemy unto *Antiochus*: whereby the same of*

the succour coming to *Larissa*, grew such, as wrought more than the succour could have done, had it arrived. For *Antiochus* perceiving many fires on the mountain's tops afar off; thought that a great army of *Romans* and *Macedonians* had been coming upon him. Therefore excusing himself, by the time of the year; he broke up his siege, and marched away to *Chalcis*. At *Chalcis* he fell in love with a young maiden, daughter unto a citizen of the town: whom, without regard of the much disproportion that was between them, both in years and fortune, he shortly married; and so spent the winter following, as delightfully as he could, without thinking upon the war in hand. His great men and captains followed his example; and the soldiers as readily imitated their captains: in such wise, that when he took the field, he might evidently perceive in what loose manner of discipline his army had passed the winter. But *M. Acilius Glabrio*, the *Roman* consul, shall meet him very shortly, and help him to reclaim them from this looseness of nuptial revels; by setting them to harder exercise.

M. Acilius was chosen consul with *P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica*. The war against *Antiochus* fell to him by lot; whereas otherwise he was no way so honourable, as *Nasica's* colleague: unto whom fell a charge, of far less credit and importance. *Nasica*, besides the great nobility of his family, had been long since, in time of the *Punic* war, crowned with the title of *The best man in Rome*: when the senate, for very fear and superstition, durst not have so pronounced him, had they not so thought him; as being commanded by oracle, That none other man than the very best, should entertain an old stone, which the devil then taught them to call *The mother of the Gods*. But no prerogative of birth, virtue, or good opinion, gave such advantage to the better man, as to make choice of his own province; or arrogate more unto himself, than his lot should afford him. This impartial distribution of employments, helped well to maintain peace and concord. *P. Scipio* therefore was appointed to make war against the *Boians*: wherein he purchased the honour of a triumph, nothing so glorious as was that of his colleague; though purchased with harder service, requiring the more ability in matter of war. But *M. Acilius* went over into *Greece*, with ten thousand foot, two thousand horse, and fifteen elephants. *Ptolemy*, king of *Egypt*, notwithstanding his late alliance with king *Antiochus*; and *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, had lately sent ambassadors to *Rome*, making offer to come each of them in person with all his forces into *Etolia*, there to assist the consul in this war. *Ptolemy* sent also gold and silver, toward the defraying of charges; as one that meant none other than good earnest. But he was too young, and dwelt too far off. So his money was returned unto him with thanks; and his loving offer as lovingly refused. Unto *Philip's* ambassadors answer was made, That this his friendly offer was gratefully accepted: and that the senate and people of *Rome* would think themselves beholden to him, for the assistance that he should give to *Acilius* the consul. *Masaniissa* likewise, and the *Carthaginians*, did strive, which of them should be most forward in gratifying the *Romans*. Each of them promised a great quantity of grain; which they would send partly to *Rome*, partly to the army in *Greece*. And herein *Masaniissa* far out-went the poor city of *Carthage*: as also, in that he offered to lend the consul five hundred horse, and twenty elephants. On the other side, the *Carthaginian*

ginians undertook to set out a fleet at their own charges: and to bring in at one payment all the tribute-money, which was behind, and ought to be discharged by many yearly pensions. But the *Romans* did neither think it good, to let them arm a fleet; nor would let them redeem themselves out of tribute, by paying all at once. As for the corn; it was accepted with condition, That they should be contented to receive the price of it.

The hasty and ridiculous issue of this war, that began with such noise and preparations, were hardly credible: were not the difference exceeding great, between the *Roman* and the *Asiatic* soldier. *Antiochus* had gotten this spring a few towns of *Acarmania*, after the same manner as he had prevailed in other parts of *Greece*; partly by fair words, and treason of the rulers; partly by terror, that was like to prove their excuse, when they should again forsake him. But king *Philip* and *Babius*, having recovered many places; and the *Roman* consul being arrived, against whom none made resistance; he was glad to withdraw himself. *Aminander* fled out of his *Atbamania*: which the *Macedonian* took and enjoyed; as in recompence of his good service to the *Romans*. *Philip*, the brother of *Aminander's* wife, was taken by the consul; made a mocking-stock; and sent away prisoner to *Rome*. The *Theffalians* used much more diligence in returning to their old friends, than they had done in yielding to the king. All their cities, one after another, gave up themselves: the garrisons of *Antiochus*, compounding only for their own lives, and departing unarmed: yet so, that a thousand of them staid behind, and took pay of the *Romans*. This did wonderfully perplex *Antiochus*: who having withdrawn himself to *Chalcis*, and hearing how things went, cried out upon his friends: and said, That they had betrayed him. He had taken a great deal of toil during one half of a winter, and spent the other half in such nuptials, as were little to his honour: after which, in time of need, he found all the promises of the *Etolians* merely verbal; and himself reduced into terms of great extremity. He therefore admired *Hannibal* as a wise man, yea, a very great prophet, that had foreseen all this long before. Nevertheless he sent word to the *Etolians*, that they should now make ready all their forces: as considering their own need to be no less than his. But the *Etolians* had cause to think, that they themselves were shamefully disappointed by *Antiochus*: who having promised to do great wonders, was in all this while seconded by no greater numbers out of *Asia*, than so many as would fill up the same ten thousand which he first brought over. Yet came there some of them, though fewer than at any time before, which joined with him. Hereat the king was angry: and could get no better satisfaction, than that *Thoas* and his fellows had done their best, in vain, to have made all the nation take arms. Since therefore neither his own men came over to him out of *Asia*, nor his friends of *Greece* would appear in this time of danger; he seized upon the streights of *Thermopylae*; as meaning to defend them against the *Romans*, until more help should come. Of the streights of *Thermopylae* there hath been spoken enough^a before, upon many occasions: and then chiefly, when they were defended by *Leonidas* against the huge army of *Xerxes*. Wherefore it may easily be conceived, how the *Romans*, that landed about *Apollonia*, and so came onwards into *Theffaly*, were unable to pass that ledge of moun-

tains, dividing the one half of *Greece*; unless they could win this difficult entrance. But there was great difference between *Leonidas* and *Antiochus*. The former of these, with an handful of men, defended this passage two or three days together, against a world of men coming to invade the country. The latter, having taken upon him to do great miracles, and effect what he listed himself in *Greece*; did commit himself unto the safety of this place, when he was charged by not many more than he had in his own army. There whilst he lay, he sent earnest messages one after another to the *Etolians*, entreating them not to forsake him thus: but at leastwise now to help, and keep the tops of the mountains, lest the *Romans*, finding any by-path, should come down upon him. By this importunity, he got of them two thousand, that undertook to make good the few passages by which only, and not without extream difficulty, it was possible for the enemy to ascend. The *Roman* consul in like sort, prepared to force the streights; without staying to expect king *Philip*, that was hindered by sickness from accompanying him. He had with him *M. Porcius Cato*, and *L. Valerius Flaccus*, that had both of them been consuls. These he sent forth by night with two thousand men, to try whether by any means they could get up to the *Etolians*. He himself encouraged his army: not only by telling them, with what base-conditioned enemies they had to deal; but what rich kingdoms *Antiochus* held, that should bountifully reward them if they were victors. This was on the day before the battel. All that night *Cato* had a fore journey (for what happened unto *L. Valerius* it is uncertain, save only that he failed in his intent) and so much the worse, for that he had no skilful guide. Seeing therefore his men exceedingly tired, with climbing up steepy rocks, and crooked ways: he commanded them to repose themselves; whilst he, being a very able man of body, took in hand the discovery, accompanied with no more than one of like mettle to himself. After a great deal of trouble, he found at length a path: which he took to be, as indeed it was, the best way leading unto the enemies. So thither he brought his men; and held on the same path till towards break of day. It was a place not haunted, because in time of peace there was a fair way through the streights below, that required no such trouble of climbing: neither had this entrance of the *Thermopylae* been so often the seat of war, as might cause any travellers to search out the passages of those desolate mountains. Wherefore the way that *Cato* followed, though it were the best; yet did it lead him to a bog at the end, which would suffer him to pass no further. So he staid there until day-light; by which he discovered both the camp of the *Greeks* underneath him; and some of the *Etolians* very near unto him, that were keeping watch. He therefore sent forth a lusty crew of his men, whom he thought fittest for that service; and willed them by any means to get him some prisoners. This was effected: and he thereby understood, that these *Etolians* were no more than six hundred; as also that king *Antiochus* lay beneath in the valley. So he presently set upon the *Etolians*, overthrew them, slew a great part of them, and chased the rest; that by flying to their camp, guided him unto it. The fight was already begun between the armies below; and the *Romans*, that had easily repelled the king's men, and driven them into their camp, found it in a manner a despe-

^a L. 3. Ch. 6. § 3.

rate piece of work to assault the camp it self, which occupied the whole breadth of the streights, was notably fortified; and not only defended by *Antiochus's* long pikes, which were best at that kind of service, but by archers and slingers that were placed over them on the hill-side, and poured down a shower of weapons upon their heads: but *Cato's* approach determined the matter. It was thought at first that the *Etolians* had been coming to help the king's men; but when the *Roman* arms and ensigns were discovered, such was the terror, that none made offer of resistance; but all of them forsook the camp, and fled. The slaughter was not great, for that the badness of the way did hinder the *Roman* army from making pursuit. Yet this day's loss drove *Antiochus* out of *Greece*, who directly fled to *Chalcis*; and from thence, with the first opportunity, got him back into *Asia*.

All the cities that had embraced the friendship of *Antiochus*, prepared forthwith to entertain the *Romans*, and intreat for pardon; setting open their gates, and presenting themselves unto the consuls in manner of suppliants. Briefly, in few days all was recovered that *Antiochus* had gained, the *Etolians* only standing out, because they knew not what else to do. Neither did the consul give them any respite. At his return from *Chalcis*, he met with king *Philip*, that, having recovered health, came to join with him against *Antiochus*; over whom, since the victory was already gotten, he did gratulate unto the *Romans* their good success; and offered to take part with them in the *Etolian* war. So it was agreed, that the consul should besiege *Heraclea*, and *Philip Lamia* at the same time. Each of them plied his work hard; especially *Philip*, who fain would have taken *Lamia* before the consul should come to help him. But it could not be, for his *Macedonians*, that used to work by mine, were over-much hindered by the stony ground. Yet was *Lamia* even ready to be taken, when the consul, having won *Heraclea*, came thither; and told *Philip*, that the spoil of these towns was a reward unto those that had fought at *Thermopylae*. Herewith *Philip* must be contented, and therefore went his way quietly. But *Acilius*, that could so ill endure to see *Philip* in likelihood of thriving by the *Romans* victory, got not *Lamia* himself, until such time as another consul was ready to ease him of his charge.

The loss of *Heraclea* did so affright the *Etolians*, that they thought no way safer than to desire peace: yet had they sent unto king *Antiochus*, presently after his flight, intreating him not to forsake them utterly, but either to return with all those forces which he had purposed to bring into *Greece*; or, if any thing withheld him from coming in person, at leastwise to help them with money and other aid. They prayed him to consider, that this did not only concern him in honour, but appertained unto his own safety; since it would be much to his hurt, if the *Etolians*, being wholly subdued, the *Romans*, without any enemies at their backs, might set upon him in *Asia*. He considered well of this, and found their words true. Therefore he delivered unto *Nicanor*, one of their ambassadors, a sum of money that might serve to defray the charges of the war; promising, that ere long he would send them strong aid both by land and sea. *Theas*, another of their ambassadors, he retained with him; who willingly stayed, that he might urge the king to make his word good. But when *Heraclea* was taken from them, then did the *Etolians* lay aside all hopes of amending their fortune by the help of *Antio-*

chus; and made suit unto the consul to obtain peace upon any reasonable condition. The consul would scarce vouchsafe to give them audience; but said, he had other business in hand: only he granted them ten days of truce, and sent *L. Valerius Flaccus* with them to *Hypata*; willing them to make him acquainted with as much as they would have delivered unto himself. At their coming to *Hypata*, they began, as men favouring their own cause, to alledge how well they had deserved of the *Romans*. Whereunto *Flaccus* would not hearken. He told them plainly, that the memory of all such good offices past, was quite obliterated by the malice which they had shewed of late. Wherefore he willed them to acknowledge their fault, and to intreat pardon. Better they thought to do so even betimes, than to stay till they were reduced into terms of more extremity. Hereupon they agreed to commit themselves unto the faith of the *Romans*; and to that effect sent ambassadors to the consul. This phrase of committing unto the faith, signified, in their use of it, little else than the acknowledgment of a fault done, and the craving of pardon. But the *Romans* used those words in another sense; and counted them all one as *yielding to discretion*. Wherefore, when the consul heard them speak in this manner, he asked them whether their meaning were agreeable to their words. They answered that it was, and shewed him the decree of their nation, lately made to this purpose. Then, said he, I command you first of all, that none of ye presume to go into *Asia* upon any business, private or publick; then, that ye deliver up unto me *Dicæarchus* the *Etolian*, *Menestrius* the *Epirot*, *Aminander* the *Athamanian*, and such of his countrymen as have followed him in revolting from us. Whilst he was yet speaking, *Phameas*, the ambassador, interrupted him; and prayed him not to mistake the custom of the *Greeks*, who had yielded themselves unto his faith, not unto slavery? What? (said the consul) Do ye stand to plead custom with me, being now at my discretion? Bring hither a chain. With that, chains were brought; and an iron collar, by his appointment, fitted unto every one of their necks. This did so affright them, that they stood dumb, and knew not what to say. But *Valerius*, and some others, intreated the consul not to deal thus hardly with them, since they came as ambassadors; though since, their condition was altered. *Phameas* also spake for himself, and said, that neither he, nor yet the *Apocleti*, or ordinary council of the nation, were able to fulfill these injunctions, without approbation of the general assembly. For which cause he intreated yet further ten days respite, and had granted unto him truce for so long.

This surcease of war, during ten and other ten days together, began presently after the taking of *Heraclea*; when *Philip* had been commanded away from *Lamia*, that else he might have won. Now because of the indignity herein offered unto that king, and to the end that he might not return home with his army, like one that could not be trusted in employment; especially the *Romans* being like hereafter to have farther need of him, in the continuance of this war: he was desired to set upon the *Athamanians*, and some other petty nations, their borderers, whilst the consul was busy with the *Etolians*; taking for his reward all that he could get. And he got in that space all *Athamania*, *Perrhebia*, *Apentia*, and *Dolopia*. For the *Etolians*, hearing what had befallen their ambassadors, were so enraged, that although they were very ill provided for war;

yet they could not endure to hear more talk of peace. And it happened that *Nicanor*, about the same time was come back from *Antiochus*; with money, and hopeful promises, the *Romans* abiding still about *Heraclea*; and *Philip* having lately risen from before *Lamia*, yet not being far gone thence. His money *Nicanor* conveyed into *Lamia*, by very unusual dexterity. But he himself being to pass further to the assembly of the *Etolians*, there to make report of his embassy, was very much perplexed about this his journey, which lay between the *Roman* and *Macedonian* camps. Yet he made the adventure, and keeping as far as he could from the *Roman* side, fell upon a station of *Macedonians*, by whom he was taken, and led unto their king. He expected no good, but either to be delivered unto the *Romans*, or used ill enough by *Philip*. But it seems that the king had not hitherto concocted well the indignity of his being sent away from *Lamia*. For he commanded his servants to intreat *Nicanor* friendly: and he himself being then at supper, did visit him as soon as he rose up; giving him to understand, That the *Etolians* did now reap the fruits of their own madness; forasmuch as they could never hold themselves contented, but would needs be calling strangers into *Greece*. They had pleased themselves well in their acquaintance, first with the *Romans*, and then with king *Antiochus*: but himself, being their neighbour, they could never well endure. It was now therefore, he said, high time, for them to have regard unto his friendship, whereof hitherto they had never made any trial: for surely their good affection, one unto the other, would be much more available unto each of them, than their mutual catching of advantages; whereby they had wrought themselves much displeasure. Thus much the king willed *Nicanor* to signify unto his countrymen; and privately to hold in mind the courtesy which he then did him, in sending him safe home. So giving him a convoy to guard him to *Hypata*; he lovingly dismissed him. For this benefit, *Nicanor* was always after dutifully affected to the crown of *Macedon*: so as in the war of *Perseus* he made himself suspected unto the *Romans*; and therefore was had away to *Rome*; where he ended his life.

When the consul understood, that the *Etolians* refused to make their submission, in such wise as he required it; he forthwith meant to prosecute the war against them, without any longer forbearance. They were preparing to make head against him at *Naupactus*: whither he therefore directly marched, to try what they could or durst. The siege of *Naupactus* was of greater length, than the *Romans* had pre-conceived it: for it was a strong city, and well manned. But *Acilius* stood upon point of honour; wherein he thought that he should have been a loser, by rising from before it without victory. So he staid there well-near all the following time of his consulship; whilst the *Macedonian* king, and the *Acheans*, made far better use of the *Roman* victory. *Philip*, as is said before, being allowed to take in such places as had revolted unto *Antiochus*, and were not hitherto reclaimed, won the strong city of *Demetrias*; and with an hasty course of victory, subdued the *Atbamans* and others. The *Acheans* called to account the *Eleans* and *Messenians*: which had long been addicted to the *Etolian* side; and followed it in taking part with *Antiochus*. The *Eleans* gave good words; whereby they saved themselves from trouble awhile. The *Messenians* being more stout, before they were invaded, had none other help,

when the *Achean* pretor wasted their country; than to offer themselves unto the *Romans*. *Titus* was then at *Corinth*: to whom they sent word, That at his commandment, their gates should be opened; but that unto the *Acheans* it was not their meaning to yield. A message from *Titus* to the *Achean* pretor, did suffice to call home the army, and finish the war: as also the peremptory command of the same *Titus*, caused the *Messenians* to annex themselves unto the *Acheans*, and become part of their common-weal. Such was now the majesty of a *Roman* ambassador. *Titus* did favour the *Acheans*; yet could not like it well, that either they, or any other, should take too much upon them. He thought it enough, that they had their liberty, and were strong enough to defend it against any of their neighbours. That they should make themselves great lords, and able to dispute with the *Romans* upon even terms; it was no part of his desire. They had lately brought the isle of *Zacynthus*, which had once been *Philip's*, and was afterwards given by him to *Aminander*, who sent a governour thither. But when *Aminander*, in this present war, was driven out of his own kingdom by *Philip*: then did the governour of *Zacynthus* offer to sell the island to the *Acheans*; whom he found ready chapmen. *Titus* liked not of this; but plainly told them, That the *Romans* would be their own carvers, and take what they thought good of the lands belonging to their enemies, as a reward of the victory which they had obtained. It was bootless to dispute. Wherefore the *Acheans* referred themselves unto his discretion. So he told them, That their commonwealth was like tortoise, whereof *Peloponnesus* was the shell: and that holding themselves within that compass, they were out of danger; but if they would needs be looking abroad, they should lie open to blows, which might greatly hurt them. Having settled things thus in *Peloponnesus*, he went over to *Naupactus*: where *Glabrio*, the consul, had lain two months, that might have been far better spent. There, whether out of compassion which he had upon the *Etolians*, or out of dislike of king *Philip's* thriving so fast: he perswaded the consul to grant unto the besieged, and to the whole nation, so long truce, that they might send ambassadors to *Rome*; and submitting themselves, crave pardon of the senate. Most like it is, that *Naupactus* was in great danger: else would not the *Etolians* have made such earnest suit as they did unto *Titus*, for procuring of this favour. But if *Glabrio* had been sure to carry it, in any short space; it may well be thought he would not have gone away without it; since the winning of that town, wherein was then the whole flower of the nation, would have made the promised submission much more humble and sincere. When they came to *Rome*, no intreaty could help them to better conditions, than one of these two: That either they should wholly permit themselves to the good pleasure of the senate; or else pay a thousand talents, and make neither peace nor war with any, further than as the *Roman* should give approbation. They had not so much money: neither could they well hope to be gently dealt withal, if they should give themselves away unto discretion; which what it signified, they now understood. Wherefore they desired to have it set down, in what points, and how far forth, they should yield unto the good pleasure of the senate. But hereof they could get no certain answer: to that they were dismissed as enemies, after long and vain attendance.

Whilst the *Etolians* were pursuing their hopes of peace, the consul had little to do in *Greece*; and therefore took upon him gravely to set things in order among the tractable *Acheans*. He would have had them to restore the banished *Lacedemonians* home into their country; and to take the *Eleans* into the fellowship of their commonwealth. This the *Acheans* liked well enough: but they did not like it, that the *Roman* should be meddling in all occurrences. Wherefore they deferred the restitution of the banished *Lacedemonians*: intending to make it an act of their own mere grace. As for the *Eleans*, they were loth to be beholden to the *Romans*, and thereby to disparage the *Acheans*: into whose corporation they were desirous to be admitted; and saw that they should have their desire, without such compulsive mediation.

The *Roman* admiral, *C. Livius*, much about the same time, fought a battel at sea with *Polyxenidas*, admiral to the king *Antiochus*. King *Eumenes* brought help to the *Romans*, though it was not great: and five and twenty sail of *Rhodians* came after the battel, when they were following the chace. The king's fleet was the better of sail: but that of the *Romans* the better manned. Wherefore *Polyxenidas* being vanquished in fight, was yet out of danger, as soon as he betook himself to a speedy retreat.

And such end had the first year's war, between king *Antiochus* and the *Romans*. After this, as many of the *Greeks* as had followed the vain hopes of the *Etolians*, were glad to excuse themselves by fear; thinking themselves happy when by ambassadors they had obtained pardon. On the contrary side, *Philip* of *Macedon*, arch-enemy of late unto the *Romans*, did now send to gratulate this their victory: and, in recompence of his good affection, had restored unto him *Demetrius*, his younger son; whom some few years they had kept as an hostage. Also king *Ptolemy* of *Egypt*, gratulating the *Roman* victory, sent word how greatly all *Asia* and *Syria* were thereby terrified. In which regard he desired the senate not to foreflow time; but to send an army, as soon as might be, into *Asia*: promising, that his assistance, wherein soever it pleased them to use it, should not be wanting. This *Ptolemy* was the son-in-law of king *Antiochus*: but he was the friend of fortune. He understood long before, as did all that were indifferent beholders of the contention, that the *Romans* were like to have the upper-hand. The same did *Antiochus* now begin to suspect, who had thought himself a while as safe at *Ephesus*, as if he had been in another world: but was told by *Hannibal*, That it was not so far out of *Greece* into *Asia*, as out of *Italy* into *Greece*; and that there was no doubt, but the *Romans* would soon be there, and make him try the chance of a battel for his kingdom.

SECT. VIII.

Lucius Scipio, having with him *Publius*; the African, his elder brother, for his lieutenant, is sent into *Greece*. He grants long truce to the *Etolians*, that so he might at leisure pass into *Asia*. Much troublesome business by sea; and divers fights. An invasion upon *Eumenes's* kingdom; with the siege of *Pergamus*, raised by an handful of the *Acheans*. *L. Scipio*, the consul, comes into *Asia*: where *Antiochus* most earnestly desireth peace, and is denied it. The battel of *Magnesia*: wherein *Antiochus* being vanquished, yielded to the *Roman's* good pleasure. The conditions of the peace. In what sort the *Romans* used their victory. *L.*

Cornelius Scipio, after a most sumptuous triumph over *Antiochus*, is surnamed The Asiatic, as his brother was siled the African.

Lucius Cornelius Scipio, the brother of *P. Scipio*, the African, was chosen consul at *Rome*, with *C. Lælius*. *Lælius* was very gracious in the senate: and therefore being desirous (as generally all consuls were) of the more honourable employment, offered to refer to the arbitrement of the senate, if *L. Cornelius* would be so pleased, the disposition of their provinces; without putting it to the hazard of a lottery. *Lucius*, having talked with his brother *Publius*, approved well of the motion. Such a question had not of long time been put unto the *Fathers*: who therefore were the more desirous to make an unblamable decree. But the matter being otherwise somewhat indifferent; *P. Scipio*, the African, said openly thus much, That if the senate would appoint his brother to the war against *Antiochus*, he himself would follow his brother in that war, as his lieutenant. These words were heard with such approbation, that the controversy was forthwith at an end. For if *Antiochus* relied upon *Hannibal*, and should happen to be directed wholly by that great captain; what better man could they oppose, than *Scipio*; that had been victorious against the same great worthy. But indeed a worser man might have served well enough the turn. For *Hannibal* had no absolute command, nor scarce any trust of great importance: excepting now and then in consultation; where his wisdom was much approved, but his liberty and high spirit as much disliked. It is worthy of remembrance; as a sign of the freedom that he used in his censures, even whilst he lived in such a court. *Antiochus* mustered his army in presence of this famous captain: thinking, as may seem, to have made him wish, that he had been served by such brave men in *Italy*. For they were gallantly decked, both men, horses, and elephants, with such costly furniture of gold, silver, and purple; as glittered with a terrible bravery on a sun-shine day. Whereupon the king, well-pleasing himself with that goodly spectacle, asked *Hannibal* what he thought; and whether all this were not enough for the *Romans*? Enough (said *Hannibal*) were the *Romans* the most covetous men in all the world: meaning, that all this cost upon the backs of cowardly *Asiatics*, was no better than a spoil to animate good soldiers. How little this answer pleased the king; it is easy to guess. The little use that he made of this *Carthaginian*, testifies that his dislike of the man, caused him to lose the use of his service, when he stood in greatest necessity thereof.

The *Scipio's* made all haste away from *Rome* as soon as they could. They carried with them, besides other soldiers newly press'd to the war, about five thousand volunteers, that had served under *P. Africanus*. There was also a fleet of thirty *Quinquereme* gallies, and twenty *Triemes* newly built, appointed unto *L. Æmilius Regillus*, that was chosen admiral the same year for that voyage. At their coming into *Greece*, they found the old consul *Glabrio* besieging *Amphissa*, a city of the *Etolians*. The *Etolians*, after that they were denied peace, had expected him once again at *Naupactus*. Wherefore they not only fortified that town; but kept all the passages thereto leading; which heedlessly, as in time of confusion, they had left unregarded the last year. *Glabrio* knowing this, deceived their expectation, and fell upon *Lamia*: which being not long since much weakened by *Philip*, and now by him attempted on the sudden, was

was carried at the second assault. Thence went he to *Amphissa*; which he had almost gotten; when *L. Scipio*, his successor, came with thirteen thousand foot, and five hundred horse, and took charge of the army. The town of *Amphissa* was presently forsaken by the inhabitants: but they had a castle, or higher town, that was impregnable; whereinto they all retired. The *Athenian* ambassadors had dealt with *P. Scipio*, in behalf of the *Etolians*; intreating him to stand their friend, and help them in obtaining some tolerable condition of peace. He gave them gentle words; and willed them to persuade the *Etolians*, that they should faithfully, and with true meaning desire it. This was gladly taken. But many messages passing to and fro; though *Publius* continued to put them in good hope; yet the consul made still the same answer, with which they had been chased from *Rome*. The conclusion was, That they should sue for a longer time of respite from war: whereby at more leisure they might attend some better disposition of the senate; or any helpful commodity which time should afford. So they obtained half a year's leisure of breathing. Hereof were they not more glad, than was *P. Scipio*; who thought all time lost, which withheld the war from passing over into *Asia*.

The business of *Etolia* being thus laid aside; and the old consul, *Glabrio*, sent home into *Italy*: the *Scipios* marched into *Theffaly*; intending thence to take their way by land, through *Macedon* and *Thrace*, unto the *Hellefpont*. Yet they considered, That hereby they must commit themselves unto the loyalty of king *Philip*, who might either do them some mischief by the way, if he were disposed to watch a notable advantage: or at the least, would he be unfaithful, though he were not so courageous; yet might he take such order with the *Tracians*, that even for want of victuals, if by no greater inconvenience, they should be disgracefully forced to return. He had promised them the utmost of his furtherance: wherein, whether he meant sincerely, they thought to make some trial, by causing a gentleman to ride post unto him, and observe his doings, as he should take him on the sudden. The king was merry at a feast, and drinking; when the messenger came: whom he lovingly bade welcome; and shewed him the next day, not only what provision of victuals he had made for the army, but how he had made bridges over the rivers, and mended the bad ways by which they were to pass. With these good news *Gracchus* returned back in haste unto the *Scipios*: who entering into *Macedon*, found all things in a readiness, that might help to advance their journey. The king entertained them royally; and brought them on their way, even to the *Hellefpont*; where they staid a good while, until their navy was in readiness to transport them into *Asia*.

Much was done at sea in the beginning of this year; though, for the most part, little of importance. *Polyxenidas*, the admiral of *Antiochus*, was a banished *Rhodian*; true to the king, and desirous of revenge upon his countrymen that had expelled him. He, hearing that the *Rhodian* fleet was at *Samus*, the *Romans* and *Eumenes* having not as yet put to sea; thought to do somewhat upon those that were so early in their diligence, before their fellows should arrive to help them. Yet went he craftily to work; and sent word, as in great secrecy, to the *Rhodian* admiral, That if the sentence of his banishment might be repealed, he would, in requital thereof, betray all the king's fleet. After many passages to and fro, this was believed: and the *Rhodian* admiral grew so care-

less, expecting still, when he should receive a watchword from *Polyxenidas*, that he himself was taken by *Polyxenidas* in his own haven. The king's fleet setting forth from *Ephesus* by night; and, for fear of being discovered, resting one day in a harbour by the way; came the second night to *Samos*: where, by morning, it was ready to enter the haven. *Pausistratus*, the *Rhodian* admiral, seeing this, thought it his best way of resistance, to bestow his men on the two head-lands, or points of the haven; so to guard the mouth of it: for that he saw no likelihood of defending himself by sea. But *Polyxenidas* had already landed some companies, in another part of the island: which falling upon the back of *Pausistratus*, compelled him to alter his directions, and command his men aboard. This could not be without great confusion; so as the enemies took him out of all order; and sunk or boarded all his navy, five excepted, that by a sudden device made shift to escape. Each of them hung out a burning Cresset upon two poles, at the beak-head: and then rowed forwards directly upon the enemy: who, having not bethought himself what shift to make against such unexpected danger of firing, was content to give way unto these desperate galleys; for fear lest they should burn, together with themselves, a part of the king's fleet.

Not long after this, the *Romans* had some loss by tempest: whereof *Polyxenidas* could not take such advantage as he had hoped; because, putting to sea for that purpose, he was driven back again by the like foul weather. But the *Rhodians*, to shew that they were not discouraged, set forth twenty other galleys; the *Romans* also, with king *Eumenes*, repaired their fleet; and all of them together, in great bravery, presented battel to *Polyxenidas*, before the haven of *Ephesus*. When he durst not accept it: they went from place to place, attempting many things, as either they were intreated by the *Rhodians*, or persuaded by some appearing hopes of doing good. Yet performed they little or nothing: for that one while they were hindered by storms at sea; and another while by strong resistance, made against them by land.

Eumenes, with his fleet, was compelled to forsake them; and return home to the defence of his own kingdom. For *Antiochus* wasted all the grounds about *Elea* and *Pergamus*: and leaving his son *Seleucus*, to besiege the royal city of *Pergamus*, did, with the rest of his army, spoil the whole country thereabout. *Attalus*, the brother of king *Eumenes*, was then in *Pergamus*; having with him no better men to defend the city, than were they that lay against it. Wherefore he had reason to stand in fear; being too much inferior in number. There came to his aid a thousand foot, and an hundred horse of the *Acheans*; old soldiers all, and trained up under *Philopæmen*; whose scholar, in the art of war, *Diophanes*, their commander, was. This *Diophanes*, beholding from the walls of *Pergamus*, which was an high town, the demeanour of the enemy; began to disclaim, that such men as they should hold him besieged. For *Seleucus's* army, which was encamped at the hill-foot, seeing that none durst sally forth upon them, grew so careless; as otherwise, than by spoiling all behind their backs; they seemed to forget that they were in an enemy's country. *Diophanes* therefore spake with *Attalus*; and told him, that he would go forth to visit them. *Attalus* had no liking to this adventure; for he said, that the match was nothing equal. But the *Achean* would needs have his will: and issuing forth, encamped not far from the enemy. They of *Pergamus* thought him little

better than mad. As for the besiegers; they wondered at first what his meaning was: but when they saw that he held himself quiet, they made a jest of his boldness; and laughed to see with what an handful of men he looked so stoutly. So they returned unto their former negligence and disorders. Which *Diophanes* perceiving, he commanded all his men to follow him, even as fast as they well might: and he himself, with the hundred horse, brake out on the sudden upon the station that was next at hand. Very few of the enemies had their horses ready saddled; but more few, or none, had the hearts to make resistance: so as he drove them all out of their camp; and chased them as far as he might safely adventure, with great slaughter of men, and no loss of his own. Hereat all the citizens of *Pergamus* (who had covered the walls of the town, men and women, to behold this spectacle) were very joyful; and highly magnified the virtue of these *Acheans*. Yet would they not therefore issue forth of their gates, to help the *Acheans* in doing what remained to be done. The next day *Seleucus* encamped half a mile further from the town, than he had done before: and against him went forth *Diophanes* the second time; who quietly rested awhile in his old station. When they had staid many hours, looking who should begin; *Seleucus*, in fair order, as he came, withdrew himself towards his lodging, that was further off. *Diophanes* moved not whilst the enemy was in sight: but as soon as the ground between them hindered the prospect, he followed them in all haste; and soon overtaking them with his horse, charged them in rear; so as he brake them, and with all his forces pursued them at the heels, to their very trenches. This boldness of the *Acheans*, and the baseness of his own men, caused *Seleucus* to quit the Siege, little to his honour. Such being the quality of these *Asiatics*, *Philopæmen* had cause to tell the *Romans*, That he envied their victory. For when *Antiochus* lay feasting at *Chalcis*, after his marriage, and his soldiers betook themselves to riot, as it had been in a time of great security: a good man of war might have cut all their throats, even as they were tipling in their victualling-houses; which *Philopæmen* said that he would have done, had he been general of the *Acheans*, and not, as he then was, a private man.

Antiochus was full of business: and turning his care from one thing to another, with a great deal of travel, brought almost nothing to pass. He had been at *Pergamus*: into which *Eumenes*, leaving the *Romans*, did put himself, with a few of his horse, and light armature. Before *Pergamus* he left his son, as before hath been shewed, and went to *Elea*: whither he heard that *Æmilius*, the *Roman* admiral, was come to bring succour to *Eumenes*. There he made an overture of peace: about which to consult, *Eumenes* was sent for by *Æmilius*, and came from *Pergamus*. But when it was considered, that no conclusion could be made without the consul; this treaty brake off. Then followed the overthrow newly mentioned; which caused *Seleucus* to give over the siege of *Pergamus*. Afterwards, four or five towns, of scarce any worth or note, were taken by the king: and the *Syrian* fleet, being of seven and thirty sail, was beaten by the *Rhodian*, which was of like number. But of this victory the *Rhodian* had no great cause to rejoice; for that *Hannibal* the *Carthaginian*, who, together with *Apollonius* a courtier of *Antiochus*, was admiral of the *Syrians*, did them in a manner as great hurt as they could do to *Apollonius*; and having the victory taken out of his hand by *Apol-*

lonius's flight, yet made such a retreat, that the *Rhodians* durst not far adventure upon him. Now of these actions, which were but as prefaces unto the war; the last and greatest was a victory of the *Romans* by sea, against *Polyxenidas*, the king's admiral. The battel was fought by *Myonæsus*, a promontory in *Asia*: where *Polyxenidas* had with him fourscore and nine gallies; and five of them greater than any of the *Romans*. This being all the strength which he could make by sea: we may note the vanity of those brags, wherewith *Antiochus* vaunted the last year, That his *Armada* should cover all the shoars of *Greece*. The *Romans* had eight and fifty gallies; the *Rhodians*, two and twenty: the *Roman* being the stronger built, and more stoutly manned; the *Rhodian*, more light timber'd, and thin plank'd, having all advantage of speed, and good sea-men. Neither forgot they to help themselves by the same device, with which five of their gallies had lately escaped from *Samos*. For with fire in their prows they ran upon the enemy: who declining them for fear, laid open his side: and was thereby in greater danger of being stemmed. After no long fight, the king's navy hoisted sail: and having a fair wind, bore away toward *Ephesus* as fast as they could. Yet forty of their gallies they left behind them: whereof thirteen were taken; all the rest burnt or sunk. The *Romans*, and their fellows, lost only two or three ships: but got hereby the absolute mastery of the sea.

The report of this misadventure may seem to have taken from *Antiochus* all use of reason. For as if no hope had been remaining, to defend those places that he held in *Europe*: He presently withdrew his garrisons from *Lyfimachia*: which might easily have been kept, even till the end of winter following, and had reduced the besiegers (if the siege had been continued obstinately) to terms of great extremity. He also gave over the siege of *Colophon*: and laying aside all thought, save only of defence, drew together all his army, and sent for help to his father-in-law, king *Ariarathes*, the *Cap-padocian*.

Thus the *Roman* consul, without impediment, not only came to the *Hellepont*; but had yielded unto him all places there, belonging to *Antiochus* on *Europe* side. The fleet was then also in readiness, to transport him over into *Asia*: where *Rumenes* had taken such care before, that he landed quietly at his own good ease; even as if the country had been his already. The first news that he heard of the enemy, was by an ambassador that came to sue for peace. This ambassador declared in his master's name, That the same things which had hindered him from obtaining peace of the *Romans* heretofore, did now persuade him, that he should easily come to good agreement with them. For in all disputations heretofore, *Smyrna*, *Lampsacus*, and *Lyfimachia*, had been the places about which they varied. Seeing therefore the king had now already given over *Lyfimachia*; and was further purposed, not to strive with the *Romans* about *Lampsacus* and *Smyrna*: what reason was there, why they should need to trouble him with war? If it was their desire, that any other towns upon the coast of *Asia*, not mentioned by them in any former treaties, should be also set at liberty, or otherwise delivered into their hands; the king would not refuse to gratify them therein. Briefly, let them take some part of *Asia*: so as the bounds, dividing them from the king, might not be uncertain; and it should be quietly put into their hands. If all this were

not enough: the king would likewise bear half the charges, whereat they had been in this war. So praying the *Romans* to hold themselves content with these good offers, and not to be too insolent upon confidence of their fortune; he expected their answer. These offers, which to the ambassador seemed so great, were judged by the *Romans* to be very little. For they thought it reasonable, that the king should bear all the charges of the war, since it began through his only fault: and that he should not only depart out of those few towns which he held in *Æolis* and *Ionis*; but quite out of *Asia the less*, and keep himself on the other side of mount *Taurus*. When the ambassador therefore saw, that no better bargain could be made, he dealt with *P. Scipio* in private: and to him he promised a great quantity of gold, together with the free restitution of his son; who (it is uncertain by what mischance) was taken prisoner, and most honourably entertained by the king. *Scipio* would not hearken to the offer of gold: nor otherwise to the restitution of his son, than upon condition, that it might be with making such amends for the benefit, as became a private man. As for the publick business: he only said thus much, that since *Antiochus* had already forsaken *Lyfiamachia*, and suffered the war to take hold on his own kingdom: there was now none other way for him, than either to fight, or yield to that which was required at his hands. Wherefore, said he, tell your king in my name, that I would advise him to refuse no condition whereby he may have peace.

The king was not any whit moved with this advice. For, seeing that the consul demanded of him no less, than if he had been already subdued: little reason there was, that he should fear to come to battel; wherein he could lose, as he thought, no more, than by seeking to avoid it he must give away. He had with him threescore and ten thousand foot, and twelve thousand horse; besides two and fifty *Indian* elephants, and many chariots armed with hooks or scythes, according to the manner of the eastern countries. Yet was he nothing pleased, to hear that the consul drew near him apace, as one hastning to fight. But howsoever he was affected; he made so little shew of fear, that hearing *P. Scipio* to lie sick at *Elea*, he sent thither unto him his son without ransom: as one both desirous to comfort this noble warrior in his sickness, and withal not desirous to retain the young gentleman for a pledge of his own safety. Thus ought his bounty to be constant. Otherwise it might be suspected, that herein he dealt craftily. For since he could have none other ransom of *Scipio*, than such as an honourable man, that had no great store of wealth, might pay: better it was to do such a courtesie before the battel, as would afterwards have been little worth; than to stay until the *Romans*, perhaps victorious, should exact it at his hands. *P. Scipio* was greatly comforted with the recovery of his son: so as the joy thereof was thought to have been much available unto his health. In recompence of the king's humanity, he said only thus much unto those that brought him this acceptable present, *I am now able to make your king none other amends, than by advising him not to fight, until he shall hear that I am in the camp.* What he meant by this, it is hard to conjecture. *Antiochus* resolved to follow his counsel: and therefore withdrew himself from about *Zbyatira*, beyond the river of *Phrygius* or *Hyllus*, unto *Magneſia* by *Sipylus*: where encamping, he fortified himself as strongly as he could. Thither followed him *L. Scipio* the consul; and sat down

within four miles of him. About a thousand of the king's horse, most of them *Gallo-Greeks*, came to bid the *Romans* welcome: of whom at first they slew some; and were anon, with some loss driven back over the river. Two days were quietly spent, whilst neither the king nor the *Romans* would pass the water. The third day the *Romans* made the adventure: wherein they found no disturbance; nor were at all opposed, until they came within two miles and a half of *Antiochus's* camp. There, as they were taking up their lodging, they were charged by three thousand horse and foot; whom the ordinary *corps du guard* repelled. Four days together after this, each of them brought forth their armies, and set them in order before the trenches, without advancing any farther. The fifth day, the *Romans* came half way forward, and presented battel; which the king would not accept. Thereupon the consul took advice, what was to be done: For either they must fight upon whatsoever disadvantage, or else resolve to abide by it all winter, far from any country of their friends, and therefore subject unto many difficulties; unless they would stain their honour by returning far back, to winter in a more convenient place; and so defer the war until the next spring. The *Roman* soldier was thoroughly persuaded, of that enemy's base temper: Wherefore it was the general cry, that this great army should be assailed, even in the camp where it lay; as if rather there were so many beasts to be slaughtered, than men to be fought with. Yet a day or two passed, in discovering the fortifications of *Antiochus*, and the safest way to set upon him. All this while *P. Scipio* came not. Wherefore the king, being very loth to dishearten his men, by seeming to stand in fear of his enemy, resolved to put the matter to trial. So, when the *Romans* took the field again, and ordered their battels; he also did the like, and advanced so far, that they might understand his meaning to fight.

The *Roman* army consisted of four legions, two *Roman* and two *Latin*; in each of which were five thousand and four hundred men. The *Latins*, as usually, were in the points; the *Romans* in the main battel: All of them, in their wonted form, were divided into maniples. The *Hastati* had the leading; after them followed the *Principes*, at such distance as was usual; and last of all the *Triarii*. Now besides these, there were about three thousand auxiliaries; partly *Acheans*, and partly such as belonged to *Eumenes*; which were placed in an equal front beyond the *Latins* in the right wing. Utmost of all (save some five hundred *Gretians*, and of the *Trallians* were almost three thousand horse;) of which, *Eumenes* had brought thither eight hundred, the rest being *Roman*. The left wing was fenced by the bank of the river; yet four troops of horse were placed there, tho' such help seemed in a manner needless. Two thousand voluntaries, *Macedonians* and *Thracians*, were left to guard the camp. The consul had with him sixteen *African* elephants, which he bestowed in his rear; so much as had they come to fight with those of *Antiochus*, they only would have served to discourage his men, as being sure to be beaten; the *Indian* being far the greater, and more courageous beasts: whereof *Antiochus* had likewise much advantage in number.

The king's army being compounded of many nations, diversly appointed, and not all accustomed to one manner of fight, was ordered according to the several kinds, in such wise as each might be of most use. The main strength of his foot consisted in sixteen thousand, armed all *Macedonian*-like, and

and called *Phalangiers*. These he placed in the midst, and divided into ten battallions ; every one having two and thirty in file, and fifty in front. Between every battalion were two elephants, goodly beasts, and such as being adorned with frontals, high crests, towers on their backs ; and besides him that governed the elephant, four men in every tower, made a gallant and terrible shew. On the right hand of these were fifteen hundred horse of the *Gallo-Greeks* : then, three thousand barb'd horse ; and a regiment of almost a thousand horse called the *Agema*, that were all *Medians*, the choice of the country, and accompanied by some others. All which troops of horse divided in their several kinds, do seem to have followed one another in depth, rather than to have been stretched out in front. Adjoyning to these were sixteen elephants together in one flock. A little further to the right hand, was the king's own regiment : called the *Argyraspides* or *silver-shields*, by a name borrowed from their furniture ; but nothing like so valiant as those of the same name, that had served under great *Alexander* : then twelve hundred archers on horseback, three thousand light-armed foot, two thousand and five hundred archers of *Myfia* ; with four thousand slingers and archers of the *Cyrteans*, and *Elymeans*. On the left hand of the *Phalangiers*, were placed the like numbers of *Gallo-Greeks* and barb'd horse : as also two thousand horse that were sent to *Ariarathes*, with two thousand and seven hundred of divers nations, and a regiment of a thousand horse more lightly armed, that were called the *king's troop*, being *Syrians*, *Phrygians*, and *Lydians*. In front of all these horse were the chariots armed with hooks or scythes, and the *Dromedaries*, whereon sat *Arabians* with long rapiers, that would serve to reach from those high camels. Beyond these were, as in the right wing, a rabble of many nations, *Carians*, *Cilicians*, *Pamphylians*, *Pisidians*, *Cyrteans*, *Elymeans*, and many others, having also with them sixteen elephants. *Antiochus* himself commanded in the right wing ; *Seleucus* in the left ; and three of his principal captains commanded over the *Phalangiers*.

The first onset was given by the *Dromedaries*, and armed chariots : of which the one, being like to terrifie the horse ; the other, to break the squadrons of the foot ; *Eumenes* with a few light-armed *Cretans*, archers, darters, and slingers, easily made frustrate the danger threatened by them both. For with shoutings, and noises, and some wounds, they were driven out of the field ; and running back upon their own men, did the same harm which they had intended to the enemies. Wherefore the *Roman* horse following this advantage, charged upon the left wing : where they found no resistance ; some being out of order ; others being without courage. It is shameful to rehearse, and so strange, that it may hardly seem credible : that the *Phalangiers*, with such variety of auxiliaries, made little or no resistance ; but all of them fled, in a manner as soon as they were charged. Only the king, *Antiochus* himself, being in the left wing of his own battle : and seeing the *Latins*, that stood opposite unto him weakly flanked with horse ; gave upon them courageously, and forced them to retire. But *M. Aemilius*, that had the guard of the *Roman* camp, issued forth with all his power to help his fellows : and, what by perswasion, what by threats, made them renew the fight. Succour also came from the right wing, where the *Romans* were already victorious : whereof, when *Antiochus* discovered the approach ; he not only turned his horse

about, but ran away upon the spur, without further tarriance. The camp was defended a little while : and with no great valour ; though by a great multitude that were fled into it. *Antiochus* is said to have lost in this battel fifty thousand foot, and four thousand horse ; besides those that were taken. Of the *Romans*, there were not slain above three hundred foot, and four and twenty horse : of *Eumenes's* followers five and twenty.

Antiochus fled into *Sardes*, and from thence to *Apamea*, the same night, hearing that *Seleucus* was gone thither before. He left the custody of *Sardes*, and the castle there, to one whom he thought faithful. But the townsmen and soldiers were so dismayed with the greatness of the overthrow ; that one man's faith was worth nothing. All the towns in those parts, without expecting summons, yielded up themselves by ambassadors : whom they sent to the *Romans*, whilst they were on the way. Neither were there many days spent, ere *Antiochus's* ambassador was in the camp : having none other errand, than to know what it would please the *Romans* to impose upon the king his master. *P. Scipio* was now come to his brother ; who obtained leave to make the answer, because it should be gentle. They required no more than they had lately done : which was, that he should quite abandon his dominions on this side of *Taurus*. For their charges in that war, they required fifteen thousand talents : five hundred in hand ; two thousand and five hundred, when the senate and people of *Rome* should have confirmed the peace ; and the other twelve thousand, in twelve years next ensuing by even portions. Likewise they demanded four hundred talents for *Eumenes* ; and some store of corn, that was due to him upon a reckoning. Now besides twenty hostages which they required, very earnest they were to have *Hannibal* the *Carthaginian*, and *Thoas* the *Etolian*, with some others, who had stirred up the king to this war, delivered into their hands. But any wise man might so easily have perceived, that it would be their purpose to make this one of their principal demands ; as no great art was needful to beguile their malice. The king's ambassador had full commission, to refuse nothing that should be enjoyned. Wherefore there was no more to do, than to send immediately to *Rome* for the ratification of the peace.

There were new consuls chosen in the mean while at *Rome*, *M. Fulvius*, and *Cn. Manlius Volso*. The *Etolians* desired peace, but could not obtain it ; because they would accept neither of the two conditions before propounded. So it was decreed, that one of the consuls should make war upon the *Etolians*, the other upon *Antiochus* in *Asia*. Now though shortly there came news, that *Antiochus* was already vanquished in battel, and had submitted himself unto all that could be required at his hands : yet since the state of *Asia* was not like to be so thoroughly settled by one victory, but that many things might fall out worthy of the *Romans* care ; *Cn. Manlius*, to whom *Asia* fell by lot, had not his province changed.

Soon after this came the ambassadors of king *Antiochus* to *Rome*, accompanied with *Rhodians* and some others ; yea, by king *Eumenes* in person ; whose presence added a goodly lustre to the business in hand. Concerning the peace to be made with king *Antiochus*, there was no disputation ; it was generally approved. All the trouble was, about the distribution of the purchase. King *Eumenes* reckoned up his own deserts ; and comparing himself with *Masanissa*, hoped that the *Romans* would be more bountiful to him than they had been

been to the *Numidian*, since they had found him a king indeed, whereas *Masaniffa* was only such in title; and since both he and his father had always been their friends, even in the very worst of the *Roman* fortune. Yet was there much ado to make him tell what he would have: he still referring himself to their courtesie; and they desiring him to speak plain. At length he craved that they would bestow upon him, as much of the country by them taken from *Antiochus*, as they had no purpose to keep in their own hands. Neither thought he it needful, that they should trouble themselves with the care of giving liberty to many of the *Greek* towns, that were on *Asia* side. For since the most of those towns had been partakers with the king in his war, it was no reason that they should be gainers by his overthrow. The *Rhodians* did not like of this. They desired the senate to be truly patrons of the *Grecian* liberty; and to call to mind, that no small part of *Greece* itself had been subject unto *Philip*, and served him in his war: which was not alledged against him as a cause why they should not be made free, after that *Philip* was overcome. But the main point whereon they insisted, was this, That the victory of the *Romans* against king *Antiochus* was so great, as easily might satisfy the desires of all their friends. The senate was glad to hear of this, and very bountifully gave away so much, that every one had cause to be well pleased.

Such end had the war against king *Antiochus*: after which, *L. Cornelius Scipio*, returning home, had granted unto him the honour of a triumph; the pomp whereof exceeded in riches, not only that of *Titus Quintius Flaminius*, but of any ten that *Rome* had beheld until that day. Now forasmuch as the surname of *The African* had been given unto *P. Scipio*, it was thought convenient by some, to reward *L. Scipio* with the title of *The Asiatic*: which the fortune of his victory had no less deserved; though the virtue requisite to the purchase thereof, was no way correspondent.

S E C T. IX.

The Etolians and the Gallo-Greeks, vanquished by the Roman consuls, Fulvius and Manlius. Manlius hardly obtains a triumph: being charged (among other objections) with attempting to have passed the bounds appointed as fatal to the Romans by Sibyl. Of Sibyl's prophecies; the books of Hermes; and that inscription, Simoni Deo Sancto. The ingratitude of Rome to the two Scipio's. Of the beginning of faction among the Roman nobility.

M*ARC. Fulvius* and *Cn. Manlius* had the same charge divided between them, which *L. Cornelius Scipio*, now stiled *Asiaticus*, had lately undergone. It was found more than one man's work, to look at once to *Greece* and *Asia*. And for this reason was it apparent, that *L. Scipio* had granted so long a truce to the *Etolians*. But since, in this long interim of truce, that haughty little nation had not sought to humble it self to the *Roman Majesty*, it was now to be brought unto more lowly terms than any other of the *Greeks*. The best was, that so great a storm fell not unexpected upon the *Etolians*. They had foreseen the danger, when their ambassadors were utterly denied peace at *Rome*: and they had provided the last remedy; which was, to entreat the *Rhodians* and *Athenians* to become intercessors for them. Neither were they so dejected, with any terrible apprehensions, that they could not well devise, upon helping them-

No. XLVIII.

selves, even by re-purchase of countries lost, where they spied advantage.

Poor king *Aminander* lived in exile among them, whilst *Philip* of *Macedon* kept, for him, possession of his lands and castles. But the *Atbamians* (besides that many of them bore a natural affection to their own prince) having been long accustomed to serve a mountain lord, that conversed with them after an homely manner; could not endure the proud and insolent manner of command, used by the captains of *Philip's* garrisons. They sent therefore some few of them to their king, and offered their service towards his restitution. At the first there were only four of them; neither grew they, at length, to more than two and fifty, which undertook the work. Yet assurance, that all the rest would follow, made *Aminander* willing to try his fortune. He was at the borders with a thousand *Etolians*, upon the day appointed: at which time his two and fifty adventurers, having divided themselves into four parts, occupied, by the ready assistance of the multitude, four the chief towns in the country, to his use. The fame of this good success at first; with divers letters running from place to place, whereby men were exhorted to do their best in helping forward the action: made the lieutenants of *Philip* unable to think upon resistance. One of them held the town of *Theium* a few days, giving thereby some leisure unto his king to provide for the rescue. But when he had done his best, he was forced thence; and could only tell *Philip*, whom he met on the way, that all was lost. *Philip* had brought from home six thousand men, of whom, when the greater part could not hold out, in such a running march, he left all, save two thousand behind him, and so came to *Athenaeum*, a little *Atbamian* castle that still was his, as being on the frontier of *Macedon*. Thence he sent *Zeno*, who had kept *Theium* awhile, to take a place lying over *Argithea*, that was chief of the country. *Zeno* did as he was appointed: yet neither he, nor the king, had the boldness to descend upon *Argithea*: for that they might perceive the *Atbamians*, all along the hill sides, ready to come down upon them, when they should be busy. Wherefore nothing was thought more honourable than a safe retreat; especially when *Aminander* came in sight with his thousand *Etolians*. The *Macedonians* were called back from-wards *Argithea*, and presently withdrawn by their king towards his own borders. But they were not suffered to depart in quiet, at their pleasure. The *Atbamians* and *Etolians* way-layed them, and pursued them so closely, that their retreat was in a manner of a plain flight; with great loss of men and arms; few of those escaping that were left behind, as to make a countenance of holding somewhat in the country, until *Philip's* return.

The *Etolians*, having found the business of *Atbamania* so easy, made an attempt in their own behalf, upon the *Amphilochians* and *Aperantians*. These had belonged unto their nation, and were lately taken by *Philip*; from whom they diligently revolted, and became *Etolian* again. The *Dolopians* lay next; that had been ever belonging to the *Macedonian*; and so did still purpose to continue. These took arms at first: but soon laid them away; seeing their neighbours ready to fight with them in the *Etolian* quarrel, and seeing their own king so hastily gone, as if he meant not to return.

Of these victories the joy was the less; for that news came of *Antiochus's* last overthrow, and

of *M. Fulvius* the new consul's hastning with an army into *Greece*. *Aminander* sent his excuses to *Rome*, praying the senate, not to take it in despite, that he had recovered his own from *Philip*, with such help as he could get. Neither seems it that the *Romans* were much offended to hear of *Philip's* losses: for of this fault they neither were sharp correctors, nor earnest reprovers. *Fulvius* went in hand with the business about which he came, and lay'd siege to *Ambracia*, a goodly city, that had been the chief seat of *Pyrrhus's* kingdom. With this he began; for that it was of too great importance to be abandoned by the *Etolians*: yet could not by them be relieved, unless they would adventure to fight upon equal ground. To help the *Ambraciens*, it was not in the *Etolians* power: for they were at the same time vexed by the *Illyrians* at sea, and ready to be driven from their new conquest, by *Persus* the son of *Philip*, who invaded the countries of the *Amphilochians* and *Dolopians*. They were unable to deal with so many at once; and therefore as earnestly sought peace with the *Romans*, as they stoutly made head against the rest. In the mean while, the *Athenian* and *Rhodian* ambassadors came; who besought the consul to grant them peace. It helped well that *Ambracia* made strong resistance, and would not be terrified by any violence of the assailants, or danger that might seem to threaten. The consul had no desire to spend half his time about one city, and so be driven to leave unto his successor the honour of finishing the war. Wherefore he gladly hearkened unto the *Etolians*, and bade them seek peace with faithful intent, without thinking it over-dear, at a reasonable price; considering with how great a part of his kingdom their friend *Antiochus* had made the same purchase. He also gave leave to *Aminander*, offering his service as a mediator, to put himself into *Ambracia*, and try what good his persuasions might do with the citizens. So, after many demands and excuses, the conclusion was such, as was grievous to the weaker, but not unsufferable. The same ambassadors of the *Athenians* and *Rhodians* accompanied those of the *Etolians* to *Rome*, for procuring the confirmation of peace. Their eloquence and credit was the more needful in this intercession; for that *Philip* had made very grievous complaint about the loss of those countries, which they had lately taken from him. Hereof the senate could not but take notice; though it hindered not the peace, which those good mediators of *Rhodes* and *Athens* did earnestly sollicite. The *Etolians* were bound to uphold the majesty of the people of *Rome*, and to observe divers articles, which made them less free, and more obnoxious to the *Romans*, than any people of *Greece*; they having been the first that called these their masters into the country. The isle of *Cephalenia* was taken from them by the *Romans*: who kept it for themselves (as not long since they had gotten *Zacynthus* from the *Acheans*, by stiffly pressing their own right) that so they might have possession along the coast of *Greece*, whilst they seemed to forbear the country. But concerning those places, whereto *Philip*, or others, might lay claim, there was set down an order so perplexed, as would necessarily require to have the *Romans* judges of the controversies, when they should arise. And hereof good use will be shortly made; when want of employment elsewhere shall cause a more lordly inquisition to be held, upon the affairs of *Macedon* and *Greece*.

Cn. Manlius, the other consul, had at the same time war in *Asia*, with the *Gallo-Greeks* and o-

thers. His army was the same that had followed *L. Scipio*; of whose victory his acts were the consummation. He visited those countries on the hither side of *Taurus*, that had scarce heard of the *Romans*; to whom they were abandoned by *Antiochus*. Among these were some petty lords, or tyrants, some free cities, and some that were together at wars, without regard of the great alteration happened in *Asia*. From every of these he got somewhat; and by their quarrels found occasion to visit those provinces, into which he should else have wanted an errand. He was even laden with booty, when, having fetch'd a compass about *Asia*, he came at length upon the *Gallo-Greeks*. These had long domineered over the country; though of late times it was rather the fame and terrour of their forepassed acts, than any present virtue of theirs, which held them up in reputation. Of the *Romans* they had lately such trial, when they served under king *Antiochus*, as made them to acknowledge themselves far the worse men. Wherefore they thought it no small part of their safety, that they dwelt upon the river *Halys*, in an inland country, where those enemies were not very like to search them out. But when such hopes failed; and when some princes of their own nation, that had been friends of *Eumenes*, exhorted the rest to yield: then was no counsel thought so good, as to forsake their houses and country, and, with all that they could carry or drive, to betake themselves unto the high mountains of *Olympus* and *Margana*. These mountains were exceeding hard of ascent, though none should undertake the custody. Being therefore well manned and victualled for a long time; as also the natural strength being help'd, by such fortification as promised greatest assurance; it was thought, that the consul would either forbear the attempt of forcing them, or easily be repelled; and that finally, when he had stay'd there a while, winter, and much want, should force him to dislodge. Yet all this availed not. For whereas the *Gallo-Greeks* had been careless of furnishing themselves with casting weapons, as if the stones would have served well enough for that purpose: the *Romans*, who came far otherwise appointed, found greater advantage in the difference of arms, than impediment in disadvantage of ground. Archers and slingers did easily prevail against casters of stones; especially being such as were these *Gallo-Greeks*, neither exercised in that manner of fight, nor having prepared their stones before-hand, but catching up what lay next, the too great, and the too little, oftner than those of a fit size. Finally, the *Barbarians*, wanting defensive arms, could not hold out against the arrows and weapons of the *Roman* light armature: but were driven from a piece of ground, which they had undertaken to make good, up into their camp on the top of the mountain; and being forced out of their camp, had no other way left, than to cast themselves headlong down the steep rocks. Few of their men escaped alive: all their wives, children, and goods, became a prey unto the *Romans*. In the very like manner, were the rest of that nation overcome soon after, at the other mountain; only more of them saved themselves by flight, as having fairer way at their backs.

These wars being ended: *Fulvius* and *Manlius* were appointed, by the senate, each of them to retain as proconsul his province for another year. *Fulvius*, in his second year, did little or nothing. *Manlius* gave peace to those whom he had vanquished, as likewise to *Artabanus* the *Cappado-*
cian,

cian; and some others; not by him vanquished, but submitting themselves for fear of the *Roman* arms. He drew from them all what profit he could; and laid upon them such conditions as he thought expedient. He also did finish the league of peace with *Antiochus*; whereto he swore, and received the king's oath by ambassadors, whom he sent for that purpose. Finally, having set in order the matters of *Asia*, he took his way towards the *Hellepont*, laden with spoil, as carrying with him (besides other treasures) all that the *Gallo-Greeks* had in so many years extorted from the wealthy provinces which lay round about them. Neither did this army of *Manlius* return home rich in money alone, or cattel, or things of needful use, which the *Roman* soldiers had been wont to take the only good purchase; but furnished with sumptuous household-stuff, and slaves of price, excellent cooks and musicians for banquets; and, in a word, with the seeds of that luxury, which finally over-grew and choaked the *Roman* virtue.

The country of *Thrace* lay between *Hellepont* and the kingdom of *Macedon*, which way *Manlius* was to take his journey homeward. *L. Scipio* had found no impediment among the *Thracians*: either for that he passed through them, without any such booty as might provoke them; or perhaps rather, because *Philip* of *Macedon* had taken order, that the *Barbarians* should not stir. But when *Manlius* came along with an huge train of baggage, the *Thracians* could not so well contain themselves. Neither was it thought, that *Philip* took it otherwise than very pleasantly, to have this *Roman* army robbed, and well beaten on the way. He had cause to be angry; seeing how little himself was regarded, and what great rewards were given to *Eumenes*. For he understood, and afterwards gave the *Romans* to understand, that *Eumenes* could not have abiden in his own kingdom, if the people of *Rome* had not made war in *Asia*: whereas contrariwise, *Antiochus* had offered unto himself three thousand talents, and fifty ships of war, to take part with him and the *Etolians*; promising moreover to restore unto him all the *Greek* cities, that had been taken from him by the *Romans*. Such being the difference between him and *Eumenes*, when the war began: he thought it no even dealing of the *Romans*, after their victory, to give away not only the half of *Asia*, but *Chersonesus* and *Lyftrmachiâ* in *Europe*, to *Eumenes*; whereas upon himself they bestowed not any one town. It agreed not indeed with his nobility, to go to *Rome* and beg provinces in the senate, as *Eumenes* and the *Rhodiens* had lately done. He had entertained lovingly the two *Scipio's*, whom he thought the most honourable men in *Rome*; and was grown into near acquaintance with *Publius*, holding correspondence with him by letters, whereby he made himself acquainted with the wars in *Spain* and *Afric*. This perhaps he deemed sufficient, to breed in the *Romans* a due respect of him. But *Eumenes* took a surer way. For the *Scipio's* had not the disposing of that which they won from *Antiochus*; as neither indeed had *Manlius*, nor the ten delegates assisting him; but the senate of *Rome*, by which those delegates were chosen, and instructed how to proceed. When *Philip* therefore saw these upstart kings of *Pergamus*, whom he accounted as base companions, advanced so highly, and made greater than himself; yea himself unregarded, contemned, and exposed to ma-

ny wrongs: then found he great cause to wish, that he had not so hastily declared himself against *Antiochus*, or rather that he had joined with *Antiochus* and the *Etolians*, by whom he might have been freed from his insolent masters. But what great argument of such discontentedness the *Macedonian* had, we shall very shortly be urged to discourse more at large. At the present it was believed; that the *Thracians* were by him set on, to assail the *Romans* passing through their country. They knew all advantages: and they fell unexpected upon the carriages, that were bestowed in the midst of the army; whereof part had already passed a dangerous wood, through which the baggage followed; part was not yet so far advanced. There was enough to get, and enough to leave behind; though both the getting, and the saving, did cost many lives, as well of the *Barbarians* as of the *Romans*. They fought until it grew night; and then the *Thracians* withdrew themselves; not without as much of the booty, as was to their full content. And of such trouble there was more, though less dangerous, before the army could get out of *Thrace* into *Macedon*. Through the kingdom they had a fair march into *Epirus*; and so to *Apollonia*, which was their handle of *Greece*.

To *Manlius*, and to *Fulvius*, when each of them returned to the city, was granted the honour of triumph. Yet not without contradiction, especially to *Manlius*; whom some of the ten delegates appointed to assist him, did very bitterly tax, as an unworthy commander. Touching the rest of their accusation; it sufficeth, that he made good answer, and was approved by the chief of the senate. One clause is worthy of more particular consideration. Reprehending his desire to have hindered the peace with *Antiochus*; they said, *That with much ado he was kept from leading his army over Taurus, and adventuring upon the calamity threatened by Sibyl's verses, unto those that should pass the fatal bounds.* What calamity or overthrow this was, wherewith *Sibyl's* prophecy threatned the *Roman* captain or army, that should pass over *Taurus*, I do not conceive. *Pompey* was the first that marched with an army beyond those limits: though the victories of *Lucullus* had opened unto him the way, and had before-hand won, in a sort, the countries on the other side of the mount; which *Lucullus* gave to one of *Antiochus's* race, though *Pompey* occupied them for the *Romans*. But we find not, that either *Lucullus* or *Pompey* suffered any loss, in presuming to neglect the bounds appointed by *Sibyl*. Indeed the accomplishment of this prophecy, fell out near about one time, with the restitution of *Ptolemy* king of *Egypt*; that was forbidden unto the *Romans* by the same *Sibyl*. It may therefore seem to have had reference unto the same things that were denounced, as like to happen unto the reduction of the *Egyptian* king. Whether the oracles of *Sibyl* had in them any truth, and were not, as *Tully* noteth, *sowed at random in the large field of time*, there to take root, and get credit by event; I will not here dispute. But I hold this more probable, than the restitution of *Ptolemy* to his kingdom by *Gabinus* the *Roman*, should have in any way betokened the coming of our Saviour: as some both ancient and modern *Christian* writers have been well pleased to interpret *Sibyl* in that Prophecy. Of the *Sibylline* predictions I have sometimes thought reverently: though not knowing what they were (as I think few men know) yet following the common belief and good autho-

^a Liv. l. 39.

^b Liv. l. 38.

^c Tull. de Divin. l. 2.

rity. But observation of the shameful idolatry, that upon all occasions was advanced in *Rome* by the books of *Sibyl*, had well prevailed upon my credulity, and made me suspect, though not the faith and pious meaning, yet the judgment of *Eusebius*: when that learned and excellent work of master *Casauban*^a upon the *Annals* of cardinal *Baronius*: did altogether free me from mine error; making it apparent, That not only those prophecies of *Sibyl*, wherein *Christ* so plainly was fore-shewed, but even the books of *Hermes*, which have borne such reputation, were no better than counterfeited pieces, and at first entertained (who-soever devised them) by the indiscreet zeal of such, as delighted in seeing the *Christian* religion strengthened with foreign proofs. And in the same rank, I think, we ought to place that notable history, reported by *Eusebius* from no mean authors, of the honour which was done to *Simon Magus* in *Rome*; namely of an altar to him erected, with an inscription *Simoni Deo Sancto*, that is, *To Simon the holy God*. For what can be more strange, than that a thing so memorable, and so publick, should have been quite omitted by *Tacitus*, by *Suetonius*, by *Dion*, and by all which wrote of those times? Philosophers and poets would not have suffered the matter to escape in silence, had it been true; neither can it be thought that *Seneca*, who then lived and flourished, would have abstained from speaking any word of an argument so famous. Wherefore I am perswaded, that this inscription, *Simoni Deo Sancto*, was, by some bad *Criticism*, taken amiss in place of *Semoni Sango*; a title four hundred years older than the time of *Simon Magus*. For the goods of one *Vitruvius* a rebel, had many ages before been consecrated *Semoni Sango*, that is, *to the spirit or demi-god Sangus*, in whose chapel they were bestowed. So as either by the ill shape of the old *Roman* letters, or by some spoil that time had wrought upon them; it might easily come to pass, that the words should be miss-read, *Simoni Sancto*, and that some *Christian* who had heard of *Simon Magus*, but not of *Sangus*, there-upon should frame the conjecture, which now passeth for a true history. Such conjectures, being entertained without examination, find credit by tradition; whereby also, many times, their fashion is amended, and made more historical, than was conceived by the author. But it cannot be safe, to let our faith (which ought to stand firm upon a sure foundation) lean over-hardly on a well painted, yet rotten, post.

Now concerning the triumph of *Cn. Manlius*, it may be numbred among a few of the richest, which ever the city beheld. Out of that which he brought into the treasury, was made the last payment of those monies, which the common-wealth had borrowed from private men, in the second *Punic* war. So long was it, that *Rome* had still some feeling of *Hannibal*: which being past, there was remaining neither care, nor memory, of any danger. This triumph of *Manlius* was deferred by him, even so long as he well could: for that he thought it not safe, to make his entrance into the city, until the heat of an inquisition, then raging therein, should be allayed. The two *Scipio's* were called, one after another, into judgment, by two tribunes of the people; men only by this accusation, known to posterity. *P. Scipio* the *African*, with whom they began, could not endure that such unworthy men should question him, of purloining from the common treasury, or of being

hired with bribes by *Antiochus*, to make an ill bargain for his country. When therefore his day of answer came; he appeared before the tribunes, not humbly as one accused, but followed by a great train of his friends and clients, with which he passed through the midst of the assembly, and offered himself to speak. Having audience, he told the people, That upon the same day of the year he had fought a great battel with *Hannibal*, and finished the *Punic* war by a signal victory. In memory whereof, he thought it no fit season to babble at the law; but intended to visit the *Capitol*, and there give thanks to *Jupiter* and the rest of the Gods, by whose grace, both on that day and at other times, he had well and happily discharged the most weighty business of the common-wealth. And hereto he invited with him all the citizens: requesting them, *That if ever since the seventeenth year of his life, until he now grew old, the honourable places by them conferred upon him, had prevented the capacity of his age, and yet his deserts had exceeded the greatness of those honourable places; then would they pray, that the princes and great ones of their city might still be like to him.* These words were heard with great approbation; so as all the people, even the officers of the court, followed *Scipio*; leaving the tribunes alone, with none about them, excepting their own slaves and a crier, by whom ridiculously they cited him to judgment, until for very shame, as not knowing what else to do, they granted him, unrequested, a further day. After this, when the *African* perceived that the tribunes would not let fall their suit, but enforce him to submit himself to a disgraceful trial, he willingly relinquished the city, and his unthankful *Romans*, that could suffer him to undergo so much indignity. The rest of his time he spent at *Liternum*; quietly, with a few of his inward friends, and without any desire of seeing *Rome* again. How many years he lived, or whether he lived one whole year, in this voluntary banishment; it is uncertain. The report of his dying in the same year, with *Hannibal* and *Philopæmen*, as also of his private behaviour at *Liternum*, render it probable, that he outlived the tribuneship of his accusers; who meant to have drawn him back to his answer, if one of their colleagues (as one of them had power to hinder all the rest from proceeding) had not caused them to desist. Howsoever it was; the same tribunes went more sharply to work with *L. Scipio* the *Asiatic*. They propounded a decree unto the people, touching money received of *Antiochus*, and not brought into the common treasury; that the senate should give charge unto one of the pretors, to inquire, and judicially determine thereof. In favour of this decree an oration was made by *Cato*, the supposed author of these contentions, and infligator of the tribunes. He was a man of great, but not perfect, virtue: temperate, valiant, and of singular industry; frugal also, both of the publick, and of his own; so as in this kind he was even faulty: for though he would not be corrupted with bribes, yet was he unmerciful and unconscionable, in seeking to encrease his own wealth, by such means as the law did warrant. Ambition was his vice; which being poisoned with envy, troubled both himself, and the whole city, whilst he lived. His mean birth caused him to hate the nobility, especially those that were in chief estimation. Neither did he spare to bite at such as were of his own rank, men raised by desert, if their advancement

^a Isaac. Casaub. Exercitat. 1. ad Annal. Bar. n. 10, & 11.

^b Euseb. Eccl. hist. l. 7. c. 13.

were like to hinder his; but lately before this, when *Glabrio*, whose lieutenant he had been at *Thermopylae*, was his competitor for the censorship, and likely to carry it, he took an oath against him, which was counted as no better than malicious perjury. That he had not brought into the common treasury some vessels of gold and silver, gotten in the camp of *Antiochus*. Now the hatred which he bore unto the *Scipio's* grew partly (besides his general spight at the nobility) from his own first rising, wherein he was countenanced by *Fabius Maximus*, who brooked not the *African*; partly from some check, that was given unto himself, in the *African* voyage by *P. Scipio*, whose treasurer he then was. For when *Cato* did utter his dislike of the consul's bad husbandry (judging magnificence to be no better) in some peremptory manner, *Scipio* plainly told him, That he had no need of such double diligence in his treasurer. Wherefore, either not caring what lies he publish'd, or for want of judgment thinking unworthily of the virtue that was far above him, *Cato* filled *Rome* with untrue reports against his general, whose noble deeds confuted sufficiently the author of such false tales. And thus began the hatred; which being not regarded, nor thought upon by the *Scipio's*, whilst it was nourish'd by their enemy, broke out upon advantage, especially against *L. Scipio*, his brother being dead, or out of the way. A severe inquiry and judgment being appointed of purpose against *Scipio*, matters were so carried, that he was soon condemn'd in a sum of money, far exceeding his ability to pay. For non-payment, his body should have been laid up in prison; but from this rigour of the law he was freed by *Tiberius Gracchus*, the same tribune who had caused the suit against the *African* to be let fall. In his estate, which was confiscated to the use of the city, when there neither appeared any sign of his having been beholden to *Antiochus*, nor was found so much as what he had been condemn'd to pay; then fell his accusers, and all whose hands had been against him, into the indignation of the people. But for this was *L. Scipio* no whit the better. His kindred, friends, and clients made such a collection for him, as would have set him in better estate than before, if he had accepted it. He took no more than such of his own goods, as were of necessary use, being redeemed for him by his nearest friends.

And thus began the civil war of the tongue, in the *Roman* pleadings; which had either not been, or not been much regardable, until now, since the *Punic* war. Security of danger from abroad, and some want of sufficient employment, were especial helps to the kindling of this fire; which first caught hold upon that great worthy, to whose virtue *Rome* was indebted, for changing into so great security her extream danger. But these factious contentions did no long while contain themselves within heat of words, and cunning practice: for when the art of leading the multitude, in such

quarrelsome business, grew to perfection, they that found themselves over-match'd by their adversaries at this kind of weapon, began to make opposition; first with clubs and stones, afterwards with swords; and finally, proceeded from frays and murders in the streets, unto battel in the open field. *Cornelia*, daughter of *Scipio* the *African*, a lady of rare virtue; that, in honour of her two sons, was more commonly named *Mother of the Gracchi*, saw those her two sons, whilst they were but young, slaughter'd in *Rome* together, with some of their friends; by those whom they oppos'd; and their death not revenged by order of law, but rather approved by the senate. At these times the senators began to take upon them authority, more than was to them belonging. They conferred upon the consuls all the whole power of the city, under this form; *Let the consuls provide, that the commonweal receive no detriment*. By this decree of theirs, and by their proclaiming any citizen enemy to the state, they thought to have won a great advantage over the multitude. But after the death of *C. Gracchus*, and of *Saturninus*, a popular man, whom, by such authority, they did put out of the way; it was not long ere *Marius*, a famous captain of theirs, was so condemn'd, who, by force of arms, return'd into the city, and murder'd all the principal senators: whereupon began the civil wars; which giving unto *Sylla*, who prevailed therein, means to make himself absolute lord of *Rome*; taught *Cesar*, a man of higher spirit, to affect and obtain the like sovereign power, when by the like decree of the senate he was provoked. It is true, that never any consul had finally cause to rejoice, of his having put in execution such authority to him committed by the senate. But, as the fury of the multitude, in passing their laws, by throwing of stones, and other violence, made the city stand in need of a sovereign lord: so the vehemency of the senate, in condemning as enemies those that would not submit themselves, when they were over-topp'd by voices in the house, did compel *Cesar*, or give him at least pretence, to right himself by arms; where-with prevailing against his adversaries, he took such order, that neither senate, nor people, should thenceforth be able to do him wrong. So by intestine discord, the *Romans* consuming all or most of their principal citizens, lost their own freedom, and became subjects unto the arbitrary government of one: suffering this change in three generations, after this beginning of their insolent rule; wherein they took upon them, as the highest lords on earth, to do even what they list'd. Yet had not *Rome* indeed attained hitherto unto compleat greatness, nor believed of herself as if she had, whilst a king sat crowned on the throne of *Alexander*, continuing and upholding the reputation of a former empire. Wherefore, this consummation of her honour was thought upon betimes. How it was effected, the sequel will discover.

C H A P. VI.

The second Macedonian war.

S E C T. I.

The condition wherein those princes and estates remained, which were associates of the Romans, when the war with Antiochus was finished. The Romans quarrel with Philip. They deal insolently with the Achæans. The Macedonian, being unready for war, obtains peace at Rome, by his son Demetrius; of whom thenceforth he becomes jealous.

AFTER the overthrow of *Antiochus*, although *Philip* of *Macedon*, *Eumenes* king of *Pergamus*, the commonweal of the *Achæans*, and all other the states of *Greece*, were governed by the same laws and magistrates, as they formerly had been, before the arrival of the *Romans* in those parts: yet in very truth (the publick declaration excepted) they were none other than absolute vassals to the people of *Rome*. For of those five prerogatives belonging to a monarch, or unto sovereign power, in whomsoever it rest; namely, to make laws, to create magistrates, to arbitrate peace and war, to beat money; and to reserve (as the *French* call it) *le dernier resort*, or the last appeals, the *Romans* had assumed four; and the greatest of them so absolutely, that is, the appeal, or last resort, as every petty injury offered to each other by the fore-named kings or states, was heard and determined either by the *Roman* ambassadors, or commissioners, in those places whence the complaint came, or otherwise by the senators themselves within *Rome*: from whose arbitrement, or direction, if either king, or commonweals declined, he or they were beaten, and enforced to obedience; or had their estates and regalities utterly dissolved. Nevertheless it is true, that they had their own laws, and officers of their own ordaining: yet so, as neither their laws were of force, when the *Romans* interposed their will to the contrary; neither was their election of magistrates so free, as that they had not therein especial regard unto the good pleasure of these their masters.

And to such degree of servitude the several estates of *Greece* did bow very gently: either as being thankful for their deliverance from a yoke more sensibly grievous; or, as being skilful in the art of flattery, and therein taking delight, since therein consisted their chief hope of thriving; or, as being more fearful of displeasing the strongest, than mindful of their own honour. But *Eumenes* living further off, and being most obsequious unto the *Romans*, was not of long time questioned about any of his doings: his conformity unto them in matter of war and peace, together with the diversion of their thoughts another way, giving him leave to use his own even as he listed, until they should otherwise dispose of him. Neither was it a little available to him, that his kingdom bordered upon the nations, by them not thoroughly subdued. For upon the same reason (as well as upon his own high deserts) were they very loving unto *Masaniissa*, and to his house, until *Carthage* was ruined, and their dominion settled in *Afric*: as likewise afterwards to the kings of *Mauritania*,

Cappadocia, and others: holding people in subjection unto themselves, by the ministry of kings: especially of such kings, as were useful and obsequious unto them.

Now the *Macedonian* was of a more noble temper, and shewed himself not forgetful of his own former greatness, the honour of his race, or the high reputation of his kingdom. But such magnanimity was none otherwise construed by the *Romans*, than as want of due reverence to their estate, and a valuation of himself against them: which, in the pride of their fortune, they could not endure. Wherefore, notwithstanding that he had lately given passage to their armies through his country, prepared the ways for them, and furnished them both with victuals, and other things needful, to transport them over the *Hellepont* into *Asia*, against *Antiochus*: yet upon the complaint of *Eumenes*, and the states of *Theffaly* and *Thrace*, he was commanded to abandon the cities of *Ænus* and *Maronea*, with all pieces and places demanded by any of his neighbours; whereof many of them he had lately conquered, by direction, or licence, even from the *Romans* themselves.

These towns of *Ænus* and *Maronea* had been part of *Lyfimachus's* kingdom: who from *Thrace* northwards, and to the north-west, extended his dominion very far. He is thought to have made himself lord of *Transylvania*: in which province it is said, ^a that innumerable medals of gold have been found in the age of our grandfathers, each of them weighing two or three crowns, and stamped with his image on the one side, on the other side with victory. Of all these lordships, the possession, or rather the title (for he lived not to settle his estate in *Europe*) fell to *Seleucus Nicator* by right of war, wherein he vanquished and slew *Lyfimachus*: as also, by the like right, *Ptolemy Ceraunus* thought them his own, when he had murdered *Seleucus*. But the inundation of the *Gauls*, which the kingdom of *Macedon* could not sustain, did shortly and easily wash away from that crown, together with the more part of *Thrace*, all those heaps of land newly thereto annexed. Somewhat of this was afterwards regained by *Antigonus* the son of *Demetrius*, and his successors: though not much; for they were otherwise busied. The fury of the *Gauls* being over-past, those countries which lately had been oppressed by them, recovered their liberty; and not only held it, but learned some of them, especially the *Dardanians* and wild *Thracians*, to find their advantages, and make use of them, even upon *Macedon*. Against the mischiefs commonly done by these, king *Philip* did provide the most convenient remedies; by shutting up the ways, whereby the *Dardanians* might enter into his kingdom; and by occupying *Lyfimachia*, with some other towns in *Thrace*, which he fortified, as bulwarks of his own country, against the *Barbarians*. Now, although it behoved him thus to do, for the defence of his own estate: yet so far as these towns were, in a manner, at absolute liberty, his possession of them was thought to partake more of violence than of justice. And in this respect, he

^a History of Hungary by Mart. Fumeé, lib. 5.

was formerly accused by the *Etolians* of wrongful usurpation and oppression, in his having occupied *Lyfimachia*. Hereto he made a good answer, that his garrison did only save it from the *Thracians*: who, as soon as he thence withdrew his men, did seize upon the town, and ruin it. The like perhaps he might have said, touching *Ænus* and *Maronea*; that they were places unable to defend themselves, and gates, by which the *Barbarians* might have entrance into his kingdom. But this plea had not availed him, in the dispute about *Lyfimachia*: and in the present question, the *Romans* were not without their own title; since *Antiochus* had gotten all the country thereabout, whilst *Philip* was busied in his former war; and since they, by their victory, had gotten unto themselves all the title, which *Antiochus* thereto could pretend. Wherefore he only submitted his right unto the good pleasure of the senate: referring it unto their disposition, whether *Ænus* and *Maronea* should be set at liberty, whether left in his hand, or whether bestowed upon *Eumenes*; who begged them, as an appendix to *Lyfimachia* and *Chersonesus*, that were already his by their gift. What they would determine, he might easily perceive, by the demeanor of their ambassadors towards him: who sitting as judges between him and all that made complaint upon him, gave sentence against him in every controversy. Nevertheless, he sent ambassadors to *Rome*, there to maintain his right unto these towns, wherein he thought, that equity (if it might prevail) was wholly on his side. For he had holpen their consuls in the war against *Antiochus* and the *Etolians*: wherein whatsoever he had gotten for himself, was now taken from him by their ambassadors: and would they now deprive him of those two towns, lying so fitly for the guard of his kingdom, which he had gotten to himself out of the ruins of *Antiochus*, like as out of his own ruins *Antiochus* had gotten in those quarters a great deal more? By such allegations either he was likely to prevail, or at leastwise to gain time, wherein he might bethink himself what he had to do. It was not long ere he had word from *Rome*, that the senate were no more equal to him than had been their ambassadors. Wherefore, considering how insolently the *Maronites* had behaved themselves, in pleading against him for their liberty, he took counsel of his own passions; and (as by nature he was very cruel) gave order to *Onomastus*, that was warden of the sea-coasts, to handle these *Maronites* in such sort, as they might have little joy of the liberty by them so earnestly desired. *Onomastus* employed *Cassander*, one of the king's men, dwelling in *Maronea*, and willed him to let in the *Thracians* by night, that they might sack the town, and use all cruelties of war. This was done, but so ill taken by the *Roman* ambassadors, who had better notice than could have been feared of these proceedings, that the king was by them directly charged with the crime, and called more strictly, than became his majesty, to an account. He would have removed the blame from himself, and laid it even upon the *Maronites*; affirming, that they, in heat of their factions, being some inclinable to him, other some to *Eumenes*, had fallen into such an outrage, that they had cut one another's throats. And hereof he willed the ambassadors to enquire among the *Maronites* themselves, as well knowing, that they who survived were either his own friends, or so terrified and amazed by the late execution of his vengeance among them, that they durst not utter an offensive word. But he found the *Romans* more severe, and more thoroughly

informed in the business, than to rest contented with such an answer. He was plainly told, that if he would discharge himself of the crime objected, he must send *Onomastus* and *Cassander* to *Rome*, there to be examined as the senate should think fit. This did not a little trouble him; yet he collected his spirits, and said, that *Cassander* should be at their disposition; but concerning *Onomastus*, who had not been at *Maronea*, nor near to it, he requested them not to press him; since it stood not with his honour, so lightly to give away his friends. As for *Cassander*, because he should tell no tales, he took order to have him poisoned by the way. By this we see that the doctrine which *Machiavel* taught unto *Cesar Borgia*, to employ men in mischievous actions, and afterwards to destroy them when they have performed the mischief, was not of his own invention. All ages have given us examples of this goodly policy, the latter having been apt scholars in this lesson to the more ancient; as the reign of *Henry* the eighth here in *England*, can bear good witness; and therein especially the lord *Cromwell*, who perished by the same unjust law that himself had devised for the taking away of another man's life.

Such actions of *Philip* made an unpleasant noise at *Rome*, and were like to have brought upon him the war which he feared, before he was ready to entertain it. Wherefore he employed his younger son *Demetrius* as ambassador unto the senate, giving him instructions how to make answer to all complaints; and withal to deliver his own grievances in such wise, that if ought were amiss, yet might it appear that he had been strongly urged to take such courses. The sum of his embassy was, to pacify the *Romans*, and make all even for the present. *Demetrius* himself was known to be very acceptable unto the senate; as having been well approved by them when he was hostage in *Rome*, and therefore seemed the more likely to prevail somewhat; were it only in regard that would be borne unto his person.

Whilst this business with the *Macedonian* hung in suspense, and whilst he, by his readiness to make submission, seemed likely to divert from himself some other way the *Roman* arms, the same ambassadors, that had been judges between him and his neighbours, made their progress through the rest of *Greece*; and took notice of the controversies which they found between some estates in the country. The greatest cause that was heard before them, was the complaint of the banished *Lacedemonians* against the *Acheans*. It was objected unto the *Acheans*, that they had committed a grievous slaughter upon many citizens of *Lacedemon*; that unto this cruelty they had added a greater, in throwing down the walls of the city: as also further, in changing the laws, and abrogating the famous institutions of *Lycurgus*. Hereto *Lycortas*, then pretor of the *Acheans*, made answer, that these banished *Lacedemonians*, who now took upon them to accuse the nation that had once protected them, were notoriously known to be the men who had themselves committed that murder, whereof shamelessly they laid the blame upon others; the *Acheans* having only called those unto judgment, that were supposed to be chief authors of a rebellion against both them and the *Romans*; and these plaintiffs having slain them upon private, though just hatred, as they were coming to make answer for themselves. Concerning their throwing down the walls of *Lacedemon*, he said, it was most agreeable to *Lycurgus's* ordinance, who, having persuaded his citizens to defend their town and liberty by their proper virtue, did inhibit unto them all kinds of fortifications, as the retreats and

nefts either of cowards, or (whereof *Lacedemon* had woful experience) of tyrants and usurpers. Further, he shewed, how the same tyrants, that had built these walls, and hemmed in the *Spartans*, had also quite abolished *Lycurgus's* ordinances, and governed the city by their own lawless will. As for the *Acheans*, they communicated their own laws, which they held for the best, or else would change them, and take better unto the *Lacedemonians*, whom they found without laws, or any tolerable form of policy. For conclusion, *Lycortas* plainly told *App. Claudius*, the chief of the ambassadors, that he and his countrymen held it strange, being friends and faithful allies of the *Romans*, to see themselves thus constrained to answer and give account of their actions, as vassals and slaves unto the people of *Rome*. For if they were indeed at liberty, why might not the *Acheans* as well require to be satisfied about that which the *Romans* had done at *Capua*, as the *Romans* did busy themselves to take account how things went at *Lacedemon*? For, if the *Romans* would stand upon their greatness, and intimate, as they began, that the liberty of their friends was nothing worth, longer than should please themselves to ratify it; then must the *Acheans* have recourse unto those agreements that were confirmed by oath, and which, without perjury, could not be violated; as reverencing, and indeed fearing the *Romans*, but much more the immortal gods. To this bold answer of *Lycortas*, *Appius* found little to reply. Yet, taking state upon him, he pronounced more like a master than a judge, that if the *Acheans* would not be ruled by fair means, and earn thanks whilst they might, they should be compelled with a mischief to do what was required at their hands, whether they would or no. This altercation was in the parliament of the *Acheans*, which groaned to hear the lordly words of *Appius*. Yet fear prevailed above indignation, and it was permitted unto the *Romans* to do as they listed. Hereupon the ambassadors restored some banished and condemned men; but the *Roman* senate, very soon after, did make void all judgment of death or banishment that had been laid by the *Acheans* upon any citizen of *Lacedemon*; as likewise they made it a matter of disputation, whether or no the city and territory of *Lacedemon* should be suffered to continue a member of the *Achean* commonwealth, or taken from them, and made, as it had been, an estate by it self. By bringing such a matter into question, the *Romans* well declared, that they held it to depend upon their own will, how much or how little any of their confederates should be suffered to enjoy, though by contributing *Sparta* to the council of *Achaia*, they discovered no less, as to them seemed, the love which they bare unto the *Acheans*, than the power which they had over them.

Into such slavery had the *Greeks*, and all kings and common-wealths whatsoever bordering upon any part of the *Mediterranean* seas, reduced themselves, by calling in the *Romans* to their succour. They wanted not the good counsel and persuasions of many wise and temperate men among them; they had also the examples of the *Italians*, *Spaniards*, *Gauls*, and *Africans*, all subdued by the *Romans*; and, by seeking patronage, made mere vassals, to instruct them what, in the like case, they should expect: yet could not the true reasons of estate and policy so prevail with them, but their private passions and neighbouring hatred, which hath evermore bought revenge at the price of self ruin, brought them from the honour which they enjoyed, of being free princes and cities, into most base and fearful servility.

All this made well for *Philip* of *Macedon*, who, though he saw the *Greeks* very far from daring to stir against those, by whom both he and they were kept in awe; yet was he not without hope that (few of them excepted, whom the *Romans*, by freeing from his subjection, had made his implacable enemies) in hearty affection all the country would be his whensoever he should take arms, as shortly he was like to do. Young *Demetrius*, coming home from *Rome*, brought with him the desired ratification of peace; though qualified with much indignity soon following. He had been lovingly used at *Rome*, and heard with great favour in the senate. There being confounded with the multitude of objections, whereto his youth, unskilful in the art of wrangling, could not readily make answer; it was permitted unto him to read such brief notes as he had received from his father, and out of those the senate were contented to gather satisfaction; more for *Demetrius's* own sake, as they then said and wrote into *Macedon*, than for any goodness in the defence. Such pride of theirs, in remitting his faults at the intreaty of his son, together with some insolence of his son, growing (as appeared) from this favour of the *Romans*, did increase in *Philip* his hatred unto *Rome*, and breed in him a jealousy of his too forward son. To set him forward in these passions, there came daily new ambassadors from *Rome*; some bringing one commandment; some another; and some requiring him to fulfill those things which had been imposed upon him by their fore-goers. Neither were there wanting that observed his countenance; and when he had fulfilled all that was required at his hands, yet laid it to his charge that he had done things unwillingly, and would be obedient no longer than he needs must. With these ambassadors young *Demetrius* was conversant; rather perhaps out of simplicity, and for that they made much of him, than for any ambitious respect; yet a great deal more than was pleasing to his father. So the rumour grew current through all *Macedon*, that *Perseus*, the elder son of the king, should not succeed unto his father; but that the diadem should be conferred upon *Demetrius*, if not by some other pretence, yet by mere favour of the *Romans*. This offended not only *Perseus*, but *Philip* himself, who suspected his younger son, as more *Roman* than his own; and accordingly misconstrued all his doings. But ere we proceed unto the bitter fruits of this jealousy, it will not be amiss to speak of some memorable accidents that were in the mean time.

SECT. II.

The death of Philopœmen, Hannibal, and Scipio. That the military profession is of all other the most unhappy, notwithstanding some examples which may seem to prove the contrary.

THE *Romans*, wanting other matter of quarrel in the continent of *Greece*, had of late been so peremptory with the *Acheans*, that they seemed not unlikely to take part against them in any controversy that should be moved. Hereupon the *Messenians*, who against their will were annexed unto the *Achean* common-wealth, having long been of a contrary faction thereto, grew bold to withdraw themselves from that society, with purpose to set up again an estate of their own, severed from communion with any other. This was the device of some that were powerful in their city, who, finding the multitude only inclinable to their purpose, and not over-strongly affected in the business, were care-

ful to seek occasion of reducing things to such pass, that all their citizens might be entangled in a necessity of standing out, and of not returning to the *Achean* league. And hereupon they began to do some acts of hostility, whereby it was probable that blood should be drawn, and either side so far exasperated, that little hopes of agreement would be left. Upon the fame of their commotion and proceedings, *Philopæmen*, then prætor of the *Acheans*, levied such forces as he could in haste, and went against them. Many principal gentlemen of the *Acheans*, especially of the *Megalopolitans*, were soon in a readiness to wait upon him. Besides these, which were all, or for the most part, horse; he had some auxiliaries out of *Thrace* and *Crete*, that usually were kept in pay. Thus accompanied, he met with *Dinocrates*, captain of the *Messenians*, whom he charged and forced to run. But whilst his horsemen were too earnest in following the chase, there arrived by chance a supply of five hundred from *Messene*, which gave new courage unto those that fled. So the enemies began to make head again, and with the help of those who very seasonably came to their aid, compelled *Philopæmen*'s horsemen to turn back. *Philopæmen* himself had long been sick of an ague, and was then very weak; yet the greatness of his courage would not suffer him to be negligent of their safety, which had so willingly adventured themselves under his conduct. He took upon him to make the retreat; and suffering his horsemen to pass along by him in a narrow lane, he often turned about against the *Messenians*, whom his reputation, and the knowledge of his great worth, did terrify from approaching over-near to him. But it fell out unhappily, that, being cast to the ground by a fall of his horse, and being withal in very weak plight of body, he was unable to get up again. So the enemies came upon him, and took him; yet scarce believed their fortune to be so good, although their eyes were witnesses. The first messenger that brought this news to *Messene*, was so far from being believed, that he was hardly thought to be in his right wits. But when the truth was affirm'd by many reports, all the city ran forth to meet him, and behold the spectacle seeming so incredible. They caused him to be brought into the theatre, that there they might satisfy themselves with beholding him. The greatest part of them had compassion on his misfortune; and, in commemoration both of his virtue, and of the singular benefits by him done unto them, especially in delivering them from *Nabis* the tyrant, began to manifest their good will for his delivery. Contrariwise, *Dinocrates*, and his faction, were desirous hastily to take away his life; because they held him a man implacable, and one that would never leave any disgrace or injury done to him unrevenge'd. They durst not one trust another with the keeping of him; but committed him into a strong vault under ground, that had been made for the custody of their treasure. So thither they let him down fast bound, and with an engine laid an heavy stone upon the mouth of the vault. There he had not staid long, ere his enemies had concluded his present death. The hangman of the city was let down unto him, with a cup of poison, which *Philopæmen* took in his hand; and asking no more than whether the horsemen were escaped, and particularly whether *Lycortas* was safe: when he heard an answer to his mind, he said it was well; and so, with a cheerful countenance, drank his last draught. He was seventy years old, and weaken'd with long sickness, whereby the poison wrought the sooner, and easily took away his life.

No. 47.

The *Acheans*, when they missed him in their flight, were marvellously offended with themselves, for that they had been more mindful to preserve their own lives, than to look unto the safety of so excellent a commander. Whilst they were devising what to do in such a case, they got advertisement of his being taken. All *Achaia* was by this report vehemently afflicted: so as ambassadors were forthwith dispatch'd unto *Messene*, craving his enlargement; and yet preparation made withal to obtain it by force, in case that fair means would not serve. *Lycortas* was chosen general of the army against *Messene*; who coming thither, and laying siege to the town, forced it in a short time to yield. Then *Dinocrates*, knowing what he was to expect, laid hands upon himself, and made an end of his own life. The rest of those that had been partakers in the murder, were compelled to wait in bonds upon the ashes of *Philopæmen*, that were carried home in solemn pomp to *Megalopolis*; where they were all of them slain at his funeral, as sacrifices to his ghost, whom they had offended. *Q. Martius*; a Roman ambassador, was then in *Greece*; whence, upon one occasion or other, the Roman ambassadors were seldom absent. He would have intermeddled in this business of *Messene*, had not *Lycortas* made short work, and left him nothing to do.

About the same time was *T. Quintius Flaminius* sent ambassador to *Prusias*, king of *Bithynia*; not so much to withdraw him from prosecuting the war against *Eumenes*, as to intreat him that he would deliver *Hannibal*, the most spiteful enemy in all the world unto the senate and people of *Rome*, into his hands. *Prusias* (therein unworthy of the crown he wore) did readily condescend; or rather (as *Livy* thinks) to gratify the *Romans*, he determined either to kill *Hannibal*, or to deliver him alive to *Flaminius*. For upon the first conference between the king and *Flaminius*, a troop of soldiers were directed to guard and environ the lodging where *Hannibal* lay. That famous captain having found cause, before this, to suspect the faith of *Prusias*, had devised some secret sallies under ground, to save himself from any treasonable and sudden assault. But finding now that all parts about him were fore-closed, he had recourse to his last remedy; which he then was constrained to practise, as well to frustrate his enemies of their triumphing over him, as to save himself from their torture and merciless hands; who, as he well knew, would neither respect his famous enterprises, his honour, nor his age. When therefore he saw no way of escape, nor counsel to resort unto, he took the poison into his hand, which he always preserved for a sure antidote against the sharpest diseases of adverse fortune; which being ready to swallow down, he uttered these words: *I will now (said he) deliver the Romans of that fear, which hath so many years possess'd them; that fear, which makes them impatient to attend the death of an old man. This victory of Flaminius over me, which am disarmed, and betrayed into his hands, shall never be numbred among the rest of his heroical deeds: No, it shall make it manifest to all the nations of the world, how far the ancient Roman virtue is degenerate and corrupted. For such was the nobleness of their fore-fathers; as, when Pyrrhus invaded them in Italy, and was ready to give them battel at their own doors, they gave him knowledge of the treason intended against him by poison: whereas these of a latter race have employed Flaminius, a man who hath heretofore been one of their consuls, to practise with Prusias, contrary to the ho-*

hour of a king, contrary to his faith given, and contrary to the laws of hospitality, to slaughter, or deliver up his own guest. He then cursing the person of *Prusias*, and all his, and desiring the immortal Gods to revenge his infidelity, drank off the poison, and died.

In this year also (as good authors have reported) to accompany *Philopœmen* and *Hannibal*, died *Scipio the African*: these being, all of them, as great captains as ever the world had; but not more famous than unfortunate. Certainly, for *Hannibal*, whose tragedy we have now finished, had he been prince of the *Carthaginians*, and one who by his authority might have commanded such supplies, as the war which he undertook required; it is probable, that he had torn up the *Roman* empire by the roots. But he was so strongly cross'd by a cowardly and envious faction at home; as his proper virtue, wanting publick force to sustain it, did lastly dissolve itself in his own, and in the common misery of his country and common-weal.

Hence it comes, to wit, from the envy of our equals, and jealousy of our masters, be they kings, or common-weals, That there is no profession more unprosperous, than that of men of war, and great captains, being no kings. For, besides the envy and jealousy of men; the spoils, rapes, famine, slaughter of the innocent, vastation, and burnings, with a world of miseries laid on the labouring man, are so hateful to God, as with good reason did *Monluc*, the marshal of *France*, confess, 'That were not the mercies of God infinite, and without restriction, it were in vain for those of his profession to hope for any portion of them: seeing the cruelties, by them permitted and committed, were also infinite.' Howsoever, this is true, That the victories, which are obtained by many of the greatest commanders, are commonly either ascribed to those that serve under them, to fortune, or to the cowardice of the nation against whom they serve. For the most of others, whose virtues have raised them above the level of their inferiors, and have surmounted their envy: yet have they been rewarded in the end, either with disgrace, banishment, or death. Among the *Romans* we find many examples hereof; as *Coriolanus*, *M. Livius*, *L. Emilius*, and this our *Scipio*, whom we have lately buried. Among the *Greeks* we read of not many, that escaped these rewards. Yea, long before these times, it was a legacy that *David* bequeathed unto his victorious captain *Joab*. With this fare *Alexander* feasted *Parmenio*, *Philotas*, and others; and prepared it for *Antipater* and *Cassander*. Here to *Valentinian*, the emperor, invited *Ætius*: who, after many other victories, overthrew *Attila* of the *Hunnes*, in the greatest battel, for the well fighting and resolution of both armies, that ever was stricken in the world; for there fell of those that fought, besides run-aways, an hundred and fourscore thousand. Hereupon it was well and boldly told unto the emperor, by *Proximus*, That in killing of *Ætius*, he had cut off his own right hand with his left: for it was not long after, that *Maximus* (by whose persuasion *Valentinian* slew *Ætius*) murder'd the emperor, which he never durst attempt, *Ætius* living. And, besides the loss of that emperor, it is true, that with *Ætius* the glory of the western empire was rather dissolved than obscured. The same unworthy destiny, or a far worse, had *Bellisarius*; whose undertakings and victories were so difficult and glorious, as after-ages suspected them for fabulous: for he had his eyes torne out of his head by *Justinian*; and he died a blind beggar. *Narses* also, to the great prejudice of the christian religion, was disgraced by *Justin*. That rule of *Cato*

against *Scipio* hath been well observed in every age since then; to wit, That the common-weal cannot be accounted free, which standeth in awe of any one man. And hence have the *Turks* drawn another principle, and indeed a *Turkish* one, That every warlike prince should rather destroy his greatest men of war, than suffer his own glory to be obscured by them. For this cause did *Bajazet the Second* dispatch *Bassa Acomat*, *Selim* strangle *Bassa Mustapha*; and most of those princes bring to ruin the most of their visiers. Of the *Spanish* nation, the great *Gonsalvo*, who drove the *French* out of *Naples*; and *Ferdinando Cortese*, who conquer'd *Mexico*, were crown'd with nettles, not with laurel. The earls of *Egmond* and *Horn* had no heads left them to wear garlands on: and that the great captains of all nations have been paid with this copper coin, there are examples more than too many. On the contrary it may be said, that many have acquired the state of princes, kings and emperors, by their great ability in matter of war. This I confess. Yet must it be had withal in consideration, that these high places have been given or offer'd unto very few, as rewards of their military virtue; though many have usurped them, by the help and favour of those armies which they commanded. Neither is it unregardable, that the tyrants which have oppress'd the liberty of free cities, and the lieutenants of kings or emperors, which have traiterously cast down their masters, and stepped up into their seats, were not all of them good men of war; but have used the advantage of some commotion; or many of them, by base and cowardly practices, have obtained those dignities, which undeservedly were ascribed to their personal worth. So that the number of those that have purchased absolute greatness, by the greatness of their warlike virtue, is far more in seeming, than in deed. *Phocas* was a soldier, and by the help of soldiers he got the empire from his lord *Mauritius*: but he was a coward; and with a barbarous cruelty, seldom found in any other than cowards, he slew first the children of *Mauritius*, a prince that never had done him wrong, before his face; and after them *Mauritius* himself. This his bloody aspiring was but as a debt, which was paid unto him again by *Heraclius*; who took from him the imperial crown, unjustly gotten; and set it on his own head. *Leontius* laid hold on the emperor *Justin*, cut off his nose and ears, and sent him into banishment: but God's vengeance rewarded him with the same punishment, by the hands of *Tiberius*, to whose charge he had left his own men of war. *Justin*, having recovered forces, lighted on *Tiberius*, and barbed him after the same fashion. *Philippicus*, commanding the forces of *Justin*, murder'd both the emperor and his son. *Anastasius*, the vassal of this new tyrant, surpris'd his master *Philippicus*, and thrust out both his eyes. But with *Anastasius*, *Theodosius* dealt more gently; for, having wrested the scepter out of his hands, he enforced him to become a priest. It were an endless, and a needless work to tell, how *Leo* rewarded this *Theodosius*; how many others have been repaid with their own cruelty, by men alike ambitious and cruel; or how many hundreds, or rather thousands, hoping of captains to make themselves kings, have, by God's justice, miserably perisht in the attempt. The ordinary, and perhaps the best way of thriving by the practice of arms, is to take what may be gotten by the spoil of enemies, and the liberality of those princes and cities in whose service one hath well deserved. But scarce one of a thousand have prospered by this course. For that

that observation made by *Solomon*, of unthankfulness in this kind, hath been found belonging to all countries and ages: *"A little city, and few men in it, and a great king came against it; and compassed it about, and builded forts against it: and there was found a poor and wise man therein, and he delivered the city by his wisdom; but none remembered this poor man."* Great monarchs are unwilling to pay great thanks, lest thereby they should acknowledge themselves to have been indebted for great benefits, which the unwiser sort of them think to favour of some impotency in themselves. But in this respect they are oftentimes couzened and abused: which proves that weakness to be in them indeed, whereof they so gladly shun the opinion. Contrariwise, free estates are bountiful in giving thanks; yet so, as those thanks are not of long endurance. But concerning other profit which their captains have made, by enriching themselves with the spoil of the enemy, they are very inquisitive to search into it, and to strip the well-deservers out of their gettings; yea, most injuriously to rob them of their own, upon a false supposition, that even they, whose hands are most clean from such offences, have purloined somewhat from the common treasury. Hereof I need not to produce examples, that of the two *Scipio's* being so lately recited.

In my late sovereign's time, although for the wars, which for her own safety she was constrained to undertake, her majesty had no less cause to use the service of martial men both by sea and land, than any of her predecessors for many years had; yet, according to the destiny of that profession, I do not remember that any of hers, the lord admiral excepted, her eldest and most prosperous commander, were either enriched, or otherwise honoured, for any service by them performed. And that her majesty had many advised, valiant, and faithful men, the prosperity of her affairs did well witness; who in all her days never received dishonour, by the cowardise or infidelity of any commander, by her self chosen and employed.

For as all her old captains by land died poor men; as *Malbey, Randol, Drewry, Reade, Wilford, Layton, Pellam, Gilbert, Cunsstable, Bouchier, Barkley, Bingham*, and others; so those of a later and more dangerous employment, whereof *Norrice* and *Vere* were the most famous, and who have done as great honour to our nation (for the means they had) as ever any did: those (I say) with many other brave colonels, have left behind them (besides the reputation which they purchased with many travels and wounds) nor title nor estate to their posterity. As for the *L. Thomas Burrough*, and *Peregrine Bertie*, *L. Willoughby* of *Eresby*, two very worthy and exceeding valiant commanders, they brought with them into the world their titles and estates.

That her majesty, in the advancement of her men of war, did sooner believe other men than her self; a disease unto which many wise princes, besides her self, have been subject: I say, that such a confidence, although it may seem altogether to excuse her noble nature, yet can it not but in some sort accuse her of weakness. And exceeding strange it were, were not the cause manifest enough, that where the prosperous actions are so exceedingly prized, the actors are so unprosperous, and so generally neglected. The cause, I say, which hath wrought one and the same effect in all times, and among all nations, is this, that those which are nearest the persons of princes (which martial men seldom are) can with no good grace commend, or at least magnify a profession far more noble than their own, seeing therein

they should only mind their masters of the wrong they did unto others, in giving less honour and reward to men of far greater deserving, and of far greater use, than themselves.

But his majesty hath already paid the greatest part of that debt; for, besides the relieving by pensions all the poorer sort, he hath honoured more martial men than all the kings of *England* have done for this hundred years.

He hath given a coronet to the Lord *Thomas Howard*, for his chargeable and remarkable service, as well in the year 1588, as at *Calais*, the islands, and in our own seas; having first commanded as a captain, twice admiral of a squadron, and twice admiral in chief. His majesty hath changed the baronies of *Montjoy* and *Burley* into earldoms, and created *Sidney* viscount, *Knollys, Russel, Carew, Danvers, Arundel* of *Warder*, *Gerald*, and *Chichester*, barons, for their governments and services in the *Netherlands, France, Ireland*, and elsewhere.

SECT. III.

Philip making provision for war against the Romans, deals hardly with many of his own subjects. His negotiation with the Bastarnæ. His cruelty. He suspecteth his son Demetrius. Demetrius accused by his brother Perseus; and shortly after slain by his father's appointment. Philip repenteth him of his son's death, whom he findeth to have been innocent: and intending to revenge it on Perseus, he dieth.

Quintus Martius, the Roman ambassador, who travelled up and down, seeking what work might be found about *Greece*, had received instruction from the senate, to use the most of his diligence in looking into the estate of *Macedon*. At his return home, that he might not seem to have discovered nothing, he told the fathers, that *Philip* had done whatsoever they enjoined him; yet so, as it might appear, that such his obedience would last no longer, than mere necessity should enforce him thereunto. He added further, that all the doings and sayings of that king did wholly tend unto rebellion, about which he was devising. Now it was so indeed, that *Philip* much repented him of his faithful obsequiousness to the *Romans*, and foresaw their intent, which was, to get his kingdom into their own hands, with safety of their honour, if they could find convenient means; or otherwise (as to him seemed apparent) by what means soever. He was in an ill case, as having been already vanquished by them; having lost exceedingly both in strength and reputation; having subjects that abhorred to hear of war with *Rome*; and having neither neighbour nor friend, that, if he were thereto urged, would adventure to take his part; yet he provided as well as he could devise against the necessity which he daily feared. Such of his own people, as dwelt in the maritime towns, and gave him cause to suspect that they would do but bad service against the *Romans*, he compelled to forsake their dwellings, and removed them all into *Emathia*. The cities and country whence these were transplanted, he filled with a multitude of *Thracians*, whose faith he thought a great deal more assured against those enemies that were terrible to the *Macedonians*. Further, he devised upon alluring the *Bastarnæ*, a strong and hardy nation, that dwelt beyond the river of *Danubius*, to abandon their fear, and come to him with all their multitude; who, besides other great rewards, would help them to root out the *Dardanians*, and take possession of their

country. These were like to do him notable service against the *Romans*, being not only stout fighting men; but such, as being planted in those quarters by him, would bear respect unto him alone. The least benefit that could be hoped by their arrival, must be the utter extirpation of the *Dardanians*; a people always troublesome to the kingdom of *Macedon*, whensoever they found advantage. Neither was it judged any hard matter to persuade those *Bastarnæ*, by hope of spoil, and other inticements, unto a more desperate expedition, through *Illyria*, and the countries upon the *Adriatic* sea, into *Italy* itself. It was not known who should withstand them upon the way. Rather it was thought that the *Scordisci*, and peradventure some others, through whose countries they were to pass, would accompany them against the *Romans*, were it only in hope of spoil. Now to facilitate the remove of these *Bastarnæ* from their own habitations, into the land of the *Dardanians*, upon the border of *Macedon*; a long and tedious journey unto them, that carried with them their wives and children: *Philip* with gifts did purchase the good will of some *Thracian* princes, lords of the countries through which they were to pass. And thus he sought means to strengthen himself, with help of the wild nations, which neither knew the *Romans*, nor were known unto them; since he was not like to find assistance from any civil nation, about the whole compass of the *Mediterranean* seas. But these devices were long ere they took effect: so as the *Bastarnæ* came not before such time as he was dead; his death being the overthrow of that purpose. In the mean time he neglected not the training of his men to war, and the exercise of them in some small expeditions, against those wild people that bordered upon him, and stood worst affected toward him.

But these his counsels and proceedings were miserably disturbed by the calamities that fell upon him, both in his kingdom, and in his own house. The families and whole townships, which he had caused much against their wills to forsake their ancient dwellings, and betake themselves to such new habitations, as he in his discretion thought meet for them, were vehemently offended at the change. Yet their anger at first contained itself within words: he having done them no great wrong in that alteration, otherwise than by neglecting their affection to the places, wherein they had long lived: which also he did unwillingly, being himself over-ruled by necessity, that seemed apparent. This evil therefore would soon have been determined, had not his cruel and vindictive nature made it worse. He could not pardon words proceeding from just sorrow: but imputed all to traitorous malice; and accordingly sought revenge where it was needless. In his rage he caused many to die: among whom, were some eminent men; and few or none of them deservedly. This encreased the hatred of the people, and turned their former exclamations into bitter curses. Which grew the more general; when the king, in a most barbarous and base fury, mistrusting all alike whom he had injured, thought himself unlike to be safe, until he should have massacred all the children of those parents, whom tyrannically he had put to death. In the execution of this his unmanly pleasure, some accidents, more tragical than perhaps he could have desired, gave men cause to think (as they could not in reason think otherwise) that, not without vengeance poured on him from heaven, he felt the like misery in his own children. It is hard to say what the *Romans* intended, in the extraordinary

favour which they shewed unto *Demetrius*, the king's yonger son. It may well be (though it may be also suspected) that they had no purpose to make and nourish dissension between the brethren, but only to cherish the virtue and towardliness of *Demetrius*: like as we find it in their histories. But their notable favour towards this young prince, and his mutual respect of them, bred extream jealousy in the father's head. If any custom of the *Romans*, the manner of their life, the fashion of their apparel, or the unsightly contriving and building (as then it was) of the town of *Rome*, were jested at in ordinary discourse and table-talk, *Demetrius* was sure to be presently on fire, defending and praising them, even in such points as rather needed excuse. This, and his daily conversation with their ambassadors, as often as they came, gave his father cause to think, that he was no fit partaker of any counsel held against them. Wherefore he communicated all his devices with his elder son *Perseus*; who, fearing so much lest his brother should step between him and the succession, converted wholly unto his destruction, that grace which he had with his father. *Perseus* was then thirty years old; of a stirring spirit, though much defective in valour. *Demetrius* was younger by five years, more open and unwary in his actions, yet thought old and crafty enough, to entertain more dangerous practices, than his free speeches discovered. The jealous head of the king having entertained such suspicions, that were much encreased by the cunning practice of his elder son, a slight occasion made the fire break out, that had long lain smothered. A muster, and ceremonious lustration of the army, was wont to be made at certain times with great solemnity. The manner of it at the present was thus. They cleft in twain a bitch; and threw the head and fore-part, with the entrails, on the right hand, and the hinder-part on the left hand of the way, which the army was to pass. This done, the arms of all the kings of *Macedon*, from the very first original, were borne before the army. Then followed the king between his two sons: after him came his own band, and they of his guard; whom all the rest of the *Macedonians* followed. Having performed other ceremonies, the army was divided into two parts: which, under the king's two sons, charged each other in manner of a true fight, using poles, and the like, instead of their pikes and accustomed weapons. But in this present skirmish there appeared some extraordinary contention for victory: whether happening by chance, or whether the two captains did over-earnestly seek each to get the upper hand, as a betokening of their good success in a greater trial. Some small hurt there was done, and wounds given, even with those flakes, until *Perseus's* side at length recoiled. *Perseus* himself was sorry for this, as it had been some bad presage: but his friends were glad, and thought, that hereof might be made good use. They were of the craftier sort: who perceiving which way the king's favour bent, and how all the courses of *Demetrius* led unto his own ruin, addressed their services to the more malicious and crafty head. And now they said, that this victory of *Demetrius* would afford matter of complaint against him; as if the heat of his ambition had carried him beyond the rules of that solemn pastime. Each of the brethren was that day to feast his own companions, and each of them had spies in the other lodging, to observe what was said and done. One of *Perseus's* intelligencers behaved himself so indiscreetly, that he was taken and well beaten by three or four of *Demetrius's* men, who turned him out of doors. After

After some store of wine, *Demetrius* told his companions, that he would go visit his brother, and see what cheer he kept. They agreed to his motion, excepting such of them as had ill handled his brother's man: yet he would leave none of his train behind, but forced them all to bear him company. They, fearing to be ill-rewarded for their late diligence, armed themselves secretly to prevent all danger. Yet was there such good espial kept, that this their coming armed was forthwith made known to *Perseus*; who thereupon tumultuously locked up his doors, as if he stood in fear to be assaulted in his house. *Demetrius* wondered to see himself excluded, and fared very angrily with his brother. But *Perseus*, bidding him be gone as an enemy, and one whose murderous purpose was detected, sent him away with entertainment, no better than defiance. The next day the matter was brought before the king. The elder brother accused the younger unto the father of them both. Much there was alledged, and in effect the same hath been here recited, save that by misconstruction all was made worse. But the main point of the accusation, and which did aggravate all the rest, was, That *Demetrius* had undertaken this murder, and would perhaps also dare to undertake a greater, upon confidence of the *Romans*; by whom he knew that he should be defended and borne out. For *Perseus* made shew, as if the *Romans* did hate him; because he bore a due respect unto his father, and was sorry to see him spoiled, and daily robbed of somewhat by them. And for this cause he said it was, that they did animate his brother against him: as also that they sought how to win unto *Demetrius* the love of the *Macedonians*. For proof hereof he cited a letter, sent of late from *T. Quintius* to the king himself: whereof the contents were, That he had done wisely in sending *Demetrius* to *Rome*; and that he should yet further do well to send him thither again, accompanied with a greater and more honourable train of *Macedonian* lords. Hence he enforced, That this counsel was given by *Titus*, of purpose to shake the allegiance of those, that should wait upon his brother to *Rome*; and make them, forgetting their duties to their old king, become servants to this young traitor *Demetrius*. Hereto *Demetrius* made answer, by rehearsing all passages of the day and night foregoing, in such manner as he remembered them, and had conceived of them: bitterly reprehending *Perseus*, that converted matters of pastime, and what was done or spoken in wine, to such an accusation, whereby he sought his innocent brother's death. As for the love which the *Romans* did bear him; he said that it grew, if not from his own virtue, at leastwise from their opinion thereof: so as by any impious practice, he were more like to lose it wholly, than to encrease it. In this wretched pleading, there wanted not such passions, as are incident to fathers, children, and brethren; besides those that are common to all plaintiffs and defendants, before ordinary judges. The king pronounced like a father, though a jealous father, That he would conclude nothing upon the excess or error, whatsoever it were, of one day and night, nor upon one hour's audience of the matter; but upon better observation of their lives, manners, and whole carriage of themselves both in word and deed. And herein he may seem to have dealt both justly and compassionately. But from this time forward, he gave himself over wholly to *Perseus*: using so little conference with his younger son, that when he had matters of weight in hand, such especially as concerned the

Romans, he liked neither to have him present, nor near unto him. Above all, he had especial care to learn out what had passed between *Demetrius* and *T. Quintius*, or any other of the *Roman* great ones. And to this purpose he sent ambassadors to *Rome*, *Philodes* and *Apelles*; men whom he thought no way interested in the quarrels between the brethren; though indeed they altogether depended on the elder, whom they saw the more in grace. These brought home with them a letter, said to be written by *Titus* (whose seal they had counterfeited) unto the king. The contents whereof were, A deprecation for the young prince; with an intimation, as by way of granting it, That his youthful and ambitious desires had caused him to enter into practices unjustifiable, against his elder brother; which yet should never take effect, for that *Titus* himself would not be author, or abettor, of any impious device. This manner of excuse did forcibly persuade the king, to think his son a dangerous traitor. To strengthen him in this opinion, one *Didas*, to whom he gave *Demetrius* in custody, made shew as if he had pitied the estate of the unhappy prince; and so wrung out of him his secret intentions, which he shortly discovered unto *Philip*. It was the purpose of *Demetrius* to fly secretly to *Rome*; where he might hope not only to live in safety, from his father and brother, but in greater likelihood, than he could find at home, of bettering such claim as he had in reversion unto the crown of *Macedon*. Whatsoever his hopes and meanings were, all came to nought through the falshood of *Didas*: who, playing on both hands, offered unto the prince his help for making the escape, and in the mean while revealed the whole matter to the king. So *Philip* resolved to put his son to death, without further expence of time. It was thought behoveful to make him away privily, for fear lest the *Romans* should take the matter to heart, and hold it as a proof, sufficient at least, of the king's despight against them, if not of his meaning to renew the war. *Didas* therefore was commanded to rid the unhappy prince out of his life. This accursed minister of his king's unadvised sentence, first gave poison to *Demetrius*; which wrought neither so hastily, nor so secretly, as was desired. Hereupon he sent a couple of ruffians, to finish the tragedy: who villainously accomplished their work by smothering that prince, in whose life consisted the greatest hope of *Macedon*.

In all the race of *Antigonus* there had not been found a king, that had thus cruelly dealt with any prince of his own blood. The houses of *Lysimachus* and *Cassander* fell either with themselves, or even upon their heels, by intestine discord and jealousies, grounded on desire of sovereign rule, or fear of losing it. By the like unnatural hatred, had almost been cut off the lines of *Ptolemy* and *Seleucus*: which though narrowly they escaped the danger, yet were their kingdoms thereby grievously distempered. Contrariwise, it was worthy of extraordinary note, how that upstart family of the kings of *Pergamus* had raised it self to marvellous greatness, in very short space, from the condition of mere slavery: whereof a principal cause was, the brotherly love maintained by them, with singular commendation of their piety. Neither was *Philip* ignorant of these examples; but is said to have propounded the last of them, to his own children, as a pattern for them to imitate. Certainly he had reason so to do: not more in regard of the benefit which his enemies reaped by their concord, than in remembrance

brance of the tender fosterage, wherewith king *Antigonus's* tutor had faithfully cherish'd him in his minority. But he was himself of an unmerciful nature; and therefore unmeet to be a good persuader unto kindly affection. The murders by him done upon many of his friends, together with the barbarous outrages, which, for the satiating of his blood-thirsty appetite, he delightfully had committed upon many innocents, both strangers and subjects of his own; did now procure vengeance down from heaven, that rewarded him with a draught of his own poison. After the death of his son, he too late began to examine the crimes that had been objected, and to weigh them in a more equal ballance. Then found he nothing that could give him satisfaction, or by good probability induce him to think, that malice had not been contriver of the whole process. His only remaining son *Perseus* could so ill dissemble the pleasure which he took, in being freed from all danger of competition, as there might easily be perceived in him a notable change, proceeding from some other cause, than the remove of those dangers which he had lately pretended. The *Romans* were now no less to be feared than at other times, when he, as having accomplish'd the most of his desires, left off his usual trouble of mind, and carefulness of making provision against them. He was more diligently courted, than in former times, by those that well understood the difference between a rising and a setting sun. As for old *Philip*, he was left in a manner desolate; some expecting his death, and some scarce enduring the tediousness of such expectation. This bred in the king a deep melancholy, and filled his head with suspicious imaginations; the like whereof he had never been slow to apprehend. He was much vexed; and so much the more, for that he knew neither well to whom, nor perfectly whereof, to complain. One honourable man, a cousin of his, named *Antigonus*, continued so true to *Philip*, that he grew thereby hateful to *Perseus*; and thus becoming subject unto the same jealous impressions which troubled the king, became also partaker of his secrets. This counsellor, when he found that the anger conceived against *Perseus* would not vent itself, and give ease to the king, until the truth were known, whether *Demetrius* were guilty or no of the treason objected; as also that *Philotes* and *Apelles* (the ambassadors which had brought from *Rome* that epistle of *Flaminius*, that served as the greatest evidence against *Demetrius*) were suspected of forgery in the business; made diligent inquiry after the truth. In thus doing, he found one *Nichus*, a man most likely to have understood what false dealing was used by those ambassadors. Him he apprehended, brought to court, and presented unto the king; saying, that this fellow knew all, and must therefore be made to utter what he knew. *Nichus*, for fear of torture, utter'd as much as was before suspected; confessing against himself, that he had been employ'd by the ambassadors in that wicked piece of business. No wonder, if the father's passions were extreme, when he understood, that by the unnatural practice of one son, he had so wretchedly call away another, far more virtuous and innocent. He raged exceedingly against himself, and withal against the authors of the mischief. Upon the first news of this discovery, *Apelles* fled away, and got into *Italy*. *Philotes* was taken; and either, so far as he could not deny it when *Nichus* confronted him, yielded himself guilty, or else was put to torture. *Perseus* was now grown stronger, than that he should need to fly the country; yet not so stout as to adventure himself into

his father's presence. He kept on the borders of the kingdom, towards *Thrace*, whilst his father winter'd at *Demetrius*. *Philip* therefore, not hoping to get into his power this his ungracious son, took a resolution to alien the kingdom from him, and confer it upon *Antigonus*. But his weak body, and excessive grief of mind, so disabled him in the travel hereto belonging, that ere he could bring his purpose to effect, he was constrained to yield to nature. He had reigned about two and forty years, always full of trouble; as vexed by others, and vexing himself, with continual wars; of which that with the *Romans* was most unhappy, and few or none of the rest found the conclusion, which a wise prince would have desired, of bringing forth together both honour and profit. But for all the evil that befel him, he might thank his own perverse condition; since his uncle king *Antigonus* had left unto him an estate so great, and so well settled, as made it easy for him to accomplish any moderate desires, if he had not abhorred all good counsel. Wherefore he was justly punish'd, by feeling the difference between the imaginary happiness of a tyrant, which he affected, and the life of a king, whereof he little cared to perform the duty. His death, even whilst yet it was only drawing near, was fore-signified unto *Perseus*, by *Calligenes* the physician; who also concealed it a while from those that were about the court. So *Perseus* came thither on a sudden, and took possession of the kingdom; which, in fine, he no less improvidently lost, than he had wickedly gotten.

S E C T. IV.

How the Bastarnæ fell upon Dardania. The behaviour of Perseus in the beginning of his reign. Some wars of the Romans; and how they suffer'd Masaniissa cruelly to oppress the Carthaginians. They quarrel with Perseus. They allow not their confederates to make war without their leave obtained. The treason of Callicrates; whereby all Greece became more obnoxious to Rome than in former times. Further quarrels to Perseus. He seeks friendship of the Achæans, and is withstood by Callicrates. The Romans discover their intent of warring upon him.

IMmediately, upon the death of *Philip*, came the *Bastarnæ* into *Thrace*; where order had been taken, long before, both for their free passage, and for the indemnity of the country. This compact was friendly observed, as long as none other was known than that *Philip* did live, to recompense all that should be done or sustained for his service. But when it was heard, that a new king reigned in *Macedon*, and not heard withal, that he took any care what became of the enterprize, then was all dash'd and confounded. The *Thracians* would no longer afford so good markets unto these strangers, as formerly they had done. On the other side, the *Bastarnæ* would not be contented with reason, but became their own carvers. Thus each part, having lost the rich hopes reposed in *Philip*, grew careful of thriving in the present, with little regard of right or wrong. Within a while they fell to blows; and the *Bastarnæ* had the upper hand, so as they chased the *Thracians* out of the plain countries. But the victors made little use of their good fortune. For, whether by reason of some overthrow, received by them, in assaulting a place of strength; or whether, because of extreme bad weather, which is said to have afflicted them, as it were miraculously; all of them return'd home, save thirty thousand, which pierced on into *Dardania*. How these thirty thousand

land sped in their voyage, I do not find: It seems, that, by the careless using of some victories, they drew loss upon themselves; and, finally, took that occasion to follow their companions back into their own country.

As for *Perseus*, he thought it not expedient, in the novelty of his reign, to embroil himself in a war so dangerous, as that with the *Romans* was likely to prove. Wherefore he wholly gave his mind to the settling of his estate; which, well done, he might afterwards accommodate himself, as the condition of his affairs should require, either for war or peace. To prevent all danger of rebellion, he quickly took away the life of *Antigonus*. To win love of his people, he sat personally to hear their causes in judgment (though herein he was so over-diligent and curious, that one might have perceived this his virtue of justice to be no better than feigned) as also he gratified them with many delightful spectacles, magnificently by him set forth. Above all, he had care to avoid all necessity of war with *Rome*; and therefore made it his first work to send ambassadors thither to renew the league, which he obtained, and was by the senate saluted king and friend unto the state. Neither was he negligent in seeking to purchase goodwill of the *Greeks*, and other his neighbours; but was rather herein so excessively bountiful, that it may seem a wonder, how in few years, to his utter ruin, he became so griping and tenacious. His fear was indeed the mastering passion which over-ruled him, and changed him into so many shapes, as made it hard to discern which of his other qualities were naturally his own. For proof of this, there is requisite no more than the relation of his actions pass'd and following.

The *Romans* continued, as they had long, busy in wars against the *Spaniards* and *Ligurians*; people often vanquished, and as often breaking forth into new rebellion. They also conquered *Istria*; subdued the rebelling *Sardinians*; and had some quarrels, though to little effect, with the *Illyrians* and others. Over the *Carthaginians* they bore (as ever since the victory) a heavy hand; and suffered *Masaniissa* to take from them what he listed. The *Carthaginians*, like obedient vassals to *Rome*, were afraid, though in defence of their own, to take arms, from which they were bound by an article of peace, except it were with leave of the *Romans*. *Masaniissa* therefore had great advantage over them, and was not ignorant how to use it. He could get possession by force of whatsoever he desired, ere their complaining ambassadors could be at *Rome*; and then were the *Romans* not hardly intreated, to leave things as they found them.

So had he once dealt before, in taking from them the country of *Emporia*; and so did he use them again and again, with pretence of title, where he had any; otherwise, without it. *Gala*, the father of *Masaniissa*, had won some land from the *Carthaginians*; which afterwards *Syphax* won from *Gala*; and, within a while, restored to the right owners, for love of his wife *Sophonisba*, and of *Asdrubal*, his father-in-law. This did *Masaniissa* take from them by force, and by the *Romans*, to whose judgment the case was referred, was permitted quietly to hold it. The *Carthaginians* had now good experience, how beneficial it was for their estate, to use all manner of submissive obedience to *Rome*. They had scarcely digested this injury, when *Masaniissa* came upon them again, and took from them above seventy towns and castles, without any colour of right. Hereof by their ambassadors they made lamentable complaint unto the *Roman* senate. They

shewed how grievously they were oppressed, by reason of two articles in their league; that they should not make war out of their own lands; nor with any confederates of the *Romans*. Now, although it were so, that they might lawfully withstand the violence of *Masaniissa's* invading their country; howsoever he was pleased to call it his; yet since he was confederate with the *Romans*, they durst not presume to bear defensive arms against him, but suffered themselves to be eaten up, for fear of incurring the *Romans* indignation. Wherefore they intreated, that either they might have fairer justice, or be suffered to defend their own by strong hand; or at least, if right must wholly give place to favour; that the *Romans* yet would be pleased to determine how far forth *Masaniissa* should be allowed to proceed in these outrages. If none of these petitions could be obtained, then desired they that the *Romans* would let them understand wherein they had offended since the time that *Scipio* gave them peace; and vouchsafe to inflict on them such punishment, as they themselves in honour should think meet; for that better and more to their comfort it were, to suffer at once, what should be appointed by such judges, than continually to live in fear, and none otherwise draw breath, than at the mercy of this *Numidian* hangman. And herewithal the ambassadors threw themselves prostrate on the ground, weeping; in hopes to move compassion. Here may we behold the fruits of their envy to that valiant house of the *Barbines*; of their irresolution, in prosecuting a war so important as *Hannibal* made for them in *Italy*; and of their halfpenny-worthing, in matter of expence, when they had adventured their whole estate in the purchase of a great empire. Now are they servants; even to the servants of those men, whose fathers they had often chased, slain, taken, and sold as bond-slaves in the streets of *Carthage*, and in all cities of *Afric* and *Greece*. Now have they enough of that *Roman* peace, which *Hanno* so often and so earnestly desired. Only they want peace with *Masaniissa*, once their mercenary, and now their master, or rather their tormentor, out of whose cruel hands they beseech their masters to take the office of correcting them. In such case are they, and adore the *Romans*, whom they see flourishing in such prosperity as might have been their own. But the *Romans* had far better intreated *Varro*, who lost the battel at *Cannæ*; than *Hannibal*, that won it, was used by the *Carthaginians*: they had freely bestowed, every man of them all his private riches, upon the common-wealth; and employed their labours for the publick, without craving recompence: as also they had not thought it much, though being in extream want, to set out an army into *Spain*, at what time the enemy lay under their own walls. These were no *Carthaginian* virtues: and therefore the *Carthaginians*, having fought against their betters, must patiently endure the miseries belonging to the vanquished. Their pitiful behaviour bred peradventure some commiseration, yet their tears may seem to have been mistrusted, as proceeding no less from envy to the *Romans*, than from any feeling of their own calamity. They thought themselves able to fight with *Masaniissa*: which estimation of their forces was able to make them, after a little while, enter into comparisons with *Rome*. Wherefore they obtained no such leave as they sought, of defending their own right by arms: but contrariwise, when without leave obtained they presumed so far, the destruction of *Carthage* was thought an easy punishment of that offence. At the present, they received a gentle answer; though they had otherwise little amends. *Gulussa* the

the son of *Masanissa* was then in *Rome*; and had not as yet craved audience. He was therefore called before the senate, where he was demanded the reason of his coming; and had related unto him the complaint made by the *Carthaginians* against his father. He answered, That his father, not being thoroughly aware of any ambassadors thither sent from *Carthage*, had therefore not given him instructions, how to deal in that business. Only it was known, that the *Carthaginians* had held council divers nights, in the temple of *Æsculapius*: whereupon he himself was dispatched away to *Rome*, there to entreat the senate, that these common enemies of the *Romans* and of his father, might not be overmuch trusted; especially against his father, whom they hated most maliciously, for his constant faith to the people of *Rome*. This answer gave little satisfaction. Wherefore the senate replied, that for *Masanissa's* sake they had done, and would do, whatsoever was reasonable; but that it stood not with their justice, to allow of this his violence, in taking from the *Carthaginians* those lands, which by the covenants of the league, were granted unto them freely to enjoy. With this mild rebuke they dismissed *Gulussa*; bestowing on him friendly presents (as also they did on the *Carthaginians*) and willing him to tell his father, that he should do well to send ambassadors, more fully instructed in this matter. This happened when the *Macedonian* war was even ready to begin: at which time the *Romans* were not willing too much to offend, either the *Carthaginians* (for fear of urging them unseasonably to rebellion) or *Masanissa*, at whose hands they expected no little help. So were they aided both by the *Carthaginians*, and *Masanissa*: by the *Carthaginians*, partly for fear, partly for hope of better usage in the future; by *Masanissa*, in way of thankfulness; though if it had happened (which was unlikely) that they should be vanquished; he made none other account, than that all *Afric* round about him and *Carthage* therewithal should be his own.

In the midst of all these cares, the *Romans* had not been unmindful of *Perseus*. They visited him daily with ambassadors: that is, with honourable spies to observe his behaviour. These he entertained kindly at first, until (which fell out ere long) he perceived whereto their diligence tended. First, they quarrelled with him about the troubles in *Dardania*: neither would they take any satisfaction, until the *Bastarnæ* were thence gone; though he protested, that he had not sent for them. Afterwards, they pryed narrowly into his doings; and were no less ill contented with good offices, by him done to sundry of his neighbours, than with those wrongs, which (they said) that he did unto other some. Where he did harm to any; they called it making war upon their friends: where he did good; they called such his bounty, seeking friends to take his part against them. The *Dolopians*, his subjects (upon what occasion it is uncertain) rebelled, and with exquisite torments slew *Euphranor*, whom he had appointed their governour. It seems that *Euphranor* had played the tyrant among them. For they were a people without strength to resist the *Macedonian*: and therefore unlikely to have presumed so far; unless either they had been extremely provoked, or else were secretly animated by the *Romans*. Whatsoever it was that bred this courage in them; *Perseus* did soon allay it, and reclaim them by strong hand. But the *Romans* took very angrily this presumption of the

king, even as if he had invaded some country of their *Italian* confederates, and not corrected his own rebels at home. Fain they would have had him to draw in the same yoke with the *Carthaginians*; whereto had he humbled once his neck, they could themselves have done the part of *Masanissa*; though *Eumenes*, or some other fit for that purpose, had been wanting. And to this effect, they told him, that conditions of the league between them were such, as made it unlawful, both to his father heretofore, and now to him, to take arms without their licence first obtained.

To the same pass they would also fain have reduced the *Greeks*, and generally all their adherents; even such as had entred into league with them upon equal terms: whom usually they rewarded with a frown, whensoever they presumed to right themselves by force of arms, without seeking first the oracle at *Rome*. Hereof the *Acheans* had good experience: whose confidence in their proper strength made them otherwhiles bold to be their own carvers; and whose hope of extraordinary favour at *Rome* caused them the more willingly to refer their causes to arbitrement. For, when they went about to have chastised the *Messenians* by war, *T. Quintius* rebuked them, as too arrogant in taking such a work in hand, without his authority: yet by his authority he ended the matter, wholly to their good liking. Probably at other times were they reprehended, even with lordly threats, when they took upon them to carry any business of importance, by their own power, without standing unto the good grace of the *Romans*. Who nevertheless, upon submission, were apt enough to do them right. Thus were they tamed by little and little, and taught to forget their absolute liberty, as by which they were not like to thrive; especially in usurping the practice of arms, which belonged only to the imperial city. In learning this hard lesson, they were such untoward scholars, that they needed, and not long after felt very sharp correction. Yet, was there no small part of blame to be imputed unto their masters. For the *Roman* senate, being desirous to humble the *Acheans*, refused not only to give them such aid as they requested, and as they challenged by the tenor of the league between them; but further, with a careless insolency, rejected this honest and reasonable petition, that the enemy might not be supplied from *Italy* with victuals or arms. Herewith not content, the fathers, as wearied with dealing in the affairs of *Greece*, pronounced openly, that if the *Argives*, *Lacedemonians*, or *Corinthians*, would revolt from the *Acheans*, they themselves would think it a business no way concerning them. This was presently after the death of *Philopemen*, at what time, it was believed, that the commonwealth of *Achaia* was like to fall into much distress, were it not upheld by countenance of the *Romans*. All this notwithstanding, when *Lycortas*, pretor of the *Acheans*, had utterly subdued the *Messenians* far sooner than was expected; and when as not only no town rebelled from the *Acheans*, but many entered into their corporation; then did the *Roman*, with an ill-favour'd grace, tell the same ambassadors, to whose petition they had made such bad answer (and who as yet were not gone out of the city) that they had straightly forbidden all manner of succour to be carried to *Messene*. Thus thinking, by a feigned gravity, to have served their own turns, they manifested their condition; both to set on the weaker, against the

stronger and more suspected; and also to assume unto themselves a sovereign power, in directing all matters of war, which dissemblingly they would have seemed to neglect. In like manner dealt they with all their confederates: not permitting any of them to make war, whether offensive or defensive; though it were against meer strangers; without interposing the authority of the senate and people of *Rome*: unless peradventure sometimes they winked at such violence, as did help towards the accomplishment of their own secret malice. Now these *Roman* arts howsoever many (for gainful or timeous respects) would seem to understand them; yet were generally displeasing unto all men endued with free spirits. Only the *Athenians*, once the most turbulent city in *Greece*, having neither subjects of their own that might rebel, nor power wherewith to bring any into subjection; for want of more noble argument wherein to practise their eloquence that was become the whole remainder of their ancient commendations, were much delighted in flattering the most mighty. So they kept themselves in grace with the *Romans*, remained free from all trouble, until the war of *Mithridates*: being men unfit for action, and thereby innocent; yet bearing a part in many great actions, as gratulators of the *Roman* victories, and pardon-cravers for the vanquished. Such were the *Athenians* become. As for those other common-weals and kingdoms, that with over-nice diligence strove to preserve their liberties and lands from consuming by piece-meal: they were to be devoured whole, and swallowed up at once. Especially the *Macedonian*, as the most unpliant, and wherein many of the *Greeks* began to have affiance, was necessarily to be made an example, how much better it were to bow than to break.

Neither *Perseus*, nor the *Romans* were ignorant, how the *Greeks* at this time stood affected. *Perseus*, by reason of his near neighbourhood, and of the daily commerce between them and his subjects, could not want good information of all that might concern him in their affairs. He well knew, that all of them now apprehended the danger, which *Philopæmen* had long since foretold; of the miserable subjection, whereinto *Greece* was likely to be reduced by the *Roman* patronage. Indeed they not only perceived the approaching danger: but, as being tenderly sensible of their liberty, felt themselves grieved with the present subjection, whereto already they were become obnoxious: wherefore though none of them had the courage, in matters of the publick to fall out with the *Romans*: yet all of them had the care, to choose among themselves none other magistrates, than such as affected the good of their country, and would for no ambition, or other servile respect, be flatterers of the greatness which kept all in fear. Thus it seemed likely, that all domestical conspiracies would soon be at an end; when honesty and love of the common-weal, became the fairest way to preferment. Of this careful provision for the safety of *Greece*, the *Romans* were not thoroughly advertised: either because things were diligently concealed from their ambassadors, whom all men knew to be little better than spies; or because little account was made of that intelligence, which was brought in by such traitors (of whom every city in *Greece* had too many) as were men unregarded among their own people, and therefore more like to speak maliciously than truly; or perhaps because the ambassadors themselves, being all senators, and capable of

the greatest office or charge, had no will to find out other matter of trouble, than was fitting to their own desires of employment. But it is hard to conceal that which many know, from those that are feared or flattered by many. The *Acheans* being to send ambassadors to *Rome*, that should both excuse them; as touching some point wherein they refused to obey the senate; and inform the senate better in the same business; chose one *Callicrates*, among others, to go in that ambassage. By their making choice of such a man; one may perceive the advantage, which mischievous wretches, who commonly are forward in pursuing their vile desires, have against the plain sort of honest men, that least earnestly thrust themselves into the troublesome business of the weal publick. For this *Callicrates* was in such wise transported with ambition; that he chose much rather to betray his country, than to let any other be of more authority than himself therein. Wherefore, instead of well discharging his credence, and alledging what was meetest in justification of his people: he uttered a quite contrary tale; and strongly encouraged the *Romans* to oppress both the *Acheans*, and all the rest of *Greece*, with a far more heavy hand. He told the senate, that it was high time for them, to look unto the settling of their authority, among his forward countrymen; if they meant not wholly to forego it. For now there was taken up a custom, to stand upon points of confederacy and laws: as if these were principally to be had in regard; any injunction from *Rome* notwithstanding. Hence grew it, that the *Acheans* both now, and at other times, did what best pleased themselves, and answered the *Romans* with excuses: as if it were enough to say, that by some condition of league, or by force of some law, they were discharged, or hindered, from obeying the decrees of the senate. This would not be so, if he, and some other of his opinion, might have their wills: who ceased not to affirm, that no columns or monuments erected, nor no solemn oath of the whole nation, to ratifie the observance of confederacy or statute, ought to be of force, when the *Romans* willed the contrary. But it was even the fault of the *Romans* themselves, that the multitude refused to give ear unto such persuasions. For howsoever in popular estates, the sound of liberty used to be more plausible, than any discourse tending against it: yet if they, which undertook the maintenance of an argument, seeming never so bad, were sure by their so doing, to procure their own good; the number of them would increase apace, and they become the prevalent faction. It was therefore strange, how the *fathers* could so neglect the advancement of those, that sought wholly to enlarge the amplitude of the *Roman* majesty. More wisely, though with seditious and rebellious purpose, did the *Greeks*; who many times, yea, and ordinarily, conferred great honours, upon men otherwise of little account or desert; only for having uttered some brave words against the *Romans*. The *fathers*, hearing these and the like reasons, wherewith he exhorted them to handle roughly those that were obstinate, and by cherishing their friends, to make their party strong; resolved to follow this good counsel in every point, yea, to depress all those that held with the right, and to set up their own followers, were it by right or wrong. And to this end, they not only dealt thenceforth more peremptorily with the *Acheans*, than had been their manner in former times; but wrote at the present unto all cities of

Greece, requiring them to see that their mandate (which was concerning the restitution of those that were banished out of *Lacedemon*) should be fulfilled. Particularly in behalf of *Callicrates*; they advised all men, to be such, and so affected, as he was, in their several common-weals. With this dispatch, *Callicrates* returned home a joyful man: having brought his country into the way of ruin, but himself into the way of preferment. Nevertheless he forbore to vaunt himself, of his eloquence used in the senate. Only he so reported his ambassage, that all men became fearful of the danger, wherewith he threatened those that should presume to oppose the *Romans*. By such arts he obtained to be made pretor of the *Acheans*: in which magistracy, as in all his courses following, he omitted nothing, that might serve to manifest his ready obsequiousness unto those whom he had made his patrons.

Now as the *Romans* by threatening terms won many flatterers, and lost as many true friends: so *Perseus* on the other side, thinking by liberal gifts, and hopeful promises, to assure unto himself those that ill could brook his enemies; got indeed a multitude of partakers, though little honestier than his enemies had. Thus were all the cities of *Greece* distracted with factions: some holding with the *Romans*; some with the *Macedonian*; and some few, respecting only the good of the estates wherein they lived. Hereat the lords of the senate were highly offended; and thought it an indignity not sufferable, That a king, no better than their vassal, should dare to become head of a faction against them. This therefore must be reckoned in the number of his trespasses: whereof if not any one alone, yet all of them together, shall afford them just occasion to make war upon him. *Perseus* having finished his business among the *Dolopians*, made a journey to *Apollo's* temple at *Delphi*. He took his army along with him; yet went, and returned, in such peaceable and friendly wise, that no place was the worse for his journey, but the good affection towards him generally increased thereby. With those that were in his way, he dealt himself; to such as lay further off, he sent ambassadors, or letters: praying them, That the memory of all wrongs whatsoever, done by his father, might be buried with his father; since his own meaning was to hold friendship sincerely with all his neighbours. The *Romans* perhaps could have been pleaded better, if he had behaved himself after a contrary fashion, and done some acts of hostility in his passage. Yet, as if he ought not to have taken such a journey, without their licence; this also was made a valuable matter, and cast into the heap of his faults. He laboured greatly to recover the love of the *Acheans*: which his father had so lost, that by a solemn decree, they forbid any *Macedonian* to enter their territories. It was jealousy perhaps no less than hatred, which caused them, at the first, to make such a decree. For howsoever *Philip* had by many vile acts, especially by the death of the two *Arati*, given them cause to abhor him: yet in the publick administration of their estate, he had, for the more part, been to them so beneficial, that not without much ado, and at length, without any general consent, they resolved to forsake him. Wherefore it was needful, even for preservation of concord among them, to use all circumspection; that he might not, by his agents, negotiate and hold intelligence with any, in a country towards him so doubtfully affected: especially when by hearkning to his messages, they might make themselves

suspected by their new friends. But the continuance of this decree beyond the time of war, and when all danger of innovation was past, was uncivil, if not inhumane, as nourishing deadly hatred, without leaving means of reconciliation. And hereof the *Acheans* reaped no good fruit. For although they were not in like sort forbidden the kingdom of *Macedon*: yet understanding what would be due to them, if they should adventure thither, none of them durst set foot therein. Hence it came to pass, that their bondmen, knowing a safe harbour, out of which their masters could not fetch them, ran daily away, in great numbers; exceedingly to the loss of such, as made of their slaves very profitable use. But *Perseus* took hold upon this occasion: as fitly serving to pacify those, whose enmity fain he would have changed into love. He therefore apprehended all these fugitives to send them home again: and wrote unto the *Acheans*, That as for good-will unto them, he had taken pains to restore back their servants; so should they do very well to take order for keeping them, that hereafter they might not run away again. His meaning was readily understood, and his letters kindly accepted by the greater part; being openly rehearsed by the pretor, before the council. But *Callicrates* took the matter very angrily: and bade them be advised what they did; for that this was none other than a plain device, to make them depart from the friendship of the *Romans*. Herewithal he took upon him, somewhat liberally, to make the *Acheans* before-hand acquainted with the war, that was coming upon *Perseus*, from *Rome*. He told them, how *Philip* had made preparations for the same war; how *Demetrius* had been made away; because of his good affection to the *Romans*; and how *Perseus* had, since his being king, done many things, tending to the breach of peace. Briefly he rehearsed all those matters, which were afterwards alledged by the *Romans*; the invasion of the *Bastarnæ*, upon the *Dardanians*; the king's journey against the *Dolopians*; his voyage to *Delphi*, and finally his peaceable behaviour, which was (he said) a dangerous temptation of men to his party. Wherefore he advised them, to expect the event of things, and not over-hastily to enter into any degree of friendship with the *Macedonians*. Hereto good answer was made by the pretor's brother: That *Callicrates* was too earnest, in so light a matter; and that, being neither one of the king's cabinet, nor of the *Roman* senate, he made himself too well acquainted with all that had passed, or was like to follow. For it was well known, that *Perseus* had renewed his league with the *Romans*; that he was by them saluted king, and friend to the estate; and that he had lovingly entertained their ambassadors. This being so: why might not the *Acheans*, as well as the *Etolians*, *Thessalians*, *Epirots*, and all the *Greeks*, hold with him such correspondence, as common humanity required? Nevertheless *Callicrates* was grown a man so terrible, by his *Roman* acquaintance, that they durst not over-stiffly gainsay him. Therefore the matter was referred unto further deliberation; and answer made the whilst, That since the king had only sent a letter without an ambassador, they knew not how to resolve. Better it was to say thus, than that they were afraid to do as they thought most reasonable and convenient. But when *Perseus*, herewith not contented, would needs urge them further, and send ambassadors: then were they fain, without any good pretence, to put on a countenance of anger, and deny to give audience: which was proof sufficient (to one that could understand)

derstand) of the condition wherein they lived. For hearkening to this advice of *Callicrates*; they were soon after highly commended by a Roman ambassador: whereby it became apparent, that the Romans intended war upon the *Macedonian*; though hitherto no cause of war was given.

S E C T. V.

How *Eumenes*, king of *Pergamus*, was busied with *Pharnaces*, the *Rhodians*, and others. His hatred to the *Macedonian*; whom he accuseth to the Roman senate. The senate honours him, greatly, and contemns his enemies the *Rhodians*; with the causes thereof. The unusual stoutness of the *Macedonian* ambassadors. *Perseus's* attempt upon *Eumenes*. The brotherly love between *Eumenes* and *Attalus*. *Perseus's* device to poison some of the Roman senators; whereupon they decree war against him, and send him defiance. Other things concerning the justice of this war.

E*umenes*, king of *Pergamus*, had been troubled about these times by the kings *Pharnaces* and *Mithridates*, his neighbours. He had taken the right course in making first his complaint to the *Romans*; by whom he was animated with comfortable words and promises. That they, by their authority, would end the business to his content. But, in conclusion, by the help of the kings *Prusias* and *Ariarathes*, he ended the war himself; and brought his enemies to seek and accept peace, on such conditions as pleased him to give them. After this, being at good leisure, he began to consider how the affairs of *Macedon* stood under *Perseus*. His hatred to *Perseus* was very great; and therefore he was glad to understand, that the hatred of the *Romans*, to the same his enemy, was as great; and withal notorious. Now, besides his ancient and hereditary quarrel with the *Macedonian*, it vexed him exceedingly, that his own honours (whereof the *Greeks*, prodigal in that kind, had heaped immoderate store on his father and him) began to wax every where stale; whilst *Perseus*, either by his currying favour, or by the envy borne to the *Romans*, had gotten their best liking and wishes. For despite of this indignity, he stirred up the *Lycians* against the *Rhodians*, his old friends; and in helping these rebels was so violent, that he proceeded, in a manner, to open war. But small pleasure found he in these poor and indirect courses of revenge. The *Lycians* could not be saved by his patronage from severe and cruel chastisement, given to them by the *Rhodians*. This render'd him contemptible; as likewise his acts of hostility, little different from robberies, made him hateful to those which loved him before. As for his honours in the cities of *Greece*, they not only continued falling into neglect; but were abrogated by a decree of the *Acheans*, as too unmeasured, mis-beseeming them to give, and affected by him beyond the proportion of his deservings. All this (which he needed not to have regarded, had he not been too vainly ambitious) belet him, especially for his being over-serviceable to the *Romans*, and for his malice to that noble kingdom; which, if it fell, the liberty of *Greece* was not like to stand. Now for the redress hereof; he thought it in vain to strive any longer with bounty, against such an adversary, as by hopeful promises alone, without any great performance, had over-topped him in the general favour. And therefore he resolved even to overturn the foundations of this popularity, by inducing the Ro-

mans utterly to take away from the eyes of men, this idol, the *Macedonian* kingdom, which all so vainly worshipped. Neither would it prove a difficult matter, to persuade those that were already desirous: rather he was like to be highly thanked, for setting forward their wishes; and perhaps to be recompensed with some piece of the kingdom, as he had been rewarded for the like service, when *Antiochus* was vanquished.

To this end he made a second voyage to *Rome*; where, though he had little to say, which they knew not before; yet his words were heard with such attention, as if they had contained some strange novelty, and so pondered by the fathers, as if the weight of them were to turn the ballance, that before was equal. The death of *Demetrius*; the expedition of the *Bastarna* into *Dardania*; that of *Perseus* himself against the *Dolopians*, and to *Delphi*; the great estimation of the *Macedonian* in *Greece*; his intermeddling in business of his neighbours; his riches, and his great provisions; were all the material points of *Eumenes's* discourse. Only he descended unto particulars, having searched into all (as he professed), like unto a spy. He said, that *Perseus* had thirty thousand foot, and five thousand horse of his own; money in a readiness to entertain ten thousand mercenaries for ten years; arms to furnish a number thrice as great; the *Thracians* his friends at hand, ready at a call, to bring him soldiers as many as he should require; and that he prepared victuals for ten years, because he would not be driven, either to live upon spoil, or to take from his own subjects. Herewithal he prayed them to consider, that king *Seleucus*, the son and successor of *Antiochus* the great, had given his daughter *Laodice* in marriage to *Perseus*; *Perseus* not wooing, but *Seleucus* offering the match; that king *Prusias* of *Bitbynia*, by earnest suit, had gotten to wife the sister of *Perseus*; and that these marriages were solemnized with great concourse of ambassages from all quarters. Neither spared he to tell them (though seeming loth to utter it plainly) that even the envy to their estate was the cause, why many that could not endure to hear of amity with *Philip*, were now grown marvellously well affected to his son. All this, and some facts of *Perseus*, which might either be denied, or justified (as that he had procured the death of some which were friends to the *Romans*; and that he had expelled *Abrypolis* the *Illyrian*, who invaded *Macedon*, out of his kingdom, or lordship) *Eumenes* failed not to amplify unto the most; laying, that he thought it his duty to forewarn them; since it would be to himself a great shame, if *Perseus* got the start of him, and were in *Italy* making war upon the *Romans*, ere *Eumenes* could come thither to tell them of the danger.

It were too great folly, to believe that the *Romans* stood in fear of *Perseus*, lest he should set upon them in *Italy*. Nevertheless, forasmuch as they loved not to make war without fair pretence, not only of wrong done to them or their associates, but of further hurt intended, great thanks were given to *Eumenes*, who had every way furnished them with such goodly colour to beautify their intentment. Now tho' it were so, that he told them little else than what they knew before; yet his person, and the manner of his coming, made all seem greater. For, if upon any relation made by their own ambassadors, or upon tales devised by their flatterers and spies, they had warred against *Perseus*, ere he had committed any open act of hostility

against them, their injustice and oppression would have been most manifest. But when the wrongs to them done were so notorious, and the danger threatening them so terrible, that such a prince as *Eumenes* came out of his own kingdom, as far as from *Asia*, to bid them look to themselves, who could blame them, if they took the speediest order to obtain their own right and security? Toward this justification of the war, and magnifying the necessity that enforced them thereto, their more than usual curiosity, in concealing what *Eumenes* had uttered in the senate, when they could not but understand that his errand was well known, helped not a little. The *Macedonian* and *Rhodian* ambassadors were, at *Rome*, provided of answers to the words which they knew before-hand that he would speak; and with matter of recrimination. The vanity either of him, or of some about him, seems to have disclosed all, when the wariness of the *fathers*, in hiding that which all men knew, made a notable shew of some fearful apprehension; against which, it behoved their wisdom to neglect no possible remedy. Wherefore, careless audience was given to the *Rhodian* ambassadors, who accused *Eumenes*, as one more troublesome to *Asia*, than *Antiochus* had ever been, and a provoker of the *Lycians* to rebellion. The *Rhodians* had, with great pomp, conveyed by sea unto *Perseus*, his bride *Laodice*; which friendly office, as the *Macedonian* bountifully requited, so the *Romans* despitefully accepted. ^a Hence it grew, that when the *Lycians*, as already vanquished, were settling themselves in their obedience to the people of *Rhodes*, ambassadors came from *Rome* with strange news, which gave new life to the rebellion. For the senate pronounced, that it stood not with the manner of the *Romans*, to alien quite from their own protection any ^b people or nation by them vanquished; and that the *Lycians* were by them assigned unto those of *Rhodes*, not as mere vassals, but as dependants and associates. For proof hereof, they referred themselves unto the commentaries of the ten ambassadors, whom they had sent to dispose of things in *Asia*, after the victory against king *Antiochus*. Hereat *Eumenes*, *Masaniissa*, the *Etolians*, and all other kings or estates, that were beholden to *Rome* for increasing the number of their subjects, had cause to find themselves aggrieved, if they well considered the matter; since, by force of this, or the like decree, those their subjects might easily be made their fellows, whensoever it should please the senate; though it were so, that all men knew the present meaning of the senate, which was only to plague the *Rhodians* for their good-will to *Perseus*, by setting them and the *Lycians* together by the ears. The *fathers* could therefore see no reason to dislike *Eumenes*, upon this complaint made by the *Rhodian* ambassadors; which indeed more nearly touched themselves. Rather, they honoured the king so much the more, for that others (as they would needs take it) conspired against him, because of his love to *Rome*.

But the *Macedonian* embassy they heard not so carelessly, as angrily; though, peradventure, it well contented them to find cause of anger. For whereas at other times, all care had been taken to pacify them with gentle words and excuses; now heard they plainer language, and were told, that king *Perseus* desired much to give them satisfaction concerning any deed or word of his, that might favour of hostility; but that if his travel in this kind proved vain, then would he be ready to defend himself by arms, and stand to the chance of war, which often

falls out contrary to expectation. These big words may seem to have proceeded from the vehemency of *Harpalus*, that was chief of the ambassadors, rather than from instruction, given by the king, with whose faint heart they agreed not. Yet was there good reason why *Perseus* himself might, at this time, think to speed better by a shew of daring, than he was like to do by any submission. For the eyes of all *Greece* being now cast upon him, as on the greatest hope of deliverance from the *Roman* servitude, it was not expedient that he should lessen, or perhaps utterly cut off, the general expectation, and the good affection borne to him, which thereon depended, by discovering his too much weakness of spirit, unanswerable to a work of such importance. Wherefore he, or his ambassador for him, was bold to set a good countenance on a game not very bad, but subject (in appearance) to fortune; which might have been his, had he known how to use it.

Now that this bravery (as better it may be termed than courage) proceeded from the king's own heat, it appears by his daring to adventure soon after, on a practice that more justly might anger the *Romans*, and give them fairer shew of reason to make war upon him. It was known that *Eumenes*, in returning home, would take *Delphi* in his way, and there do sacrifice to *Apollo*. *Perseus* deadly hating him, and, thirsting after his blood, resolved to way-lay him; and, by making there of him a sacrifice, to rid his own hands of a most mischievous enemy. So there were appointed three or four stout ruffians to do the murder; who, placing themselves behind a broken mud-wall, on the side of a very narrow path leading up from the sea to the temple, did thence assault the king, whom they sorely bruised with great stones, and left for dead. They might have finished their work, such was the opportunity of the place which they had chosen; but fear of being apprehended, made them, without staying to see all sure, flee in such haste, that they killed one of their own companions, who could not hold pace with them, because he should not discover them. *Eumenes* was conveyed away to the little isle of *Aegina*, where he was cured, being all the while kept so secretly, that the fame of his death was current in *Asia*. Hence it came that his brother *Attalus* took upon him as king, and either took, or would have taken to wife (supposing it belike a matter of state) *Stratonica*, the daughter of *Ariarathes*, whom he then thought the widow of *Eumenes*. It may well be number'd among the rare examples of brotherly love, that when the king returned alive home, *Attalus* going forth to meet him, and do his duty, as in former times, received none other check, than *That he should forbear to marry with the queen, until he were well assured of the king's death*. More than this, *Eumenes* never spake of these matters; but bequeathed at his death unto the same brother both his wife and his kingdom. As likewise *Attalus* forbore to attempt any thing to the prejudice of the king his brother, though the *Romans* (with whom he continued and grew in especial favour, when *Eumenes* fell into their hatred) were in good readiness to have transferred the kingdom from his brother to him. By such concord of brethren was the kingdom of *Pergamus* raised and upheld; as might also that of *Macedon* have been, if *Demetrius* had lived and employed his grace with the *Romans* to the benefit of *Perseus*.

It is likely that *Perseus* was very glad, when he understood that his ministers had both accomplished his will, and had saved all from discovery. But, as he was deceived in the main point, and heard shortly after that *Eumenes* lived; so was he beguiled in that other hope, of the concealment, which he vainly esteemed the less material. For he had written to one *Praxo*, a gentlewoman of *Delphi*, to entertain the men whom he sent about this business; and she being apprehended by *C. Valerius*, a Roman ambassador then attending upon the matters of *Greece*, was carried to *Rome*. Thus all came to light. *Valerius* also brought with him to *Rome*, out of *Greece*, one *Rammius*, a citizen of *Brundisium*; who, coming newly from the court of *Macedon*, laden with a dangerous secret, had presently sought out the ambassador, and thereof discharged himself. *Brundisium* was the ordinary port for ships passing between *Italy* and *Greece*. There had *Rammius* a fair house, wherein he gave entertainment, being a wealthy man, to ambassadors, and other honourable personages, both *Romans* and *Macedonians*, journeying to and fro. By occasion of such his hospitality, he was commended to *Perseus*, and invited into *Macedon* with friendly letters; as one, whose many courtesies to his ambassadors the king was studious to requite. At his coming, he was much made of; and shortly, with more familiarity than he expected or desired, made partaker of the king's secrets. The sum of all was, that he must needs do a turn, in giving to such of the *Romans*, as the king should hereafter name, a poison of rare quality, sure in operation, yet not to be perceived either in the taking, or afterwards. He durst not refuse to accept this employment, for fear lest the virtue of this medicine should be tried upon himself. But, being once at liberty, he discovered all. *Rammius* was but one man, and one whom the king had never seen before, nor was like to see again; and therefore, besides that the king's denial ought to be as good as such a fellow's affirmation, the accusation was improbable. Thus did *Perseus*, in time shortly following, answer for himself; and in like sort concerning the attempt upon *Eumenes*, denying to have had any hand either in the one or other; yet withal professing, that such objections were not to be made unto a king, to prove the righteousness of making war upon him; but rather unto a subject pleading for his life in judgment. But howsoever the *Romans* neglected the getting of stronger proof (which might have been easy) than any that we find by them produced; yet the base and cowardly temper of *Perseus* was very suitable to these practices. Neither did the senate greatly stand to dispute the matter with him, these his treacheries being held inexcusable. And as for his royal estate, wherein he supposed that they ought not to touch him for such private offences, it gave him no privilege, they judging him to have offended in the nature of a king. Herein surely they wanted not good reason. For, if he might not lawfully make war upon *Eumenes*, their confederate; that is, if he might not send men to waste the kingdom of *Pergamus*, or to besiege the towns, might he send ruffians to murder the king? If it were no less breach of the league to destroy the senators by fire or famine, than by violence of the sword; was it lawful for him to do it by poison? Wherefore they presently decreed war against him, and sent ambassadors to denounce it unto him, unless he would yield to make such amends as they should require. He seems, at this time, to have

been so confident in the general favour of *Greece* and other comfortable appearances; that if he desired not war, yet he did not fear it; or at least he thought, by shew of courage, to make his enemies the more calm. He caused the ambassadors to dance attendance, till, being weary, they departed without audience. Then called he them back, and bade them do their errand. They made a tedious rehearsal of all matters, which they had long been collecting against him, and wherewith *Eumenes* had charged him; adding thereto, that he had entertained long and secret conference in the isle of *Samothrace*, with ambassadors sent to him out of *Asia*, about some ill purpose. In regard of all which, they peremptorily required satisfaction, as was their manner when they intended to give defiance. Better they might have stood upon the evidence brought against him by *Rammius* and *Praxo*. For, if those accusations could be verified, then wanted they not good ground whereon to build, of which otherwise they were destitute; it being no fault in a king to be strong, well-beloved, and well-friended. *Perseus* answered, for the present, in a rage; calling the *Romans* greedy, proud, insolent, and underminers of him, by their daily ambassadors, that were no better than mere spies. Finally, he promised to give them in writing their full answer, which was to this effect; That he would no longer stand to the league made between them and his father, and renewed by himself indeed only for fear; but wished them to descend to more equal conditions, whereupon he, for his part, would advise, as they might also do for theirs.

In the form of the league between *Philip* and the *Romans*, as it is set down by ^a *Polybius*, we find no condition, binding the *Macedonian* to any inconvenience in the future, excepting those which he immediately performed. But ^b *Livy* inserts a clause, whereby he was expressly forbidden to make any war abroad, without leave of the *Romans*. It is most likely, that all the *Roman* confederates were included in this peace, whereby every one of the neighbours round about *Macedon*, entering shortly into league with *Rome*, did so bind the king's hands, that he could no more make war abroad, than if he had been restrained by plain covenant. And thus might that seem an article of the peace, which never was agreed upon, but only was inferred by consequence. Now if the *Romans* would urge this point further, and say, that the *Macedonian* might not bear defensive arms without their permission; then had *Perseus* very just reason to find himself aggrieved. For since they had allowed his father, without controul, to make war in *Thrace* (whilst they themselves were unacquainted with the *Thracians*) and elsewhere abroad, though he asked not their licence, why should they now interpret the bargain after another fashion? Was it now become unlawful for him to chastise his own rebels, or to repay an *Illyrian* that invaded *Macedon*? By such allegations he maintained the right of his cause in very mild sort, when it was too late. At the present, by disclaiming the league, as unjust, he ministered occasion unto the ambassadors to give him defiance. Having heard the worst of their message, he commanded them to be gone out of his kingdom in three days. But either he should have been less vehement, or more constant in his resolution. For, if his heart could serve him to undertake the war, he should courageously have managed it, and have fallen to work immediately, whilst the enemy was unprepared; not have lost opportunity, as now and often he did, in hope of obtaining a worse peace than the former.

^a Polyb. Legat. 9.

^b Liv. lib. 33.

SECT. VI.

The Romans solicit the Greeks to join with them in the war against Perseus. How the Greeks stood affected in that war. The timorousness of Perseus. Martius, a Roman ambassador, deludes him with hopes of peace. His forces. He takes the field; and wins part of Thessaly. The forces of Licinius, the Roman consul: and what assistance the Romans had in this war. Of Tempe in Thessaly: and what advantages the Macedonian had, or might have had; but lost by his fear. Perseus braves the Romans; fights with them; knows not how to use his victory; sues for peace; and is denied it by the vanquished. Perseus, having the worse in a skirmish, forsakes all the country lying without Tempe. The Beotians rebel against the Romans, and are rigorously punished. The Roman commanders unfortunate in the war against Perseus. They vex the Greeks, their friends, for whose ease the senate makes provision, having heard their complaints. The flattering Alabanders.

SO long had the Romans been seeking occasion to take in hand this Macedonian war, that well might they have been ready for it, when it came; and not (as they were) behind-hand in provisions. But it was on a sudden that they met with a confluence of good pretences to make the war; whereof if no one alone had weight enough, yet all of them together seemed more than sufficient. This opportunity of making their cause honest in common opinion, was not to be neglected; though otherwise they were unprepared for the action. Wherefore knowing, or having reason to believe, that their own strength was such as would prevail in the end, they hastily embraced the fair occasion of beginning, and referred other cares to the diligence of time. Neither was this their unreadiness a small help towards examining the disposition of the Greeks, and others, who must afterwards dearly pay for any backwardness found in their good-will. There was not indeed any cause to fear that all of the Greeks, or other eastern people, should conspire together, and take part with the Macedonian: such was the dissension between their several estates, howsoever the generality of them were inclined the same way. Nevertheless, ambassadors were sent to deal with them all, and to crave their help against *Perseus*, or rather to demand it, in no less ample manner, than heretofore they had yielded it against *Philip* and *Antiochus*, in wars, pretending the liberty of Greece. The ambassadors used as gentle words for fashion's sake, as if they had stood in doubt that their request might happen to be denied. But the Greeks were now grown well acquainted with such Roman courtesy, and understood, that not only such as made refusal, but even they who might seem to have granted half unwillingly, were like to hear other manner of words, when once this business was ended. Wherefore none of them were scrupulous in promising the best of their help to the Romans, the *Acheans* and *Rhodians*, which were chief among them, being rather doubtful, even when they had done their best, lest it should be ill taken, as if they had halted in some part of their duty. It is strange that men could be so earnest to set up the side, whereof they gladly would have seen the ruin. The vulgar sort was every-where addicted to *Perseus*; of the nobles and rulers, if some were vehemently Roman, they wanted not opposers that were wholly Macedonian; yea, the wisest and most honest, who

regarded only the benefit of their country, wished better to *Perseus* than to the Romans. And of this number, *Polybius*, the chief of historians, was one; who, though he judged the victory of *Perseus* like to prove hurtful to Greece, yet wished he the Romans ill to thrive, that so the Greeks might recover perfect liberty; for his endeavours in which course, he was at length tyrannically handled, as shall be shewed hereafter. This considered, it appears, that an extraordinary fear, and not only reverence of the imperial city, made the *Acheans*, and other estates of Greece thus conformable to the Romans. The occasion of this their fear, may be justly imputed unto the timorous demeanor of *Perseus* himself. He had undertaken a war, whereof the benefit should redound not only to his own kingdom, but unto all that were oppressed by the Romans. Yet no sooner were some few companies brought over-sea, to make a countenance of meaning somewhat against him, than he began to speak the enemy fair, and sue for peace at Rome. Since therefore it was known, that every small thing would serve to terrify him; and consequently, that it should at all times be in the Romans power, by giving him any tolerable conditions of peace, to take revenge at leisure upon those which had assisted him, little occasion was there, why any should adventure to partake with him. He made indeed a great noise; leading about his army; taking by force, or composition, some few towns; and soliciting all to join with him. But wise men could not be so beguiled: for at the same time he sought all means of pacification; and to that end, made humble suit unto the Roman ambassadors. *Q. Martius*, the chief of those ambassadors, and a man of more finesse in cunning than was usual among the Romans, made shew of inclination to the king's desire; and gave out such comfortable words, that the king intreated and obtained a meeting at the river *Peneus*. There did *Martius* very gently rebuke the king, and charge him with those crimes that are before-mentioned. Whereto though *Perseus* made none other answer, than the same which they could have made for him; yet the ambassadors, and especially *Martius*, took it in good part, as therewith satisfied: and advised him to give the like satisfaction to the senate. That this might conveniently be done; a truce was agreed upon. Thus had *Martius* his desire; which was to make the king lose time. For *Perseus* had all things then in readiness, and might have done much, ere the Roman army could have been in Greece. But by the interposition of this truce, he no way increased his forces; he suffered a most convenient season of winning upon the enemy, to slip away; and obtained in recompence nothing else, than leisure and vain hope. Yet was he pleased herewith, as it had been with some victory: publishing a copy of the disputation between him and the Romans, whereby he gave men to understand, how much he had the better, and what hope there was of peace. He sent ambassadors also to the *Rhodians*, of whose good will to him he was best perswaded; not only to let them know how much he was superiour in cause; but to intreat them, that they would take upon them, as moderators, to compound the differences between him and the Romans, if perhaps, notwithstanding the goodness of his cause, he should be denied peace. These were poor helps. For hereby it appeared, that his late standing upon point of honour, was no better than mere vanity: his own safety being the utmost of his ambition. This his fearfulness might seem ex-

a Polyb. Legat. 73, 78, & 80.

b Polyb. Legat. l. 77.

cusable, and the blame thereof to appertain unto the *Greeks*; who deceived his expectation, by being wanting to him in a time of necessity, that was partly their own: had it not been his office, who took upon him as their champion to give such a manly beginning to the war, as might encourage all others to follow him. But his timorous quality being found, men grew daily more and more averse from him, and grew careful, not to put their shoulders to a falling wall. The *Rhodians*, among whom he had many stout partizans, desired him not to crave any thing at their hands, in which they might seem to do against the good liking of the *Romans*. The *Beotians* also, who had entred of late into a strict society with the *Macedonian*, renounced it now, and made the like with the *Romans*: to whom further, in a sort, they yielded themselves as vassals. Neither was *Martius* contented to accept their submission under a general form; but caused their several towns to make covenant apart, each for it self; to the end, that being thus distracted into many little common-weals, they might not (were they never so desirous to rebel) have such force to do hurt, as when they agreed, and were incorporated in one, under the city of *Thebes*. This work, of separating the *Beotians* from *Thebes* their head, was more than *Agefilans* could effect, or *Epaminondas* would suffer, then when all *Greece* followed the *Lacedemonians*. So far more available to *Thebes*, being destitute of help from abroad, was the virtue of *Epaminondas*, and a few brave citizens; than was the society with king *Perseus*, against a number not so great as followed the *Lacedemonians*.

Martius brought this to effect, whilst the king sat still, as being bound by the truce: and having done this, he returned to the city; where vaunting what he had wrought by his craft, he was commended, and (though some reproved it as dishonest) employed it again by the senate, with commission to deal as he should think expedient. Touching the ambassadors which *Perseus* had sent; audience was given to them, for that they should not plainly see how their master was deluded: but neither excuse nor entreaty, would serve their turn; the senate being resolved before-hand what to do. It was enough that they were admitted into the city, and had thirty days respite allowed them to depart out of *Italy*: whereas they, who came last on the same errand, did their message without the walls, in the temple of *Belona* (the usual place of giving audience to open enemies, or to such commanders, as might not, by reason of some custom, enter the city) and had only the short warning of eleven days, to be gone out of *Italy*. Neither did this poor courtesy serve alone to hide the craft of *Martius*, as if he had meant none other than good earnest: but it was a likely mean, both to keep a long while from *Perseus* the knowledge of his business, and to stagger his resolution; when it should need it most firm.

And accordingly it fell out. For *Licinius*, the *Roman* consul, was at *Apollonia* in a manner as soon as the *Macedonian* ambassadors were with their king at *Pella*. Which though it were enough to have roused *Perseus*, and have made him lay aside all cowardly hope of getting pardon; yet was he content to deliberate awhile, Whether it were not better to offer himself tributary to the *Romans*, and to redeem their good-will with some part of his kingdom, that so he might enjoy the rest; than to put all at once to hazard. But finally, the stoutest counsel prevailed: which also was the wisest; and so would have proved, had it been

stoutly and wisely followed. He now began, as if the war had not begun until now, to do what should have been done long afore. He caused all his forces to be drawn together; and appointed their rendezvous at *Citium*, a town in *Macedon*. All being in readiness, he did royal sacrifice, with an hundred beasts, to I know not what *Minerva*, that was peculiarly honoured in his country: and then, with all his courtiers, and those of his guard, set forward to *Citium*. His army he found consisting of nine and thirty thousand foot, and four thousand horse: whereof about twelve thousand foot, and a thousand horse, were strangers, of sundry nations, most part *Thracians*; the rest his own *Macedonians*. These he animated with lively speeches; laying before them the glory of their ancestors, the insolency of the *Romans*, the goodness of his cause, the greatness of his provisions, and the many advantages which they had of the enemy, especially in numbers. They answered him cheerfully, with loud acclamations, and bade him be of good courage. From all cities of *Macedon* there came likewise messengers, offering to help him with money and victuals, according to their several abilities. He gave them thanks: but answered, That his own provisions would abundantly suffice; willing them only to furnish him with carts, for his engines and munition.

Out of his own kingdom he issued forth into *Thessaly*: knowing that the *Romans* were to pass through that country, in their journey towards him. Some towns of *Thessaly* opened their gates unto him, without making offer to defend themselves; some he balked, thinking them too strong or well manned; and some he won by force. Of these last was *Myle*; a town thought impregnable, and therefore not more stoutly than proudly defended by the inhabitants, who gave contumelious language to the assailants. It was taken by reason of a sally, which the townsmen rashly made, and being driven back, received the *Macedonians*, that entred pell-mell with them at the gates. All cruelty of war was practised here, to the greater terror of the obstinate. So *Velatie* and *Connus* (towns of much importance, especially *Connus*, which stood in the streights of *Offa*, leading into *Tempe*) yielded at the first. Having well fortified this passage, the king marched onwards to *Sycurium*, a town seated on the foot of mount *Offa*; where he rested a while, expecting news of the enemy.

Licinius, the consul, brought with him only two *Roman* legions; being promised other strength of auxiliaries, which was thought sufficient. *Eumenes*, and *Attalus's* brother, came to him in *Thessaly*, with four thousand foot and a thousand horse. Thither also came, from every part of *Greece*, such aid as the several estates could afford, or thought expedient to send: which from the most of them was very little. Of the kings abroad, *Masaniissa* sent thither his son *Misagenes*, with a thousand foot, as many horse, and two and twenty elephants. *Ariarathes* the *Cappadocian*, by reason of his affinity with *Eumenes*, was friend to the *Romans*, and had sent to *Rome* his young son, there to be brought up; yet he did little or nothing in this war; perhaps because *Eumenes* himself began within a while, but when it was too late, to be otherwise advised than he had been in the beginning. *Prusias* was content to be a looker on: as being allied to *Perseus*, and yet fearing the *Romans*. *Antiochus*, and *Ptolemy* (though *Ptolemy* was then young, and under tutors) had business of their own; the *Syrian* meaning to invade the *Egyptian*: yet each of them promised help to the *Romans*,

Romans, which they cared not to perform. *Gentius* the *Illyrian* was inclinable to the *Macedonian*: yet made good countenance to the *Romans*, for fear. It was a pretty trick, wherewith *M. Lucretius*, the *Roman* admiral's brother served him for this his counterfeit good will. This king had four and fifty ships, riding in the haven of *Dyr-rachium*, uncertain to what purpose: all which *Lucretius* took away, after a very kind sort; making shew to believe, That for none other end than to serve the *Romans*, their good friend *Gentius* had sent thither this fleet. But whatsoever *Gentius* thought in the beginning; he foolishly lost both his kingdom and himself, in the end of this war; by offering, rather than giving, his help to *Perseus*.

With none other company than what he brought over the sea, *Licinius* came into *Thessaly*: so tired with a painful journey, through the mountainous country of *Athamania*, which stood in his way from *Epirus*; that if *Perseus* had been ready, attending his descent into the plains, the *Romans* must needs have taken a great overthrow. He refreshed himself and his wearied army, by the river *Peneus*; where he encamped, attending his auxiliaries, that came in as fast as they could. It was not any slender help, that could enable him to deal with *Perseus*. Therefore he resolved to abide where he then was, and keep his trenches, until his numbers were sufficiently increased: contenting himself in the mean while, to have gotten quiet entrance into the country. The land of *Thessaly*, in which these two armies lay, was better affected to the *Romans*, than any part of *Greece* besides: as having been freed by them, from a more heavy yoke of bondage to the *Macedonian*, when there was little hope or expectation of such a benefit. It was generally rich, fruitful, and abounding in all things needful to man's life. In the midst of it, but somewhat more to the east, was that beautiful valley of *Tempe*, so exceedingly full of all delights, that the name was often used at large, to signify the most pleasant and goodly places. This valley of itself was not great; but adding to it those huge mountains, *Ossa* and *Olympus* (famous in poesy) with their spurs or branches, by which it was on all sides enclosed; it occupied the better part of *Thessaly*. And this way were the *Romans* to enter into *Macedon*; unless they would make an hungry journey through the country of the *Dassareti-ans*, as in the former war with *Philip* they had long in vain attempted to do. *Perseus* therefore had no small advantage, by being master of the streights leading into *Tempe*: though far greater he might have had, if by mispending of time he had not lost it. For, if in defending the ragged passages of these mountains, he were able to put the *Romans* often to the worse; yea to win upon them (for a while) every year more than other, both in strength and reputation: unquestionably, he might have done far greater things, had he seized upon the streights of *Aous*, which his father once kept, and defended all the country behind the mountains of *Pindus*. Surely not without extrem difficulty, must the *Romans* have either travelled by land, with all their carriages and impediments, through places wherein was no relief to be found; or else have committed their armies, and all things thereto needful, unto the mercy of seas that were very dangerous; if they would have sought other way into *Macedon*, than through the heart of *Greece*: upon neither of which courses they once devised, notwithstanding any trouble which they found in this present war. It may perhaps be said, that the

Greeks, and others, whom the king must have left on his back, would have made him unable to defend any places too far from his own home. But they were all, excepting the *Thessalians*, better affected now to him, than they had been to his father in the former war. The *Etolians*, upon whom the *Athamanians* depended, grew into suspicion with the *Romans* (as we shall find anon) even as soon as they met with *Perseus*. The *Beotians*, how politic soever *Martius* had wrought with them, adventured themselves desperately in the *Macedonians* quarrel: what would they have done, if he at first had done his best? The *Rhodians*, *Illyrians*, yea, and *Eumenes* himself after a while began to waver, when they saw things go better with *Perseus*, than they had expected. So that if, instead of discouraging his friends, by suing basely for peace; he had raised their hopes, by any brave performance in the beginning; and encreased the number of his well willers, yea, and bought down with money (as he might have done) some of his enemies, and among them *Eumenes*, who offered for good recompence, to forget his broken head: then might the *Romans* perhaps have been compelled to forsake their imperious patronage over *Greece*; and to render the liberty, by them given, entire; which otherwise was but imaginary. Such benefit of this war, since it was hoped for afterwards, might with greater reason have been expected at first, from greater advantages. But, as a fearful company running from their enemies, till some river stay their flight; are there compelled by mere desperation to do such acts, as done, while the battel lasted, would have won the victory: so fell it out with *Perseus*. In seeking to avoid the danger of that war, whereof he should have sought the honour; he left his friends that would have stood by him, and gave them cause to provide for their own safety; yet being overtaken by necessity, he chose rather to set his back to the mountains of *Tempe*, and defend himself with his proper forces; than to be driven into such misery, as was inevitable, if he gave a little further ground. What was performed by him or the *Romans*, all the while that he kept his footing in *Thessaly*, it is hard to shew particularly; for that the history of those things is much perished. Wherefore, we must be contented with the sum.

The consul, having no desire to fight until such time as all his forces were arrived, kept within his trenches, and lay still encamped by the river of *Peneus*, about three miles from *Larissa*. That which perswaded the consul to protract the time, did contrariwise incite the king to put the matter into a hasty trial. Wherefore he invited the *Romans* into the field, by wasting the land of the *Phereans*, their confederates. Finding them patient of this indignity, he grew bold to adventure even unto their trenches, out of which if they issued, it was likely that his advantage in horse would make the victory his own. At his coming they were troubled, for that it was sudden; yet no way terrified, as knowing themselves to be safely lodged. They sent out a few of king *Eumenes*'s horse, and with them some light-armed foot, to entertain skirmish. The captain, and some other of these, were slain; but no matter of importance done, for that neither *Licinius* nor *Eumenes* found it reasonable to hazard battel. Thus day after day, a while together, *Perseus* continued offering battel, which they still refused. whereby his boldness much increased; and much more his reputation, to the grief of those, who being so far come to make a conquest, could ill digest the shame that fell upon them by their enduring

enduring these bravadoes. The town of *Sycurium*; where *Perseus* then lay, was twelve miles from the *Romans*: neither was there any convenient watering in that long march, which used to take up four hours of the morning; but he was fain to bring water along with him in carts, that his men might not be both weary and thirsty when they came to fight. For remedy of these inconveniences, he found out a lodging, seven miles nearer to the enemy, whom he visited the next day by the sun-rising. His coming at such an unusual hour, filled the camp with tumult; insomuch, as though he brought with him only his horse and light armature, that were unfit to assail the trenches, yet the consul thought it necessary, and resolved to give check to his pride. Wherefore, he sent forth his brother *C. Licinius*, king *Eumenes*, *Attalus*, and many brave captains, with all his power of horse, his *velites*, and all the rest of his light armature, to try their fortune: he himself remaining in the camp, with his legions in readiness. The honour of this morning, was the *Macedonian* king's; for he obtained the victory in a manner entire (though the *Thessalians* made a good retreat) with little loss of his own. But he discovered his weakness ere night, by hearkening, as princes commonly do, to counsel, given by one of his own temper. For, whereas the *Romans* were in great fear, lest he should assault their camp; and, to that purpose, upon the first news of his success, his phalanx was brought unto him by the captains, though unsent for: he nevertheless took it for sound advice, which indeed was timorous and base. To work warily, and moderate his victory; by which means it was said, that either he should get honest conditions of peace, or at leastwise many companions of his fortune. Certainly it was like that his good fortune would exalt the hope and courage of his friends. Yet had it been greater; and had he won the *Roman* camp, his friends would have been the more, and the bolder. But over-great was his folly, in hoping then for peace: and in suing for it, even when he had the victory, what else did he, than proclaim unto all which would become his partakers, that neither good nor bad fortune should keep him from yielding to the *Romans*, whensoever they would be pleased to accept him? At this time the joy of his victory would admit none of these considerations. He had slain of the *Roman* horse two hundred, and taken of them prisoners the like number. Of their foot he had slain about two thousand: losing of his own no more than twenty horse and forty foot. The *Roman* camp, after this disaster, was full of heaviness and fear; it being much doubted that the enemy would set upon it. *Eumenes* gave counsel to dislodge by night, and remove to a surer place beyond the river *Peneus*. The consul, though ashamed to profess, by so doing, in what fear he stood; yet thought it better to acknowledge the loss past, than by standing on proud terms, to draw upon himself a greater calamity. So he passed the river in the dead of the night, and incamped more strongly on the further side. The *Etolians* were sorely blamed for this loss; as if rather a traiterous meaning, than any true fear, had occasioned their flight, wherein the rest of the *Greeks* followed them. Five of them that were men of especial mark, had been observed to be the first which turned their backs: an observation likely to cost them dear, at a time of better leisure. As for the *Thessalians*, their virtue was honoured with reward: so as the *Greeks* might learn, by examples of either kind, that if they would shun indignation, or incur favour, then must they adventure no

less for their lords the *Romans*, than gladly they would do for their own liberty. Thus fared it with the consul and his army. *Perseus* came the next day to correct the former day's error; which how great it was, he not until then found. The *Romans* were gotten into a place of safety; whither they could never have attained, if the king had either pressed his victory, or given better heed to them that night: his light armature alone being sufficient to have routed them, whilst they were conveying themselves to the other side of *Peneus*. But it was vain to tell what might have been done, since there was no remedy. The *Romans* were beaten, even the flower of their city, the gentlemen of *Rome*; out of whom were chosen their senators, and consequently the generals themselves, pretors, consuls, and all that bore office or command among them; yea, they were beaten so shamefully, that they stole away by night, and suffered him to gather up the spoils of them without resistance, as yielding themselves overcome. With such brave words did the king set out the glory of his action; dividing the spoils among his followers. But there was much wanting within him, to have made his honour sound. He came nearer to the *Romans*, and encamped at *Mopselus*, a place in the mid-way between *Tempe* and *Larissa*: as if it were his meaning to press them somewhat harder. Nevertheless he was easily perswaded to use the occasion, which he seemed to have, of obtaining peace. Therefore he sent unto the consul, and offered to yield unto the same conditions, wherein his father had been bound to the *Romans*, if the war might so take end. It were needless here again to shew the folly of this his course. Towards the accomplishment of this desired peace, there was in the consul no greater power, than to grant a truce, whilst ambassadors might go to *Rome*: it resting in the senate and people to approve the conditions, and ratifie the league. And of such a truce granted by *Martius*, he had lately found no small discommodity redounding. But *Licinius* dealt plainly, and returned answer that other hope of peace there was none; save that *Perseus* would yield both his kingdom and person, simply and absolutely, to discretion of the senate. A manly part it was of *Licinius* to be so resolute in adversity. On the other side, it argued a faint heart in *Perseus*, that having received an answer so peremptory, he still persisted making vain offers of great tribute. Finding that the peace, which he so much desired, could not be purchased with money, the king withdrew himself back to *Sycurium*. There he lay hearkening what the enemy did; whose forces were well repaired by the coming of *Misagenes* the son of *Masanissa*, with the aid before mentioned. This distance between the king and them, caused the *Romans* to wax the more bold in making their harvest: about which business they ranged all over the fields. Their careless demeanour gave him hope to do some notable exploit; which he attempted, both upon their camp, and upon those that were abroad. The camp he thought to have fired on the sudden: but the alarm being taken in good season, he failed in the enterprise. As for the forragers; he had a good hand upon them, if he could have withdrawn it, and given over in time. But whilst he strove to force a guard, he was visited by the consul; by whom either in a skirmish of horse, or (for the report is diverse) in a great battel he was overcome. This misadventure, whether great or small, caused *Perseus*, after a few days, to fall back into *Macedon*; as being naturally given to fear danger, even where none was; whereby what loss he felt will appear here-

hereafter. He left all behind him, save only *Tempe*, weakly guarded; and consequently an easy prey to the *Romans*.

After the king's departure, *Licinius* went straight unto *Connus*; hoping to have taken it, and so to have gotten entrance into *Tempe*. But finding the work too hard, he returned back upon the *Perrhebi*ans and others; from whom he won some towns, and among the rest *Larissa*. There were sundry towns thereabout, bearing the same name of *Larissa*: so that this which the consul took, may seem not to have belonged unto the *Thessalians*; unless, perhaps, after this victory, *Perseus* did greater acts than we find recorded, and got some part of *Thessaly*.

Of matters happening in *Greece* at this time, it is hard to give a precise account; for that the histories of them are greatly defective. One may think it strange, that the *Beotians*, whom a *Roman* ambassador could terrify, and bring altogether to his own will, should not be afraid of a *Roman* army, then on foot in *Greece*, and a navy on their coast. But more strange it is, that the *Thebans*, from whom their dependants were taken by the art of *Martius*, were more true to *Rome*, than other petty towns, which by that same distraction of the *Beotians*, became within themselves more absolute, than formerly they had been. The causes hereof were to have been sought among the changes happening in their variable factions: whereof the knowledge is now lost. Some of them rebelled, and were thoroughly punished by *Lucretius* the *Roman* admiral: who got so much by spoiling them, that he would have brought others to rebel in like sort, if by extream oppression he could have driven them so far. Neither was *Licinius* the consul undiligent in the same kind. What his doings were, after such time as he was at leisure from *Perseus*, I find no where mentioned. Only this is said in general, That in the war which he made, he^a cruelly and covetously demeaned himself.

After the same fashion dealt they, that commanded in the year following; *Hosilius* the consul, and *Hortensius* the admiral, or pretor of the fleet. *Hosilius* shewed more of his industry, in picking quarrels with the confederates of *Rome*, than in prosecuting the war against the *Macedonian*. For, concerning the *Roman* war upon his kingdom, after that the consul had sought passage in vain over certain mountains, *Perseus* seemed, in a manner^b free from it. He was troubled indeed on that side which looked toward *Illyria*, by *Ap. Claudius*, whom the consul sent thither with an army of four thousand, and who, by levies made upon the confederates, doubled this his army. But *Claudius* thinking to have taken *Uscana*, a border town of *Illyria*, by treason, came thither in such careless order, that the inhabitants, which had made shew of treason, with purpose only to train him into danger, sallied forth upon him, overthrew him, and chased him to far, that hardly he escaped with a fourth part of his company. Yet this town of *Uscana* shortly after became *Roman*: which howsoever it happened, *Perseus* very soon recovered it, and many other places therewithal: *Cotys*, a *Thracian* king, securing him on the one side of *Macedon*; and *Cephalus* an *Epirot* revolted from the *Romans*, on the other. *Perseus* likewise made a painful journey into *Attolia*: where he was promised to be admitted into *Stratus*, that was the strongest city

in that region. Of this hope, though he were disappointed by those of the *Roman* faction; yet in his return home, he took in *Aperantia*; and shortly heard good news, That *Ap. Claudius* was again thoroughly beaten by *Clewas*, one of his lieutenants. Such success had the *Macedonian* war under *Hosilius*. The same consul offended much the *Greeks*, by the strict inquisition which his ambassadors made into men's affection towards *Rome*. For these ambassadors travelling thorough all the cities of *Peloponnesus*, gave out speeches tending to shew, That they liked no better of those who sought not by might and main to advance their business, than of those which were of the *Macedonian* faction. Their meaning was, to have accused by name, in the parliament of *Achaia*, *Lycortas*, that worthy commander, who nobly followed the steps of *Philopammen*; and together with him, his son *Polybius*, who soon after was general of the *Achean* horse; but more notable by that excellent history which he wrote, than by his great employments, which he well and honourably discharged. The sum of the accusation should have been; That these were not hearty friends unto the *Romans*, but such as abstained from raising troubles, more for lack of opportunity, than for any love to the common quiet. But since no colour of truth could be found, that might give countenance to such a tale; it was thought better, for the present, to let it alone, and give gentle words, as if all were well. In like manner dealt they among the *Etolians*: they demanded hostages; and found some in the council that approved the motion: as also among the *Acarnanians*, there were that entreated to have *Roman* garrisons bestowed in their towns. But neither the one nor the other of these propositions took effect. They of the *Roman* faction accused not only such as were inclinable to the *Macedonian*, but also the good patriots; making it no less than a matter of treason, to be a *Grecian* in *Greece*. On the contrary side, there wanted not some, who roundly told these pick-thanks of their base flattery; rating them openly in such sort, that one of them hardly escaped being stoned, even in presence of the ambassadors. Thus was all full of accusations and excuses: among which the ambassadors carried themselves, as men that could believe none ill; though it were well enough known what they thought. The best was, that an order from the senate was brought into *Greece*, and published, to this effect: That it should be free for all men, to refuse obedience to any *Roman* magistrate, imposing any burthen for the present war, unless it were such, as the senate had likewise thought meet. Of this decree the whole country was glad: for it was, or seemed, a good remedy of many inconveniencies. But they that standing on the privilege hereof, refused to fulfill every commandment, were numbered among the patriots; which in the end of this war proved little better, if not worse, than to have been traitors. The senate was driven to set down this order; by reason of the many and vehement complaints brought to *Rome*, concerning the wrongs done by *Roman* magistrates, and especially by the admirals, *Lucretius* and *Hortensius*. *Lucretius* was condemned in a great sum of money, for the wrongs by him done: highly to the commendation of the *Romans*, in that they loved not to have their subjects oppressed. *Hortensius* being still in office, had warning to amend.

^a Liv. lib. 43.^b Polyb. Legat. 70.^c Polyb. Legat. 74.

Among the great number of embassages that came to *Rome* about this time, either to seek redress of injuries, or to offer their services: it is note-worthy, that from *Alabanda*, a town of the lesser *Asia*, there was presented unto the senate, and well accepted, a most base piece of flattery. These *Alabanders* brought three hundred horsemen's targets, and a crown of gold, to bestow upon *Jupiter* in the capitol. But having a desire to gratify the *Romans* with some exquisite token of their dutiful obedience; wherein they would be singular; and being not able to reach unto any great performance: they built a temple, unto the town *Rome*, and appointed anniversary games to be celebrated among them, in honour of that Goddess. Now, who can wonder at the arrogant folly of *Alexander*, *Antigonus*, *Ptolemy*, and the like vain men, that would be thought Gods; or at the shameless flattery of such as bestowed upon men, and not the most virtuous of men, divine honours; when he sees a town of houses, wherein powerful men dwell, worshipped as a goddess, and receiving (without scorn of the givers, or shame of the present) the title of *Deity*, at the gift of such a rascal city as *Alabanda*?

SECT. VII.

Q. *Martius the Roman consul, with extream difficulty and danger, enters into Tempe. The cowardise of Perseus in abandoning Tempe. The town of Diu quitted by Martius; repaired and fortified by the king. The Romans attempt many places, with ill success. Their affairs in hard estate. Martius a cunning and a bad man. Polybius sent ambassador to Martius from the Achæans. Polybius's honest wisdom beneficial to the Achæans. King Eumenes grows averse from the Romans. Perseus negotiates with Antiochus and Eumenes. His false dealing with Gentius king of Illyria; whom he draws into the Roman war. He sends ambassadors to the Rhodians; who vainly take upon them to be arbitrators between him and the Romans. Perseus loseth a mighty succour of the Bactariæ, by his wretched parsimony.*

AFTER two years of the *Macedonian* war, things were further out of tune in *Greece*, than when the war began, which had been thought likely to reform all those countries, and bring them to what pass the *Romans* desired, as it did in the end. *Perseus* had hitherto the better, and was stronger now, than when he lived in peace. He had enlarged his borders on the *Illyrian* side; his friends in all parts of *Greece*, took courage daily; and his reputation grew such, as caused those that were wholly *Roman*, to suspect what the issue of the war might prove, and thereupon to become wise for themselves. Contrariwise, *Licinius* and *Hostilius* the consuls, had one after the other spent their time in vain, seeking way into *Macedon*; and defaced the glorious enterprise of conquest, by many losses received. The *Roman* admirals had so demeaned themselves, that many towns, even of the best affected to *Rome*, kept them out by force. Generally, the fear was great on the *Roman* side; and the army much lessened, not only by casualties of war, but by the facility of the tribunes or colonels, or else of the consul himself (for they laid the blame one upon the other) in licensing the soldiers to depart. *Quintius Martius* the new consul, who succeeded unto *Hostilius*, was to amend all this: which nevertheless was more than he knew how to do, though he brought with him a strong supply

of men. He began hotly to set the war on foot, which a long time had slept. And he began the right way, not seeking to force the streights that were surely guarded, but taking pains to climb the mountains, which were thought able to forbid all passage over them, without help or need of any custody. The king heard of his approach, and being uncertain what way he meant to take, distributed his own forces to the defence of all places which might give entrance, or permit ascent. But the consul proceeded in his journey, with hope either not to be discovered by the enemy, or to break through all opposition, or at leastwise, to fight on as convenient ground, as they should have that lay to stop him; and at length, if all failed, to make a safe retreat. He sent before him four thousand of his most expedite foot, to discover the ways. Two days was this company troubled, in overcoming the difficulty of no more than fifteen miles, after which they had sight of the enemy, that lay to deny their passage. They occupied therefore a safe piece of ground, and sent back word to the consul where they were, intreating him to hasten unto them, which he did. The *Macedonians* were not a whit dismayed at his arrival, but met him, and fought with him two or three days together, each returning to their own camp at night, with little loss on either side. This bickering was on the narrow ridge of a mountain, which gave scarcely room unto three to march in front. So that very few hands came to be employed, all the rest were beholders. In this case, it was impossible to get forwards, yet a shame to return. Wherefore *Martius* took the only course remaining, and indeed the best. Part of his men he left with *Popilius*, to attend upon the *Macedonians*, whilst he, with the rest, fetched a compass about, and sought out ways that never had been trodden. Herein he found extreme difficulty, which notwithstanding he overcame. Besides the troubles commonly incident to such journeys, through places unfit for habitation, he was compelled by labour of hand to make paths where none were, yea, where nature might seem to have intended that none should be. So steep he found the descent of the mountains, in this way which he took, that of seven miles, which they travelled the first day, his men were compelled, for the most part, to rowl themselves down, as not daring to trust their feet. Neither was this the worst; for they met with rocks that stood one over another, so upright, and cumbersome to get down, that their elephants were afraid of the giddy prospect; and, casting their governors, made a terrible noise, which affrighted the horses, and bred great confusion. Having therefore gone, or wallowed four miles of this grievous journey, there was nothing more desired by the soldiers, than that they might be suffered to creep back again the same way which they had come. But shift was made to let down the elephants by a kind of bridges, like unto falling draw-bridges, whereof the one end was joined to the edge of the cliff, the other sustained by two long posts, fastened in the ground below. Upon these two posts, or poles, which indeed (not being very strong, since it was intended that they should be either cut or broken) were fastened two rasters, answerable in length to the distance between the higher and the lower fall; so as the end of one bridge might reach to the beginning of another. These were covered with planks and turf, that they might seem continent with the ground, so as to make the beasts adventurous to go upon them. If there were a plain of any good extent from the foot of a rock to the next downsfall, then might the bridge be shorter.

When

When an elephant was gone a pretty way upon one of these, the posts upholding the frame were cut asunder, thereby causing him to sink down unto the next bridge; whence he was conveyed in like manner to the third, and onward still to the very bottom. Thus went they down sliding, some on their feet, others on their buttocks, till they came to an even valley. By this it appears how thoroughly provided the *Romans* used to be in their journeys, of things needful in all occasions; as also what inestimable pains they took in this descent, about the conveyance of themselves and all their carriages down the mountains. The next day they rested, staying for *Popilius* and his company, who hardly, or perhaps never, should have over-taken them, if the enemy had followed, and set upon him from aloft. The third and fourth days journeys were like unto the first, save that custom, and the nearness to their way's end, without meeting the enemy, caused them the better to endure the labour.

Perseus could not be ignorant of the *Romans* coming towards him, since they fought with his men upon the passage three days together, he lying so nigh, that he might well near have heard the noise. Yet was he so possessed with fear, that he neither stirred to help his own men, or to hinder the consul, nor made any provision for that which might fall out; but, as one void of counsel, sat harkening after the event. Four only passages there were leading into *Tempe*; the first by *Connus*, which the *Romans* were unable to force; the second and third were the same which *Martius* had attempted in vain, and another like unto it; the last by the city of *Dium*, out of *Macedon*. All these were sufficiently guarded, and whosoever would seek any other way, must be fain to take such pains as *Martius* had undergone. The entrance by *Dium* was fairer than any of the rest, whereof only the king had benefit; for that his enemies could not get thither, save through the valley it self, into which they must first pierce another way. *Dium* stood upon the foot of the huge mountain *Olympus*, about a mile from the sea; of which mile, the river *Helicon* becoming there a lake, and called *Baphyras*, took up the one half; the rest being such as might easily have been fortified. Besides all these, there was in the midst of *Tempe* a passage, which ten men might easily keep, where the spurs of the mountains reaching far into the valley, drew near to the very banks of *Peneus*, a goodly and deep river, which ran through it. Wherefore nothing had been more easy, than to make the consul repent him of his troublesome journey, if *Perseus* could have seen his own advantages. For the *Roman* army was not only in ill case to fight, after the vexation of that miserable travel, but must needs have either perished for want of victuals, or been enforced to return the same way that it came, if the king had made good the streight of *Dium*. To have returned, and climbed up with their elephants and carriages against those rocks, from which, with extreme labour, they could hardly get down, it seems a matter of impossibility; especially considering how the enemy, from above their heads, would have beaten upon them, being now aware of the path which they had taken, though he knew it not when they stole away from him. It may therefore be thought strange, that the *Romans* did not rather take their journey into *Macedon*, from the side of *Illyria*, whence that kingdom had often been invaded, as lying open on that part, than put themselves to the trouble of breaking into *Tempe*; whence, after that they were there arrived, there was no means to escape, without forcing one of those passages, which they de-

spared to win. But the cowardise of *Perseus* did commend the counsel by them followed, as wise. For he no sooner heard that the enemy was come over the mountains into *Tempe*, than he feared like one out of his wits; saying, that he was vanquished, and had lost all without battel. Herewithal he began to take out of *Dium*, what he could carry away in haste; and straightways abandoned the town. In the same vehemency of amazement, he sent a strait commandment to *Theffalonia*, that the arsenal there should be set on fire; and to *Pella*, that his treasures there should be cast into the sea; as if the *Romans* were like presently to be masters of these two cities. *Nicias*, who was appointed to drown the treasure, performed it hastily as well as he could; though soon after, his master grew sorry for the loss, and it was all, in a manner, recovered by divers from under the water. But *Andronicus*, who had charge to set fire on the king's arsenal, deferred the execution, foreseeing that repentance might follow; and so he prevented the damage. Whether *Nicias*, for his absolute and blind obedience, or *Andronicus*, for his careful providence, merited the greater commendation, or more easy pardon, it rested in the king to interpret. The reward of their service was this. *Perseus*, growing ashamed of his mad cowardise, that appeared in this hasty direction, caused them both to be slain. Also those poor men, which had fetched his treasure out of the sea by their diving, were pay'd their wages after the same sort, that so there might be no witness of the king's base folly. Such end must they fear, who are privy to dishonourable actions of great princes. If *Perseus* would have gone surely to work for the hiding of his fault; then must he so royally have behaved himself, that no man might believe him to be the author of any unworthy act or counsel. But his virtue was of no such capacity. He thought it enough to lay the blame upon others. And therefore having called *Hippias* away (the captain which had stopped the consul on the top of the mountain) and *Asclepiodatus*, from defence of the passages, whereto they were by him appointed, he rated them openly; saying, that they had betrayed unto the enemy the gates and bars of *Macedon*. Of this reproach if they would discharge themselves, by laying it upon him, to whom of right it belonged; then might they have sped as did *Nicias* and *Andronicus*.

The consul *Martius* had great cause to rejoyce, for that the king so hastily relinquished his possession of *Tempe*, and all the passages leading thereinto, since the *Roman* army; this notwithstanding, was hardly able to subsist for want of victuals. He took *Dium* without resistance, and thence went forward into *Macedon*: wherein having travelled about a day's journey, and gotten one town that yielded, he was compelled, by mere lack of food for his men, to return back towards *Theffaly*. His fleet came to him in this time of necessity, well appointed to have holpen him in the war; but having left behind at *Magnesia*, the ships of burthen, which carried the provisions. Wherefore it fell out happily, that one of his lieutenants had been careful to occupy one of the castles about *Tempe*, which were forsaken by the *Macedonians*: for by those ways only might corn be brought into the army. To meet the sooner with this corn, which was most desirously expected; he forsook *Dium*, and went to *Phila*; by which foolish journey (if not worse than foolish) he lost more, than a little the longer fasting had been worth. It is probable that his carts, with all or the most of his store, were lost among the mountains; for otherwise it had been madness to

put himself on such an enterprize, so slenderly provided, as that without enforcement, or sight of the enemy, he should be fain to quit it. Howsoever it was; men thought him a coward, or at least a bad man of war; since he thus recoiled and gave off, when it most behoved him to have prosecuted the action.

By understanding the folly and cowardise of *Martius*; the king recollected himself; understood his own error; sought to hide it by such poor means as have been shewed; and laboured to make what amends he could. He quickly repossessed the town of *Dium*, which he hastily repaired, finding it dismantled by the *Romans*. This done, he encamped strongly by the river *Enipeus*: meaning there to stop the enemies proceeding all that summer. Less diligence, more timely used, would have been enough not only to have delivered *Martius* into his hand, who had beguiled him with an idle hope of peace: but to have given him such a noble victory, as might cause the *Romans* to seek a good end of the war upon fair conditions, and not to begin again in haste. Yet this recovery and fortification of *Dium*, was to the consul an exceeding hinderance. For little or nothing could afterward be done toward the conquest in hand, in all the continuance of his office. Only the town of *Heraclea*, standing on the river of *Peneus*, five miles from *Dium*, was taken by force; or rather by a trick of climbing up on mens heads, somewhat after the manner of our tumblers. But it made such defence as it could; and was not given up for fear. After this, *Martius* did set a bold face towards *Dium*; as if he would have taken it again, and have driven the king further off; though his intent or hope, was nothing like so great: his chief care being to provide for his wintering. He sent the admiral to make attempt upon the seათowns, *Theffalonica*, *Cassandrea*, *Demetrias* and others. All these were assayed; but in vain. The fields about *Theffalonica* were wasted; and some companies, that sundry times adventured forth of the town, were still put to the worse. As for the town itself, there was danger in coming near it, either by land or sea; by reason of the engines which shot from the walls, and reached unto the fleet. Wherefore the admiral setting sail from thence, ran along by *Enia*, and *Antigonea* (landing near to each of them, and both doing and receiving hurt) until he came unto *Pallene*, in the territory of *Cassandrea*. There king *Eumenes* joyned with him, bringing twenty ships of war: and five other were sent thither from king *Prusias*. With this access of strength the admiral was bold to try his fortune at *Cassandrea*; which was bad. There was a new ditch lately cast by *Perseus*, before the town: which while the *Romans* were filling up, question was made, what became of the earth taken thence, for that it lay not upon the bank. By this occasion it was learned, that there were arches in the town-wall filled up with that earth, and covered with one single row of brick. Hence the admiral gathered hope of making way into the town, by sapping the walls. To this work he appointed such as he thought meetest: giving an alarm to the other side of the town, thereby to shadow his attempt. The breach was soon made. But whilst the *Romans* were shouting for joy, and ordering themselves for the assault: the captains within the town perceived what was done; and falling forth unexpected, gave a fierce charge on the companies that were between the ditch and the

wall; of whom they slew about six hundred, and suffered few to escape unwounded. This disaster; and the want of good success on that part of the town which king *Eumenes* assailed (a supply in the mean while entering the town by sea) caused the siege to break up. *Torone* was the next place which the admiral thought meet to attempt: and thence likewise he was repelled. Finding this too well manned; he made way towards *Demetrias*; whereinto *Euphranor*, a *Macedonian* captain, was gotten before his coming, with such forces, as were not only sufficient to have defended the town, if the admiral had layed siege to it, but to keep the land about it from spoil; or at least (as they did) to make the enemy pay dear for all that he there got. This *Euphranor* had taken his journey to *Demetrias*, by *Melibea*; whither the consul (that he might not be quite without work) had sent his lieutenant to besiege it: and by the terror of his appearing suddenly over their heads, caused the besiegers to dislodge in all haste, setting their camp on fire.

Such fortune attended on the *Romans*; or rather, so far was their ability short of their enterprizes; ever since their consul (whether dastardly, or carelessly) most unlike a good commander, had let go his hold of *Macedon*, by forsaking *Dium*: yea, it is to be suspected, that some greater harm befel them, or at least, that they were in some greater danger, than is expressed in the broken remaining history of this war. For *Martius* perswaded the *Rhodians*, by *Agesspolis* their ambassador, who came to him at *Heraclea* about other business of less importance, that they should do well to interpose themselves as mediators, and seek to finish the war. Now, although ^a *Polybius* do most probably conjecture, that this was rather a malicious device of *Martius*, craftily seeking to bring the *Rhodians* in danger (as anon it fell out) by their opposing the resolution of the senate; than that it proceeded from any true fear in him, either of *Perseus*, or of *Antiochus*, who had then an army on foot; yet since he made shew of fear, it is like withal, that somewhat had happened, which might make his fear seem not counterfeit. And so were the *Rhodians* moved to think of him; not only for that the extraordinary courtesy, both of him and of the admiral, towards their ambassador, coming from proud natures, did argue diffidence, where there was no ambition to cause it; but much more, for that shortly after the ambassadors of *Perseus*, and of *Gentius* the *Illyrian*, did set out their business at *Rhodes*, not more with the strength of a good fleet, which the *Macedonian* had gotten, than with the honour of some victory, wherein he had lately slain great numbers of the *Roman* horse. ^b Thus much we find intimated; though the time, place, or other circumstances of the fight be not specified. And hereto may be referred, the report of those that were sent from *Rome*, to view the estate of *Martius's* army. For they found the consul wanting meat; the admiral wanting men; and, for those few that he had, wanting both money and cloaths: and *Ap. Claudius* the pretor, who lay on the frontier of *Illyria*, so unable to invade *Macedon*, that contrariwise, he was in extream danger, so as either he must quickly be sent for thence, or a new army be sent thither to him. Wherefore it may seem, that some blow had been taken on the *Illyrian* side, which made all to halt; or at least, that the *Romans* with greater loss, than is before spoken of, had been driven from some of the towns which they besieged.

^a Polyb. legat. 80.^b Polyb. legat. 87.

Now although it were so, that *Martius*, in very few of his actions, behaved himself like a man of war; yet in exercise of cunning, which one hath most aptly termed, *a crooked or sinister kind of wisdom*, he dealt as a craftsman, with a restless working diligence. This indeed neither proved his sufficiency, nor commended his honesty; since thereby he effected nothing to his own benefit: and nevertheless, out of envy, vain-glory, or such delight as weak and busy-headed men take in creating inexplicable troubles, he directly made opposition to the good of his country. At such time as *Perseus*, by the success of his doings against *Hosilius*, had gotten much reputation, and was thought likely to invade *Thessaly*; *Archo*, *Lycortas*, and other good patriots among the *Acheans*, judged it expedient for their nation to help the *Romans*, as in a time of adversity, whom in prosperity they loved not to flatter. Wherefore *Archo* proposed a decree, which passed; that the *Acheans* should send their whole power into *Thessaly*, and participate with the *Romans* in all danger. So the army was levied, and *Polybius*, with others, sent ambassadors unto *Martius*, to certify him thereof, and know his pleasure. *Polybius* found the consul busied in seeking passage through *Tempe* into *Macedon*. He went along with the army, and awaited the consul's leisure, till they came to *Heraclea*; where, finding the time convenient, he presented the decree, and offered the service of his nation, wherein soever it should be commanded. *Martius* took this very kindly; but said, that he needed now no manner of help. Forthwith *Polybius* dispatched home his companions, to signify thus much, tarrying himself behind in the camp. After a while, word was brought to *Martius*, that *App. Claudius* desired, or rather imperiously required of the *Acheans*, five thousand men, to be sent him into *Epirus*. It was manifest, that *Appius* had need of these men; and that if he were strong in the field, he might do notable service, by distracting the forces of *Perseus*. But the labyrinthian head of *Martius* could not allow of such plain reason. He called unto him *Polybius*, to whom he declared, that *Appius* had no need of such aid; and therefore willed him to return home, and in any wise take order that the men might not be sent, nor the *Acheans* be put to such needless charges. Away went *Polybius*, musing, and unable to resolve, whether it were for love to the *Acheans*, that the consul was so earnest in this business; or rather for envy, and to hinder *App. Claudius* from doing any thing, since himself could do nothing. But when *Polybius* was to deliver his opinion in the council, touching this matter; then found he a new doubt, that more nearly concerned his own self, and those of his own party. For, as he was sure to incur the great indignation of the consul, if he should neglect what was given him in charge; so was it manifest, on the other side, that the words by *Martius*, uttered to him in private, would prove no good warrant for him and his friends, if openly they should refuse to help *Claudius*, alledging, that he had no need. In this case therefore, he had recourse unto the decree of the senate, which exempted men from necessity of doing what the *Roman* commanders should require, unless by special order from the senate the same were likewise appointed. So for lack of warrant from the senate, this demand of *Appius* was referred unto the advice of the consul, by whom it was sure to be made frustrate. Hereby the *Acheans* were savers of more than an hundred and twenty talents, though *Polybius* him-

self ran into danger of *Appius's* displeasure; and for such honest dealing in his country's behalf, was afterwards rewarded by the *Romans* with many a long year's imprisonment.

Whether it were by the like policy of *Martius*, that king *Eumenes* grew cold in his affection to the *Romans*, or whether this king began when it was too late to stand in fear, lest the fire, which he himself had helped to kindle, would shortly take hold on his own lodging; or whether the regard of money were able to overway all other passions, it is hard to determine; since they, that had better means to know the truth, have not precisely affirmed any certainty. One report is, that *Eumenes* did not so much as give any help to *Martius*; but, coming to have joined with him in such friendly manner as he did with the former consuls, was not entertained according to his liking; and thereupon returned home in such anger, that he refused to leave behind him certain horse of the *Gallo-Greeks*, being requested to have done it. If this were true, and that his brother *Attalus* tarrying behind with the consul, did the *Romans* good service; then is the reason apparent of the hatred borne afterwards by the senate to *Eumenes*, and the love to *Attalus*. But it is more generally received, that *Eumenes* gave a willing ear to *Perseus's* desire of accord, for mere desire of gain. And it might well be, that covetousness drew him on in the course whereinto indignation first led him. Howsoever it befel, *Perseus* caused *Eumenes* to be sounded, and found him so tractable, that he was bold to solicit him by an embassy. The tenor of his advertisements both to *Eumenes*, and to *Antiochus*, was, that there could be no perfect love between a king and a free city; that the *Romans* had quarrel alike to all kings, though they dealt with no more than one at a time, and used the help of one against another; that *Philip* was oppressed by them, with the help of *Attalus*; *Antiochus*, with the help of *Philip* and *Eumenes*; and now *Perseus* assailed, with the help of *Eumenes* and *Prusias*. Herewith he willed *Eumenes* to consider, that when *Macedon* was taken out of their way, they would be doing with him in *Asia*, which lay next at hand; yea, that already they began to think better of *Prusias* than of him. In like sort, he admonished *Antiochus* not to look for any good conclusion of his war with the *Egyptian*, so long as the *Romans* could make him give over, by denouncing their will and pleasure. Finally, he requested both of them either to compel the *Romans* to surcease from their war upon *Macedon*, or else to hold them as common enemies unto all kings. *Antiochus* lay far out of the *Romans* way, and therefore was little troubled with such remonstrances. *Eumenes* was more nearly touch'd, and as he felt part of this to be true, so had he reason to stand in doubt of the rest. Yet, when he should give answer, he began to offer a bargain of peace for money. He thought the *Romans* to be no less weary, than *Perseus* was afraid. Wherefore he promised, for his own part, that if he might have fifteen hundred talents for withdrawing his hand from this war, then would he remain a neuter therein; and that for some greater quantity of money (how much I find not) he would also bring the *Romans* to condescend unto peace: and, for assurance of his true meaning herein, he offered to give hostages. *Perseus* liked well to receive the hostages, but not to lay out the money; especially before-hand, as was required. He would fain have peace with *Rome*, and not with *Eumenes* only. For procuring of this,

he promised to be at any reasonable cost; but he would lay down the money in the temple at *Samothrace*, whence it should be delivered unto *Eumenes*, after that the peace was fully concluded and ratified. The isle of *Samothrace* was *Perseus's* own, and therefore *Eumenes* thought the money no nearer to him, being there; than if it remained in *Pella*. Besides, his labour deserved somewhat, howsoever the business might happen to succeed; so that needs he would have part of his wages in *prêt*. Thus the two kings did no more than lose time; and *Eumenes* grew suspected of the *Romans* as a traitor.

After the same manner dealt *Perseus* with king *Gentius* the *Illyrian*. He had attempted this *Illyrian* before, who dealt plainly, and said, that without money he could not stir. Hereunto *Perseus* loved not to hearken, thinking that his treasures would serve at the last cast, to deliver him from all his fears. But when the *Romans* had gotten within *Tempe*, then did his fear urge him to prodigality; so as he agreed to pay three hundred talents, which *Gentius* demanded for a recompence. So the bargain was soon made, and pledges on both sides delivered for performance. This was openly done by *Perseus*, to the end that all his army might have comfort by such access of strength to their party. Presently, upon the bargain made, ambassadors were sent to *Rhodes*, both from *Perseus* and *Gentius*, who desired the *Rhodians* to take upon them as arbitrators between *Perseus* and the *Romans*, and to bring the war to an end. The *Rhodians*, thinking that *Martius* the consul was no less desirous of peace than the *Macedonian*, arrogantly promised, that they, by their authority, would make peace; wishing the kings to shew themselves conformable. But the *Roman* senate, hearing proud words to the same effect from the *Rhodian* ambassadors, gave an answer as disdainful, angry, and menacing as they could devise; so as this vain glory of the *Rhodians* was thoroughly chastised; and more thoroughly should have been, if their submission had not been as humble, as their folly was proud. Such use of *Gentius's* friendship made *Perseus*, without laying out one ounce of silver. Now fain he would have hastned this young and rash *Illyrian* to enter with all speed into the war; but then must the money be hastned away. *Pantauchus*, the *Macedonian* ambassador, who remained with *Gentius*, exhorted him daily to begin the war by land and sea, whilst the *Romans* were unprovided. But finding what it was that made all to stay, he sent word to *Perseus*. Hereupon ten talents were sent to *Pantauchus*, who delivered it to the young king, as earnest of that which followed. More followed indeed, and sealed up with the seal of the *Illyrians*; but carried by *Macedonians*, and not too fast. Before this money came into *Illyria*, *Gentius* had laid hands upon two *Roman* ambassadors, and cast them into prison; which *Perseus* no sooner heard, than he recalled his treasure-bearers, and sent them with their load to *Pella*; for that now the *Illyrian* was of necessity to make war with the *Romans*, whether he were hired thereto or not.

* There came about the same time, through *Illyria*, to the aid of *Perseus*, under one *Clondicus* a petty king, ten thousand horse and ten thousand foot, of the *Gauls*, which were (as *Plutarch* hath it) the *Bastarnæ*. These had before-hand made their bargain, and were to receive present pay at the first. At their entry into the kingdom, *Perseus* sent one to them; desiring their captains to come visit him, whom he promised to gratify with

goodly rewards; hoping that the multitude would take good words for payment. But the first question that their general asked, was, Whether the king had sent money to give the soldiers their pay in hand, according to his bargain? Hereto the messenger had not what to answer. Why then (said *Clondicus*) tell thy master, That the *Gauls* will not stir one foot further, until they have gold, as was agreed, and hostages. *Perseus* hereupon took counsel: if to utter his own opinion, before men so wise that they would not contradict him, were to take counsel. He made an invective against the incivility and avarice of the *Bastarnæ*: who came with such numbers, as could not but be dangerous to him and to his kingdom. Five thousand horse of them, he said, would be as many as he should need to use; and not so many, that he should need to fear them. It had been well done, if any of his counsellors would have told him, that there wanted not employment for the whole army of them, since without any danger to the kingdom, they might be let out by the way of *Perrhæbia*, into *Thessaly*: where wasting the country, and filling themselves with spoil, they should make the *Romans* glad to forsake *Tempe*, even for hunger and all manner of want; therein doing the king notable service, whether they won any victory, or not. This, and a great deal more might have been alledged, if any man had dared to give advice freely. In conclusion *Antigonus*, the same messenger that had been with them before, was sent again, to let them know the king's mind. He did his errand: upon which followed a great murmur of those many thousands that had been drawn so far to no purpose. But *Clondicus* asked him now again, whether he had brought the money along with him, to pay those five thousand, whom the king would entertain. Hereto, when it was perceived, that *Antigonus* could make no better answer than shifting excuses; the *Bastarnæ* returned presently towards *Danubius*, wasting the neighbour parts of *Thrace*; yet suffering this crafty messenger to escape unhurt: which was more than he could have well expected.

Thus dealt *Perseus*, like a careful treasurer, and one that would preserve his money for the *Romans*, without diminishing the sum. But of this painful office he was very soon discharged by *L. Æmilius Paulus* the new consul: who in fifteen days after his setting forth from *Italy*, brought the kingdom of *Macedon* to that end, for which God had appointed over it a king so foolish and so cowardly.

SECT. VIII.

Of *L. Æmilius Paulus* the consul. His journey. He forceth *Perseus* to discamp. He will not hazard battel with any disadvantage. Of an eclipse of the moon. *Æmilius's* superstition. The battel of *Pydna*. *Perseus's* flight. He forsakes his kingdom: which hastily yields to *Æmilius*. *Perseus* at *Samothrace*. He yields himself to the *Roman* admiral; and is sent prisoner to *Æmilius*.

BY the war of *Macedon*, the *Romans* hitherto had gotten much dishonour. Which though it were not accompanied with any danger, yet the indignity so moved them, that either they decreed that province to *L. Æmilius Paulus*, without putting it, as was otherwise their manner, to the chance of lot, between him and his fellow con-

* Liv. lib. 44. Plutarch in vit. Æmyl.

† Plutarch in vit. Æmyl.

ful ; or at least were gladder that the lot had cast it upon him, than that so worthy a man was advanced to the dignity of a second consulship. He refused to propound unto the senate any thing that concerned his province ; until by his ambassadors, thither sent to view the estate of the war, it was perfectly understood, in what condition both the *Roman* forces, and the *Macedonian*, at the present remained. This being thoroughly known to be such, as hath been already told ; the senate appointed a strong supply, not only unto the consul, but unto the navy, and likewise to the army that lay between *Illyria* and *Epirus* ; from which *Ap. Claudius* was removed, and *L. Anicius* sent thither in his place. *Æmylius*, before his departure from *Rome*, making an oration to the people, as was the custom, spake with much gravity and authority. He requested those that thought themselves wise enough to manage this war, either to accompany him into *Macedon*, and there assist him with their advice ; or else to govern their tongues at home, and not take upon them to give directions by hearsay, and censure by idle reports : for he told them plainly, that he would frame his doings to occasions ; not to the expectation of the multitude. The like speech of his father *L. Æmylius*, who died valiantly in the battel of *Cannæ*, might well be living in some of their memories : which was enough to make them conform themselves the more gladly unto the instructions given by a wise and resolute consul.

All his business within the city being dispatched, *Æmylius* was honourably attended, at his setting forth on his journey ; with an especial hope of men, that he should finish the war : though that he should finish it so soon and happily, was more than could have been hoped or imagined. He came to *Brundisium* ; whence, when the wind came fair, he set sail at break of day, and arrived safely at the isle of *Corcyra* before night. Thence passed he to *Delphi* : where, having done sacrifice to *Apollo*, after the fifth day he set forwards to the camp ; and was there in five days more. So are there but five of the fifteen days remaining, in which he finished the war.

Perseus lay strongly encamped at *Dium* ; having spared no labour of men and women to fortify the banks of *Enipeus*, where it was fordable in dry weather. So as there was little hope, or none, to force him ; and consequently as little possibility to enter that way into *Macedon*. One great inconvenience troubling the *Romans*, and much disabling them to make attempt upon *Dium*, was lack of fresh water. For there were ten miles between *Dium* and *Tempe* ; all the way lying between the sea-shore and the foot of *Olympus*, without any brook or spring breaking forth on that side. But *Æmylius* found present remedy for this, by digging wells on the shore, where he found sweet springs ; as commonly there is no shore that wants them, though they rise not above the ground. Want of this knowledge was enough to hinder *Martius* from taking up his lodging any nearer to the enemy, than the town of *Heraclea*, on the river *Peneus* ; where he had watering at pleasure, but could perform no service of any worth. Yet when the *Roman* camp had such means to lye close to the *Macedonian*, as it presently did ; the passage onward being defended as hath been already shewed, seemed no less difficult than before. Wherefore it was necessary to search another way ; which by enquiry was found out. There was a narrow passage over *Olympus*, leading into *Perrhebia* : hard of ascent, but slenderly guarded, and therefore promising a

fair journey. *Martius* either had not been informed hereof ; or durst not attempt it : or perhaps could not get his soldiers to make the adventure ; they fearing lest it would prove such a piece of work, as had been their march over *Ossa* into *Tempe*. But *Paulus* was a man of greater industry, courage, and ability, to command. He had reformed, even at his first coming, many disorders in the *Roman* camp ; teaching the soldiers, among other good lessons, to be obedient and ready in execution ; without troubling themselves, as had been their manner, to examine the doings and purposes of their general. And now he appointed about five thousand men to this enterprise : whereof he committed the charge unto *Scipio Æmylianus* and *Q. Fabius Maximus*, his own sons by nature, but adopted ; the one of them, by a son of *Scipio* the *African* ; the other by one of the *Fabii*. *Scipio* took with him some light-armed *Thracians* and *Cretans* ; but his main strength was of legionaries. For the king's guard, upon the mountain, consisted in a manner wholly of archers and slingers : who, though at some distance they might do notable service against those that should climb up unto them ; yet when the darkness took away their aim, they were like to make a bad night's work, being to deal with those that were armed to fight at hand. To conceal the business about which they went, *Scipio* and *Fabius* took a wrong way towards the fleet ; where victuals were provided for their journey : it being noised, that they were to run along the coast of *Macedon* by sea, and waste the country. All the while that they were passing the mountains (which was about three days) the consul made shew of a meaning to set upon *Perseus* where he lay ; rather to divert the king's attention from that which was his main enterprise, than upon any hope to do good, in seeking to get over *Enipeus*. The chanel of *Enipeus*, which received in winter time a great fall of waters from the mountains, was exceeding deep and broad ; and the ground of it was such, as though at the present it lay well-near all dry, yet it served not for those that were weightily armed to fight upon. Wherefore *Æmylius* employed none save his *Velites* ; of whom the king's light armature had advantage at far distance, though the *Romans* were better appointed for the close. The engines from off the towers which *Perseus* had raised on his own bank, did also beat upon the *Romans*, and gave them to understand, that their labour was in vain. Yet *Æmylius* persisted as he had begun ; and continued his assault, such as it could be, the second day. This might have served to teach the *Macedonians*, that some greater work was in hand : since otherwise a good captain, as *Æmylius* was known to be, would not have troubled himself with making such bravado's, that were somewhat costly. But *Perseus* only looked unto that which was before his eyes : until his men that came running fearfully down the mountain, brought word into the camp, That the *Romans* were following at their backs. Then was all full of tumult, and the king himself no less (if not more) amaz'd than any of the rest. Order was forthwith given to dislodge ; or rather, without order, in all tumultuous haste, the camp was broken up, and a speedy retreat made to *Pydna*. Whether it were so, that they which had custody of the passage were taken sleeping, or whether they were beaten by plain force, *Scipio* and *Fabius* had very good success in their journey. It may well be, that they slept until the *Romans* came somewhat near to them ; and then taking alarm, when their arrows and slings

things could do little service, were beaten at hand-strokes: so as the different relations that are cited by *Plutarch* out of *Polybius*, and an epistle of *Scipio*, may each of them have been true: Thus was an open way cleared into *Macedon*: which had been effected by *Martius* in the year foregoing; but was closed up again, through his not prosecuting so rich an opportunity.

Perseus was in extremum doubt what course to take, after this unhappy beginning. Some gave advice, to man his towns, and so to linger out the war: having been taught by the last year's example, how resolute the people were in making defence. But far worse counsel prevailed; as generally it doth in turbulent and fearful deliberations. The king resolved to put all at once to hazard of battel: fearing belike, to put himself into any one town, lest that should be first of all besieged; and he therein (as cowardly natures always are jealous) not over-carefully relieved. This was even the same that *Æmylius*, or any invader, should have desired. So a place was chosen near unto *Pydna*, that served well for the *Phalanx*, and had likewise on the sides of it some pieces of higher ground, fit for the archers and light armature. There he abode the coming of the enemy; who stayed not long behind him. As soon as the *Romans* had sight of the king's army; which, with greater fear than discretion, had hastened away from them, forsaking the camp that was so notably well fortified: they desired nothing more, than to give battel immediately; doubting lest otherwise the king should change his mind, and get further off. And to this effect *Scipio* brake with the consul; praying him not to lose occasion by delay. But *Æmylius* told him, that he spake like a young man; and therefore willed him to have patience. The *Romans* were tired with their journey; had no camp wherein to rest themselves; nor any thing there, save only the bare ground whereon they trod. For these and the like respects, the consul made a stand, and, shewing himself unto the *Macedonian*, who did the like, in order of battel, gave charge to have the camp measured out and entrenched behind the army; whereunto at good leisure, he fell back without any manner of trouble. After a night's rest, it was hoped both by the *Romans* and the *Macedonians*, that the matter should be determined; each part thinking their own general to blame, for that they had not fought the same day. As for the king, he excused himself by the backwardness of the enemy; who advanced no further, but kept upon ground serving ill for the *Phalanx*: as on the other side, the consul had the reasons before shewed, which he communicated to those about him the next day.

That evening (which followed the third of September, by the *Roman* account) *C. Sulpicius Galus*, a colonel, or tribune of a legion, who had the former year been pretor, foretold unto the consul, and (with his good liking) unto the army, an eclipse of the moon, which was to be the same night: willing the soldiers not to be troubled therewith, for that it was natural, and might be known long before it was seen. It was the manner of the *Romans*, in such eclipses, to beat pans of brass and basons, as we do in following a swarm of bees; thinking that thereby they did the moon great ease, and helped her in her labour. But this prognostication of *Sulpicius* converted their superstition into admiration of his deep skill, when they saw it verified. Contrariwise, the *Macedonians* howled and made a great noise as long as the eclipse lasted: rather perhaps because it was their fashion, than

for that they were terrified therewith as with a prodigy, betokening their loss; since their desire to fight was no wit lessened by it. I will not here stand to dispute, whether such eclipses do signify, or cause, any alteration in civil affairs, and matters that have small dependance on natural complexion; for the argument is too large. More worthy of observation it is, how superstition captivates the understanding of the wisest, where the help of true religion is wanting. *Æmylius*, though he were sufficiently instructed concerning this defect of the moon, that it was no supernatural thing, nor above the reach of human understanding, so as he should need to trouble himself with any devout regard thereof: yet could he not refrain from doing his duty to this moon, and congratulating with sacrifice her delivery, as soon as she shone out bright again: for which, he is commended even by *Plutarch* a sage philosopher, as a godly and religious man. If *Sulpicius* perhaps did not assist him in this foolish devotion; yet is it like, that he being a senator, and one of the council for war, was partaker the next morning in a sacrifice done to *Hercules*; which was no less foolish. For a great part of the day was vainly consumed, ere *Hercules* could be pleased with any sacrifice, and vouchsafe to shew tokens of good luck in the entrails of the beasts. At length in the belly of the one and twentieth sacrifice, was found a promise of victory to *Æmylius*; but with condition, that he should not give the onset. *Hercules* was a *Greek*, and partial, as nearer in alliance to the *Macedonian* than to the *Roman*. Wherefore it had been better to call upon the new goddesses, lately canonized at *Alabanda*; or upon *Romulus*, founder of their city; on whom the *Romans* had bestowed his deity; or (if a god of elder date were more authentic) upon *Mars* the father of *Romulus*, to whom belonged the guidance of military affairs; and who therefore would have limited his favour with no injunctions contrary to the rules of war.

Now concerning the battel; *Æmylius* was thoroughly perswaded, that the king meant to abide it: for that otherwise he would not have stayed at *Pydna*, when, as a little before, his leisure served to retire whither he listed, the *Romans* being further off. In regard of this, and perhaps of the tokens appearing in the sacrifices, the consul thought that he might wait upon advantage, without making any great haste. Neither was it to be neglected, that the morning sun was full in the *Roman's* faces: which would be much to their hinderance all the forenoon. Since therefore *Perseus* kept his ground, that was commodious for the *Phalanx*, and *Æmylius* sent forth part of his men to bring in wood and fodder; there was no likelihood of fighting that day. But about ten of the clock in the morning, a small occasion brought to pass that, whereto neither of the generals had over-earnest desire. A horse brake loose at watering; which two or three of the *Roman* soldiers followed into the river, wading after him up to the knees. The king's men lay on the further bank; whence a couple of *Thracians* ran into the water, to draw this horse over to their own side. These fell to blows, as in a private quarrel; and one of the *Thracians* was slain. His countrymen seeing this, hastened to revenge their fellow's death, and followed those that had slain him, over the river. Hereupon company came in, to help on each part, until the number grew such, as made it past a fray, and caused both the armies to be careful of the event. In fine, each of the generals placed his men in order of battel, accordingly as the man-

ner of his country, and the arms, wherewith they served, did require. The ground was a flat level, save that on the sides a few hillocks were raised here and there; whereof each part might take what advantage it could. The *Macedonians* were the greater number, the *Romans* the better soldiers, and better appointed. Both the king and the consul encouraged their men with lively words; which the present condition could bountifully afford. But the king having finished his oration, and sent on his men, withdrew himself into *Pydna*; there to do sacrifice, as he pretended, unto *Hercules*. It is the less marvel, that he durst adventure battel, since he had bethought himself of such a stratagem, whereby to save his own person. As for *Hercules*, he liked not the sacrifice of a coward: whose unreasonable devotion could be no better than hypocrisy. For he that will pray for a good harvest, ought also to plow, sow, and weed his ground. When therefore the king returned to the battel, he found it no better than lost: and he, in looking to his own safety, caused it to be lost altogether, by beginning the flight.

The acts of this day, such as we find recorded, are, that the *Roman* elephants could do no manner of good; that the *Macedonian Phalanx* did so stoutly press onwards, and beat off all which came before it; as *Æmylius* was thereat much astonished; that the *Peligni* rushing desperately on the *Phalanx*, were over-borne, many of them slain, and the squadrons following them so discouraged herewith, as they retired apace towards an hill. These were the things that fell out adverse to the *Romans*; and which the consul beholding, is said to have rent his coat-armour for grief. If the king, with all his power of horse, had in like manner done his devoir, the victory might have been his own. That which turned the fortune of the battel, was the same, which doubtless the consul expected even from the beginning: the difficulty, or almost the impossibility, of holding the *Phalanx* long in order. For, whilst some of the *Romans* small battalions pressed hard upon one part of it, and others recoiled from it; it was necessary (if the *Macedonians* would follow upon those which were put to the worse) that some files having open way before them, should advance themselves beyond the rest that were held at a stand. This coming so to pass, admonished the consul what was to be done. The long pikes of the *Macedonians* were of little use, when they were charged in flank by the *Roman* targettiers; according to the direction given by *Æmylius*, when he saw the front of the enemies great battel become unequal, and the ranks in some places open, by reason of the unequal resistance which they found. Thus was the use of the *Phalanx* proved unavailable against many small squadrons, as it had been formerly in the battel of *Cynoscephale*: yea, this form of embatteling was found unserviceable against the other, by reason, that being not every-where alike distressed, it would break of itself; though here were little such inconvenience of ground, as had been at *Cynoscephale*.

Persius, when he saw his battel begin to rout, turned his bridle presently, and ran amain towards *Pella*. All his horse escaped in a manner untouched, and a great number followed him; the little harm which they had taken, witnessing the little good service which they had done. As for the poor foot, they were left to the mercy of the enemy; who slew above twenty thousand of them; though having little cause to be furious, as having lost in

that battel, only some fourscore, or sixscore men at the most. Some of the foot escaping from the execution, overtook the king and his company in a wood; where they fell to railing at the horsemen, calling them cowards, traitors, and such other names, till at length they fell to blows. The king was in doubt lest they had ill meaning to himself: and therefore turned out of the common way, being followed by such as thought it good. The rest of the company dispersed themselves: every one as his own occasions guided him. Of those that kept along with their king, the number began within a while to lessen. For he fell to devising upon whom he might lay the blame of that day's misfortune, which was most due to himself: thereby causing those that knew his nature, to shrink away from him how they could. At his coming to *Pella*; he found his pages and household servants ready to attend him, as they had been wont. But of his great men that had escaped from the battel, there was none appearing in the court. In this melancholy time, there was two of his treasurers, that had the boldness to come to him, and tell him roundly of his faults. But in reward of their unreasonable admonitions, he stabbed them both to death. After this, none whom he sent for would come at him. This boded no good. Wherefore standing in fear, lest they that refused to come at his call, would shortly dare some greater mischief; he stole out of *Pella* by night. Of his friends he had with him only *Evander* (who had been employed to kill *Eumenes* at *Delphi*) and two other. There followed him likewise about five hundred *Cretans*; more for love of his money than of him. To these he gave of his plate, as much as was worth about fifty talents, though shortly he cozened them of some part thereof; making shew as if he would have redeemed it; but never paying the money. The third day after the battel he came to *Amphipolis*; where he exhorted the townsmen to fidelity, with tears; and his own speech being hindered by tears, appointed *Evander* to speak what himself would have uttered. But the *Amphipolitans* made it their chief care to look well to themselves. Upon the first fame of the overthrow, they had emptied their town of two thousand *Thracians* that lay there in garrison: sending them forth under colour of a gainful employment, and shutting the gates after them. And now to be rid of the king; they plainly bid *Evander* be gone. The king hearing this, had no mind to tarry: but embarking himself and the treasure which he had there, in certain vessels that he found in the river *Strymon*; passed over to the isle of *Samothrace*: where he hoped to live safe, by privilege of the religious sanctuary therein.

These miserable shifts of the king made it the less doubtful how all the kingdom fell into the power of *Æmylius*, within so few days after his victory. *Pydna*, which was nearest at hand; was the last that yielded. About six thousand of the soldiers that were of sundry nations, fled out of the battel into that town, and prepared for defence: the confused rabble of so many strangers hindering all deliberation and consent. *Hippius*, who had kept the passage over *Ossa* against *Martius*, with *Pantauchus*, who had been sent ambassador to *Gentius* the *Illyrian*, were the first that came in: yielding themselves and the town of *Berea*, whither they had retired out of the battel. With the like message came others from *Thessalonica*, from *Pella*, and from all the towns of *Macedon*, within

two days: the loss of the head bereaving the whole body of all sense and strength. Neither did they of *Pydna* stand out any longer, when they knew that the king had forsaken his country; but opened their gates upon such terms, that the sack of it was granted to the *Roman* army. *Æmylius* sent abroad into the country such as he thought meetest, to take charge of other cities; he himself marching towards *Pella*. He found in *Pella* no more than three hundred talents; the same whereof *Perseus* had lately defrauded the *Illyrian*. But within a very little while he shall have more. It was soon understood, that *Perseus* had taken sanctuary in the temple at *Samothrace*: his own letters to the consul, confirming the report. He sent these letters by a person of such mean condition, that his case was pitied, for that he wanted the service of better men. The scope of his writing was, to desire favour; which though he begged in terms ill becoming a king; yet since the inscription of his epistle was, *king Perseus to the consul Paulus*; the consul, who had taken from him his kingdom, and would not allow him to retain the title, refused to make any answer thereunto. So there came other letters, as humble as could be expected; whereby he craved and obtained, that some might be sent to confer with him about matters of his present estate. Nevertheless, in this conference he was marvellous earnest, that he might be allowed still to retain the name of king. And to this end it was perhaps, that he had so carefully preserved his treasure unto the very last: flattering himself with such vain hopes as these; that the *Romans* would neither violate a sanctuary, nor yet neglect those great riches in his possession; but compound with him for money, letting him have his desire to live at ease, and to be called king. Yea, it seems that he had indeed, even from the beginning, a desire to live in this isle of *Samothrace*: both for that in one of his consultations about the war, he was dehorted by his friends, from seeking to exchange his kingdom of *Macedon*, for ^a such a paltry island; and for that he offered to lay up the money which *Eumenes* demanded in the holy temple that was there. But he finds it otherwise. They urge him to give place unto necessity, and without much ado, to yield to the discretion and mercy of the people of *Rome*. This is so far against his mind, that the conference breaks off without effect. Presently there arrives at *Samothrace* *Cn. Octavius* the *Roman* admiral with his fleet; who assays, as well by terrible threats, as by fair language, to draw the king out of his lurking hole; wherein, for fear of imprisonment, he had now already imprisoned himself. When all would not serve, a question was moved to the *Samothracians*; how they durst pollute their temple, by receiving into it one that had violated the like privilege of sanctuary, by attempting the murder of king *Eumenes* at *Delphi*? This went to the quick. The *Samothracians*, being now in the power of the *Romans*, take this matter to heart; and send word to the king that *Evander*, who lives with him in the temple, is accused of an impious fact committed at *Delphi*, whereof unless he can clear himself in judgment, he must not be suffered to prophane that holy place, by his abiding in it. The reverence borne to his majesty now past, makes them forbear to say, that *Perseus* himself is charged with the same crime. But what will this avail, when the minister of the fact being brought into judgment, shall (as is to be feared) impeach the au-

thor? *Perseus* therefore willed *Evander* to have consideration of the little favour that can be expected at the *Romans* hand, who are like to be presidents and overseers of this judgment: so as it were better to die valiantly, since none other hope remains, than hope to make good an ill cause; where, though he had a good plea, yet it could not help him. Of this motion *Evander* seems to like well, and either kills himself, or hoping to escape thence, by deferring the time as it were to get poison wherewith to end his life, is killed by the king's commandment. The death of this man, who had stuck to *Perseus* in all times of need, makes all the king's friends that remained hitherto to forsake him; so as none are left with him, save his wife and children; with his pages. It is much to be suspected, that they which leave him upon this occasion, will tell perilous tales, and say, that the king hath lost the privilege of this holy sanctuary, by murdering *Evander* therein. Or, if the *Romans* will affirm so much, who shall dare to gainsay them? Since therefore there is nothing but a point of formality, and even that also liable to dispute, which preserves him from captivity, he purposeth to make an escape, and fly, with his treasures, unto *Cotys*, his good friend, into *Thrace*. *Oroandes*, a *Cretan*, lay at *Samothrace* with one ship; who easily was persuaded to waft the king thence. With all secrecy the king's money, as much as could be conveyed, was carried aboard by night; and the king himself, with his wife and children (if rather it were not true, that he had with him only ^b *Philip*, his elder son, who was only by adoption his son, being his brother by nature) with much ado got out of a window by a rope, and over a mud-wall. At his coming to the sea-side, he found no *Oroandes* there; the *Cretans* had played a *Cretan* trick, and he was gone with the money to his own home. So it began to wax clear day, whilst *Perseus* was searching all along the shoar, who had stayed so long about this, that he might fear to be intercepted ere he could recover the temple. He ran therefore amain towards his lodging, and, thinking it not safe to enter it the common way, lest he should be taken, he hid himself in an obscure corner. His pages missing him, ran up and down making enquiry, till *Octavius* made proclamation, that all the king's pages, and *Macedonians* whatsoever, abiding with their master in *Samothrace*, should have their lives and liberty, with all to them belonging, which they had either in that isle, or at home in *Macedon*, conditionally, that they should presently yield themselves to the *Romans*. Hereupon they all came in. Likewise *Ion*, a *Thessalonian*, to whom the king had given the custody of his children, delivered them up to *Octavius*. Lastly, *Perseus* himself, with his son *Philip*, accusing the gods of *Samothrace*, that had no better protected him, rendered himself, and made the *Roman* victory compleat. If he had not trusted in those gods of *Samothrace*, but employed his whole care in the defence of *Macedon*, without other hopes of living, than of reigning therein, he might well have brought this war to an happier end. Now, by dividing his cogitations, and pursuing at once those contrary hopes of saving his kingdom by arms, and himself by flight, he is become a spectacle of misery, and one among the number of those princes, that have been wretched by their own default. He was presently sent away to *Æmylius*, before whom he fell to the ground so basely, that he seemed thereby to dishonour the victory over himself, as

^a Liv. lib. 42. ^b Plut. in vit. *Æmyl.* Liv. lib. 45. Liv. lib. 42.

gotten upon one of abject quality, and therefore the less to be esteemed. *Æmilius* used to him the language of a gentle victor, blaming him, though mildly, for having with so hostile a mind made war upon the *Romans*. Hereto good answer might have been returned by one of better spirit. As for *Perseus*, he answered all with a fearful silence. He was comforted with hope of life, or (as the consul termed it) almost assurance; for that such was the mercy of the people of *Rome*. After these good words, being invited to the consul's table, and respectfully intreated, he was committed prisoner to *Q. Ælius*.

Such end had this *Macedonian* war, after four years continuance; and such end therewithal had the kingdom of *Macedon*, the glory whereof, that had some time filled all parts of the world then known, was now translated unto *Rome*.

S E C T. IX.

Gentius, king of the Illyrians, taken by the Romans.

ABOUT the same time, and with like celerity, *Anicius*, the *Roman* pretor, who succeeded unto *App. Claudius*, had the like success against king *Gentius*, the *Illyrian*. *Gentius* had an army of fifteen thousand, with which he was at *Lissus*, ready to assist king *Perseus* as soon as the money should come, whereof he had received only ten talents. But *Anicius* arrested him on the way; fought with him; overcame him; and drove him into *Scodra*. This town was very defensible by nature, besides the help of fortification, and strongly manned with all the force of *Illyria*; which, assisted with the king's presence, made it seem impossible to be won in any, not a very long time. Yet *Anicius* was confident in his late victory, and therefore presented his army before the walls, making countenance to give an assault. The *Illyrians*, that might easily have defended themselves within the town, would needs issue forth and fight. They were it seems rather passionate than courageous, for they were beaten; and thereupon forthwith began amazedly to treat about yielding. The king sent ambassadors, by whom, at first, he desired truce for three days, that he might deliberate concerning his estate. It ill became him, who had laid violent hands on the *Roman* ambassadors, to have recourse to such mediation. But he thought his own fault pardonable, inasmuch as hitherto there was no greater harm done by him, than the casting of those ambassadors into prison, where they were still alive. Having obtained three days respite, he passed up a river, within half a mile of the *Roman* camp, into the lake of *Scodra*, as it were to consult the more privately; though indeed, to hearken whether the report were true, that his brother *Caravantius* was coming to his rescue. Finding that no such help was toward, it is a wonder that he was so foolish as to return into *Scodra*. He sent messengers craving access unto the pretor, before whom having lamented his folly past (which, excepting the dishonesty, was not so great as his folly present) he fell down humbly, and yielded himself to discretion. All the towns of his kingdom, together with his wife, children, brother, and friends, were presently given up. So this war ended in thirty days, the people of *Rome* not knowing that it was begun, until *Perpenna*, one

of the ambassadors that had been imprisoned, brought word from *Anicius* how all had passed.

S E C T. X.

How the Romans behaved themselves in Greece and Macedon, after their victory over Perseus.

NOW began the *Romans* to swell with the pride of their fortune, and to look tyrannically upon those that had been unmannerly towards them before, whilst the war with *Perseus* seemed full of danger. The *Rhodian* ambassadors were still at *Rome*, when the tidings of these victories were brought thither. Wherefore it was thought good to call them into the senate, and bid them do their errand again. This they performed with a bad grace; saying, that they were sent from *Rhodes* to make an overture of peace; forasmuch as it was thought, that this war was no less grievous to the *Romans* themselves, than to the *Macedonians* and many others; but that now they were very glad, and in behalf of the *Rhodians* did congratulate with the senate and people of *Rome*, that it was ended much more happily than had been expected. Hereto the senate made answer, that the *Rhodians* had sent this embassy to *Rome*, not for love of *Rome*, but in favour of the *Macedonian*, whose partisans they were, and should be so taken. By these threats, and the desire of some (covetous of the charge) to have war proclaimed against *Rhodes*, the ambassadors were so affrighted, that in mourning apparel, as humble suppliants, they went about the city; beseeching all men, especially the great ones, to pardon their indiscretion, and not to prosecute them with vengeance for some foolish words. This danger of war from *Rome* being known at *Rhodes*, all that had been any whit averse from the *Romans* in the late war of *Macedon*, were either taken and condemned, or sent prisoners to *Rome*; excepting some that slew themselves for fear, whose goods also were confiscated. Yet this procured little grace, and less would have done, if old *M. Cato*, a man by nature vehement, had not uttered a mild sentence, and advertised the senate, that in decreeing war against *Rhodes*, they should much dishonour themselves, and make it thought, that rather the wealth of that city, which they were thought greedy to ransack, than any just cause, had moved them thereto. This consideration, together with their good deserts in the wars of *Philip* and *Antiochus*, helped well the *Rhodians*; among whom, none of any mark remained alive, save those that had been of the *Roman* faction. All which notwithstanding, many years passed, ere by importunate suit, they could be admitted into the society of the *Romans*; a favour which, till now, they had not esteemed; but thought themselves better without it, as equal friends.

With the like, or greater severity, did the *Romans* make themselves terrible in all parts of *Greece*. *Æmilius* himself made progress through the country, visiting all the famous places therein, as for his pleasure; yet not forgetting to make them understand what power he had over them. More than five hundred of the chief citizens in *Demetrias* was slain at one time by those of the *Roman* faction, and with help of the *Roman* soldiers. Others fled, or were banished, and their goods confiscated. Of which things, when complaint was made to the consul, the redress was such,

* Called now Scutari.

b Cæsar. in orat. apud Salust. de Conjurat. Catilinæ.

as required not the pains of making supplication. His friends, that is to say, those which betrayed unto the *Romans* the liberty of their country, he feasted like a king, with excessive cheer; yet so, that he had all things very cheap in his camp: an easy matter, since no man durst be backward in sending provisions, nor set on them the due price. Ambassadors likewise were sent to *Rome*; some to give order for settling the estate of *Macedon*, towards which they had more particular instruction from the senate than was usual in such cases; and some to visit the affairs of *Greece*. The kingdom of *Macedon* was set at liberty by *Æmylius*, and the ambassadors, his assistants, who had order therefore from the senate. But this liberty was such as the *Romans* used to bestow. The best part of it was, that the tribute which had been pay'd unto the kings, was lessened by half. As for the rest, the country was divided into four parts, and they forbidden commerce one with the other. All the nobility were sent captive into *Italy*, with their wives and children, as many as were above fifteen years old. The ancient laws of the country were abrogated, and new given by *Æmylius*. Such mischief the senate thought it better to do, at the first alteration of things in this province, and in the time of conquest, than otherwise to leave any inconvenience that should be worse in the future. But concerning the *Greeks*, that were not subject to *Rome*, the things done to them, could deserve no better name than mere tyranny, yea, and shameless perjury; were it not so, that the familiar custom among princes and great estates of violating leagues, doth make the oaths of confederation seem of no validity. The ambassadors, that were sent to visit the *Greeks*, called before them all such men of note, from every quarter, as had any way discovered an unserviceable disposition towards the *Romans*. These they sent to *Rome*, where they were made sure enough. Some of these had sent letters to *Perseus*, which fell at length into the *Romans* hands; and in that respect, though they were no subjects, yet wanted there no colour for using them as traitors, or at least as enemies. But since only two men were beheaded, for having been openly on the *Macedonian* side; and since it is confessed, that the good patriots were no less afflicted in this inquisition, than they that had sold themselves to the king: this manner of proceeding, was inexcusable tyranny. With the *Acheans* these ambassadors were to deal more formally; not so much because that commonwealth was strong (though this were to be regarded by them, having no commission to make or denounce war) and like to prove untractable, if manifest wrong were offered; as for that there appeared no manner of sign by letters, or otherwise, whereby any one of the *Acheans* could be suspiciously charged to have held correspondence with the *Macedonian*. It was also so, that neither *Callicrates*, nor any of his adherents, had been employed by the nation in doing or offering their service to the *Romans*, but only such as were the best patriots. Yet would not therefore the ambassadors neglect to use the benefit of the time; wherein, since all men trembled for fear of *Rome*, the season served fitly to rank the *Acheans* with the rest. And hereto *Callicrates* was very urgent, fearing, and procuring them to fear in behalf of him and his friends, that if some sharp order were not now taken, he and his fellows should be made to pay for their mischievous devices, ere long time passed. So the ambassadors came among the

Acheans, where one of them, in open assembly of the nation, spake as *Callicrates* had before instructed him. He said, that some of the chief among them had, with money and other means, befriended *Perseus*. This being so, he desired that all such men might be condemned, whom, after sentence given, he would name unto them. After sentence given (cried out the whole assembly) what justice were this? Name them first, and let them answer; which if they cannot well do, we will soon condemn them. Then said the *Roman* boldly, that all their pretors, as many as had led their armies, were guilty of this crime. If this were true, said *Xenon*, a temperate man, and confident in his innocence, then should I likewise have been friend to *Perseus*; whereof, if any man can accuse me, I shall thoroughly answer him, either here presently, or before the senate at *Rome*. Upon these words of *Xenon*, the ambassador laid hold, and said, that even so it were the best way for him and the rest to purge themselves before the senate at *Rome*. Then began he to name others, and left not until he had cited above a thousand; willing them to appear and answer before the senate. This might even be termed the captivity of *Greece*, wherein so many of the honestest and worthiest men were carried from home, for none other cause than their love to their country, to be punished according to the will of those, who could not endure, that virtue, and regard of the publick liberty, should dwell together in any of the *Greeks*. At their coming to *Rome*, they were all cast into prison, as men already condemned by the *Acheans*. Many embassies were sent from *Achaia* (where it is to be wondered, that any such honest care of these innocent men could be remaining; since honesty had been thus punished as a vice in so many of the worthiest among them) to inform the senate, that these men were neither condemned by the *Acheans*, nor yet held to be offenders. But instead of better answer, it was pronounced, that the senate thought it not expedient for the country, that these men return into *Achaia*. Neither could any solicitation of the *Acheans*, who never ceased to importune the senate for their liberty, prevail at all; until after seventeen years, fewer than thirty of them were enlarged, of whom that wise and virtuous man *Polybius*, the great historian, was one. All the rest were either dead in prison, or, having made offer to escape, whether upon the way before they came to *Rome*, or whether out of jail after that they were committed thereto, suffered death as malefactors.

This was a gentle correction, in regard of what was done upon the *Epirots*. For the senate being desirous to preserve the *Macedonian* treasure whole, yet, withal to gratify the soldiers, gave order that the whole country of *Epirus* should be put to sack. This was a barbarous and horrible cruelty; as also it was performed by *Æmylius*, with mischievous subtilty. Having taken leave of the *Greeks*, and of the *Macedonians*, with bidding them well to use the liberty bestowed upon them by the people of *Rome*, he sent unto the *Epirots* for ten of the principal men out of every city. These he commanded to deliver up all the gold and silver which they had; and sent along with them into every of their towns what companies of men he thought convenient, as it were to fetch the money. But he gave secret instruction to the captains, that upon a certain day by him appointed they should fall to sack, every one the town whereinto he was sent. Thus in one day

were threescore and ten cities, all confederate with the *Romans*, spoiled by the *Roman* soldiers: and, besides other acts of hostility in a time of peace, a hundred and fifty thousand of that nation made slaves. It may be granted, that some of the *Epiphiots* deserved punishment, as having favoured *Perseus*. But since they among this people, that were thought guilty of this offence, yea, or but coldly affected to the *Romans*, had been already sent into *Italy*, there to receive their due; and since this nation in general was not only at the present in good obedience, but had, even in this war, done good service to the *Romans*: I hold this act so wicked, that I should not believe it, had any one writer delivered the contrary. But the truth being manifest by consent of all; it is the less marvellous, that God was pleased to make *Æmylius* childless, even in the glory of his triumph, how great soever otherwise his virtues were.

In such manner dealt the *Romans*, after their victory, with the *Greeks* and *Macedonians*. How terrible they were to other kingdoms abroad, it will appear by the efficacy of an ambassage sent from them to *Antiochus*: whereof before we speak, we must speak somewhat of *Antiochus's* fore-goers, of himself, and of his affairs, about which these ambassadors came.

SECT. XI.

The war of Antiochus upon Egypt, brought to end by the Roman ambassadors.

A*ntiochus* the great, after his peace with the *Romans*, did nothing that was memorable in the short time following of his reign and life. He died the six and thirtieth year after he had worn a crown, and in the seventeenth or eighteenth of *Ptolemy Epiphanes*: while he attempted to rob the temple of *Bel*, or (according to ^a *Justin*) of *Jupiter*. He left behind him three sons, *Seleucus Philopator*, *Antiochus Epiphanes*, *Demetrius Soter*; and one daughter, *Cleopatra*, whom he had given in marriage to *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, king of *Egypt*. *Seleucus*, the fourth of that name, and the eldest of *Antiochus's* sons, reigned in *Syria* twelve years, according to ^b *Eusebius*, *Appian*, and *Sulpitius*; though *Josephus* give him but seven. A prince, who as he was slothful by nature, so the great loss which his father *Antiochus* had received, took from him the means of managing any great affair. Of him, about three hundred years before his birth, ^c *Daniel* gave this judgment, *Et stabit in loco ejus vilissimus Et indignus decore regio; And in his place* (speaking of *Antiochus* the father of this man) *shall start up a vile person, unworthy the honour of a king*. Under this *Seleucus*, those things were done which are spoken of *Onias* the high priest, in these words, and other to the same effect. ^d *What time as the holy city was inhabited with all peace, because of the godliness of Onias the priest, it came to pass, that even the king did honour the place, and garnished the temple with great gifts*. And all that is written in the third chapter of the second of *Maccabees*, of *Simon of Benjamin*, who by *Apollonius* betrayed the treasures of the temple; and of *Heliodorus* sent by the king to seize them; of his miraculous striking by God; and his recovery at the prayers of *Onias*; of the king's death, and of his successor *Antiochus Epiphanes*. It is therefore from the reign of this king, that the books of the *Maccabees* take beginning: which books seem not

to be delivered by one and the same hand. For the first book, although it touch upon *Alexander* the great, yet it hath nothing else of his story, nor of the acts of his successors, till the time of *Antiochus Epiphanes*, the brother and successor of this *Seleucus*; from whom downward to the death of *Simon Maccabeus* (who died in the hundred threescore and seventeenth year of the *Greeks* in *Syria*) that first book treateth. The author of the second book, although he take the story somewhat further off, by way of a proem, yet he endeth with the hundred and one and fiftieth year of the *Grecian* reign, and with the death of *Nicanor*, slain by *Judas*: remembring in the fourth chapter the practice of *Jafon*, the brother of *Onias*, who, after the death of *Seleucus*, prevailed with *Antiochus Epiphanes*, his successor, for the priesthood: ^e It is also held by *Jansenius* and other grave writers, that it was in the time of this *Onias*, that *Arius* king of the *Spartans* sent ambassadors to the *Jews*, as to their brothers and kinsmen. Which intelligence between them and the *Greeks*, *Jonathan* the brother and successor of *Judas*, remembreth in the preamble of that epistle, which he himself directed to the people of *Sparta* by *Numenius* and *Antipater* his ambassadors, whom he employed at the same time to the senate of *Rome*; repeating also the former letters word by word, which *Arius* had sent to *Onias* the high-priest, whereto *Josephus* adds, that the name of the *Lacedemonian* ambassador was *Demoteles*, and that the letters had a square volume, and were sealed with an eagle holding a dragon in her claws.

Now to this *Seleucus*, the fourth of that name, succeeded *Antiochus Epiphanes*, in the hundred and seven and thirtieth year of the *Greeks* in *Syria*. He was the second son of the great *Antiochus*: and he obtained his kingdom by procuring the death of the king his brother; which also he usurped from his brother's son.

Ptolemy Philometor, his nephew by his sister *Cleopatra*, being then very young, had been about seven years king of *Egypt*.

Ptolemy Epiphanes, the father of this king *Philometor*, had reigned in *Egypt* four and twenty years, in great quiet, but doing little or nothing that was memorable. *Philip* of *Macedon*, and the great *Antiochus*, had agreed to divide his kingdom between them, whilst he was a child. But they found such other business, ere long, with the *Romans*, as made them give over their unjust purpose; especially *Antiochus*, who gave with his daughter in marriage, unto this *Ptolemy*, the provinces of *Cælesyria*, *Phenice*, and *Judea*, which he had won by his victory over *Scopas*, that was general of the *Egyptian* forces in those parts. Nevertheless, *Ptolemy* adhered to the *Romans*; whereby he lived in the greater security. He left behind him two sons; this *Ptolemy Philometor*, and *Ptolemy Physcon*, with a daughter *Cleopatra*. *Cleopatra* was wife to the elder of her brethren, and after his death to the younger, by whom she was cast off, and her daughter taken in her stead. Such were the marriages of these *Egyptian* kings.

Ptolemy Philometor, so call'd (that is, the lover of his mother) by a bitter nick-name, because he slew her, fell into hatred with his subjects, and was like to be chased out of his kingdom; his younger brother being set up against him. *Physcon* having a strong party, got possession of *Alexandria*; and *Philometor* held himself in *Memphis*, craving succour of king *Antiochus's* uncle. Hereof *Antiochus*

^a Strab. lib. 16. Jull. lib. 35. ^b Euseb. in Chron. App. de bell. Syr. Ant. 12. c. 5. ^c Dan. 11. 21. ^d 2 Mac. c. 7.

^e 2 Mac. 1. 12. Super Ecclef. c. 5.

was glad; who, under colour to take upon him the protection of the young prince, fought by all means possible to possess himself of that kingdom. He sent *Apollonius* the son of *Menestheus* ambassador into *Egypt*, and, under colour to assist the king's coronation, he gave him instructions to persuade the governours of the young king *Philometor*, to deliver the king his nephew, with the principal places of that kingdom into his hands; pretending an extraordinary care and desire of his nephew's safety and well doing. And, the better to answer all argument to the contrary, he prepared a forcible army to attend him. Thus came he along the coast of *Syria*, to *Joppe*, and from thence on the sudden he turned himself towards *Jerusalem*, whereby ^a *Jason* the priest (a chaplain fit for such a patron) he was with all pomp and solemnity received into the city. For though lately, in the time of *Seleucus*, the brother and predecessor of ^b *Epiphanes*, that impious traitor *Simon* of the tribe of *Benjamin*, ruler of the temple, when he would have delivered the treasures thereof to *Apollonius* the governour of *Cœlesyria* and *Phœnicia*, was disappointed of his wicked purpose by miracle from heaven; the said *Apollonius* being stricken by the angel of God, and recovering again at the prayer of *Onias*: yet sufficed not this example to terrify others from the like ungodly practices. Presently upon the death of *Seleucus*, this *Jason*, the brother of *Onias*, seeking to supplant his brother, and to obtain the priesthood for himself, offered unto the king three hundred and threescore talents of silver, with other rents and sums of money. ^c So he got his desire, though he not long enjoyed it.

This naughty dealing of *Jason*, and his being over-reached by another, in the same kind, calls to mind a by-word taken up among the *Acheans*, when as that mischievous *Callicrates*, who had been too hard for all worthy and virtuous men, was beaten at his own weapon, by one of his own condition. It went thus:

*One fire than others burn more forcibly;
One wolf than other wolves does bite more sore;
One hawk than other hawks more swift does fly.
So one most mischievous of men before,
Callicrates, false knave as knave might be,
Met with Menalcidas more false than he.*

And even thus fell it out with *Jason*; who within three years after, was betrayed, and overbidden by *Menelaus* the brother of *Simon*, that for three hundred talents more obtained the priesthood for himself: *Jason* thereupon being forced to fly from *Jerusalem*, and to hide himself among the *Ammonites*.

From *Jerusalem*, *Antiochus* marched into *Phœnicia*, to augment the numbers of his men of war, and to prepare a fleet for his expedition into *Egypt*: with which, and with a mighty army of land-forces, ^d *He went about to reign over Egypt, that he might have the dominion of two realms, and entered Egypt with a mighty company, with chariots and elephants, with horsemen, and with a great navy, and moved war against Ptolemæus king of Egypt, but Ptolemæus was afraid of him and fled, and many were wounded to death. He won many strong cities, and took away the spoils of the land of Egypt. Thus was fulfilled the prophecy of ^e Daniel. He shall enter into the quiet and plentiful pro-*

vinces, and he shall do that which his fathers have not done, nor his father's fathers. Never indeed had any of the kings of *Syria* so great a victory over the *Egyptians*, nor took from them so great riches. For he gave a notable overthrow to the captains of *Ptolemy*, between *Pelusium* and the hill *Cassius*; ^f after which, he entered and sack'd the greatest and richest of all the cities of *Egypt*, *Alexandria* excepted, which he could not force. In conclusion, after that *Antiochus* had smitten *Egypt*, ^g *He turned again and went up towards Israel and Jerusalem, with a mighty people, and entered proudly into the sanctuary, and took away the golden altar, and the candlestick for the light, and all the instruments thereof, and the table of the shew-bread, and the pouring vessels and the bowls, and the golden basons, and the vail, and the crowns, and the golden apparel. He took also the silver and the gold, and the precious jewels, and the secret treasures: and when he had taken away all, he departed into his own land, after he had murdered many men.*

^h It was about the beginning of the *Macedonian* war that *Antiochus* took in hand this *Egyptian* business. At what time he first laid claim to *Cœlesyria*; justifying his title by ⁱ the same allegations which his father had made; and stiffly averring, that this province had not been consigned over to the *Egyptian*, or given in dowry with *Cleopatra*. ^k Easy it was to approve his right unto that which he had already gotten, when he was in a fair way to get all *Egypt*. The *Acheans*, *Rhodians*, *Athenians*, and other of the *Greeks*, pressed him, by several embassages, to some good conclusion. But his answer was; that if the *Alexandrines* could be contented to receive their king his nephew *Philometor*, the elder brother of the *Ptolemies*, then should the war be presently at an end; otherwise not. Yet when he saw that it was an hard piece of work to take *Alexandria* by force; he thought it better to let the two brothers consume themselves with intestine war, than by the terror of his arms, threatening destruction unto both of them, to put into them any desire of coming to agreement. He therefore withdrew his forces for the present; leaving the *Ptolemies* in very weak estate; the younger, almost ruined by his invasion: the elder hated and forsaken by his people.

But how weak soever these *Egyptians* were, their hatred was thought to be so strong, that *Antiochus* might leave them to the prosecution thereof; and follow, at good leisure, his other business at *Jerusalem* or elsewhere. So after the sack of *Jerusalem*, he rested him a while at *Antioch*; and then made a journey into *Cilicia*, to suppress the rebellion of the *Thracians* and other in those parts, who had been given, as it were, by way of dowry, to a concubine of the king's called *Antiochis*. For governour of *Syria* in his absence, he left one *Andronicus*, a man of great authority about him. In the mean while *Menelaus* the brother of *Simon*, the same who had thrust *Jason* out of the priesthood, and promised the king three hundred talents for an income, committing the charge of the priesthood to his brother *Lysimachus*, stole certain vessels of gold out of the temple: whereof he presented a part to *Andronicus* the king's lieutenant, and sold the rest at *Tyre*, and other cities adjoining. This he did, as it seemeth, to advance the payment of the three hundred talents promised; the same being now by *Soltra-*

^a 2 Mac. 4. ^b 2 Mac. cap. 3. ^c 2 Mac. c. 4. ^d 1 Mac. c. 1. v. 17, 18, 19, 20, &c. ^e Dan. c. 11. v. 24.
^f Hieron. in Dan. ^g 1 Mac. c. 1. ^h Lib. 6. ⁱ Cap. 5. §. 2. ^k Polyb. Legat. 81, 82, &c.

tus eagerly demanded. Hereof when *Onias* the priest (formerly dispossessed by *Jason*) had certain knowledge, being moved with zeal, and detesting the sacrilege of *Menelaus*, he reproved him for it; and fearing his revenge, he withdrew himself into a sanctuary at *Daphne*.

Daphne was a place of delight adjoining as a suburb to *Antioch*. In compass it had about ten miles: wherein were the temples of *Apollo* and *Diana*, with a grove, sweet springs, banquetting places, and the like; which were wholly, in a manner, abused to lust, and other such voluptuousness. Whether it were well done of *Onias*, to commit himself to the protection of *Apollo* and *Diana*, or to claim privilege from the holiness of a ground consecrated to any of the heathen gods, I will not stand to discourse. Only I say for my own opinion; that the inconvenience is far less, to hold this book as *Apocryphal*; than to judge this fearful shift which *Onias* (though a virtuous man) made for his life, either commendable, or allowable, as the book seems to do. As for this refuge, it could not save the life of the poor old man: ^a For *Menelaus* taking *Andronicus* apart, prayed him to slay *Onias*. So when he came to *Onias*, he counselled him craftily, giving him his right hand with an oath, and perswading him to come out of the sanctuary: so he slew him incontinently, without any regard of righteousness. Hereof when complaint was made to *Antiochus*, after his return out of *Cilicia*, ^b He took away *Andronicus's* garment of purple, and rent his cloaths, and commanded him to be led throughout the city, and in the same place where he had committed the wickedness against *Onias*, he was slain as a murderer. In taking revenge of this innocent man's death, I should have thought that this wicked king had once in his life-time done justice. But presently after this, at the suit of one *Ptolemy*, a traitor to *Ptolemy Philometor*, he condemned innocent men to death; who justly complained against *Menelaus*, and his brother *Lyfmachus*, for a second robbing of the temple, and carrying thence the vessels of gold remaining. Hereby it is manifest, that he was guided by his own outrageous will, and not by any regard of justice: since he revenged the death of *Onias*, yet slew those that were in the same cause with *Onias*, ^c Who, had they told their cause, yea, before the *Scythians*, they should have been heard as innocent. By reason of such his unsteadiness, this king was commonly termed *Epimanes*, that is, mad, instead of *Epiphanes*, which signified noble or illustrious.

After this, *Antiochus* made a preparation for a second voyage into *Egypt*, ^d and then were there seen throughout all the city of *Jerusalem*, forty days long, horsemen running in the air with robes of gold, and, as bands of spearmen, and as troops of horsemen set in array, encountering and coursing one against another. Of these prodigious signs, or rather forewarnings of God, all histories have delivered us, some more, some less. Before the destruction of *Jerusalem* by *Vespasian*, a star in the form of a sword appeared in the heavens, directly over the city; after which there followed a slaughter like unto this of *Epiphanes*, though far greater. In the *Cymbrian* wars, ^e *Pliny* tells us, that armies were seen fighting in the air from the morning till the evening.

In the time of pope *John* the eleventh, a fountain poured out blood instead of water, in or near the city of *Genoa*; soon after which the city was

taken by the *Saracens*, with great slaughter. Of these and the like prodigious signs, *Vipera* hath collected many, and very remarkable. But this one seemeth to me the most memorable, because the most notorious. All men know that in the emperor *Nero*, the off-spring of the *Cesars*, as well natural as adopted, took end; whereof this notable sign gave warning.

^f When *Livia* was first married to *Augustus*, an eagle let fall into her arms a white hen, holding a lawrel branch in her mouth. *Livia* caused this hen to be carefully nourished, and the lawrel branch to be planted: of the hen came a fair increase of white poultry, and from the little branch there sprang up in time a grove of lawrel; so that afterwards, in all triumphs, the conquerors did use to carry in their hands a branch of bays taken out of this grove; and, after the triumphs ended, to set it again in the same ground; which branches were observed, when they happened to wither, to foreshew the death of those persons who carried them in triumph. And in the last year of *Nero*, all the broods of the white hen died, and the whole grove of bays withered at once. Moreover, the heads of all the *Cesars* statues, and the scepter placed in *Augustus's* hand, were stricken down with lightning. That the *Jews* did not think such strange signs to be unworthy of regard, it appears by their calling upon GOD, and praying, that these tokens might turn to good.

Now, as the first voyage of *Antiochus* into *Egypt* was occasioned by discord of the two brethren therein reigning; so was his second expedition caused by their good agreement. For the elder *Ptolemy* being left in *Memphis*, not strong enough to force his brother, who had defended *Alexandria* against all the power of their uncle, thought it the best way to seek entrance into that royal city, rather by perswasion than by arms. *Physcon* had not as yet forgotten the terror of the former siege: the *Alexandrians*, though they loved not *Philometor*, yet loved they worse to live in scarcity of victuals (which was already great among them, and like to grow extreme) since nothing was brought in from the country; and the friends of the younger brother saw no likelihood of good issue to be hoped for without reconciliation. These good helps, and above all these, the loving dispositions of *Cleopatra*, who then was in *Alexandria*, encouraged *Philometor* in his purpose. But that which made him earnestly desirous to accomplish it, was the fear wherein he stood of his uncle. For though *Antiochus* were gone out of *Egypt* with his army, yet had he left behind him a strong garrison in *Pelusium*; retaining that city, which was the key of *Egypt*, to his own use. This consideration wrought also with *Physcon*, and with those that were about him; so as by the vehement mediation of *Cleopatra*, their sister, the two brethren made an end of all quarrels.

When the news of this accord was brought to *Antiochus*, he was greatly enraged; for notwithstanding that he had pretended no other thing than the establishment of the king *Philometor*, his nephew, and a meaning to subject his younger brother unto him, which he gave in answer to all ambassadors; yet he now prepared to make sharp war upon them both. And to that end, he presently furnished and sent out his navy towards *Cyprus*, and drew his land-army into *Celestria*,

^a 2 Mac. cap. 4.

^b 2 Mac. c. 4. v. 38.

^c Ver. 47.

^d 2 Mac. c. 5. v. 1.

^e Plin lib. 2. c. 17.

^f Mercur. *Vipera* de Prodig. lib. 8. *Vipera* de pisco & sacro instituto.

^g Sueton. Galba.

ready to enter *Egypt* the spring following. When he was on his way as far as *Rhinocorura*, he met with ambassadors sent from *Ptolemy*. Their errand was partly to yield thanks to *Antiochus* for the establishing of *Philometor* in his kingdom; partly to beseech him, that he would rather be pleased to signify what he required to have done in *Egypt*, which should be performed, than to enter it as an enemy with so puissant an army. But *Antiochus* returned this short answer, that he would neither call back his fleet, nor withdraw his army, upon any other condition, than that *Ptolemy* should surrender into his hands, together with the city of *Pelusium*, the whole territory thereto belonging; and that he should also abandon and leave unto him the isle of *Cyprus*, with all the right that he had unto either of them, for ever. For answer unto these demands, he set down a day certain, and a short one. Which being come and pass'd, without any accord made, the *Syrian* fleet enter'd *Nilus*, and recovered as well those places which appertained to *Ptolemy* in *Arabia*, as in *Egypt* it self; for *Memphis*, and all about it, received *Antiochus*, being unable to resist him. The king having now no stop in his way to *Alexandria*, passed on thitherwards by easy journeys.

Of all these troubles pass'd, as well as of the present danger wherein *Egypt* stood, the *Romans* had notice long ago. But they found, or were contented to find, little reason for them to intermeddle therein. For it was a civil war, and wherein *Antiochus* seemed to take part with the juster cause. Yet they gave signification, that it would be much displeasing unto them, to have the kingdom of *Egypt* taken from the rightful owners. More they could not, or would not do, being troubled with *Perseus*; and therefore loth to provoke *Antiochus* too far. Nevertheless, the *Egyptian* kings being reconciled, and standing jointly in need of help against their uncle, who prepared and made open war against them both; it was to be expected, that not only the *Romans*, but many of the *Greeks*, as being thereto obliged by notable benefits, should arm in defence of their kingdom. *Rome* had been sustained with food from *Egypt*, in the war of *Hannibal*; when *Italy* lying waste, had neither corn nor money wherewith to buy sufficient store. By help of the *Egyptian*, had *Aratus* laid the foundation of that greatness whereto the *Acheans* attained. And by the like help, had *Rhodes* been defended against *Demetrius Poliorcetes*. Neither were these friendly turns, which that bountiful house of the *Ptolemies* had done for sundry people abroad, ill followed or seconded, by other as bad in requital; but with continuance of suitable beneficence from time to time increased. Wherefore the two brothers sent abroad confidently for aid; especially to the *Rhodians* and *Acheans*, who seemed most able to give it effectually. To the *Romans*, *Phyſcon* and *Cleopatra* had sent a year since; but their ambassadors lay still in *Rome*. Of the *Acheans* they desired in particular, that *Lycortas*, the brave warrior, might be sent to them as general of all the auxiliaries, and his son *Polybius* general of the horse. Hereunto the *Acheans* readily condescended, and would immediately have made performance, if *Callicrates* had not interposed his mischievous art. He, whether seeking occasion to vaunt his obsequiousness to the *Romans*; or, much rather, envying those noble captains,

whose service the kings desired, withstood the common voice, which was, that their nation should not with such small numbers, as were requested, but with all their power, be aiding unto the *Ptolemies*. For it was not now (he said) convenient time to entangle themselves in any such business, as might make them the less able to yield unto the *Romans* what help soever should be required in the *Macedonian* war. And in this sentence, he, with those of his faction, obstinately persisted; terrifying others with big words, as it were, in behalf of the *Romans*. But *Polybius* affirmed, that *Martius*, the late consul, had signified unto him, that the *Romans* were pass'd all need of help; adding further, that a thousand foot and two hundred horse might well be spared to the aid of their benefactors, the *Egyptian* kings, without disabling their nation to perform any service to the *Romans*; forasmuch as the *Acheans* could, without trouble, raise thirty or forty thousand soldiers. All this notwithstanding, the resolution was deferred from one meeting to another; and finally broken by the violence of *Callicrates*. For when it was thought that the decree should have pass'd, he brought into the theatre where the assembly was held, a messenger, with letters from *Martius*; whereby the *Acheans* were desired to conform themselves to the *Roman* senate, and to labour, as the senate had done, by sending ambassadors to set *Egypt* in peace. This was an advice against all reason. For the senate had indeed sent ambassadors to make peace; but as in a time of greater business elsewhere, with such mild words, that nothing was effected. Wherefore it was not likely, that the *Acheans* should do any good in the same kind. Yet *Polybius* and his friends durst not gainsay the *Roman* council, which had the force of an injunction. So the kings were left in much distress; disappointed of their expectation. But within a while was *Perseus* overcome; and then might the ambassador sent from the *Roman* senate perform as much as any army could have done.

Audience had been lately given by the senate unto those ambassadors of *Phyſcon* and *Cleopatra*; which having stay'd more than a whole year in the city, brought nothing of their business to effect until now. The ambassadors delivered their message in the name of those that had sent them; though it concerned (which perhaps they knew not) *Philometor* no less than his brother and sister.

In this embassy of *Ptolemy*, now requesting help from *Rome*, appeared a notable change of his fortune, from such as it had been before three or four years last past. For in the beginning of these his troubles, which began with the *Macedonian* war, either he, or *Euleus*, or *Lencus* (upon whom the blame was afterwards laid) which had the government of him, thought his affairs in such good estate, that not only he determined to set upon *Antiochus*, for *Coelesyria*, but would have interposed himself between the *Romans* and *Perseus*, as a competent arbitrator; though it fell out well, that his ambassador was by a friend perswaded to forget that point of his errand. From these high thoughts, he fell on the sudden, by the rebellion of his brother and subjects, to live under the protection of the same *Antiochus*. And now at such time, as by atonement with his brother and subjects, he might have seemed to stand in no need of such protection, he hath remaining none other help whereby to save both his kingdom and life, than

what can be obtained by their intercession which were employed against him. This miserable condition of him, his brother, and sister, shewed it self even in the habit of those ambassadors. They were poorly clad; the hair of their heads and beards over-grown, as was their manner in time of affliction; and they carried in their hands branches of olive. Thus they entered into the senate, and there fell groveling and prostrate upon the floor. Their garments were not so mean and mournful, nor their looks and countenances so sad and dejected, but that their speech was than either of the other far more lamentable. For having told in what danger their king and country stood, they made a pitiful and grievous complaint unto the senate, beseeching them to have compassion of their estate, and of their princes, who had always remained friendly and faithful to the Romans. They said, that the people of Rome had so much heretofore favoured this *Antiochus* in particular, and were of such account and authority with all other kings and nations, as if they pleased but to send their ambassadors, and let *Antiochus* know that the senate was offended with his undertaking upon the king their confederate, then would he presently raise his siege from before *Alexandria*, and withdraw his army out of *Egypt* into *Syria*. But that if the senate protracted any time, or used any delay, then should *Ptolemy* and *Cleopatra* be shortly driven out of their realms, and make repair to Rome, with shameful dishonour to the senate and people thereof, in that, in the extreme dangers of all their fortunes, they had not vouchsafed to relieve them.

The lords of the senate, moved with compassion, sent incontinently *C. Popilius Lenus*, *C. Decimius*, and *A. Hostilius*, as ambassadors, to determine and end the war between those kings. In commission they had first to find king *Ptolemy*, and then *Antiochus*, and to let them both understand, that unless they surceased and gave over arms, they would take that king no more for a friend to the senate and people of Rome, whom they found obstinate, or using delay. So these Romans, together with the *Alexandrian* ambassadors, took their leave, and went onward their way within three days after.

Whilst *Popilius* and his fellows were on their way towards *Egypt*, *Antiochus* had transported his army over *Lucine*, some forty miles from *Alexandria*. So near was he to the end of his journey, when the Roman ambassadors met him. After greeting and salutations at their first encounter, *Antiochus* offered his right hand to *Popilius*; but *Popilius* filled it with a roll of Paper, willing him to read those mandates of the senate, before he did any thing else. *Antiochus* did so, and having a little while considered of the business, he told *Popilius*, that he would advise with his friends, and then give the ambassadors their answer. But *Popilius*, according to his ordinary blunt manner of speech, which he had by nature, made a circle about the king with a rod which he held in his hand, willing him to make him such an answer as he might report to the senate, before he moved out of that circle. The king, astonished at this so rude and violent a commandment, after he had stay'd and paused a while, I will be content (quoth he) to do whatsoever the senate shall ordain. Then *Popilius* gave unto the king his hand, as to a friend and ally of the Roman.

Thus *Antiochus* departed out of *Egypt* without any good issue of his costly expedition, even in

such manner as *Daniel* had prophesied long before; yea, fulfilling every particular circumstance, both of returning, and of doing mischief to *Jerusalem* after his return; like as if these things had rather been historified than fore-told by the prophet. As for the Roman ambassadors, they stayed a while, and settled the kingdom of *Egypt*, leaving it unto the elder brother, and appointing the younger to reign over *Cyrene*. This done they departed towards *Cyprus*; which they left, as it had been, in the power of the *Egyptian*, having first sent away *Antiochus's* fleet, which had already given an overthrow to the *Egyptian* ships.

SECT. XII.

How the Romans were dreadful to all kings. Their demeanour towards Eumenes, Prusias, Masanissa, and Cotys. The end of Perseus and his children. The instability of kingly estates. The triumphs of Paulus, Anicius, and Octavius. With the conclusion of the work.

BY this peremptory demeanour of *Popilius*, in doing his message, and by the ready obedience of king *Antiochus* to the will of the senate; we may perceive how terrible the Romans were grown, through their conquest of *Macedon*. The same *Popilius* had been well contented a year before this, to lay aside the roughness of his natural condition, and to give good language to the *Acheans* and *Etolians*, when he went ambassador to those people of *Greece*, that were of far less power than king *Antiochus*. Likewise, *Antiochus* had with good words, and no more than good words, dismissed other ambassadors which came from Rome, in such sort, as they complained not, much less used any menacing terms, though he performed nothing of their request. But now the case was altered. So found other kings as well as *Antiochus*.

Eumenes sent to Rome his brother *Attalus* to gratulate the victory over *Perseus*, and to crave help or countenance of the senate against the *Gallo-Greeks*, which molested him. Very welcome was *Attalus*, and lovingly entertained by most of the senators; who bade him be confident, and request of the senate his brother's kingdom for himself; for it should surely be given him. These hopeful promises tickled *Attalus* with such ambition, that he either approved, or seemed to approve the motion. But his honest nature was soon reclaimed by the faithful counsel of *Stratius* a physician; whom *Eumenes* had sent to Rome of purpose to keep his brother upright. So when he came into the senate, he delivered the errand about which he had been sent; recounting his own services done to the Romans in the late war, ^b wherewithal he forgot not to make of his brother as good mention as he could: and finally requested, that the towns of *Aenus* and *Maronea* might be bestowed upon himself. ^c By his omitting to sue for his brother's kingdom, the senate conceived opinion, that he meant to crave another day of audience for that business alone. Wherefore, to make him understand how gracious he was, they not only granted all his desire; but in the presents which they gave to him (as was their custom to ambassadors that came with an acceptable message) they used singular magnificence. ^d Nevertheless, *Attalus* took no notice of their meaning; but went his way, contented with what they had already granted. This did so highly displease the senate, that whilst he was yet in *Italy*,

^a Dan. c. ii. v. 29, 30, &c.

^b Liv. lib. 45.

^c Polyb. legat. 93.

^d Polyb. lib. ii.

they gave order for the liberty of *Ænus* and *Mæronæa*: thereby making ineffectual their promise; which otherwise they could not, without shame, revoke. And as for the *Gallo-Greeks*, which were about to invade the kingdom of *Pergamus*; they sent ambassadors to them, with such instructions, as rather encouraged than hindered them in their purpose. The displeasure of the senate being so manifest; *Eumenes* thought it worthy of his labour to make another voyage to *Rome*. He might well blame the folly of his second voyage thither, for this necessity of the third; since, by his malice to *Perseus*, he had lay'd open unto these ambitious potentates the way to his own doors. No sooner was he come into *Italy*, than the senate was ready to send him going. It was not thought expedient to use him as an enemy, that came to visit them in love: neither could they in so doing, have avoided the note of singular inconstancy; and to entertain him as a friend, was more than their hatred to him, for his ingratitude, as they deemed it, would permit. Wherefore they made a decree, that no king should be suffered to come to *Rome*; and by virtue thereof sent him home, without expence of much further complement.

Prusias king of *Bitlynia* had been at *Rome* somewhat before; where he was welcomed after a better fashion. He had learned to behave himself as humbly as the proud *Romans* could expect or desire. For entering into the senate, he lay down, and kissed the threshold, calling the *fatiers* his gods and favours; as also he used to wear a cap, after the manner of slaves newly manumised, professing himself an enfranchised bondman of the people of *Rome*. He was indeed naturally a slave, and one that by such abject flattery kept himself safe; though doing otherwise greater mischief than any wherewith *Perseus* had been charged. His errand was, besides matter of complement, to commend unto the senate the care of his son *Nicomedes*, whom he brought with him to *Rome*, there to receive education. Further petition he made, to have some towns added to his kingdom: whereto, because the grant would have been unjust, he received a cold answer. But concerning the wardship of his son, it was undertaken by the senate: which, vaunting of the pleasure lately done to *Egypt*, in freeing it from *Antiochus*, willed him thereby to consider what effectual protection the *Romans* gave unto the children of kings, that were to their patronage commended.

But above all other kings, *Masaniissa* held his credit with the *Romans* good. His quarrels were endless with the *Carthaginians*: which made the friendship of the *Romans* to him the more assured. In all controversies they gave judgment on his side; and whereas he had invaded the country of *Emporia*, holding the lands, but unable to win the towns; the *Romans* (though at first they could find no pretext, whereby to countenance him in this oppression) compelled finally the *Carthaginians* both to let go all their hold, and to pay five hundred talents to the *Numidian*, for having hindered him of his due so long. Now indeed had *Rome* good leisure to devise upon the ruin of *Carthage*: after which, the race of *Masaniissa* himself was shortly by them rooted up. But hereof the old king never dreamed. He sent to *Rome* one of his sons, to congratulate the victory over *Perseus*; and offered to come thither himself, there to sacrifice for joy unto *Jupiter* in the *Capitol*. His good will was lovingly accepted; his son rewarded; and he entreated to stay at home.

Cotys the *Thracian* sent ambassadors, to excuse himself touching the aid by him given to *Perseus*, for that the *Macedonian* had him bound by hostages; and to entreat, that his son which was taken with the children of *Perseus*, might be set at liberty for convenient ransom. His excuse was not taken; since he had voluntarily obliged himself to *Perseus*, by giving hostages without necessity: yet was his son given back to him ransom-free; with admonition, to carry himself better toward the *Romans* in time following. His kingdom lay between *Macedon* and some barbarous nations; in which respect, it was good to hold him in fair terms.

As for those unhappy kings, *Perseus* and *Gentius*, they were led through *Rome*, with their children and friends, in the triumphs of *Æmylius* and *Anicius*. *Perseus* had often made suit to *Æmylius*, that he might not be put to such disgrace; but he still received one scornful answer, that it lay in his own power to prevent it; whereby was meant, that he might kill himself. And surely, had he not hoped for greater mercy than he found, he would rather have sought his death in *Macedon*, than have been beholden to the courtesy of his insolent enemies for a wretched life. The issue of the *Roman* clemency, whereof *Æmylius* had given him hope, was no better than this: after that he, and his fellow king, had been led in chains through the streets, before the chariots of their triumphing victors, they were committed to prison, wherein they remained without hope of release. It was the manner, that when the triumpher turned his chariot up towards the *Capitol*, there to do sacrifice, he should command the captives to be had away to prison, and there put to death: so as the honour of the vanquisher, and misery of those that were overcome, might be both together at the utmost. This last sentence of death was remitted unto *Perseus*: yet so, that he had little joy of his life; but either famished himself, or (for it is diversly reported) was kept watching perforce by those that had him in custody; and so died for want of sleep. Of his sons, two died; it is uncertain how. The youngest called *Alexander* (only in name like unto the *Great*, though destined sometimes perhaps by his father, unto the fortunes of the great) became a joyner, or turner, or, at his best preferment, a scribe under the *Roman* officers. In such poverty ended the royal house of *Macedon*: and it ended on the sudden; though some eightscore years after the death of that monarch, unto whose ambition this whole earth seemed too narrow.

If *Perseus* had known it before, that his own son, should be compelled to earn his living by handy-work, in a painful occupation; it is like, that he would not, as in a wantonness of sovereignty, have commanded those poor men to be slain, which had recovered his treasures out of the sea, by their skill in the feat of diving. He would rather have been very gentle, and would have considered, that the greatest oppressors, and the most untrodden wretches are all subject unto the one high power, governing all alike with absolute command. But such is our unhappiness; instead of that blessed counsel, *Do as ye would be done unto*; a sentence teaching all moderation, and pointing out the way to felicity; we entertain that arrogant thought, *I will be like to the most high*: that is, I will do what shall please my self. One hath said truly:

— *Et qui nolunt occidere quenquam,
Posse volunt* —

*Even they that have no murd'rous will,
Would have it in their power to kill.*

All, or the most, have a vain desire of ability to do evil without controul : which is a dangerous temptation unto the performance. God, who best can judge what is expedient, hath granted such power to very few : among whom also, very few there are, that use it not to their own hurt. For who sees not, that a prince, by racking his sovereign authority, to the utmost extent, enableth (besides the danger to his own person) some one of his own sons or nephews to root up all his progeny ? Shall not many excellent princes, notwithstanding their brotherhood, or other nearness in blood, be driven to flatter the wife, the minion, or perhaps the harlot, that governs one, the most unworthy of his whole house, yet reigning over all ? The untimely death of many princes, which could not humble themselves to such flattery ; and the common practice of the *Turkish* emperors, to murder all their brethren, without expecting till they offend ; are too good proofs hereof. Hereto may be added, That the heir of the same *Roger Mortimer*, who murdered most traiterously and barbarously king *Edward* the second, was, by reason of a marriage, proclaimed, in time not long after following, heir apparent to the crown of *England* : which had he obtained, then had all the power of *Edward* fallen into the race of his mortal enemy, to exercise the same upon the line of that unhappy king. Such examples of the instability whereto all mortal affairs are subject ; as they teach moderation, and admonish the transitory gods of kingdoms, not to authorize by wicked precedents, the evil that may fall on their own posterity : so do they necessarily make us understand, how happy that country is, which hath obtained a king able to conceive and teach, That ^b *God is the forest and sharpest schoolmaster, that can be devised, for such kings, as think this world ordained for them, without controulment to turn it upside down at their pleasure.*

Now, concerning the triumph of *L. Æmylius Paulus* ; it was in all points like unto that of ^c *Q. Quintus Flaminius* : though far more glorious, in regard of the king's own person, that was led along therein, as part of his own spoils ; and in regard likewise both of the conquest and of the booty. So great was the quantity of gold and silver carried by *Paulus* into the *Roman* treasury, that from thenceforth, until the civil wars which followed upon the death of *Julius Cæsar*, the estate had no need to burthen it self with any tribute. Yet was this noble triumph likely to have been hindered by the soldiers ; who grudged at their general, for not having dealt more bountifully with them. But the princes of the senate over-ruled the people and soldiers herein, and brought them to reason by severe exhortations. Thus *Paulus* enjoyed as much honour of his victory as men could give. Nevertheless, it pleased God to take away from him his two remaining sons, that were not given in adoption : of which, the one died five days before the triumph ; the other, three days after it. This loss he bore wisely : and told the people, That he hoped to see the commonwealth flourish in a continuance of prosperity ; since the joy

of his victory was requited with his own private calamity, instead of the publick.

About the same time, *Octavius* the admiral, who had brought *Perseus* out of *Samothrace* : and *Anicius* the pretor, who had conquered *Illyria*, and taken king *Gentius* prisoner : made their several triumphs. The glory of which magnificent spectacles ; together with the confluence of ambassages from all parts ; and kings either visiting the imperial city, or offering to visit her, and do their duties in person ; were enough to say unto *Rome*, *Sume superbiam ; Take upon thee the majesty, that thy deserts have purchased.*

BY this which we have already set down, is seen the beginning and end of the three first monarchies of the world ; whereof the founders and erectors thought that they could never have ended. That of *Rome* which made the fourth, was also at this time almost at the highest. We have left it flourishing in the middle of the field ; having rooted up or cut down, all that kept it from the eyes and admiration of the world. But after some continuance, it shall begin to lose the beauty it had ; the storms of ambition shall beat her great boughs and branches one against another ; her leaves shall fall off ; her limbs wither, and a rabble of barbarous nations enter the field, and cut her down.

Now these great kings, and conquering nations have been the subject of those ancient histories, which have been preserved, and yet remain among us ; and withal of so many tragical poets as in the persons of powerful princes, and other mighty men, have complained against infidelity, time, destiny ; and most of all, against the variable success of worldly things, and instability of fortune. To these undertakings, these great lords of the world have been stirred up, rather by the desire of *fame*, which ploweth up the air, and soweth in the wind ; than by the affection of bearing rule, which draweth after it so much vexation, and so many cares. And that this is true, the good advice of *Cyneas* to *Pyrrhus* proves. And certainly, as fame hath often been dangerous to the living, so is it to the dead of no use at all ; because separate from knowledge. Which were it otherwise, and the extrem ill bargain of buying this last discourse, understood by them which were dissolved ; they themselves would then rather have wished, to have stolen out of the world without noise ; than to be put in mind, that they have purchased the report of their actions in the world, by rapine, oppression and cruelty, by giving in spoil the innocent and labouring soul to the idle and insolent, and by having emptied the cities of the world of their ancient inhabitants, and filled them again with so many and so variable sorts of sorrows.

Since the fall of the *Roman* empire (omitting that of the *Germans*, which had neither greatness nor continuance) there hath been no state fearful in the east, but that of the *Turk* ; nor in the west any prince that hath spread his wings far over his nest, but the *Spaniard* ; who since the time that *Ferdinand* expelled the *Moors* out of *Granado*, have made many attempts to make themselves masters of all *Europe*. And it is true, that by the treasures of both *Indies*, and by the many kingdoms which they possess in *Europe*, they are at this day the most powerful. But as the *Turk* is now counterpoised by the *Persian*, so instead of so many millions as have been spent by the *English*, *French*,

^a Juvenal, Sat. 10.

^b The true law of free monarchies.

^c Chap. 3. §. 4.

and *Netherlands* in a defensive war, and in diversions against them, it is easy to demonstrate, that with the charge of two hundred thousand pounds, continued but for two years or three at the most, they may not only be persuaded to live in peace; but all their swelling and over-flowing streams may be brought back into their natural channels and old banks. These two nations, I say, are at this day the most eminent and to be regarded; the one seeking to root out the christian religion altogether, the other the truth and sincere profession thereof; the one to join all *Europe* to *Asia*, the other the rest of all *Europe* to *Spain*.

For the rest, if we seek a reason of the succession and continuance of this boundless ambition in mortal men, we may add to that which hath been already said; That the kings and princes of the world have always laid before them, the actions, but not the ends, of those great ones which preceded them. They are always transported with the glory of the one; but they never mind the misery of the other, till they find the experience in themselves. They neglect the advice of God, while they enjoy life, or hope it; but they follow the counsel of death, upon his first approach. It is he that puts into man all the wisdom of the world, without speaking a word; which God with all the words of his law, promises or threats, doth not infuse. *Death*, which hateth and destroyeth man, is believed; God, which hath made him and loves him, is always deferred. *I have considered (saith Solomon) all the works that are under the sun, and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit: but who believes it, till death tells it us. It was death, which opening the conscience of Charles*

the fifth, made him enjoin his son *Philip* to restore *Navarre*; and king *Francis* the first of *France*, to command that justice should be done upon the murderers of the protestants in *Merindol* and *Cabrières*, which till then he neglected. It is therefore death alone, that can suddenly make man to know himself. He tells the proud and insolent, that they are but abjects, and humbles them at the instant; makes them cry, complain, and repent; yea, even to hate their fore-passed happiness. He takes the account of the rich, and proves him a beggar; a naked beggar, which hath interest in nothing, but in the gravel that fills his mouth. He holds a glass before the eyes of the most beautiful, and makes them see therein, their deformity and rottenness; and they acknowledge it.

O eloquent, just and mighty death! whom none could advise, thou hast persuaded; what none hath dared, thou hast done; and whom all the world hath flattered, thou only hast cast out of the world and despised: thou hast drawn together all the far stretched greatness, all the pride, cruelty, and ambition of man, and covered it all over with these two narrow words, *Hic jacet*.

Lastly, whereas this book, by the title it hath, calls itself, the first part of the *general history* of the *world*, implying a *second*, and *third* volume; which I also intended, and have hewn out; besides many other discouragements, persuading my silence; it hath pleased GOD to take that glorious prince out of the world, to whom they were directed; whose unspeakable and never enough lamented loss, hath taught me to say with *Job*, *Versa est in luctum cithara mea, & organum meum in vocem flentium*.

F I N I S.



To the R E A D E R.

THE use of chronological tables is needful to all histories, that reach to any length of time; and most of all, to those that are most general: since they cannot, like annals, yearly set down all occurrences not coherent. This here following, may serve as an index to the present part of this work; pointing unto the several matters, that having fallen out at one time, are far disjoined in the relation. Certainly it is not perfect: neither do I think, that any can be. For howsoever the years of the first patriarchs may seem to have been well-near compleat; yet in the reigns of the kings of Juda and Israel, we find many fractions, and the last year, or years, of one king reckoned also as the foremost of another. The same is most likely to have fallen out in many other; though not so precisely recorded. Hereto may be added the diverse and imperfect forms of the year, which were in use among sundry nations: causing ^a the summer months, in process of some ages, to fall into the winter; and so breeding extream confusion in the reckoning of their times. Neither is it a small part of trouble, to chuse out of so many, and so utterly disagreeing computations, as have already gotten authority, what may probably be held for truth. All this, and a great deal more, is to be alledged, in excuse of such error as a more attentive and perfect calculator shall happen to find herein. It may serve to free the book, and likewise the reader (if but of mean judgment) from any notorious Anachronism; which ought to suffice. The book indeed will need it, even in that regard; not only for some errors of the press, in the numbring of years, but for some hasty mis-reckonings of mine own; which I desire to have hereby reformed, in hope that the printing of this table shall not want careful diligence. The reader, if he be not offended with the rest, shall find reason to be pleased with this, as tending wholly to his own ease.

The titles over the columns, have reference to that which follows under them; as will readily be conceived. Where two titles, or more, are over the head, as

Rome	Nabonassar
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 there do the numbers underneath answer proportionably, the higher to the higher, the lower to the lower. For example: the walls of Jerusalem were finish'd in the 319 year from the building of Rome, and in the 314 from Nabonassar. In like manner it is to be understood, That Jehosaphat began his reign in the 3774 of the Julian Era, in the 3092 of the world, and in the 99 year of the temple. This needs not more illustration; nor indeed so much, to those that are acquainted with works of this kind. To avoid prolixity, I have forbore to insert those years, which I find not signed with some regardable accident: as with the birth or death of some patriarch; the beginning of some king's reign; some change of government; some battel fought; or the like. So, of the 13 years wherein Sylvius Capetus reigned over the Latins, I note only the first; that is, omitting all between the 4 of Jehosaphat, wherein Capetus began, unto the 17, wherein Sylvius Aventinus succeeded, and wherein Jehoram first reigned with Jehosaphat his father. For I thought it vain to have filled up a page with 12 lines of idle cyphers; numbring forth 2, 3, 4, 5, and so still onwards, till I had come to the first of Aventinus, and 17 of Jehosaphat. In setting down the kings, there is noted over the head of every one, what place he held in order of succession; as whether he were the first, second, fifth, seventh, or so forth, in rank, of those that reigned in his country, without notable interruption: Before the name is the first year of his reign; at the end, or foot of the name (as the space gives leave) is the whole number of years in which he reigned; in the spaces following underneath are those years of his, which were concurrent with the beginning of some other king, or with the year of any remarkable accident. Where two numbers, or more, are found before one king's name, there it is to be understood, that the same year belonged, not

^a See Lib. 2. Chap. 7. §. 6.

To the R E A D E R.

only to the king then beginning, but unto some one or more of his fore-göers ; as the first year of Jehoram, king of Israel was the same with the second of his brother Ahazia, and the twenty-second of his father Ahab. So, where two or three names are found in one space ; as in the 3077 year of the world, Zimri, Tibni, and Omri, it is meant, that every one of them reigned in some part of the same year ; which is reckoned the second of Ela, and the first of Omri. Particularly, under the years of the Egyptian kings, are set down the years of those Dynasties, which it was thought meet to insert ; as likewise, otherwhiles, the day of the month upon which Nabonassar's year began ; which, how it varied in other years, may be found in the place last above-cited.

Concerning the Æra, or account of years, from Iphitus, who began the Olympiads, from Rome built, from Nabonassar, and the like, as much as was thought convenient hath been said, where due place was in the book it self ; so as it remaineth only to note, that under the title of Olympiads is set down first the number of the Olympiad, and beneath it the year of that Olympiad ; as that Cyrus began his reign in Persia, in the fifty-fifth Olympiad, and the first year thereof.

Now, for that the years of the world, of the Olympiads, of Rome, of Nabonassar, and other, had not beginning in one month, but some of them in March, some in April, some about Midsummer, and some at other times ; the better to express their several beginnings, some painful chronologers have divided them proportionably in their several columns ; opposing part of the one year to part of the other : not (as I have here done) cutting all overthwart with one strait line, as if all had begun and ended at one time. But this labour have I spared, as more troublesome than useful ; since the more part would not have apprehended the meaning, and since the learned might well be without it. It will only be needful to observe, that howsoever the Æra of the Olympiads be 24 years older than that of Rome, and 29 than that of Nabonassar ; yet the reign of some king may have begun at such a time of the year, as did not suit with this difference. But hereof I take little regard. The more curious will easily find my meaning ; the vulgar will not find the difficulty. One familiar example may explain all. Queen Elizabeth began her reign the 17th of November, in the year of our lord 1558 : she was crowned ; held a parliament ; brake it up ; threw down images ; and reformed many things in religion ; all in her first year : yet not all in that year 1558, but the greater part in the year following ; whether we begin with the first of January, or with the 25th of March. The like may be otherwhiles found in this table ; but so, as the difference is never of a whole year.

The Julian period, which I have placed, as the greater number, over the years of the world, was devised by that honourable and excellently learned Joseph Scaliger ; being accommodated to the Julian years, now in use among us. It consisteth of 7980 years ; which result from the multiplication of 19, 28, and 15 ; that is, of the cycle of the moon, the cycle of the sun, and the years of an indiction. Being divided by any of these, it leaves the number of the present year ; or, if no fraction remain, it shewes the last year of that cycle to be current. For example, in the 4498th of this period, when was fought the great battel of Cannæ, the prime, or golden number was 14, the cycle of the sun 18, and consequently the dominical letter V, as may be found by dividing the same number of the Julian period 4498, by 19, for the prime, by 28, for the cycle of the sun. This Julian period, after the present account, always exceeds the years of the world by 682. Besides the former uses, and other thence redounding, it is a better character of a year, than any other Æra (as From the beginning of the world, from the flood, from Troy taken, or the like) which are of more uncertain position.

More I shall not need to write, as touching the use or explication of these tables. Neither was thus much requisite to such as are conversant in works of this kind ; it sufficeth, if hereby all be made plain enough to the vulgar.

A

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

YEARS of the JULIAN PERIOD, WORLD,
PATRIARCHS, &c.

	Julian. The World and Adam.													
	683 1 Adam 930													
	813 131	1 Seth 912												
	918 236	196	1 Enos 905											
	1008 326	996	91	1 Ca- naan 910	All the years of the Patriarchs, wherein they begat children, died, or performed any thing, are reckoned compleat : which is inferred out of the addition of the years before they begat children, unto those that followed ; making always a compleat sum, Genesis 5.									
	1078 396	266	161	71	1 Maha- laleel 895									
	1143 461	331	226	136	66	1 Jared 962								
	1305 623	493	388	298	228	163	1 Enoch 263							
	1370 688	558	453	363	293	228	66	1 Me- thufelah 969						
	1557 875	745	640	550	480	415	253	188	1 La- mech 777					
Adam died about the end of this year	1612 930	800	695	605	535	470	308	243	56					
Enoch translated	1669 98	857	752	662	592	527	365	300	113					
Seth died about the end of this year.	1724 1042	912	807	717	647	582		355	168					
	1739 1057		822	732	662	597		370	183	1 Noa 950				

A Chronological Table.

	Julian The World	Enos	Cainan	Maha- laleel	Jared	Me- thuf- lah.	Lamech	Noah	Sem				
Enos died	1822 1140	905	815	745	680	453	266	84					
Canaan died	1917 1235		910	842	775	548	361	179					
Mahälaleel died this year	1972 1290			895	830	603	416	234					
Jared died	2104 1422					735	584	366					
Flood threatned, Gen. 6. 3.	2219 1537					850	663	481					
	2241 1559					872	685	503	1 Sem 600				
Lamech died	2333 1651					964	777	595	93				
Methufelah died this year a little before the flood. Noah entered into the Ark. c. 7. §. 8. & 9. The flood.	2338 1656					969		600	98				
The flood ceaseth. Noah issued out of the ark.	2339 1657							601	99				
	Julian. World Flood	Noah	Sem	1 Ar- phaxad 438									
	2341 1659	603	101										
	2376 1694 37	638	136	36	1 Sa- lah 433								
	2406 1724 67	668	166	66	31	1 He- ber 464							
	2440 1758 101	702	200	100	65	35	1 Pe- leg		Kings of Assy- ria				
	2470 1788 131	732	230	130	95	65	31	1 Rec- rod 239	1 Nim- rod 114				
	2502 1820 163	764	262	162	127	97	63	33	1 Sa- rug 230	Kings of E- gypt.			
Vide Lib. 2. c. 2. §. 2.	2530 1848 191	792	290	190	155	125	91	61	61	29	1 Chan- nah 161		
	2532 1850 193	804	292	192	157	127	93	63	63	31	3	1 Na- ber 148	
	2561 1879 222	823	321	221	186	156	122	92	92	60	32	30	1 Te- rah 205
	2584 1902 245	846	344	244	209	179	145	115	115	83	55	53	24

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. Wo. Fl.	Noah	Sem	Arphaxad	Salah	Heber	Peleg	Reu	Affyria	Sarug	Egypt	Nabor	Terah	Kings of Sicyon	
	2618 1936 279	880	378	278	243	213	179	149	35	117	89	87	58	1 1 Egypt leus 52	
	2649 1967 310	911	409	309	274	244	210	180	3 1 Ni- nus 52	148	120	118	89	32	
	2670 2988 331	932	430	330	295	265	231	201	22	169	141	139	110	2 1 Europ. 45	
The last year of Peleg's life	2678 1996 339	940	438	338	303	273	239	209	30	177	149	147	118	9	
The death of Nahor	2679 1997 340	941	439	339	304	274		210	31	178	150	148	119	10	
Noah died thi year	2688 2006 319	950	448	348	313	283		219	40	187	159		128	19	
The 16 Dynasty in Egypt. Vid. l. 2. 2. §. 3, 4, 5, &c.	2691 2009 352		451	351	316	286		222	43	190	1 Mizrim or Ofiris 261		131	22	1 Abram 175
	2701 2019 362		461	361	326	296		232	4 1 Semi- ramis 42	200	11		141	32	11
The last year of Reu	2708 2026 269		468	368	333	303		239	8	207	18		148	39	18
	2715 2033 376		475	375	340	310			15	214	25		155	3 1 Telebin or Selebr 20	25
The last of Sarug	2731 2049 392		491	391	356	326			31	230	41		171	17	41
	Julian. World. Flod.	Sem	Arphaxad	Salah	Heber	Affyria					Egypt	Terah	Sicyon		Abram
	2735 2053 396	495	395	360	330	35					45	175	4 1 Apis 25		45
	2743 2061 404	503	403	368	338	5 1 Ninias 38					53	183	9		53
	2760 2078 421	520	420	385	355	18					70	200	5 1 Thelxion or Thelafion 52		70
Abram recovers the promise Terah dies in Haran l. 2. c. 1. §. 1, 2, 3, &c.	2765 2083 426	525	425	390	360	23					75	205	6		75
	Julian World. Promisi	Sem	Arphaxad	Salah	Heber	Abram					Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon		
Abram enters int Canaan and des cends into Egypt. The first of the 43 years of servitude	2766 2084 1	526	426	391	361	76					24	76	7		
Abram return into Canaan	2767 2085 2	527	427	392	362	77					25	77	8		
Abram his wife and other kings. l. 2. c. 1. §. 8, 9, &c.	2775 2093 10	535	435	400	370	85					33	85	16		
Ismael born	2777 2095 12	537	437	402	372	87					35	87	18		
Arphaxad dies	2778 2096 13	538	438	403	373	88					36	88	19		

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Promise	Sem	Salah	Heber	Abra- ham	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon		
	2781 2099 16	541	406	376	91	6 Ariu. 30	91	22		
Isaac born when Abraham was 100 years old compleat, 101 current.	2791 2109 26	551	416	386	101	11	101	32	Isaac 180	
The last year of Salah.	2808 2126 43	568	433	403	118	28	118	49	18	
	2811 2129 46	571		406	121	7 Arali- us 40	121	52	21	
	2812 2130 47	572		407	122	2	122	6 Ægy- us 34	22	
Sarai the wife of Abraham died this year.	2827 2145 62	587		422	137	17	137	16	37	
Isaac took Rebecca to wife when he was 40 years old compleat.	2831 2149 66	591		426	141	21	141	20	41	
The last year of Sem.	3840 2158 75	600		435	150	30	150	29	50	
	Julian. World. Promise	Heber	Abra- ham	Isaac	Jacob	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Argive.	
	2846 2164 81	441	156	56		36	156	7 Thuri- mac. 45		
	2851 2169 86	446	161	61	Jacob 147	8 Baleu 30	161	6	1 Ina- chus 50	
Abraham died this year.	2865 2183 100	460	175	75	15	15	175	20	15	
Heber died this year.	2869 2187 104	464		79	19	19	179	24	19	
The 17 Dynastie, called of the shepherds, beginning this year, lasted 103 years.	2881 2199 116			91	31	9 Arma- mich. 38	191 1	36	31	
	2891 2209 126			101	41	11	201 11	8 1 Leu- cippus 53	41	
	2901 2219 136			111	51	21	211 21	11	2 Pharo- neus 60	
The flood of Ogyges, a thousand and twenty years before the Olympiads. See lib. 1. cap. 7. §. 2.	2919 2237 154			129	69	10 Belchus Pisgus 3	229 39	29	19	
	2942 2260 177			152	92	24	252 62	52	42	Joseph 110
	2944 2262 179			154	94	26	254 64	9 1 Meffa- us 47	44	3
See l. 2. cap. 2. §. 6.	2952 2270 187			162	102	31	3 & 4 Typhon & at him the end.	9	52	11
	2954 2272 189			164	104	11 Raka 52	3 3	11	54	

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Promise		Isaac	Jacob	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Argives	
Joseph sold into Egypt.	2959 2277 194		169	109 7	6	5 Orus 79 115	16	59	18
	2961 2279 196		171	111	8	3 81	18	3 Apu 35	20
The last year of Isaac	2970 2288 205		180	120	17	12 90	27	10	29
Israel into Egypt.	2980 2298 215			130	27	22 100	37	20	39
The eighteenth Dynasty in Egypt, which lasted 348 years.	2984 2302 219			134	31	26 1	41	24	43
	2991 2309 226			141	38	33 8	10 Pera- tus 46	31	59
	2996 2314 231			146	43	38 13	6	4 Argu 70	55
Jacob dies in Egypt.	2997 2315 232			147	44	39 14	7	2	56
	Julian. World. Promise	Joseph	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Argives			
	3006 2324 241	65	12 1 Altades 32	48 23	16	11			
	3037 2355 272	96	32	79 54	11 1 Plem- naus 41	42			
	3038 2356 273	97	13 1 Mamirus 30	80 55	2	43			
The last year of Joseph.	3051 2369 286	110	14	93 68	15	56			
	3066 2384 301		29	108 83	30	5 Pirafus, or Crisfu 54			
	3068 2386 303		14 1 Mancaus 30	110 85	32	3			
	3074 2392 309		7	6 1 Sefoftris the Great 33 91	38	9			
	3085 2403 320		18	12 102	12 Ortho- polis 62	20			
	3098 2416 333		15 1 Spherus, or I- phereus 20	25 115	14	33			
	3107 2425 342		10	7 1 Sefoftris 2d. 1. 124	21	42			
	3116 2434 351	1 Mofes 120	19	10 133	32	51			

A Chronological Table.


	Julian. World. Promise	Moses	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Argive.		
	3118 2436 353	3	16 1 Mamilas, or Mamelus 30	12 135	34	53		
	3120 2438 355	5	3	14 137	36	6 1 Phorbas 35		
	3121 2439 356	6	4	8 1 Orus 2, or Busiris 38 138	37	2 Athenians		
	3148 2466 383	33	17 1 Sparetus 40	28 165	13 1 Marathus 3	20		
	3151 2469 386	36	4	31 168	4	32 1 Cerops 50		
Moses visits his brethren the Israelites; kills an Egyptian, and flies into Midian.	3155 2473 390	40	8	35 172	5	7 1 Triopas 46	5	
	3159 2477 394	44	12	9 1 Thermutis, or Acencheres. Qu. 12. 1-6	12	5	9	
	3171 2489 406	56	24	10 1 Rathoris, or Achoris 9 188	24	17	21	
	3178 2496 413	63	31	8 195	14 1 Marathus 20	24	28	
	3180 2498 415	65	33	11 1 Cheneres 16 197	3	26	30	
	3188 2506 423	73	18 1 Ascatides 40	9 205	11	34	38	
Moses his wonders in Egypt.	3195 2513 430	80	8	16 212	18	41	45	
	Julian. World. Exodus	Moses	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Argos	Athens	
The passover. Israel delivered out of Egypt. Pharaoh drowned. The law given. The first of the 480 years from Exodus to building the temple.	3196 2514 1	81	9	12 1 Acherres 8 213	19	42	46	
The flood of Deucalion, and conflagration of Phaeton about this time.	3198 2516 3	83	11	3 215	15 1 Echiurus 55	44	48	
	3201 2519 6	86	14	6 218	4	8 1 Cratopus 21	2 1 Cratons 10	
	3204 2522 9	89	17	13 1 Cherres 15 221	7	4	4	
	3211 2529 16	96	24	8 228	14	11 1 Sophistryon 12	3	
	3219 2537 24	104	32	14 1 Arneus, or Danaus 5 236	22	19	9	
	3222 2540 27	107	35	4 239	2	9 1 Stenhus 13	12	

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Exodus.	Moses	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Argos	Albent	
	3223 2541 28	108	36	5 240	26	2	4 Eric- thontus 50	
	3224 2542 29	109	37	14 1 Rameffes 68 241	27	3	2	Troy
	3228 2546 33	113	19 1 Amyntas 45	5 245	31	7	6	
	3229 2547 34	114	2	6 246	32	8	7	1 Dar- danus 64
	3233 2551 38	118	6	10 250	36	10 1 Danaus 50	11	5
The last year of Moses.	3235 2553 40	120	8	12 252	38	3	13	7
	Julian. World. Exodus	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Argos	Albens	Troy
The Israelites enter the Land of Promise.	3236 2554 41	1 1 Josua 18	9	13 253	39	4	14	8
	3253 2571 58	18	26	30 270	16 1 Corax 30	21	31	25
	3254 2572 59	2 1 Otho- niel 40	27	31 271	2	22	32	26
	3273 2591 78	20	20 1 Belochus the second 25	50 290	21	41	5 1 Pan- tion 40	45
	3283 2601 88	30	11	60 300	17 1 Epe- rus 35	11 1 Lynceus 41	11	55
	3292 2610 97	39	20	16 1 Menophis 40 309	10	10	20	64
	3293 2611 98	40	21	2 310	11	11	21	2 1 Eric- thontus 46
	3294 2612 99	3 1 Ebud 80	22	3 311	12	12	22	2
	3298 2616 103	5	21 1 Belopares 30	7 315	16	16	26	6
	3313 2631 118	20	16	22 330	31	31	6 1 Eric- thontus 50	21
	3318 2636 123	25	21	27 335	18 1 Lam- don 40	36	6	26
	3324 2642 129	31	27	33 341	7	12 1 Abbas 2	12	32
	3328 2646 133	35	22 1 Lamprides 32	37 345	11	5	16	36

A Chronological Table.

The 19 Dynastie : of the Lathes, 194. See L. 2. C. 26. §. 4.	3332 2650 187	39	5	17 Zethus, or Setebosus 1	15	9	20	40
	3339 2657 144	46	12	8 8	22	16	27	3 1 Trus 60
Tantalus in Phrygia.	3347 2665 152	54	20	16 16	30	13 1 Præ tus 17	35	9
	3358 2676 163	65	31	27 27	1 Sicyon 45	12	46	20
	3360 2678 165	67	23 1 Sofares 20	29 29	3	14	48	22
	3363 2681 168	70	4	32 32	6	17	7 1 Crecopt be 2.40	25
Pelops in Pisa, who gave name to Peloponnesus.	3364 2682 169	71	5	33 33	7	14 1 Acisfi us 31	2	26
Ion and Xuthus the Sons of Hellen. See L. 2. C. 17. §. 6.	3374 2692 179	4 1 Debra & Ba. 40	15	43 43	17	11	12	36
	3380 2698 185	7	24 1 Lamparis 30	49 49	23	17	18	42
	3387 2705 192	14	8	18 1 Ramses 66 56	30	24	25	49
After the death of Acrilius, the kingdom of the Ar- gives was divided into many small parts, and overgrown by that of Mycenæ, whereof some kings descended from Perseus, others from Pelops, as in the pedigree following.	3394 2712 199	21	15	8 63	37	31	32	56



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A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Exodus	Israel	Assyria	Egypt	Sicily	Mycenae	Athens	Troy
	3399 2717 204	26	20	13 68	42		37	4 1 Illus 55
	3402 2720 207	29	23	16 71	45	1 Eur- stheus 45	40	4
	3403 2721 208	30	24	17 72	20 1 Poly- bus 45	2	8 1 Pand- the 2, 25	5
	3410 2728 215	37	25 1 Pannias 45	24 79	8	9	8	12
	3414 2732 219	5 1 Gede- on 40	5	28 83	12	13	12	16
Pandion chased out of his kingdom, which is recovered by his son Aegeus, in few years after. The omission of this inter- regnum, and reckoning the years in the forty eighth of Aegeus, or the number- ing them a-part by themselves, breeds an- swerable difference in the times of the Athenians following: as of Meneleus, Carops, and the rest.	3427 2745 232	14	18	41 96	25	26	25	29
	3432 2750 237	19	23	46 101	30	31	9 1 Aege- us 48	34
Oedipus in Thebes.	3443 2761 248	30	34	57 112	21 1 Ha- ebus 42	42	12	45
	3447 2765 252	34	38	61 116	5	1 Aten- & Thye- stes 65	16	49
	3453 2771 258	40	44	19 1 Amenophis 40 122	11	7	22	55
	3454 2772 259	6 1 Abime- lech 3	45	2 123	12	8	23	5 1 Lau- med. 36
	3455 2773 260	2	26 1 Sofarmus 19	3 124	13	9	24	2
	3457 2775 262	7 1 Thola- 23	3	5 126	15	11	26	4
	3474 2792 279	18	27 1 Mitrus 27	22 143	32	28	43	21
	3480 2798 285	8 1 Jair 22	7	28 149	38	34	10 1 Theji- us 30	27
	3485 2803 290	6	12	33 154	22 1 P/4 flus 8	39	6	32
	3490 2808 295	11	17	38 159	6	44	11	6 1 Priu- mus 45
	3493 2811 298	14	20	20 1 Anemones 26 162	23 1 Ad a flus 4	47	14	4
	3497 2815 302	18	24	5 166	24 1 Poly- phides 31	51	18	8
	3501 2819 306	22	28 1 Tautanes 32	9 170	5	55	22	12

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Exodus.	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Mycena	Athens	Troy	
	3502 2820 307	9 1 Jeph- ta 6	2	10 171	6	56	23	13	
	3508 2826 313	10 1 Ibzan 7	8	16 177	12	62	29	19	
	3510 2828 315	3	10	18 179	14	64	11 1 Mnef- theus 24	21	
	3512 2830 317	5	12	20 181	16	1 Aga- memnon 18	3	23	
	3515 2833 320	11 1 Elon 10	15	23 184	19	4	6	26	
The war at Troy began this year.	3519 2837 324	5	19	21 1 Thuoris 7 188	23	8	10	30	
	3525 2843 330	12 1 Abdon 8	25	7 194	29	14	16	36	
The twentieth Dynasty, called of the Diapolitani, began this year in Egypt, and lasted 178 years. See lib. 2. cap. 26. §. 4.	3526 2844 331	2	26	20 1 Dynasty 178	30	15	17	37	
	3528 2846 333	4	28	3	25 1 Pelaf- gus 20	17	19	39	
Troy taken 408 years before the beginnig of the Olympiads. See lib. 2. cap. 14. §. 1.	3529 2847 334	5	29	4	2	18	20	40 Troy taken	
	Julian. World. Exodus.	From Troy taken	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Mycena	Athens	The kingdom of the Latins
	3530 2848 335	1	6	30	5	3	1 Aegy- sthus 6	21	
	3533 2851 338	4	13 1 Sampson 20	29 1 Teu- teus 40	8	6	4	24	1 Aene- as 3
	3534 2852 339	5	2	2	9	7	5	12 1 Demo- phon 35	2
	3536 2854 341		4	4	11	9	1 Ora- stus 70	3	2 1 Asca- nius 38
	3548 2866 353	19	16	16	23	26 1 Zeusip- pus 32	13	15	13
	3553 2871 358	24	14 1 Eli 40	21	28	6	18	20	18
	3567 2885 372	38	15	35	42	20	32	13 1 Oxy- tes 12	32
	3573 2891 378	44	21	30 1 Thy- neus 3	48	26	38	7	38
	3574 2892 379	45	22	2	49	27	39	8	3 1 Syl- Pophu- mus 29

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Exodus.	From Troy taken.	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Sicyon	Mycena	Athens	The kingdom of the Latines
<i>The Sicyonian kings ended in Zeulippus.</i>	3579 2897 384	50	27	7	54	32	44	14 Aphidas 1	6
	3580 2898 385	51	28	8	55		45	15 Timotes 8	7
	3588 2906 393	59	36	16	63		53	16 Melanthus 3	15
	3593 2911 398	64	15 Samuel and after him Saul 40	21	68		58	6	20
	3603 2921 408	74	11	31 Der-cilus 40	78		68	16	4 Sylvius Eneas 31
	3606 2924 411	77	14	4	81		1 Tifamenus 2	19	4
<i>The descent of the Heraclidae into Peloponnelus gave end to the kingdom of Mycenæ, and beginning to the kingdom of Sparta, Corinth, and Messene, the kings whereof I forbear to insert in this table.</i>	3609 2927 414	80	17	7	84			22	7
	3625 2943 430	96	33	23	100			17 Codrus 21	23
	Julian. World. Exodus.		From Troy taken.	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines	
	3633 2951 438		104	1 David 40	31	108	9	31	
	3634 2952 439		105	2	32	109	10	5 1 Syl. Latinus 50	
	3643 2961 448		114	11	32 1 Eupales 38	118	19	10	
<i>The Medontidae succeed unto the Athenian kings, after the death of Codrus. See l. 2. c. 17. §. 10.</i>	3646 2964 451		117	14	4	121	1 Medos 20	13	
	3666 2984 471		137	34	24	141	2 1 Agastus 36	33	
<i>Vaphres reigneth in Egypt. See l. 2. c. 26. §. 5.</i>	3673 2991 478	Temple 1	144	1 Salomon 40	31	148	8	40	
<i>Salomon began to build the temple 480 years compleat after the deliverance out of Egypt.</i>	3676 2994 481	1	147	4	34	151	11	43	
	3681 2999	6	152	9	33 1 Luof-benens 45	156	16	48	
	3684 3002	9	155	12	4	159	19	6 1 Syl. Alba 35	
	3692 3010	17	163	20	12	167 1 Sejac 26	27	9	
	3702 3020	27	173	30	22	11 177	3 1 Archippus 19	19	

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World.	Temple	From Troy taken.	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines
The 21 Dynasty in Egypt; which lasted 130 years.	3704 3022	29	175	32	24	13 1	3	21
The Ionic migration after the taking of Troy 180 years. See l. 2. c. 17. §. 6.	3709 3027	34	180	37	29	18 6	8	26
	Julian. World. Temple.	Troy	Juda	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines
	3713 3031 38	184	1 Rehoboam 17	1 Jarobam 22	33	22 10	12	30
	3718 3036 43	189	6	6	38	1 Chem- mis 50 15	17	35
	3721 3039 46	192	9	9	41	4 18	1 Ter- sippus 41	38
	3723 3041 48	194	11	11	43	6 20	3	1 Syl. A- lys 26
	3726 3044 51	197	14	14	34 1 Pirithiades 30	9 23	6	4
	3730 3048 55	201	2 1 Abijam 3	18	5	13 27	10	8
	3733 3051 58	204	3 1 Asa 41	21	8	16 20	13	11
	3734 3052 59	205	2	23 2 1 Nadab 2	9	17 31	14	12
	3735 3053 60	206	3	2 3 1 Baasha 24	10	18 32	15	13
	3749 3067 74	220	17	15	24	32 46	29	1 Syl. Cap- tus 28
	3756 3074 81	227	24	22	35 1 Ophraeus 20	39 53	36	8
	3758 3076 83	229	26	24 4 1 Ela 2	3	41 55	38	10
Of the Israelitish kings. See l. 2. cap. 19. §. 5.	3759 3077 84	230	27	2 5 Zimri 6 1 Tibni 7 Omri 12	4	42 56	39	11
	3762 3080 87	233	30	4	7	45 59	1 Phor- bas 31	14
	3768 3086 93	239	36	10	13	1 Che- ops 56 65	7	20
	3770 3088 95	241	38	12 8 1 Abab 22	15	3 67	9	22
	3774 3092 99	245	4 1 Jehoshaphat 25	5	19	7 71	13	26

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Temple.	Troy	Juda	Israel	Assyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines
	3776 3098 101	247	3	7	36 1 Ophratus 50	9 73	15	28
	3777 3095 102	248	4	8	2	10 74	16	9 1 Syl. Ca- petus 13
Of Jehoram his sundry beginning to reign. See l. 2. c. 20. §. 1 & 2.	3790 3108 115	261	17. 5 1 Je- horam	21 9 1 Abazia 2	15	23 87	29	10 1 Syl. Tiberi- nus 8
	3791 3109 116	262	18 2	22 2 10 1 Jehoram 12	16	24 88	30	2
	3793 3111 118	264	20 0	3	18	26 90	6 1 Meza- des 30	4
	3795 3113 120	266	22 1 Jehor- again 8	5	20	28 92	3	6
Jehosaphat dies, and Jehoram reigns alone.	3798 3116 123	269	25 4	8	23	31 95	6	11 1 Syl. Agrippa 41
	3802 3120 127	273	3 6 1 Abazia 1	12	27	35 99	10	5
	3803 3121 128	274	7 1 Atha- lia 7	11 1 Jehu 28	28	36 100	11	6
	3809 3127 134	280	7 8 1 Joas 40	7	34	42 106	17	12
Carthage built. L. 2. c. 22. §. 6.	3819 3137 144	290	11	17	44	52 116	27	22
	3825 3143 148	294	15	21	48	56 120	7 1 Diagne- tus 28	26
	3824 3142 149	295	16	22	49	50 121	2	27
	3826 3144 151	297	18	24	37 Orazap. or 1 A- nicyndaraxes 4.	3 123	4	29
	3831 3149 156	302	23	12 1 Jehoabaz 17	6	8 128	9	34
The end of the 21. Dynasty. The Dynasties following, 1 omit.	3833 3151 158	304	25	3	8	10 120	11	36
	3839 3157 164	310	31	9	14	16	17	12 1 Syl. Aladus 19
Joas reigned with his father. Lib. 2. c. 22. §. 7.	3845 3163 170	316	37	15 13 1 Joas	20	22	23	7
Joas reigns alone.	3847 3165 172	318	39	1 Joas 16	22	24	25	9
	3848 3166 173	319	40 9 1 Amas- sia 2	2	23	25	26	10

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Temple.	Troy	Juda	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines	
	3851 3169 176	322	4	5	26	28	8 1 Phere- dus 19	13	
	3858 3176 183	329	11	12	33	35	8 13 1 Syl. A- ventinus 37		
	3862 3180 187	333	15	16 14 1 Jeroboam 41	37	39	12	5	
	3868 3186 193	339	21	7	38 1 Sarda- napalus 20	45	18	11	
	3870 3188 195	341	23	9	3	47	9 1 Ari- phron 20	12	
	3874 3192 199	345	27	13	7	1 Myce- rinus 6	5	16	
	Julian. World. Temple.	Troy	Juda	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines	Media
L. 2. c. 22. §. 11.	3877 3195 202	348	1 Inter- regnum eleven years	16	10	4	8	19	
	3880 3198 205	351	4	19	13	1 Boc- chorus 44	11	22	
L. 2. c. 22. §. 12.	3887 3205 212	358	11	26	20 Sar- danapa- lus slain	8	18	29	
L. 2. c. 33. §. 1 & 4.	3888 3206 213	359	10 Uzzia, or Aza- ria 52	27		9	19	30	1 Arba- ces 28
	3890 3208 215	361	3	29		11	10 1 Thespo- rus 27	32	3
L. 2. c. 23. §. 4.	3892 3210 217	363	5	31	1 Belsh- or Phul. 48	13	3	34	5
	3895 3213 220	366	8	34	4	16	6	14 1 Syl. Procas 23	8
L. 2. c. 23. §. 1.	3903 3221 228	374	16	1 Interregnum 23 years	12	24	14	9	16
	3916 3234 241	387	29	14	25	37	27	22	2 1 Sofar- mus 30
	3917 3235 242	388	30	15	26	38	11 1 Agam- nestor 20	23	2
	3918 3236 243	389	31	16	27	39	2	15 1 Syl. Amulius 44	3
	3924 3242 249	395	37	22	33	1 Afchi- and af- ter him Anyfis 6	8	7	9
Zacharia began at the very end of the year. L. 2. c. 23. §. 1.	3925 3243 250	396	38	23 15 Zacharia six months	34	2	9	8	10

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Temple.	Troy		Juda	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines	Media	
	3926 3244 251	397			16 39 Sballum 1 month. 17 Menahem 10	35	3	10	9	11	
This year nearly concurs with the first of Menahem.	3927 3245 252	398		40	1	36	4	11	10	12	
	3930 3248 255	401		43	4	39	1 Sabacus the Ethiopian 50	14	13	15	
	3937 3255 262	408	Iphitus	Olympiads	50	18 1 Pekabiah 2	46	8 12 1 Æschylus 23	20	22	
The beginning of the Olympiads. L. 2. c. 23. §. 5.	3938 3256 263	409	1	1 1	51	2	47	9	21	23	
	3939 3257 264	410	2	1 2	52	19 1 Peka Romeliæ 20	48	10	3	24	
L. 2. c. 23. §. 6.	3940 3258 265	411	3	1 3	11 1 Jotham 16	2	2 1 Tiglab Phul Osmar 27	11	4	25	
	Julian. World. Temple.	Iphitus	Olympiads	Juda	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Athens	Latines	Media	
	3946 3264 271	9	3 1	7	8	7	17	10	29 1 Medidus 40		
	3955 3273 280	18	5 2	16 12 1 Abaz 16	17	16	26	19	38	10	
	3959 3277 284	22	6 2	5	1 Inter-regnum 7 years	20	30	23	42	14	
	3960 3278 285	23	6 3	6	2	21	31	13 1 Alcmeon 2	43	15	
	Julian World. Temple.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus	Olympiads	Juda	Israel	Affyria	Egypt	Athens	Romans	Media
Rome built. L. 2. c. 24. §. 5. Carops the first governing in Athens for 10 years; after whom succeeded six chosen each after other for the like time; and thence the office became annual.	3962 3280 287	1	25	7 1	8	4	23	33	1 Carops 10	1 Romulus 37	17
	3966 3284 291	5	29	8 1	12	20 1 Hosea 9	27	37	5	5	21
The Era of Nabonassar. L. 2. c. 25. §. 1.	3967 3285 292	6 1	30	8 2	13	2	3 1 Salmanassar, or Nabonassar 10	38	6	6	22
Ezekia began in the very end of this year. L. 2. c. 25. §. 1.	3968 3286 293	7 2	31	8 3	14 13 Ezekia 29	3	2	39	7	7	23
This year concurs with the first of Ezekia. Ibid.	3969 3287 294	8 3	32	8 4	15 1	4	3	40	8	8	24
The beginning of the first Mæsseni an war. Whenceof sect. 2. c. 27. §. 4. It lasted 20 years.	3971 3289 296	10 5	34	9 2	3	6	5	42	10	10	26
Amuria besieged by Salmanassar	3972 3290 297	11 6	35	9 3	4	7	6	43		11	27

A Chronological Table.

<i>The captivity of the ten tribes.</i>	3974 3292 292	13 8	37	10 1	6	9	8	45	13	29
	3976 3294 301	15 10	39	10 3	8		10 4 Senacherib 7	47	15	31
<i>L. 2. c. 26. §. 7.</i>	3980 3298 305	19 14	43	11 3	12	<i>Kings of the Chaldeans</i>	5	1 Setbon 32	19	35
<i>Senacherib's army destroyed, and he slain.</i> <i>L. 2. c. 26. §. 2.</i>	3982 3300 307	21 16	45	12 1	14		7	3	21	37
	3983 3301 308	22 17	46	12 2	15	<i>Merodach, or Mardocempadus</i>	5 1 Afar-baddon 10	4	22	38
	3986 3304 311	25 20	49	13 1	18	4	4	7	25	4 1 Cardiceas 13
<i>Merodach gets the whole empire. This year or in the end of the year foregoing.</i> <i>An eclipse of the moon.</i>	3993 3311 318	32 27	56	14 4	25	1 Merodach 40	11	14	32	8
	<i>Julian.</i> <i>World.</i> <i>Temple.</i>	<i>Rome.</i> <i>Nabon.</i>	<i>Ipbis</i>	<i>Olympiads</i>	<i>Juda</i>	<i>Chaldea</i>	<i>Egypt</i>	<i>Rome</i>	<i>Media</i>	<i>Lydia</i>
<i>Two eclipses of the moon, in the second year of Mardocempadus.</i>	3994 3312 319	33 28	57	15 1	26	2	15	33	9	
	3997 3319 322	36 31	60	15 4	29	5	18	36	12	1 Gyges 38
	3998 3316 323	37 32	61	16 1	14 1 Marnaffes 53	6	19	37	13	2
	3999 3317 324	38 33	62	16 2	2	7	20	1 Interregnum 1 year	5 1 Deioce. 53	3
	4000 3318 325	39 34	63	16 3	3	8	21	2 1 Numa Pompilius 43	2	4
<i>L. 2. c. 27. §. 2.</i>	4013 3331 338	52 47	76	19 4	16	21	1 Interregnum 2	14	15	17
	4015 3333 340	54 49	78	20 2	18	23	1 12 Princes 15	16	17	19
<i>The beginning of the second Mæstennian war; which lasted about 18 years.</i> <i>L. 2. c. 27. §. 4.</i>	4029 3347 354	68 63	92	23 4	32	37	15 1 Psammiticus 44	30	31	33
<i>L. 2. c. 28. §. 3.</i>	4033 3351 358	72 67	96	24 4	36	2 1 Ben Merodach 21	5	34	35	37
	4035 3353 360	74 69	98	25 2	38	3	7	36	37	2 1 Araks 49
	4043 3361 368	82 77	106	27 2	46	11	15	3 1 Tullus Hostilius 22	45	9
	4052 3370 377	91 86	115	29 3	55	20	24	10	6 1 Pbraortes 24	18
	4053 3371 378	92 87	116	29 4	15 1 Anu. 2	21	25	11	2	19

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World. Temple.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphit	Olympi- ads	Juda	Chaldean	Egypt	Rome	Media	Lydia
The expedition of the Scythians. L. 2. c. 28. §. 3 & 4.	4054 3372 379	93 88	117	30 1	2	3 1 Nabu- laffer 35	26	12	3	20
	4055 3373 380	94 89	118	30 2	16 1 Josias 31	2	27	13	4	21
L. 2. c. 28. §. 2.	4073 3391 398	112 107	136	34 4	19	20	1 Neco 17	31	22	39
	4075 3393 400	114 109	138	35 2	21	22	3	4 1 Ancus Marius 22	24	41
	4076 3394 401	115 110	139	35 3	22	23	4	2	7 1 Cyax- ares 40	42
	4084 3402 409	123 118	147	37 3	30	31	12	10	9	3 2 Sady- attes 12
L. 2. c. 28. §. 1 & 2.	4085 3403 410	124 119	148	37 4	31 17 Jehoabab 3 months	32	13	11	10	2
Nabuchodonosor had reigned one year with his father; which is to be regarded in astronomi- cal observations concerning his time. L. 2. c. 28. §. 6. & c. 25. §. 1.	4086 3404 411	125 120	149	38 1	18 1 Jehoia- kim 11	33	14	12	11	3
	4089 3407 414	128 123	152	38 4	4	4 1 Nabu- chodonosor the Gr. 44	17	15	14	6
	4090 3408 415	129 124	153	39 1	5	2	1 Psalmis 12	16	15	7
	4096 3414 421	135 130	159	40 3	11 1 Jeconia 3 months 10 1 Zedekiah 11 years	8	7	22	21	4 1 Halyat- us 57
Zedekiah his journey to Babylon. L. 2. c. 28. §. 6.	4099 3417 424	138 133	162	41 2	4	11	10	5 1 L. Tarju- inus Prif- cus 28	24	4
	4102 3420 427	141 136	165	42 1	7	14	1 Aprie, or Ho- pbra 10	4	27	7
Jerusalem taken by Nabuchodo- nosor; with whose 18 for the more part, and partly with whose 19 this year concurs.	4106 3424 431	145 140	169	43 1	11	18	5	8	31	11
	Julian. World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphit	Olymp.	Captivity	Chaldean	Egypt	Rome	Media	Lydia
Jerusalem destroyed.	4107 3425	146 141	170	43 2	1	19	6	9	32	12
Egypt conquered by Nabuchodo- nosor. L. 3. c. 1. §. 8 & 9.	4111 3429	150 145	174	44 2	5	23	10 1 Pharaoh Hoph- stain, and the king- dom of Egypt go- verned 40 years by him.	13	36	16
	4116 3434	155 150	179	45 3	10	28	6	18	8 1 Affy- ages 35	21
Nabuchodonosor lives wild; and his kingdom is governed by others for him, during seven years L. 3. c. 1. §. 13.	4125 3443	164 159	188	47 4	19	37 1 Evil- merodach 2	15	27	10	30
	4127 3445	166 161	190	48 2	21	39 1 Nigl- far and Nihar.	17	29	12	32

A Chronological Table.

	Julian. World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus	Olym- piads	Juda	Chaldee	Egypt	Rome	Media	Lydia	
Nebuchadnezzar recovers his sense and kingdom.	4131 3449	170 165	194	49 2	25	43 1 Labo- rosar- lach 9m.	21	33	16	36	
L. 3. c. 1. §. 6. The 37 of Jechonia his captivity compleat, and he enlarged.	4133 3451	172 167	196	49 4	27	5 1 Evil mer. 26	23	35	18	38	
	4137 3455	176 171	200	50 4	31	5	27	6 1 Serviu Tullus 44	22	42	
Forty years after the conquest of Egypt past, Ama- lis began his reign: this being inclusively the 41st, and therefore the next year seems concurrer with Amasis's first.	4151 3469	190 185	214	54 2	45	19	Amasis 34	15	9 1 Cyaxares or Darius the Mede 26	56	
	4153 3471	192 187	216	54 4	47	21	2	17	3	5 1 Cræsus 14	
	Julian. World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus	Olym- piads	Persia	Chaldee	Egypt	Rome	Media	Lydia	Jews
	4154 3472	193 188	217	55 1	1 1 Cyrus in Pe. 23	22	3	18	4	2	48
The seven sages in Greece.	4159 3477	198 193	222	56 2	6 1 Bal- thasf. 17	6	8	23	9	7	53
Pisistratus makes himself tyrant in Athens.	4104 3480	203 198	227	57 3	11	6	13	28	14	12	58
	4160 3484	205 200	229	58 1	13	8	15	30	16	14 Cræsus taken by Cyrus	60
The end of the Chaldean empire.	4175 3492	214 209	238	60 2	22	17 Bal- thasf slain	24	39	25		69
	4176 3494	215 210	239	60 3	23	1 Darius the Mede 2	25	40	26		70
The beginning of Cyrus's empire. The Edict of liberty to the Jews.	4177 3495	216 211	240	60 4	1 Cyru 7	2	26	41	Years from Cyrus		Zoroba- bel
	4181 3499	220 215	244	61 4	5		30	7 L. Tar- quinius Super. 7	5		Only Zorobabel and Nehemias are remembered as governors of the Jews unto the 32 of Artaxerxes Mnemon. But there were many before Nehemias; as himself witness 1eth. c. 5. v. 15. is that the story of them, their number, and names, are uncer- tain.
	4184 3502	223 218	247	62 3	2 1 Cam- byses 7		33	4	8		
The two first years of Psammenitus, and part of the third, may be added to the years of his father; if it be true that Cambyles won Egypt present- ly upon the death of Amasis. L. 2. c. 4. §. 2	4186 3501	225 220	249	63 1	3	1 Psam- menitus 3		6	10		
The conquest of Egypt by Cambyles.	4188 3506	227 222	251	63 3	5		3	8	12		
	Julian. World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus	Olym- piads	Persia	Egypt	Rome	Greece	Jews	From Cyrus	
Cambyles reigned 7 years and 5 months, so as the his last year was filled up by the Magi, and (as may seem) a good part of the next. L. 2. c. 4. §. 4	4191 3509	230 225	251	64 2	8 The Ma- gi 1 year		11			15	
	4192 3510	231 226	255	64 3	3 1 Darius Hystas- pes 36		12			16	

A Chronological Table.

	Julian and World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphit.	Olym.	Persia	Egypt	Rome.	Greece	Jews and from Cyrus.
	4197 3515	236 231	260	65 4	6		17	Hippias the son of Pisistratus ty- rant in Athens	21
	4204 3522	243 238	267	67 3	13 Babylon which had rebelled, ta- ken by Darius.		24		28
The Tarquines expelled Rome. L. 4. c. 7. §. 1.	4205 3523	244 239	268	67 4	14		25		29
The Carthaginians first league with Rome. L. 5. c. 1. §. 2.	4206 3524	245 240	269	68 1	15		Brutus and Publicola } Consuls		30
L. 3. c. 5. §. 4.	4211 3529	250 245	274	69 2	20 Darius's ex- pedition against the Scythians.				35
	4212 3530	251 246	275	69 3	21			The Athenians and Ionians take Sardes.	36
	4222 3540	261 256	285	72 1	31		Sp. Cassius, Posth. Co- minius, Consuls.	The battle of Marathon.	46
	4226 3544	265 260	289	73 1	35	Egypt rebelleth against Darius.			50
	4228 3546	267 262	291	73 3	4 1 Xerxes 21				52
The law Agraria in Rome propounded, for division of lands: which bred great commotion.	4229 3547	268 263	292	73 4	2	Egypt recovered by Xerxes.	Proc. Vir- ginius Sp. Cassius } Consuls		53
An eclipse of the sun. L. 3. c. 6. §. 2.	4233 3551	272 267	296	74 4	6 The great mis- ter of Xerxes's army at Sardis.				57
L. 3. c. 6. §. 3 & 6.	4234 3552	273 268	297	75 1	7			The battles at Thermopylae, Artemisium and Salamis.	58
L. 3. c. 6. §. 9, 10 & 11.	4235 3553	274 269	298	75 2	8 Xerxes's tra- gical love.			The battle of Plataea and My- cale.	59
L. 3. c. 7. §. 1 & 2	4237 3555	276 271	300	75 4	10			The Athenians rebuild their walls, and lay the foundation of their dominion.	61
	4244 3562	283 278	307	77 3	17			The great victo- ries of Cimon, at Eurymedon and elsewhere.	68
L. 3. c. 7. §. 3.	4248 3566	287 282	311	78 3	21 The death of Xer- xes by the treasor- er Artabanus.				72
	4249 3567	288 283	312	78 4	5 1 Artaxerxes Longimanus 40			Themistocles being banished flies to Artaxer.	73
	4251 3569	290 285	314	79 2	3	Inarus set up as king by the Eg- yptians.			75
L. 3. c. 7. §. 5 & 7.	4255 3573	294 289	318	80 2	7 The marriage of Heller.	Inarus vanquish- ed by the Persi- ans.			79 Belshazzar comes to Jerusalem. 1 Daniel's 70 weeks or 490 years begins.
	4264 3582	303 298	327	82 5	16		The Decemviri chosen to compound a body of the Roman laws.	Hippocrates the great physician, and Democritus the philosopher flourish.	88 10

A Chronological Table.

<i>The Account from the solution of the captivity is the same with that from Cyrus.</i>	Julian. World.	Rome Nabon	Iphitus	Olympiads	Persia	Egypt	Rome	Greece	Jews; or from Cyrus and Daniel
	4265 3583	304 299	328	82 4	17		The Decemviri chosen for a 2d year, tyrannize and usurp the place a 3d year.	Cimon's voyage to Cyprus, in which he died.	89 11
Nehemias comes to Jerusalem.	4268 3586	307 302	331	83 3	20			A league for 30 years between Athens and Sparta.	92 14
	4272 3590	311 306	335	84 3	24		Tribuni Militum first chosen instead of consuls. Dionys. Livy placeth them in the 110 year of Rome.		96 18
	4273 3591	312 307	336	84 4	25			The conquest of Samos by the Athenians under Pericles.	97 19
	4278 3596	317 312	341	86 1	30			The Athenians aid the Corcyreans against the Corinthians.	102 24
The Walls of Jerusalem finished. Nehemias returns to K. Artaxerxes.	4280 3598	319 314	343	86 3	32				104 26
L. 3. c. 8. §. 1.	4283 3601	322 317	346	87 2	35			The first year of the Peloponnesian war.	107 29
L. 3. c. 9. §. 1. L. 3. c. 8. §. 4.	4289 3607	328 323	352	88 4	6 Xerxes 2 months 7 Sogdianus 8 months			The victory of the Athenians at Salamis.	113 35
L. 3. c. 9. §. 1.	4290 3608	329 324	353	89 1	8 1 Darius Nothus 19				114 36
L. 3. c. 8. §. 5 & 6.	4292 3610	331 326	355	89 3	3			A vain and troublesome peace between Athens and Sparta.	116 38
L. 3. c. 9. §. 1 & c. 8. §. 8.	4301 3619	340 335	364	91 4	12 Egypt rebelleth against the Persian, and sets up kings that reign successively till Ochus's reconquest.	1 Amyrtaeus 6		The Athenian forces in Sicily utterly destroyed.	125 47
C. 8. §. 9.	4302 3620	341 336	365	92 1	13 Darius enters into confederacy with the Spartans.	2		The government of the 400 in Athens, which was suppressed the year following.	126 48
The Carthaginians invade Sicily with an army of 500000 men. L. 5. c. 1. §. 4. 13	4304 3622	343 338	367	92 3	15	4		The Athenians begin to recover strength.	128 50
L. 3. c. 8. §. 10.	4306 3624	345 340	369	93 1	17	6		Alcibiades after many victories returns from banishment to Athens: is made general, and banished again.	130 52
	4307 3625	346 341	370	93 2	18	2 Nephtes 6		The battle at Arginusæ.	131 53
	4308 3626	347 342	371	93 3	19	2		Dionysius the elder ships tyranny in Syracuse.	132 54
L. 3. c. 8. §. 12.	4309 3627	348 343	372	93 4	9 1 Artaxerxes Mnemon, 43	3		The battle at Aigos Potamos, &c.	133 55
	4311 3629	350 345	374	94 2	3	5	The siege of Veii, which lasted 10 years.		135 57
L. 3. c. 10. §. 1.	4313 3631	352 347	376	94 4	The expedition of Cyrus against Artaxerxes	3 1 Darius 12		Socrates put to death. The thirty tyrants put down in Athens.	137 59

A Chronological Table.

	Julian and World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphit.	Olymp.	Persia	Egypt	Rome	Greece	Jews From Cyrus and Daniel.
L. 3. c. 11. §. 4	4318 3636	357 352	381	96 1	10	6		Agessilaus warreth in Asia.	142 64
L. 3. c. 11. §. 7.	4320 3638	359 354	383	96 3	12	8		The victory of Conon at Ghidus, &c.	144 66
	4321 3639	360 355	384	96 4	13	9	Vei taken by Camillus.	Xenophon and Plato flourish.	145 67
	4325 3643	364 359	388	97 4	17	3 1 Plammiticus the son of Inarus, and after him Nephres. that had been expelled, reigned in all about two years.	The honourable victory of Camillus over the Falisci.		149 71
L. 4. c. 7. §. 1. L. 3. c. 11. §. 9.	4326 3644	365 360	389	98 1	18	2	Rome taken and burnt by the Gauls.	The peace of Antalcidas.	150 72
	4327 3645	376 361	390	98 2	19	4 1 Nectanebus 18			151 73
	4332 3650	371 366	395	99 3	24	6	M. Manlius Capitolinus put to death.	The Lacedemonians take the citadel of Thebes by treason.	156 78
L. 3. c. 11. §. 11.	4336 3654	375 370	399	100 3	28	10		The Thebans recover their citadel, and make strong war upon the Lacedemonians.	160 82
	4340 3658	379 374	403	101 3	32	14	Tribunes of the people continued 5 years in office, propounded popular laws, among which, that one of the consuls should be still a Plebeian.		164 86
L. 3. c. 12. §. 1.	4343 3661	382 377	406	102 2	35	17		The famous battle of Leuctra.	167 89
L. 3. c. 12. §. 4.	4345 3663	384 379	408	102 4	37	4 1 Tachus 8. Eusebius gives only 2 years to Tachus. Reince, 6; but the story of him proves more.	L. Sextus a Plebeian, and L. Aemilius, consuls.	The hasty growth of the Theban estate.	169 91
	4351 3669	390 385	414	104 2	43 Many provinces rebel against Artaxerxes, and are soon reclaimed.	7		The great battle of Mantinea. Epaminondas dies.	175 97
L. 3. c. 12. §. 8.	4352 3670	391 386	415	104 3	10 1 Ochus 23	8 Tachus betrayed by Agessilaus 1 Nectanebus 13		Peace in Greece. The Athenians awaken themselves by converting their treasures to vain uses.	Jonathan about this time high priest. 176 98
	4354 3672	393 388	417	105 1	3	3		Philip king of Macedonia 24 years, and part of the 25th.	178 100
L. 4. c. 1. §. 4.	4359 3677	398 393	422	106 2	8	8		The Phocian war begins	183 105
	4364 3682	403 398	427	107 3	13 Ochus reconquers Egypt.	13 Nectanebus flies into Ethiopia.		11	188 110
L. 4. c. 1. §. 6.	4368 3686	407 402	431	108 3	17			The end of the Phocian war.	192 114
L. 5. c. 1. §. 4. 1. 4	4369 3687	408 403	432	108 4	18			Timoleon's voyage into Sicily.	193 115
	4370 3688	409 404	433	109 1	19	Nabonassar. November the 17		Philip vanquisheth Illyria, and draws the Thessalians to follow him.	194 116
After this, the years from Cyrus and Daniel, are to five, by one	4375 3693	414 409	438	110 2	11 1 Arses 3.			22	199 Jaddus high priest. 121 16

A Chronological Table.

	Julian and World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus	Olymp.	Persia	Egypt	Rome	Greece	Jews. From Cyrus and Daniel.	
	4376 3694	415 410	439	110 3	2			²³ The battle of Cheronæa. Philip chosen captain-ge- neral of the Greeks.	² 199 121	
	4378 3696	417 412	441	111 1	¹² 1 Darius 6 years and somewhat more.	Nabon Novem. 15		²⁵ Philip slain by Pausanias 1 Alexander the great 12 years and 5 months.	⁴ 201 123	
	4379 3697	418 413	442	111 2	2			² Thebes razed by Alex- ander.	⁵ 202 124	
	4380 3698	419 414	443	111 3	3			³ Alexander passeth into Asia.	⁶ 203 125	
L. 4. c. 2. §. 4.	4381 3699	420 415	444	111 4	⁴ The battle of Issus.			4	⁷ 204 126	
L. 4. c. 2. §. 5, 6 & 7. & L. 5. c. 2. §. 8.	4382 3700	421 416	445	112 1	5	The Gauls enter into league with the Romans.		⁵ Alexander wins Tyre and Egypt.	⁸ Joddus meeting 205 Alexander is re- 127 verenced by him.	
	Julian. World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitus	Olymp.						
An eclipse of the moon.	4583 3701	422 417	446	112 2	⁶ The battle of Arbela			⁶ Babylon, Susa, and Per- sepolis won by Alexand.	⁹ 206 128	
L. 4. c. 2. §. 13.	4384 3702	423 418	447	112 3	⁷ Darius slain by Bessus			7	¹⁰ 207 129	
					Macedon	Egypt	Rome	Greece	Romans	Jews. Daniel.
	4385 3703	424 419	448	112 4	¹ Alexander chan- geth conditions: he puts to death Par- menio and Philotas					¹¹ 130
	4386 3704	425 420	449	113 1	⁹ Alexander pas- seth into India: kills Clytus and Callisthenes.					¹² 131
Alexander died 17 days before the summer sol- stice. From Nabonassar hitherto are collected 424 years: and hence to the reign of Augus- tus, 294. The sum is 718 years, which a- grees with this account. Ptolom. Almagest. l. 3. c. 8.	4390 3708	429 424	453	114 1	¹³ Alexander dies at Babylon.	Nabon. Novemb. 12.				¹⁶ 135
	4391 3709	430 425	454	114 2	¹ Arydæus 6. and 4 months.	¹ Ptolemy Lagi 39	L. 3. c. 3. §. 1, 2 & 3.	The Lami- an war.		¹ Onias 23 136
	4394 3712	433 428	457	115 1	4	⁴ Perdikkas slain in E- gypt	Nab. Nov. 11	L. 4. c. 3. §. 8 & 9.	Victories of Eume- nes.	⁴ 139
	4395 3713	434 429	458	115 2	⁵ Antigonus sent against Eumenes.	5				⁵ 140
Arydæus slain by Olym- pias. Antigonus beat- en by Eumenes.	4397 3715	436 431	460	115 4	7	7				⁷ 142
Eumenes betrayed to An- tigonus. Olympias slain by Cassander. Antigo- nus grows distrustful.	4398 3716	437 432	461	116 1	¹ Cassander 19	8		Thebes re- edified by Cassander.		⁸ 143
Some place the beginning of Seleucus in this 121 from Alexander, by which account he reign- ed 32 years.	4402 3720	441 436	465	117 1	5	¹² Nabonassar. Novemb. 9.	Demetrius beat- en at Gaza, by Ptolemy and Se- leucus.			¹² 147
Peace between Alexan- der's captains: with division of provinces.	4403 3721	442 437	466	117 2	6	13				¹³ 148

A Chronological Table.

	Julian and World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphit	Olyn.	Macedon	Egypt	Syria and the kingdom of the Greeks.	Greece	Romans	Jews and Daniel.
The Era of the kingdom of the Greeks.	4404	443	117				1			14
	3722	438	467	3	7	14	1 Seleucus 30 1	L. 4. c. 5. §. 7		149
Alexander's captains as- sume the name of kings.	4406	445	118				3	Athens set free by Demetrius		16
	3724	440	465	1	9	16 Ptolemy overcome by Demet. at Cyprus	3	the son of Anti- gonus.		151
L. 4. c. 6. §. 4.	4413	452	119				10 The battle of Ip- sus, wherein Anti- gonus was slain.			23
	3731	447	476	4	16	23	10			158
	4414	453	120				11 Seleucus makes alliance with De- metrius.			1 Simon the an- tient.
	3732	448	477	1	17	24	11			13
	4417	456	120				14			4
	3735	451	480	4	1 Antipater and Alexan. the son. of Cassander	27	14			162
L. 4. c. 6. §. 7.	4421	460	121				18			8
	3739	455	484	4	1 Demetrius 6	31	18			166
	Julian World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphit	Olyn.	Macedon	Egypt	Sy. i. i.	Greece	Rome	Jews. Daniel.
	4427	466	123				24			1 Eleaz. b. priest
	3745	461	490	2	1 Pyrrhus 7 months	37	24			19 172
	4428	467	123				25			2
	3746	462	491	3	1 Lyfimachus 5	38	25			173
	4429	468	123				26			3
	3747	463	492	4	2	39 2 1 Ptolemy Philadel- phus 38	26			174
The translation of the Bible by the Septua- gint.	4432	471	124				29		The Tarentines raise war in the eastern part of I- taly and call in Pyrrhus against the Romans.	6
	3750	466	495	3	5	4	29			177
L. 4. c. 6. §. 9. & c. 7 §. 2.	4433	472	124				30 Seleucus slain in the end of the 124 Olymp. Polyb. & Justin. 30		Pyrrhus's victo- ry against the Romans.	7
	3751	467	496	4	6 Lyfimachus slain. Seleucus 7 mon	5				178
L. 4. c. 7. §. 3 & 7	4434	473	125				2	Gauls do great spoil in Maced. & Greece under Brennus & Belg		8
	3752	468	497	1	1 Ptol. Ceraunus. Antipater Meleager Sophthenes	6 Nabon. Nov. 1.	1 Antiochus So- ter 19 31			179
	4436	475	125				3			10
	3754	470	499	3	1 Antigonus Gonatas 36	8	33		Pyrrhus goes into Sicily.	181
L. 5. c. 2. §. 6.	4438	477	126				5	About this time the Achaeans be- gun their society.	Pyrrhus called out of Sicily a- gainst the Rom.	12
	3756	472	501	1	3	10 Nabon year begins the first of October.	35			183
	4439	478	126				6		Pyrrhus over- thrown by the Romans.	13
	3757	473	502	2	4	11	36			184
L. 4. c. 7. §. 5.	4441	480	126				8		The Tarentines crave aid of the Carthaginians.	15
	3759	475	504	4	6	13	38			186
The translation by the Septuagint finished, the 17 of Philadelphus.	4445	484	127				12			19
	3763	479	508	4	10	17	42			190
	4446	485	128				13			1
	3764	480	509	1	11	18 Na- bonassus Oct. 25	43			191
The more ancient Ro- man consuls have been often so uncertain, that Livy hath doubted whom to name.	4450	489	129				17		The beginning of the first Puni- war.	5
	3768	484	511	1	15	12 Na- bonassus Oct. 28	47	L. 5. c. 1 §. 3.		195

A Chronological Table.

	Julian and World.	Rom.e. Nabon	Ipbit	Olymp	Mace- don	Egypt	Syria and king- dom of the Greeks	Greece	Romans	Jews. Daniel	
	4453 3771	492 487	516	129 4	18	25	3 1 Antiochus The- us 16 50			8 198	L. Valerius T. Othacilius
L. 5. c. 1. §. 6.	4454 3772	493 488	517	130 1	19	26	2 51		Duilius's victory at sea.	9 199	G. Duilius Cn. Cornelius
	4457 3775	496 491	520	130 4	22	29	5 54		Regulus passed into Africk.	12 202	M. Atil. Reg. Cn. Cornelius
L. 5. c. 1. §. 8.	4458 3776	497 492	521	131 1	23	30	6 55	Marcus Carya- nensis pretor of the Achæans.	Regulus taken prisoner.	13 203	L. Manlius Q. Cæcilius
	4463 3781	502 497	526	132 2	28	35	11 60	Aratus recovers Sicyon and joins it to the Achæans.		18 208	L. Cæcilius G. Furius
The Roman consuls bea- ten at Lilybæum. The beginning of the Par- thian kingdom.	4464 3782	503 498	527	132 3	29	36	12 61		Regulus's death	19 209	G. Atilius L. Manlius
	4465 3783	504 499	528	132 4	30	37	13 62		Shipwreck & un- happy fight of the Romans at sea.	20 210	P. Claudius Pulcher, and L. Junius
	4467 3785	506 501	530	133 2	32	39 Ptole- my Ever- getes 26	15 64			22 212	L. Cæcilius M. Fabius
Amilcar the Carthagi- nian in Sicily. L. 5. c. 1. §. 11.	4469 3787	508 503	532	133 4	34	3	4 1 Seleucus Calli- nicus 20 66			22 214	M. Fabius G. Atilius
	4472 3790	511 506	535	134 3	2 Deme- trius 10	6	4 69		Lucretius his great victory at Ægædis.	27 217	C. Luc. Catu- s. Posthumius
The war of the Mercen- aries with the Car- thaginians. L. 5. c. 2	4473 3791	512 507	536	134 4	2	7	5 70	Aratus wins Corinth.	Peace granted to Carthage.	Onias 1 218	Q. Lucretius A. Manlius
	4474 3792	513 508	537	135 1	3	8 Nabon Oth. 22	6 71			Simon the just 28 219	G. Claudius M. Sempronius
The war with the Mer- cenaries ended.	4476 3794	515 510	539	135 3	5	10	8 73		The Romans tak- Sardinia from the Carthaginians.	3 221	Gracchus Falko
	4482 3800	521 516	545	137 1	3 Antio- chus Do- fon 12	16	14 79			9 227	Lepidus Marcellus
	4483 3801	522 517	546	137 2	2	17	15 80		A Roman am- bassador slain by queen Teuta.	10 228	M. Æmilius M. Junius
L. 5. c. 2. §. 7.	4485 3803	524 519	548	137 4	4	19	17 82		Teuta queen of Illyria subdued by the Romans.	12 230	L. Posthumius G. Fulvius
L. 5. c. 5. §. 1.	4489 3807	528 523	552	138 4	8	23	5 1 Seleucus Ce- raunus 3 86			16 234	L. Æmilius G. Atilius
Flaminius was also con- sul this year. See L. 5. c. 2. §. 8.	4492 3810	531 526	555	139 3	11	26	5 1 Antiochus the Great 36 89		Marcellus's vic- tory over the Gauls about Mi- lan.	19 237	G. Cornelius M. Marcellus
L. 5. c. 5. §. 2.	4493 3811	532 527	556	139 4	12	27	2 90			20 238	P. Cornelius M. Minutius
	4494 3812	533 528	557	140 1	4 1 Philo- pator 42	2	3 91			21 240	L. Furius Q. Lucretius

A Chronological Table.

	Jul. Worl	Ro. Na	Ip.	Oly.	Macedon	Egypt	Syria and king- dom of the Greeks.	Greece	Rome	Jesus and Daniel	Consuls
Hannibal takes Saguntum.	4495 3813	534 529	558	140 2	2	3	4 92	Demetrius Pharius chased out of his lord- ship.		22 240	L. Æmilius M. Livius
The beginning of the second Punic war.	4496 3814	534 530	559	140 3	3	4	5 93	L. 5. c. 3. § 4.	The battle of Ficinus and Trebia.	23 240	P. Cor. Scipio T. Sempronius
The occurrences of this year are referred by Polybius l. 5. to the 3 of the 14 Olympiad. This battle of Thrasymene was fought in the spring. The Olympian year began at the summer solstice.	4497 3815	536 531	560	140 4	4 22. Feb. 11. reckoning by Ju- lian years.	5 between Antio- chus and Ptole- my.	6 94	Philip and the Ache- ans make peace with the Ætol.	The battles of Thrasymene.	24 242	C. Flaminius Cn. Servilius
Hannibal and Marcellus. Hiero K. of Syracuse dies. Hieronymus succ.	4499 3817	538 533	562	141 2	5	6 Nabonassar's year beg. Oct. 16	7 95		The great battle of Cannæ.	25 243	C. Ter. Varr. Æm. Paul.
The two Scipio's slain in Spain. Hannibal wins Tarentum.	4502 3823	541 536	565	142 1	9	10	11 99	Philip and the Ache- ans have war with the Ætoli- ans and Romans in Greece.	Syracuse won by Marcellus. Capua besieged.	247 39	Ap. Claudius Onias Q. Fulvius
Hannibal at the walls of Rome.	4503 3821	542 537	566	142 2	10	11	12 100		Scipio sent in to Spain. Capua won by the Rom.	2 248	Cn. Fulvius P. Sulpitius
	4507 3825	546 541	570	143 2	14	15	16 104		The battle at Metaurus.	6 252	C. Claud. Nero M. Livius
	4508 3826	547 542	571	143 3	15	16	17 105		Scipio drives the Carthaginians quite out of Spain.	7 253	Q. Cæcilius L. Veturius
	4510 3828	549 544	573	144 1	17	5 Ptolemy Epi- phanes 24	19 107		Scipio invades Africk	9 255	Cethegus P. Sempronius
	4511 3829	550 545	574	144 2	18	2	20 108		King Syphax taken.	10 256	Servilius and Servilius
	4512 3830	551 546	575	144 3	19	3	21 109		Hannibal van- quished by Scipio	11 257	T. Claudius M. Servilius
The end of the 2d Punic war, and beginning of the Macedonian war with Philip. This year and the next were 3 eclipses of the moon.	4513 3831	552 547	576	144 4	20	4	22 110		Scipio triumph over Carthage.	12 258	Lentulus Pætus
	4516 3834	555 550	579	145 3	23 Philip over- come at the river Apus by the Ro-	7	25 113		L. 5. c. 4. §. 13	15 261	T. Q. Flamin. Sex. Ælius
L. 5. c. 4. §. 14.	4517 3835	556 551	580	145 4	The battle at Cynoscephalæ.	8	26 114			16 262	Cethegus Q. Minucius
Hannibal expelled Carthage, L. 5. c. 5. §. 4. C. 4. §. 15.	4518 3836	557 552	581	146 1	25 Peace be- tween Philip and the Romans.	9	27 115	Liberty of Greece pro- claim'd by the Rom.		17 263	L. Furius Marcellus
C. 5. §. 5.	4519 3837	558 553	582	146 2	26	10	28 116	War upon Nabis the tyrant.		18 264	M. Cato L. Valerius
C. 5. §. 7.	4522 3840	561 556	585	147 1	29	13	31 119	Antio. at Cbalcis		21 267	L. Quintius Cn. Domitius
	4523 3841	562 557	586	147 2	30	14	32 120	Ant. vanquished at Thermopylæ.		22 268	Acilius Glab. Nasica
	4524 3842	563 558	587	147 3	31	15	33 121	C. 5. §. 8	The gr. victory of L. Scipio over Antiochus in Affi- nica which gave be- ginning to the Roman luxury.	23 269	L. Scipio L. Lælius

A Chronological Table.

	Julian World.	Rome. Nabon.	Iphitu.	Olym.	Macedon	Egypt	Syria & kingdom of the G.	Greece	Rome	Jews and Daniel.	Consuls
L. 5. c. 5. §. 9.	4527	566	590	148	34	18	36		Scipio driven to banish himself from Rome.	26	Lepidus
	3845	561		2							Flaminius
	4528	563	591	148	35	19	6 1 Seleu- cus Phi- lopat. 12			27	Sp. Posthumius
	3846	562		3							Q. Martius
L. 5. c. 6 §. 2.	4531	570	594	149	38	22	4		Scipio, Hanni- bal and Philo- pæmen die. Tully placeth Scipio's death 2 years earlier.	30	Marcellus
	3849	565		2							Q. Fabius
L. 5. c. 6. §. 3.	4532	571	595	149	39 The tyranny of Philip. His son Demetrius ac- cused to him, and slain next year.	23	5			31	Paulus
	3850	566		3							Cn. Bæbius
C. 6. §. 4.	4533	572	596	149	40	24	6 Calli- crates betrays the A- cheans and all the Gre.			32	Cethegus
	3851	567		4							M. Bæbius
	4534	573	597	150	41	1 PtolemæusPhi- lometor and his brother Physcon	7 131			33	A. Posthumius
	3852	568		1							Piso
	4535	574	598	150	42 1 Perseus 11, or 12 years.	2	8 132			34	Piso
	3853	569		2							Manlius
An eclipse of the moon the 7th of Philometor 573 years and 206 days from the beginning of Nabon. which agrees with this account. It was (by Julian year.) the last of April, about one of the clock in the morning.	4540	579	603	151	6	7	7 1 Antio- chus E- phan. 12			39	Sp. Posthumius
	3853	574		3							Scævola
	4541	580	604	151	7	8	2 138		See L. 5. c. 6. §. 11.	Jason buys the h. priest- hood and suff. him Menela- us. 286	L. Posthumius
	3859	575		4							M. Popilius
	4543	582	606	152	9 The beginning of the war of Per- seus.	10	4 140		C. 6. §. 6.	288	P. Licinius
	3861	577		2							C. Cassius
	4545	584	608	152	11	Egypt invaded by Antiochus under pretence of helping one king against the other	6 142			290	Martius
	3863	579		4							Servilius
A total eclipse of the moon, following the a- rrival of Perseus, in the year of Nabon- nassar here re- corded.	4546	585	609	153	12 Perseus van- quished and ta- ken.	13 Antiochus com- manded out of Egypt by the Romans, spoils the temple.	7 143	C. 6. §. 8, 9 & 11.	Gentius king of Illyria taken.	291 Persecu- tion in Jewry for reli- gion.	L. Æm. Paul.
	3864	580		1							C. Licinius
	4547	586	610	153	Macedon made a Roman pro- vince.	14	8 144	The cap- tivity of all the best a- mong the Greeks.	Triumphs in Rome.	C. 6. §. 10 & 12.	Pætus
	3865	581		2							Junius
	4549	583	612	153		16	10 146			1 Judas Macca- beus 6	Torquatus
	3867	581		4							Octavius

F I N I S.

I N D E X.

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- A** BACUC, where buried 216. his monument seen by St. *Jerome, ibid.*
- ARIJAH succeeds *Rehoboam* in the kingdom of *Israel*, 290. his victory against *Jeroboam, ibid.*
- ARIMELECH murders his seventy brethren, all but one, and is made king by the *Shechemites*, 245. mortally bruised with a stone thrown by a woman, and, at his own command, run through the body by his page, *ibid.*
- ABNER, *Saul's* general, forced to kill *Asabel*, 272. slain by *Joab*, 273
- ABORIGINES, 232
- ABRAHAM, when born, 124, 128. not the eldest son of *Terah*, 127. made but one journey into *Canaan*, 124. his age before *Noah* died, *ibid.* at his entrance into *Canaan*, 128. and when he rescued his nephew *Lot*, and overthrew *Amraphel*, 130. first taught the *Chaldeans*, *Phenicians*, and *Egyptian* priests astrology and divine knowledge, 115. contemporary with *Ninus*, *Semiramis*, and *Xerxes*, 123. many mighty families that came out of his kindred, 217
- ABROCOMAS, his cowardice, 432
- ABSALOM, his rebellion, 276
- Absolute lords, their advantage over such as are served by voluntaries, 423
- ABYDENI, their furious resolution, 723
- Academics, their opinion of light, against *Aristotle*, 7
- ACHAB, and his successors, 211. his death, 229
- ACHÆMENES, his association with *Arbaces* against *Sardanapalus*, 387
- ACHÆMENIDÆ, two races of them, 387
- ACHÆUS slays the murderers of *Selucus Ceraunus*, and takes charge of the army in the minority of *Antiochus* the great, 736. turns traitor, 741. blocked up in *Sardis*, 742. betrayed to *Antiochus*, who weeps over him, and condemns him to a cruel death, 744
- ACHAIANS, when the most powerful nation in *Greece*, 593
- ACHERON, the river which the poets describe to be in hell, where it riseth, 237
- ACHILLES, his contention with *Agamemnon*, 258. reconciled, 259. kills *Heclor*, and is slain by *Paris, ibid.*
- ACHITOPHEL rebels against his lawful prince, 276. hangs himself, *ibid.*
- ACRISIUS, his fate foretold by an oracle, 240
- ACRITHONOS, a most delightful and healthful situation, 27. the place, according to *Tertullian*, where the blessed souls were preserved till the last judgment, *ibid.*
- ADA, queen of *Caria*, adopts *Alexander the great* her son, and successor, 465, 466
- ADAM, his body, its creation, 40. whence his name, 157. his sin, and fall, 42. his free power in his first creation enigmatically described in the person and fable of *Proteus*, 21. his line by *Cain* 45. where buried, an improbable conjecture, 27. — and *Eve*, the cause of their disobedience, 42
- ADHERBAL, governor of *Drepanum*, arrives with great forces about *Lilybæum*, 560. takes the *Roman* fleet under *M. Claudius*, the consul, 574
- AMETUS, king of *Thessaly*, served by *Apollon* a herdsman, 239
- ADONI-BEZEK, his cruelty to 70 kings justly requited, 177, 216, 235
- ADONIJAH, *David's* eldest son, his faction, 278
- ADRIAN, his severe edict against the *Jews*, 234
- Adversity always friendly, 450. often malicious, 480. sure to hear of her errors, 580. rectifies the understanding, 671
- Advisedness and rashness, 614
- ÆGINA forced by the *Athenians*, 417
- ÆGEO-POTAMOS, the battle at, which ended the *Peloponnesian* war, 427
- ÆGYRA taken by surprise, and lost again through greediness of spoil, 702, 703
- ÆMILIUS PAULUS, his great circumspection, 620. encouragement of his soldiers, 621. his care to prevent great mischief from the ill conduct of his vain-glorious colleague, 623. slain at the battle of *Cannæ*, 626
- ÆMILIUS PAULUS, his Son, sent against *Perseus*, and forces him to decamp from *Dium*, 804. his superstition, 805. gets the victory at *Pydna*, 806. and the whole kingdom of *Macedon* into his power, *ibid.* will not allow *Perseus* the title of king, 807. abrogates the ancient laws of that country, and gives new ones, 809. sacks the whole country of *Epirus*, 190, 810. his triumph at *Rome*, 816. calamities which beset him at that time, and a noble expression of his to the people thereupon, *ibid.*
- ÆNEAS flies to *Italy* from *Troy*, and marries *Lavinia*, 334. said to be the founder of some towns in *Sicily*, 550
- Æra of the kingdom of the *Greeks*, when it began, 515
- ÆSCULAPIUS, when he flourished, 181
- AGAG, a general name given by the *Amalekites* to their kings, 178
- AGAMEMNON at variance with *Achilles*, 258. with *Menelaus*, 260. killed by *Ægyllus, ibid.*
- AGATHOCLES, the degrees by which he became tyrant of *Syracuse*, 560. a comparison between him and our king *Richard III. ibid.* gains a victory over the *Carthaginians*, and styles himself king of *Afric*, 562. his bloody nature, 563. his base and obscure death, *ibid.*
- AGATHOCLES, protector of *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, stabbed to death, 746
- AGENOR built and possessed the cities of *Tyre* and *Zidon*, 204. neither he, nor his son *Cadmus*, the inventor of letters, *ibid.*
- Ages, the seven, of man, compared to the seven planets, 20.
- AGESILAUS, his war with *Tissaphernes*, 443. war and treaty with *Pharnabazus*, 444. called out of *Asia* to help his country, 445. wastes *Boeotia*, and overthrows the *Thebans* and their allies, 446. sent into *Egypt, ibid.* proves a traitor, *ibid.* his death and character, 455. a comparison between him and *Pompey the great, ibid.*
- AGIS, the second of the *Heracidae* in *Lacedæmon*, his glorious achievements, 280. his successor, king of *Sparta*, endeavouring to reform that state, is imprisoned and strangled, with his mother and grandmother, 595
- AGRIGENTUM besieged, and won by the *Romans*, 564. an account of its foundation, magnificent buildings, &c. *ibid.*
- AHAZ, his reign, 330
- AHAZIAH, his reign, 300. death, 202, 301
- AJAX, his proud and prophane answer to his father, 316
- Air, its original, 7. prodigies seen in it, 812
- ALBA, the kings of, 334. *Alba longa*, by whom founded, *ibid.*
- ALCETUS, brother to *Perdiccas*, his unhappy end, 498
- ALCIBIADES first appears powerful in *Athen*, and occasions the renewing of the *Peloponnesian* war 423. forced to banish himself, 425. like to be murdered for lying with the wife of *Agh* king of *Sparta*. 426. conveys himself to *Tissaphernes*, and plays his own game with him, *ibid.* wins many great victories for the *Athenians*, is recalled from exile, made their general, and again banished, 427. his good counsel rejected by the *Athenian* commanders, 428. put to Death, *ibid.*
- ALCINOUS's gardens, *Homer's* invention of them from *Moses's* description of *Paradise*, 24
- ALEXAMENUS, sent by the *Etolians*, kills *Nabis*, 760. himself slain, *ibid.*
- ALEXANDER, son of *Amyntas*, king of *Macedon*, his bloody entertainment of ambassadors from *Darius*, 398
- ALEXANDER the great born, 462. succeeds his father, 463. elected captain-general of *Greece, ibid.* beats the *Persians* at the *Granicus*, 464. and *Darius* at *Issus*, taking his wife, mother, and children prisoners, 469. wins the city of *Tyre*, 470. and *Gaza, ibid.* and *Egypt*, 471. makes a journey

I N D E X.

- to the temple of *Jupiter Hammon*, and is saluted son of *Jupiter*, *ibid.* routs *Darius* at *Arbela*, and finds a great mass of treasure there, 474. burns *Persepolis* by the persuasion of a strumpet, 475. visited by *Thalestris*, queen of the *Amazons*, 478. his treatment of a flattering historian, *ibid.* grows luxurious, 479. a conspiracy against him, *ibid.* subdues the *Bactrians*, &c. and fights the *Scythians*, 481. kills *Clitus*, and others of his friends, 483. marches into *India*, and gets a victory over *Porus*, 484. forms a device to beguile posterity, 485. gives himself wholly to feasting and drinking, 486. visits the sepulchre of *Cyrus*, *ibid.* marries *Statira*, *ibid.* suppresses a dangerous mutiny; laments the death of *Ephastion*; returns to *Babylon*, and dies, *ibid.* the time of his death, 394. his character, 487. his issue, 488. pompously buried at *Alexandria*, a city of his own building, 489. his whole race extinct, 518. &c. all his treasures found, where, 509
- ALEXANDER, son of *Perseus* king of *Macedon*, bred a joiner at *Rome*, 815
- ALEXANDER, son of *Polyperchon*, revolts from *Antigonus*, 511. loses his life by the treason of the *Sigonians*, 512. his death revenged by *Cratesipolis* his wife, *ibid.*
- ALEXANDER JANNEUS, king of the *Jews*, overthrown by *Ptolemaeus Lathurus*, 202. surprises *Gaza*, &c. and slays 500 senators in the temple of *Apollo*, 239
- ALEXANDRIAN library, by whom built and furnished, 738
- ALLIENSIS, dies, an unlucky day, what, and why so called in the *Roman Calendar*, 534
- ALTIINIUS, his treason justly punish'd, 651
- ALMAGGIM, trees brought from *Ophir*, of which the pillars of *Solomon's* temple were made, 284
- ALPS, a weak defence against an invasion, and why, 465
- AMALEK overthrown by *Moses*, 150
- AMALEKITES, a branch of the *Ismaelites*, 177
- AMASIS takes possession of *Egypt*, 383
- AMAZIA, king of *Judah*, his dissimulation, 312. war and success against *Edom*, 313. idolatry, 314. taken prisoner by *Joas*, king of *Israel*, 315. grossly flattered under his misfortunes, 317. generally hated, 318. his death, *ibid.*
- AMAZONS, the opinion of ancient historians, &c. concerning them 478
- Ambassadors, the law of nations concerning them, 602
- Ambition, the first sin, 245. makes haste to find out dishonour, 612. malignant of others virtue, a vile quality in a great counsellor, 739. why boundless in kings, 817
- AMILCAR, sent by the *Carthaginians* to relieve *Syracuse*, 560. suspected of treachery, carried prisoner into that city, and beheaded, 562
- AMILCAR, son of *Gisco*, admiral of the *Carthaginians*, beaten by the *Romans*, 567
- AMILCAR BARCAS, father of *Hannibal*, recovers the city of *Eryx* from the *Romans*, 574. holds war with them for five years, 575. his passage over the river *Bagradas*, 586. first victory over the mercenaries, 587. his humanity to his prisoners affrights their captains, *ibid.* his artful entrapping of the rebels, and great slaughter of them, 589. takes *Yunis*, *ibid.* made general in the *Spanish* expedition, 591. his singular virtues acknowledged by his greatest enemies, *ibid.* slain in the battle with the *Vettones*, *ibid.*
- AMILCAR, a *Carthaginian*, captain of the *Gauls* in *Italy*, besieges *Cremona*, overcome and slain by the *Romans*, 728
- AMBRUSE, St. his saying of truth, 4
- AMMON, king of *Juda*, his reign, 358
- AMMONITES, their kings, 224
- AMO., the prophet, when he lived, 322
- AMPHIARAUS, his destiny, 247, 248
- AMRAPHEL, king of *Shinar*, who he was, 130. wars with a nation of *gibbims*, 217
- AMRERAEUS usurps the kingdom of *Persia*, 429
- Amraquists, contemners of all order, discipline, and church-government, 167
- ANAK, a giant, from what custom he got the name, and left it to his posterity, 216
- ANASTASIUS, the emperor, slain by lightning, 336
- ANUS MARTIUS succeeds *Tullus Hostilius* in the kingdom of *Rome*, 366, 531
- ANDROCLUS, the founder of *Ephesus*, 282
- ANDROMEDA delivered from the sea monster by *Perseus*, 213
- ANDRONODORUS, his inability in resigning his protectorship, 651. artful attempts to usurp a tyranny in *Syracuse*, 659. slain, 660
- Angels, why *Moses* forbore to speak of them, 5
- ANGRA, in *Terara*, a strong fort, 574
- ANNIUS, quite contrary to *Moses*, in his situation of *Henoch*, 44. his mistake in planting *Gomer* in *Italy*, and *Tubal* in *Spain*, 77. how to be credited, 134. his *Philo* condemned, 304. *Araxea*, a nation of the *Scythians*, feigned by him, 69
- ANATOLIDAS, the peace of, 447
- ANTIGONUS, the elder, in danger of his life, flies to *Antipater*, 494. made lieutenant of *Asia* by him, 497. routs *Eumenes*, *ibid.* his greatness, 501. great war raised against him by *Eumenes*, 502. driven back with great loss, 505, 506. a second battle between them, *ibid.* the last battle, 507. puts to death *Eumenes*, who was betray'd to him, 508. slays *Python*, and makes himself lord of *Persia*, 509. leaves none in office there, but his own creatures, *ibid.* his great riches, and yearly income, 509, 510. the *Chaldeans* bring strange prophecies to him, 510. combined against by *Ptolemy*, *Cassander*, and others, *ibid.* his sturdy answers to each of their ambassadors, *ibid.* takes many cities in *Egypt*, 511. his declaration against *Cassander*, *ibid.* his fleet and land-army utterly defeated, 512. his successes in *Asia* and *Greece*, 513, 598, 600. takes upon him the style of king, 521, 593. his unsuccessful expedition against *Egypt*, 523. great preparations of war against him, 524. slain at the battle of *Ipsus*, and his whole estate lost, 526. his character, *ibid.*
- ANTIGONUS GONATAS, son of *Demetrius*, gets the kingdom of *Macedon* from the *Gauls*, 538. forsaken by his own soldiers, and loses it to *Pyrrhus*, 539. raises a new army, and regains his kingdom, 540. gets possession of *Acrocorinthus* by a subtil device, 593. his death, *ibid.*
- ANTIGONUS, called the Tutor, also *Dofon*, and why, 593. made protector to *Philip*, son of *Demetrius*, *ibid.* his expedition into *Achaia*, 598. made captain-general over the *Achaians* and their confederates, *ibid.* vanquishes *Cleomenes* at *Selasia*, 600. overcomes the *Illyrians*, but catches his death in that battle by overtraining his voice, *ibid.*
- ANTIOCH, upon the *Orontes*, St. *Luke* and *Ignatius* born there, and St. *Peter* bishop thereof, 94
- ANTIOCHUS SOTER, son of *Seleucus*, beaten by *Demetrius*, son of *Antigonus*, 526. falls passionately in love with, and marries his father's wife *Stratonice*, 526, 737. his death and issue, 738
- ANTIOCHUS, surnamed the great, 600. in the beginning of his reign wholly governed by *Hermias*, 739. marches against *Molo*, a rebel, 740. gets an easy victory over him, *ibid.* wins *Seleucia* from *Ptolemy Evergetes*, 741. loses the battle at *Raphia*, and goes to *Ptolemy* for peace, 742. takes the city of *Sardis*, 743. his expedition against the *Parthians*, and *Hircanians*, 744. *Bactrians* and *Indians*, 745. his personal valour, *ibid.* passes over the *Hellestont*, and rebuilds *Lyfimachia*, 747. sends ambassadors to the *Romans*, 748, 772. intreated to go to *Greece*, as arbitrator between the *Romans* and *Etolians*, 759. made general of all the *Etolian* forces, 762. wins *Chalcis*, and the whole island of *Eubœa*, *ibid.* marries a citizen's daughter of *Chalcis*, 764. driven out of *Greece*, 766. utterly vanquished by the *Romans*, 772. accepts of a peace from them upon their own terms, *ibid.* his death and issue, 810. an account of his war in *Egypt*, 811, 812. brought to an end by the *Roman* ambassadors, 813, 814
- ANTIOCHUS, surnamed *Theos*, son to *Soter*, poisoned by his own wife, 738
- ANTIOCHUS HIERAX, or the Hawk, why so called, 739. wars with his brother *Seleucus Callinicus*, 738, 739. put to flight, betakes himself to *Ptolemy Evergetes*, is imprisoned by him, escapes, falls among thieves, and is murdered by them, 739
- ANTIPATER said to poison *Alexander the great*, 486. sends to *Craterus* for succour, 490. loses a battle to *Leosthenes*, and is besieged in *Lamia*, *ibid.* comes to the aid of the *Macedonian* camp, 492. grants peace to the *Athenians*, and makes great changes in their government, *ibid.* drawn into *Asia*, 493. Chosen protector of *Macedon*, and returns thither with king *Antidæus*, 497. his death and character, 498
- ANTIPATER, eldest son of *Cassander*, kills his own mother, 528. put to death by his father-in-law, 528, 529
- ANTONIUS, *Lucius*, rebel to *Domitian* the emperor, the humour of his defeat, how far carried in one day, 412
- ATIGA, wife of *Nabûs* tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, fitly matched with him, for plundering their subjects, 724
- APELLER, counsellor to *Philip*, his device to supplant *Arræto*, 707. happily discovered, *ibid.* enters into a conspiracy against the king, 708. his arrogance and treachery towards him, 714. falls into disgrace, and is forsaken by his attendant, *ibid.* committed to prison, and dies therein, *ibid.*
- APOCLETI, the privy council of *Etolia*, so called, 759
- Apostles, the twelve, where chosen, 198
- APOLLO, his temple at *Delphus*, the many ruins it suffered, 56. consumed by fire from heaven, in the time of *Juhan* the *Apostate*, *ibid.* plunder'd by the *Phocians*, 459. his oracle to *Pyrrhus*, 540. that concerning *Athen* misinterpreted, 407
- APOLLO and *Diana*, whence the invention of that fable, 58
- APOLLORIDI, his treachery, 497
- Appetites, three sorts of, in every man, 115
- APPIUS

I N D E X.

APPIUS CLAUDIUS arrives at *Messene* in favour of the *Mamertines*, 546. routs the *Carthaginians*, 548
 APRIES, king of *Egypt*, strangled by his own subjects, 379
 APSUS, or *Aous*, a river in the streights of *Epirus*, 729
 ARABIA FELIX, by whom planted, 81. *Petrea*, 177
 ARAD, king of the *Canaanites*, surprises divers *Israelites*, 168
 ARAM, the sons of, 98
 ARAM NAHARAJIM, now *Mesopotamia*, 101
 ARARAT, the mountain, where, 71, &c.
 ARATUS expels the tyrant of *Sicyon*, 593. surprises the citadel of *Corinth*, 594. led by private passion, makes a bad bargain for his country, 596. violently opposes a league with *Cleomenes*, 597. obstinate against all the gentle overtures of *Cleomenes*, who thereupon waives his native country, 598. wholly governs *Philip*, 598, 703. a plot formed to supplant him, 707. poisoned by *Philip's* means, 717. divine honours decreed him by the *Sicyonians* and *Achæans*, *ibid.*
 ARAXEA, a nation of *Annius's* making, 69
 ARBACES obtains the kingdom of *Affyria* after *Ninus*, 319. transfers it to the *Persians*, *ibid.* takes *Nineveh*, after above two years siege, *ibid.*
 ARBELA, the battel of, 473. different accounts of it, 474.
 ARCADIA, from whom its name, 179. great tumults therein, 452
 ARCADIANs plant *Italy*, 331. desert the *Messenians*, 353. stone their king *Aristocrates*, 354. their boast, that they were more ancient than the moon, explained, 179
 ARCHELAUS makes himself king of *Macedon*, by the murder of his brother, uncle and cousin, 457
 ARCHIMEDES, where born, 549. his strange engines for the defence of *Syracuse*, 661, 662. his lamented death and honourable burial, 664
 ARCHONS of *Athens*, 399
 AREOPAGUS, why so called, 55
 ARGINUSÆ, the battel at, 427
 ARGIVES, how they came to be called *Danai*, 89. at dissension among themselves, 424
 ARGONAUTS, their expedition, 243
 ARGOS, the name of an altar in *Greece*, where *Seleucus Nicator* was slain, 737
 ARIADNE, the story of her, 246
 ARIARETHES, king of *Cappadocia*, made prisoner, and crucified by *Perdiccas*, 491
 ARIDÆUS, base brother to *Alexander*, succeeds him in the kingdom of *Macedon*, 487. the princes divide the empire from him, and leave him a bare title, 489. his great weakness, *ibid.* seized by *Antipater*, 497. cruelly put to death by *Olympias*, 503
 ARIMASPI, a one-eyed nation, their war with griffins, 100
 ARIOCH, said to be king of *Ellas*, where he reigned, 130, 131
 ARISTAGORAS surprises the *Persian* fleet, 400. assisted by the *Athenians*, 401. surprises and burns *Sardis*, *ibid.* his troops destroyed by the *Edonians*, *ibid.*
 ARISTALUS, the book, which goes under his name, suspected as counterfeit, 738
 ARISTIDES, general of the *Athenians*, his integrity, 414. his *Ephemerides* of his own dreams, 117
 ARISTOCRACY, what sort of government, 303
 ARISTOCRATES, his treachery, 353. the just reward thereof, 354
 ARISTODEMUS, his blind zeal, with the fruits of it, 353
 ARISTOMENES heads the *Messenians*, and routs the *Spartans*, 353. refuses to be made king, *ibid.* taken by the *Spartans*, 354. his marvellous escape out of prison, *ibid.* his bravery and generosity, *ibid.* his death and character, 355
 ARK, *Noah's*, where it rested, 66
 — of GOD, taken by the *Philistines*, 261. sent back, 262. conducted to the city of *David*, 273
 ARMEUS, otherwise *Danans*, king of *Egypt*, 139. afterward becomes king of *Aegy*, *ibid.*
 AROR, the chief city of *Gad*, distinguished from other cities of that name, 221
 ARSINOE married to her brother *Ptolemy Ceraunus*, and banished by him, 537
 ARTABANUS, his fruitless counsel to *Xerxes*, 403. his treason, 415. himself and his whole family put to death by extreme torments, *ibid.*
 ARTABAZUS flies into *Thrace*, after the battel of *Plataea*, 411. highly favoured by *Alexander* for his fidelity to *Darius*, 477. made governor of *Bactria*, 481
 ARTAXERXES MNEMON succeeds his father *Darius* in the kingdom of *Persia*, 429. the battel between him and *Cyrus* the younger, 433. his vain ostentation, *ibid.* base mind, 434. his court a school for the art of falsehood, 437
 ARTAXERXES LONGIMANUS, his reign, 415. was *Abasuerus*, the husband of queen *Esther*, 417.
 ARTEMISIA, queen, fits out several galleys, 404. accompanies *Xerxes* in his *Grecian* expedition, 408. her good advice to him, *ibid.*

ARTEMISIUM; the battel at, 405
 ASA, king of *Juda*, his reign, 291. a remarkable battel between him and *Zara*, king of the *Arabians*, 216, 291. imprisons the prophet *Hanan*, and dies miserably, 292.
 ASCALON, the birth-place of *Herod*, CHRIST's persecutor, repaired by *Richard I*, king of *England*, 214
 ASCALUS, one of the sons of *Hymenæus*, 214
 ASCLEPIUS, his method of curing the frenzy, 271
 ASDRUBAL arrives with a great army about *Lilybæum*, and is defeated by *Timoleon*, 560. made general of the *Carthaginian* forces in *Spain*, 591. greatly enlarged the dominions of *Carthage*, and built the city, now called *Carthagera*, *ibid.* killed by a slave, whose matter he had put to death, 592
 ASDRUBAL, son of *Amilcar*, brings forces to *Hannibal* against the *Romans*, 618. commands the *Gauls* and *Spanish* horse, 624. breaks the *Roman* troops, 625. routs them with very great slaughter, 625, 626. his strange flight towards *Italy*, 642. his terrible entry into *Italy*, 671. his main oversight, 672. his death, and character, 674
 ASDRUBAL, son of *Gesco*, chosen general of the *Carthaginians*, 685. fired out of his camp by *Scipio*, 688. flies to *Carthage*, *ibid.* raises new forces, and again put to flight by the *Romans*, 689
 ASDRUBAL, surnamed the *Kid*, sent ambassador from the *Carthaginians* to *Rome*, to obtain a peace, 700
 ASHER, the tribe of, where settled, 189
 ASIA the *Less*, by whom planted, 78
 ASSUR, the name thereof diversly taken, 108
 ASSYRIA, the kings of, 340
 ASSYRIANS, who the father of them, 97. invite *Cæsar* to their assistance, 131.
 ASTARTE, *Juno* called by that name, 189
 ASTRONOMY, how long since known, 92. by whom invented, 110
 ASYCHIS, his severe law against insolvent debtors, 347
 ATHALIA, her schemes, 301. cruelty, 302. usurps the kingdom of *Juda*, *ibid.* her sacrilege, 303. would destroy her grandson *Joas*, *ibid.* a conspiracy against her, 307. her miserable death, 308. her character, 297. a comparison between her and *Jezabel*, *ibid.*
 ATHENIANS, their true original, 82. their ingratitude to *Theseus*, 246. enmity to *Xerxes*, 409. besiege *Sestos*, 413. send a fleet into *Egypt* against the *Persians*, 415, 416. force *Ægina* to surrender upon most base conditions, 417. and *Samos*, 418. subdue *Mitylene*, 420. their rough answer to the *Lacedæmonian* ambassadors, 423. an instance of their bad policy, 425. their government changed from a democracy to an oligarchy, 426. their flattery of *Antigonus* and *Demetrius*, 517. thirty tyrants oppress them intolerably, 428. their stratagem against *Syracuse*, 553. they besiege it, *ibid.* obstinate in prosecuting the war in *Sicily*, 554. beaten at sea by the *Syracusians*, *ibid.* their last sea-fight in *Sicily*, 554; 555. the miserable end of their whole army 555
 ATLAS, brother of *Prometheus*, contemporary with *Moses*, 171. his judgment in astrology, 179. divers of that name, 178, 179
 ATROSSA, her wanton pride the occasion of *Xerxes's* war with *Greece*, 306. by some thought the same with queen *Esther*, 393. proved not, 417.
 ATTALUS, king of *Pergamus*, beleagued in his own city, 720. relieved by the *Tectosages*, a nation of the *Gauls*, from *Thrace*, *ibid.* they afterwards invade his kingdom, and are beaten by him, *ibid.* enters into a confederacy with the *Etolians*, &c. and wars upon *Philip*, 720, 721. grossly flattered by the *Athenians*, 722. assists the *Romans*, 727. requests their aid against *Antiochus*, 728. his death, 737. a rare example of brotherly love between him and *Eumenes*, 792
 ATTILIUS REGULUS kills a monstrous serpent, 568. victorious against the *Carthaginians*, *ibid.* utterly beaten by them, made prisoner, and cruelly put to death, 569. his character, *ibid.*
 AUGUSTINE, St. his saying of wicked men, 11. of predestination, 13. his answer to those that take the tree of life allegorically, 40. makes *Noah's* ark a figure of the church, 64. his opinion of *Baal* and *Astarte*, 189
 AULIS in *Beotia*, a goodly haven, 143
 AULONIUS, his epigram upon *Dido*, 312.

B

BABYLON, king of *Israel*, begins his reign in blood, and continues it in idolatry, 292
 BABEL, the first known city of the world after the flood, 67. the tower forty years in building, 68
 BABYLON, its history, 323, &c. kings, 360, 374. won by *Cyrus*, 390. the greatness of it before that time, 391. surrendered to *Alexander*, 474. submits to *Schæmus*, 514
 BACCHUS, his expedition into *India*, 53, 482
 BAGOAS, his malicious cruelty, 486

BALONI.

I N D E X.

- BALONIMUS, a gardener, made king of *Zidon*, 205. a good saying of his to *Alexander the Great*, 470
Balsamum, a medicinal drug, where found, 217, 224
 BALTHASAR, his mischievous nature, 384. impious feast, 390. the hand-writing on the wall against him, 391. slain by his revolted lords, *ibid.*
 BANKS, his horse, 119
 BARIS, an exceeding high mountain in *Armenia*, on which it is reported many were saved at the deluge, 57
 BASAN, a region most fertile of oaks, 224
 BASTARNÆ, a nation beyond the *Danubius*, invited by *Philip*, 783. fall upon *Dardania*, 787. return home from *Perseus* for want of pay, 803
Baths of the *Inca's*, or kings in *Peru*, 218. in *England*, much warmer in the night than in the day, 472
 BATHSHEBA, the mother of *Solomon*, why not named by *St. Matthew*, 278
Battels of *Ægos-Potamos*, 427. *Arbela*, 473. *Arginusæ*, 427. *Artemisium*, 405. *Cannæ*, 622. *Chæroneæ*, 461. *Cynosephale*, 733. *Gaza*, 513. the *Granicus*, 464. *Ipsus*, 525. *Iffus*, 467. *Leuctra*, 449. *Magnesia*, 771. *Mantineæ*, 453. *Marathon*, 402. *Metaurus*, 673. *Mysale*, 411. *Nadagara*, 696. *Olynthus*, 460. *Platææ*, 410. *Pydna*, 805. *Salamis*, 408. *Thermopylæ*, 405. *Thrasymene*, 615. *Ticinum*, 611. *Trebia*, 612
 BDELLIUM, what it is, and where great plenty of it, 35, 36
 BECANUS, his opinion of the tree of knowledge refuted, 41
Beginning, the meaning of the word, 4
 BEGLERBEG, a *Turkish* title, its signification, 346
 BEL, a name imposed, 110
 BELISARIUS, his unworthy destiny, 782
 BELLEROPHON, the history of, 239. the fable of him and *Pegasus* moralized, *ibid.*
 BELOSUS rebels against *Sardanapalus*, 319. he and *Phul* the same, 323
 BELUS, *Nimrod*, and *Ninus*, were three distinct persons, 106. *Belus*, properly the first that peaceably, and with general allowance, exercised sovereign power, *ibid.* his sepulchre, 110
Benefit, from wrongs done, makes not injustice the more excusable, 665
 BENHADAD twice overthrown by *Achab*, 229
 BENJAMIN, the tribe of, where settled, 231
 BEROALDUS, his solution of doubts from the text, *a river went out of Eden*, 33
 BERSUS, his fragment proved to be counterfeit, 80
 BESSUS, governor of *Bactria*, his treasons against *Darius*, 476. pursued by *Alexander*, 477, 479. taken and delivered up to *Darius's* brother, 482
 BETHLEHEM, the native city of *Ibzan*, *Elimelec*, and our Saviour *JESUS CHRIST*, 216
 BETHSAN, anciently *Nysa*, built by *Liber Pater*, 201
 BETHSEMITES, above fifty thousand, slain for looking into the ark of *GOD*, 262
 BETIS, his gallant defence of *Gaza*, and behaviour under *Alexander's* cruelties, 470
Birds, their prognostications, 117. a child fed by them, 122. — of *India*, their cunning in making their nests, 154
Birds and beasts, their language understood, by whom, 238
Birbright, the cause of *Adonijah's* death, 283
 BITUMEN, where found, and its use, 220
Blissing, the valley of, 216
Bodies, human, reflections upon the baseness and frailty of them, 18
 BOEOTIANS re-enter their own land, and recover their liberty, 418. rebel against the *Romans*, and are rigorously punished, 798
Books, mentioned in scripture, which are lost, 172. *Numa Pompilius's* found near 600 years after they had been buried, 356
 BOREAS, his rape of *Orythia*, 237
 BOZIUS, his false doctrine, 208
 BRANTIUS, his easy nature, 630
Bravery, of all qualities, the least requisite to sovereign command, 627
Breathing, how understood of *GOD's* breathing the spirit of life into man, 19
 BRIAREUS, the fable of him well expounded by *Sir Francis Bacon*, 294
 BRITAINS, what boats they crossed the seas with, in the time of the *Romans*, 78. their manner of fight, 143. their policy against the *French* under *Charles VIII*, 544
 BRITISH language hath remained among us above 2000 years, 81
 BRITOMARUS slain by *Marcellus* in single fight, 605
 BRIZE, an easterly wind, so called by the *Spaniards*, 28
 BRUTUS, his extreme severity, 532
 BURROUGH leads the way for the *English* fleet through the wreights of *Fishnoor*, 574
 BUSIRIS, king of *Egypt*, the first oppressor of the *Israelites*, 138

C

- CABALA, what it imports, 47
 CADMUS, the first that brought letters into *Bæotia*, 180
 CÆCILIUS, the *Roman* consul, his victory at *Panormus*, 573
 CÆSARIA PALESTINÆ, 202. *Philippi*, 195
 CAIN, the history of him, 42, 43. his going from *GOD's* presence not to be understood literally, 43. the first *Jupiter*, 50
 CAIRO, by whom founded, 344
 CALANUS, an *Indian* philosopher, burns himself, 486
 CALEB, of greatest authority in the tribe of *Juda*, after the death of *Joshua*, 236
Calendar reformed by *Julius Cæsar*, 145
 CALIPPUS slain with the same dagger, with which he had murdered *Dion*, 559
 CALLISTHENES cruelly put to death by *Alexander*, 483. *Seneca's* censure of that deed, *ibid.*
 CALPAS, a goodly haven, 440
 CAMBYSES, his chief reason for hindering the building of the city and temple of *Jerusalem*, 393. marries two of his own sisters, *ibid.* conquers *Egypt*, 395. his indignities to the dead body of king *Amasis*, *ibid.* attempts to overturn the temple of *Jupiter Ammon*, *ibid.* his many detestable murders, *ibid.* his accidental death by his own sword, 396
 CAMILLUS, *Furius*, his integrity and fortitude, 533. unjustly banished, *ibid.* his notable service against the *Gauls*, 534
 CAMPANIA, the most fruitful province of *Italy*, 627
 CAMPANIANS submit to the *Romans*, 534. their character, 627
 CANAAN, the land of, described, 187
 CANAANITES, what nations they were, 176. their kings, 177. most of their cities unconquered by *Israel*, 185
 CANDAULES, king of *Lydia*, his fatal dotage upon his wife, 340, 341
 CANNÆ, the battle of, 623
 CANUTUS, his advantage against *Edmund Ironside*, 570. a single combat between them, 678
 CAPE, now called of *Good Hope*, discovered, and by whom, 359
 CAPERNAUM, where *CHRIST* first preached, its situation, 196
 CAPONI, *Peter*, his bravery at the siege of *Florence*, 316
 CAPUA, the siege of, 652. taken by the *Romans*, 656
 CARDAN's mortal devils, 118
 CARTHAGE, when, and by whom built, 312, 545. its antiquity, power and strength, 544. described, 545. the causes of its destruction, *ibid.*
 CARTHAGENA, in the kingdom of *Granada*, when and by whom built, 591.
 — in the *West-Indies*, built by the *Spaniards*, and sack'd by the *English*, *ibid.*
 CARTHAGINIAN butchery, 330
 CARTHAGINIANS anciently *Tyrians*, 191. their wars with the *Romans*, 547, 566. gain a victory against *Attilius*, 568. prosperous afterwards, 570. beaten at sea by *Lutetius*, 576. forced to sue for peace upon hard terms, 577. cruel war with their own mercenaries, 577, &c. provoke the *Romans* to war, 608. victorious at *Thrasymene*, 615. niggardly to *Hannibal*, 634. war with the *Romans* in *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, and are overcome, 657, &c. driven by *Scipio* from the continent to the isle of *Gades*, 675. obtain a peace from the *Romans*, 701
 CARTHAGO, his great enterprize against the *Romans*, 575
 CASLOIM, the first founder of the *Philistines*, 281
 CASSANDER begs the assistance of *Antigonus* in his insurrection against *Polyperchon*, 499. his successes against *Polyperchon*, 500. beaten by *Alexander* for mocking his assumed divinity, 503. his revenge upon *Olympias*, 504. seeks to make himself king of *Macedon*, 505. builds *Cassandra*, and redifies *Thebes*, *ibid.* wars with *Antigonus*, 511. his politick dealing with *Alexander*, son of *Polyperchon*, 512. vanquishes *Glaucias*, king of the *Illyrians*, *ibid.* murders *Roxana*, *Alexander's* wife, and his son, 518. pressed hard by *Demetrius*, 520. his death, 528. his children slain, and whole race soon extinct, *ibid.*
 C. CASSIUS, his wife answer, 425
 CATARRACTÆ COELI, probably expounded, 62
 CATO, *M. Portius*, his character, 756, 776. overthrows the *Etolians*, 765. his oration in the *Roman* senate against *L. Scipio*, 776. his writings, 756
 CAUCASUS, its height, 72
 CEDAR, the most lasting wood, 64
Celestial bodies, observations of them, the surest marks of time, 515
 CENSORS, *Roman*, their office, 649
 CENTAURS, from whom descended, 245

CENTRITES,

I N D E X.

ENTRITES, the river, its rise, and course, 437
CETAPHIM, or *Hagiographa*, what, and why so called, 372
CETHIM, afterwards called *Macedon*, 85
CHABOT, admiral of *France*, loses his estate, offices, and liberty, by the falshood of chancellor *Poyer*; but restored to them, 682
CHERONEA, the battel of, puts an end to the liberties of *Greece*, 461
CHALDEA, *Babylonia*, and *Shinar*, three names of one country, 30
CHALDEANS, their original, 97
CHALYBES, their merchandize in iron, and other metals, 79. annoy the *Greeks* in their march to *Trabifond*, 437
Challenges, giving them condemned, 679, 680
CHAM, or *Ham*, intitled *Jupiter Hammon* by the *Egyptians*, 54. his sons, 85. the first king of *Egypt*, 134. his successors, 134, 136
CHARIDEMUS, his good advice to *Darius* most barbarously rewarded, 468, 469
CHARLES V. emperor, his precept to his son *Philip*, 567. his great loss by tempest, 570. the *Lie* sent him by *Francis* the *French* king, 679
CHARLES IX. of *France*, his treachery to *Monsieur de Piles*, 557
CHARRAN, sometimes called *Charre*, *Haran*, and *Aran*, is but the same *Charran* in *Mesopotamia*, 30. famous for the overthrow of *Craffus*, *ibid.*
CHÉBAR, mentioned by *Ezekiel*, but a part of the *Euphrates*, 36
CHEDORLAOMER, where he reigned, 131. wars with a nation of giants, 217
CHEMNIS, king of *Egypt*, his *Pyramis*, 346
CHEOPS, the tale devised against his daughter, 346
Child, fed by birds, 122
CHISON, on whose banks the idolatrous priests of *Baal* were slain in king *Achab's* time, 201
Chivalry, the court of, its good institution, 681
CHRIM TARTARS, their manner of living, 398
Christian Religion, an indiscreet zeal, to admit foreign proofs to strengthen it, 776
Churches, why built east and west, 23
CHUSH, his sons, 94, 105
CICERO, *M. Tullius*, an observation upon his conduct, and fate, 15. curious remarks of his, 153, 165, 179, 534, 544, 775
Cidarim, a garment worn by the *Persian* kings, 132
Cimbri, whence so called, 80. broke into *Asia*, 362. their war in *Lydia*, 363
CIMON, general and admiral of the *Athenians*, 414. takes the city of *Phaselis*, 415. obtains two great victories by sea and land in one day, *ibid.* sent with a strong fleet to take in the isle of *Cyprus*, 416. his death, 417
CINCINNATUS, *L. Quintius*, taken from the plough and made *Dictator*, the highest honour in *Rome*, 533. his noble expedition against the *Volsi*, *ibid.*
Cios taken, and cruelly destroy'd by *Philip*, son of *Demetrius*, 720
Ciphers and characters, when, and by whom, first used, 47
Civil law defined, 164. when first written, *ibid.*
Civility, when it first appeared in *Europe*, 178
CLEADAS, his fruitless arguments with *Alexander* not to destroy *Thebes*, 464
CLEANDER, and his accomplices in the murder of *Parmenid*, justly rewarded, 486
CLEANTHES, the *Stoic*, his description of *God*, by what attributes and properties, 36
CLEARCHUS drives the *Persians* out of their camp, 434. his arrogant message to *Artaxerxes*, *ibid.* his fatal credulity, 435. beheaded, 436
CLEOMENES marries the wife of *Agis*, king of *Sparta*, 595. his victory against *Aratus*, 596. returns to *Sparta*, slays the *Ephori*, and restores the ancient discipline of *Lycurgus*, *ibid.* his great courage and conduct, *ibid.* his victory at *Dymes* in *Achaia*, 597. forced to abandon *Acrocorinthus*, 598. defeated at *Olympus*, flies to *Sparta*, and is lovingly entertained by *Ptolemy Evergetes*, 600. fails in a desperate attempt at *Alexandria*, and kills himself, *ibid.*
CLEOPATRA, sister to *Alexander the great*, betrothed to *Ptolemy Lagus*, 516, 520. murdered by the secret contrivance of *Antigonus*, 520
CLYPEA, a port-town, of great use to the *Romans* against the *Africans*, 567
COCALUS, king of the *Sicani*, kills *Minos*, king of *Crete*, 243, 349
COCKES, *Horatius*, his admirable resolution, 532
CODRUS, king of the *Athenians*, his generous attempt, and hard fate, 282. the *Athenians* change their government, in honour to his memory, 399
Coin, gold and silver, where found, and by whom supposed to have been hidden, 61

COLLIGNI, *Gaspar de*, admiral of *France*, his answer to one that foretold his death, 509
Combats, single, a very ancient custom, 272. a discourse of them, 678
Common law of *England*, upon what customs grounded, 164
CONCOLITANUS, and *Anerosflus*, kings of the *Gauls*, slain in battel with the *Romans*, 605
CONGO, the kingdom of, threw off the *Christian* religion, because plurality of wives was denied them, 166. emperor of, guarded by *Amazons*, 478, 479
Conjecture, its use in history, 306
CONON, the *Athenian*, his victories, 445. rebuilds the walls of *Athens*, 446
CONON, the *Byzont*, his famous retreat, 441
Conquerors, a reflection on them, 816
Consuls, the first at *Rome*, instead of kings, 532. their government transferred to military tribunes, 534. the consular authority established, *ibid.*
Contineny not a virtue, only a degree unto it, 162
Coral, great store of it in the *Red sea*, 147
CORIOLANUS, *T. Martius*, by what victory he got that surname, 533. banished by the *Romans*, and put to death by the *Volsi*, *ibid.*
Corn, without sowing, 35, 549. the rules of setting and sowing it, where first taught, 549
CORTEZ, *Ferdinando*, his unfortunate offer to the emperor *Charles V.* 558
Counsellors, dishonour rather to be laid on them, than on kings, and why, 523
Court-wars, wicked arts in them, 590
Cowardice and courage, a strange mixture of them, 594
CRATERUS, his malice, 480. made lieutenant of *Macedon*, &c. 486. joins forces with *Antipater*, 492. marries his daughter, 493. reduces the *Etolians* to hard terms, *ibid.* too hasty for an encounter with *Eumenes*, 495. his death greatly lamented by *Eumenes*, 496
CRATIPPUS, his answer to *Pompey*, 389
Creation of the world, 3, 4. a sum of the six days works, 10
CREON, his cruelty, 248
Crocodiles in *Egypt*, 100
CROESUS, the cause of his enmity with the *Medes*, 386. his pedigree, 388. many conquests, *ibid.* despises the good counsel of *Sardanes*, *ibid.* quits the field to *Cyrus*, and flies to *Sardis*, 389. besieged therein, *ibid.* condemned to death, and by what accident saved, *ibid.*
CROMWELL, lord, perished by an unjust law of his own devising, 779
Crows, a flight of them guides *Alexander*, and his army, over the desarts of *Egypt*, 471
Cruelly, examples of men repaid with their own, 782
Cubit, mentioned in scripture, not the geometrical, 65
CURTIVS and *Trogus*, greatly mistaken, on *Alexander's* arrival on the banks of *Tanais*, 482
CUSH, the land of, where it lies, 37. ill expounded for *Ethiopia*, 87. many places in scripture corrupted thereby, 87, 88
CYAXARES besieges *Nineveh*, 361. forced to abandon *Affyria*, *ibid.* delivers his country from extreme oppression by a stratagem, 365
CYNEAS, chief counsellor to *Pyrhus*, his notable expostulation with him, 535. sent ambassador to bribe the *Romans*, 536
CYNIOYRUS, a brave *Grecian*, his hardy valour, 403
CYNOSCEPHALÆ, the battel of, between *Philip* and *T. Quintius*, 733
CYRUS, of his name, and first actions, 383, 388. his decree for building the temple of *God* in *Jerusalem*, 392, 393. his conquest of *Lydia*, and *Babylon*, 389. great mercy and generosity to *Craffus*, *ibid.* reputed the greatest monarch then living, 390. his wars in *Scythia*, *ibid.* besieges *Babylon*, *ibid.* drains *Euphrates*, and enters the city through the dry channel, 391. his death, and epitaph, 392. *Apollo's* oracle concerning him, 376
CYRUS, the younger, his policy in levying soldiers, 432. the battel between him and his brother *Artaxerxes*, wherein he is slain, 433

D

DANUR, the university, or academy, of old *Palestine*, 215
DÆDALUS, the story of him, 242. his curious work-manships, *ibid.* 549
DAGON, the idol of the *Philistines* described, 122. his fall, 122, 261
DALAUQA, formerly *Leques*, an island in the *Red-Sea*, 147
DAMARATUS, the paternal ancestor of the *Tarquinius*, 531
DAMASCUS, by whom built, 227. taken by *Tamerlain*, 228. first kings, *ibid.* Inter kings, and their overthrow, 230
DAN, the tribe of, where settled, 212
DANAE, the fable of her, 240
DANAUS made king of *Argos*, 343. the story of his daughters, 344

I N D E X.

DANES and Saxons, remarks on the wars between them, 364
 DANIEL, the prophet, interprets the hand-writing on the wall against *Balthasar*, 391. his book, when made canonical, 372
 DAPHNE, a place of delight, near *Antioch*, 812
 DARES and *Dicte*, the books of, 260
 DARIUS *Hystaspes*, made king from the neighing of his horse, 396. his lineage, government and war with the *Scythians*, 397. his narrow escape out of *Scythia*, 398. wars with the *Athenians*, and why, 399. his jealousy of *Histieus*, 400. demands tribute of the *Greeks*, 402. his death, and issue, 403
 DARIUS, son of *Xerxes*, unjustly suffers death as a parricide, 415
 DARIUS *Nothus*, or the *Bastard*, his reign, 429
 DARIUS, the last king of *Persia*, his vain insolency, 464. his numerous army, and its condition, 464, 467. defeated by *Alexander*, near the *Granicus*, 465. utterly vanquished at *Iffus*, and his mother, wife, and children taken prisoners, 469. offers terms of peace to *Alexander*, 470. raises new forces, 472. offers farther conditions of peace, 473. routed at *Arbela*, 474. retreats into *Media*, *ibid.* bound in chains, and killed by the treason of *Bessus*, 477. his dying message to *Alexander*, *ibid.*
 DAVID, when born, 269. made king of *Juda*, 268. kills *Goliath*, *ibid.* his condition in the time of *Saul*, 271. the beginning of his reign, 272. takes *Jerusalem*, 273. overthrows the *Philistines* and the *Moabites*, and makes war upon the *Scythians*, 274. great troubles befall him after his adultery with *Bathsheba*, 276. disconsolate at the death of *Abshalom*, 277. his speech in the parliament held at *Jerusalem* for building the temple, 278. the good effect it had, 279. enjoins *Solomon* to rid himself of *Shimei*, *ibid.* his death and character, *ibid.* the vast treasure he left, 280
 Dead sea, an account of it, 220
 Deadly feud, an hereditary prosecution of malice in *Scotland*, so called; suppressed by king *James*, 681
 Death, its eloquence, justice, and might, 817
 DEBORAH, and her contemporaries, 240
 Decalogue, its several commandments, 160, 161. necessary to be observed, were there no religion among men, 162
 DECAPOLIS, the cities of, 196
 Decit, in all professions, 118. over-reached, 670
 DECIUS, the *Roman* consul, purchases victory by his death, 534
 DECIUS *Magius*, son to the former, his constancy towards the *Romans*, 628, 629. *Tully's* remarks on the desperate resolution of these *Decii*, 534
 DEJOCES, his strict form of government, 355. built *Tauris*, formerly called *Ecbatana*, *ibid.* whether that king *Arphaxad* mentioned in *Judith*? 355
 Deluges, several, 60
 DEMETRIUS, son of *Antigonus* the elder, begs his father to spare *Eumenes*, 508. his vain expedition into *Cilicia*, 513 takes *Cilles*, *Ptolemy's* lieutenant, with his camp and army, 515. gives liberty to *Athens*, 520. his wantonness well punished, *ibid.* victory over *Ptolemy* in *Cyprus*, 521 takes upon him the title of king, 522. translates *Sicyon*, and calls it *Demetrias*, 524. forsaken by the *Athenians*, 526. reconciled to *Selencus* and *Ptolemy*, 527. takes *Athens*, *ibid.* conquers in *Greece*, 529. unsuccessful there, and in *Asia*, 530. compelled to yield himself to *Selencus*, *ibid.* is a prisoner at large, and dies, *ibid.*
 DEMETRIUS, son of *Antigonus* *Gonatas*, drives *Alexander*, son of *Pyrhus*, out of *Macedon* and *Epirus*, 592. decays in virtue after he became king, 593
 DEMETRIUS *Pharius*, made king of great part of *Illyria* by the *Romans*, rebel against them, 607. expelled his kingdom by them, and entertained by king *Philip*, 705. persuades *Philip* to enter into league with *Hannibal* against them, 715. tooth him in his vices, 716. slain in an attempt upon *Messina*, 717
 Democracy, what sort of government, 303
 DEMOSTHENES too hastily invades the *Syracusians*, and is beaten, 554. his good advice rejected, 555. deserted by *Nicias*, forced to surrender himself, and basely murdered, *ibid.*
 DEMOSTHENES, the orator, dissuades the *Athenians* from accepting *Philip's* reasonable conditions of peace, 461. put to death by *Antigater*, 492
 DERCETA, the mother of *Semiramis*, her temple, 121, 122, 214
 DEMOND, countess of, her long life, 46
 Desolation, effects of it, 569
 Destiny often confounded with providence, prescience, and predestination, 2
 EDUCATION, contemporary with *Moses*, 179. his, a second flood, and no that of *Noah*, 59. king of *Thessaly*, 269

Devil, his policy, 117. the several ways by which he seems to work wonders, 119. none ever raised from the dead by his power, 120. his last refuge to maintain his kingdom, 57
 DEUTERONOMY, the book so called, made into a law, 358
 DIAGORAS, his three sons, 329
 DIANA, her temple at *Ephesus*, its dimensions, 282
 DIDO, whose daughter, 283. the founder of *Carthage*, 206, 312, 545. all that *Virgil* hath written of her fabulous, 312
 DIENECE, the *Spartan*, his resolute answer, 406
 DION banished out of *Sicily* for his publick spirit, 558. returns with an army, and enters *Syracuse*, 559. driven out again, and murdered, *ibid.*
 DIONYSIUS, the elder, the degrees by which he became tyrant of *Syracuse*, 256. his victories in *Sicily* and *Italy*, 257. his death, and character, 258
 DIONYSIUS, the younger, artfully begins his reign with several good acts, 558. causes all his brethren to be slain, *ibid.* takes *Plato* for his instructor, but soon banishes him, *ibid.* forced to quit *Syracuse*, and recovers it again, 559. besieged by *Icetes*, and surrenders to *Timoleon*, who deposes him, *ibid.*
 DODANIM, fourth son of *Javan*, first planted *Rhodes*, 85
 Dogs, brought by the *Spaniards* into *Hispagniola*, changed into wolves, 65. a strange story of dogs
 DOMITIAN, his beastly spectacle, 243
 DORIA, *Peter*, pays dear for his insolency, in a victory over the *Spaniards*, 569
 Dove, why worshipped by the *Babylonians*, and given in their ensigns, 122, 214
 DRACO, his rigorous laws, 366
 Dreams, warnings and discoveries by them, 117
 Duels, the custom very ancient, 272. a discourse of them, 678, &c.
 DULLIUS, his policy in fight with the *Carthaginian* galleys, 565. honoured with the first naval triumph ever seen at *Rome*, 566
 Dying of purple and scarlet cloth, how first found out, 190
 Dynasties, *Egyptian*, 134, 135, 344

E

EACIDES, king of *Epirus*, banished by his own subjects, 503
 Earth, by whom re-peopled, 74. when divided, 98, 99
 East, whence the custom of praying towards it, 23
 East-Indies, by whom planted, 101
 Eclipses, of the sun, 328, 329, 337. of the moon, 357, 425, 454, 472, 805
 Eden, the country of, why so called, 22. the true *Eden* of *Paradise*, 23. described by the countries bordering it, 31. an island of that name in the *Tygris*, described, 32. now called *Geserta*, 33
 EDMOM rebels against *Jehoram*, and shakes off subjection to *Juda*, 298
 Education, the power of, 12
 EDWARD III, king of *England*, his victories in *France*, 543
 EGLON, king of *Moab*, subdues and governs *Israel*, 220. slain in his own house, *ibid.* 237
 EGYPT, its plantation and antiquities, 89. whence its name, *ibid.* a flourishing kingdom in the time of *Abraham*, 133. the names and times of its first kings, 134. all the first-born therein slain, 149. governed by twelve rulers, 350. conquered by the *Babylonians*, 379. by *Alexander the Great*, 471. never any rain there, *ibid.*
 EGYPTIAN wisdom, 182. learning, and mystical kind of writing, 183. *Dynasties*, 134, 135
 EGYPTIANS the first idolaters, 50. when they first took their name, 89. how they may be said to have story 13000 years, *ibid.* had gods for all turns, 146
 EUD goes as an ambassador to *Eglon*, king of the *Moabites*, and slays him: invades the territory of *Moab*, and destroys their whole army, 220, 237
 Elder, the signification of the word, 101
 Elephants first used by the *Romans* in fight, 726
 ELI, an account of him, his sons, and his priesthood, 261
 ELISA, the isles of, mentioned by *Ezekiel*, 84
 ELISHA, when he lived, 313. the miracles wrought by him, and his dead bones, *ibid.*
 ELIUS, or *Sol*, his pedigree, 54
 ELIZABETH, queen of *England*, very sparing of rewards to martial men, 786
 EMAUS, afterwards *Nicopolis*, overturned by an earthquake, 216
 EMIMS, giants of huge stature, 173, 217
 EMPEDOCLES, the philosopher, where born, 549
 EMPORIE, a town of great importance in *Spain*, 634
 Enemy, his approbation the best witness, 262
 ENGLISH, their valour not equalled by the *Macedonians*, nor the

I N D E X.

- the *Romans*, 542. examples of that virtue in them, 544.
 husbandmen and yeomen the freest of all the world, 545
ENOCH wrote before the flood, 47. his translation, 48
ENOCH, the first city of the world, by whom built, 43
EPAMINONDAS wailes the territory of *Lacedemon*, restores the
Messenians and rebuilds their city *Messine* for them, 355, 450.
 invades and spoils *Peloponnesus*, 452. heads a select troop,
 which forces the *Lacedemonian* army to give way, at the great
 battel of *Mantineia*, 453. charged by *Spartans*, who all at
 once throw their darts at him alone, *ibid.* his heroick be-
 haviour when mortally wounded; his death, and great cha-
 racter, *ibid.*
EPAPHUS, the founder of *Memphis* in *Egypt*, 139
EPHESTION, *Alexander's* chief favourite, has the disposal of
 the kingdom of *Ziden*, 205, 469. marries *Darius's* youngest
 daughter, 486. dies, *ibid.*
EPHESUS, by whom built, 282
EPHORI of *Sparta*, when they began, 331. their power, 331,
 399. slain by *Cleomenes*, 596
EPHRAIM, the tribe of, head of the ten tribes, 208
EPHRAIMITES, the ground of their quarrel with *Gideon*,
 241
EPICIDES, his craft with the *Leontines*, 660. his costly feast-
 ing of the *Syracusan*, 663
ERA betray'd by a slave, and how, 354
ERYX, the city of, surpris'd by the *Romans*, and recovered by
Amilcar, 575
ESDRAS, the history of, when written, 417
ESTHER, the book of, arguments to prove the age of it, 417,
 418
ETEOCLES and *Polynices*, sons of *OEdipus*, quarrel about the
 government of the kingdom of *Thebes*, 247. slay each
 other in single fight, 248
ETHIOPIA, its distance from *Arabia* and *Palestina*, 38. See
Cush
ETHNICS had the invention of sacrifice from *Cain*, 51
ETOLIANS beaten by *Antigonus*, 512. driven out of their
 country by *Philip*, *Cassander's* lieutenant, 513. their ingra-
 titude, 595. join with the *Romans* in their war upon *Philip*
 in *Greece*, 644. over-run *Peloponnesus*, 705. invade *Greece*
 and *Macedon*, 703, 704. are invaded at home by *Philip*,
 705. again, 707. beg and obtain a peace, *ibid.* break it,
 and are beaten, 727. vanquished by the *Romans*, 773
Euangelion, its various significations, 159
EUPHONES, his treachery, and murder, the pretended grounds
 of the *Messinian* war, 352
EUCLID, the famous geometrician, where born, 549
EUDÆMON-JOHN, *Andrew*, a libeller of the author, 743
EVE, her desire continued down in her sex, 42
EVILMERODACH, his reign, 383
EUMENES, one of *Alexander's* captains, his country and con-
 dition, 503. made governor of *Cappadocia*, 491. his vic-
 tories in the *Lesser Asia*, 495. kills *Neoptolemus* in single
 fight, 496. his arts to redeem the love of his people, *ibid.*
 the conditio of his army, 497. defeated by *Antigonus*, *ibid.*
 besieged by him at *Nora*, 498. relieved by *Aridæus*, go-
 vernor of *Phrygia*, 502. raises great war upon *Antigonus*,
 in defence of the royal house, *ibid.* his profitable use of a
 feigned dream, 505. goes into *Persia*, *ibid.* defeats *Antigo-*
nus at *Susa*, 506. Again, in open battel, *ibid.* his politic
 delusion of him, 507. a conspiracy against his life, *ibid.*
 the last brutel between him and *Antigonus*, *ibid.* betrayed and
 slain, 508, 509. his virtue the sole cause of his overthrow,
 507. his character, and honourable funeral, 509
EUMENES, king of *Pergamus*, goes in person to *Rome*, and
 accuses *Perseus* of *Macedon* to the senate, 791. set upon,
 in his return, by *Perseus's* rustians, and left for dead, 792.
 a singular instance of brotherly love between him and *Atta-*
lus, *ibid.*
EUMENES, king of *Pergamus*, his pretty device, at a sacrifice,
 to animate his men for victory, 719. obtains it against
Antiochus Hierax, *ibid.* dies by a surfeit of too much drink,
ibid.
EUPHRATES, one of the guides to the country of *Eden*, 29.
 being one of the four heads, into which the rivers of *Pa-*
radise were divided, 32. itself divided into four branches,
 33, 34
EUROPE, by whom planted, 76
EUKORUS, an infant king of *Macedon*, carried into the field
 with his army, in his cradle, 457
EURYDICE, her incest and murder, 458. her title to the em-
 pire of *Macedon* after *Alexander's* death, 488. calls *Cassan-*
der to her aid, 503. cruelly put to death, with her hus-
 band *Aridæus*, by *Olympius*, *ibid.*
EUSEBIUS, an error of his, 346
Expectation always tedious, when the event is of most impor-
 tance, 621
EZEKIA, the godly beginning of his reign, 356. besieged
 by *Sennacherib*, 338. marvellously delivered, 359. his
 sickness and recovery, *ibid.* great oversight and death, *ibid.*
EZION-GEBER, where *Solomon* turnish'd his fleets for the East-
Indies, 179
- F
- FABII**, three hundred and five, all of one family, slain,
 533
FABIVS, a partial historian, 634
FABIUS-MAXIMUS, his artful delays of battel with *Hanibal*,
 617. divides the legions with *Minutius*, 619. his exhorta-
 tion to *Emilius*, 621. his unanswerable objection to *Scipio*,
 633. becomes lieutenant to his own son, 651. recovers *Ta-*
rentum, and by what means, 668. envies the growing virtue
 of *Scipio*, 683. his opinion upon *Hanibal's* departure out of
Italy, 695. his death, *ibid.*
Fables, most of them occasion'd by some ancient truth, though
 darkly expressed, 332, 333. instances thereof, 333
Fair Promontory, where, 686
Faith, of keeping it, a remarkable instance in *Joshua*, 184
Faith-breakers, God's judgment upon them, 185
Fall of our first parents explained, 42
Fame, often dangerous to the living, and of no use to the dead,
 816
Fate, 10
FAYAL, taken by the *English*, 572
Ficus Indica, described, 40. allegorized, 41
Firmament, its extension, 9
First-born slain throughout *Egypt*, 149
FLAMINIUS, his fiery disposition, 615. slain, 616
FLANDERS, earl of, the fruits of his insolency, 569
Flatterers, the basest of slaves, 585
Fleet, examples of the advantages of a good one, in war be-
 tween nations divided by the sea, 570. &c.
Flight, sometimes commendable, 613
Poll Sells, its strange nature, 472
Forlorn Hope, what part of the army so called, 623
FORTESCUE, judge, his report of an unjust judgment given
 against a gentlewoman, at *Salisbury*, 166
Fortitude, a diligent preserver of itself, 689
FORTUNE, a goddess the most revered, and most reviled;
 but not ancient, 13. an imaginary power, 14. a verse of
Æschylus applied to her, *ibid.*
Fountain running with blood, 812
FRANCIS I. of *France*, his justice upon the lord of *Tallard*,
 for wilful murder, 681. upon his chancellor *Poyer*, for false-
 hood, *ibid.* 682
Freewill given to man in his creation, 20
FRENCH, their miserable overthrow at *Naples*, to what ow-
 ing, 604
French cured by musick, 271
Friends taken for enemies, 655
Friendship sought after a strange manner, 808
Fruits, of fair outside, and nothing but dust within, 220
Funeral games, held by *Scipio*, 678
- G
- GAD**, the tribe of, 221. chief city, *ibid.* possessions,
 224
GADUS, isle and city of, yielded to the *Romans*, 683
Gallies, by whom invented, 77
GAM, captain, his gallant report to king *Henry V.* before the
 battle of *Agincourt*, 623
GAMA, *Stephen*, his discovery of the *Red sea*, in 1544, 147
GAMALA, a strong city, why so called, 225. forced by *Ves-*
passian, *ibid.*
GAMES, *Olympian*, first instituted, 328. *Nemean*, 248
GANGES, where it falls into the ocean, 35
GASCOIGNES, the reason of their faithful affection to the kings
 of *England*, 517
GAULS, their furious invasion and spoil of *Rome*, 533, 534.
 overthrown by *Antigonus Gonatas*, 538
GAZA, taken by *Alexander the great*, 470. a great battel
 there, won by *Ptolemy* and *Selencus*, against *Demetrius* son of
Antigonus, 513
Geese save the capitol of *Rome*, 534
GHIAZITES, whence the sellers of spiritual gifts so called,
 211
GHON disproved to be *Nilus*, 37. so confessed by *Ptolemy*,
ibid.
GELON elected prince of *Syracuse*, 551. gets a victory over
 the *Carthaginians*, *ibid.* grants them a peace upon high
 terms, 552. dies exceedingly beloved and honoured, *ibid.*
 an odd story of his dog, *ibid.*
GENOÈSE, their insolent use of their success against the *Ven-*
tians cost them dear, 569
- GENTILU,

I N D E X.

GENEAS, king of the *Illyrians*, taken by the *Romans*, 808. led in chains to adorn the victors triumph at *Rome*, and put to death, 815

Geographers, the liberty they take of describing undiscovered countries, 327

GEORGE, St. the castle of, where, 192. observations on the story of St. George and the dragon, *ibid.* St. George, perhaps not the same, his sepulchre, 209

GERGESEUS, fifth son of *Canaan*, founder of *Berytus*, afterwards called *Felix Julia*, in *Phenicia*, 93

GERMAN prince, his answer to those who persuaded him to turn *Lutheran*, 167

GERMANY possessed by *Gomer's* posterity, 80

GESCO, his provident course in transporting the *Carthaginian* army from *Sicily* to *Carthage*, 578. sent to pacify the mutineers, 579. is detained prisoner by them, 580

Giants mentioned in scripture, 48, 49, 173, 217, 225. giants since, 550. greater now, for vice and injustice, than those, for bodily strength, *ibid.*

GIDEON, his stratagem of trumpets and lamps in pitchers, 241. revenges the death of his brethren on *Zeba* and *Zalmunna*, 242. offered sovereignty, and refuses it, *ibid.* his ephod the cause of idolatry, and his destruction, *ibid.* his contemporaries, *ibid.*

Glass, the invention of, 189. where the best made, 194

GLAUCIAS, king of *Illyria*, restores *Pyrrhus* to his father's kingdom, 528

GOD, the invisible, seen in his creatures, 3. never seen with corporeal eyes, 4. his creation of the world acknowledged by the wisest heathen, *ibid.* his rest from the creation, 21. he foreknew and comprehended the beginning and end, before they were, *ibid.* he works the greatest things by the weakest means, 142. his first punishment of the *Egyptians* by changing their rivers into blood, wherein their forefather had drowned the innocent children of the *Hebrews*, 143. his secret hand in all manner of accidents, 175. he punishes places for the people's sakes, 234. the ancient philosophers opinion of *GOD*, 54.

Gods, the multiplicity of them, among the heathens, 112

GOG and *Magog*, what understood by them, 78

Gold, mountains in *America*, full of it, 100

Golden age, 104. *see*, several interpretations of that fiction, 245

Golden number, the invention of it, 145

Gopher, of which the ark was made, what kind of timber, variously taken, 64

Government, its beginning and establishment, 101. three commendable forms, with their opposites, 102

GOURGES, monsieur du, a saying of his to the *Spaniards* in *Florida*, 713

GRACCHUS, his victory at *Benevento*, 648

GRANICUS, the battle of, between *Alexander* and the *Persians*, 464

Grapes, where the largest bunches of them, 73

GREECE, by whom anciently possessed, 269. the pedigree of its first planters, *ibid.* war made upon it by *Darius*, 432. by *Xerxes*, 403, &c. troubles therein, foregoing the *Peloponnesian* war, 418. affairs of it, while managed by the *Lacedemonians*, 441. divided between them and the *Athenians* on the one side, and the *Thebans* on the other, 451. peace concluded therein, after the battle of *Mantineia*, 454. the estate of it, in the first *Punic* war, and between it and the second, 592. the coasts of it infested by the *Illyrians*, 601. invaded by the *Etolians*, 704

GREEKS, from whom descended, 82. corrupted the story of the creation, 50. their siege and taking of *Troy*, 258, 259. how dispersed after that, 260. revolt from the *Persians*, 400. reduced, 402. vainly boasting of their antiquity, held that no flood preceded that of *Ogyges*, 58. their memorable victory at *Salamis*, 408. at *Plataea*, 411. and at *Mycale*, 412. terrible to the *Barbarians*, 422. their sad condition after the battle between *Cyrus* and *Artaxerxes*, 434. all their captains betrayed by *Tissaphernes*, 435. animated by *Xenophon*, 436. rout *Teribaxus*, 437. overthrown by *Philip* at *Mantineia*, and lose their liberty, 461. the plantation of them in *Sicily*, 550

Griffins, mountains of gold guarded by them, 100

Guile, killing by, many ways of, 681

Guns, and ordnance of battery, how old the use of them, 67, 485

GYGES obtains the kingdom, and queen of *Lydia* by treason, 341

GYLIPPUS comes to the relief of *Syracuse*, 554. takes the *Athenian* fort, *ibid.* and *Nicias*, their general, prisoner, 555.

H

HADDON, judge of *Israel*, at the time of the destruction of *Troy*, 246, 253. had forty sons and thirty grandchildren, 253

Hagiographa. See *Cetaphim*.

HALON, the *Tartar*, forces *Damascus*, and makes his son *Agab* king of it, 228

HALYATTES, the beginning of his reign in *Lydia*, 362. six years war between him and *Cyaxares*, 364. the occasion of it, as delivered by *Herodotus*, questioned, *ibid.*

HAM. See *Cham*.

HANAN, king of the *Ammonites*, his contemptuous treatment of king *David's* ambassadors revenged with strange severity, 224

HANNIBAL made general of the *Carthaginians* in *Spain*, 606. besieges and takes *Saguntum*, 607, 608. his hereditary hatred to the *Romans*, 609 goes into *Italy*, *ibid.* his progress there, 610. his victory at *Ticinum*, now called *Pavia*, 611. at *Trebia*, 613. takes in *Clasidium*, *ibid.* his peril among the *Gauls*, 614. loses one of his eyes, in going to *Hetruria*, *ibid.* his victory at *Thrasymene*, 615. his stratagem in passing the hills of *Calicula* and *Caflinum*, 617. seizes the *Roman* stores in the castle of *Cannæ*, 621. his victory at *Cannæ*, 626. takes *Capline*, after a long siege, 632. his fruitless attempt upon *Cumæ*, 648. loses back some towns to the *Romans*, 650. wins *Tarentum*, 652. and two field-victories, 654. passes over *Vulturnus*, and comes to the gates of *Rome*, 655. forced to decamp, 656. his glory declines, 657. his stratagem against *Fabius* discovered, 668. surprises *Marcellus*, 670. *Polybius* and *Livy* very full in his praise, 675. raises an altar with a large inscription of his victories, 684. called out of *Italy*, and his speech thereupon, 694, 695. beaten by *Scipio* at *Nadagara*, 699. his rough treatment of a vain orator, 700. his reasons for his laughing in a general calamity, *ibid.* enters into a league with *Philip* against the *Romans*, 715. the tenor of the league, *ibid.* examines into the treasury at *Carthage*, detects corrupt officers, strips them of their authority, and makes them restore the publick money they had turned to their own use, 749, 750. hated for this virtue by the *Roman* faction, and forced to leave his country, 750. flies to *Antiochus*, *ibid.* his conferences with the *Roman* ambassadors, 759. brought into council, and gives good advice to *Antiochus*, in vain, 763, 764. betrayed into the hands of the *Romans*, 781. drinks poison, and dies, 782. his character, with remarks upon it, *ibid.*

HANNO beats the *Romans* into their trenches near *Agrigentum*, 564. made admiral of the *Carthaginian* fleet, 576. his character, *ibid.* intercepted and defeated by *Catulus*, 577. difficulties with the mercenaries of the *Carthaginians*, 578, 579. a bitter enemy to *Amilcar*, 578. his ill conduct of the *Carthaginian* army, 580. his malicious jest at *Hannibal's* victories, 632. unjustly accuses *Hannibal*, 634. made by him governor of the *Bargutians*, adventures a battle with *Scipio*, is overcome and taken, 635, 636

HARAN, the eldest son of *Terah*, 128

Hardiness, without regard to honesty or friendship, not to be called valour, 594

HARPALUS, treasurer to *Alexander the great*, goes off with vast treasures and forces to the *Greeks*, 486. those rejected by them and himself slain, *ibid.*

Harpies, what they were, 243

HAVILAH, one of the sons of *Joshan*, inhabited the *East-Indies* in the continent, 101

HAZABEL, king of *Aram*, his conquests in *Juda*, 309, 310

Heathenism miraculously confounded under *Julian the Apostate*, 56

Heaven, chrystalline, whether there be any, 9

Heaven and earth, the meaning of the words, 5

HEAVEN-FIELD in *Northumberland*, whence so called, 222

HEBREW year, the form of it, 144

HEBREWS, who their father, 97. the history of them the most ancient, 371

HEBRON, vulgarly *Cariotharbe*, one of the most ancient cities of *Canaan*, 216. *Adam*, *Abraham*, *Isaac*, and *Jacob* buried there, *ibid.*

HECTOR, slain by *Achilles*, 259

HELEN, the empress, her sumptuous chappel, built in memory of the transfiguration, 200

HELEN, of *Greece*, the rape of, by *Theseus*, 246. by *Paris*, *ibid.* 256, 257

HELLER, one of the sons of *Deucalion*, 179, 269

Hemorrhoids, great numbers of the *Philistines* perish of that disease, 262

HENRY I. king of *England*, what bettered his claim to the crown, 548

HENRY VII, king of England, with regard to *Pool*, took pattern from *David* towards *Shimei*, 279

HENRY VIII, king of England, very curious in his choice of commanders at sea, 475

HENRY IV. of France, inflamed against the duke of *Byron*, and for what, 558

HERACLIDÆ, the children of *Hercules*, persecuted by *Euryftheus*, king of *Mycenæ*, 270. protected by the *Athenians*, *ibid.* recover *Peloponnesus*, 270, 282

HERCULES, his twelve labours, 269. kings descended from him, 341

HERMES *Trismegistus*, 179. his two last speeches, 181. his many writings, 183. those in divinity, now extant, corrupted by the *Greeks*, and *Egyptian* priests, 180. his books foretelling *CHRIST*, little better than counterfeit pieces, 776

HERMIAS, prime minister of *Antiochus*, wholly governs him, 739. works the death of *Epigenes*, for good counsel contrary to his own liking, 740. consults his own good, rather than the king's honour, 741. odious to the people, *ibid.* suspected by the king, forsaken by those who had been most obsequious to him, and put to death, *ibid.* his wife and children stoned to death by the citizens, *ibid.*

HERMOCRATES, general of the *Syracusians*, his stratagem to gain time with the *Athenians*, 555. is banished, 556. returns to *Sicily*, and is slain, *ibid.*

HEROD *Agrippa*, his blasphemy, 203. stricken dead by an angel, *ibid.* a wicked usurper, but magnificent, 234. *Herodium*, an exceeding beautiful strong castle built by him, 216

HERODOTUS, his testimony of *Eden*, and the country adjoining, 34. his argument, that *Helen* was not at *Troy* during the siege, 257

HETRURIANS become tributary to *Rome*, 534

HIERO, made king of *Syracuse*, 546. enters into league with the *Carthaginians*, for exterminating the *Mamertines* out of *Sicily*, *ibid.* his wrong judgment, and ill success, in encountering with *Claudius*, 547. retires from *Messina*, *ibid.* forsakes the *Carthaginians*, and makes his peace with *Rome*, 563. relieves *Carthage*, 589. and sends help to *Rome*, to preserve the ballance, 620

HIERONYMUS, the last king of *Syracuse*, managed by *Andronodorus*, 658. of a tyrannical disposition, and wholly given up to his pleasures, *ibid.* a conspiracy against him, *ibid.* slain before his guards, 659

HIMILCO recovers many towns in *Sicily*, 557, 662. besieges *Syracuse*, 557, makes a treacherous peace with *Dionysius*, and is repaid with like perfidy, *ibid.* joins with *Hippocrates*, and over-runs the whole island of *Sicily*, 663

HIPPOCRATES, sends counterfeit letters to *Marcellus*, and the success thereof, 661

HIPPONES, his cruel punishment of his own daughter for unchastity, 340

HIRAM, king of *Tyre*, his displeasure against *Solomon*, 193. assisted him in building the temple, 206. enforced by policy to hold league with him, 207. when he reigned king of *Tyre*, against an error of *Josephus*, 283. congratulates *Solomon* on his accession to the throne, *ibid.* his answer to king *Solomon's* letter, *ibid.*

HISTIEUS abandons his tyranny, and sets *Miletus* at liberty, 400. the first mover of the *Ionian* rebellion, 401. taken by the *Persians*, and beheaded, *ibid.*

HISTORIANS of all ages, especially of the latter, partial, 101. borrowers of poets, 306. partial to their own country-men, 622

HISTORICAL caution, 341

HISTORY, sacred and prophane, the connection of, 371

HOLLANDERS passage by the mouth of the duke of *Parma's* cannon, 574

HOMER, when he lived, 270. whether he or *Hesiod* were the elder, much disputed, 271. stole almost word for word, from the books of *Moses*, 55

HONEY-dew, congealed into hard sugar, where, 194

HONOUR defined, 680

HOOKE, his definition of law, 152

HORATI and *Curiatii*, their combat, 357, 678

HORSES, where the best of the *Lesser Asia* bred, 282

HOSEA, the prophet, when he lived, 322

HOWARD, lord *Charles*, admiral of England, his good conduct, in 1588, 565. rewarded, 785

HUSBAND, his rule over the wife, as the dominion of reason over appetite, 584

HUSBANDRY, the ancient kings enriched themselves by it, 280

HYARNES commands the select *Persians*, called the immortal regiment; why so called, 404

HYLLUS and *Echeus*, their combat, and the conditions of it, 270

I

JABIN, king of *Hazor*, invades and oppresses *Israel*, 240. his death, *ibid.*

JACOB, when he came into *Egypt*, 130. when he died, 137

JAMES I, king of England, his prudence and kingly power, 681. his justice, *ibid.* 583. honours confer'd upon martial men, 783

JANNES and *Jambres*, two notorious forcerers, 181

JANUS not *Noah*, 63, 80. who he was, 63

JAPAN, isle of, now *Zipingari*, a great character of its inhabitants, 67

JAPETUS, why called the son of heaven and earth, by the poets, 269

JAPHA, a strong city, forced by *Titus Vespasian* with great slaughter, 199

JAPHET, the eldest son of *Noah*, 75. his sons, *ibid.* his portion, 76

JASON adventures for the *Golden Fleece*, 243. carries it off by the help of *Medæa's* magick, and marries her, 244. his story moralized, 245

JAVAN, the sons of, and where settled, 84, 85

ICETES, governor of *Leontium*, enters into confederacy with the *Carthaginians*, 559. besieges *Dionysius the Younger*, in the castle of *Syracuse*, *ibid.* his army surpris'd and routed by *Timoleon*, *ibid.* is reinforced, and again assaults the castle of *Syracuse*, 559, 560. overthrown by *Timoleon*, and slain, 560

IDANTHURA, king of the *Scythians*, his mysterious presents, in answer to *Darius's* threatening letters, 183

Idolatrous corruptions, 49. very ancient, 50. sacrifices, 330. the idolatry of the ten tribes, 289

Idols first invented, 50, 112. *Numa's* law against them, 111

JEHOAHAZ deposed by *Pharaoh*, and carried prisoner into *Egypt*, 360

JEHOIACHIM, his reign, 360. becomes tributary to *Nabuchodonosor*, 367. is slain, 368

JEHOIADA, his preservation of the young prince *Joas*, 303. his policy against the ruling power, 307. makes *Joas* king, 308. his death and honourable funeral, 309

JEHORAM made king sundry times, 296. his reign alone, 298. all his sons slain by the *Philistines*, 291, 299. his miserable death, *ibid.* and infamous funeral, 299

JEHOSHAPHAT, his good reign, 295. his death, 296. part of his monument yet to be seen, *ibid.*

JEHOVAH, the proper name of the true God, 127

JEHU destroys the house of *Ahab*, 300, 301. slays the priests of *Baal*, 302. his ingratitude, and punishment, 303

JEPHTHA's just defence against the claim of the *Ammonites*, 217, 218. his victory over them, 249. his rash vow, and death, *ibid.*

JEREMIAH, the prophet, where born, 233. his prophecies, 367, &c. stoned to death, in *Egypt*, by his own countrymen, 140, 270

JERICHO, the last of the toparchies of *Juda*, its situation, 231. by whom destroyed, and rebuilt, *ibid.*

JEROBOAM, his idolatry, 189. that compared with the policies of late ages, *ibid.* overthrown by *Abijah*, 290

JERUSALEM, uncertain when built, 233. taken by *David*, 273. fortified with a treble wall by *Solomon*, 285. spoiled by *Sesac*, 290. besieged by *Sennacherib*, 338. destroyed by the *Romans*, 234. by the *Chaldeans*, 370

JESRAEL, a city in *Gilboa*, where *Naboth* was stoned, 202

JESUS-Well, where, 141

JEWS, many thousands over-whelmed in rebuilding the temple at *Jerusalem*, 57. oppressed by the *Chaldeans*, 367. their seventy years of captivity, 373. compared to *Cain*, 43. ancient, belied by heathen writers, 235

JEZABEL devoured by dogs, 301. compared to *Athaliah*, 308

ILLYRIANS infest the coasts of *Greece*, 601. subdued by the *Romans*, 602

Image and similitude taken in one sense by *St. Paul* and *St. James*, 16. of God, man created according to it, 15

Images, the worshipping of them, where, and from whom, begun, 111

INARUS, king of *Libya*, hanged by the *Persians*, 417

Indian, above 300 years old, 46

INDUS, its descent into the ocean, 35

Initiation, days of, mysteries of idolatrous superstition then delivered, in the temple of *Ceres*, 722

Injuries, newly received, abolish the memory of old good turns, 730

I N D E X.

- Inscription upon Ozymandias's tomb*, 343. under the statue of *Setbon*, 348. upon an altar at *Rome*, 776
- Inscriptions*, two, in the *Hebrew* character, found at *Panormus*, now *Palermo*, 566
- Intellectual* mind of man, 17
- Intercalation*, the manner of, among the *Hebrews*, 144
- Inter regnum*, when it took name and being at *Rome*, with the order of it, 620
- Inundations*, an account of several, 61
- JOAS*, king of *Juda*, whose son he was, 304. repairs the temple, 309. his apostacy, *ibid.* forced to buy a peace of *Hazeael* with the hallowed treasures, 310. murders the prophet *Zecharia*, *ibid.* shamefully beaten by the *Aramites*, and killed in his bed, 311. his contemporaries, 312
- JOAS*, king of *Israel*, his good husbandry in the beginning of his reign, 313. makes a triumphant entry into *Jerusalem*, with *Amaziah* prisoner, 315. his error, *ibid.* forsaken of his prosperity, and dies, 316
- JOB*, who he was, and where he dwelt, 226. his sepulchre assigned, *ibid.* whence his friends, *Elibu*, and the rest, 227
- JOCANAN*, the sons of, where they settled, 99
- JOEL*, the prophet, when he lived, 322
- JOHN*, the son of *Levi*, his commotions in the upper *Galilee*, 193
- JONAS* supposed to be the most ancient of the lesser prophets, 322. some of his prophecies lost, *ibid.*
- JONATHAN*, his great exploit, 267
- JONES*, from whom descended, 81. driven out of *Peloponnesus*, 269
- IONIAN* rebellion, 400
- JOPPE* in *Judea*, founded before the flood, 58. burnt to the ground by the *Romans*, 209. rebuilt, and now called *Jaffa*, 213
- JOSEPH*, the history of him, 137. esteemed by some the first *Mercury*, 181
- JOSEPHUS*, his tale of an *Ethiopes*s, wife of *Moses*, disputed, 86. another opinion of his disproved, 95. his error concerning *Hiram*, 283
- JOSHUA*, the beginning of his government, 183. draws his army to the banks of *Jordan*, *ibid.* his passage over it, 184. his skill in war, and strict observance of his word to the enemies, 184, 185. his death, 186. remarks upon his book, 187. contemporaries, *ibid.* his sepulchre remaining in *St. Jerome's* time, 209
- JOSIAS* abolishes idolatry, and rebuilds the temple, 358. his fidelity to the king of *Babel*, 359. encounters *Pharaoh-Neco* at *Megiddo*, and is slain, *ibid.*
- JOTAPATA*, a strong city, fortified by *Josephus*, 199
- JOTHAM*, his short, but happy reign, 329. his great character by *Josephus*, *ibid.*
- IPSUS*, the battle at, 525
- IRISH*, hard upon their husbandmen, 545
- IRON*, the use of, by whom found out, 236
- ISAAC*, his birth a miracle rather wrought upon *Sarah*, than upon *Abraham*, 126
- ISAIAH*, first of the four great prophets, when he lived, 322, 347. the excellency of his style and argument, 322. put to death in a most cruel manner, 349
- ISAURIANS*, their desperate resolution, 493
- ISCAH* and *Sarah*, two names of one signification, 128
- ISHBOSHETH* slain by *Rechab* and *Banaab*, 273
- ISHMALL*, his sons, twelve princes, where settled, 177, 178
- ISRAELITES* punished with famine in *Saul's* time, for a breach of faith, given 400 years before by *Joshua*, 185. cruelly used by *Pharaoh*, 141. pursued by him, 143, 147. their number and passage from *Succoth*, 146. and over the *Red Sea*, 147. their passage miraculous, and not at low ebb, 148. the history of them, from the receiving of the law to the death of *Moses*, 166. overthrown by the *Philistines*, 261
- ISSACHAR*, the tribe of, where settled, 200
- ISSUS*, the battle of, between *Alexander* and *Darius*, 467
- ITALY*, its names, and old inhabitants, 60, 331. part of it occupied by the *Abrigines*, 332
- ITURIA*, of whom that country so called, 197. the people excellent archers, *ibid.*
- JUDA*, the tribe of, where settled, 215. carries on the war successfully against the *Canaanites* in the *Inter-regnum* after *Joshua's* death, 235. the crown void eleven years after *Amaziah*, 310
- Judaism* confounded under *Julian* the apostate, 56
- Judges*, a good lesson to them, 682
- JUDITH*, remarks on the history of, 355, 356
- JULIAN* account, its beginning, 145
- JULIAN*, the apostate, miraculously hindered from rebuilding the temple of *Jerusalem*, 57
- JULIUS Caesar*, from whom descended, 335
- JULUS*, the name of *Albanus*, son of *Aeneas*, 334. his son, of that name, contented to hold the priesthood instead of the kingdom, *ibid.*
- JUPITERS*, the three chiefest, 51. the strange story of the third, 52, 53. the pedigree of them, 54. *Jupiter Belus*, the son of *Nimrod*, *ibid.*
- Jus acquisitum*, what gives it, 548
- JUSTINIAN*, the emperor, builds a church over the tomb of *St. George* the martyr, 109

K

- K**ENITES, an account of them, 150
- KETURA*, wife of *Abraham*, maternal ancestor of the *Kenites*, *ibid.*
- King*, a common father of his people, 584. the qualities of a good one, 585
- Kingdom* of the *Greeks*, when the *Æra* of it began, 515
- Kingly* government, the instability of it, 816. abolished at *Rome*, 532
- Kings*, called *Jupiters* by the ancients, 52. their power not to be resisted by their subjects, 103. made by God and laws divine; by human laws only so declared, 165. rather pardon ill designs than villainous words, 558. their unthankfulness, and the reason of it, 783. the good government of the first kings, 104
- KORAH*, the rebellion of, 170
- KNOLLES*, Sir *Robert*, a renowned commander in the *French* wars, 678

L

- L**abyrinth in *Egypt*, built for a monument, 350
- LACEDÆMONIANS* war with the *Messenians*, 353. their patient valour, 411. war with the *Athenians*, 420. obtain a disadvantageous peace, 421. lose their old true friends for new false ones, 422. send an embassy to *Corinth*, *ibid.* make war upon *Artaxerxes*, 441. take revenge upon the *Eleans*, 443. their fleet destroyed by *Pharnabazus*, 446. take *Thebes* by treason, and *Olynthus* by famine, 449. driven out of *Messene* by *Epaminondas*, 450
- LAMIAN* war, its beginning, 490. process, 491
- LAMPACUS*, a city of *Mysia*, upon the *Hellepont*, 400
- LAPITHÆ*, from whom descended, 245
- LATINI* and *Latium*, the reason of the names, 333. their ancient kings before *Æneas*, *ibid.*
- Law* and right, the name and meaning of the words, 151
- Law* of *Moses*, when given, 151. defined, 157. not always taken in one sense in scripture, *ibid.* hath three parts, moral, ceremonial and judicial, 158. the ends and use of them, 160
- Law* of nature, 154. of God, written, 156, 158. unwritten, 156. human, written and unwritten, 163, 164
- Laws*, commendations of the invention of them, 151
- LEHABIM*, the son of *Mizraim*, called *Hercules Libyus*, 136
- LEMNIA*, a harlot, cuts out her own tongue, to keep a secret, 400
- LENTULUS*, his compassionate address to *Æmilius* under his wounds at the battle of *Cannæ*, the consul's reply, and a comment thereupon, 625, 626
- LEONATUS*, one of *Alexander's* captains, made protector to *Aridæus*, 489. slain in battle against the *Athenians*, 492
- LEONIDAS*, king of the *Lacedæmonians*, his admirable prowess, 405. his death, 406
- LEONTIUS*, his quarrel with *Aratus*, and the issue of it, 713. endeavours to raise sedition in the army, *ibid.* is detected, and put to death, 714
- LEOSTHENES* levies an army against the *Macedonians*, 490. routs and pursues *Antipater*, *ibid.* slain at the siege of *Lamia*, 491
- LEPTINES*, brother to *Dionysius*, his victory at sea over *Himilco*, 557. utterly beaten by the *Carthaginians*, *ibid.*
- Letter*, a very concise one, 427
- Letters*, the invention of, 47, 67, 180, 204, 205
- LEUA*, *Antony de*, fatal dishonour laid upon him, by *Charles V.* of *France*, 523
- LEUCTRA*, the battle of, 449
- LEUTYCHIDES*, admiral of the *Greek* navy, his successful stratagem, 411
- Library* at *Alexandria*, by whom founded, 738
- Lie*, the offence of giving it examined, 679. who most tender in taking it, *ibid.* the subject of deadly quarrels, *ibid.*
- Light*, its creation, excellency, and use, 7
- LIQUIRIANS*, their nature and condition, 755
- LILYNUM*, the siege of, 573, 574
- LINUS*, when he flourished, his writings, and hard fate, 243
- LIVIA*, her white hen, and laurel branch, 812
- LIVY*, a problem of his discussed, 541. his history relating to the actions of the *Scipios* in *Spain* condemned, 635. a follower of *Polybius*, 688
- Long-Liver*, 46

I N D E X.

LOMBARDY, the towns of, mistaken in their fancied security against *Francis I. of France*, 465

LORAY law, 679

LUCIAN, makes *Helen* almost as old as *Hecuba*, at the siege of *Troy*, 257. his feigned conference with *Homer* in hell, concerning the *Iliad*, 271

LUCRETIA, ravished by *Sextus Tarquinius*, kills herself, 532

LUCIATYUS CATULUS, his victory over the *Carthaginians* at sea, 576, 577

LUDIM, eldest son of *Mixraim*, from whom came the *Libyans* in *Africa*, 95

Luxury of the age, 46. verses of *Lucan* upon it, *ibid.*

LYCIDAS, his counsel to the senate of *Atheni*, 409. fatal to himself and his family, 410

LYCOPHRON, an usurper, driven out of *Theffaly*, 460

LYCURGUS, his law for husbands and wives, 154. against fortifications, 779, 780. buys his election to the kingdom of *Sparta* of the *Ephori*, 704. drives out his fellow king, and establishes his tyranny, 706

LYDA, afterward *Diospolis*, where *St. Peter* cured *Aeneas* of the palsy, 96

LYDIA, kings of, 340, 355. won by *Antigonus*, 502

LYSANDER surprises the *Athenian* fleet at *Ægæi-Potamos*, 428. razes the walls of *Atheni*, and sets up thirty tyrants, *ibid.*

LYSIMACHUS, one of *Alexander's* captains, his victories, 513, 525. murders his son-in-law, 528, 529. is taken prisoner by the *Thracians*, and released, 529. shares the kingdom of *Macedon* with *Philip*, 530. poisons his eldest son, 531. his city *Lysimachia* destroyed by an earthquake, *ibid.* himself slain, and his whole family soon extinct, *ibid.* thought to have been lord of *Transylvania*, from medals of gold found there, 778

M

MACCABEES, their sepulchre, 213

MACEDON, whence so called, its situation, kings before *Philip*, 457. delivered from many troubles by him, 459. divisions in it, 489, 493, 527, 537, 592. shared between *Pyrrhus* and *Lysimachus*, 528

MACEDONIANS, who the father of them, 85. the ceremony of mustering, and lustration of their army, 784

MACHÆRUS, a strong city and castle, where *John Baptist* was beheaded, 218

MACHANAIM, where the angels met *Jacob* for his defence, 222

MACHIAVEL, his observation upon mercenary soldiers, 582. his doctrine to *Cæsar Borgia*, 779

MIDIANITES, a great slaughter of them by *Gideon*, 177

MAGDALUM, a strong castle, the habitation of *Mary Magdalen*, 199

Magick, the invention of it, 113. anciently far different from conjuring and witchcraft, 114, 116. natural, not to be condemned, 116, 181. helps us to know the divinity of *Christ*, 116. unlawful, the many kinds of it, 118

Magistrate, his office and duty, 103

MAGO brings great forces to *Ictes*, 559. abandons him through fear, and hangs himself, 560

MAGO, brother of *Hannibal*, sent express to *Carthage*, with the news of the victory at *Cannæ*, 632. ordered into *Italy*, 682. takes *Genoa*, 683. called out of *Italy*, 694. fights a battle with the *Romans*, wherein he is mortally wounded, *ibid.*

MAGNA Græcia, what part of *Italy* formerly so called, 653

MAGNESIA, the battle of, between the *Romans* and *Antiochus the great*, 771

MAHOMET's dove, the imposture of it, 119

MAHOMETAN *Arabians* descended from the *Ishmaelites*, 38

Mali, invented by some of great knowledge in natural philosophy, 662

MAMERTINES, their treachery to the *Messenians*, 546. are besieged in *Messina*, *ibid.* their impudent request to the *Romans*, 547

Man created according to the image of *God*, 15. as it were, a little world, 19

MANASSEH, one half tribe of, and the territory which fell to it, 201. the other half, and its provinces, 224

MANASSE, his wickedness, imprisonment, repentance, and death, 349

MANDEVILLE, the traveller, his monument, 485

MANIA, her good government of *Æolis*, under *Pharnabazus*, 442. murdered by her son-in-law, *ibid.*

MANLIUS, *Titus*, sent to the *Baleares*, 657. gets a victory over the *Sardinians*, 658

MANLIUS Torquatus causes his son to be put to death for a breach of his order, 534

MANTINEA, the battle of, 453

MARATHON, the battle of, 402

MARCELLUS forces *Hannibal* to raise the siege of *Nola*, 631. is dishonourable at *Casiline*, 650. takes *Leontium*, 660. besieges *Syracuse*, 661. his profitable circumspection, 663. his underhand dealing with the *Syracusians*, during a treaty of peace, 664. gets *Syracuse* by the treason of *Mericus*, *ibid.* comes to *Rome*, and is honoured with the lesser triumph, called *Ovation*, 666. follows *Hannibal*, 666, &c. prepares for battle with him, and is slain, 670

MARDONIUS made general of *Xerxes's* army in *Greece*, 404. his flattering promises to that king, 409. his embassy to the *Athenians*, *ibid.* invades *Attica*, 411. quits it, and burns *Atheni*, 410. slain at *Platæa*, *ibid.*

MARGIANA, where *Alexander*, finding the best wine there, feasted himself and his army, for ten days together, 73

MARRONITES, Christian, two monasteries of them, near mount *Horeb*, their hospitality, 151

Marshall (earl) of *England*, his power, 681

MARTIUS, L. a young *Roman* gentleman, chosen general, 639. surprises *Asdrubal's* camp, *ibid.* marvellous victories ascribed to him by some historians, 640. proved idle dreams, 641

MARTIUS, Quintus, the *Roman* consul, his difficult and dangerous march against the *Macedonians*, 799. takes *Diurni*, 800. quits that city, and enters into *Tempe*, *ibid.* his character, 802

Martyrs, who may be numbered among them, 680

MARUS, his monument, 350

MASANISSA offers his service to *Scipio* against the *Carthaginians*, 685. driven out of his kingdom, by *Syphax*, *ibid.* the cause of his revolt from them to the *Romans*, *ibid.* easily defeats *Hanno*, 686. pursues *Syphax*, 689. restored to his kingdom, 690. takes *Syphax* prisoner, and carries him bound to *Cirta*, where he marries *Sophonisba*, *ibid.* sends her a sad message, with a cup of poison, 691. brought before the *Roman* army by *Scipio*, and proclaimed king, *ibid.* returns to his kingdom, 692. comes again to help *Scipio* against *Hannibal*, 696. does good service at the battle of *Nadagara*, 698. cruelly oppresses the *Carthaginians*, 787. in credit with the *Romans* above all other kings, 815

MASISTES and his wife, the barbarous cruelty to them by *Xerxes* and *Amestris*, 412, 413

Masons, the number of them employed in building the temple of *Solomon*, 284

Mathematicians, the consent of, in account of times, more sure than the authority of any history, 337

MATHO, his mutinous oration against the *Carthaginians*, 579. chosen by the mutineers for one of their captains, 580. makes a furious sally upon the *Carthaginians*, 589. utterly defeated, taken prisoner, and put to death with extreme torments, 590

MAURICE, count, of *Nassau*, deceives the *Spaniards*, and takes *Zutphen*, *Hulst*, and *Nimeguen*, 570. his character, *ibid.*

MAZEUS, his treacherous cowardice, 472, 474

Meal-tub plot among the *Athenians*, 427

Medals, of gold, found in the province of *Transylvania*, 778

MEDES, from whom descended, 81. chief actors in the subversion of the *Babylonian* empire, 385. their war with the *Affyrians*, 386. their estate in times foregoing, *ibid.*

MEDIA, kings of, 340, 361, 385. occupied by *Antigonus*, 509.

MENON, first *Archon* of *Atheni*, 399. the twelve generations of the *Medontidæ* after him, *ibid.*

MEDUSA, the story of her, 239

MELAMPUS said to have understood the voices of birds and beasts, 238

MELIAGER, proclaims *Arideus* king, 488, 489. his plot against *Perdiccas* discovered, 489. slain, *ibid.*

Men of renown before the flood, 47

MENAHAM, his inhuman cruelty, 321

Menas, Minæus, and Menis, names or titles of dignity among the *Egyptians*, 137

MENDESIUS, an island in the mouth of *Nilus*, 417

MENEDERMUS slain, and his army overthrown by *Spitamenes*, 482

MENELAUS, brother to *Ptolemy*, his fatal rigour against *Nicoles*, king of *Paphos*, 521. besieged in *Salamis*, *ibid.* forced to yield up the town, and his army, 522

MENON, first husband to *Semiramis*, compelled to part with her to *Ninus*, drowns himself, 113

Mercenaries, useful to tyrants, 580. the dangers of them, 582

MERCURIES, five of them, 179

MERODACH usurps the kingdom of *Babylon*, 339

MESSENE, in *Sicily*, what its old name, and how changed, 355

MESSENIAN wars, the first and second, 352. nobility, of whom the chief of them came, 353

MESSENIANS, why called *Helotes*, 282

METAPONTINES give up *Tarentum* to *Hannibal*, 653

METABURUS, the battle of, 673

MEXICO,

I N D E X.

- MEXICO, written books, like the *Egyptian* hieroglyphicks, found there, 205
- MICAH, the prophet, where born, 216
- MICROCOSMOS, man so called, and why, 19
- MIDAS, king of *Phrygia*, many fables devised of him, 357
- MIDIAS, his detestable murders, 442
- MILTIADES gets the victory at *Marathon*, 402. dies under the ingratitude of the *Athenians*, 403
- Mind, a discourse of it, 17
- Ministers, ill for princes, the making them over-great, 487
- MINOS thrusts his brother out of *Crete*, 243. brings the *Athenians* to a tribute of delivering, every year, seven of their sons, *ibid.* his pursuit of *Dædalus*, 549. slain by treason, 243, 549
- MIRIAM, the sister of *Moses*, her sepulchre, 170
- MOLO rebels against *Antiochus*, 740. forced to retire towards *Media*, *ibid.* returns, surprises and destroys *Xanætus*, and his whole army, *ibid.* forsaken by his followers, and kills himself, *ibid.*
- MOLOCH described, and the manner of sacrifice, 330
- MONA, now called *Anglesey*, given up to the *Romans* under *Julius Agricola*, 465
- Monarchy, the first and best government, 102, 103
- Money not used in *Greece*, in *Homer's* time, 247
- MONTLUC, a marshal of *France*, his ingenuous confession, 782
- Months, *Hebrew*, their names, 144
- MONS CHRISTI, where our Saviour chose the twelve apostles, 198
- Moon, a total eclipse of it, foregoing the overthrow of *Perseus*, 305. other eclipses, 357, 425, 454
- Mortality, a digression concerning it, 21
- MOSAL, a large city, lying upon the *Tygris*, anciently the *Seleucia Parthorum*, 32
- MOSCOVITES, from whom descended, 82. the first present their wives make them in the time of wooing, 366
- MOSES, the time of his birth, 139, 149. different opinions concerning it, 140. his preservation and education, 141. whence his name, 142. flight out of *Egypt*, 142, 149. numbers the tribes, and disposes of the army of *Israel* for their marches through the wilderness, 166. his several marches and encampments, 168, &c. his death, 174. his sepulchre never known, *ibid.* was the most ancient historian, 75. supposed to have wrote the book of *Job*, 142
- Mother of the Gods, an old stone, so called by the *Romans*, 764
- Mountains from the creation, 26. the highest now in the world, 72. called by the ancients after their own, or their ancestors names, and why, 85. some in *America* full of gold, 100
- MURDER by guile distinguished, 681. examples of its punishment, *ibid.*
- Musick, frenzy cured by it, 271
- MUTINES, his good services gets him the envy of *Hanno*, 665. his wrongful disgrace occasions the loss of all the *Carthaginians* held in *Sicily*, *ibid.*
- MYCALE, the battel of, 411
- MYRIS, a great lake in *Egypt*, with monuments in the middle of it, 344, 350
- NAVAL triumph, the first ever seen in *Rome*, 566
- Navigation, by whom invented, 77. the first about *Africa*, 359
- NEBO, the idol oracle of the *Moabites*, 219
- NEBUCHADNEZZAR subdues *Egypt*, 380. destroys *Nineveh*, 381. his buildings, madness, and death, 382
- Necessity binds every nature, but the immortal, 102
- Nectar and Ambrosia, alluded to the tree of life, by the ancient poets, 40
- NEHEMIAH, the book of, when written, 417
- NEMEAN games, first instituted, 248
- NEOPTOLEMUS, his dissimulation with *Eumenes*, 495. shamefully beaten, *ibid.* rallies again, and is slain by the hand of *Eumenes*, 496
- NEPHTALIM, the tribe of, where settled, 194
- NESTORIAN christians, their epistles to the pope concerning the land of *Eden*, 31, &c.
- NETHERLANDS, what helped them greatly against the *Spaniards*, 570, 532
- NICANOR, brother to *Cassander*, timely put into *Athens* by him, 499. takes *Pireus*, 500. his victory at sea against *Clitus*, 501. murdered by the command of *Olympias*, 503
- NICIAS, an honourable citizen of *Athens*, sent ambassador to *Sparta*, 424. made general of the *Athenians*, in *Sicily*, 425, 553. his reasons for carrying on his unfortunate siege of *Syracuse*, 425. beaten, *ibid.* 555. intangled in his passage to *Camerina*, *ibid.* surrenders himself, and is barbarously murdered, *ibid.*
- NICOCLES, king of *Paphos*, his pitiful tragedy, 521
- NIMROD, where his country was, 39. the first sovereign lord after the flood, 105. built *Nineveh*, 107. re-established the *Babylonian* empire, 106, 109. he, *Belus*, and *Ninus*, three distinct persons, 106.
- NINEVEH, formerly called *Campfor*, 121. destroyed by *Arbaces*, 322
- NINIAS, son of *Semiramis*, succeeds her, 123. an effeminate prince, *ibid.* supposed to be the *Amraphel* whom *Abraham* overthrew, 130
- NINUS, the time of his government after the flood, 90. the first notorious sacrificer to idols, 109. his wars, 112. forces *Semiramis* from *Menon* her husband, 113. his buildings, and death, 121
- NITOCRIS, sister to *Evilmerodach*, takes the government out of his hands, 384
- NOAH, the many names given him, 62, 63. first planter of the vine, 63. not remembered in scripture after his sacrifice, and why, 69. his sons, which the eldest, 75. their issue, where settled, 81, &c. his flood forewarned of God, 57. universal, 60. supernatural, 61. no need of any new creation of matter to make it, 62. he and his family enter the ark, 65, 66
- Nobility, the beginning of it, 104. vainly boasted of without virtue, 105. ancient, had in due regard, proof against conquest, 516. examples of this in *France*, *ibid.*
- NOMADES, what sort of people, 43
- Novogrodskoy, a coin in *Russia*, upon what occasion stamped, 366
- NUMA Pompilius chosen king of the *Romans*, 356. more like a priest than a king, 336. his law against idolatry, 111. his books of his own constitutions, and of philosophy, found in his grave, near 600 years after his death, 356. and ordered by the senate to be burnt, *ibid.* an answer of his, reported by *Plutarch*, 263

N

- NARATHEANS, in what they traded with the remote *Arabians*, 517
- NABIS, tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, a cruel oppressor of his subjects, 724. his engine, in the form of his wife, to gripe those to death who refused money, *ibid.* has *Argos* delivered to him by *Philip*, and presently enters into league with the *Romans* against him, 732. defeated by *Philopæmen*, 758. slain by the treachery of the *Etolians*, 760
- NANONASSAR, the *Ara* of, 337
- NABOTH, the eldest son of *Ismael*, of whom sprung the *Arabians* of *Petrea*, 176
- NABONIDUS, who he was, various opinions about it, 376
- NABUCHODONOSOR overthrows *Necho*, 367. his peremptory message to *Jehoiakim*, *ibid.* conquers *Egypt*, 368. besieges *Tyre*, *ibid.* puts *Jehoiakim* to death, *ibid.* takes *Jerusalem*, 369. and destroys the temple, 370. *Megasthenes's* report of him, 376. his victories between the destruction of *Jerusalem* and conquest of *Egypt*, 378
- NABURZANES, his intolerance to *Darius*, 476
- NADAGARA, battel at, between *Scipio* and *Hannibal*, 696
- NAHAB, king of the *Ammonites*, his cruelty to the *Gileadites*, 221
- NANUM, the prophet, when he lived, 330
- NASSAMENTS, a people that live upon the spoils of shipwreck,
- Nations, the first planting of, after the flood, 74. the law of, 163
- Nature, no privation for it, 10
- OATHS, how sacred they ought to be, 185
- OBADIAH, the prophet, when he lived, 322
- OCEANUS and *Hesperus*, contemporaries with *Moses*, 178
- ORPHEUS, the story of him, 247
- OG, his iron bed, its dimensions, 223
- OGYGES, contemporary with *Jacob*, and his flood above 500 years after *Noah's*, 58
- Olympiads, when they began, and whence their name, 328
- Olympian games first instituted by *Hercules*, 328. how and when celebrated, 329
- OLYMPIAS, mother to *Alexander the great*, her hatred to *Antipater*, 490. recalled into *Macedon*, 498. her easy victory over *Eurydice*, 503. puts *Aridæus* to death by cruel torments, and hangs *Eurydice*, *ibid.* besieged by *Cassander*, and submits to him, 504. her death, and character, 504, 505. many instances of her barbarous cruelty, 462, 503, 505
- OLYNTIUS, a city in *Thrace*, compelled by famine to surrender to the *Lacedæmonians*, 447, 448. sacked by *Philip*, son of *Amintas*, 460
- OMRI proclaimed king of *Israel*, 292
- ONOMARCHUS, commander of the *Phocian* army, assists *Lycophron* in the invasion of *Thessaly*, 459. gets a great victory over

I N D E X.

over the *Theſſalians*, and *Macedonians*, 460. his army overturned, and himſelf hanged by *Philip*, ſon of *Amyntas*, *ibid.*
OPHIR, one of *Joſtan's* ſons, ſeated in an iſland in the *East-Indies*, now called *Molucca*, 99
Orchards in the air, 382
OREB and *Zeb* taken by the *Ephraimites*, 241
ORESTES murdered by his tutor *Æropus*, 458
ORIGEN, his opinion of the ſtars, 11. his glorious ſepulchre, 192
Original ſin explained, 18
ORONTES, the river, whence ſo called, 396
ORUS the ſecond, or *Bufiris*, his edict for drowning the *Hebrew* children, 138
OSIRIS, the eldeſt ſon of *Cham*, 135
Oſtraciſm, a law of *Athens*, deviſed by *Theſeus*, 246
OSYMANDYAS, his tomb, 343
OTHONIEL commands the *Jews* after *Joſhua's* death, 236. his contemporaries, *ibid.*
Oyl, by whom firſt preſſed, 181
Oyſters growing on trees, 41

P

P*ACUVIUS Calavius*, an ambitious nobleman of *Capua*, his conjunction with *Hannibal*, 627. ſaves the ſenators from being murdered by the people, 328, 628
Painters Wives iſland, 327
Palm-tree, where it grows, 34. yields meat, drink, and cloth, *ibid.*
Palmito-tree, the wonderful nature of the female, 154
PANORMUS, now *Palermo*, by whom founded, 550. a further account of it, 556
PAPYRIUS, his noble exhortation to the *Roman* ſoldiers againſt the *Samnites*, 468
Paradiſe, the ſeat of it greatly miſtaken, 21. many ſtrange opinions about it, 22. where ſeated, 23, 32. neceſſary to be known, 24. the marks of it not utterly defaced by the flood, 25. not the whole earth, as ſome have thought, 26. placed by ſome as high as the moon, 27. by others under the *Equinoctial*, 28. the two chief trees in it, 40
Parents, our firſt, their ſin and fall, 42
PARMENIO, one of *Alexander's* captains, wins *Miletus*, 465. the very right-hand of *Alexander's* good fortune, 473. put to death by his order, 481
PARTHENIANS, their riſe, 353
PASIPHAE, her unnatural luſt, 242
Paſſover, the firſt celebration of it, 149. the ſecond, 168. the third, 184
Patriarchs, their different ages, when they begat their children, 45. long-lived, *ibid.* the cauſes thereof, 46. their years not lunar, 45. delivered their knowledge by tradition, 47
PAUSANIAS, king of *Sparta*, carries large forces to the aid of the *Athenians*, 410. recovers *Byzantium*, now *Conſtantinople*, from the *Persians*, 414. condemned as a traitor, and dies in baniſhment, 445
PELASGI, a nation that once gave name to all *Greece*, 332
PELAGUS choſen king of *Arcadia* for his bodily ſtrength, 178
PELOPIDAS, ſent ambaffador from the *Thebans*, to *Artaxerxes* *Mnemon*, 450
PELOPONNESIAN war, its beginning, 419. the end of it, 428
PELUSIUM, a great city upon the branch of *Nilus*, next *Arabia*, 88
Pen, inſtances of guileful killing by it, 681
PENTHESILEA, queen of the *Amazons*, ſlain by *Pyrhus*, ſon of *Achilles*, 259
PERDICCAS, his nature and quality, 488. joined with *Leonatus* in the government of *Aridæus's* army, 489. made protector and commander of the king's forces, *ibid.* conquers *Cappadocia*, and crucifies *Ariarettes*, the king of it, 491. makes an unfortunate voyage into *Egypt*, 494. is ſlain, 495
PERRIANDER, one of the ſeven ſages of *Greece*, a cruel tyrant, 366
PERROT, Sir *John*, the cauſe of his ruin, 558
PERSEPOLIS burnt by *Alexander*, at the requeſt of a ſtrumpet, 475. the immense riches of that city, 176
PERSEUS, eldeſt ſon of *Philip*, the ſon of *Demetrius*, accuses his brother *Demetrius*, and works his death, 785. ſucceeds his father in the kingdom of *Macedon*, 786. his timorous nature, 787. the *Dolopians* rebel againſt him, 788. makes a journey to *Apollo's* temple at *Delphi*, 790. accused by *Eumenes*, king of *Pergamus*, to the *Roman* ſenate, 791.

attempts to murder *Eumenes*, 792. and to poiſon ſome of the *Roman* ſenators, 793. the *Romans* declare war againſt him, *ibid.* his forces, 795. his cowardice in abandoning *Tempe*, 800. overthrown by the *Romans* at *Pydna*, and the firſt that fled, 806. takes ſanctuary at *Sanoſtræce*, *ibid.* conſented by the *Cretans*, 807. led captive to *Rome*, and dies miſerably, 815. his ſon put to a low trade, *ibid.*
PERSIANS, from whom deſcended, 97. their firſt greatneſs, 385. kings, their number and names, 394. empire, troubles therein, 451. the battel between them and *Alexander* near the *Granicus*, 464. their barbarity to their priſoners, 475
PERU, whence its name, 100. *Solomon* traded thither, *ibid.*
PETALISMUS, a law for baniſhment among the *Syracuſians*, 552
PETELIA, a city of the *Brutians* in *Italy*, its fidelity to the *Romans*, 583, 643
PETRA, the native city of *Ruth*, 219
PEUCESTES put to flight by *Antigonus*, 506. conſpires againſt *Eumenes's* life, 507. deſerts the army, 508. lives contemptibly, and dies obſcurely, 509
PHÆDRA and *Hippolytus*, the ſtory of them, 246
PHÆTON's conflagration, 179
PHALARIS, his juſtice upon *Perillus*, 551. ſtoned to death, *ibid.*
PHALINUS, a *Grecian*, endeavours to talk his countrymen into ſlavery, 434. well answered by *Xenophon*, *ibid.*
PHARAOH, his cruelty againſt the *Israelites* children in *Egypt*, and the ground of it, 141. his army, and purſuit of the *Israelites*, 143, 147. drowned in the *Red ſea*, 147
PHARAOH, a general name given by the *Egyptians* to their kings, 178
PHARAOH Neco, his conqueſts, 358, 359. ſlain, 367
PHARAOH Vaphres, father-in-law to *Solomon*, 137
PHARNABAZUS aſſiſts the *Bithynian Thracians* againſt the *Greeks*, 440. the war and treaty between him and *Agſſilauſ*, 444. helps *Conon* to a victory over the *Lacedæmonian* fleet, 446. marries one of the daughters of *Artaxerxes*, 447
PHARNUS and his ſeven ſons, 383
PHÉMONE, prieſt of *Apollo*, the deviſer of heroic verſe, 238
PHENICIA, its bounds, chief cities, and their founders, 203. kings, 204. won by *Ptolemy Lagus*, 498
PHENICIANS, ſome of the firſt idolaters, 50. their kings, eſpecially of *Tyre*, 205
PHIDIPPIDES, his familiar devil, 402
PHILETÆRUS, an eunuch, by what means he got the kingdom of *Pergamus*, 719
PHILIP, ſon of *Amyntas* king of *Macedon*, carried as an hoſtage into *Thebes*, 450. loſes one of his eyes at the ſiege of *Methone*, *ibid.* the beginning of his reign, 458. makes a politick league with the *Olynthians*, 459. is beaten by, and afterwards overthrows *Onomarchus* and his whole army, 460. deſtroys *Olynthus*, and ſells the inhabitants for ſlaves, *ibid.* ends the *Phocian* war, *ibid.* defeated in his attempts upon *Perinthus*, *Byzantium*, and the *Scythians*, 461. victorious over the *Greeks* at *Chæronea*, and choſen their captain-general againſt the *Persians*, *ibid.* raiſes a great army to invade *Aſia*, *ibid.* killed by *Pausanias*, a gentleman of his guard, 462. the good foundations he laid for his ſon *Alexander's* greatneſs, *ibid.* his character, and iſſue, *ibid.* his whole race extinct, 520
PHILIP, ſon of *Demetrius*, king of *Macedon*, comes to the crown in his infancy, 593, 600. drives *Attalus* out of *Opus*, 645. his gallant demeanour towards the *Acheans*, his confederates, *ibid.* his friendship courted by the *Romans*, 646. wars with the *Etolians*, 705. miſadviſed by evil counſellors, 706. invades the *Etolians* a ſecond time, 708. waſtes *Etolia*, and carries away rich ſpoils, 713. grants peace to the *Etolians*, 715. enters into a league with *Hannibal* againſt the *Romans*, 647, 715. his double dealing between the nobility and commons of *Aſſene*, 716. makes his friends his enemies, 715. poiſons the *Arati*, father and ſon, *ibid.* his perſidiouſneſs and cruelty to the *Cians*, 720. the notable ſtratagem by which he won *Prinæſſus*, 721. war proclaimed againſt him by the *Athenians*, 722. and by the *Romans*, 723. attempts to ſurprize *Athens*, and deſtroys the temple of *Hercules* near it, 724. ſchumiſhes between him and the *Romans*, 726. waſtes *Theſſaly*, 729. delivers *Argos* to *Nabis*, 732. vanquiſhed by the *Romans* at *Cynocephala*, 733. obtains a peace of them upon hard conditions, 736. puts his youngelt ſon to death, 785. relat-

I N D E X.

- ves to give the kingdom from the eldest, but dies before he could effect it, 786
- PHILIP II. of *Spain*, his enterprize upon *England*, in 1588. compared to that of *Xerxes* against *Greece*, 405
- PHILISTINES, their foundation, and first kings, 281, 282. slay great numbers of the *Israelites* in two battels, 261. take the ark of God, *ibid.* plagued with a grievous disease, and forced to return it, 262. dispersed by thunder, 263. their victory over *Saul* at *Gilboa*, 272. their policy in not prosecuting it after *Saul's* death, *ibid.*
- PHILISTUS, the historian, prevails upon *Dionysius* to banish *Plato*, 558. put to death, 559
- PHILOMELA, whose daughter, 236. the fable of her, 237, 238
- PHILOPOEMEN, his first military action, 600. made general of the *Acheans*, 718. gets a victory over the *Lacedemonians*, and slays the tyrant *Machanidas*, 719. his exact skill in advantage of ground, 758. overcomes *Nabis* thereby, and wastes his country, *ibid.* unites the *Lacedemonians* and *Acheans*, 760. taken prisoner by the revolted *Messenians*, and poisoned, 781
- Philosophers, ignorant in nature, and the ways of her working, 10
- Philosophy, natural, from whence it came, 550
- Philosiratus, a passage in his life of *Apollonius Tyanus*, found true, though fabulously expressed, 67
- PHILOTAS, his treason against *Alexander*, 479, 480. tortured to death for it, 481. an excellent note of *Sam. Daniel's* in his tragedy of *Philotas*, 480
- PHINEUS plagued by the harpies, 244
- PHOCIAN war began, 459. ended, 460
- PHOCION made chief ruler in *Athens*, 493. poisoned by the *Athenians*, after having been chosen their governor five and forty times, 500. his character, 500, 501
- PHRAORTES, king of the *Medes*, slain at the siege of *Nineveh*, 361
- PHRYGIA won by *Antigonus* the elder, 502
- Phunon, a principal city of the *Edomites*, where *Moses* erected the brazen serpent, 172
- PHYLLIDAS gives liberty to the *Thebans* by a stratagem, 448
- Pilgrims, the castle of, where, and by whom built, 200
- Pillar, one set up 1426 years before *Noah's* flood, seen in *Josephus's* time, 25
- PINDAR, the poet, all his race pardoned by *Alexander*, at the destruction of *Thebes*, 464
- PINEDA, his miracle, 286
- PISISTRATUS changes the popular government of *Athens* into a monarchy, 399. the various turns of his fortune, *ibid.*
- PISON, 35. falsely taken for *Ganges*, 27. joins *Tygris* under *Apamia*, and now called *Piso-Tygris*, 36
- PLATÆÆ, the battel of, 410. the city taken by the *Peloponnesians*, 420
- PLATO, his good instructions to *Dionysius*, 558. banished by him, *ibid.*
- PLAYS, musical, instituted to *Apollo Delphicus*, 181
- PLEMINIUS, a captain under *P. C. Scipio*, plunders the temple of *Proserpina*, at *Locri*, 684
- PLESSIS, *M. du*, the satisfaction given him, for a blow, by a baron of *France*, 680, 681
- Plunder, divided before the victory won, 601. expectation of it gives the greatest edge to the common soldiers, 468
- PLUTO, his rape of *Proserpina*, 237
- Poets, ancient, little historical truth in them, 256
- POLYBIUS, an impartial historian, 634
- POLYSPERCHON made protector of the king and empire of *Macedon*, 498. his cruelty to a familiar friend, 500. his vain expedition against *Cassander*, 501. his treachery to his sovereign, 503. endeavours to place *Hercules*, son of *Alexander*, upon the throne, 519. bribed by *Cassander*, murders him, *ibid.*
- POLYXENIDAS, admiral of *Antiochus*, surprises the *Rhodian* fleet, 769
- PONTUS, whence used for the sea in general, 85
- Popular jealousy, the fruits of it, 616
- PORUS beaten and taken prisoner by *Alexander*, 484. restored to his estate by him, with a great enlargement, *ibid.*
- POSTHUMIUS, general of the *Romans*, the strange manner of his overthrow by the *Gauls*, 643. his skull made a drinking cup, *ibid.*
- POYET, chancellor to *Francis I.* of *France*, worthily punished for his falsehood, 681, 682
- Predestination, 13
- PRENESTINES, their great resolution and patience at the siege of *Capitoline*, 631, 632
- Prescience, 112
- PRIAMUS, king of *Troy*, rebuilt it, 246. had fifty sons, *ibid.*
- Primum mobile, whether there be any, 9
- Printing invented, 67. improved by great scholars, and wise men; afterwards corrupted, and by whom, 662
- PROGNE, the fable of her, 237, 238
- PROMETHEUS flourished in the time of *Moses*, 178. his story moralized, 61, 178. *Æschylus's* testimony of his knowledge, 178
- Prophets, greater and lesser, whence the difference of them taken, 322
- PROTEUS takes *Helena* from *Paris*, 257, 345. what he was probably, 345.
- Providence, 13
- PROXIMUS, his just reflection upon the emperor *Valentinian*, for killing *Ætius*, 782
- PRUSIAS, king of *Bithynia*, sends a fleet into *Greece* to assist *Philip*, son of *Demetrius*, 645. marries his daughter, 720. persuades him to destroy the town of *Cios* in a cruel and perfidious manner, *ibid.* promises to deliver up *Hannibal* to the *Romans*, 781. basely flatters them in the senate, 815
- Psalms, a dispute whether all were written by *David*, 279. the supposed nine other authors of them, 280. divided and distinguished by *Ezechias*, 279
- PSAMMITICUS, his reign, 350. forsaken by his soldiers, 351. the means he used to find out what language was most ancient, *ibid.* his long siege of *Azotus*, *ibid.* his provident course to divert the *Scythians* from *Egypt*, 365
- PSAMMONES, the philosopher, takes down the pride of *Alexander* the great, 472
- PTOLEMÆUS Lathurus, his victory over the *Jews*, 202. his barbarous contrivance to strike the rest of that people with terror, *ibid.*
- PTOLEMAIS, its situation, and whence its name, 192
- PTOLEMY called the son of *Lagus*, but reputed of *Philip*, 488. his subtilty to debar all claim to the crown of *Macedon*, *ibid.* very powerful and popular in *Egypt*, 494, 511. sides with *Antipater*, *ibid.* scours the sea with his fleet, under the conduct of *Seleucus*, 511. subdues *Cyprus*, 513. surprises *Gaza*, and takes *Tyrus*, and *Sidon*, 514. retires with treasures into *Egypt*, 516. obtains *Sicyon* and *Corinth*, 518. distresses *Antigonus*, 523. besieges *Salamis*, 528. his death, and character, 531
- PTOLEMY Philadelphus, his son, succeeds him, *ibid.* his character, 738. built and furnished the famous library at *Alexandria*, *ibid.* first of the *Egyptian* kings that entered into league with the *Romans*, *ibid.*
- PTOLEMY Ceraunus treacherously murders *Seleucus*, 531. seizes all the dominions of *Lyfimachus*, 536. is possessed of all *Macedon* and *Thrace*, 537. marries his own sister, murders her children, and banishes her, *ibid.* taken prisoner by the *Gauls*, who struck off his head, *ibid.*
- PTOLEMY Energetes, his reign, 738. death, 739. his actions, and whence his name, *ibid.*
- PTOLEMY Philopator succeeds him, *ibid.* his surname given him in derision, 745. his lewd reign, and death, *ibid.*
- PTOLEMY Epiphanes left his successor, 745, 746
- PTOLEMY Philometor, and Ptolemy Physcon, his sons, their contention for the crown, 810, &c.
- PUBLICOLA, *Valerius*, his sincerity, 532
- PUNIC faith, a proverb among the *Romans*, 561
- PUNIC war, the beginning of the first, 547. its end, 577. the second, 606
- PURIM, the feast of, when, and why, instituted, 417
- PYDNA, besieged by *Cassander*, 504. extreme famine therein, *ibid.* the battel of, between the *Romans* and *Perseus* king of *Macedon*, 805, 806
- PYGMALION, king of *Tyre*, when he reigned, 206, 312. his barbarous murder of *Sichæus*, 206
- Pyramids of *Egypt*, 346
- PYRRHUS, king of *Epirus*, his descent and education, 528. his personal valour, 529. gets *Macedon*, 530. his triumphant entry into it, *ibid.* made patron of the *Athenians*, *ibid.* forsaken by the *Macedonians*, 531. wars with the *Romans*, and vanquishes them in two battels, 535. wins most part of *Sicily*, is tyrannical, and soon loses it, 537. beaten out of *Italy* by the *Romans*, and forced to return to *Epirus*, 538. besieges *Sparta* without success, 539. his enterprize

I N D E X.

terprize upon *Argos*, 540. his death by a stone from the hand of a woman, *ibid.* his character, 538
PYTHAGORAS, his eagle, 119. his golden precept, 155
PYTHIUS, a *Lydian*, entertains *Xerxes*, and his whole army, 404. barbarously requited by him, *ibid.*
PYTHON sent against the rebel *Greeks* in *Asia*, 491. succeeds *Perdiccas* in the protectorship of *Macedon*, 495. resigns his office, 497. deluded, and slain, by *Antigonus*, 509

Q

QUINQUEREMES, Roman gallies, how built, 565, 567
QUINTIUS (T.) Flaminius, consul of *Rome*, sent with an army into *Macedon*, 728. wins a passage against *Philip*, 729. enters into a treaty with him, 731. which is broken off, 732. vanquishes *Philip* at *Cynoscephalæ*, 733. falls out with the *Etolians*, 734. grants peace to *Philip*, 735. thereby sets the *Greeks* at liberty, *ibid.* his magnificent triumph, 754. sent ambassador to *Prusias*, king of *Bitbynia*, and requires him to deliver up *Hannibal*, 781

R

RABBA, the chief city of the *Amunitei*, where *Uriah* was slain, 223
Ram, in gold, a curious piece of workmanship, in the temple of *Venus Erycina*, 549
RAMASES, a city in *Goshen*, whence the *Israelites* made their march towards the *Red sea*, 144
Rats, great mischief done by them, in *Sennacherib's* army, 338, 348
Rebels, how vain their confidence in their favour with the multitude, 714
RECEM, now called *Crac* and *Moxera*, a strong city, wherein the foldans of *Egypt* kept all their treasures, 219
Red colour superstitiously observed by the *Egyptians*, 143
Red sea described, 147. the various names given to it, *ibid.* by whom discovered in 1544, 147.
de Repetundis, or of recovery, a law among the *Romans* against extorting magistrates, 581
Reges Arabum & Sabæ, in *Psal.* 72. expounded according to the *Hebrew*, 31
REHOBAM succeeds his father *Solomon*, 288. his impiety, and death, 290
Report of a victory, how far carried in one day, 412
Retreat, in the head of an enemy's army, how dangerous, 604
Revelation of St. John, an interpretation of *Daniel's* visions, 373
Revenge, steadfastness in taking it, wrongfully held a point of honour, and why, 588. its true conquest, 680
REUBEN, the tribe of, and his borderers, 217
RHODES, the siege of, by *Demetrius*, 523
RHODIAN, with one galley, defies the *Roman* fleet, 573
RHODIANS, their fleet overthrown by *Ptolemy's* navy, 512. war upon *Philip*, 720. recover the whole province of *Peræa* from the *Macedonians*, 734. their proud embassy to *Antiochus*, 747. slighted by the *Romans*, 792
Ring, the privilege of wearing it at *Rome*, granted only to their knights, 652
Rivers, the four, that went out of *Eden*, 32, &c.
Roberies, more committed in *England*, than in any other christian country, 161
ROME, when, and by whom, founded, 335. her kings, 335, 531. first consuls, 532. how, and when, she fell under subjection to a prelate, 336
ROMANS, their first wars, 533, 534. with *Pyrrhus*, 535. victory over him, 537. first *Punic* war unjustly undertaken by them 547. contend with the *Carthaginians* for *Stetily*, 549, 563. besiege and win *Agrigentum*, 564. begin to fit out a fleet, 565. their first loss, and first victory, by sea, *ibid.* a second victory, 567. carry the war into *Africa*, and prevail there, 567, 568. lose their fleet by tempest, and rely only on a land-army, 570. attempt again to get the mastery of the seas, and sail, 573, &c. build a new fleet at the charge of private men, 576. get a great victory at sea, and thereby bring the *Carthaginians* to hard terms of peace, 577. take *Sardinia* from them, contrary to that peace, 590, 591. war with, and subdue, the *Illyrians*, 601, 602. and the *Gauls*, 603, 604, 605. undertake the second *Punic* war, 606. rebelled against by the *Cisalpine Gauls*, 610. beaten by *Hannibal*, at *Ticinum*, 612. at *Trchia*, 613. at *Thrasymene*, 615. their lingering

war under *Q. Fabius*, 616, &c. driven to hard shifts, 629. join with the *Etolians*, and make war upon *Philip* in *Greece*, 644, 645. begin to recover their strength, 647, 650. their noble affection for their common-weal, 649. besiege and take *Capua*, 652, &c. rout *Hannibal* at *Nadagara*, 699. force the *Carthaginians* to beg a peace, *ibid.* assist the *Athenians* against *Philip*, 723, &c. war with *Antiochus*, 737. with the *Gauls*, *Ligurians*, and *Spaniards*, 755. vanquish *Antiochus* at *Magnesia*, 772. subdue the *Etolians*, 773. and *Gallo-Greeks*, 774. their ingratitude to the *Scipios*, 776, 777. their custom, of leading captive princes in triumph, condemned, 701. factions among their nobility, 777. their victory over *Perseus*, 867. dreadful to all kings, 814

ROMULUS, his birth, 335. death, 336

Rowing, after a strange fashion, 565

ROXANA, her bloody malice upon *Statira* justly revenged, 518

Rule, the desire of it belongs to the nobler part of reason, 584. of the husband over the wife, and of parents over their children, *ibid.*

RUTH and *Janus* contemporaries, 81

S

SABA, now *Semiscasac*, whence the *Magi* come to worship *CHRIST*, where seated, 94

SABA, son of *Jofan*, seated in *India*, from whom came the nation of the *Sabæi*, 99

Saccharum, whence the word, 194

SAFFA, the birth city of *Zebedæus*, *Alpheus*, *James* and *John* 200

Sages of Greece, when they flourished, 328

SAGUNTUM besieged and taken by *Hannibal*, 608. recovered by the *Romans*, 638

SALADINE, soldan of *Egypt*, gets the sovereignty, 344. forced by the *Christians* to raise the siege of *Belfort*, 193

SALAMIS, the battel of, 408

SALLUM gets the crown of *Juda* by treason, reigns one month, and is slain, 321

SAMARIA, the metropolis of the kingdom of *Israel*, by whom built, 208. magnificent buildings in it formerly, now onlay a few cottages of *Greelan* monks, *ibid.* *Helisæus*, *Abdias*, and *John Baptist* buried there, *ibid.*

SAMARITANS ever a perfidious nation, 94

SAMNITES become tributary to *Rome*, 534

SAMSON, his surpassing strength, 49. observations upon some parts of his history, 260

SAMUEL, his descent and government, 262, &c. his death, 268

SANAR, the first that brought the *Turks* into *Egypt*, 341

SARDANAPALUS, king of *Affyria*, his voluptuous life, and death, 319

SAREPTA, a city, where situate, 190. excellent wines near it, *ibid.*

SARKE, the island of, surprised by the *French* in queen *Mary's* time, regained by a stratagem, 483

SARMIENTO, don *Pedro de*, a petty jest of his, 327

Satrapæ, the *Persian*, their precarious condition, 517

SAUL, elected king of *Israel*, 264. his first victories, 265. his disobedience, 266. his cruelty, 268. his severe conditions of peace to the *Ammonites*, 201, 202. slain with his three sons by the *Philistines*, *ibid.* dishonour done to their bodies, *ibid.* his contemporaries, 269

SCALIGER, *Joseph*, his opinion concerning *Nabonidus*, 376

SCIPIO, *Publius Cornelius*, saves his father's life, 612. sent proconsul into *Spain* at 24 years of age, 641. wins *New-Carthage* by assault the first day, *ibid.* makes an entire conquest of *Spain*, 675, 676. drives the *Carthaginians* from the continent to the isle of *Gades*, 677. institutes funeral games at *New-Carthage*, 678. his exemplary justice on his mutineers, 682. returns to *Rome*, and is chosen consul, 683. procures the war to be transferred into *Africa*, *ibid.* recovers *Locri*, 684. lands in *Africa*, 686. the manner of his winter-camp, *ibid.* fires the camps of *Syphax* and *Asdrubal*, 687, 688. fights the *Carthaginians* in the haven at *Utica*, 689. proclaims *Masanissa* king before the army, 691. sends ambassadors to *Carthage*, 693. meets and parleys with *Hannibal*, 696, 697. routs him at *Nadagara*, and makes the *Carthaginians* submit, 499. his triumphant journey through *Italy*, and entry into *Rome*, 700. surnamed the *African*, from the province he had subdued, *ibid.* condescends to go his younger brother's lieutenant in the

I N D E X.

- the war against *Antiochus*, 768. proof against bribery, 772. yet accused of it by two tribunes, 776. leaves the ungrateful city, and dies in voluntary banishment, *ibid.*
- SCIPIO, *Lucius Cornelius*, brother to *Publius*, chosen consul at *Rome*, 768. grants peace to the *Etolians*, 769. goes into *Asia*, 779. overcomes *Antiochus* at *Magnesia*, 772. returns to *Rome*, and is honoured with a most pompous triumph, and the title of the *Asiatic*, 773. falls under the same false accusation with his brother, 776. prosecuted with more severity, 777. condemned in a fine, far beyond his ability to pay, and his estate confiscated, *ibid.*
- Scriptures, beyond all other records, in age and authority, 75
- Scripture chronology, seemingly disagreeing, reconciled, 249
- SCULTET, *Bartholomew*, his calculation on what day the sun went back in *Ezekia's* time, 336
- SCYTHIA Saga, under the mountains of *Parapanisus*, 69. *Scythia intra Inaum*, now called *Gassaria*, 70.
- SCYTHIANS, their expedition against the *Cimmerians*, 362. their vast army, 363. their war in the higher *Asia*, 364. tyrannous dominion over it, 365. *Alexander* wars with them, 482
- Sea fight in general, observations thereon, 565
- Seas, principal, their appellations, and whence, 73
- Second causes, our ignorance how they should have any proportion with their effects, 10
- SEHON discomfited by *Moses*, 174
- SELEUCUS *Nicanor*, chased out of *Babylon* by *Antigonus*, flies to *Ptolemy*, 509, 510. lands with a fleet in *Cyprus*, 511. gains with him a victory at *Gaza*, over *Demetrius*, son of *Antigonus*, 513. surprizes *Nicanor's* camp, and routs his whole army, 514, 515. the *Æra* of the kingdom of the *Greeks* begins from his victories, 515. joins forces with *Lyfmachus*, 525. marries *Stratonice*, and then gives her to his love-sick son, 526, 737. has *Demetrius* prisoner, 530. treacherously slain by *Ptolemy Ceraunus*, 531, 737. the last of *Alexander's* captains, *ibid.*
- SELEUCUS *Callinicus* begins his reign with cruelties, 738. prepares a fleet to make war upon his own subjects, which is cast away, *ibid.* vanquished by *Ptolemy Evergetes*, 739. invaded by his brother *Antiochus Hierax*, but gets the upper hand of him, *ibid.* killed by a fall from his horse, *ibid.*
- SELEUCUS *Ceraunus*, son to the last, slain by the treason of *Nicanor*, 739
- SELEUSIA, anciently called *Chalanne*, 30. taken by *Molo*, 740
- SEMIRAMIS, her policy to obtain the empire, 121. her parentage, and education, *ibid.* the vast army with which she invaded *India*, 67, 68, 90, 122. overthrown by *Staurabates*, and dies, *ibid.* her buildings, *ibid.*
- SEMPRONIUS going to *Africa*, recalled with his army to save *Italy*, 611
- SENNACHERIB, his wars with the *Jerus*, 88, 338, 348. his army destroy'd by a pestilence, 336, 338. slain by his sons, *ibid. ibid.*
- SENONES, a tribe of the *Gauls*, win a great battel from the *Romans*, slay the ambassadors they sent to treat about the ransom of prisoners, and are expelled out of their country, 603
- Serpent, 120 foot long in *Africa*, slain by *Regulus*, 568
- SERVIUS *Tullius* usurps the kingdom of *Rome*, 532. the first that levied subsidies there, *ibid.*
- SEVORA and *Thura*, famous midwives, *Pharaoh's* cruel edict by them, 141
- SEPHORIS, formerly the bulwark of *Galilee*, the city of *Joachim* and *Anna*, parents of the virgin *Mary*; now but a castle called *Zaphet*, 200
- SESAG invades *Judea* with a vast army, takes *Jerusalem*, spoils the temple, and subjects the whole kingdom to *Egypt*, 290
- SESOSTRIS, two of the name, 137. divers errors about the former, *ibid.* he makes four captive kings draw his coach, 288. both fall blind, 137. the fabulous recovery of the last, 138
- SETH, worshiped by the *Egyptians*, 51. *Sethetica*, a principal province in *Egypt*, so called in honour to him, *ibid.*
- SETHON, king of *Egypt*, in the time of *Ezekia*, 348
- SEXTUS *Tarquinius*, his rape of *Lucretia*, 532
- SFORZA, *Lodowick*, duke of *Milan*, delivered up to his enemy, by the treachery of his mercenaries, 582
- SHERA, borders upon the *Persian* gulf, 29. the queen of it visits *Solomon* with rich presents, 286
- Shekel of the sanctuary, its weight, and value, 168
- Ships, the invention of them, 78
- SHISHAC, his policy in entertaining *Jeroboam* and *Adad*, 210
- SIBYL's books, of great credit among the *Romans*, 629, 775. shameful idolatry advanced by them, 776. their prophecies of *CHRIST* suspected as counterfeit, *ibid.*
- SIBYLLA *Erythraea*, when she lived, 282.
- SICILY, the quality and first inhabitants of it, 548. whence so named, 549. plantation of the *Greeks* in it, 550. the government and affairs of it before *Dionysius's* tyranny, 551. conquered by the *Romans*, 666
- SIDNEY, Sir *Philip*, his observation of historians, 306.
- Siege, a great one, breaks the force of a great army; instances of it, 617
- SIMEON, the tribe of, where settled, 214
- SIMON *Magus*, his end, 119
- SIMONI *Deo Sancto*, an inscription on an altar at *Rome*, conjectures upon it examined, 776
- SIMONIANS, whence the sellers of spiritual gifts so called, 211
- Sin, the image of *God* in man much deformed by it, 18. of our first parents explained, 42
- SINAI and *Horeb* but one mountain, 151
- SINOPE, a port-town in *Leucosyria*, a colony of the *Milesians*, 438
- SISAMNUS, an unjust judge, punished in a most severe manner by *Cambyfes*, 395
- SIXTUS *Quintus*, his good answer to a friar, 306
- Slave, whence the word, 282. who naturally so, 585
- SOCRATES, his death, and for what, 27
- Solar and lunar years, and how reconciled, 144
- Soldiers, their profession unprosperous, and why, 782
- SOLOMON declared *David's* successor, 278. anointed king, 279. his riches, 280. his weak pretence for the murder of *Adonijah*, his elder brother, 283. wisdom, buildings and glory, 284. his letter to *Suron*, king of *Tyre*, *ibid.* sends a fleet to *India*, 285. the strength of his garrisons, and grandeur of his court, 286. his death and writings, 287. the greatest example of human frailty, 288. his contemporaries, *ibid.*
- SOLON gives laws to the *Athenians*, 399. a saying of his, remembered by *Cæsar*, saves that king's life, 389
- Sons of *God*, the meaning thereof, 48
- SOPHONISBA, daughter of *Astrubal* the son of *Gisgo*, betrothed to *Masaniffa*, but afterwards married to *Sypbax*, 685. yields herself into the hands of *Masaniffa*, and is married to him, 690. boldly drinks off a cup of poison, sent her by him, 691
- SPAIN, by whom first peopled, 79. the figure of it likened to an ox-hide, 755. most of its provinces subjected to *Carthage*, 591. *Hannibal's* progress, 606. wars there between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, 635. the most powerful kingdom in the *West*, 817
- SPANIARDS, their pride in *America*, 98. plant in the eastern islands of *Manilia*, 285. three hundred smothered to death in *Guiana*, 479. their patient virtue in their *Indian Discoveries*, 575. fall from the *Carthaginians* to the *Romans*, 637. turn against the *Romans*, 756
- SPARTANS, their obstinancy in the first *Messenian* war, 353. enter into war with *Athens*, 419. are beaten at *Pylus*, and sue for peace, 420. reduce the *Athenians*, 428. join with them against the *Thebans*, 450
- SPENDIUS, a principal ring-leader of the *Carthaginian* mutineers, 579. takes the field against *Amilcar*, 589. subdued and crucified at *Tunis*, *ibid.*
- Sphere, the invention of it, by whom, 53. — and cylinder, the proportion between them, by whom found out, 664
- SPHINX, various accounts of her, 243
- SPHODRIAS, his foolish attempt upon the haven of *Athens*, 448
- Spirit of *God* moved upon the waters, how to be understood, 6. not to be searched curiously, *ibid.*
- Spirit of life, which *God* breathed into man, 19
- SPITAMENES revolts from *Alexander*, 422. murdered by his own wife, 483
- Spouts, what those fallings of water, in the *Indies*, 62
- Spring, perpetual, in the south of *America*, 34
- Springs, of hot and cold, bitter and sweet, water, where found, 218
- Stars, their influence, and operations, 11
- STRATO, king of *Sidon*, dethroned by *Alexander Macedon*, 205

I N D E X.

STROSSIE, *Peter*, lost at the *Azores*, by an ignorant bravery, 565
 STYX, *by the water of*, an inviolable oath, the meaning of it, 721
 Subjects, held as slaves, easily conquered, 516. examples of this in *Turky*, and *Persia*, *ibid.* 517.
 SUCCOTH, the feast of tabernacles instituted there, 222
 Sugar made by the sun, 194
 SULPICIUS, the Roman consul, invades *Macedon*, 723. forces *Antipatria*, 725. returns with his army to *Apollonia*, 727
 Sun, its original, 7. material substance, *ibid.* excellency and use, 8. motion and heat, 9. the miracle of its standing still, 184. going back, 184, 339. eclipses, 328, 329, 337
 SUPH, a region bordering the *Dead sea*, 172, 218. the ambiguity of the word, 286
 SURON, the same as *Huron*, or *Hiram*, v. *Hiram*.
 SUSA, in the province of *Elam*, the seat-royal of the kings of *Persia*, 97. taken by *Alexander*, 475. by *Molo*, 740
 SYPHAX enters into league with the *Romans*, 677. afterwards sides with the *Carthaginians*, 685. brings with him large forces to *Carthage*, 686. forms a very odd camp, 687. *Scipio* fires it, *ibid.* escapes back to his own kingdom, 689. fights a battel with *Lælius* and *Masanissa*, 690. taken and carried prisoner to *Cirta*, *ibid.* loses, and exclaims against *Sophonisba*, 690, 691. sent to *Rome*, 692. his death, 700
 SYRACUSE, where, and by whom founded, 357. *Cicero's* description and account of it, 550. taken by the *Romans*, 664
 SYRACUSIANS, their unfortunate expedition against *Ducetius*, king of the *Sicilians*, 552. war with the *Athenians*, 553. lock up the *Athenian* fleet in their haven, 554
 SYRIA described, 187. won by *Ptolemy Lagus*, 498
 SYRIANS, the history of them, 227. invade *Juda*, in the reign of *Joas*, 309

T

T^{Abnacles}, the feast of, whence, and where, instituted, 222
 TACCHI, kill themselves, and their children, to avoid captivity, 437
 TACITUS contradicts himself, 235
 TALARD, the lord of, justice done upon him, for guileful murder, 681
 TALBOT, *John*, viscount *Liste*, compared to *Æmilius Paulus*, 626
 TALUS, a man of brass, destroyed by *Medæa*, 244
 TAMBERLAIN, emperor of the *Parthians*, his trophy of victory, 228
 TANAI, whence it rises, 72
 Tanistry, the custom of, in *Ireland*, 164, 678
 TANTALUS, the fable of him, variously expounded, 238
 TARICHEA, a city near the sea of *Galilee*, taken from the *Jews*, first by *Cassius*, afterwards by *Vespasian*, 200
 TARQUINIUS, *Lucius*, slain by the sons of *Ancus Martius*, 531
 TARQUINIUS *Priscus* gets the kingdom of *Rome*, 366
 TARQUINIUS *Superbus* deposed, and the government of *Rome* given to consuls, 532
 TELASSAR, a strong city, inhabited by the *Edenites*, situate in an island of the *Euphrates*, 31
 TELUTIAS surprises the *Athenian* navy at *Piræus*, 447
 TEMPE, in *Thessaly*, described, 796, 800. abandoned by *Perseus* in a cowardly manner, 800. entered into, with extreme difficulty, by *Q. Martius*, the Roman consul, *ibid.*
 Temple of *Solomon*, an account of its building, 284
 Ten tribes of *Israel*, their kings, 210, 212. captivity, 211. idolatry, 289. the causes of their defection from the house of *David*, 293
 TENERIFFE, in the *Canaries*, the highest mountain in the world, 72
 TERENCE *Varro*, made *Plbeian* consul by detaching from the nobles, 619, 620. prepares for battel with *Hannibal*, 620. put to flight by *Asdrubal*, 623. writes to the Roman senate, 627. deludes the *Campanian* ambassadors, 628. called home, 629
 TEREUS, his rape of *Philomela*, 237
 TERIBAZUS, governor of *Armenia*, seeking to entrap the *Greeks* there, shamefully beaten, 437

Testament, old, the law of it defined, 157. old and new, the difference and agreement between them, 159
 Tetrarchy and a toparchy, the difference between them, 202
 TEUTA, queen of the *Illyrians*, causes one of the *Roman* ambassadors to be slain, 601. the *Romans* take away most part of her kingdom, and make her pay tribute for the rest, 602
 TEUTONICI, an order of *Dutch* knights, 193
 THALESTRIS, her visit and lustful suit to *Alexander*, suspected as a forged tale, 478
 THARSIS, often used, in scripture, for the ocean, and why, 85, 285
 THARSUS, the metropolis of *Cilicia*, by whom founded, 85. *St. Paul* born there, *ibid.*
 THEBAN war, the most ancient ever wrote of by any *Greek* historian or poet, 247
 THEBANS raise great commotions in *Greece*, 445. send ambassadors to the *Athenians*, *ibid.* join with them against *Sparta*, and get a victory at *Leuctra*, 449. invade and spoil *Peloponnesus*, 450. grow great, 449, 451. their ingratitude to *Cassander*, 513
 THEBES surprised by the *Lacedemonians*, and recovered, 448. destroyed by *Alexander*, 464. rebuilt by *Cassander*, 505.
 THEMISTOCLES gets his first reputation at the battel of *Marathon*, 403. his contrivance to alienate the *Ionians* from the *Persians*, 406. gets the most glory at the battel of *Salamis*, 409. pretends friendship to *Xerxes*, *ibid.* banished, and flies to *Artaxerxes*, 415. poisons himself, 416
 THEOCLES, the first discoverer of *Sicily* to the *Greeks*, 550
 Theology, what it teaches, 182
 THEORIE, *Athenian* ambassadors, so called, 521
 THERAMINES, one of the thirty tyrants of *Athens*, compelled by his fellows to drink poison, 430
 THERMOPYLÆ, the battel at, 405
 THESEUS, his birth, famous acts, and amours, 246
 THIMBRO sent by the *Lacedemonians* with forces to assist the *Ionians*, against the *Persians*, 441. slain by *Struthas*, 447.
 THRACIANS, from whom descended, 83
 THRASYBULUS delivers *Athens* from the thirty tyrants, 430. takes part with the *Thebans*, 445. reduces the isle of *Lefbos* to the *Athenians*, 446. slain at *Aspendus*, 447
 THRASYBULUS, tyrant of *Syracuse*, banished by the citizens, 552
 THRASYMENE, the battel at, between the *Carthaginians* and the *Romans*, 615
 THULIS, an *Egyptian* king, his consultation with the devil, 345
 THUORIS, the last of the *Larthes*, supposed to be *Proteus*, 345
 TIBER, the river, whence its name, 296, 334
 TIBERIUS, forbids human sacrifices, 248. *Cæsar*, his vain curiosity, 382
 TICINUM, the battel at, between *Hannibal* and *Scipio*, 611
 TIDAL, king of the nations, his kingdoms, 131
 TIGRIS, a river of *Eden*, 32, &c. overflowed *Nineveh*, 319
 TIMOLEON sent by the *Corinthians* to deliver *Syracuse* from tyranny, 559. surprises and defeats *Ictes's* army, *ibid.* sends *Dionysius* the younger to *Corinth*, *ibid.* gets many more victories, slays many tyrants, and lives in great honour among the *Syracusians*, till his death, 560
 TIRAS, youngest son of *Japhet*, father of the *Thracians*, 83
 TIRIDATES, one of *Darius's* false-hearted grandees, offers *Persopolis* to *Alexander the Great*, 476
 TISSAPHERNES, corrupted by *Alcibiades*, 426. his perfidious dealing with *Cyrus*, 431. generally hated, 432. betrays all the captains of the *Greeks*, 435. burns the country about them, 436. his cowardice, 442. his camp taken and plundered of great riches by *Agésilas*, king of *Sparta*, 444. put to death by the order of his own king, *Artaxerxes*, *ibid.*
 TITHRAUSTES, his wife course against the *Greeks*, 445
 TITYUS, the story of him, 239
 TOHU oppressed by *Hadadadzer*, and delivered by *David*, 274. his rich presents to *David*, 275
 TOMYRIS, queen of *Scythia*, her true name *Spartiba*, 392
 Tongue, the civil war of, in the *Roman* pleadings, when it began, 777

I N D E X.

TORNIELLUS, his device to prove the book of *Judith* canonical, 356
Torture, that kind of judicial proceeding condemned, 481
Towns, removcable at pleasure, 398
TRADISON, a colony of the *Greeks*, where situate, 437
Treasure, the burying it with the dead, an ancient custom, 281
TREBIA, the battel at, between *Hannibal* and the *Romans*, 612
Trees of life, and of knowledge, material trees, 40, 42. tree of life, the *Hebrews* construction of it, 40. of knowledge, explained, 42
Trees, red, growing under water, 147
Triarii, a part of the *Roman* army, what their duty, 567
Tribunes, military, governors of *Rome*, instead of consuls, 534
Tribute denied, causes *Sennacherib* to make war on *Ezechias*, 338
TRIPTOLEMUS his galley, fictions of the poets upon the make and speed of it, 236
TROJANS, by whom assisted against the *Greeks*, 258, 259
TROY, by whom built, 253. rebuilt, 246. kings of, the history and genealogy of them, 253, 255. the city besieged, 258. taken, 259
Tselm, the signification of it, 16
TULLIA, her barbarity to her father's dead corpse, 532
TULLUS Hostilius, third king of the *Romans*, 357. burnt by lightning, 531
TUNIS taken from the *Carthaginians* by the *Romans*, 568. recovered by *Amilcar Barcas*, 589. taken from the *Turks* by *Charles V.* 568
TURIN forced by *Hannibal*, 611. whence called *Augusta Taurinorum*, *ibid.*
TURKS, their heavy tithes upon husbandmen, 545
TYDEUS, his quarrel with *Polynices*, and the issue of it, 247
TYPHON, his perfidious villainy, 203
Tyranny properly defined, 580. ingrafted by nature in mankind, 584, 585. a vice distinct from others, 584. the true name of it, *ibid.* of a city over her subjects, worse than the tyranny of one man, 581. both mult use mercenary soldiers, 580, 581
TYRUS, by whom founded, 190, 204. kings of, 205. a brief history of it, 190, 191. besieged by the *Chaldeans*, 367, 368. taken by *Alexander*, 470
TYRIANS, a mistake concerning their descent, rectified, 207
TYRRHENUS first brought vines into *France*, 71
TYRTÆUS, an *Athenian* poet, sent by an oracle to direct the *Lacedemonians*, against the *Messenians*, and raises their courage with his verses, 353

V

V *Apabond*, how to be understood, 43
Valour, without discretion, the inconvenience of it, 588, 589. scorns to hunt after opinion, 681
VAPHRES, king of *Egypt*, father-in-law to *Solomon*, 137, 282, 285, 288, 345
VASCO de Gama, discovers the *Cape*, now called, of *Good Hope*, 559
VENETIANS probably descended from the *Trojans*, 260. war with the *Genoese*, 569
VERMINA, son of *Syphax*, courts the *Romans* to call him king, and is refused, 691, 728. brings an army to aid the *Carthaginians*, after they were vanquished, 699. beaten by the *Romans*, *ibid.* peace between them, 728
Vice, heroick, by whom devised, 238
VLTONES, a nation in *Portugal*, their battel with the *Carthaginians*, 591
VIATORIS and *Sejffris* the same person, 109, 137
Vines first planted by *Noah*, 63. where the best, 73, 214
VIRGIL a flatterer, 76. his opinion concerning the original of the *Trojans*, 253
Virtue, unfortunate, contemned, 422. what is justly termed heroick, 585
UMBRI, not inhabitants of *Italy* before the flood, 60. why so called, and from whom descended, 69
Unchastity strangely punished, 340
United provinces, from what their present riches and strength chiefly grew, 650
VOUGA, where it rises, 72
Vols and *Civitas* distinguished, 103

URIAH slain by *David's* means, 274, 275. his death considered with *Solomon's* murder of his elder brother, 264
Urim and *Thummim* of the *Jewish* high-priests, what, 265
UTICA, its situation, antiquity, &c. 586. besieged by the *Carthaginian* mercenaries, *ibid.* by *Scipio*, without success, 686, &c.
VULCAN, whence the name, 236
UZ, the country of *Job*, how bounded, 98
UZZIA, king of *Juda*, his prosperity, 319, 320. invades the priest's office, and is smitten with leprosy, 321. his death, *ibid.* prophets contemporary with him, 322

W

W *Ant* of money finds many blind excuses, 630
War, the calamities of it, in some cases, rather enable than weaken kingdoms, 650
Warriors unprosperous, and why, 782
Water miraculously supplied to the *Israelites* in the wilderness, 170
Waters, why named by *Moses* in the third place, 5. above the firmament, what they are, 9
Well of living waters, a spring that driveth six great mills, in the length of a bow-shot, 193
Wheat, growing of it self, where, 549
Wicked Street, in *Rome*, whence its name, 532
WILLIAM of *Tyre*, an ancient account of him, 343. his report of the *Egyptian* caliph, 341, 342
Wines, where the best, 39, 190, 228
Wintering-houses under ground, 437
Wisdom, God's gift to *Solomon*, 284. taught by necessity, an example of it in *Philip II.* of *Spain* his dealing with the duke of *Alva*, 671
Wife at home, and foolish abroad, 314
Wise men, which worshipped *CHRIST*, whence they came, 94
Wife of men not without their vanities, 307
Witches, their *Pegasus*, 118. how they differ from necromancers, 119
Woman given to man for a comforter and companion, not for a counsellor, 42
WOMAN-COW, *St. Jerome's* story, 383
Women make *Solomon* an idolater, 288
Wooden horse, at the taking of *Troy*, the story of it improbable, 259
World, the plantation of it, after the flood, 101
Worldly men, their nature, 266. — prosperity, trust therein, how vain, 300, 301
Writ of right, what, 678
Wrongs that are insolent, are most grievous, 581

X

X *ANTIPPUS*, a *Spartan*, made general of the *African* forces, obtains a victory over the *Romans*, and takes *Attinus*, their consul, prisoner, 568, 569
XENOETAS sent by *Antiochus* with forces to suppress *Molo*, 740. his politick passage over *Tigris*, *ibid.* loses the advantage of it by his own folly, and is slain, *ibid.*
XENOPHANES, ambassador of *Philip*, king of *Macedon*, his league with *Hannibal*, 715
XENOPHON, a good observation of his, 434. his wife answer to the ambassadors of *Tissaphernes*, 436. raises the courage of the *Greeks*, and conducts them through great difficulties, *ibid.* defeats *Teribaxus* at the river *Teleboas*, 437. his resolute answer to the ambassadors of *Sinope*, and the effect of it, 438. quiets a dissension in the army, and is offered to be made sole commander of it, but refuses, 439. rescues part of it from the *Barbarians*, 440. his speech to his soldiers, *ibid.* ransacks *Bithynia*, 441
XERXES, his preparations against *Greece*, 403. barbarous ingratitude to *Pythius*, 404. cuts off mount *Atbos* from the continent, and makes a bridge of boats over the *Hellepont*, *ibid.* weeps, and why, *ibid.* the muller of his prodigious army at *Sardis*, 405. and great slaughter of it by a handful of men at *Thermopylae*, 405, 406. attempts to spoil *Apollo's* temple at *Delphi*, and takes *Athens*, 406, 407. refuses the good counsel of *Artemisia*, and follows worse, 408. defeated at *Salamis*, *ibid.* his shameful flight, 409. one part of his army vanquished at *Plutar*, 411. another

I N D E X.

at *Mysale*, *ibid.* his barbarous qualities, 412. fortunate against the *Egyptians*, but not against the *Greeks*, 413. makes a dishonourable peace with the *Greeks*, 415. his death by the treason of *Artabanus*, his uncle, *ibid.*
 XERXES II. a vicious prince, his very short reign, 429

Y

YEAR, *Hebrew*, the form of it, 144. *Julian*, corrected by pope Gregory XIII. 145
 Years, solar and lunar, how reconciled, 144
 YNCA's, or kings, in *Peru*, their baths, 218
 Yvo, bishop of *Chartres*, his complaint against duels, 679

Z

ZABULON, the tribe of, where settled, 199
 ZACHARIA, the prophet, murdered by *Joas*, 310
 ZACHARIA, king of *Juda*, his short reign, slain by *Sallum*, 320, 321

ZALBUCHUS, his mild laws, 366. a singular example of justice, when his own son had committed adultery, *ibid.*
 ZANZUMMIMS, giants so called, 49, 173
 ZARA, king of the *Arabians*, his army, of a million of fighting men, beaten by *Asa*, 216
 ZEDEKIAS, that name, and the kingdom of *Juda*, given him by *Nabuchodonosor*, 368. revolts from *Nabuchodonosor*, who besieges and takes *Jerusalem*, 369. flies and hides himself under ground, *ibid.* his eyes torn out, sent to *Babylon*, and imprisoned for life, 193, 370
 ZIMRI, murders his master *Elah* king of *Israel*, and reigns for seven days; is besieged in *Tirzah*, and burns himself with his palace, 292
 ZIOBERIS, a great river in *Parthia*, its course into the *Caspian* sea, 477
 ZIPINGARI. See *Japan*.
 ZOPYRUS, his marvellous love to *Darius*, 397
 ZOROASTER, king of the *Bastrians*, not *Cham*, nor the inventor of astrology, or of magick, 113. divers great magicians of that name, 113, 114
 ZUTPHEN, how taken by prince *Maurice* of *Nassau*, 570

F I N I S.

